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2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › NB---DIPLOMATIC CREDIBILITY › Link---AT CP Drains DoS Resources

Diplomatic resources are not zero-sum

Blackwill and Fontaine 22, senior fellow at the Council of Foreign Relations, **Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security (Robert and Richard, “Ukraine War Should Slow But Not Stop the U.S. Pivot to Asia,” Bloomberg,

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has upended this approach. Now Washington must deal with revisionist great powers in two regions, while the Middle East also continues to demand attention. The U.S. should continue a long-term shift to Asia, but in a way that better balances resources and engagements across the three strategic theaters. Paradoxically, Putin’s aggression demonstrates how this should be done. First, policy makers should absorb the enduring strategic logic behind a pivot to Asia. China combines the greatest capability and will to upend the international order. The Indo-Pacific represents the primary, but not the only, regional theater in which U.S.-China competition takes place. But a sustainable pivot to Asia is possible only in the absence of serious national security crises in Europe and the Middle East. No U.S. president will ignore a Russian-induced emergency in Europe, a major terrorist threat, or a nuclear and/or hegemonic Iran. America remains a global and not a regional power. The central challenge is allocating national security resources across all three regions, without either weakening vital U.S. national interests in one or imagining that America can do everything, everywhere. That problem is most acute in the military sphere. An increase in defense spending will be required, but how that money is spent is equally important. In the Middle East, for example, regular troops should relieve the burden placed on elite special operations forces in security cooperation missions. Washington should move expensive military equipment — like F-35 and F-22 aircraft — to the two arenas of great-power competition, employing less-capable aircraft, including unmanned systems, for counterterrorism missions. A combination of regional diplomacy and continued deterrence could limit Iran's regional ambitions, freeing up some of the forces that have deployed to the Middle East in recent years to deter a potential Iran threat. In Europe, the U.S. should build on its allies’ newfound willingness to enhance their military capabilities and deter further Russian aggression. This should involve moving American troops currently stationed in Europe further east, to countries such as Poland, Romania and the Baltics. Washington should also capitalize on the recent increase in intelligence sharing – including to NATO non-members – by eliminating barriers to sharing defense technology with allies newly willing to invest. For the Indo-Pacific, Washington should reserve the lion's share of military resources that matter most, including smaller naval surface ships, long-range missiles and next-generation fighter aircraft. Building on efforts like the Aukus security arrangement with Australia and the U.K. would give regional allies more leverage to strengthen their own defense, helping them better deter China and serve as the frontline in daily competition with it. Diplomatic resources are less zero-sum than military power, and economic engagement less still. Intense diplomatic work in Europe and the Middle East could bolster the coalitions in each that are willing and able to deal with threats there, and potentially reduce some of the threats themselves. Washington should couple this with an affirmative economic agenda, beginning with re-entry to or renegotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › NB---DIPLOMATIC CREDIBILITY › Link---AI

State Department leadership on AI is key to diplomatic credibility across-the-board

Dukeman 20, senior fellow at FP21 and a Ph.D. student at Princeton University, where he researches institutional reform in U.S. foreign policy agencies. He previously helped found the U.S. State Department’s Center for Analytics (Ryan, “WINNING THE AI REVOLUTION FOR AMERICAN DIPLOMACY,” War on the Rocks,

No such transformation is possible without congressional resourcing and executive sponsorship in the State Department. With some changes and investments, the State Department is well positioned to promulgate a democratic digital agenda that is aligned with American values, and to use investments in AI to transform its diplomatic and foreign policymaking functions. When discussing AI and innovation in government, it is common to fetishize technology and insist on its centrality to transformation. However, technological innovations should come with accompanying culture change, and leaders across the department should define and communicate the value of these innovations to the mission of diplomacy. Skepticism towards technology is as old as the diplomatic profession itself: Upon receiving his first telegraph message in the 1860s, British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, for example, exclaimed, “My God, this is the end of diplomacy!” Yet when used properly, AI can empower (rather than replace) career diplomacy like never before, putting civilian foreign policymakers back into the driver’s seat at home and overseas through leadership on a major “gray rhino” security threat and improved decision-making.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › NB---DIPLOMATIC CREDIBILITY › Link

Bleeding responsibilities to the DoD weakens State Department credibility

Withers 8, WOLA Senior Fellow focused on human rights in Latin America, et al (George, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy,” WOLA,

These changes are not just theoretical. In December 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted the increasing role of U.S. defense agencies in leading foreign policy on the ground, and issued a stern warning in a document entitled Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign (S. Prt. 109-52): It has traditionally been the military’s mission to take direct action against U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies’ mission has been to pursue non-coercive measures through diplomacy, international information programming, and foreign and economic assistance. As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on war fighting. Policy Recommendations 1. The next administration should reassert the State Department’s control over foreign military training and assistance programs in its communication with the Congress, in interagency discussions and, most importantly, in the budget it presents for the State and Defense Departments.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › NB---DIPLOMATIC CREDIBILITY › Link

The plan militarizes diplomacy. That empowers the DoD and sidelines diplomats.

Early 11, Lt Col, USAF (Billy, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” Air War College, )//BB

Militarization occurs when a state relies on the military to pursue national security objectives better achieved by other means.3 The DOD is criticized as having militarized US foreign policy through its new authority to build the capacity for foreign military forces to counter terrorism and support US military and stability operations. The controversy stems from the direct funding and authority now given to DOD, not the State Department which is responsible for US foreign assistance programs. The continuation of this authority, going on its sixth year and already costing more than $1.2 billion, shifts responsibility away from the State Department. Secretary of Defense Gates even warns of a “creeping militarization” of some aspects of American’s foreign policy when discussing the US military’s increased involvement in activities previously done by civilian agencies, and cautions against an overreliance on military combat operations.4 DOD involvement in foreign policy may undermine US foreign policy objectives. A shift in the core functions away from the State Department may have undesirable effects for several reasons. First, it may weaken the State Department’s role in implementing foreign policy. The State Department advances US interests in foreign countries and its authority may be weakened if DOD is also making decisions that impact US foreign policy. Second, it may weaken congressional oversight, particularly human rights protections, a large concern in many developing countries around the world. Congress authorizes and funds State Department-managed military assistance programs. State Department support that goes through the regular foreign assistance budget process is subject to conditions and closely scrutinized. In contrast, support that goes through the defense budget may receive far less review by foreign oversight committees. Third, it gives the Pentagon a greater diplomatic role and significant autonomy over support to foreign military forces, which has the potential to cause stronger military-to-military ties with a country than existing diplomatic ties.5 These effects may harm US foreign policy objectives. However, DOD involvement in US foreign assistance efforts is not without precedence.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT DA Links to CP

The plan creates the perception of the US as a military-focused hegemon, the counterplan promotes a more peaceful diplomatic-focused perception

Withers 8, WOLA Senior Fellow focused on human rights in Latin America, et al (George, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy,” WOLA, )//BB

Why, one might ask, shouldn’t the military budget be the source of U.S. military aid overseas? The short answer is that equipping and training the world’s armies is a major foreign policy decision. For example, The choice to train and equip foreign militaries is perceived as a U.S. endorsement of those militaries. The relative balance of economic and military aid to a country affects perceptions about how the United States chooses to project its power. Strengthening a military can affect the balance of power within a geographic region, and within a country. The association of the United States with a particular military, especially one engaged in human rights violations, affects the image of our country. Instead of the regional and diplomatic considerations which concern the State Department, the Defense Department’s assigned mission requires it to adopt a military focus on potential national security threats. Military training and aid decisions, as a significant part of foreign policy, should be governed by the agency in charge of foreign policy and diplomacy—the State Department. And they should be overseen by the congressional committees whose jurisdiction is foreign affairs.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT DA Links to CP

Even if the counterplan seems like a minor distinction, it has a crucial bearing on how assistance is executed and perceived

Withers 8, WOLA Senior Fellow focused on human rights in Latin America, et al (George, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy,” WOLA,

Why Does It Matter Whether Defense or State Controls Military Aid Programs?

The question of whether military aid and training programs should be funded by the Defense Department or the State Department may seem, at first glance, to be a subject more suited to civics textbooks than public debate. Yet the outcome of this debate will have a crucial bearing on how U.S. power is exercised and projected around the world. Let’s take a look at some examples from Latin America. n In 2006-2007, the congressional foreign operations subcommittees, which govern only State Department-funded military aid, learned about killings of civilians and other human rights violations by the Colombian army, which receives a annual military aid package. Responding to the subcommittees’ concerns, which invoked conditions in the foreign aid law, the State Department was forced to withhold temporarily $110 million worth of aid and training. More importantly, the State Department had to ask the Colombian government to take steps to curb killings of civilians by the army and to increase so-far glacial progress in investigating and prosecuting members of the armed forces credibly alleged to have committed crimes such as torture, murder, or collaborating with brutal illegal paramilitary forces. Only 25% of State Department- funded aid was subject to these conditions, so the overall aid program was not strongly affected, but human rights concerns played a more prominent role in the U.S.-Colombian government dialogue. On the other hand, all military aid through the Defense Department continued to flow during this time period, and no visible sign of any concern about human rights abuses emerged from the Armed Services Committees or Defense Appropriations subcommittees, which govern the aid flowing through the Defense Department. Had most military aid and training flowed through the defense bill, the U.S. government’s voice on human rights would have dropped to a whisper.4

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT DA Links to CP

The agent matters. Inclusion of DoD-led assistance creates incoherent solutions and undermines State-led diplomatic efforts

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, *senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)

The current security assistance system contributes to the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Militarizing foreign policy entails the increasing use of the military to solve foreign policy challenges and results in a bloated DOD budget with more resources and authority. Researchers describe it as a phenomenon whereby “the military more and more becomes the primary actor and face of U.S. policy abroad,” leading to a cycle in which the DOD requires and receives significantly more resources than any other foreign policy agency and is thus increasingly relied on to solve U.S. foreign policy problems.62 There are several elements of a militarized foreign policy in today’s security assistance system, but primarily, the DOD’s control of significantly more security assistance resources puts the Pentagon—rather than diplomats—in the driver’s seat in policymaking. The Pentagon’s significant resources also distort the face of U.S. security assistance on the ground. Gordon Adams, a former White House budget official, warned, “Who owns the ball matters here because it colors the way the U.S. engages overseas. If American engagement wears a uniform … that’s one form of interaction. If it involves the ambassador and the [U.S. Agency for International Development] and people doing governance work, it’s a different set of missions and there’s a hugely different perception.”63 Recipient countries can utilize this to their advantage; foreign officials may more eagerly seek to follow through or make progress on DOD requests or priorities, such as going through with a significant military exercise or a ship visit, while ignoring or slow-rolling State Department requests or priorities, such as releasing a dissident or altering an economic regulation. And if the interlocutor that matters in relations with the United States is the military, the subject that matters is defense. The Pentagon’s priorities can therefore end up carrying more importance with partners than the State Department’s broader foreign policy concerns, making combatant commands more powerful than any diplomat. When the State Department is deprived of resources, or cut out of the decision-making process entirely, diplomats cannot effectively weigh in on whether a proposed sale or package makes sense given a range of other nonmilitary concerns that may exist in a bilateral relationship. In short, money is power, and the DOD has the money. The net effect is that U.S. foreign policy is less coherent, with Pentagon policy more likely to be out of sync with broader foreign policy concerns. For example, the DOD’s U.S. Africa Command posture review is being conducted with little to no coordination with the State Department, and the rumored outcome is to call for reduced U.S. presence and security investments in order to free up DOD resources to focus on competition with Russia and China.64 Yet the United States still has serious security and geopolitical interests in the continent that are likely not reflected in traditional military-only decision-making. Rachel Stohl, managing director at the Stimson Center, warned that developing military-to-military security assistance programs is “an important relationship, one that should be cultivated, but it is not separate from the diplomatic and foreign policy relationships that have to be developed and take time. If you lose the foreign policy piece and just focus on the security piece, you’re doing a disservice to the larger strategic objectives.”65 The siloed security assistance system leads to disjointed U.S. foreign policy, divorces security concerns from broader economic or diplomatic concerns, and can end up promoting militarized solutions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT DoD Tradeoff Links to CP

Security Cooperation is exclusively funded by the Department of Defense, and Security Assistance is exclusively Department of State funding.

White 14, Major, USMC, a Joint Doctrine Development Officer with the Joint Staff J7 (Taylor, “Security Cooperation How It All Fits” Joint Forces Quarterly, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-72/jfq-72_106-108_White.pdf?ver=2014-03-13-152407-220)

Department of Defense (DOD) security cooperation activities support or are combined with other assistance programs and often are a part of nation assistance. This often occurs in a manner that may appear confusing or convoluted to the joint warfighter. This article portrays how the programs and activities converge. Although the various terms and activities in show in the accompanying figure appear to have simple names and meanings, they in fact have strict definitions based on funding and authorities. While some of the activities directly support one another, others have distinct boundaries between their definitions and functions. The joint community is beginning to address the framework of security cooperation in a new joint doctrine publication, Joint Publication (JP) 3-XX, Security Cooperation. It is important to embark with clear definitions and understanding of the complex relationship among these terms to facilitate understanding by the joint force.

Security cooperation is referred to in both joint professional military education programs and joint staffs as a tool to be employed by combatant commands. However, in other settings, it is a set of programs managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Extensive review of joint doctrine and policy reveals that the definition of security cooperation appears to encompass these areas and more. After expanding our understanding of security cooperation, other terms such as security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and security assistance provide additional specificity for the tasks being conducted, yet some of these actions fall outside security cooperation. Even though security cooperation spans the range of military operations and is inclusive of large-scale operations conducted in support of foreign nations, it is not all-encompassing of security related support from U.S. agencies other than DOD.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDB---Doesn’t Solve Diplomatic Credibility

Even if both policies are equally resourced, the Department of State will be pushed into the supporting role

Oakley 19, Army strategist and currently serves as an assistant professor at National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (David, “THE PROBLEMS OF A MILITARIZED FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICA’S PREMIER INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,” War on the Rocks, )//BB

Neither is Stavridis the first retired military leader to voice this concern. In 2013, future secretary of defense James Mattis, then a Marine Corps general, famously quipped, “if you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.” In 2012, Karl Eikenberry, a retired lieutenant general and former ambassador to Afghanistan, argued that the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and an unequal investment in the Defense Department over other departments resulted in the military becoming the “starting and relief pitcher for a number of foreign policy problems.” In a speech at Kansas State University in 2010, Michael Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, articulated his concern with the Defense Department’s increasing role in foreign policy: “My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren’t moving fast enough in this regard. U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our major overseas commands. It’s one thing to be able and willing to serve as emergency responders; quite another to always have to be the fire chief.” In an earlier interview, Mullen described a vicious cycle of policymakers turning to the military and increasing funding to the Defense Department because they have greater trust in military capability than in other agencies, and this greater funding in turn makes the military even more capable relative to other national security institutions. Instead of correcting a significant imbalance in resourcing national security capabilities, policymakers just turn to the military to handle an increasing array of missions. The military then becomes the lead while other organizations find themselves in supporting roles.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDB---Doesn’t Solve Diplomatic Credibility

The State Department needs primacy to effectively establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries

Withers 8, WOLA Senior Fellow focused on human rights in Latin America, et al (George, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy,” WOLA,

These changes are not just theoretical. In December 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted the increasing role of U.S. defense agencies in leading foreign policy on the ground, and issued a stern warning in a document entitled Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign (S. Prt. 109-52): It has traditionally been the military’s mission to take direct action against U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies’ mission has been to pursue non-coercive measures through diplomacy, international information programming, and foreign and economic assistance. As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on war fighting.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDB---Doesn’t Solve Diplomatic Credibility

The link is linear. Every funding decision matters.

Ryan 16, writes about diplomacy, national security and the State Department for The Washington Post. She joined The Post in 2014 to write about the Pentagon and military issues (Missy, “State Department and Pentagon tussle over control of foreign military aid,” Washington Post,

State Department officials fear that an expansion in Pentagon control over security assistance would impair diplomatic efforts and move the United States further from the Obama administration’s goal of getting the military out of foreign aid. Diplomats also say that military-led programs, without adequate input from the State Department, can overlook key human rights or governance concerns and heighten tensions with nations such as China and Russia, because foreign governments see assistance delivered by the U.S. military, rather than civilian agencies, as a potential threat. “We’ve got to balance the various components of our foreign policy,” said a senior State Department official who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. “The more money and more authority you move out of traditional accounts we have used for decades to work with our partners, the more you lose the ability to balance.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDB---Doesn’t Solve Diplomatic Credibility

Diplomacy has to be the tool of first-resort to restore US diplomatic leadership

Burns 19, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of The Back Channel: A Memoir of American Diplomacy and the Case for Its Renewal (Random House, 2019), from which portions of this essay are adapted. He was a career diplomat in the U.S. State Department for 33 years, serving as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State from 2011 to 2014 (William, “The Lost Art of American Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs,

Diplomacy may be one of the world’s oldest professions, but it’s also one of the most misunderstood. It’s mostly a quiet endeavor, less swaggering than unrelenting, oftentimes operating in back channels, out of sight and out of mind. U.S. President Donald Trump’s disdain for professional diplomacy and its practitioners—along with his penchant for improvisational flirtations with authoritarian leaders such as North Korea’s Kim Jong Un—has put an unaccustomed spotlight on the profession. It has also underscored the significance of its renewal. The neglect and distortion of American diplomacy is not a purely Trumpian invention. It has been an episodic feature of the United States’ approach to the world since the end of the Cold War. The Trump administration, however, has made the problem infinitely worse. There is never a good time for diplomatic malpractice, but the administration’s unilateral diplomatic disarmament is spectacularly mistimed, unfolding precisely at a moment when American diplomacy matters more than ever to American interests. The United States is no longer the only big kid on the geopolitical block, and no longer able get everything it wants on its own, or by force alone. Although the era of singular U.S. dominance on the world stage is over, the United States still has a better hand to play than any of its rivals. The country has a window of opportunity to lock in its role as the world’s pivotal power, the one best placed to shape a changing international landscape before others shape it first. If the United States is to seize that opportunity and safeguard its interests and values, it will have to rebuild American diplomacy and make it the tool of first resort, backed up by economic and military leverage and the power of example.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDB---Doesn’t Solve Diplomatic Credibility

The permutation undermines State Department credibility. Collapses liberalism.

Munson 13, senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer (Peter, “THE LIMITS OF SECURITY COOPERATION,” War on the Rocks,

U.S. military SC [Security Cooperation] efforts may also complicate diplomacy. Generals whisk in on executive jets with large entourages and largesse in the form of SC funds and services. The result is that foreign officials see their military counterparts as congenial and influential partners in contrast to the U.S. ambassador—who comes with little in the way of other aid and is often seen as browbeating and meddling in sovereign affairs—whose role is to try to hold back the tide of illiberalism much to the chagrin of his or her counterparts.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDB---No Solvency

The perm leads to bifurcated and incoherent foreign policy, not coordination

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, *senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, )//BB

There are several challenges of this duplicative security assistance system at the DOD:

The DOD’s authorities duplicate authorities originally granted to the State Department. Congress originally granted long-term efforts to develop another country’s security forces to the State Department and put these efforts under the purview of diplomats. But in the post-9/11 security environment, rather than fix the State Department’s lack of resources to handle counterterrorism issues, appropriators gave the funds to the DOD, contributing to more bifurcation of security assistance policy. This was exemplified by the 2006 creation of Section 1206: a $350 million annual authority for the secretary of defense to support counterterrorism efforts and assist coalition partners. Though it required cooperation with the State Department, it was explicitly designed to empower the DOD, in part because some DOD officials thought the State Department was too slow and lacking expertise to carry out counterterrorism activities.37 In 2014, a Congressional Research Service report found that “government personnel state that Section 1206 has been used as a substitute for FMF, especially in the early years, given what many analysts believe is a shortage of FMF funds to meet legitimate foreign defense equipment needs.”38

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDB---No Solvency

The State Department needs full control of the policy in order to guarantee mission success

Gould 4-22-2022, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry, April 11, 2022 (“For America’s security aid programs, who will run the show?,” Defense News,

Max Bergmann, a former State Department official who authored security assistance reform recommendations last year, said efforts to shift greater authority to the State Department will succeed only if the White House prioritizes them. In a high-stakes competition with China, the U.S. can’t afford for parallel security-assistance bureaucracies to undermine statecraft, he said. “What is critical is that we have full control over that lever, and not have it be a bureaucratic mess where one hand doesn’t know what the other is doing and it’s difficult for any senior policymaker in the White House to know what the hell’s going on,” said Bergmann, now a senior fellow at Center for American Progress. Meanwhile, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on both sides of the aisle are generally supportive of shifts, arguing for an overhaul of the current setup. “As the Defense Department continues efforts to cut the State Department out of security cooperation, we’ve seen a greater focus on short-term tactical capabilities than on sustainable forces aligned with strategic foreign policy,” Risch said. “We must address governance challenges like corruption in all our activities, and we need to professionalize our security assistance workforce.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDB---No Solvency

The permutation is two simultaneous and overlapping assistance programs. That dooms solvency for both. Duplication causes operational and planning conflicts that cause great power miscalculation

Bergmann 21, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, and Alexandra Schmitt, senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center, 2021 (Max, “It’s time to get the Pentagon out of the business of administering U.S. foreign aid,” Washington Post, )//BB

The result today is that the United States has two distinct security assistance systems — one at the State Department and one at the Defense Department — doing the same thing. That has created a bureaucratic mess involving countless planning and operational conflicts — one that also makes it impossible for Congress to conduct effective oversight, since the two departments answer to different committees. Recognizing the problem, some policymakers in Congress and the Pentagon have recently implemented a few useful reforms — but they go only so far. Today, when combatant commanders show up in the countries they’re assigned to, they frequently have security assistance funding at their disposal. But State Department officials of similar rank often lack comparably flexible funding and yet have to deliver tough messages on other U.S. foreign policy priorities, from human rights to economic reform, democratization or even climate policy. This power imbalance is not lost on foreign partners, and they act accordingly, often tuning out the State Department while cultivating their relations with the Defense Department. The current bifurcated system is not just wasteful — it’s also potentially dangerous. Policymakers originally expanded Defense Department assistance in response to the post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism, when security assistance was often seen as a technical tool to smooth collaboration with foreign militaries. But in a new era of global great power competition, the provision of arms to another country sends a loud foreign policy signal, one that can easily lead to miscalculation. Those assistance decisions need to be well coordinated and calibrated by diplomats, not generals.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDCP---Prefer Our Interp

Given that basically any activity is included, the only functional limit on the topic has to come at the agent-level

Mazarr 22, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously he worked at the U.S. National War College, where he was professor and associate dean of academics; as president of the Henry L. Stimson Center; senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; senior defense aide on Capitol Hill; and as a special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Michael, “Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition,” RAND, )

To pursue this analysis, we first had to define the bounds of what we would assess. Official U.S. government definitions of security cooperation are very broad. One definition from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency states that security cooperation

comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DoD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.3

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDCP---SC Requires DoD

Security Cooperation requires a military branch to be the implementing agency

Arnold 20, colonel in USAF (Jason, “Add Value to Security Cooperation through Joint Unification,” FAO Journal of International Affairs,

In the Security Cooperation Enterprise, the military departments loom large as the primary implementing agencies of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases, Building Partner Capacity (BPC) cases, and in training activities.[6] These SC programs provide our international partners with the capabilities they require both for their own security and to assist in regional security objectives that improve the overall global security situation. Most open SC cases have one of the military departments as an Implementing Agency (IA) and each service has built its own organizational structure, bureaucracy, and automated systems to support the effort.[7]

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDCP---SC Requires DoD

Even the broadest definitions requires the DoD

Williams 12, Lt Col in Army National Guard (James, “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Element of Smart Power,” )//BB

Similarly, the six Geographic Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) have underscored security cooperation and building partner capacity as essential to their respective Theater Strategy Plans and Country Campaign Plans in support of National Security objectives. In every COCOM posture statement the reader will find references 7 to the importance of the concepts of cooperation, engagement, and building partner capacity. “Security Cooperation” is defined broadly as interactions between the Department of Defense and foreign militaries that promote specific United States security interests; develop allied and friendly military capabilities; and provide the United States with both peacetime and contingency access to host nations.12 Typical security cooperation and engagement activities include military-to-military contact, coalition training, nation assistance and long term operations. These types of activities range from Navy ship port visits to combined training exercises, foreign military education, leader conferences, foreign military sales and counter-drug operations.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › COMPETITION › AT PDCP---SC Requires DoD

SC is done by the military encouraging and enabling other countries to work with the US

Mariano and O’Brien 9, *recently served as the Dean of the NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy, **received his M.A. in Security Policy Studies from the George Washington University's Elliott School (Stephen and Charles, “US Army Africa: Smart Power in Action,” Small Wars Journal, https://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/193-mariano.pdf)//BB

Security cooperation is defined as the means by which the Department of Defense encourages and enables countries to work with the United States. It includes official, cooperative and general non-combat interactions.4 Military organizations conduct security cooperation activities, as part of the range of military operations. These activities are intended to build institutional capacity within partner nation security structures so those nations can become self-sufficient, secure their populations, control their borders and contribute to regional peace. Security cooperation activities are also aimed at developing peacetime interoperability between US and partner forces so that in times of crisis, activities are executed effectively and efficiently. The US also conducts security cooperation to enhance relationships with partner nations and to gain dependable host nation support. Though sometimes misconstrued, routine military cooperation activities can evolve into relationships that help ensure the US can successfully assist regional partners in times of crisis. For example, US ability to position forces, equipment and supplies, or use ports, warehouses and airfields when planning and conducting crisis response operations could save time… and ultimately, lives.