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2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 2AC---SC---DOD › SC---Congressional Oversight (For Oversight DA)

Security cooperation necessitates Congressional oversight

Bolko J. Skorupski & Nina M. Serafino 16, research assistance & specialist in international security affairs, “DOD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues”, 08/23/2016, Congressional Research Service, /lg

Congress has several avenues of influence in the design, implementation, and oversight of U.S. security cooperation activities. Congress determines which activities and operations will be conducted, and it provides input on the selection of recipient countries, organizations, and groups. It defines the division of labor between DOD, the State Department, and other agencies, including specifying the modes of interagency collaboration. It determines the levels of assistance and appropriates funds. In addition, Congress sets conditions on how the funds may be used and, through its committees, oversees security cooperation activities by instituting reporting and assessment requirements.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 2AC---SC---DOD › SC---AT: Excludes Civilians

Security Cooperation includes the use of armed forces and civilian employees of the DoD

Army LT. General Charles Hooper 18, Director of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES HOLDS A DISCUSSION ON STRENGTHENING ALLIANCES AND PARTNERSHIPS THROUGH DEFENSE COOPERATION”, 03/16/2018, Political Transcript Wire /lg

Last year DSCA created a workforce development directorate to focus on these efforts and among the accomplishments, what we're -- what we're trying to do is determine the scope of the Security Cooperation Workforce, something we have never done before, create a DOD wide defense competency assessment tool and develop revised education and training curriculum and a competency-based certification program.

And all of this is relatively new. The first thing we did was identify DOD personnel performing duties related to security cooperation and believe it or not, we had never done that before. So, we initially considered the Security Cooperation Workforce to be around 10,000 people.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 2NC---SC---Extensions › 2NC---SC – Excludes States (for DoS CP)

Security cooperation activities are purely federal

Lawrence Kapp & Nina M. Serafino 11, Specialist in Military Manpower Policy & Specialist in International Security Affairs, “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress”, 08/15/2011, Congressional Research Service, /lg

A final area in which the SPP differs from active component security cooperation activities lies in the role of individual states in the relationship. Active component security cooperation activities are purely federal in nature; there is no connection with any U.S. state. SPP activities have both a federal and a state connection, and this latter relationship can be important from several perspectives. For the state and the foreign nation, the SPP provides a link between senior state and foreign nation officials. The adjutant general (the head of a state National Guard) is typically a senior official in his or her state government, normally heading up the state department of military affairs, and sometimes leading the state department of emergency management or homeland security.16 This can provide a conduit for the state and the foreign nation to develop relationships beyond that with the state National Guard—for example, enhancing economic ties or conducting educational exchanges. From the federal perspective, a strong relationship between a state and a foreign nation could potentially contribute to a stronger relationship between the United States and the foreign nation.17 On the other hand, conflicts of interest could conceivably develop between the state and the United States in their relationships with the partner nation.18

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 2NC---SC---Extensions › 2NC---SC – Excludes Hostilities

Security cooperation is a means to prevent armed conflicts, not to resolve them --- Afghanistan proves

Nathan L. Fenell 11, thesis for Master of Arts in International Studies, “Security Cooperation Poorly Defined”, 12/12/2011, The University of San Francisco, https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=thes

Currently a foreign policy that points to the doctrinal use of SC as the means of achieving U.S. foreign policy goals does not exist. A U.S. foreign policy that draws from defensive liberalism is an ideal way to shape the proper employment of a SC strategy. The National Security Strategy (NSS) is the first place where security cooperation emerges as a means to achieve security goals and the placement of SC in the NSS is appropriate; however, without a clear understanding of the definition of security cooperation, the DOD and DOS are improperly executing SC activities. The most visible SC strategy, executed improperly, is the PRT in Afghanistan.131 The use of SC as a means to achieve post reconstruction goals improperly aligns means and ends. SC is designed as a means to prevent armed conflict not as a means to resolve the conflict at the conclusion of hostilities.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 2NC---SC---Extensions › 2NC---SC – DoD

Security cooperation consists of DoD activities including training and exercises, foreign military sales and financing, officer exchange programs, educational opportunities, technical exchanges, and security force assistance.

Thomas K. Livingston 11, Air Force Fellow, “Building the Capacity of Partner States Through Security Force Assistance”, 05/05/2011, Congressional Research Service, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R41817.pdf /lg

Build the Security Capacity of Partner States: Since the United States assumed the role of a leading security provider after the end of World War II, DOD has worked actively to build the defense capacity of allied and partner states. Doing so has also given the U.S. Armed Forces opportunities to train with and learn from their counterparts. These efforts further the U.S. objective of securing a peaceful and cooperative international order. Security cooperation activities include bilateral and multilateral training and exercises, foreign military sales (FMS) and financing (FMF), officer exchange programs, educational opportunities at professional military schools, technical exchanges, and efforts to assist foreign security forces in building competency and capacity. In today's complex and interdependent security environment, these dimensions of the U.S. defense strategy have never been more important. U.S. forces, therefore, will continue to treat the building of partners' security capacity as an increasingly important mission. Within the range of security cooperation activities, the most dynamic in the coming years will be security force assistance (SFA) missions: "hands on" efforts, conducted primarily in host countries, to train, equip, advise, and assist those countries' forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories. In order to ensure that improvements in partner security forces are sustained, the Department must seek to enhance the capabilities and capacity of security institutions, such as defense ministries, that support fielded forces....246 [emphasis added]

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 2NC---SC---Extensions › 2NC---SC – DoD

Security cooperation must be administered by the DoD --- DSCA definition

Kathleen J. McInnis & Nathan J. Lucas 15, Analyst in International Security & Section Research Manager, “What Is ‘Building Partner Capacity?’ Issues for Congress”, 12/18/2015, Congressional Research Service, /lg

According to DSCA, security cooperation refers to those activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DOD-administered security assistance programs that (1) build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; (2) develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and (3) provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.15 Security cooperation is a core aspect of DOD's key planning processes, to include the Guidance for the Employment of the Force and Guidance for the Development of the Force.16

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 1NC---SC---Fighting Crimes

Security cooperation means fighting crimes and exchanging expertise on narcotics, human trafficking, unlawful trade trade, and arms

UAE Government News 13, “UAE, Algeria ink agreement defining security cooperation”, 03/12/2013 /lg

Abu Dhabi: The UAE on Monday inked an agreement with North African country Algeria to define security cooperation on fighting all kinds of crimes as well as exchanging expertise and information on narcotics, human trafficking and unlawful trade, specifically in arms and ammunition, state media WAM reported.

Deputy prime minister and interior minister of the UAE Sheikh Saif bin Zayed Al Nahyan and minister for interior and local governments of Algeria Dahou Ould Kablia signed the agreement in capital city Abu Dhabi.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 1NC---SC---Excludes NATO Exercises

Security cooperation is distinct from a NATO exercise --- incorrect terminology leads to decreased national security

Nathan L. Fenell 11, thesis for Master of Arts in International Studies, “Security Cooperation Poorly Defined”, 12/12/2011, The University of San Francisco, https://repository.usfca.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=thes

As a major in the Marine Corps, I planned and participated in a security cooperation exercise with Estonia. It was important to the United States European combatant commander and the commanding general Estonian Self Defense Force that communication with the media specifically addressed our operation as a security cooperation exercise. Eighteen countries participated in the exercise, to include the United States and Estonia, and sixteen other countries that are part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, this exercise, named BALTIC OPERATIONS, was not officially a NATO exercise.

This distinction between security cooperation exercise and NATO exercise may seem like nothing more than semantics. However a misunderstanding of the semantic nuances had potential negative strategic consequences. Estonia shares a border with Russia and former Soviet military forces occupied Estonia prior to the 1991 Singing Revolution. Diplomatic tensions between Estonia and Russia remain tense and Estonia is constantly defending its territorial waters in the Baltic Sea against Russian naval vessels. During the exercise a Russian frigate and a Russian submarine attempted to violate Estonia’s territorial water. In response, Estonia deployed a small portion of its Navy to block the Russian vessels and force a return to internationally recognized neutral waters shared by countries bordering the Baltic Sea. This level of international tension between Estonia and Russia is constant. If the participants of a security cooperation exercise were to describe the event as a NATO exercise, it would be interpreted by Russia as a signal that NATO forces, led by the United States, were rehearsing air, land, and sea strategies in the Baltic Sea that would support an amphibious assault against the Russian city of St. Petersburg. This instance and many others like it demonstrate that the improper use of military terminology can have unintended negative consequences.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 1NC---SC---Limiting Power

Security cooperation requires limiting a country’s freedoms and military power, especially in the context of NATO

Harald Müller 13, head of the Peace Studies Foundation of Hesse and Professor of International Relations at the University of Frankfurt who was the disarmament advisor to the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, “Chapter 24: Security Cooperation”, 01/10/2013, Handbook of International Relations, /lg

Security cooperation implies relying on other states for national survival, which is hard to reconcile with exclusive reliance on self-help. In addition, security cooperation limits the freedom to act and constrains one's ability to maximize military power. Arms control aims at reducing offensive, destabilizing options, and enhanced transparency may reduce the chances of achieving surprise. In wartime alliances, mutual dependency is high. As a state's existence is at stake in war, relying on someone else is an existential issue; strategic choices have to be closely coordinated, and freedom of action might be lost. Peacetime alliances can be more relaxed and may be little more than token promises that might be broken in the moment of truth. But they may as well entail intimate structural cooperation or integration. The degree of mutual knowledge, transparency, and dependence within NATO is inexplicable, seen from the perspective of potential future hostilities. NATO member states put much more on the line than participants in average arms control or nonproliferation agreements: Alliance cooperation presents a puzzle as well.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 1AR---Defensive Only › 1NC---SC---Arms + Exercises

Interpretation---security cooperation is arms transfers and military exercises.

Stephen Watts et al. 22, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation focused on strategic competition and deterrence, force posture, security sector assistance, irregular warfare and stabilization, and long-term conflict trends, xx/xx/2022, Deterrence and Escalation in Competition with Russia, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA720-1.html \\SYang

Activities: We capture U.S. security cooperation activities using two measures: arms transfers and multilateral military exercises. As with the measure of “competitive arms transfers,” our measure of arms imports from the United States comes from SIPRI data. The use of this measure is intended to capture not only the materiel transfer but the training and related activities that usually accompany U.S. arms transfers. These data run from 1950 to 2010 in our sample. Our data on multilateral military exercises come from a data set compiled by the political scientist Vito D’Orazio from an examination of major news sources between 1970 and 2010.12 Although the SIPRI data provide a measure of the scale of U.S. assistance, the data on military exercises only indicate whether an exercise took place and where; they do not include details on the scale or purpose

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 1AR---Defensive Only

Warsaw Summit proves – defense and deterrence include offensive operations

Tomas Minarik (JUDr in Penal law from Charles University Prague; Head of International Organisations and Law unit; “NATO Recognises Cyberspace as a ‘Domain of Operations’ at Warsaw Summit”; NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Exellence ) //LVL

Second, the use of the word ‘deterrence’ in connection with cyberspace is significant, because it is another step towards the acceptance of offensive cyber capabilities as part of collective defence. However, linking deterrence to cyber defence is difficult. The line of argument is simple: how can you achieve deterrence when your adversaries are not afraid of you, because they do not know what offensive capabilities you have and when and how you would use them? Others view the term more broadly, and they are willing to admit that there exists something like ‘deterrence by denial’. The extension of deterrence to the cyber realm should be considered by NATO, but it relies primarily on the will of nations. Third, the idea of moving towards recognition of offensive cyber capabilities is supported by the statement that cyber defence will be integrated into operational planning and NATO’s operations and missions. As NCIA is already responsible for protecting NATO networks in an operational setting, this statement makes little sense if it only refers to passive capabilities. Nevertheless, no official commitment was made in this regard, as the Alliance continues to avoid public statements about offensive cyber capabilities.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 1AR---Defensive Only

Specifically joint operations include offensive and defensive missions

CJCS, 17 (5/23/17; “Security Cooperation”; Joint Chief of Staff ) //LVL

Stability activities include military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with or in support of other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability activities typically occur during all phases of an operation/campaign in balance with offensive and defensive operations. Normally, civil-military operations (CMO) and civil affairs operations are essential to stabilization efforts, especially for larger and more complex operations.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 2AC---AT: Defensive Only

CI: Security cooperation includes activities with the intent of promoting US interests and allied partnerships

CJCS, 17 (5/23/17; “Security Cooperation”; Joint Chief of Staff ) //LVL

Security cooperation (SC) encompasses all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests; enable partner nations (PNs) to provide the US access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objectives. It includes, but is not limited to, military engagements with foreign defense and security establishments (including those governmental organizations that primarily perform disaster or emergency response functions), DOD-administered security assistance (SA) programs, combined exercises, international armaments cooperation, and information sharing and collaboration.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 2AC---AT: Defensive Only

OCOs prove offensive capabilities are used as a part of NATO’s collective defense strategies – cyber policy proves

Erica D. Lonergan and Mark Montgomery, 22 (1/25/22; PhD in Political Science from Columbia, Assistant Professor in the Army Cyber Institute; Master’s degree in Modern History from Oxford University, Senior director and Fellow at the Foundation Defense of Democracies; “PRESSING QUESTIONS: OFFENSIVE CYBER OPERATIONS AND NATO STRATEGY” Modern War Institute ) //LVL

But the seeds were also planted in 2016 for NATO to consider a potential role for offensive cyber operations. That year, the alliance recognized cyberspace as a domain of military operations, comparable to land, sea, and air. At the 2018 Brussels summit, NATO began to more seriously consider offensive cyber operations. Specifically, NATO created the Cyberspace Operations Centre to coordinate requests for member states to provide offensive cyber effects through the Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies process. Following the 2018 summit, then-Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated in a press conference that five states—the United States, the United Kingdom, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Estonia—were contributing cyber forces to “help NATO fight in this important domain.” More recently, in June 2021, NATO convened in Brussels and committed to a Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy. A key feature of the new policy is the prominent role of offensive cyber operations. In Brussels, member states committed to “employ the full range of capabilities at all times to actively deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats.” NATO’s shift to incorporating offensive cyber operations into existing strategy and policy has focused on integrating offensive effects into conventional military plans and operations in the context of a conflict. While NATO’s updated strategy is a positive development, its limited focus on conflict scenarios for employing cyber power fails to accurately account for the cyber threat environment NATO faces—particularly the mismatch between the alliance’s clear distinction between wartime and peacetime and the approach of adversaries like Russia, who adopt a competition-conflict continuum. Additionally, the focus on employing offensive cyber during a high-end conventional fight is also not consistent with how several NATO members are already engaged in gray zone offensive cyber operations.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 2AC---AT: Defensive Only

W/M – Defense Security Cooperation Agency announced security cooperation includes both offensive and defensive capabilities

Richard Bumgardner, 21 (9/3/21; Chief, Public Affairs Officer at USACE Transatlantic; “USASAC: Providing Strength in Cooperation” US Army ) //LVL

In the past three years, William Slade, USASAC’s country program manager for the Baltics states, and members of the Army Security Assistance Enterprise have processed and implemented more than $1 billion in FMS cases to help assure the Baltic states could deter aggressive action by neighboring militaries. In major FMS announcements released by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, this includes offensive and defensive capabilities to include Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV), UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters, Javelin missiles, and many other operational and tactical equipment items. These equipment items would also enable the Baltic states to gain significant interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 2NC---Defensive › AT: Cyber Example

US Code gives security programs the authority to conduct defensive cyber operations

Legal Information Institute (“10 U.S. Code § 333 - Foreign security forces: authority to build capacity” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute ; Accessed 7/11/22) //LVL

(a)Authority.—The Secretary of Defense is authorized to conduct or support a program or programs to provide training and equipment to the national security forces of one or more foreign countries for the purpose of building the capacity of such forces to conduct one or more of the following:

(1)Counterterrorism operations.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 2NC---Defensive › AT: Joint Operations

Joint operations are not a part of DOD security cooperation under the DSCA – operations can only respond to threats

USA Gov (“Defense Security Cooperation Agency; USA gov ; Accessed 7/11/22) //LVL

The Defense Security Cooperation Agency supports U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. They train, educate, advise, and equip foreign security forces to respond to shared challenges.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 2NC---Defensive › AT: W/M

US Code defines military exchanges as between defensive organizations

Major Anthony V. Lenze, 17 (Judge Advocate, United States Army, The Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia; J.D., 2007; “ARTICLE: TRADITIONAL COMBATANT COMMANDER ACTIVITIES: ACKNOWLEDGING AND ANALYZING COMBATANT COMMANDERS' AUTHORITY TO INTERACT WITH FOREIGN MILITARIES”, Military Law Review, 225, 641. .) //LVL

10 U.S.C. § 168 defines military-to-military contacts as "contacts between members of the armed forces and members of foreign armed forces" through the following activities: (1) traveling contact teams, including any transportation expense, translation services expense, or administrative expense that is related to such activities; (2) The activities of military liaison teams; (3) Exchanges of civilian or military personnel between the Department of Defense and defense ministries of foreign governments; (4) Exchanges of military personnel between units of the armed forces and units of foreign armed forces; (5) Seminars and conferences held primarily in a theater of operations; (6) Distribution of publications primarily in a theater of operations; (7) Personnel expenses for Department of Defense civilian and military personnel to the extent that those expenses relate to participation in an activity described in paragraph (3), (4), (5), or (6); (8) Reimbursement of military personnel appropriations accounts for the pay and allowances paid to reserve component personnel for service while engaged in any activity referred to in another paragraph of this subsection."

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 2NC---Defensive › AT: Funding=Offensive SC

Funding for security cooperation comes from defense operation funds

CRS, 16 ((8/23/16; “DOD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues” Every CRS Report ) //LVL

Not all Title 10 and NDAA authorities have funding levels specified by authorization and/or appropriations legislation. Funding for some security cooperation authorities may be subsumed under a larger budget category or simply drawn from the defense-wide operations and maintenance budget, making identification of funding levels for difficult.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Security Cooperation › 1NC---Defensive Only

Security Cooperation is only for defensive measures

CRS, 16 (8/23/16; “DOD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues”; Every CRS Report ) //LVL

DOD defines "security cooperation" as a broad set of activities undertaken by DOD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. Included in the definition are DOD interactions with both foreign defense and foreign nonmilitary security establishments. Security cooperation includes all DOD-administered security assistance programs that (1) build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; (2) develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and (3) provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.4 According to DOD, security assistance is a subset of DOD's security cooperation portfolio.