2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Econ Decline
Anadolu Agency 5-24 (Anadolu Agency is a news agency headquartered in Ankara, Turkey, 5-24-22, “Turkey boasts ‘diversified, resilient’ economy: Moody’s executive”, Daily Sabah, https://www.dailysabah.com/business/economy/turkey-boasts-diversified-resilient-economy-moodys-executive)
Risks aside, Turkey boasts a large, diversified, resilient economy with a solid banking sector, an executive at Moody’s Investors Service, a sister company of the global ratings agency, said Monday. “They (Turkish banks) have had pretty good results. They are solid,” Kathrin Muehlbronner, senior vice president within Moody’s Investors Service Sovereign Risk Group, told Anadolu Agency (AA), citing “stabilizing factors.” “Exporters are benefiting clearly very much from the (Turkish lira’s) depreciation,” she said, praising the country’s “large diversified resilient economy.” She noted that Turkey may benefit from supply chain shifts in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic. “Turkey can benefit massively from a nearshoring of production by European companies and (from its) Customs Union with the EU.” She said prospects for Turkish economic growth are optimistic, adding: “Exports are doing well. Lira depreciation helps. There are clear incentives such as credit stimulus for exporters and investments.” Muehlbronner welcomed steps by the Turkish government to shield the poorest households from inflation. Propelled by rising energy and commodity prices, Turkey’s annual inflation runs at a 20-year high of nearly 70% as of April, according to official data. Consumer prices have been increasing despite tax cuts on basic goods and government subsidies for utility bills to ease the burden on household budgets. After it took a hit from the pandemic like the rest of the world, Muehlbronner said she expects the Turkish tourism sector to have a good season. She underlined that the Turkish economy may grow faster than Moody’s forecast of 3% this year. On inflation, Muehlbronner said the upward trend stemmed from the weaker lira, especially through end-2021 and elevated commodity prices. “We think inflation will drop kind of mechanically at the end of the year because of a base effect,” Muehlbronner noted. Listing risks to the Turkish economy, she said high inflation, currency pressure and loose monetary policy create downside risks for the country. The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) is expected to hold its key policy rate unchanged at 14% for the fifth straight month on Thursday, according to surveys. Inflation has surged since last autumn as the lira weakened after the central bank in September embarked on a 500-basis point-easing cycle. The government’s foreign exchange-protected lira deposits tool, she said, “was certainly a good step to stabilize the currency. And it has reduced dollarization of deposits by around 10 percentage points.” Muehlbronner was referring to the scheme that the government unveiled in December to boost lira deposits by protecting them against exchange rate volatility. Ankara has called on individuals and companies to convert their foreign exchange savings to lira to support the currency. “So, we’re back to the levels of share of deposits and dollars that we had before the latest currency crisis. So that’s certainly a positive step,” Muehlbronner added.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Econ Decline
Balcells 2-11 (Francesc Balcells is running the Global EM Debt Fund at FIM partners. Formerly at PIMCO for eight years, managing EM hard and local currency debt portfolios, 2-11-22, “Why Turkey’s economic resilience has defied worst fears”, Financial Times, SC)
The warnings back in 2011-2013 were ominous: “If the Turkish lira breaks through 2 against the dollar, the economy will implode.” Once the 2 was reached, the new implosion target moved to 3, then to 5, and here we are at 13. The economy is still standing. An economy with debt in dollars as high as Turkey’s should seemingly have imploded a long time ago under such currency volatility. The history of emerging markets is littered with balance of payments crises under similar foreign exchange depreciations. There might be several reasons for this resilience. For one, up until earlier this year, the Turkish authorities did what they always had done in the past when confronted with capital outflows and currency weakness: interest rate hikes, if only belatedly and often in an obfuscated manner. This boom-and-bust way of managing the economy kept the system going for quite some time. That time is what gave economic actors the chance to build buffers against an unbalanced economy. Banks, for example, kept balance sheets largely hedged on currency. By virtue of a build-up of dollar deposits and a low level of foreign currency loans made relative to them, banks also had excess dollars. So they kept lending dollars to obtain cheap lira funding, creating in the process another safety mechanism for themselves. But it hasn’t been only banks which have built resilience over time. As dollarisation progressed, households have continued to accumulate dollar assets but no foreign exchange liabilities. This is because banks were forbidden to lend foreign currency to households, making them a lot more resilient to currency risk. This was perhaps the regulators’ greatest foresight. The creditor profile of the country has also changed over time. Fickle portfolio flows have greatly reduced. Foreigners used to own nearly 30 per cent of the local debt market but this number is now less than 5 per cent (a mere $3bn in absolute terms). Meanwhile locals now own almost 50 per cent of the country’s sovereign Eurobonds. This has left Turkey more dependent on different types of external creditor — the syndicated loan market, trade finance, intra-corporate lending, or domestic lenders. These creditors are more patient, more long-term oriented than foreign portfolio investors. The passing of time has also allowed Turkish corporates, the weakest link in the country’s external balance sheet chain, to reduce debt levels somewhat while building a positive net short-term foreign exchange position. The problem, however, remains one of co-ordination. While on paper each economic sector has enough liquidity buffers of its own, they are all “joined at the hip”. One sector drawing on its foreign exchange assets has a ripple effect on the entire system, as those assets will be residing in someone else’s balance sheet. Against that, the country is tentatively turning its persistent current account deficit into a surplus by virtue of the very large lira depreciation which boosts exports and contracts imports. Whether this turn in the current account, if it materialises, is yet another boom-and-bust episode or a structural manifestation of a policy-driven rebalancing of the economy remains unclear. All in all, it’s been a surprisingly resilient journey, though longer than many of us would have anticipated. Turks also have suffered from high inflation and a squeeze in purchasing power in dollars. And the fact that Turkey hasn’t “broken” yet doesn’t mean it still can’t.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Econ Decline
Samuelson 18 (Robert J. Samuelson wrote a twice-weekly economics column before he retired in September 2020. Both appeared online, and one usually ran in The Washington Post in print on Mondays. He was a columnist for Newsweek magazine from 1984 to 2011. He began his journalism career as a reporter on The Post business desk, from 1969 to 1973. From 1973 to 1976, he was a freelance writer. He was an economics reporter and columnist for National Journal magazine from 1976 to 1984 — when he joined Newsweek. He grew up in White Plains, N.Y., and attended Harvard College, 8-21-18, “Will Turkey’s economic woes spill over into other countries?”, SC)
WASHINGTON – The pertinent and unanswerable question about Turkey is whether the country’s present economic turmoil is an isolated event, mostly confined to Turkey itself, or whether it portends a larger economic convulsion that shakes markets around the world. Among economists and other experts, there’s no consensus. Some foresee contagion: Turkey’s problems will spread. Others envision a one-country economic blip. Which is it? The answer obviously matters. The global economy already faces obstacles to growth. American interest rates are rising as the Federal Reserve tries to prevent higher inflation. President Trump’s trade wars are threatening. If we now add a slowdown of “emerging market” economies – China, Brazil and similar “middle-income” nations – the global expansion might sputter or halt. Turkey’s experience is relevant. In recent months, its currency, the lira, has collapsed. At the start of 2018, it was trading at roughly 4 lira to the dollar; now that’s about 6 lira to the dollar. This makes it harder for Turkish businesses and consumers to repay debts, which – more than in many other countries – are often made in dollars. To repay these debts, Turkish companies need to earn more lira, which can be sold for dollars. The more lira go to repay dollar debts, the fewer lira are left over to buy other things. Economic growth slows. If debtors can’t raise the dollars to repay their loans, they default. Too many defaults, and growth stops. Turkey’s debt problems are undeniably daunting, notes economist Hung Tran of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), an industry research and advocacy group. Consider: Between now and the end of 2018, Turkey faces debt repayments – principal and interest – of about $120 billion; in 2019, the total is about $200 billion. By comparison, Turkey’s economy – gross domestic product – is about $850 billion. Some of these loans could be rolled over; how many is unclear. Many debts were incurred by banks or private firms, encouraged by easy-money policies. The government pumped up the economy in the wake of a failed military coup in 2016 and in anticipation of a new election. The election was held in June 2018 and won by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He was surely helped by the economic stimulus. Last year, Turkey’s GDP grew 7 percent, up from 3.2 percent in 2016. To complicate matters further, Turkey and the Trump administration are feuding over the Turks’ detention of Andrew Brunson, an American pastor accused of anti-state activities. Now comes the reckoning. Many observers believe that what happened in Turkey will stay in Turkey. Its economy is simply too small – about 1.4 percent of global GDP, according to some estimates – to influence the rest of the world. “It’s mainly a Turkish issue,” says economist C. Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute. He doesn’t expect large spillover effects, say a slowdown of growth in Europe or capital flight from other “emerging market” countries, such as Brazil or India. Not all economists are so hopeful. Writing in The Hill, Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute predicts that “Turkey will default on its debt and impose capital controls.” Capital controls are legal restrictions on money movements in and out of a country. He expects contagion – capital flight from heavily indebted countries – that will weaken the global recovery and hurt the U.S. economy. Economist Tran of the IIF thinks that emerging-market countries that have problems similar to Turkey’s – poor policies, maturing debts, sizable current account deficits – are the most vulnerable to capital flight. These include South Africa, Indonesia and Egypt. So far, the evidence is reassuring; the IIF’s most recent survey of capital movements didn’t detect any sizable money surges since the lira’s latest large drop. Crowd psychology could trigger a panic. If investors expect other investors to sell, there could be a stampede for the door. This story isn’t over yet. What’s uncontroversial, at least among many economists, is that Turkey will need to go to the IMF to end the present crisis. The IMF would provide a hefty loan – it’s doubtful anyone else would – and impose “tough austerity policies” designed to improve the economy’s performance, says Jacob Funk Kirkegaard of the Peterson Institute. By their nature, these policies would be unpopular, especially with Erdogan, because they “could weaken (his) hold on power,” as Kirkegaard puts it. It seems likely that he would resent and resist them as long as possible. That could change everything. Stay tuned.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Econ I/L
Inman 7/4 (Phillip Inman, Phillip Inman is economics editor of the Observer and an economics writer for the Guardian, 7/4/22, “Turkey hit with soaring prices as inflation nears 80%”, /RM)
Turkey’s official inflation rate increased to almost 80% last month – the highest in 24 years – as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s unconventional economic policies continued to drive up the cost of living. The growth in annual prices rose from 73.5% in May to 78.6% in June, according to the Turkish statistics agency. However, opposition parties and economists said recent hikes in oil and gas prices meant the real rate of inflation was almost double the official figure. The minister of treasury and finance, Nureddin Nebati, has attempted to head off criticism of the government’s handling of the economy, saying last week that consumer prices would start dropping by the end of the year. “I promise to you and to the president, we will see a drop in inflation starting in December,” Nebati said. His comments came after the government announced its second increase in the minimum wage in six months, raising pay by 30%. The increase lifted the monthly salary of about 40% of the workforce from $254 (£209) to $328. Erdoğan has claimed that Turkey’s problem is not inflation. “We do not have an inflation problem. We have a cost of living problem,” he said last month. Economists said Turkey’s official data disguised a more disturbing trend of rising prices that had shown no sign of abating. A monthly report release by Turkey’s ENAG group of independent economists showed consumer prices had risen by 175% in June compared with a year earlier. ENAG said prices had risen by 71.4% since the start of 2022. The Istanbul chamber of commerce said inflation in Turkey‘s largest city had reached an annual rate of 94%. “No one actually believes official Turkish data any more,” said Timothy Ash, an economist at BlueBay Asset Management. “There is no expectation of anything like a credible policy response.” The growing dispute over the veracity of Turkey’s official data is expected to be a difficult political issue for Erdoğan’s government ahead of next year’s general election, which is widely viewed as the toughest of his two-decade rule. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, the leader of the main opposition party, accused the state statistics agency of “lying”, urging it in a tweet to “stop committing crimes for the benefit of President Erdoğan.” A survey published by the Metropol polling agency on Friday showed 69% of respondents believed the unofficial ENAG figure and just 24% the one reported by the government. Turkey was hit hard by the fallout from the European debt crisis in 2012 and the threat of higher interest rates by the US Federal Reserve in 2013. Its currency tumble ever since. In 2013 the lira was worth 36p, compared with 4.9p on Monday. To arrest the decline, in 2018 Erdoğan embarked on what he called a “new economic model”, which meant setting aside rising inflation and cutting interest rates to boost economic growth. This was done against the advice of his central bank chief and caused the lira to plunge to a record low, pushing up costs in a country that is dependent on imported materials, especially energy. Inflation, which officially stood at 15% at the beginning of 2021, has now reached its highest level since a currency meltdown during the 1998 debt crisis that helped bring Erdoğan to power. Three central bank bosses have been fired by the president since 2018. The Turkish lira has plummeted 20% this year alone.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Econ I/L
Adar 22 (Sinem Adar, Dr. Sinem Adar is Associate at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at SWP ,April 6, 2022, “Perceptions in Turkey about the War in Ukraine”, https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/perceptions-in-turkey-about-the-war-in-ukraine)
Ankara is carefully trying to not antagonize Russia while continuing to militarily support Ukraine. Besides the economic burden that an open confrontation with the Kremlin might inflict on Turkey, it could also lead to military retaliation in Syria and to a subsequent migration wave from Idlib to Turkey, which hosts the largest refugee population worldwide. At the same time, the increased Russian presence in Ukraine, particularly along the coastline in the south, further raises Turkey’s strategic vulnerability in the Black Sea, accentuating its Cold War threat perceptions. Ankara justifies its non-participation in the EU’s sanctions regime with these economic and security considerations. Turkish airspace also remains open to Russia. Still, Turkey is acting in close coordination with NATO and has repeated its firm commitment to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty numerous times. Recognizing the violent conflict between the two countries as “war,” in accordance with the Montreux Convention, Ankara closed the Straits to warships from any country, whether or not they border the Black Sea. Meanwhile, it is also acting as a mediator between Ukraine and Russia.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Econ I/L
Carbonaro 6/30 (Giulia Carbonaro, US News Reporter, 6/30/22, “Russia's Economy is Collapsing, Data Reveals”, //RM)
If Russia defaulting on its foreign debt for the first time since the Bolshevik revolution wasn't a clear enough sign of the impact Western sanctions are having on the Russian economy, a new report on the country's socio-economic situation leaves no margin for doubt that the Russian economy is gradually collapsing. New statistics on the state of the Russian economy, produced by the country's Federal State Statistics Service, show production has plunged in multiple sectors, from vehicles to domestic appliances, as has retail confidence. Overall, Russia's industrial production index—a monthly economic indicator measuring real output in the manufacturing, mining, electric, and gas industries—dropped by 1.7 percent in May compared to the same month in 2021. That's higher than the decline of 1.6 percent year-on-year reported in April. Mining dropped by 0.8 percentage points in May 2022 compared to May 2021, and manufacturing dropped by 3.2 percentage points. The overall numbers seem quite modest, but they reflect a downward trend that is more obvious in the staggering drops affecting the production of specific products. Above all, car production has suffered, and it's now down by 96.7 percent compared to 2021. Production of trucks plunged by 39.3 percent, that of diesel and gasoline engines by 57 percent, that of diesel locomotives by 63.2 percent and that of freight wagons by 51.8 percent. French automaker Renault, which controls Russia's largest carmaker AvtoVAZ, suspended operations at its Moscow plant in March, under pressure from Ukrainian leaders to act in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Renault later agreed to sell its Russian operations for a nominal payment. Air cargo is down by 86 percent year on year. Other products were also affected. The production of fridges is also down by 58.1 percent compared with 2021 levels, that of washing machines by 59.2 percent, that of AC electric motors by 49.9 percent. TV sets were down by 49.7 percentage points. Production of elevators is down by 34.7 percent and that of excavators was down by 60 percent. Curiously, cigarette production also dropped by 24.5 percent. Graphs show that retail turnover and retail confidence have also gone down compared to one year before and even from the beginning of 2022. Wholesale turnover has also plunged drastically, with consumer demand dropping in what is likely a reflection of lower wages amid high inflation in the country. Even more significantly for the Russian population, pensions have also fallen in real terms, decreasing by 8.2 percentage points year-on-year in May, while salaries dropped by 7.2 percentage points in April compared to a year prior. These data are a clear sign that the Russian economy is suffering, despite the fact that the rouble bounced back after collapsing in late February following the invasion of Ukraine and that the country has held up surprisingly better than expected after Western sanctions were imposed. The drop in industrial production is less than Western economists expected, but the economic contraction of the country is still undeniable. Even the Russian central bank said it expected a fall in GDP of 7.8 percent this year, almost in line with Western predictions but not quite, as Western experts estimate that the country's economy will shrink by 15 percent by the end of the year, according to the Institute of International Finance's (IIF). One piece of unexpected good news for Russia came from the jobs market, with a record-low unemployment rate of 3.9 percent reported in May. And yet, as high inflation continues to cripple wages in Russia, it's unlikely this high employment will turn into higher consumer demand able to turn the tide of Russia's likely incoming recession.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Ukraine I/L
Dan Lamothe and Adela Suliman, 06-24-2022, [(Dan Lamothe joined The Washington Post in 2014 to cover the U.S. military. He has written about the Armed Forces for more than 14 years, traveling extensively, embedding with each service and covering combat in Afghanistan numerous times.) "Ukraine retreats from Severodonetsk as Russia advances in the east," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/24/severodonetsk-troop-withdrawal-ukraine-lysychansk/]//DS
Russia claimed control Sunday over the key city of Lysychansk, the last major Ukrainian foothold in the Luhansk region — signaling a potential turning point in Moscow’s campaign to take all of eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian officials said their forces had withdrawn from Lysychansk after fierce fighting to preserve lives from the Russians’ relentless assault. The slow Russian advance across the region it has targeted since the invasion began in February has been facilitated by overwhelming artillery power that has leveled cities and towns and left a trail of wounded and dead prompting comparisons with the devastation of World War I in Europe. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said in a statement that Russian troops and pro-Kremlin separatists of the self-declared Luhansk People’s Republic “have established full control” over Lysychansk “and a number of nearby settlements.” The Ukrainian military’s general staff said Sunday that Ukrainian forces were forced to withdraw from Lysychansk after waging a stiff but losing battle. Ukraine had tried to defend Lysychansk for weeks. The military said it decided to withdraw because remaining in the city would bring “fatal consequences,” given the Russian forces’ “overwhelming advantage” in “artillery, aviation, ammunition and personnel.” The decision was “made to save the lives of Ukrainian defenders,” according to a statement posted on Facebook. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky vowed to return. “If the command of our army withdraws people from certain points of the front where the enemy has the greatest fire superiority, in particular this applies to Lysychansk, it means only one thing: We will return thanks to our tactics, thanks to the increase in the supply of modern weapons,” Zelensky said in his nightly address Sunday. “Ukraine does not give anything up.” The city is a key target in Russia’s battle to capture the Donbas region, the heavily industrialized area bordering Russia that is partly controlled by separatists loyal to Moscow. In 2014, they unilaterally established two independent “republics” in the Donbas region. ‘They’re in hell’: Hail of Russian artillery tests Ukrainian morale Russian President Vladimir Putin cited false claims of Ukrainian “genocide” against Russian-speaking residents there as justification for his invasion. Russia’s latest advances in eastern Ukraine add to creeping doubts among U.S. lawmakers and observers of the war that the Ukrainian government can stop Putin from seizing territory. Optimism sparked by the defeat of his forces in the battle for Kyiv in the spring has faded as Russian artillery hammers Ukrainian forces and civilian targets. As Ukraine war bogs down, U.S. assessments face scrutiny President Biden said last week that U.S. support for Ukraine is unshakable and will continue “as long as it takes” to ensure a Russian defeat. “We continue to fight. Unfortunately, the steel willpower and patriotism are not enough to achieve success — we need the technical resources,” the Ukrainian military’s statement added. Why is Ukraine’s Donbas region a target for Russian forces? Ukrainian troops withdrew just over a week ago from Severodonetsk, a city across the Donets River to the east. Russia’s capture of Lysychansk, if confirmed, would be a major victory that gives its troops clear access to Donetsk, the other region that makes up Donbas. Biden administration officials say Putin’s gains have been uneven and have come at a significant cost, highlighting the steep death toll among Russian troops. But Ukrainian forces also are paying a heavy price, which U.S. military officials rarely acknowledge. Ukraine retreats from Severodonetsk as Russia advances in the east Control over Donbas is the primary goal of Moscow’s military operation in Ukraine, after it failed to capture the capital, Kyiv, and other areas in the initial weeks of the war. Russian troops and their allies have been making steady gains in the east, as officials in Kyiv say they are outgunned and running out of ammunition. Ukrainian Defense Ministry spokesman Yuriy Sak told the BBC earlier Sunday that Ukraine controls other cities in Donetsk and argued that “the battle for the Donbas is not over yet.” Serhiy Haidai, governor of the Luhansk region, said earlier in the day that in attacking Lysychansk, Russian fighters used tactics even more brutal than in Severodonetsk to overcome resistance. Photos showed bombed-out residential buildings in Lysychansk early Sunday, amid a barrage reminiscent of the destruction of Severodonetsk. As recently as Saturday, a Russian-backed politician said Lysychansk was “completely surrounded,” but defense officials in Ukraine said they still had control of the city. Those counterclaims were probably “outdated or erroneous,” according to an analysis from the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) think tank. It cited unconfirmed videos showing Russian forces erecting a red “victory” flag in Lysychansk and “casually walking around” its neighborhoods. “Ukrainian forces likely conducted a deliberate withdrawal from Lysychansk, resulting in the Russian seizure of the city on July 2,” it said. As Russia issued its claim of control over Lysychansk on Sunday, Slovyansk, a town about 50 miles west in Donetsk, came under intense shelling that killed at least six people, local officials said. Mayor Vadym Lyakh said in a video on Telegram that “the biggest shelling of Slovyansk recently” had left “a large number of wounded and dead.” Tetyana Ignatchenko, a spokeswoman for the Donetsk region, told Ukrainian public broadcaster Suspilne News that at least six people were killed and 15 were injured in the shelling. She added that missiles hit the town of Kramatorsk, to the south of Slovyansk. In its assessment Saturday, the ISW said Russia was likely to fully take over the Luhansk region “in coming days” and would probably “then prioritize drives on Ukrainian positions in Siversk before turning to Slovyansk and Bakhmut,” in Donetsk. In other developments, Ukraine’s ambassador to Turkey said Sunday that Turkish authorities have detained a Russian-flagged cargo ship loaded with stolen Ukrainian grain. Millions of metric tons of grain await export from Ukraine, blockaded by Russia’s control of Black Sea shipping lanes. The export blockades have resulted in global food shortages and rising prices, which have particularly affected poorer countries. Three people were killed in Russian strikes early Sunday in the Kharkiv region, Ukrainian officials said. Cities across Kharkiv were shelled Saturday and Sunday, according to regional governor Oleh Synyehubov. In one district, Russian forces “burned farm buildings, garages, and shelled open areas,” he added. Russian forces have recently intensified their attacks on Kharkiv, and some Ukrainians worry that Moscow is planning to renew its stalled attempt in March to seize Ukraine’s second-largest city.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Ukraine I/L
Kirby 22 (Jen Kirby, Foreign and National Security Reporter, April 1, 2022, “What diplomatic solution might end the war in Ukraine?”, //RM)
The war in Ukraine has ground on for five weeks. For almost as long, Russian and Ukrainian officials have been attempting to negotiate. Those negotiations have yielded few firm results so far, especially as Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian cities. Still, the talking matters. Diplomacy is the only way this war will finally end, and the type of agreement that might end the fighting looks a lot clearer than it did even a month ago. In the early days of the war, the talks made little apparent progress. Ukraine appeared to be demanding an immediate ceasefire, and Russian withdrawal of troops. Russia, however, had pretty different ideas. It laid out some aggressive demands. Among them were: Ukraine’s neutrality and no membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); so-called “demilitarization and “denazification;” the protection of Russian language within Ukraine; and that Ukraine recognize Crimea as part of Russia and recognize the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, the two regions in eastern Ukraine that Vladimir Putin had declared as independent on the eve of his full-scale invasion. In recent days, some glimmers of optimism have emerged. Ukraine has put forward serious proposals, which is centered around a commitment to permanent neutrality and an agreement not to seek NATO membership, in exchange for security guarantees. Russia has also reportedly eased up on some of its previous demands, including “denazification” — a likely ruse for regime change — and “demilitarization,” a sign that Ukraine’s battlefield successes so far have pushed the Kremlin to possibly reconsider some of its most maximalist demands. Mevlut Cavusoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister, who is helping to broker the talks, described the discussions earlier in the week as “the most meaningful progress since the start of negotiations.” But these really are just glimmers of progress — and they might not be so long lasting. Russia, this week, promised to “drastically reduce” military activity around Kyiv and Chernihiv, in the name of “mutual trust,” though reports of shelling continued in those areas. Some, including US and NATO officials, have expressed skepticism that Moscow is sincere, and instead using talks to buy time, so it can regroup and refocus its offensive, potentially on areas in eastern and southern Ukraine. Since then, both Russia and Ukraine have downplayed the seriousness of the talks, even as negotiations resumed Friday. And huge gulfs remain. Perhaps the most intractable problem may be the future of the Crimean peninsula, which Russia annexed in 2014, and Donetsk and Luhansk, which Russia and Russia-backed militias control parts of. Ukraine is unlikely to agree to slice up its country. It is also hard to imagine Russia settling for less territory than it controlled the day before its invasion in February 2022. Other issues will emerge, and concessions and proposals may shift depending on developments in the battlefield. The prospect of a quick peace deal between Ukraine and Russia remains unlikely. Perhaps the best case short term is that both sides broker a ceasefire that includes a framework for an agreement, and then work the details out over time. But the war continues.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Syria I/L
Tziarras 21 (Zenonas Tziarras, researcher at Peace Research Institute Oslo Cyprus Centre and a co-founder of Geopolitical Cyprus, and Jalel Harchaaoui, a senior fellow at the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, a Swiss-based institute; “What Erdogan Really Wants in the Eastern Mediterranean”; Foreign Policy; 1/19/21; SC)
In an episode that has tediously repeated itself several times since July, Turkey’s seismic-survey ships and navy vessels clash with Greek authorities while probing for hydrocarbons in waters off the small Greek island of Kastellorizo. Turkey and Greece—perennial foes—don’t see eye to eye on the Mediterranean’s maritime boundaries. Yet, each time they bicker, pundits are quick to reduce the Greek-Turkish standoff to a bilateral kerfuffle over natural resources. In reality, the dispute over Kastellorizo—and Turkey’s incursions in the Eastern Mediterranean more generally—are merely proximate symptoms of a deep-rooted conflict over sovereignty. That fight has been brewing for decades, and it was recently exacerbated by the abandonment of long-held Turkish foreign-policy principles based on caution and an aversion to adventurism. Nothing that happens in the Eastern Mediterranean is separable from the wider dynamics in a region where Europe, Asia, and Africa meet. The region has always been ground zero for great-power politics, but it has developed a new vulnerability in the aftermath of Washington’s ill-fated Iraq War, which prompted a reconfiguration of U.S. foreign-policy priorities around the world. Today, the United States is increasingly unwilling to intervene decisively abroad—making space for other actors to scramble in pursuit of their individual agendas, trying to carve out their own spheres of influence. Nowhere is this more evident than in Turkey’s environs, where Ankara has sought to capitalize on these changes to pursue what amounts to a revisionist geopolitical agenda. Domestically, this about-face has been buttressed by a move toward Islamic populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism—away from what some Washington policy wonks used to call the “Turkish model”: a perceived synthesis of economic liberalization, pro-Western democracy, and Islamic values that many believed could be a model for the Arab world. Now, rather than going for a clean and quick divorce, Ankara is leveraging its various institutional, economic, and security ties with the West to climb the power ladder of the regional system while embracing illiberalism at home. Since 2015, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has exuded historical revanchism in justifying Turkish interference in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia—his discourse peppered with flowery mentions of “geography in our heart” and “our spiritual borders.” But a nostalgic policy of neo-Ottomanism doesn’t begin to explain Ankara’s geopolitical reasoning under Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP). Turkey today seeks to become a great power able to negotiate on equal terms with the rest of the great powers and, wherever possible, impose its will by resorting to faits accomplis. In order to maximize its stature, then, Turkey has invested in its national security apparatus and military-projection capabilities while also ramping up its global soft power in everything including entertainment, religion, and commerce. All in all, Erdogan’s agenda encompasses much more than mere defense and survival. His ultimate goal is to alter the geopolitical status quo in ways he believes benefit Turkey. In this sense, Turkey is now a revisionist state: It embarks upon military interventions and seeks to control foreign territory, as in Syria and Iraq; challenges land borders and maritime boundaries, as with Cyprus and Greece; engages in demographic engineering and political interference, as in Syria and Northern Cyprus; maintains bases overseas, as in Somalia and Qatar; and galvanizes dependent proxies, as in Libya, northern Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. All this may be needlessly provocative and eventually prove counterproductive in bolstering Turkey’s stature vis-à-vis erstwhile allies. But it’s a vindictive path informed by Ankara’s current foreign policy, which is instilled with Turkey’s own brand of political Islam: Necmettin Erbakan’s Milli Gorus (National Outlook) movement of the 1970s. Chief among Milli Gorus’s tenets is that Turkey was—and continues to be—ripped off by the West.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Syria I/L
Tastekin 6-17 (Fehim Tastekin is a Turkish journalist and a columnist for Turkey Pulse who previously wrote for Radikal and Hurriyet. He has also been the host of the weekly program "SINIRSIZ," on IMC TV. As an analyst, Tastekin specializes in Turkish foreign policy and Caucasus, Middle East and EU affairs. He is the author of “Suriye: Yikil Git, Diren Kal,” “Rojava: Kurtlerin Zamani” and “Karanlık Coktugunde - ISID.” Tastekin is founding editor of the Agency Caucasus, 6-17-22, “Russia, Iran won't endorse Turkish military operation in Syria”, Al-Monitor, SC)
Turkey failed to garner Russian and Iranian backing for a fresh military intervention against Syrian Kurdish forces at the meeting of the Astana platform this week. Senior diplomats from Turkey, Russia and Iran, the three guarantors of the platform, as well as representatives of Syria’s government and opposition, attended the June 15-16 meeting in Kazakhstan’s capital Nur-Sultan, known previously as Astana. While the official agenda included topics such as the return of Syrian refugees, the humanitarian and economic situation in Syria, the work of the constitutional committee in Geneva and confidence-boosting measures toward a political settlement, the main issue was Turkish threats to wrestle control of further territory held by the Kurds. President Recep Tayyip has openly named Tel Rifaat and Manbij as targets, vowing to rid them of “terrorists” as part of a plan to create a safe zone with a depth of 30 kilometers (about 20 miles) along the Turkish border. The groups in Ankara’s crosshairs are the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the backbone of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces, and its political wing, the Democratic Union Party. Ankara equates them with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), the armed outfit designated as a terrorist group over its decades-long separatist campaign in Turkey. Speaking to reporters ahead of the meeting, Alexander Lavrentiev, the Kremlin’s special Syria envoy and head of the Russian delegation, called Turkey’s intervention plan an “illogical and irrational” prospect that threatens “an escalation of tension and a new military confrontation in those areas,” according to Syrian media. He dismissed speculation that Russia could turn a blind eye in return for Turkey blocking Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO. “There is no such thing. We are not bargaining. We are not giving up on our allies in the region,” he said. Ali Asghar Khaji, the head of the Iranian delegation, “underlined that Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are untouchable” in a meeting with the Turkish delegation, according to the Iranian Foreign Ministry. Meanwhile, Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Ayman Sousan, who led the Syrian delegation, urged the United Nations “to rein in [Erdogan’s] aggressive policies” in a meeting with UN officials, Syrian media reported. In response, the UN officials cited statements by the UN secretary-general’s spokesperson in support of Syria’s sovereignty and against fresh escalatory moves in the country. In separate talks with the Russians, Sousan rejected Turkey’s pretexts for attacks on Syrian territory, charging that they were designed “to achieve its expansionist ideals” and that “the Syrian people are determined to defend their country [and] resist the occupation.” Lavrentiev, for his part, pledged Russia would do its best to prevent further escalation in Syria. In the final statement, the parties denounced “separatist agendas” in Syria in a nod to Turkey’s security concerns and a rebuke of the Kurdish groups leading the de facto self-rule in the north. They also reaffirmed commitment to Syria’s sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and a political settlement to the conflict, as they have done in all previous statements in the past six years. In Turkey’s view, its control of significant chunks of Syrian territory does not contradict that commitment. The parties also pledged to work together “to combat terrorism in all forms and manifestations.” The sixth point of the statement referred to Kurdish-held areas in northeast Syria, saying that lasting security and stability in the region can only be achieved by preserving Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The wording matched the arguments that Russia has put forward against Turkey’s attempts to expand its control in northern Syria. Simply put, Moscow argues that the best way to address Ankara’s security concerns is to ensure that the Syrian army returns all the way to the Turkish border as Ankara begins to cooperate with Damascus and discuss joint measures under the 1998 Adana accord on security cooperation between the two countries. The communique suggests that Ankara has toed Moscow’s line, at least on paper. In the same paragraph, the statement acknowledged Turkey’s concerns, saying that the parties reject “all attempts to create new realities on the ground, including illegitimate self-rule initiatives under the pretext of combating terrorism.” In a reference to the United States, the statement denounced “the illegal seizure and transfer of oil revenues that should belong to Syria” and “the actions of countries that support terrorist entities including illegitimate self-rule initiatives in the northeast of Syria.” Pledging continued cooperation to eliminate the Nusra Front, al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and other UN-designated terrorist groups, the statement expressed “serious concern” with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which holds sway in Idlib and with which Turkey has tacitly cooperated on the ground. It stressed also the need to facilitate the return of refugees and support the UN-sponsored process of drafting a new constitution for Syria. The text, released by the Kazakh hosts of the meeting, did not explicitly mention the YPG or the PKK, but Turkey’s state-run Anatolia news agency said the final communique emphasized Turkey’s determination to “fight the PKK/YPG terrorist organization” and enact “any measures to protect our borders and prevent attacks on our people and security forces and innocent Syrian civilians.” Russia’s denunciation of “separatist agendas” — a reference to the Kurds’ autonomy drive and partnership with the United States — suggests that it is shifting to a position more pleasing to Turkey. This trend has been tangible in other statements in recent times. Moscow’s temperate policy on the Kurds appears to be wearing out amid rising Russian-US tensions over Ukraine, opening room for Ankara to maneuver. According to media reports on the talks, the Turkish side insisted that the YPG’s removal from Tel Rifaat and Manbij was a commitment that Russia failed to deliver under the 2019 Sochi deal, while the Russians recalled Turkey’s outstanding commitment to eliminate terrorist groups in Idlib and reopen the M4 motorway. Such exchanges between Turkey and Russia have recurred time and again as a tactic to balance or restrain each other. The talks in Nur-Sultan were significant in terms of clarifying Moscow’s attitude on Ankara’s intervention threat, for its initial reactions were softer and more ambivalent compared to similar tensions in the past, contrasting the firm objections of Tehran. Some Russian statements even sought to justify Turkey’s security concerns, fueling speculation that Turkish-Russian bargaining on issues related to NATO and Ukraine might extend to the conflict in Syria. Nevertheless, a marked difference was visible between Russia’s rhetoric and its actions on the ground. Russia took a number of steps signaling solidarity with the Syrian army, including joint military exercises in the south of Idlib on June 10. In a series of firsts, the Russians installed a Pantsir-S1 anti-aircraft system at the Hasakah airport in the northeast; deployed tanks, armored vehicles, anti-aircraft weapons and missiles to the Abkar base in the same region; and dispatched eight helicopters to the Abu al-Duhur base in eastern Idlib. Russian planes and helicopters rumbled in the skies of northeastern cities such as Qamishli, Tel Tamir, Amuda, Darbasiyah and Ras al-Ayn. The Iranians, meanwhile, deployed reinforcements to the vicinity of Tel Rifaat and moved Shiite militia from Deir ez-Zor to the al-Nayrab base to the east of Aleppo. In other words, Russia and Iran were naysaying a Turkish intervention with their actions on the ground, and any expectation that they would step back in the talks in Nur-Sultan was unrealistic. Though the final statement touched prominently on Turkey’s concerns, the settlement path it outlined is dismissive of military intervention.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn –Turkey-Russia k2 Emerging Tech
Starodubtsev 20 (Ivan Starodubtsev, December 10, 2020, “Can Russia and Turkey cooperate in cyberspace?”, /RM)
It is clear that both Russia and Turkey today think similarly about modern technologies, including AI and cybersecurity. Russian companies and solutions, including Yandex with all the variety of its services, the Kaspersky cybersecurity company and social network and messenger software Telegram, are well known and in demand in Turkey. We may expect that Sberbank will soon enter the Turkish market with its solutions in the field of AI. Turkey-Russia cooperation At the end of this article, one may ask, can Russia and Turkey fully cooperate in the field of digital technologies? However, this question is no longer valid today as cooperation in the AI field has become a necessity. Russia and Turkey, which work together to ensure security in the region, including in Syria, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh, should also cooperate in the field of digital technologies, primarily in AI and cybersecurity. Russia and Turkey both think in a similar way, stating that it is necessary to implement not only international regulation in digital space but also moral and ethical norms. The promotion of this idea to the world is another potential mission of Russian-Turkish relations. Achieving this task is not only about the prosperity of the two countries in the new technological order and economy of the future but also a matter of peace and stability of the region and the strengthening of neighborly relations.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn –Key To ME
Ellehuus 19 (Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. “Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving.” Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving | Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 Dec. 2019, www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving.//BVN SC)
A second area where Turkey’s immediate security concerns intersect with the majority of other NATO members is stability in the Middle East, most immediately in Syria. To be sure, Turkey’s anger over United States’ partnership with the YPG in the fight against the Islamic State—appnd NATO’s anger at Turkey for its unilateral incursion into northern Syria—will make progress difficult. But ultimately, the two sides share a mutual interest in seeing stability and pluralistic governance in Syria. This entails constraining Syrian president Bashar al-Assad; preventing the return of the Islamic State and Europe-based Islamic State fighters; and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and refugee return. More broadly, both sides also share an interest in limiting Russian and Iranian influence in the region. With the Russian military presence in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Crimea now supplemented by the Russian naval base at Tartus, airbases at Kobani and Khmeimim, and helicopter base[s] at Qamishli, Turkey is effectively encircled by Russia. It is in this context that German minister of defence Kramp-Karrenbauer’s suggestion of an internationally-controlled security zone along the Turkey-Syria border, possibly NATO-led and backed by the United Nations in loose partnership with Russia, makes sense. It would address a situation that immediately and directly affects the security of Europe and Turkey and demonstrate that the NATO is invested in addressing Turkey’s security concerns. Should NATO and Turkey move to restore some level of trust by taking these first steps, it will be important to avoid unnecessarily escalating tensions. For Turkey, this means abiding by the terms of the Syria ceasefire, not pursuing additional purchases of Russian military equipment, and doing its part to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State in the region or return of Islamic State foreign fighters to Europe. For the United States and Europe, the trick will be to apply the required sanctions and arms embargoes in a discriminate way. For example, whereas imposing sanctions in accordance with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and withholding delivery of Turkey’s F-35s due to its purchase of the Russian S-400 makes good policy sense, imposing additional blanket sanctions could do more harm than good, affecting the Turkish people more than their leadership and giving Erdogan another opportunity to blame the West for Turkey’s economic problems. A smarter approach might involve going after corrupt actors using the Global Magnitsky Act. Similarly, a total arms embargo by the United States and the European Union will only drive Turkey to procure more Russian or non-NATO interoperable military equipment. Rather, the arms embargoes should be limited along the lines of the most recent House sanctions bill, which includes exemptions for items to be used in NATO-approved operations. Finally, as some of Turkey’s biggest export partners, the European Union and the United States can provide needed carrots along the way to incentivize constructive behavior by Ankara. Measures might include an eventual upgrade of Turkey’s customs union with the European Union or limited visa-free travel to EU countries for Turkish citizens. For the United States, President Trump’s offer of a $100 billion trade deal will also be attractive to Erdogan in Turkey’s struggling economy. To be sure, repairing the trust that has been lost and returning Turkey to the path of Western integration will be a struggle, requiring sustained effort, and a setting aside of egos, on all sides. Yet on this occasion of NATO’s 70th anniversary, Turkey and its NATO allies owe it to one another to pause for a moment and reflect not on their many disagreements but on what brought them together in the first instance and why that still matters.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn –Key To ME
Üzümcü et al 20 (Ahmet Üzümcü is the Former Director-General of the OPCW, Former Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO, Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is a Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2013-2018, Ümit Pamir is a Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2004-2006, 12-16-20, “Turkey and NATO: resolving the S-400 spat”, European Leadership Network, SC)
But the critics do not stop there. There is the wider accusation of Turkish unreliability. It should not be forgotten that Turkey has been a reliable member of NATO for the past seven decades. It contributed significantly to the Alliance’s collective defence and deterrence in the Cold War. By tying up a large portion of Soviet troops in its region, it considerably reduced the pressure on Central Europe. Ironically, the Western European countries were able to build their Union gradually in a secure and stable environment ensured by NATO, with Turkey shouldering a heavy military burden. With the end of the Cold War, alone among the existing allies, Turkey’s security situation worsened. Turkey found itself increasingly exposed in a region of turmoil engulfed by several armed conflicts. The new and emerging security risks, including terrorism, have impacted Turkey as much, if not more, than any other Ally. Turkey feels itself on a new front line. But throughout this period, Turkey has remained an island of stability in a volatile region. Even though instability and disorder are on our doorstep, Turkey has fulfilled all its NATO obligations and provided security and stability rather than consuming them. Turkey has stood solid behind every key NATO decision. NATO invoked Article V of the Treaty for the first time following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan had become a haven for international terrorism. As a staunch ally, Turkey has played a significant role in NATO’s stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. It has deployed troops and other military assets in harm’s way alongside other allies and partners. Turkey has never deviated from the NATO policy “in together-adjust together-out together“. Moreover, Turkey’s especially close and long-standing ties with Afghanistan has enabled the Alliance as a whole to benefit from its knowledge, expertise and political weight in that country. Moreover, the fight against ISIS, a serious concern for the whole world, would not have been so successful without Turkey’s participation and assistance. Turkey has become an essential partner in this struggle by joining the coalition against ISIS. It made three air bases, including Incirlik, available for the Allies, enabling decisively effective military operations. Elsewhere, in the Balkans and Iraq, Turkey has contributed to NATO’s stabilization efforts. In terms of NATO’s priority core task, collective defence, successive governments in Turkey have never wavered in their commitment to the Alliance. Turkey’s current contribution cannot be overstated. It currently hosts a range of NATO commands and and assets, essential to NATO’s collective defence, including Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) in Izmir and the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC) in Istanbul. Significantly, Turkey will be the lead nationin 2021 in command of the ‘Spearhead Force’ of NATO (VJTF). This force can be deployed at short notice to any allied country considered under threat.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn –Key To ME
Cammack & Dunne 18(Perry Cammack was a nonresident fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on long-term regional trends and their implications for American foreign policy., Michele Dunne is a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, where her research focuses on political and economic change in Arab countries, particularly Egypt, as well as U.S. policy in the Middle East., ND, “Fueling Middle East conflict—or Dousing The Flame”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/23/fueling-middle-east-conflicts-or-dousing-flames-pub-77548//BVN SC)
In comparison with almost every other geographical region, the Middle East suffers from a lack of both regional dispute resolution mechanisms and diplomatic protocols that might reduce the scope for regional conflict. While the Cold War was defined by the antagonism between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both sides increasingly felt the need for inclusive institutions and mechanisms to reduce tensions. Every U.S. president during the Cold War, from Dwight D. Eisenhower to George H. W. Bush, met with his Soviet counterpart. During the tensest moments, high-level U.S.-Soviet channels of communications were especially important. Over time, a number of confidence-building institutions and transparency-enhancing measures were created, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), successive arms control agreements, and later the Treaty on Open Skies, which allows for unarmed surveillance flights over signatory countries to promote military and nuclear weapons openness. In the Middle East, however, the absence of any similar mechanisms or organizations, particularly amid proliferating military conflicts, feeds security dilemmas across multiple vectors, so that steps justified by one state as necessary to its security—military intervention, arms procurement, alliance formation, and so on—are perceived by its rivals as threatening. During the Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts of the 1990s, there were attempts to build mechanisms for regional communication and cooperation. Participants at the 1991 Madrid Conference set up five multilateral working groups to address regional challenges, each involving Israel and a range of Arab states. The centerpiece was the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group, which marked the first bid to create a formal multilateral framework for regional security issues. Six ACRS plenary sessions, co-hosted by the United States and Russia, were held and a series of regional confidence-building measures were outlined before the working group slowly broke down by 1995 under the weight of regional animosities and implementation challenges. While all of the working groups have long been defunct, one tangible result survives: the Middle East Desalination Research Center in Oman, created in 1995. The center conducts transboundary water research and development projects, and its membership includes Israel, Jordan, Oman, Palestine, and Qatar as well as several Western nations.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn –Key To Black Sea
Ellehuus, 19 (Ellehuus, Rachel. “Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving.” Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving | Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 Dec. 2019, www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving.) [Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.//BVN SC]
Yet these foundational factors remain valid: Turkey’s geopolitical position at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa still provides NATO with needed political and operational reach, and Turkey continues to benefit from the collective military power of NATO. With the relationship close to (if not at) its nadir, Turkey and NATO, with the support of the EU, need to take active measures to anchor it for the future, while avoiding steps that could destroy the relationship entirely. Assuming that Turkey is in fact interested in rebuilding the relationship with its NATO allies, there are several active measures NATO and Turkey can take now to create a foothold for the future. The key is to focus on areas of mutual interest where NATO involvement is critical to Turkish strategic interests and where Turkey has a unique role to play in NATO. The first of these is the Black Sea, where Turkey, as well as fellow NATO Black Sea littoral states Romania and Bulgaria, are trying to balance an increasing Russian military presence. While previously resistant to a greater NATO role in the Black Sea for fear it would dilute its own influence in the region, Turkey now sees the dangers of leaving Russian influence and presence in [the] Black Sea unchecked. With its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and entry into the Syrian civil war in 2015, Russia has significantly increased its presence and combat capabilities in both the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. NATO now faces an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble that restricts allies’ freedom of maneuver in the Black Sea, with Russia capable of attacking from both land and sea. To effectively counter this, NATO should establish a more continuous presence in the Black Sea, revive the idea of a permanent NATO maritime fleet in the Black Sea, and consider basing more counter-A2/AD capabilities in Turkey and Romania. Importantly, Turkey holds unique power to control access to the Black Sea thanks to the 1936 Montreux Convention, which governs naval passage through the Turkish Straits, limiting the number of foreign vessels that can enter the Black Sea via the Straits and how long these vessels can stay. This access is important to both Russia and NATO. Whereas Turkey has proven to be an impartial and reliable enforcer of the treaty, Russia has pushed the boundaries of Montreux repeatedly since the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and, more recently, impeded the course of NATO vessels that have entered and departed the Black Sea in compliance with the treaty. More behavior along these lines, or a Russian attempt to leverage its new, closer relationship with Turkey to secure more favorable access to the Black Sea, would likely increase Turkey’s unease and lead it to rely more on NATO as a counterbalance. For its part, the European Union should closely watch Turkey’s proposed construction of the Istanbul Canal to connect the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara (and, as such, the Aegean and Mediterranean seas), which is reportedly drawing interest from Chinese as well as Russian investors. As the canal would allow ships to sail between the Mediterranean and Black Sea without transiting the Turkish Straits, and thus abiding by the restrictions of Montreux, the European Union and United States should consider investing in this infrastructure project to ensure they are in a position to work with Turkey to ensure free and fair transit through the canal.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn –Key To Black Sea
Aydogan, 21 (Merve Aydogan, 06-14-2021, accessed on 1-3-2022, Aa.com, "Turkey remains as indispensable member of NATO for 69 years", SC)
NATO forces in Aegean, Black Sea Turkey provides permanent naval assistance to NATO missions in the Aegean Sea, presenting surveillance, reconnaissance, and monitoring activities to prevent illegal crossings. Turkey also supports Standing NATO Maritime Groups' (SNMG) activities in the Black Sea and Aegean, which is included as part of NATO obligations. Moreover, Turkey also hosts LANDCOM, NATO's land command, in the Aegean coastal province of Izmir. The NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – one of nine NATO land forces headquarters with high readiness level – is also stationed in Istanbul. Turkey also took command of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) in 2021. "Built around Turkey's 66th Mechanised Infantry Brigade of around 4,200 troops, a total of around 6,400 soldiers will serve on the VJTF," according to NATO. Turkey's latest armed vehicles, anti-tank missiles and howitzers have been allocated to the task force.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn –Turkey-West Increasing
Dalay 5-20 (Galip Dalay is a CATS Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkish Studies (CATS) at SWP. (5-20-2022). Deciphering Turkey's geopolitical balancing and anti-westernism in its relations with Russia. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/deciphering-turkeys-geopolitical-balancing-and-anti-westernism-in-its-relations-with-russia//BVN SC)
While discontent with the West and anti-Westernism have facilitated cordial and cooperative relations between Moscow and Ankara, Russian geopolitical revisionism has almost invariably pushed Turkey closer to the West. The logic here is straightforward. First, Russian revisionism poses direct security threats to Turkey. Historically, the centre of gravity of Turkish-Russian rivalry has been the Black Sea. From the Turkish perspective, Russia’s actions – from the war in Georgia to annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine – all decisively tilt the balance of power in this region in Russia’s favour. Although Russia’s policy in each of these cases might have specifics and contextual nuances, taken together they point to one unmistakable outcome: Russian revisionism in the post-Soviet space and an aspiration to turn the region into a sphere of domination. This will only aggravate the Turkish threat perception vis-à-vis Moscow. Second, the post-Soviet space is also Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood. If successful, the Russian policy will restrict Ankara’s geopolitical room for manoeuvre in this region, and undermine its standing from the Black Sea to the Balkans and the South Caucasus to Central Asia. Additionally, Turkish and Western interests are in broad alignment in these regions, so Moscow’s geopolitical revisionism is likely to bring Turkey and the West relatively closer together.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – No Link–Turkey Does Both
Kusa 6/13 (Iliya Kusa, Iliya Kusa is a Kyiv-based author and analyst of international relations with the Ukrainian Institute for the Future. For the past six years he has been writing about Middle East, Ukrainian foreign policy after 2014, and European politics. A special focus of his expertise is dedicated to the Middle East and North Africa, June, 13, 2022, “Turkey’s Goals in the Russia-Ukraine War”, //RM)
Of the many countries struggling to find a proper approach to the Russia-Ukraine war, Turkey seems to have landed on the most controversial yet comfortable one. Ankara has managed to preserve its relationship with both Moscow and Kyiv without endangering its own geostrategic calculations in the region while at the same time avoiding joining ranks with Western countries in imposing crippling sanctions on Russia. The role of a key mediator, which President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was so eager to take on, has allowed Turkey to conveniently position itself in the middle of the fight—and not just in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine but more broadly in the struggle between Russia and the West, and even globally between the West and the numerous non-Western countries that have preferred to strike a more cautious and balanced approach to the war. The overall political and ideological polarization incited by the war in Ukraine has threatened many countries that have worked for years to build a balanced, pragmatic, multivector foreign policy. Now many of them find themselves having to make a hard choice. Western countries under U.S. guidance are urging them to make common cause against Russia, which often means abandoning their balancing act between major powers. As the war has shown, in a highly tense international environment, a posture of neutrality and balancing on the part of countries struggling not to choose sides is not welcome by the conflicting parties, which strive to mobilize support for their own efforts. Turkey in particular has had to carve a path that does not lethally threaten relations with either Russia or the EU. The war in Ukraine has presented Ankara with both opportunities and risks. After the 2015 centralization of political power in the hands of Recep Erdoğan, the president moved his personal ambitions and goals to the forefront of Turkey’s foreign policy. In particular, he has sought to make Turkey a regional Muslim superpower capable of designing and guiding a new “post-Western” security architecture in greater Eurasia and one of the first non-Western powers to shape the new multipolar world order. To preserve this course, Turkey has had to find an appropriate way to deal with the Ukraine challenge. In essence, two global objectives became a priority for Turkey when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24: to preserve its global and regional positions, which Turkey has managed to consolidate and enhance after 2016; as well as to reinforce Ankara’s influence and amplify earlier achievements to ensure further expansion. Objective 1: Preserving Turkey’s Global and Regional Positions The first global objective is reflected in several developments that became essential in Ankara’s quest to hold its ground. First, the war in Ukraine has threatened Turkey’s pragmatic multipolar approach underpinning its foreign policy. The political coalescence of NATO and EU countries against Russia could not have escaped Turkey’s attention. Nor could Ankara remain on the sidelines and refrain from getting involved, given its close ties with several Western countries and its NATO commitments. On the other hand, Turkey did not want to degrade its relations with Russia by joining the Western-led sanctions, in which Ankara has declined to participate since 2014. For Turkey, Russia has been an important trading partner ($32.5 billion as of 2021), a key source of foreign investment (more than $10 billion), a colossal source of tourists (Russians account for almost 5 million visits, or 1 percent of all foreign tourist visitation), a crucial energy supplier, and an important “frenemy” in several regional playgrounds where Turkey (though not without Russia) has been able to actually accomplish something, such as in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey has been able to maintain relations with Russia and the West, thereby sustaining its desired global position, by assuming the role of a key mediator between Russia and Ukraine. This formal role gives Ankara a good reason not to get involved in sanctioning Moscow. Second, the war in Ukraine, with its subsequent social, economic, political, and transnational repercussions, has endangered stability on a number of regional issues that are vital for Turkey’s security, reputation, and international self-reliance. For years, Turkey’s regional policy was built on a situational partnership with Moscow. The possible weakening of Russia as a result of the war in Ukraine could throw the regional balance in the South Caucasus, the Black Sea region, and the Levant into disarray, strengthening, for instance, Iran in Syria—and Iran is one of Turkey’s less preferred competitors. Regional destabilization is not in Ankara’s interests, especially in light of the substantial financial and economic difficulties Turkey has been struggling with since last autumn. Objective 2: Reinforcing Ankara’s Influence The second global objective has to do with furthering Turkey’s political, economic, trade, and geopolitical expansion. By shaping the dynamics of the current crisis, Turkey is trying to “ride the tide” and use it to its advantage. Its tactics to achieve this goal include taking the place of Western companies on the Russian market, accruing tourist and financial flows from Russia, thereby bypassing sanctions, and gaining political ground in regional affairs by taking on a mediation role, forcing the conflicting parties to consult with and through Ankara on issues of war, peace, maritime trade, the demining of the Black Sea, and the restoration of essential Ukrainian wheat exports. In addition, many Russians, fearing Western sanctions, have moved to Turkey, investing millions in the local real estate market and registering businesses there, which is also a lucrative deal for Ankara. (Ankara offers citizenship for a $400,000 investment.) Finally, Turkey sees an opportunity to achieve its long-sought goal of becoming the major gas transit hub for Europe. With the European allies determined more than ever to reduce their dependence on Russian gas imports, Turkey is offering its services and lobbying for realization of a long-discussed new subsea pipeline between Israel and Turkey, one that would allow eastern Mediterranean gas to reach Europe through Turkey. Even more important for Ankara in this context is exploiting the momentum to strengthen its own standing in the world. As Western partners search for support in containing the Russian threat and dealing with an array of war-related consequences, Ankara sees the time is ripe to make the West drop sanctions against the Turkish defense industry and embrace Turkey as an equal partner. It is with this logic in mind that Turkey’s leadership unexpectedly jumped on NATO’s expansion process with bold demands as to what Sweden, Finland, and NATO member states should do to obtain Ankara’s consent. And it is this tactic of getting the most out of concessions from all parties that drove Erdoğan to announce a new military operation in northern Syria against the Western-backed Kurds, thereby endangering the regional positions of both Russia and the United States. All in all, Ankara’s predominant stance on the Russia-Ukraine war is not about Russia or Ukraine at all. It is about ensuring that any future postwar settlement in the region and the world will necessarily include Turkey’s interests, and ideally establish Turkey as a stakeholder in the process. Turkey’s serious economic problems, however, mean these plans may have to be adjusted. The key aspect of the Russia-Ukraine war for Erdoğan and his government remains not so much support for Ukraine or Russia as an opportunity for Erdoğan to strengthen his position on the international stage at the expense of either country’s interests by proactively practicing diplomacy amid the developing crisis.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – No Link–NATO Over Russia
Bardakçı 21 (Mehmet Bardakçı, 12-6-21, “Is a Strategic Partnership Between Turkey and Russia Feasible at the Expense of Turkey’s Relations with the EU and NATO?”, Comparative Southeast European Studies, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2021-0001/html?lang=en//BVN SC)
The article mainly contends that since the real and expected benefits from the European Union (EU) and NATO were not delivered sufficiently from Turkey’s perspective, Turkey looked for alternatives and collaborated with Russia more intensely in recent years. Turkey’s cooperation with Russia was also facilitated by several global, political, economic, conjectural, security-related, and individual-level factors. Another argument of the study is that despite Turkey’s intensive collaboration with Russia, it is not feasible for Turkey to build a strategic partnership with it in the short- and medium-term at the expense of its relations with NATO and the EU. The main reasons for this are, in addition to the institutional and social shortcomings, geostrategic divergences, Russia’s inadequacy as an economic actor, the pitfalls of an asymmetric relationship with Russia, the security risks posed by Russia, NATO’s continuing importance for Turkey’s security needs, and the incompatibility of Russia’s and Turkey’s political systems. Keywords: EU; NATO; Russia; strategic partnership; Turkish foreign policy Introduction The arrival of the Russian S-400 air defence system in Turkey in July 2019 was welcomed enthusiastically by many in Turkey. This breakthrough event was even described by some in Turkey as the “country’s liberation from the West” (Tol and Taşpınar 2019, 107). Almost a decade ago, the question started to be asked as to whether Turkey was drifting away from the West, especially since it had approached Iran and voted against sanctions on Iran over its nuclear programme in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as well as clashed with Israel over the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. This time, however, this question is more pronounced and the likelihood of a strategic shift became more tangible with the arrival of a weapon system from a country that has been confronting the West recently. Given that Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union (EU) have been at a nadir in recent years, many regarded the acquisition of the Russian weapon system as a precursor of Turkey’s withdrawal from the North Atlantic Alliance (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO) and the EU. In addition to many other factors, Moscow’s and Ankara’s bitter relations with the West are a major reason why the two countries have closed ranks in recent years. A milestone for Moscow’s relationship with the West was its annexation of Crimea in March 2014 while the coup plot against the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government in Turkey in July 2016 marked a watershed in Ankara’s relations with the West. Russia had to confront a series of economic sanctions from the West after 2014 while Turkey was deeply disappointed with its Western allies for their slow and reluctant condemnation of the coup attempt. Ankara has even aired doubts that the West might have been behind the coup attempt. These events have helped peak the two countries’ deeply-ingrained sense of distrust towards the West. As one observer put, “Despite their obvious differences and even antagonisms, Russia and Turkey are united by one thing—the fact that they are two great powers connected historically, culturally, and geographically to a Europe that never fully accepted them as one of their own” (Lukyanov, People with Big Ambitions, The Moscow Times, 19 July 2016). A major objective of this article is to unpack the puzzle of whether Russia could replace the EU and NATO as a strategic partner for Turkey. The article contends that in addition to some factors facilitating the Russo–Turkish rapprochement, Turkey searched for alternatives, collaborating with Russia owing to the decline in the real and expected benefits from the EU and NATO from the Turkish perspective. Another major contention of this article is that despite the close collaboration between Moscow and Ankara, in particular after the coup attempt against the Turkish Government in July 2016, it is hard for Turkey to forge a strategic partnership with Russia because of significant divergent geostrategic interests, Russia’s inadequacy as an economic actor, the downsides of an asymmetric relationship with Russia, the security risks posed by Russia, the continuing importance of NATO for Turkey’s security as well as the incompatibility of Turkey’s and Russia’s political systems. Moreover, the absence of a solid social basis and the lack of institutionalization in their relations further make it infeasible for Turkey to switch from the Transatlantic Alliance to Russia. The study is divided into three sections. The first part concerns the motives that brought Moscow and Ankara together, including, first and foremost, their strained relationship with the West, economic interests, conjectural factors such as the Syrian conflict, transformation of the global governance system, and similarity of their political culture based on security and personal harmony between the leaders. The second part draws attention to the limitations in the relationship, and the third part explains why a strategic partnership between Turkey and Ankara and at the expense of Turkey’s partnership with the EU and NATO is not feasible in the foreseeable future. Finally, the conclusion wraps up the article.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Ukraine Thumper
Cook 3-3 (Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He is an expert on Arab and Turkish politics as well as U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook is the author of False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle East; The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square, which won the 2012 gold medal from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey. Oxford University Press is publishing his next book, The End Of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East in 2022, 3/3/2022, “Where Turkey Stands on the Russia-Ukraine War”, Council On Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/where-turkey-stands-russia-ukraine-war//BVN SC)
The Turkish government has designated the Russian invasion as a “war,” giving it the right under the 1936 Montreux Convention to close the Bosporus Strait—which leads to the Black Sea—to warships. Although this action applies to any naval vessel, it is clearly aimed at Russia’s fleet in case Moscow seeks to reinforce the firepower it already has there. Turkey’s decision is, at least, an important symbolic one in support of Ukraine. A Russian submarine surfaces in the Bosporus with Istanbul in the background A Russian submarine sails in the Bosporus on its way to the Black Sea. Despite the restrictions on warships in the Bosporus, it seems clear that Turkey—like other countries including Israel—has sought a strategically defensible but morally questionable middle ground. Though Turkey voted for a UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia, it has not sanctioned Russia or closed its airspace to Russian aircraft. Some observers have been quick to highlight the differences between Turkish policy and the definitive pro-Ukraine approaches of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), implying that Ankara is trying to have it both ways—remaining rhetorically committed to Ukraine’s independence and offering to mediate the conflict while tilting toward Russia. There is some logic to this, especially after the purchase of the Russian-made air defense system known as the S-400. However, it is less a tilt than a recognition that Turkey’s interests are intertwined with Russia in critical areas, most importantly Syria. There, Turkey wants to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish state and maintain pressure on the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a group linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the United States and Turkey have designated a terrorist organization. To accomplish these goals, Turkish officials have to consider Russian sensibilities, as Moscow is the most important external actor in Syria and can thus complicate Turkey’s military operations there and frustrate its diplomatic efforts. In recent years, Turkey has pursued what can best be described as foreign policy independence. As an important power in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Caucusus, Ankara has sought a multifaceted foreign policy that has, at times, conflicted with its NATO allies. For example, in 2017, Turkey decided to purchase S-400s. This step coincided with a growing dialogue between Ankara and Moscow that included moves to upgrade economic ties and discussions about deepening diplomatic and even military relations. At the same time, Turkey and Russia have found themselves on opposite ends of major regional conflicts, including in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, a region over which Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a recent war. Even while they were supporting different sides in these places, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin maintained a dialogue. What about Ukraine? Turkey has generally supported Ukrainian independence and the country’s territorial integrity. Erdogan denounced Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and has advocated on behalf of Crimean Tatars (a Turkic ethnic group) who have suffered under Russian rule. Turkey sold armed drones to Ukraine ahead of Russia’s most recent invasion, though some reports indicate that only about twelve to twenty were delivered. Still, in whatever number, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones are lethal and have been deployed to great effect in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. How is this war likely to affect Turkey’s interests in the region? Turkey has sought to expand its trade and commercial relations with both Russia and Ukraine. It is also a destination for Russian tourists and an importer of oil and gas. To the extent that this war affects these ties and drives up energy prices, the Turkish economy—which is already experiencing upwards of 50 percent inflation—will feel the repercussions.