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Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Russia-Iran Ties
Dixon et. al. 7-19 (Robyn Dixon is a foreign correspondent on her third stint in Russia, after almost a decade reporting there beginning in the early 1990s. In November 2019 she joined The Washington Post as Moscow bureau chief, Kareem Fahim has served as the Istanbul bureau chief and a Middle East correspondent for The Washington Post since September 2016. Previously, he worked for 11 years as a staff reporter for the New York Times, with assignments on the metro desk and as a Cairo-based foreign correspondent reporting on the Arab uprisings and their aftermath, Karina Tsui is a reporting intern on The Washington Post’s Foreign desk. Before The Post, she was a Toni Stabile fellow for investigative reporting at Columbia Journalism School, 7-19-22, “Putin makes rare international trip to Iran amid isolation from the West”, The Washington Post, SC)
RIGA, Latvia — Russian President Vladimir Putin, shunned by much of the world after his invasion of Ukraine, traveled to Iran on Tuesday in a show of deepening ties between the two nations, united in their isolation from the West. Putin met with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, and Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi soon after arriving in Tehran, and then with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Later in the evening, he held talks with both Raisi and Erdogan, part of his first trip outside the former Soviet Union since the start of the Ukraine war in February. Khamenei said the West did not want Russia to be strong, describing the United States as “cunning” and NATO as “dangerous,” according to Iranian state media. “As regards Ukraine, if you did not take the initiative, the other side would have initiated the war,” IRNA quoted Khamenei as saying, echoing a common talking point from Putin. Putin also discussed trade, energy, transportation and the conflict in Syria in his meeting with Raisi, who is emerging as a key ally of Moscow. Putin admitted Monday in a meeting with government officials that Western sanctions had created “colossal” difficulties for the Russian economy. He has sought to expand trade with China, Asia and the Middle East to make up for plummeting imports from the West. Putin’s only other international trip since February was late last month when he flew to Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. In his meeting with Raisi, he extolled growing trade ties with Iran, sending a message to his Russian audience that while Western companies have left the country in droves, Moscow still has reliable friends. “We can boast of record figures in terms of trade growth,” Putin said. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia and Iran were used to Western sanctions, which he called the price of their independence. “Iran has been under sanctions of various sorts for decades … which, as we should point out outright, we view as absolutely illegitimate from the standpoint of international law,” Peskov said in comments to Iranian media broadcast on Russian state television. He said that improving relations with Iran was “a long-term line of our foreign policy,” adding that a strategic cooperation deal will probably be signed in the coming months. The White House has claimed that Russia wants to acquire surveillance drones from Iran for use in Ukraine, but Peskov said this was not on the agenda in Tehran. The presence of Erdogan, who has tried to position himself as a mediator between Moscow and Kyiv, raised hopes that he could help build on progress made last week in Turkey, when Russia and Ukraine agreed to preliminary steps that would allow grain shipments to resume from Ukrainian ports.
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Javad Heiran-Nia 3/30, director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran, 3/30/2022, “Iran won’t break with Russia over Ukraine. Here’s why.,” , RES
Russia has abandoned a recent attempt to exploit the Vienna talks to gain sanctions relief beyond what was guaranteed in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). However, there are no signs that Tehran is walking away from its relationship with Moscow despite Russia’s actions toward Iran and its invasion of Ukraine. Any improvement in Iran’s relationship with the West has always been a concern for Russia. Its March 5 demand for a written guarantee from the United States that trade with Iran not be affected by new US sanctions imposed on Russia for the invasion is the latest example of Moscow playing the Iranian card and jeopardizing Tehran’s interests to secure its own interests. This isn’t the first time that Russia has used nuclear talks in such a manner. Former Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, said in March 2021 during a leaked interview about Russia’s destructive role in the Iran nuclear talks: “The Russians have been trying to prevent the nuclear deal (JCPOA)since 2015 and [Foreign Minister] Sergei Lavrov wanted to disrupt everything on the night of the agreement. After the JCPOA, when Lavrov returned to Russia, he was attacked by the Russian media. Why did you allow this agreement to be reached and Iran to get closer to the West?” On the other hand, Russia doesn’t want Iran to become a nuclear weapons state or be subjected to sanctions, since this would undermine trade and technical relations with Iran. Russia’s policy is to maintain crises that can be controlled and hinder the improvement of Iran-West relations. As Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group said in December 2021: “Russia is seeking to revive the agreement because alternatives to Russia are not attractive at all. If Iran goes to nuclear weapons, it is possible that some other actors and Russia’s neighbors, such as Turkey and even Azerbaijan, want to go in this direction, or the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, and this will be a real big problem for Russia.” However, Rajab Safarov, a former member of the Russian Federation Presidential Political Council and head of the Iran Commission at the Moscow Chamber of Commerce and Industry, said in March that a pro-Western Iran is far more dangerous to Russia than a nuclear Iran. Russia fears that a further expansion of Iran’s nuclear program could lead to new conflict in the region and a bigger US military presence. It’s also in Russia’s interest that sanctions against Iran be lifted to expand trade relations in the form of a twenty-year cooperation document, while preventing Iran from improving relations with the West. Moscow also seeks Iran’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (Iran’s membership process in the SCO takes about two years and, after the technical and legal process concludes, Tehran will formally join this organization). “We are working on a draft of a new agreement between the two countries, which defines the principles of our cooperation in the international arena,” said Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov on March 15. “This document has increased the volume of economic relations with Iran by 82 percent during the sanctions period. No illegal sanctions can stop the escalating growth of Iran and Russia.” Still, the Iran-Russia agreement hasn’t had much economic benefit for Iran so far. Trade with Russia currently accounts for only 4 percent of Iran’s imports and 2 percent of Iran’s exports—only about $4 billion a year. Tehran plans to increase its trade volume with Russia to $25 billion, but that goal seems overly ambitious. Iran also sees the twenty-year agreement to strengthen its security cooperation with Russia and obtain new weapons. On January 21, Iran held a tripartite maneuver with the Russian and Chinese navies. Tehran is reportedly seeking to purchase Russian Sukhoi-5 fighter jets and the S-400 missile defense system. The government of President Ebrahim Raisi also seeks to utilize a twenty-five-year cooperation agreement with China to bolster a “look to the East” policy first introduced by the administration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad during an earlier bout of US-led sanctions. Additionally, a February 27-published document on the transformation of the government of Raisi in Iran’s foreign relations doesn’t mention North America. This document does seek lifting sanctions but doesn’t view the nuclear deal as a basis for improving relations with the West. Iran’s political elites see the future of the international order as belonging to the East. They argue that cooperation with the West on issues such as Afghanistan and Iraq didn’t improve relations, as the George W. Bush administration labeled Iran an “axis of evil.” The Raisi position isn’t universally shared in Iran. Reformists and even moderate conservatives as well as the middle class and many ordinary people have reacted negatively to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Domestic opponents see Iran’s long-term agreements with Russia and China as unilateral concessions comparable to the treaties of Golestan and Turkmenchay, in which imperial Persia gave up important territories in the Caucasus to tsarist Russia. Accordingly, the content of these agreements has been kept secret, leading parliament speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf to comment on January 26 that “a contract has not been legally concluded, otherwise the parliament would have been informed.” Russia did abandon its effort to hold the Vienna talks hostage after Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian visited Moscow on March 15, but Iran appears to have granted concessions. During the visit, the two countries discussed cooperation in the Caspian Sea, the EAEU and the acceleration of Iran’s membership in the SCO. It should be noted that Russia views its policy towards Iran as a package. In other words, Russia connects different issues and makes the support of one issue conditional on receiving concessions on another. For example, Russia has linked its support in the Vienna talks to the Iranian ratification of a Convention on the Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea, signed on August 2018 at the Fifth Summit of the Caspian littoral states in Aktau, Kazakhstan. Tehran had previously considered Iran’s share in the Caspian Sea to be 50 percent, citing a 1921 Treaty of Friendship and 1940 Soviet–Iranian Trade and Navigation Agreement, but then agreed to a 20 percent share. Per the median lines formula, Iran’s share is actually about 13 percent. However, based on the Aktau agreement, it would be 11 percent, according to former Iranian member of parliament Mahmoud Sadeghi. The agreement benefits Russia by making Moscow the de facto naval power in the Caspian Sea, granting Russian warships the right to operate unhindered and barring the US from any military presence. Russia uses the Iran card to create balance and gain points. Whenever Iran’s relations with the West improve, Moscow balances with gestures towards Iran’s rivals. On the other hand, whenever Iran’s relations with the West is bad, Russia approaches Iran and seeks closer ties. Despite extensive Iranian-Russian cooperation in Syria, Moscow doesn’t want Iran to have widespread influence in Syria. Allied Iranian forces stationed near the Golan Heights have retreated under Russian pressure. Moscow also gives the green light to Tel Aviv for freedom of action in Syria. Days after Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett traveled to Moscow and met with President Vladimir Putin, Israel assassinated two senior IRGC officers on the outskirts of Damascus in early March. Recent Israeli attacks on the Iranian-controlled port of Latakia reportedly include covert Russian-Israeli cooperation in Syria. Despite Russia’s attempts to use relations for its own benefit and widespread international condemnation of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Iran isn’t walking away from its relationship with Moscow. Iranian officials have refrained from condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine and blamed the crisis on the United States and expansion of NATO. Raisi, for example, said on February 24 that he understands Russia’s security concerns; “NATO expansion is a serious threat to the stability and security of independent states in different regions,” the Iranian president told Putin. In the United Nations General Assembly, Iran abstained from voting on a resolution condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Raisi government appears committed to the “look to the East” policy, whatever happens with the JCPOA. It sees Russia as a strategic partner that is both a counterweight to Western pressure and a pillar for the survival of the Iranian political system.
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Bloomberg News 5/25, news service provider based in NYC, 5/25/2022, “Russia, Iran Tighten Trade Ties Amid US Sanctions,” , RES
Russia said it’s strengthening trade with Iran, boosting the economies of both nations as they contend with heavy US sanctions. “We agreed to accelerate the preparation of agreements on a free trade zone, and discussed cooperation in the nuclear area in detail,” Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said in Tehran after meeting with the co-chairman of the Russian-Iranian intergovernmental commission. Also discussed were oil and gas supply swaps and increasing joint investments in hydrocarbon projects, he said. Novak, who co-chairs the intergovernmental commission from Russia’s side and oversees the nation’s energy affairs, is visiting Tehran as both nations seek to galvanize economic ties. Trade between the nations rose 81% to a record $3.3 billion in 2021, but Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi said that level was “not acceptable” and vowed to increase two-way commerce to $10 billion a year. On Wednesday, top officials set even more ambitious target. Iran and Russia plan to raise trade to $40 billion a year by 2025, said Iranian Oil Minister Javad Owji, who co-chairs the commission from the Iranian side, according to the state-run Islamic Republic News Agency. Bilateral trade will be conducted in the countries’ own currencies, according to Owji. The energy industries of both countries are sanctioned by the US -- in response to Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, and following America’s withdrawal from the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal. “We’re on track to raise trade, economic, logistics, investment, financial, banking cooperation, despite the unprecedented pressure that Russia is experiencing,” Novak said at a meeting with businesses in Tehran earlier, as reported by news service Interfax. Trade between Russia and Iran rose by more than 10% in the first quarter, he said. “We are ready to continue the implementation of already-initiated projects and to launch new ones,” Novak said. Among those is the expansion of the Russian-built Bushehr nuclear plant. Talks with Moscow continue on the second and third phases of the facility, which will require “a lot of investment,” said Behrouz Kamalvandi, a spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency. Moscow is also interested in developing the long-delayed North-South Transport Corridor, a rail cargo route from Russia to India that would boost trade from the Caspian and Persian Gulf regions, according to Novak.
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Tehran Times 6/22, 6/22/2022, “Iran, Russia upgrade ties,” , RES
Russian state news agency TASS said Lavrov will meet Iranian President Ayatollah Seyed Ebrahim Raisi and Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian during his two-day visit. Lavrov is expected to discuss with Iranian officials a full range of issues spanning economic cooperation, and political consultations on bilateral and international issues. The visit is noteworthy for two major reasons: First, it is Lavrov’s first visit to Tehran since Ayatollah Raisi assumed the presidency in August 2021. Second, the visit comes amid growing economic sanctions by the West against Russia over the Ukraine war and uncertainties over the talks in Vienna over reviving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. During Lavrov’s visit, “issues around the signing of a long-term cooperation agreement and work to expand bilateral economic contacts amid the West’s tightening sanctions will be discussed. Cooperation in regional security, concerning Syria and Afghanistan, will also be key,” according to TASS. Russia is facing blanket Western sanctions over the Ukraine war and it has overtaken Iran as the most sanctioned nation in the world, according to press reports. Exploring avenues for cooperation against sanctions is on the agenda of the visit, according to Al Araby Al Jadeed. Citing Iranian sources, the Qatari-owned newspaper said Lavrov and Iranian officials will discuss “the intensification of Iranian-Russian cooperation in the face of U.S. sanctions.” The newspaper pointed out that Russian officials visited Iran secretly and publicly in recent months to “benefit from its experience in facing sanctions.” Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak paid a visit to Iran on May 25. The Russian official met Iranian Petroleum Minister Javad Owji and First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber in Tehran. Earlier in January, President Raisi visited Russia and met with President Vladimir Putin. This exchange of visits is part of President Raisi’s foreign policy agenda of fostering relations with neighboring countries and major non-Western powers. The policy, known as the Neighborhood Policy, saw Iran strengthening its relations with central Asian countries, China, Russia, and some Arab states. A major part of this policy is to boost ties with countries under Western sanctions such as Venezuela, Syria, and Russia in what came to be known as the club of sanctioned countries. To this end, Iran signed long-term cooperation documents with China and Venezuela. It is in the process of signing another one with Russia. Officials and experts of the sanctioned countries have voiced support for this kind of cooperation. Marco Fernandes, a researcher at Tricontinental Institute for Social Research, has said that the BRICS group of nations needs to focus on creating an alternative to the U.S. dollar’s hegemony in global transactions, which gives Washington leverage over its opponents, according to TASS. Fernandes added, “After reserves and assets worth tens of billions of dollars were confiscated from countries like Venezuela, Iran, and Afghanistan, the U.S. and EU decision to freeze Russian reserves worth over $300 billion raised alarms all over the world, underscoring the need to find an alternative to the dollar’s dominance.” Overcoming the dominance of the U.S. dollar over bilateral trade between the sanctioned countries is a major goal of the efforts to found the club of sanctioned countries.
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Nasser Karimi 7/19 and Vladimir Isachenkov, 7/19/2022, “Isolated by West, Putin arrives in Tehran to deepen Russia-Iran relations,” , RES
TEHRAN, Iran (AP) — Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived Tuesday in Iran for a visit intended to deepen ties with regional heavyweights as part of Moscow’s challenge to the United States and Europe amid its grinding campaign in Ukraine. In only his second trip abroad since Russian tanks rolled into its neighbor in February, Putin is scheduled to hold talks with Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan about the pressing issues facing the region, including the conflict in Syria and a UN-backed proposal to resume exports of Ukrainian grain to ease the global food crisis. As the West heaps sanctions on Russia and the costly campaign drags on, Putin is seeking to bolster ties with Tehran, a fellow target of severe US sanctions and a potential military and trade partner. In recent weeks, Russian officials visited an airfield in central Iran at least twice to review Tehran’s weapons-capable drones for possible use in Ukraine, the White House has alleged.
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Iran-Russia Relations › 2NC UQ/Link Toolbox › 2NC – UQ – Russia-Iran Ties
Tasnim News Agency 6/30, a private news agency in Iran launched in 2012. Its purpose is to cover a variety of political, social, economic and international subjects along with other fields, 6/30/2022, “President Highlights Great Potential for Expansion of Iran, Russia Relations,” , RES
TEHRAN (Tasnim) – Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi hailed the high level of the ties between Tehran and Moscow but said there is still great potential for developing the relations. “Relations between the two countries in the field of trade and energy cooperation are at a high level, but given the existing fields in the two countries, these relations still have great potential for expansion,” Raisi said in a Wednesday meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Turkmenistan's capital, Ashgabat. The two presidents had traveled to Ashgabat to take part in the sixth summit of the Caspian littoral states. “After my (recent) visit to Russia, several reciprocal visits have been made by the relevant officials in order to follow up on the agreements between the two countries, and the implementation process of these agreements is at a good pace,” Raisi said. The Iranian president had paid a two-day visit to Moscow at the head of a delegation in January and met Putin. He described the visit as a "turning point" in bilateral relations between the two countries, saying they could boost their security and trade through maintaining close dialogue. Last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Tehran where he met Raisi, confiding that Moscow was adapting to what he called the West's aggressive policies. “In all the countries experiencing the negative influence of the selfish line taken by the United States and its satellites, there arises the objective need to reconfigure their economic relations so they can avoid relying on the whims and vagaries of our Western partners,” Lavrov said. Last month Moscow said Russia and Iran, which are both under Western sanctions and sit on some of the world’s largest oil and gas reserves, had discussed swapping supplies for oil and gas as well as establishing a logistics hub. On Wednesday, Raisi stressed the need for the two countries to support strengthening of the North-South corridor, saying Iran and Russia have also good capacities for cooperation in the field of energy, including swaps. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) is a multimode network of sea and rail routes that links the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to Iran, India, Russia and North Europe. The Iranian president also stressed the need for mechanisms to strengthen banking and monetary relations between Iran and Russia, stating that financial exchanges between the two countries should be carried out within an independent framework outside the Western financial exchange system so that no country can manipulate it for pressure. Putin expressed his satisfaction with meeting his Iranian counterpart again, saying trade and economic relations between the two countries have increased in recent months, adding the path must continue. The Russian leader also welcomed Raisi's proposal to increase energy cooperation between the two countries, including swaps. Putin also asked the Iranian president to convey his warm greetings to Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei. The two countries have been working to sign a new and improved long-term bilateral cooperation agreement. Iranian officials have said they have been making headways on banking cooperation, most importantly on foreign currency transfers. Bilateral trade surged 80% percent last year, hitting a record high of $4 billion, including $1 billion in Iranian exports, deputy minister of industry, mining and trade Alireza Peyman-Pak has said.
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Vlad Kondratiev 3/30/2022, “Russia and Iran intensify trade and economic ties,” , RES
While the Western world is increasingly moving away from Russian exports, Moscow and Tehran are taking measures to intensify trade and economic cooperation, as evidenced by intensive negotiations between the parties. A delegation of Iranian businessmen will visit Moscow in early April to present industrial and investment potential. Notably, Russia and Iran are working on the issue of combining financial message transmission systems bypassing the SWIFT international system for transferring interbank payments. Tehran is also considering recognising the Russian payment system “Mir” cards. Moreover, Eurasian Economic Union member states are preparing an agreement to establish a free trade zone between them and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Russia-Iran entente on Eurasian current issues and dynamics). Iran – Russia’s potential cooperation in agribusiness, industry and trade On March 18th, 2022, a working meeting was held in Moscow between the Deputy Head of Rosselkhoznadzor Konstantin Savenkov and the Head of the Iranian Plant Protection Organization (IPPO) Jahpur Jamshid Alai Moghadami and the Head of the Iranian Veterinary Organization (IVO) Seyyed Mohammad Aghamiri. The event was attended by senior officials of the Iranian Embassy in Moscow and the Ministry of Agriculture of Russia. The parties confirmed their intention to develop bilateral trade and business relations intensively, adhere to the principles of openness and trust, and build a direct dialogue to resolve emerging issues promptly. The Iranian side said that it is interested in increasing the volume of imports of grains and oilseeds from Russia from the current 7 million tons per year to 12 million tons. In addition, Iran plans to consider opening its market for Russian poultry, lamb and other meat products in the near future. Shortly, Iranian specialists will come to Russia to inspect poultry processing enterprises. As for Iranian food exports to Russia, the talks discussed Iran’s ability to supply up to 2 million tons of vegetables, such as tomatoes, eggplants, cucumbers, peppers, greens and apples. The volume of imports of these crops to Russia by the Iranian side is estimated at 570,000 tons. The parties discussed in detail the existing quarantine and plant protection systems in Russia and Iran, the mechanisms for ensuring phytosanitary and veterinary safety, which allow for strict control over the supply of products for export. During the meeting, an agreement was reached to promptly complete work on two agreements that will regulate the interaction of the parties in the field of the safe use of pesticides and agrochemicals and allow for the establishment of electronic document management for traceability of trade processes. A separate topic of the dialogue was the export of dairy products from Iran. Rosselkhoznadzor reported that after the reconstruction, the international checkpoint “Yarag-Kazmalyar” (Republic of Dagestan) is starting to work, the import of products through which will significantly simplify logistics between countries. The Russian department noted that Iranian enterprises certified for export consistently supply Russia with a wide range of dairy products in consumer packaging, including cheese, butter, and cream. In a short time, the Rosselkhoznadzor will send detailed explanations to the Iranian Veterinary Service regarding the situation with frozen concentrated cream, the import of which to Russia is temporarily limited. A few days after the talks in Moscow, on March 23th, 2022, a working meeting was held between the Russian Ambassador to Iran, Levan Jagaryan and the head of the Trade Development Organization, Deputy Minister of Industry, Mines and Trade of Iran A. Peymanpak. Rustam Zhiganshin, Trade Representative of Russia in Iran, reportedly took part in the meeting. At the talks, the Iranian side confirmed the growing interest of the country’s business circles in expanding trade and economic cooperation with Russia. It was announced that a delegation of Iranian businessmen is scheduled to visit Moscow in early April to present industrial and investment potential. More than forty companies producing food products, seafood, cosmetics, household chemicals, construction and sanitary materials, leather and textile products, accessories, polymers, plastics, medicines have already expressed their readiness to hold meetings at the site of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation. During the conversation, A. Peymanpak spoke about the demand for Russian mining equipment and machinery, buses and minibuses, locomotives, ships, agricultural raw materials in Iran and expressed the seriousness of intentions to implement joint investment projects in the automotive industry, medicine and agriculture. Rustam Zhiganshin informed the Deputy Minister of Industry, Mines and Trade of Iran about the increased number of proposals from Russian companies for cooperation with Iranian partners. In turn, the Head of the Trade Development Organization, A. Peimanpak, assured that the Iranian side would provide the necessary assistance in expanding foreign economic relations with Russia. Against the backdrop of the negotiations held in March, it became known that Russia and Iran are working on the issue of combining financial message transmission systems bypassing the SWIFT international system for transferring interbank payments. Kazem Jalali, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) to Russia, told journalists. “We are making efforts in this direction (connecting Iranian banks to the SPFS) to hold good events in this area in the future,” Jalali said. As the Iranian ambassador noted, his country is also discussing with Russia the recognition of the cards of the Russian payment system “Mir”. “This issue is also on the agenda. We discussed it with our Russian colleagues,” the ambassador said. Notably, the integration of the Iranian payment system Shetab with the Russian MIR was announced in 2017 when a corresponding agreement was signed between the countries. In August 2017, much technical work began, but the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 partially created sanctions risks for certain Russian banks planning to integrate with the Iranian Shetab system. The Financial Message Transfer System (SPFS) of the Bank of Russia was created in response to the risks of a possible disconnection of Russian banks from SWIFT, an international interbank system for transmitting information and making payments. Conclusion In conclusion, one more important event that took place in Tehran in March should be noted. On March 14th-16th, 2022, the second round of negotiations was held to prepare an Agreement on the establishment of a free trade zone between the Eurasian Economic Union and its member states and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The event was attended by representatives of the Eurasian Economic Commission and the Trade Development Organization of Iran, the Russian Foreign Ministry, the Russian Ministry of Economic Development, the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade, various departments of the EAEU member states joined via videoconference. As a result, the parties agreed to hold the next round of talks in Moscow. Recall that the Interim Agreement leading to forming a free trade zone with Iran was signed on May 17th, 2018 and entered into force on October 27th, 2019. As a result, the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Iran are increasing the volume of mutual trade. Thus, according to the Iranian customs service data, the trade turnover between Iran and the EAEU countries for 11 months of the current Iranian year (March 21st, 2021 – February 19th, 2022) increased by 48%, amounting to more than $5 billion.
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Iran Press IP ’20, is an international news agency providing you with real-time visual news content. Iran Press is the first and only Iranian video news agency specializing in video on demand, providing our customers with real-time visual news from Iran, Middle East, and the wider world, broadcast on Eutelsat, on a round-the-clock 24-hour basis, “Iran-Russia relations, stronger than ever: Zarif”, Iran Press, 7/22/20, https://iranpress.com/content/24330
Iran Press/Europe: Addressing the reporters at the end of his visit to Moscow, Mohammad Javad Zarif referred to the constructive talks with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov and his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, saying: "One of the most important topics of this trip was the discussion about the Iran Nuclear Deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the US policies towards it and Russia's very good stance in this regard." Iran's top diplomat further referred to the cooperation between Tehran and Moscow, noting: "Today, our relationship with the Russian Federation is much broader and stronger than the relationship we had 20 years ago." According to Iran's Foreign Minister, regional issues, including Syria, Afghanistan, and Yemen, were other issues that the two sides discussed during the meetings. Regarding his meeting with Putin, Zarif said that talking to Putin and conveying the message was very useful.
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TASS ‘21, Russian News Agency, “Putin pledges aid to Iran in fight against novel coronavirus”, TASS, 2/29/21, https://tass.com/society/1125183
MOSCOW, February 29. /TASS/. Russian President Vladimir Putin in a phone call with his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rouhani offered his condolences over deaths from the new coronavirus in Iran and offered assistance in curbing the spread of the infection, the Kremlin said in a statement on Saturday. "Vladimir Putin offered condolences to Hassan Rouhani over fatalities in the coronavirus infection outbreak in Iran and pledged help aimed at containing the spread of the infection," the statement says.
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Syed Zafar Mehdi ’20, journalist for the Anadolu Agency, “Iran likely to renew 20-year agreement with Russia”, Anadolu Agency, 7/21/20, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-likely-to-renew-20-year-agreement-with-russia/1917909
Iran and Russia are likely to renew their “20-year agreement”, which expires in March 2021, Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said during his official visit to Moscow on Tuesday. Speaking to Iranian media in Moscow, Zarif said another “long-term deal” with Russia is “on the agenda”, terming the relations between the two all-weather allies as “strategic.” Zarif, accompanied by Deputy Foreign Minister Seyyed Abbas Araqchi, left for Moscow early on Tuesday for talks with the Russian officials, including President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. It is the second visit by the Iranian foreign minister to Moscow in a month, and coincides with Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi’s first official visit to Tehran. Zarif had visited Baghdad on Sunday. While it was not immediately clear which “20-year agreement” Zarif was referring to, according to reports it pertains to a series of petrochemical and weapons deals signed by the two sides in 2001. The long-term deals were signed in Kremlin in March 2001 between then Iran’s President Mohammad Khatami and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, when Putin agreed to sell Russian conventional arms to Iran after a gap of six years. In what was the first meeting in four decades between the top political functionaries of the two countries, Moscow had also expressed its willingness to help Iran complete work on the country’s only nuclear power plant in the Persian Gulf region. Since 2001, the relations between the two countries have strengthened while Iran’s relations with the US have gradually deteriorated. Extension of arms embargo Pertinently, Russia is one of the countries that have opposed the US’ demand for extending the UN arms embargo on Iran, which is slated to expire in October this year. The US government officials have upped the ante in recent weeks, calling for extension of arms embargo on Iran, and threatening to invoke sanctions snapback. Commenting on why he chose to visit Moscow just a month after his last visit, Zarif said “continued dialogue with Russia and other friendly countries such as China is essential given the major international developments.”
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Maziar Motamedi 22, a Tehran-based journalist who covers Iran, 1/21/2022, “What next for Iran and Russia ties after Raisi-Putin meeting?,” , RES
Tehran, Iran – Prior to his departure for Moscow this week, Ebrahim Raisi expressed hope that the visit, the first by an Iranian president in almost five years, would lead to a “turning point” in his country’s relations with Russia. In the Russian capital, both Raisi and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, supported improving bilateral ties during a three-hour meeting on Wednesday in which they also discussed regional and international issues. For their part, Iran’s petroleum and economy ministers who accompanied Raisi said their talks with their counterparts exceeded expectations. Without disclosing many details, the ministers said agreements were made in trade, energy, transportation and banking sectors and promised that the results would be felt in the foreseeable future. Following the two-day visit, analysts said Iran and Russia were on track to improve their bilateral ties across the board – but the scale and timing were complicated by a number of factors. As in previous years, comprehensive United States sanctions on Iran are sure to complicate any commitments, for as long as they persist. Meanwhile, the record figure of Iran-Russia bilateral trade that exceeded $3.5bn in 2021, according to Iran’s ambassador in Moscow, still falls far short compared with the levels reached between Russia and several other regional actors. “The visit seems more ceremonial than a substantive turning point in bilateral relations,” Nicole Grajewski, a research fellow with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, told Al Jazeera. For one, she said, a new and improved 20-year cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia has yet to be finalised, and Raisi only handed over Iran’s proposed draft during his trip. “That being said, Russia-Iran relations are significantly stronger today than they were the last time an Iranian president visited Russia in 2017 under [Hassan] Rouhani,” Grajewski added, referring to Raisi’s predecessor, whose term ended in August 2021. Nuclear deal The fate of the ongoing intensive talks in Vienna aimed at restoring Iran’s 2015 nuclear deal with world powers will still play a major role in the future of Iran’s ties with Russia. Russia, a signatory, has been actively trying to facilitate the revival of the landmark accord that the US unilaterally abandoned in 2018, and has been a mediating force between Iran, the European signatories and the US. “It is very important for me to know your opinion on the JCPOA,” Putin told Raisi on Wednesday, referring to the deal by its formal name, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. All sides have attested that some real progress has been achieved in recent weeks in the Austrian capital, but resolving outstanding political issues appears to hinge on concessions by both Iran and the US. “The Iranian nuclear issue has historically affected Russia-Iran relations but it has been variable in its impact across certain issues,” the Belfer Center’s Grajewski said. “The Vienna talks are a central aspect of the Russia-Iran relationship today. Moscow has historically adopted a constructive position on Iran’s nuclear programme even during low points of US-Russia relations after Ukraine.” However, Grajewski pointed out that if the talks fail because Iran refuses to tone down some of its demands, different aspects of the two countries’ relations could be affected. Arms deal For instance, the two have been discussing the possibility of Iran purchasing advanced arms – especially the top of the line S-400 air defence systems and Su-35 fighter jets. Such a prospect is made possible by the lifting of a United Nations embargo on conventional arms sales to Iran in 2020 as a result of the nuclear deal, something Russia supported. At the moment, Iran may not have the funds to pay for such a major deal as tens of billions of dollars of its money are frozen abroad and its revenues have been slashed due to US sanctions. Moreover, the Iranian establishment may not be eager to face potential local criticism of an arms deal when its population is under the enormous strain of rampant inflation amid an ailing economy. According to Samuel Ramani, associate fellow at the Royal United Service Institute, Russia may not be eager to sell the arms to Iran at the moment either. “Russia’s overall policy in the Middle East is to be friends with all, allies of none, enemies of none, so selling arms to Iran might disrupt its efforts to balance closer ties with Israel and the UAE, in particular, as tensions are heightened between these countries and Tehran right now and Saudi Arabia,” he told Al Jazeera. But that does not mean Iran and Russia are disinterested in boosting military cooperation, as the two held a joint trilateral naval drill with China in an area north of the Indian Ocean on Friday. Regional cooperation Observers say Iran and Russia have shared interests across the region that will be maintained or improved regardless of others factors, such as the Vienna talks – something that was also apparent in the two presidents’ meeting. Both Raisi and Putin praised “successful” joint efforts in Syria, where the two countries support President Bashar al-Assad in the country’s 10-year war. They agreed that “combating terrorism” in Syria is a shared goal. Iran and Russia have a shared concern about the fate of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan after the chaotic US exit in August. Both have been active in organising talks to find solutions on a number of issues. Along with China, Iran and Russia have repeatedly denounced US “unilateralism”. And Moscow and Beijing recently supported Tehran’s successful bid to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Putin on Wednesday also expressed his support for Iran to gain a larger foothold in the Eurasian Economic Union, and said both sides are working to create a free-trade zone. Lastly, Russia has been vocal about its interests in being increasingly engaged in mediating efforts on Persian Gulf and regional security. On Friday, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Russia wants to organise a conference to resolve regional issues through dialogue. Lavrov described it as “a conference that would bring Iranians and Arabs together where Iran would not be the subject of discussion and where each side would lay their concerns on the table” and would address issues with Yemen, Syria and Iraq as well.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 1NC – Iran Relations › 1NC – Syria Scenario
Alex Lantier 19, PhD at the University of Geneva and writings appeared on Global Research, Countercurrents, "Syrian army, Iran threaten counterattack against Turkish invasion of Syria," 10/14/2019, https://countercurrents.org/2019/10/syrian-army-iran-threaten-counterattack-against-turkish-invasion-of-syria, /\
The war unleashed by Turkey’s invasion of Syria, targeting formerly US-backed Kurdish forces, escalated out of control this weekend as the Syrian army and Iran moved to counterattack. With Turkish troops and allied Al Qaeda militias advancing deep into Kurdish-held territory in Syria, the Middle East is only days away from an all-out war between the major regional powers that could trigger a global conflict between nuclear-armed world powers. UN reports show that 130,000 Syrians have fled their homes in the region amid the Turkish offensive, and Turkish officials claim they had “neutralized” at least 415 Kurdish fighters. Turkish troops seized the cities of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn, amid heavy fighting including ongoing Turkish air raids, and seized a road crossing that cut off US and Kurdish troops in Kobani. Turkish troops also fired artillery at US troops near Kobani in what former US envoy Brett McGurk said was “not a mistake,” although Turkish officials later denied this. Turkey’s Syrian “rebel” allies, the Islamist Syrian National Army (SNA, formerly the Free Syrian Army), are executing Kurdish civilians in areas they hold, according to multiple reports. Kurdish politician Hevrin Khalaf was executed; her bullet-riddled car appeared in a video surrounded by SNA fighters. Beyond Al Qaeda-linked calls to destroy infidels, the British Daily Telegraph noted, the SNA’s main outlook “is sectarian: they are anti-Kurdish and they are Arab chauvinists.” Yesterday evening, the Syrian army announced it would march on the area. The official Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported: “Syrian Arab Army units began moving north to confront Turkish aggression on Syrian territory... The movement comes to confront the ongoing Turkish aggression on towns and areas in the north of Hasaka and Raqqa provinces, where the Turkish forces committed massacres against locals, occupied some areas and destroyed infrastructure.” The Syrian army has reportedly reached an agreement with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) militia, whose alliance with the United States was broken by Washington a week ago. Under this agreement, Syrian army troops would reach the city of Kobani near the Syrian-Turkish border in 48 hours. On Saturday, President Donald Trump had authorized the remaining 1,000 US troops in Kobani to withdraw, and US forces were in full retreat across northern Syria this weekend to avoid being cut off by advancing Turkish troops. Iran, which has deployed tens of thousands of troops as well as drones to Syria in recent years to back the Syrian regime against a NATO-led proxy war, indicated it would support the Syrian army. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s Advisor for International Affairs Ali Akbar Velayati met with Syrian Ambassador to Iran Adnan Mahmoud yesterday in Tehran. He gave Iran’s “full support to Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, calling for the withdrawal of the Turkish forces,” SANA reported. Velayati added, “The principled policy of Iran is based on supporting the people and government of Syria and defending their righteous stances in a way that entails continuing joint cooperation until terrorism and terrorist organizations are completely eliminated.” At the same time, military tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are surging amid mutual attacks on tankers carrying Persian Gulf oil supplies that are critical to the world economy. Last month, the US and Saudi governments blamed a September 14 missile attack on Saudi oil facilities that caused a sharp rise in world oil prices on Iran, without providing any evidence. Then on October 11, two missiles hit the Iranian tanker Sabiti off Saudi Arabia’s Red Sea coast. Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of the Iranian Supreme National Security Council, said yesterday that Iran would retaliate against unnamed targets for the attack on the Sabiti. “A special committee has been set up to investigate the attack on Sabiti... Its report will soon be submitted to the authorities for decision,” Shamkhani told Fars News. “Piracy and mischief on international waterways aimed at making commercial shipping insecure will not go unanswered.” Saudi officials declined to comment on the Sabiti attack, and officials with the US Fifth Fleet in the Gulf sheikdom of Bahrain claimed to have no information on it. But there is widespread speculation in the international media that the attack was carried out by Saudi Arabia or with its support. The conflicts erupting between the different capitalist regimes in the Middle East pose an imminent threat not only to the population of the region, but to the entire world. Workers can give no support to any of the competing military plans and strategic appetites of these reactionary regimes. With America, Europe, Russia and China all deeply involved in the proxy war in Syria, a large-scale Middle East war could strangle the world oil supply and escalate into war between nuclear-armed powers. The working class is coming face to face with the real possibility of a Third World War. The Kurdish-led SDF militias in Syria, vastly outgunned by Turkish forces and vulnerable to air strikes, warned US officials in talks leaked by CNN that they would appeal for Russia to attack Turkey and protect SDF and Syrian army forces. As Turkey is legally a NATO ally of Washington and the European powers, such an attack could compel the United States and its European allies to either break the 70-year-old NATO alliance or go to war with Russia to protect Turkey. “You are leaving us to be slaughtered,” SDF General Mazloum Kobani Abdi told US officials in a meeting last Thursday. “You are not willing to protect the people, but you do not want another force to come and protect us. You have sold us.” Mazloum dismissed US officials when they replied by demanding that the SDF not cut a deal with Russia, but instead keep taking huge casualties from Turkish air raids. He said, “I need to know if you are capable of protecting my people, of stopping these bombs falling on us or not. I need to know, because if you’re not, I need to make a deal with Russia and the regime now and invite their planes to protect this region.” US forces across Syria were in full retreat, however, and US Defense Secretary Mark Esper told US television news yesterday that the Turkish-Kurdish conflict “gets worse by the hour.” Given the attempts by the Kurds to work out an alliance with Syria and Russia, he added, Trump “directed that we begin a deliberate withdrawal of forces from northern Syria.” Esper said he would “not place American service members in the middle of a longstanding conflict between the Turks and the Kurds. This is not why we are in Syria.” Esper said the Turkish army was rejecting the Pentagon’s appeals for a ceasefire with the Kurds and instead expanding its war aims inside Syria. “In the last 24 hours, we learned that they likely intend to expand their attack further south than originally planned, and to the west,” he said. Esper added that “all the exact things” US officials warned their Turkish counterparts would likely happen if they invaded Syria were now taking place, including the release of tens of thousands of Islamic State (ISIS) fighters held in prison camps by Washington’s former Kurdish allies.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 1NC – Iran Relations › 1NC – Syria Scenario
Basel Haj Jasem ‘20, Researcher in Russian and Turkish affairs, political adviser, “Moscow and Tehran in Syria: Competition or partnership?”, Daily Sabah, 9/5/20, https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/moscow-and-tehran-in-syria-competition-or-partnership
Russia and Iran's partnership has often wavered between cooperation and rivalry due to the incompatibility of interests and goals in many regional and international issues. However, their joint efforts have so far succeeded in achieving substantial results in Syria, which has become an important pillar in the foreign policy of both countries. It is no secret that Iran is a regional competitor of Russia, as well as a major target for Washington and Tel Aviv. Moscow also knows well that this tension will escalate as long as Iran stays in Syria and this is considered a major threat to Russian interests. Several months ago, during an interview with Russian news agency TASS, Israel's Moscow envoy asserted that Israel was satisfied with Russia's stance on Iranian military presence on the Israeli-Syrian border. He pointed out that Israel and Russia are engaged in intensive discussions on this issue while stressing that the presence of Iranian forces in the region is "targeting Israel." According to the report of the Israeli "Politics and Strategy" Institute, the undeclared war between Tehran and Tel Aviv, which has been continuing since the beginning of the Syrian crisis, does not worry Russia, at least, as long as the parties are wary of harming Moscow's interests in the process. However, the competition between the Kremlin and Tehran for control, influence and for determining Syria's future is fast becoming a problem. Israel's frequent attacks on Iranian locations inside Syria, in addition to pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump on Iran, increase Iran's need to have a good relationship with Russia, which makes Moscow stronger than before when confronting Tehran in Syria. It cannot be ignored what many observers have said, that the invitation of Iran to participate in Astana talks in 2017 was an attempt by Ankara and Moscow to push Tehran to fulfill its obligations because it is difficult to control groups affiliated with Iran in Syria, and unlike Tehran, Russia has managed to build bridges with the Syrian political and armed opposition through Saudi Arabia and Turkey.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 1NC – Iran Relations › 1NC – Syria Scenario
Ghoncheh Tazmini ‘20, is a Visiting Fellow at the LSE Middle East Centre. Formerly an Associate Member at the Centre for Iranian Studies at SOAS, where she was Iran Heritage Foundation Fellow, Ghoncheh conducts research on Iran-related themes as a British Academy grant-holder. She is currently researching Iranian-Russian alignment in the Middle East, “Russian–Iranian Alignment: The Pillars of a Paradoxical Partnership”, LSE, 8/20/20, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/08/20/russian-iranian-alignment-the-pillars-of-a-paradoxical-partnership/
Vacillating between cooperation and contention, the Russian–Iranian partnership has long been riddled with contradictions. For scholars, Moscow’s mercurial manoeuvrings have made it challenging to decipher the nature of the partnership. One Iranian analyst qualified Moscow’s interactions with Tehran as a ‘run with the hare, hunt with hounds’ approach. Following its ‘zigzagging’ trajectory, he argued that the degree of expansion or contraction in Russian–Iranian cooperation depended on whether relations between the US and Russia were amicable or hostile at the time. Evidence of this was the construction of the Bushehr power plant and the delivery of the sale of Russian-made S-300 surface-to-air missile systems. Russia stalled for years, especially during Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and US President Barack Obama’s dalliance with the idea of a ‘reset’ in relations. What was underplayed was the fact that while Russia delayed, it did deliver in the end. This point cannot be emphasised enough – for an isolated Iran, with more foes than friends, what ultimately mattered was that (some) of its needs were being met. In the end, Russia delivered on its matrimonial promises. Curiously, the Russian–Iranian partnership has proven to be steady. What explains the durability of the partnership despite conflicting interests in different geopolitical theatres? Syria, for example, is regularly singled out as the arena in which the Russian–Iranian partnership is bound to unravel. Tehran and the Kremlin are aligned in that they both support Bashar al-Assad’s leadership, but they pursue very different approaches when it comes to post-conflict Syrian governance, state-building and military reform. In fact, tensions have been brewing for years over reconstruction and investment opportunities. Vying over lucrative government contracts, both states expect dividends. ‘We have probably paid $20–30 billion to Syria, and we have to take that money back’, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, a member of the Iranian parliament’s national security committee said in an interview with the state-run news website Etemad Online. There was also speculation that tensions would flare up between the two states when on 8 July, Iran and Syria signed a bilateral pact to strengthen military and defence cooperation. Analysts were quick to predict that the Iranian military deployment (two batteries of surface-to-air missiles) authorised in the military deal would challenge the partnership. However, as long-term patterns of engagement suggest, the Russian–Iranian partnership will likely pass this litmus test as it has others. Iranian analyst, Shuaib Bahman, corroborates this view. Speaking to the Mehr News Agency, he explained that although Russia and Iran have disagreements over Syria, they are not competitors. Bahman maintains that that while other actors and coalitions in Syria, including Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and the US have disbanded over discrepancies and disputes, Tehran and Moscow have been able to successfully manage their differences in Syria. Russia and Iran, he argues, will continue cooperating in Syria and beyond. In the past month alone, Tehran and the Kremlin have reaffirmed their commitment to bilateral cooperation in several ways. On 20 July, Iranian Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, who visited Moscow for the third time in six months, confirmed that Tehran was planning to extend a 20-year agreement with Russia. The agreement is set to expire in March 2021. In turn, Moscow expressed its willingness to help Iran complete work on their nuclear power plant. On 2 August, Zarif reaffirmed to Leonid Slutsky, Chairman of the International Affairs Committee of Russia’s State Duma, Iran’s readiness to ramp up parliamentary relations to a strategic level. Russia recently came to Iran’s defence in the UNSC over the controversial vote over the Iranian arms embargo. On 14 August, Russian President, Vladimir Putin proposed a seven-way online summit of UNSC permanent members, along with Germany and Iran, in a bid to avoid ‘confrontation and escalation’ at the UN. The US lost the bid to extend a UN arms embargo, set to expire on October 2020. How can we explain the durability of the partnership despite ups and downs, clashes and discord? In my research, I have identified a unique ideational synergy binding Moscow and Tehran despite asymmetrical approaches and conflicting interests. Both states espouse a similar political logic and understanding of the international system. This shared geopolitical vision has developed organically along deeper lines of convergence, including civilisational peculiarities, historical experiences, normative values and social identities, cultural orientations, and a similar discursive genealogy in relation to the West. While Russia and Iran may clash in different regional theatres, their alignment is buttressed by several ideational pillars. Russia and Iran are both anti-hegemonic, opposing the idea of a single state or a constellation of states being able to impose particular normative values and power structures as universal. Both states have demonstrated a commitment to building alternative integrative networks, and multilateral institutions on a regional level in order to create a counterweight to US unipolarity (the Shanghai Cooperation Council, the Eurasian Economic Union, or Iran’s recent 25-year agreement with China, for instance). Both have a common security threat perception, strongly opposing the universalist normative aspirations of the international system, which they deem as a threat to their unique civilisational identities. Moscow, in particular, opposes the US-led Atlantic ideological and power systems that gained traction at the end of the Cold War, when Russia and the West entered the era of ‘Cold Peace’. As a countermeasure, Russia’s overriding strategic goal has been to advance what Trine Flockhart refers to as a ‘multi-order’ in which different ‘inter-orders’ of sovereign states are nested within an overall international system. In this pursuit, Tehran has been a reliable partner. Iran and Russia are firmly ensconced as an ‘inter-order’ within this emerging ‘multi-order’ international system. In order to better understand the paradoxes and contradictions of this partnership, it is useful to conceptualise two separate levels that define Moscow–Tehran relations: on the top plane there are both common or clashing realpolitik interests that are held down by a gravitational pull onto a foundational level, comprised of common principles and perceptions of the international system. It is this crucial foundational level that accounts for the paradoxes of this most peculiar, but permanent, partnership.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 1NC – Iran Relations › 1NC – Syria Scenario
Strobe Talbott and Maggie Tennis ’20, *is a distinguished fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, **Research Assistant - Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, The Brookings Institution, “The only winner of the US-Iran showdown is Russia”, Brookings, 1/9/20, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/01/09/the-only-winner-of-the-us-iran-showdown-is-russia/
Relations between Washington and Tehran have deteriorated since the onset of the Syrian conflict and even more so since President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal. At the same time, Russia and Iran have grown closer through military cooperation in Syria. Moscow’s expanding influence in Syria suggests that a conflict between the United States and Iran could advance Russia’s power and reputation in the region. At the very least, Russia will be able to paint the United States as an erratic aggressor, leading regional actors and international allies to question cooperation with Washington. Russia has helped the Assad regime maintain control in Syria, even as the U.S. and its NATO allies demanded Assad’s ouster. As the U.S. pulls back from Syria, Assad and Russia remain in control. Russia’s backing of Assad began as a quest to undermine U.S. interests and gain influence in the Middle East. More than four years later, Russia’s triumphs from that conflict include drawing Turkey away from its NATO allies, building a reputation as a valuable foreign backer, and emerging as a kingmaker—all at the expense of the United States. Poorly reasoned U.S. foreign policy decisions, such as, most recently, abandoning Kurdish partners in Syria, helped create a power vacuum that Russia has stepped in to fill. Friday’s strikes — and every Trump administration action taken since — will likely improve Russia’s position in Syria and the broader region. Iraq’s government is outraged by what it views as a U.S. violation of its sovereignty, with the Iraqi prime minister calling the strike a “flagrant violation of the conditions authorizing the presence of U.S. troops.” Iraq could soon expel U.S. forces from the country in response. With no troops in Iraq, the United States will find it hard to sustain a presence in Syria. That void would create more maneuverability for Moscow in the region — essentially, cementing its position as a regional power broker. Beyond strengthening Russia’s position, the Soleimani strike contributes to Russia’s goals of driving a wedge between Washington and its partners and advancing global perceptions of the United States as volatile and belligerent. Moscow has already succeeded in undermining U.S. relations with Middle Eastern allies. The prime example is Turkey: Although Russia and Turkey were on opposite sides of the conflict in Syria, they now jointly control operations in the north of the country after a remarkable October 22 agreement between Washington and Ankara to establish a “Syria Safe Zone” and the withdrawal of U.S. troops. In reaction to Soleimani’s death, Turkey released a statement that it opposes “foreign interventions, assassinations and sectarian conflicts in the region.” Moscow could also benefit if the U.S. strikes create more disunity between Washington and its European allies. Numerous U.S. decisions in the Middle East have frustrated allies, particularly its withdrawal from the nuclear deal. Reports suggest that the Trump administration even failed to warn Britain and other allies ahead of the strikes on Soleimani. If Washington does not heed its allies’ calls for immediate de-escalation, the United States could find itself further isolated on the world stage. Washington could incur additional damage to its relationships with European allies if Iran now hastens its pursuit of a nuclear weapon as a result of the strikes. Iran announced Sunday it would stop obeying all restrictions imposed by the Iran deal on its nuclear activities. Russia has been a vocal critic of the U.S. decision to withdraw from the deal and instead mount a “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran. In fact, Moscow’s position has placed it on the same side as European powers like France and Germany opposing the U.S. decision to reimpose sanctions. Russia has worked with France and Germany to sidestep U.S. sanctions to keep Iran in the deal. Consequently, Russia is ideally situated to emphasize its efforts to maintain the agreement and blame Washington for pushing Iran toward a nuclear bomb. Of course, there are major downsides for Russia from a U.S.-Iran conflict in the Middle East. A proxy conflict could stress Russian forces in Syria, especially if Israel escalates its strikes against Iranian-backed groups like Hezbollah, which vowed to revenge Soleimani’s death. Furthermore, any Iranian progress toward nuclear breakout surely would destabilize the region, complicating Russia’s ability to control the situation in Syria. Finally, if Russia cooperates too closely with Iran, it will attract criticism from other Middle Eastern partners. For a while it seemed that Trump was trying to fulfill his campaign promise of a reduced U.S. presence in the Middle East. Now, it seems as if he’s trying to draw the country into another prolonged quagmire — whether as a distraction from impeachment proceedings or to force Iran to the negotiating table, it is too early to tell. Russia, on the other hand, is left with the enviable position of capitalizing on the turbulent behavior of the United States in the Middle East, regardless of whether the United States and Iran go to war. Ultimately, U.S. actions will strengthen Russian leadership: first, by removing American competition, and second, by turning regional and global sentiment against the United States. Provided Moscow continues cooperating with all regional states and maintains stability in Syrian territory where Russian forces are present, Russia stands a good chance of supplanting U.S. influence in the Middle East — no matter what happens next.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › 1NC – Iran Relations › 1NC – Syria Scenario
MEHR News ‘21, made up of Mehr News agency and Iran’s best-selling international Daily, The Tehran Times, is one Of Iran’s Main stream News sources., “Iran, Russia in full solidarity against inhumane sanctions”, MEHR News Agency, 3/12/21, https://en.mehrnews.com/news/170991/Iran-Russia-in-full-solidarity-against-inhumane-sanctions
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran issued a statement on Friday to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the "Treaty on the basis for mutual relations and the principles of cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation," which expires today. The statement reads "The twentieth anniversary of the Treaty on the basis for mutual relations and the principles of cooperation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation "coincides with the exchange of messages between the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation." It also said that the Islamic Republic of Iran views the Russian Federation as a strong neighbor and friend on the basis of "cooperation and mutual respect" and is interested in further expanding its relations with the country in all fields. It further said, "In the light of the will of the leaders and high-ranking officials, the cooperation between the two countries in line with their shared interests has gone beyond the level of normal bilateral relations and has entered the phase of assisting the regional and international security and it is stronger than ever." Iran and Russia are in full solidarity against "unilateral and inhumane sanctions", "Western interference in the affairs of other countries", "preventing third parties from playing a role in their own relations" and the need for "respect for international rights," the Iranian Foreign Ministry concluded.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2NC – AT: Oil Impact
Borrell 7-16 (Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission, 7-16-22, “The sanctions against Russia are working”, SC)
Since Russia brutally invaded Ukraine, the EU has adopted six packages of sanctions against Moscow – and we are about to finalise a “maintenance and alignment” package to clarify a number of provisions to strengthen legal certainty for operators and align the EU's sanctions with those of our allies and partners of the G7. Our measures already now target nearly 1,200 individuals and almost 100 entities in Russia as well as a significant number of sectors of the Russian economy. These sanctions were adopted in close coordination with the G7 member, and the fact that over forty other countries, including traditionally neutral countries, have also adopted them or taken similar measures enhances their effectiveness. Sanctions require strategic patience because it may take a long time for them to have the desired effect. Now, as the war drags on and the costs of energy rises, people in Europe and elsewhere ask whether these sanctions are working and/or whether the side effects are too great. Without underestimating different problems that could occur, including attempts made to bypass them, sanctions remain an important instrument of political action. But for sure we need to use them in a well targeted manner, and, above all, they require strategic patience because it may take a long time for them to have the desired effect. One of the main sanctions adopted is to stop buying 90% of EU oil supplies from Russia by the end of 2022, depriving Moscow of corresponding revenues. Yes, Russia is able to sell its oil to other markets, however this benefit is limited by the fact that Russia is forced to give high discounts on each barrel (Russian oil is sold at around $ 30 less than the global average). In addition, and this is perhaps the most important point, this gradual oil embargo and the scaling back of the import of gas, liberates Europe from its energy dependence on Russia. We have discussed this issue at the EU level for years, but now we are implementing it. Cutting our structural energy dependence on Russia matters a lot because this dependence has been an obstacle to developing a strong European policy towards Moscow’s aggressive actions. Cutting our structural energy dependence on Russia matters a lot because this dependence has been an obstacle to developing a strong European policy towards Moscow’s aggressive actions. This dependence probably played an important role in Putin's initial calculations in Ukraine. He may have believed that the EU would never sanction Russia seriously because it was too dependent on energy. This is one of his most important blunders when launching this war. Of course, this rapid detoxification from Russian energy involves significant costs for a number of countries and sectors that we will have to face. However, it is the price to pay to defend our democracies and international law. We have to handle these consequences by reinforcing our internal solidarity and that is what we are doing. By breaking its energy dependence, in line with its climate ambition, the EU is learning that interdependence is not always a neutral instrument that is beneficial to all or a mean to guarantee peaceful international relations. The Ukraine war confirmed that interdependence can be used as a weapon. This rapid detoxification from Russian energy involves significant costs for a number of countries and sectors that we will have to face. However, it is the price to pay to defend our democracies and international law. Are the sanctions really hurting the Russian economy? Some observers have argued they are not very effective because the exchange rate of the Russian currency is very high. But this interpretation is dubious. The exchange rate of the Rouble simply reflects the fact that Russia has a massive imbalance between the high volume of oil and gas exports and the parallel collapse of imports that has followed the sanctions. This trade surplus is not a sign of good economic health, especially for an economy like Russia. While exporting unprocessed raw materials, Russia must import many high-value products that it does not manufacture. For advanced technology products, Russia depends on Europe for more than 45%, the United States for 21% and China for only 11%. Russia may of course try to limit the effects of sanctions by substituting imports through domestic products. This was done, not without success, in the agricultural sector after the 2014 sanctions. However, for high-tech products, import substitution is much more difficult to achieve. Russia will try to substitute imports through domestic products. This was done, not without success, in the agricultural sector after the 2014 sanctions. However, for high-tech products, it is much more difficult to achieve. Sanctions on semiconductors imports for instance have a direct impact on Russian companies that produce consumer electronics, computers, airplanes, cars, or military equipment. In this field, which is obviously crucial in the war in Ukraine, sanctions limit Russia's capacity to produce precision missiles. On the ground, the Russian army is not making much use of this type of precision-guided missiles, not out of moderation, but out of necessity, as it does not have enough of them. In addition, the Russian air force has underperformed in Ukraine, also because it lacks precision-guided munitions. The automotive sector is another sector that is very much feeling the effects of the sanctions. Almost all foreign manufacturers have decided to withdraw from Russia and production was last May down by 97% compared with 2021. In addition, the few cars that Russian manufacturers still produce will not have airbags or automatic gearboxes. The Russian oil industry will suffer Russia as the world’s second largest oil producer is still earning large sums from selling its oil worldwide, notably to Asian customers and this helps it to keep financing the war. But over time, the Russian oil industry will suffer not only from the departure of foreign operators but also from its increasing difficulty in accessing sophisticated technologies such as horizontal drilling. In fact, the capacity of Russia to put new wells in production will be limited, which will lead to a drop in production. Finally, there is the airline industry, which plays a very important role in such a vast country. Around 700 of Russia's 1,100 civilian aircraft are of foreign origin. Russia will have to sacrifice a large part of its fleet, to find spare parts, so that the remaining aircrafts can fly. Even the Russian-produced aircrafts are dependent on technologies and material from western countries. As Alexander Morozov, the head of the research department of Bank of Russia recently wrote: ”The restrictions will lead to decreases in technological and engineering sophistication and in labour productivity in the sanctioned industries. Industries that rely on the most advanced foreign technologies and those with highly digitalized business processes risk being hit harder than others”. The list could go on with other important factors: the loss of access to financial markets; the disconnection of Russia with the major global research networks such as CERN for example; the massive brain drain of Russian elites with thousands of highly qualified professionals having left the country. The effects of such moves are not immediately visible. However, the scientific, economic and technological isolation of Russia is a major loss for the country in the medium term. The scientific, economic and technological isolation of Russia is a major loss for the country in the medium term. Moscow may claim that its relations with many countries remain intact. However, in reality, sanctions against Russia are also hurting its trade with non-sanctioning countries like China. The alternative offered by China to the Russian economy remains indeed limited. Although Beijing seems to want to make ideological gestures by siding with Moscow; refusing to condemn its invasion; or taking up the Russian narrative on the threat of NATO, it is overall rather careful regarding helping Russia circumvent the sanctions. While its imports from Russia have risen (mainly through greater energy imports), Chinese exports to Russia have decreased in proportions that are comparable to those of Western countries. Even if it does not admit it publicly, China is probably worried that this war could strengthen the position of the United States not only in Europe but also in Asia, with the strong involvement of countries such as Japan and South Korea in responding to Russia’s aggression. This is not exactly what China is aiming at. As a result, the latest Russian figures released by Bank of Russia show that transactions through the Russian payment system are down 7.2% in June compared to the first quarter of 2022. This is a real-time indicator of the important slowdown in the Russian economy. Of course the biggest question of all is this: will the sanctions and the real effects they have, lead Putin changing his strategic calculations and if so when? Here we need to be cautious and recognise that his actions have always been disconnected from economic considerations. Putin believes in the magical power of political voluntarism. However, this cannot last forever. Hence Europe must show strategic patience. The war will be long and the test of strength will last. We have no other choice. Allowing Russia to prevail would mean allowing it to destroy our democracies and the very basis of the international rules-based world order. Europe must show strategic patience. The war will be long and the test of strength will last. Allowing Russia to prevail would mean allowing it to destroy our democracies and the very basis of the international rules-based world order. Even if sanctions do not change the Russian trajectory in the short-term, that does not mean they are useless for they do affect sheer amount of resources it has to wage its war. Without sanctions, Russia would ‘have its cake and eat it’, as the expression goes. With sanctions, it will be forced to “choose between butter and guns” locking Putin in a vice that is gradually tightening. Finally, let me raise here as well the issue of the alleged or real impact of our sanctions on third countries, particularly African countries, which depend on Russian and Ukrainian wheat and fertilisers. Here it is very clear where responsibility lies for the food crisis. Our sanctions do not target Russian wheat or fertiliser exports. And it is until now Russia’s aggression and its blockade of the Black Sea that is preventing Ukraine from exporting its wheat. We hope however that the negotiations led by the Secretary General of the United Nations will enable this issue to be resolved quickly. I have informed my African counterparts that we are ready to assist them with any difficulties they may encounter related with our sanctions while urging them not to be fooled by the Russian authorities' lies and disinformation regarding this subject. I have informed my African counterparts that we are ready to assist them with any difficulties they may encounter related with our sanctions while urging them not to be fooled by the Russian authorities' lies and disinformation regarding this subject. There is a “battle of narratives” going on internationally over who is responsible global food and energy crisis as was clear at the last G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. But the real answer is to bring an end to the war and this can only be achieved by Russia's withdrawal from Ukraine. I keep reminding all our international partners that respect for the territorial integrity of states and the non-use of force are not Western or European principles. They are the basis of all international law and Russia is blithely trampling on them. To accept such a violation would open the door to the law of the jungle on a global scale. Europe must become a real power The war in Ukraine makes clear that, contrary to what many thought rather naively just a few years ago, economic interdependence does not automatically guarantee peaceful international relations. This is why Europe must become a real power, as I have been calling for since the beginning of my mandate. Faced with the invasion of Ukraine, we have moved from debates to concrete actions, showing that, when provoked, Europe can respond. Since we do not want to go to war with Russia, economic sanctions and the support of Ukraine are at the core of this response. And our sanctions are beginning to have an effect and will do so even more in the months to come.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Thumper
ET 3-25 (The Economic Times is an Indian English-language business-focused daily newspaper. It is owned by The Times Group, 3-25-22, “Greece is a critical partner and NATO ally of the US, Blinken says”, SC)
US Secretary of State, Anthony J. Blinken, acknowledged Greece’s role as a critical partner to the US. According to the US, Greece is a strategic partner and a crucial NATO ally. Blinken highlighted the historical ideals and democratic rights that bind the people of both countries on Greek Independence Day. Blinken also expressed gratitude to Greece for its response to the Ukraine conflict, which entered its 30th day on Friday. Greece and the US have enhanced cooperation across a range of vital topics. Last year, the relationship became more robust as the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement modification strengthened their defense and security cooperation for years to come. A proclamation honoring Greek Independence Day was issued by US President Joe Biden President Joe Biden also expressed his heartfelt gratitude towards the US and Greece partnership by signing a proclamation today. Biden emphasized Greece's leadership role in supporting peace and prosperity from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Black Sea and the Western Balkans and the solid historical and current relations between Greece and the US. He also mentioned that Greece and the US are working together to address the problems of our day, including managing the climate catastrophe and diversifying the region's energy supplies, demonstrating that democracies work for people and combating the growing menace of authoritarianism. Blinken’s statement on Greek Independence Day Blinken pointed out the crucial importance of the partnership that both the countries share at the present moment of the Russian-Ukraine war. He also thanked Greece on behalf of the United States for its unwavering and unwavering support for Ukraine's people, authority, and democracy. Both Greece and the US have a stronger relationship, boosting security and prosperity for both the nations and the broader transatlantic connection. Lastly, Blinken stated that the US carries on to support Greece to strengthen and expand the strong and significant relationship governed by democratic values that originated in Greece.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Thumper
Dr. Jake Sotiriadis and John Sitilides ’22, *is Director of the Center for Futures Intelligence at National Intelligence University and an Air Force Intelligence Officer, **is a geopolitical strategist at Trilogy Advisors and diplomacy consultant to the State Department under a U.S. government contract., “U.S. and Greece Take Strategic Partnership to New Heights”, The National Interest, 5/16/22, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-and-greece-take-strategic-partnership-new-heights-202444
President Joe Biden is hosting Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in the Oval Office today, but this is no ordinary visit. The Biden-Mitsotakis meeting showcases Greece’s enhanced role as one of Washington’s closest allies, with U.S.-Greece cooperation advancing American foreign policy objectives across Southern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. Underscoring this historic visit will be Mitsotakis’ address to a joint session of Congress at the invitation of Speaker Nancy Pelosi—a rare honor reserved for prominent international leaders—and the first ever to Congress by a Greek prime minister. The timing of Mitsotakis’ visit comes at a critical moment, as the largest conflict in Europe since World War II rages in Ukraine. Mitsotakis has burnished Greece’s Atlanticist credentials, voting to sanction Russia, sending weapons to Ukraine at considerable domestic political cost, and expelling Russian diplomats suspected of espionage. Greece is a small country in terms of territory and population, yet its outsized impact on world history, culture, and civilization has shaped the values that define America’s constitutional republic. Thus, the joint session also celebrates the bicentennial of Greece’s 1821 declaration of independence from the Ottoman Empire, and the shared Western ideals of freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights. Indeed, U.S.-Greece diplomatic relations have never been better. Last week, Athens ratified the U.S.-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement, extending the current agreement by five years and solidifying and expanding the U.S. military presence in Greece under the Strategic Dialogue launched by President Donald Trump and continued by President Biden. Greece’s northern port of Alexandroupolis, near the Dardanelles Straits entry to the Black Sea, is taking on a significant role in America’s forward defense footprint. The port is now a U.S. and NATO defense hub, hosting the largest-ever U.S. military shipment in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve, to deter and defend against regional aggression and augment NATO’s air, ground, and naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea regions. Alexandroupolis is also becoming a key energy hub in Europe, with a new liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility set to expand the gas supply grid for Europe and reduce reliance on Russian energy. Greece’s heightened defense and energy roles posture Athens to defend the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean as well as to cooperate with NATO allies Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania to constrain Russian naval and air forces in the Black Sea. Greece is a strong advocate of European Union accession for Western Balkan countries, to boost the regional economy, advance democratic reforms, and combat malign Russian influence, especially in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro. The United States greatly benefits from Greece’s network of strategic alliances beyond Europe’s borders. Despite the lack of White House support for the EastMed natural gas pipeline project, the 3+1 mechanism of Cyprus, Greece, Israel—the three most democratic states in the Eastern Mediterranean—along with the United States, represents a key cooperation framework in trade, technology, energy security, counterterrorism, and interconnectivity in an extremely volatile region. Greece is strengthening ties to the Persian Gulf as well, hosting a Saudi Air Force exercise on Crete and a diplomatic gathering called the “Philia Forum,” including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as well as Egypt and Cyprus. In 2021, Greece deployed a Patriot battery along with 130 troops for operations in Saudi Arabia, and concluded a military cooperation agreement with the UAE. Two major hurdles—the unresolved Cyprus problem and Turkey’s challenges of Greek sovereignty in the Aegean Sea—present perilous dilemmas for the region. While the war in Ukraine highlights U.S. and NATO efforts to keep Turkey in the Western camp, heightened Turkish-Greek tensions are counterproductive for the security alliance. Ankara is seeking to mend fences in its immediate periphery, with Egypt, UAE, and Israel, but has been escalating direct overflights of Greek islands in recent weeks. Greece and Turkey have a long and troubled history, and nearly came to blows over maritime disputes in the Aegean in 2020, as they nearly did in 1976, 1987, and 1996. These sovereignty disputes are not Washington’s alone to help resolve. Greece’s key NATO allies, such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, also have important roles in resolving conflicts in Southern Europe. The Ukraine crisis clearly emphasizes the criticality of continued stability, security, and cooperation on NATO’s southern flank. Prime Minister Mitsotakis’ visit presents an opportunity to elevate these regional and functional issues to Biden, the U.S. Congress, and the American public. Washington can use its indispensable influence carefully to reinforce this key alliance and dial down regional tensions where solidarity within NATO is of the utmost importance, and where its seams are under greatest stress.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Thumper
Edmond Y. Azadian 6/9/22, Senior editorial columnist EDMOND Y. AZADIAN is Advisor to the Alex and Marie Manoogian Museum in Detroit, Michigan; Advisor from the Diaspora to the Ministry of Culture in Armenia; member of the Republic of Armenia’s Academy of Sciences, “Armenia, Greece and Cyprus Triangle May be in the Offing”, The Armenian Mirror-Spectator, 6/9/22, https://mirrorspectator.com/2022/06/09/armenia-greece-and-cyprus-triangle-may-be-in-the-offing/
More recently, Greece’s former socialist government had reduced the country into a basket case. But Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ center-right New Democracy Party won a landslide election in 2019 and brought about a turnaround to the country’s economy and politics. Although Turkey brags that it has the second strongest army after the US in the NATO structure, Greece no longer lags far behind. As Turkey continues to abuse its power and thus erode its standing in NATO, sympathy and support is shifting to Greece. After Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias met US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in May, a spokesperson called the two countries to resolve their problems through diplomacy and characterized Greece as “an irreplaceable ally and key ally of the United States in NATO,” while describing Turkey as “an important US partner and important ally in NATO.” The characterizations are very subtle but clear enough to make clear their place in US foreign policy.