2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn –Key To ME
Ellehuus 19 (Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. “Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving.” Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving | Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 Dec. 2019, www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving.//BVN SC)
A second area where Turkey’s immediate security concerns intersect with the majority of other NATO members is stability in the Middle East, most immediately in Syria. To be sure, Turkey’s anger over United States’ partnership with the YPG in the fight against the Islamic State—appnd NATO’s anger at Turkey for its unilateral incursion into northern Syria—will make progress difficult. But ultimately, the two sides share a mutual interest in seeing stability and pluralistic governance in Syria. This entails constraining Syrian president Bashar al-Assad; preventing the return of the Islamic State and Europe-based Islamic State fighters; and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid, reconstruction, and refugee return. More broadly, both sides also share an interest in limiting Russian and Iranian influence in the region. With the Russian military presence in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Crimea now supplemented by the Russian naval base at Tartus, airbases at Kobani and Khmeimim, and helicopter base[s] at Qamishli, Turkey is effectively encircled by Russia. It is in this context that German minister of defence Kramp-Karrenbauer’s suggestion of an internationally-controlled security zone along the Turkey-Syria border, possibly NATO-led and backed by the United Nations in loose partnership with Russia, makes sense. It would address a situation that immediately and directly affects the security of Europe and Turkey and demonstrate that the NATO is invested in addressing Turkey’s security concerns. Should NATO and Turkey move to restore some level of trust by taking these first steps, it will be important to avoid unnecessarily escalating tensions. For Turkey, this means abiding by the terms of the Syria ceasefire, not pursuing additional purchases of Russian military equipment, and doing its part to prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State in the region or return of Islamic State foreign fighters to Europe. For the United States and Europe, the trick will be to apply the required sanctions and arms embargoes in a discriminate way. For example, whereas imposing sanctions in accordance with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and withholding delivery of Turkey’s F-35s due to its purchase of the Russian S-400 makes good policy sense, imposing additional blanket sanctions could do more harm than good, affecting the Turkish people more than their leadership and giving Erdogan another opportunity to blame the West for Turkey’s economic problems. A smarter approach might involve going after corrupt actors using the Global Magnitsky Act. Similarly, a total arms embargo by the United States and the European Union will only drive Turkey to procure more Russian or non-NATO interoperable military equipment. Rather, the arms embargoes should be limited along the lines of the most recent House sanctions bill, which includes exemptions for items to be used in NATO-approved operations. Finally, as some of Turkey’s biggest export partners, the European Union and the United States can provide needed carrots along the way to incentivize constructive behavior by Ankara. Measures might include an eventual upgrade of Turkey’s customs union with the European Union or limited visa-free travel to EU countries for Turkish citizens. For the United States, President Trump’s offer of a $100 billion trade deal will also be attractive to Erdogan in Turkey’s struggling economy. To be sure, repairing the trust that has been lost and returning Turkey to the path of Western integration will be a struggle, requiring sustained effort, and a setting aside of egos, on all sides. Yet on this occasion of NATO’s 70th anniversary, Turkey and its NATO allies owe it to one another to pause for a moment and reflect not on their many disagreements but on what brought them together in the first instance and why that still matters.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn –Key To ME
Üzümcü et al 20 (Ahmet Üzümcü is the Former Director-General of the OPCW, Former Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO, Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is a Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2013-2018, Ümit Pamir is a Turkish Permanent Representative to NATO, 2004-2006, 12-16-20, “Turkey and NATO: resolving the S-400 spat”, European Leadership Network, SC)
But the critics do not stop there. There is the wider accusation of Turkish unreliability. It should not be forgotten that Turkey has been a reliable member of NATO for the past seven decades. It contributed significantly to the Alliance’s collective defence and deterrence in the Cold War. By tying up a large portion of Soviet troops in its region, it considerably reduced the pressure on Central Europe. Ironically, the Western European countries were able to build their Union gradually in a secure and stable environment ensured by NATO, with Turkey shouldering a heavy military burden. With the end of the Cold War, alone among the existing allies, Turkey’s security situation worsened. Turkey found itself increasingly exposed in a region of turmoil engulfed by several armed conflicts. The new and emerging security risks, including terrorism, have impacted Turkey as much, if not more, than any other Ally. Turkey feels itself on a new front line. But throughout this period, Turkey has remained an island of stability in a volatile region. Even though instability and disorder are on our doorstep, Turkey has fulfilled all its NATO obligations and provided security and stability rather than consuming them. Turkey has stood solid behind every key NATO decision. NATO invoked Article V of the Treaty for the first time following the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the U.S. Under the Taliban, Afghanistan had become a haven for international terrorism. As a staunch ally, Turkey has played a significant role in NATO’s stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. It has deployed troops and other military assets in harm’s way alongside other allies and partners. Turkey has never deviated from the NATO policy “in together-adjust together-out together“. Moreover, Turkey’s especially close and long-standing ties with Afghanistan has enabled the Alliance as a whole to benefit from its knowledge, expertise and political weight in that country. Moreover, the fight against ISIS, a serious concern for the whole world, would not have been so successful without Turkey’s participation and assistance. Turkey has become an essential partner in this struggle by joining the coalition against ISIS. It made three air bases, including Incirlik, available for the Allies, enabling decisively effective military operations. Elsewhere, in the Balkans and Iraq, Turkey has contributed to NATO’s stabilization efforts. In terms of NATO’s priority core task, collective defence, successive governments in Turkey have never wavered in their commitment to the Alliance. Turkey’s current contribution cannot be overstated. It currently hosts a range of NATO commands and and assets, essential to NATO’s collective defence, including Allied Land Command (LANDCOM) in Izmir and the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps (NRDC) in Istanbul. Significantly, Turkey will be the lead nationin 2021 in command of the ‘Spearhead Force’ of NATO (VJTF). This force can be deployed at short notice to any allied country considered under threat.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn –Key To ME
Cammack & Dunne 18(Perry Cammack was a nonresident fellow in the Middle East Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on long-term regional trends and their implications for American foreign policy., Michele Dunne is a nonresident scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East Program, where her research focuses on political and economic change in Arab countries, particularly Egypt, as well as U.S. policy in the Middle East., ND, “Fueling Middle East conflict—or Dousing The Flame”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/10/23/fueling-middle-east-conflicts-or-dousing-flames-pub-77548//BVN SC)
In comparison with almost every other geographical region, the Middle East suffers from a lack of both regional dispute resolution mechanisms and diplomatic protocols that might reduce the scope for regional conflict. While the Cold War was defined by the antagonism between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, both sides increasingly felt the need for inclusive institutions and mechanisms to reduce tensions. Every U.S. president during the Cold War, from Dwight D. Eisenhower to George H. W. Bush, met with his Soviet counterpart. During the tensest moments, high-level U.S.-Soviet channels of communications were especially important. Over time, a number of confidence-building institutions and transparency-enhancing measures were created, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), successive arms control agreements, and later the Treaty on Open Skies, which allows for unarmed surveillance flights over signatory countries to promote military and nuclear weapons openness. In the Middle East, however, the absence of any similar mechanisms or organizations, particularly amid proliferating military conflicts, feeds security dilemmas across multiple vectors, so that steps justified by one state as necessary to its security—military intervention, arms procurement, alliance formation, and so on—are perceived by its rivals as threatening. During the Israeli-Palestinian peace efforts of the 1990s, there were attempts to build mechanisms for regional communication and cooperation. Participants at the 1991 Madrid Conference set up five multilateral working groups to address regional challenges, each involving Israel and a range of Arab states. The centerpiece was the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group, which marked the first bid to create a formal multilateral framework for regional security issues. Six ACRS plenary sessions, co-hosted by the United States and Russia, were held and a series of regional confidence-building measures were outlined before the working group slowly broke down by 1995 under the weight of regional animosities and implementation challenges. While all of the working groups have long been defunct, one tangible result survives: the Middle East Desalination Research Center in Oman, created in 1995. The center conducts transboundary water research and development projects, and its membership includes Israel, Jordan, Oman, Palestine, and Qatar as well as several Western nations.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn –Key To Black Sea
Ellehuus, 19 (Ellehuus, Rachel. “Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving.” Turkey and NATO: A Relationship Worth Saving | Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 Dec. 2019, www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving.) [Rachel Ellehuus is deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.//BVN SC]
Yet these foundational factors remain valid: Turkey’s geopolitical position at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa still provides NATO with needed political and operational reach, and Turkey continues to benefit from the collective military power of NATO. With the relationship close to (if not at) its nadir, Turkey and NATO, with the support of the EU, need to take active measures to anchor it for the future, while avoiding steps that could destroy the relationship entirely. Assuming that Turkey is in fact interested in rebuilding the relationship with its NATO allies, there are several active measures NATO and Turkey can take now to create a foothold for the future. The key is to focus on areas of mutual interest where NATO involvement is critical to Turkish strategic interests and where Turkey has a unique role to play in NATO. The first of these is the Black Sea, where Turkey, as well as fellow NATO Black Sea littoral states Romania and Bulgaria, are trying to balance an increasing Russian military presence. While previously resistant to a greater NATO role in the Black Sea for fear it would dilute its own influence in the region, Turkey now sees the dangers of leaving Russian influence and presence in [the] Black Sea unchecked. With its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and entry into the Syrian civil war in 2015, Russia has significantly increased its presence and combat capabilities in both the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. NATO now faces an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble that restricts allies’ freedom of maneuver in the Black Sea, with Russia capable of attacking from both land and sea. To effectively counter this, NATO should establish a more continuous presence in the Black Sea, revive the idea of a permanent NATO maritime fleet in the Black Sea, and consider basing more counter-A2/AD capabilities in Turkey and Romania. Importantly, Turkey holds unique power to control access to the Black Sea thanks to the 1936 Montreux Convention, which governs naval passage through the Turkish Straits, limiting the number of foreign vessels that can enter the Black Sea via the Straits and how long these vessels can stay. This access is important to both Russia and NATO. Whereas Turkey has proven to be an impartial and reliable enforcer of the treaty, Russia has pushed the boundaries of Montreux repeatedly since the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and, more recently, impeded the course of NATO vessels that have entered and departed the Black Sea in compliance with the treaty. More behavior along these lines, or a Russian attempt to leverage its new, closer relationship with Turkey to secure more favorable access to the Black Sea, would likely increase Turkey’s unease and lead it to rely more on NATO as a counterbalance. For its part, the European Union should closely watch Turkey’s proposed construction of the Istanbul Canal to connect the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara (and, as such, the Aegean and Mediterranean seas), which is reportedly drawing interest from Chinese as well as Russian investors. As the canal would allow ships to sail between the Mediterranean and Black Sea without transiting the Turkish Straits, and thus abiding by the restrictions of Montreux, the European Union and United States should consider investing in this infrastructure project to ensure they are in a position to work with Turkey to ensure free and fair transit through the canal.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn –Key To Black Sea
Aydogan, 21 (Merve Aydogan, 06-14-2021, accessed on 1-3-2022, Aa.com, "Turkey remains as indispensable member of NATO for 69 years", SC)
NATO forces in Aegean, Black Sea Turkey provides permanent naval assistance to NATO missions in the Aegean Sea, presenting surveillance, reconnaissance, and monitoring activities to prevent illegal crossings. Turkey also supports Standing NATO Maritime Groups' (SNMG) activities in the Black Sea and Aegean, which is included as part of NATO obligations. Moreover, Turkey also hosts LANDCOM, NATO's land command, in the Aegean coastal province of Izmir. The NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – one of nine NATO land forces headquarters with high readiness level – is also stationed in Istanbul. Turkey also took command of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) in 2021. "Built around Turkey's 66th Mechanised Infantry Brigade of around 4,200 troops, a total of around 6,400 soldiers will serve on the VJTF," according to NATO. Turkey's latest armed vehicles, anti-tank missiles and howitzers have been allocated to the task force.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn –Turkey-West Increasing
Dalay 5-20 (Galip Dalay is a CATS Fellow at the Centre for Applied Turkish Studies (CATS) at SWP. (5-20-2022). Deciphering Turkey's geopolitical balancing and anti-westernism in its relations with Russia. Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/deciphering-turkeys-geopolitical-balancing-and-anti-westernism-in-its-relations-with-russia//BVN SC)
While discontent with the West and anti-Westernism have facilitated cordial and cooperative relations between Moscow and Ankara, Russian geopolitical revisionism has almost invariably pushed Turkey closer to the West. The logic here is straightforward. First, Russian revisionism poses direct security threats to Turkey. Historically, the centre of gravity of Turkish-Russian rivalry has been the Black Sea. From the Turkish perspective, Russia’s actions – from the war in Georgia to annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine – all decisively tilt the balance of power in this region in Russia’s favour. Although Russia’s policy in each of these cases might have specifics and contextual nuances, taken together they point to one unmistakable outcome: Russian revisionism in the post-Soviet space and an aspiration to turn the region into a sphere of domination. This will only aggravate the Turkish threat perception vis-à-vis Moscow. Second, the post-Soviet space is also Turkey’s immediate neighbourhood. If successful, the Russian policy will restrict Ankara’s geopolitical room for manoeuvre in this region, and undermine its standing from the Black Sea to the Balkans and the South Caucasus to Central Asia. Additionally, Turkish and Western interests are in broad alignment in these regions, so Moscow’s geopolitical revisionism is likely to bring Turkey and the West relatively closer together.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – No Link–Turkey Does Both
Kusa 6/13 (Iliya Kusa, Iliya Kusa is a Kyiv-based author and analyst of international relations with the Ukrainian Institute for the Future. For the past six years he has been writing about Middle East, Ukrainian foreign policy after 2014, and European politics. A special focus of his expertise is dedicated to the Middle East and North Africa, June, 13, 2022, “Turkey’s Goals in the Russia-Ukraine War”, //RM)
Of the many countries struggling to find a proper approach to the Russia-Ukraine war, Turkey seems to have landed on the most controversial yet comfortable one. Ankara has managed to preserve its relationship with both Moscow and Kyiv without endangering its own geostrategic calculations in the region while at the same time avoiding joining ranks with Western countries in imposing crippling sanctions on Russia. The role of a key mediator, which President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was so eager to take on, has allowed Turkey to conveniently position itself in the middle of the fight—and not just in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine but more broadly in the struggle between Russia and the West, and even globally between the West and the numerous non-Western countries that have preferred to strike a more cautious and balanced approach to the war. The overall political and ideological polarization incited by the war in Ukraine has threatened many countries that have worked for years to build a balanced, pragmatic, multivector foreign policy. Now many of them find themselves having to make a hard choice. Western countries under U.S. guidance are urging them to make common cause against Russia, which often means abandoning their balancing act between major powers. As the war has shown, in a highly tense international environment, a posture of neutrality and balancing on the part of countries struggling not to choose sides is not welcome by the conflicting parties, which strive to mobilize support for their own efforts. Turkey in particular has had to carve a path that does not lethally threaten relations with either Russia or the EU. The war in Ukraine has presented Ankara with both opportunities and risks. After the 2015 centralization of political power in the hands of Recep Erdoğan, the president moved his personal ambitions and goals to the forefront of Turkey’s foreign policy. In particular, he has sought to make Turkey a regional Muslim superpower capable of designing and guiding a new “post-Western” security architecture in greater Eurasia and one of the first non-Western powers to shape the new multipolar world order. To preserve this course, Turkey has had to find an appropriate way to deal with the Ukraine challenge. In essence, two global objectives became a priority for Turkey when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24: to preserve its global and regional positions, which Turkey has managed to consolidate and enhance after 2016; as well as to reinforce Ankara’s influence and amplify earlier achievements to ensure further expansion. Objective 1: Preserving Turkey’s Global and Regional Positions The first global objective is reflected in several developments that became essential in Ankara’s quest to hold its ground. First, the war in Ukraine has threatened Turkey’s pragmatic multipolar approach underpinning its foreign policy. The political coalescence of NATO and EU countries against Russia could not have escaped Turkey’s attention. Nor could Ankara remain on the sidelines and refrain from getting involved, given its close ties with several Western countries and its NATO commitments. On the other hand, Turkey did not want to degrade its relations with Russia by joining the Western-led sanctions, in which Ankara has declined to participate since 2014. For Turkey, Russia has been an important trading partner ($32.5 billion as of 2021), a key source of foreign investment (more than $10 billion), a colossal source of tourists (Russians account for almost 5 million visits, or 1 percent of all foreign tourist visitation), a crucial energy supplier, and an important “frenemy” in several regional playgrounds where Turkey (though not without Russia) has been able to actually accomplish something, such as in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey has been able to maintain relations with Russia and the West, thereby sustaining its desired global position, by assuming the role of a key mediator between Russia and Ukraine. This formal role gives Ankara a good reason not to get involved in sanctioning Moscow. Second, the war in Ukraine, with its subsequent social, economic, political, and transnational repercussions, has endangered stability on a number of regional issues that are vital for Turkey’s security, reputation, and international self-reliance. For years, Turkey’s regional policy was built on a situational partnership with Moscow. The possible weakening of Russia as a result of the war in Ukraine could throw the regional balance in the South Caucasus, the Black Sea region, and the Levant into disarray, strengthening, for instance, Iran in Syria—and Iran is one of Turkey’s less preferred competitors. Regional destabilization is not in Ankara’s interests, especially in light of the substantial financial and economic difficulties Turkey has been struggling with since last autumn. Objective 2: Reinforcing Ankara’s Influence The second global objective has to do with furthering Turkey’s political, economic, trade, and geopolitical expansion. By shaping the dynamics of the current crisis, Turkey is trying to “ride the tide” and use it to its advantage. Its tactics to achieve this goal include taking the place of Western companies on the Russian market, accruing tourist and financial flows from Russia, thereby bypassing sanctions, and gaining political ground in regional affairs by taking on a mediation role, forcing the conflicting parties to consult with and through Ankara on issues of war, peace, maritime trade, the demining of the Black Sea, and the restoration of essential Ukrainian wheat exports. In addition, many Russians, fearing Western sanctions, have moved to Turkey, investing millions in the local real estate market and registering businesses there, which is also a lucrative deal for Ankara. (Ankara offers citizenship for a $400,000 investment.) Finally, Turkey sees an opportunity to achieve its long-sought goal of becoming the major gas transit hub for Europe. With the European allies determined more than ever to reduce their dependence on Russian gas imports, Turkey is offering its services and lobbying for realization of a long-discussed new subsea pipeline between Israel and Turkey, one that would allow eastern Mediterranean gas to reach Europe through Turkey. Even more important for Ankara in this context is exploiting the momentum to strengthen its own standing in the world. As Western partners search for support in containing the Russian threat and dealing with an array of war-related consequences, Ankara sees the time is ripe to make the West drop sanctions against the Turkish defense industry and embrace Turkey as an equal partner. It is with this logic in mind that Turkey’s leadership unexpectedly jumped on NATO’s expansion process with bold demands as to what Sweden, Finland, and NATO member states should do to obtain Ankara’s consent. And it is this tactic of getting the most out of concessions from all parties that drove Erdoğan to announce a new military operation in northern Syria against the Western-backed Kurds, thereby endangering the regional positions of both Russia and the United States. All in all, Ankara’s predominant stance on the Russia-Ukraine war is not about Russia or Ukraine at all. It is about ensuring that any future postwar settlement in the region and the world will necessarily include Turkey’s interests, and ideally establish Turkey as a stakeholder in the process. Turkey’s serious economic problems, however, mean these plans may have to be adjusted. The key aspect of the Russia-Ukraine war for Erdoğan and his government remains not so much support for Ukraine or Russia as an opportunity for Erdoğan to strengthen his position on the international stage at the expense of either country’s interests by proactively practicing diplomacy amid the developing crisis.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – No Link–NATO Over Russia
Bardakçı 21 (Mehmet Bardakçı, 12-6-21, “Is a Strategic Partnership Between Turkey and Russia Feasible at the Expense of Turkey’s Relations with the EU and NATO?”, Comparative Southeast European Studies, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/soeu-2021-0001/html?lang=en//BVN SC)
The article mainly contends that since the real and expected benefits from the European Union (EU) and NATO were not delivered sufficiently from Turkey’s perspective, Turkey looked for alternatives and collaborated with Russia more intensely in recent years. Turkey’s cooperation with Russia was also facilitated by several global, political, economic, conjectural, security-related, and individual-level factors. Another argument of the study is that despite Turkey’s intensive collaboration with Russia, it is not feasible for Turkey to build a strategic partnership with it in the short- and medium-term at the expense of its relations with NATO and the EU. The main reasons for this are, in addition to the institutional and social shortcomings, geostrategic divergences, Russia’s inadequacy as an economic actor, the pitfalls of an asymmetric relationship with Russia, the security risks posed by Russia, NATO’s continuing importance for Turkey’s security needs, and the incompatibility of Russia’s and Turkey’s political systems. Keywords: EU; NATO; Russia; strategic partnership; Turkish foreign policy Introduction The arrival of the Russian S-400 air defence system in Turkey in July 2019 was welcomed enthusiastically by many in Turkey. This breakthrough event was even described by some in Turkey as the “country’s liberation from the West” (Tol and Taşpınar 2019, 107). Almost a decade ago, the question started to be asked as to whether Turkey was drifting away from the West, especially since it had approached Iran and voted against sanctions on Iran over its nuclear programme in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as well as clashed with Israel over the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010. This time, however, this question is more pronounced and the likelihood of a strategic shift became more tangible with the arrival of a weapon system from a country that has been confronting the West recently. Given that Turkey’s relations with the United States and the European Union (EU) have been at a nadir in recent years, many regarded the acquisition of the Russian weapon system as a precursor of Turkey’s withdrawal from the North Atlantic Alliance (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, NATO) and the EU. In addition to many other factors, Moscow’s and Ankara’s bitter relations with the West are a major reason why the two countries have closed ranks in recent years. A milestone for Moscow’s relationship with the West was its annexation of Crimea in March 2014 while the coup plot against the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government in Turkey in July 2016 marked a watershed in Ankara’s relations with the West. Russia had to confront a series of economic sanctions from the West after 2014 while Turkey was deeply disappointed with its Western allies for their slow and reluctant condemnation of the coup attempt. Ankara has even aired doubts that the West might have been behind the coup attempt. These events have helped peak the two countries’ deeply-ingrained sense of distrust towards the West. As one observer put, “Despite their obvious differences and even antagonisms, Russia and Turkey are united by one thing—the fact that they are two great powers connected historically, culturally, and geographically to a Europe that never fully accepted them as one of their own” (Lukyanov, People with Big Ambitions, The Moscow Times, 19 July 2016). A major objective of this article is to unpack the puzzle of whether Russia could replace the EU and NATO as a strategic partner for Turkey. The article contends that in addition to some factors facilitating the Russo–Turkish rapprochement, Turkey searched for alternatives, collaborating with Russia owing to the decline in the real and expected benefits from the EU and NATO from the Turkish perspective. Another major contention of this article is that despite the close collaboration between Moscow and Ankara, in particular after the coup attempt against the Turkish Government in July 2016, it is hard for Turkey to forge a strategic partnership with Russia because of significant divergent geostrategic interests, Russia’s inadequacy as an economic actor, the downsides of an asymmetric relationship with Russia, the security risks posed by Russia, the continuing importance of NATO for Turkey’s security as well as the incompatibility of Turkey’s and Russia’s political systems. Moreover, the absence of a solid social basis and the lack of institutionalization in their relations further make it infeasible for Turkey to switch from the Transatlantic Alliance to Russia. The study is divided into three sections. The first part concerns the motives that brought Moscow and Ankara together, including, first and foremost, their strained relationship with the West, economic interests, conjectural factors such as the Syrian conflict, transformation of the global governance system, and similarity of their political culture based on security and personal harmony between the leaders. The second part draws attention to the limitations in the relationship, and the third part explains why a strategic partnership between Turkey and Ankara and at the expense of Turkey’s partnership with the EU and NATO is not feasible in the foreseeable future. Finally, the conclusion wraps up the article.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Ukraine Thumper
Cook 3-3 (Steven A. Cook is Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). He is an expert on Arab and Turkish politics as well as U.S.-Middle East policy. Cook is the author of False Dawn: Protest, Democracy, and Violence in the New Middle East; The Struggle for Egypt: From Nasser to Tahrir Square, which won the 2012 gold medal from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey. Oxford University Press is publishing his next book, The End Of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East in 2022, 3/3/2022, “Where Turkey Stands on the Russia-Ukraine War”, Council On Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/where-turkey-stands-russia-ukraine-war//BVN SC)
The Turkish government has designated the Russian invasion as a “war,” giving it the right under the 1936 Montreux Convention to close the Bosporus Strait—which leads to the Black Sea—to warships. Although this action applies to any naval vessel, it is clearly aimed at Russia’s fleet in case Moscow seeks to reinforce the firepower it already has there. Turkey’s decision is, at least, an important symbolic one in support of Ukraine. A Russian submarine surfaces in the Bosporus with Istanbul in the background A Russian submarine sails in the Bosporus on its way to the Black Sea. Despite the restrictions on warships in the Bosporus, it seems clear that Turkey—like other countries including Israel—has sought a strategically defensible but morally questionable middle ground. Though Turkey voted for a UN General Assembly resolution condemning Russia, it has not sanctioned Russia or closed its airspace to Russian aircraft. Some observers have been quick to highlight the differences between Turkish policy and the definitive pro-Ukraine approaches of the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), implying that Ankara is trying to have it both ways—remaining rhetorically committed to Ukraine’s independence and offering to mediate the conflict while tilting toward Russia. There is some logic to this, especially after the purchase of the Russian-made air defense system known as the S-400. However, it is less a tilt than a recognition that Turkey’s interests are intertwined with Russia in critical areas, most importantly Syria. There, Turkey wants to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish state and maintain pressure on the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a group linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which the United States and Turkey have designated a terrorist organization. To accomplish these goals, Turkish officials have to consider Russian sensibilities, as Moscow is the most important external actor in Syria and can thus complicate Turkey’s military operations there and frustrate its diplomatic efforts. In recent years, Turkey has pursued what can best be described as foreign policy independence. As an important power in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Caucusus, Ankara has sought a multifaceted foreign policy that has, at times, conflicted with its NATO allies. For example, in 2017, Turkey decided to purchase S-400s. This step coincided with a growing dialogue between Ankara and Moscow that included moves to upgrade economic ties and discussions about deepening diplomatic and even military relations. At the same time, Turkey and Russia have found themselves on opposite ends of major regional conflicts, including in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh, a region over which Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a recent war. Even while they were supporting different sides in these places, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin maintained a dialogue. What about Ukraine? Turkey has generally supported Ukrainian independence and the country’s territorial integrity. Erdogan denounced Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and has advocated on behalf of Crimean Tatars (a Turkic ethnic group) who have suffered under Russian rule. Turkey sold armed drones to Ukraine ahead of Russia’s most recent invasion, though some reports indicate that only about twelve to twenty were delivered. Still, in whatever number, Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones are lethal and have been deployed to great effect in Libya, Syria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. How is this war likely to affect Turkey’s interests in the region? Turkey has sought to expand its trade and commercial relations with both Russia and Ukraine. It is also a destination for Russian tourists and an importer of oil and gas. To the extent that this war affects these ties and drives up energy prices, the Turkish economy—which is already experiencing upwards of 50 percent inflation—will feel the repercussions.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Swindland Thumper
Moore 7-18 (Mark Moore is a political editor at the New York Daily Posts, 7-18-22, “Turkey’s Erdogan renews threat to block Finland and Sweden from NATO”, New York Post, SC)
Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Monday renewed his threat to “freeze” NATO membership for Sweden and Finland unless they stick to their pledges to crack down on terrorist groups. “I want to reiterate once again that we will freeze the process if these countries do not take the necessary steps to fulfil our conditions,” Erdogan told reporters. “We particularly note that Sweden does not have a good image on this issue,” the Turkish strongman continued. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, Finland and Sweden set aside decades of neutrality during wartime and asked to join the 30-member alliance. But Erdogan balked, saying the two countries were too lax in their stand against terrorists because they hosted Kurdish militants. At June’s NATO summit in Madrid, which was attended by President Biden, the three countries reached a deal on deporting or extraditing groups considered to be security threats, including members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, and lift arms restrictions imposed after Turkey’s 2019 military incursion into northern Syria. But on Monday, Erdogan once again raised the threat of blocking their entrance into NATO unless they make good on the promises they made. Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan renewed his threat to "freeze" NATO membership for Finland and Sweden.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ – Turkey-NATO Coop Now
Ash 6-28 (Timothy Ash Senior Sovereign Strategist at BlueBay Asset Management in London, 6-28-22, “ASH: Turkey playing a delicate balancing act between Ukraine, Russia and Nato”, SC)
Turks are rightly proud of the success of Bayraktar drones in the conflict in Ukraine. Ukraine has also celebrated the success of Bayraktar drones against Russian armour, particularly in turning the tide in the first few weeks in the Battle of Kyiv – with songs even produced and sung by Ukrainians soldiers to acclaim the battlefield changing nature of this high-end Turkish technology. Turks like to view this as a great example of the country’s new-found technological and military prowess, but also their willingness to show support for Ukraine despite obvious risks to damaging valuable relations with Russia. Ukrainians are, though, beginning to doubt Turkey’s commitment to their cause, notwithstanding the undoubted success of Bayraktar. Turkey’s stance on peace talks in Antalya in March and again over trying to broker a deal to break the grain blockade of Ukrainian ports has left a distinct impression in Kyiv that Ankara is too keen to toe the Russian line and force a Russian friendly peace deal down their throats. In Antalya the Turkish side were confident a deal was to be done, and even sold a deal as in the offing, but this seemed to be close to terms being offered by Moscow, with little effort to accept or even understand the Ukrainian position. Predictably the Antalya peace process eventually collapsed. The fact that Ankara seems tone deaf to Ukraine’s position was also evident on talks on-going over breaking the grain blockade, with Ankara negotiating directly with Moscow and seemingly little effort being made to involve the Ukrainian side – even though any plan involves decisions about unblocking Ukrainian ports. On the ports issue, Turkey seemed unable to comprehend the Ukrainian position that getting agreement to de-mine ports was worthless unless there were also security guarantees to ensure that Russian forces did not use this as an opportunity to launch amphibious landings against Odesa, Mikolaiv, et al. Turkey appeared naïve in both the Antalya talks and the talks over ending the grain blockade. The Turkish side appeared to be adopting a peace deal at any (to Ukraine) cost strategy, but with zero effort to understand the Ukrainian position. But key to understanding the Turkish position on the war in Ukraine, and its seemingly blinkered effort to bring peace at almost any cost (to Ukraine), is that the Erdogan administration views all of this through its very narrow electoral lens. And therein it faces difficult elections within the next year, with opinion polls not looking good for either Erdogan or his ruling AKP, while the economy is in a desperately weak position. A degree of desperation and wishful thinking is hence evident in Turkey’s approach to the war in Ukraine. On the latter, over the past decade, under Erdogan’s failed monetary policy mantra that “high interest rates cause inflation,” the economy has been in an almost constant state of balance of payments crisis. Erdogan continually prioritises growth over inflation and exchange rate stability, as in the past credit growth has delivered real GDP growth, jobs and votes. But this has meant the economy has been run too hot, the price of which has been wide current account deficits, large external financing requirements and constant pressure on the lira to weaken. An orthodox response would be to tighten monetary and/or fiscal policy to slow domestic demand, lower import demand and with it the trade and current account deficits, thereby alleviating pressure on the lira. But Erdogan’s interest rate ideology has removed this option for the CBRT, meaning that the lira has had to take the strain, which has in turn fuelled inflation. Turks are unhappy with inflation and a constantly weakening lira. They feel poorer, which explains Erdogan’s lowly popularity. But Erdogan still thinks he can win the election by pulling a few more rabbits out of the hat – including the recent exchange rate protected deposit scheme, and more recently restrictions on corporates borrowing in lira if they have large FX deposits. Erdogan thinks that this can buy him some time, helping slow dollarisation, anchor the lira enough for him to push the growth agenda just one more time to win the next election. In normal times it would be touch and go whether this strategy could hold things stable enough to get through to elections by June 2023 and deliver Erdogan a win. But the war in Ukraine has just made the maths here even more difficult – higher energy and food import costs and the threat of the loss of key Ukrainian and Russian tourism receipts (one quarter of the total) are pushing the current account deficit wider and putting even more pressure on the lira. Erdogan needs this war to end and soon, otherwise he risks getting rolled over in an extreme balance of payments crisis which would scupper any remaining popularity he has. So, Erdogan has been happy to allow Bayraktar drones to go to Ukraine – they advertise Turkish engineering prowess and generate important export earnings. But beyond that Turkey has done little to help Ukraine’s cause. And, as noted, if anything the Antalya peace talks and the talks over unblocking grain deliveries from Ukraine have undermined Kyiv’s position. Turkey has also failed to join Western sanctions on Russia – arguing that it simply cannot afford to, given its challenging balance of payments position. If relations with the West were better, it might have hoped for financial support to offset losses from sanctions and the war in Ukraine. But this option is constrained by broader Western concern about policy choices made by Erdogan, including over monetary policy. Some close to the Erdogan administration have even argued that Turkey could benefit from sanctions by acting as a middle-man similar to its position on Iranian sanctions. Some think that Turkey could benefit as Russian companies look to reflag to avoid sanctions, as Russian capital and business look to exit and evade sanctions, and also by being a conduit for Russian capital – tourism, the latter being the scenario where Russians seek to holiday in Turkey but using this as an opportunity to park capital by opening Turkish bank accounts and buying property. To some extent facilitating capital flight from Russia is a benefit for the West in heaping the economic pressure on Russia, but there is a fine dividing line for Turkey here from being seen to profit from the conflict, and concern that some of the activity might be on the edge of actual sanctions breaking. A recent visit by US Treasury officials to Turkey likely was meant to draw clear lines as to what is and is not acceptable. And then there is the whole furore around Turkey’s stalling on Finland and Sweden’s bid to join Nato. As Nato allies have highlighted, Turkey does have understandable security concerns over Scandinavian support for various Kurdish groups. It has leverage now to force Sweden and Finland to rein these in. And playing hardball on this issue will play very well with the domestic nationalist constituency in Turkey before elections. It's potentially a win-win for Turkey. But the risk is that Erdogan overplays his hand and permanently damages relations with the West. He needs to realise that for the US and the rest of its Nato allies, Russia is the priority and is seen as a clear and present danger, and an existential threat to Ukraine and the West. Finnish and Swedish Nato entry is a huge win for the West, for Ukraine, and a major snub to Putin. If Erdogan now blocks this at the Nato summit in Madrid later this month, relations with the West will, I think, be permanently soured. And likely the West will adopt an openly hostile, as opposed to largely neutral, approach to Erdogan’s re-election by June 2023. Blocking Swedish and Finnish membership would also stall rising hopes of a deal over Turkey’s compensation for leaving the F35 project, through purchase of additional F16s and upgrade kits. This would damage Turkey’s defence capability. Now playing hardball to the end of this could turn the next election in Erdogan’s favour, and I think he will have to balance this off against the risk of a major balance of payments crisis if he plays hardball too long. And with the West angered, he would have few tools to allay any such BOP crisis – he does not want to hike policy rates or go to the IMF, capital controls are counterproductive and will damage business, the CBRT has limited reserves and FX adjustment just leads to more inflation. If he faces a BOP crisis after vetoing Finnish and Swedish Nato membership, I think the West would stand on the sidelines as a full balance of payments crisis washes over Erdogan. And likely Erdogan would lose the next election. Logic would suggest that Erdogan would play very hardball to the Madrid summit – get deals over Kurdish groups in Sweden and Finland, easing of arms sanctions, and new agreements over new arms purchases like the F16. He can tell electors at home that he played hardball and won concessions. He will hope the West is grateful enough to keep capital markets open to allow him to finance his external borrowing needs. All this feels pretty binary. But I think in all this, Erdogan needs to realise that for the West the crisis in Ukraine is a defining moment, a definitive challenge they face, and it’s a time to ask if allies are with the West or against it. Erdogan has tried staying on the fence, to some extent trying to play one side off against the other. I think time for such an approach is fast running out. Madrid will likely be the moment when Erdogan has to decide whose side he is on. An important week is in store for Nato and Turkey.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ – Turkey-NATO Coop Now
Congressional Research Service 21 (Congressional Research Service, December-30-2021, accessed on 1-3-2022, Congressional Research Service, "Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief", https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44000.pdf//BVN SC)
Turkey’s location near several global hotspots has made the continuing availability of its territory for the stationing and transport of arms, cargo, and personnel valuable for the United States and NATO. In addition to Incirlik Air Base near the southern Turkish city of Adana, other key U.S./NATO sites include an early warning missile defense radar in eastern Turkey and a NATO ground forces command in Izmir (see Figure A-3). From Turkey’s perspective, NATO’s traditional importance has been to mitigate Turkish concerns about encroachment by neighbors, as was the case with the Soviet Union’s aggressive post-World War II posturing. Some similar Turkish concerns—though somewhat less pronounced—may stem from Russia’s ongoing regional involvement in places such as Syria and Ukraine, and may partly motivate recent Turkish military operations to frustrate some Russian objectives in various conflict arenas.86 As a result of growing tensions between Turkey and Western countries, and questions about the safety and utility of Turkish territory for U.S. and NATO assets, some observers have advocated exploring alternative basing arrangements in the region.87 Some reports suggest that expanded or potentially expanded U.S. military presences in places such as Greece, Cyprus, Jordan and Romania might be connected with concerns about Turkey.88 Additionally, Turkish actions in opposition to the interests of other U.S. allies and partners in the Eastern Mediterranean (see “Cyprus, Greece, and Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas” below)— particularly over the past two years—have led U.S. officials to encourage cooperation among those allies and partners.89 In 2020, the Trump Administration waived restrictions on the U.S. sale of non-lethal defense articles and services to the Republic of Cyprus, effectively ending a U.S. arms embargo that had dated back to 1987, and attracting criticism from Turkish officials.90 Turkey’s influence in the Black Sea littoral region and its relationships with European countries bordering Russia make its actions in this sphere important for U.S. interests. Ongoing Turkish defense cooperation with or arms sales to Ukraine, Poland, Georgia, and Azerbaijan may present opportunities to make renewed common cause between the United States and Turkey to counter Russia.91 Alternatively, Turkey’s interactions with these other countries could possibly check both U.S. and Russian ambitions, or increase regional tensions potentially leading toward conflict.92 A case in point will be how Turkey regulates and controls other countries’ maritime access to and from the Black Sea—a limited privilege granted to Turkey in the Montreux Convention of 1936 (with provisions to give Turkey greater control when at war).93
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ – Turkey-West Coop Now
Outzen 7-1 (Rich Outzen is a geopolitical consultant and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council IN TURKEY with thirty-two years of US government service both in uniform and as a civilian. 7-1-22, TURKEYSource, “Experts react: What the NATO summit breakthrough means for Turkey and the Alliance”, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/experts-react-what-the-nato-summit-breakthrough-means-for-turkey-and-the-alliance//BVN SC)
This week at their Madrid summit, NATO allies formally invited Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance. It was the latest step in a whirlwind process initiated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and delayed by Turkey—home to the second-largest military in the Alliance, after the United States—which argued that the Nordic countries did not sufficiently address Turkey’s national-security concerns. After weeks of tough negotiations, Turkey, Finland, and Sweden agreed to a breakthrough trilateral declaration on Tuesday. Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asked experts for their take on the implications of the summit and the trilateral declaration. Jump to an expert reaction Mehmet Fatih Ceylan: A victory for NATO unity and cohesion Ian Brzezinski: Erdogan recognizes NATO brings far more geopolitical value than Russia Rich Outzen: The summit brings Turkey’s security concerns to the fore A victory for NATO unity and cohesion The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014 has entirely changed the security landscape, not only in the Euro-Atlantic area, but globally. It has fundamentally altered threat perceptions beyond the Alliance, leading Finland and Sweden to officially apply for membership in NATO. These two countries have indeed crossed the Rubicon and deserted their neutrality in response to persistent Russian belligerence in the middle of Europe. Their decision to combine their efforts and assets with the Alliance against Russian aggression is natural and legitimate. Hence the need to incorporate Finland and Sweden into the Alliance family. The trilateral memorandum signed among Turkey, Finland, and Sweden on June 28 is a welcome development designed to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and unity, and further strengthen the Alliance. It is commonplace in NATO to consult on and negotiate over any dispute among allies and would-be allies to find a common ground. That is how NATO plays its role, and at the end a solution accommodating such concerns is found by consensus. It is also true that once new members accede to NATO, they are bound by the decisions previously taken by the Alliance on a wide range of subjects. In NATO there exists a robust set of decisions and practices in fighting terrorism, beginning with the intervention in Afghanistan. Therefore, there is already an agreement comprising all sorts of conceptual work and practices in different geographical theaters on combatting terrorism, developed within NATO and binding on all members. The newly adopted Strategic Concept (SC) clearly identifies Russia and “terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations” as the primary sources of threats in a 360-degree manner and across all three core tasks of NATO: collective deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Given that terrorism is “the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity,” as defined in the SC, it makes sense both for Finland and Sweden to cooperate with Turkey in combatting terrorism as one of the primary sources of threats against Alliance interests. In a nutshell, collective deterrence and defense against actual and potential adversaries, nipping crises in the bud, and expanding the web of networks with partners under challenging circumstances are the main tasks of NATO in the next decade. The main center of gravity for NATO is its solidarity, unity, and cohesion, including all allies and those set to become allies. The summit decisions in their entirety will help NATO to navigate the troubled waters ahead over the long term. —Mehmet Fatih Ceylan is the president of Ankara Policy Center and previously served as permanent representative of Turkey to NATO. Erdogan recognizes NATO brings far more geopolitical value than Russia At their summit in Madrid, NATO leaders decided to “invite Finland and Sweden to become members of NATO, and agreed to sign the accession protocols.” This was an important breakthrough. Until now, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had held up the protocols on the grounds that the two Nordic nations had embargoed his nation from defense sales and refused to extradite alleged Kurdish terrorists. Consensus was facilitated by a meeting between US President Joe Biden and Erdogan—a bilateral long sought by the Turkish leader—and memorialized via a trilateral Turkey-Sweden-Finland memorandum in which the latter two agreed to lift the embargoes, condemn the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization, “address” Turkey’s pending extradition requests, and support Turkey’s involvement in European Union defense initiatives. The breakthrough underscored the influence and leadership of the United States in NATO. There is no way Erdogan would have lifted his veto solely due to European pressure. It also reflects Erdogan’s recognition that NATO brings Turkey far more geopolitical value than Russia, which would savor seeing this Nordic bid for NATO membership fail. Consensus on Finland and Sweden’s applications also demonstrated the Alliance’s unity in the face of Russia’s aggression and the difficulty Moscow still has when it comes to fully peeling Erdogan away from the transatlantic community. Once again, Putin’s strongest relationship in the Black Sea region has proven to be far more transactional than strategic. With that said, Turkey, like all the other NATO allies, still has to ratify these accession protocols. There remains ample opportunity for Erdogan to introduce additional negotiations with the rest of NATO. I am optimistic that Sweden and Finland will become NATO members, but it is still too early to say this round of NATO enlargement is a done deal. —Ian Brzezinski is a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and previously served as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy. The summit brings Turkey’s security concerns to the fore The summit was a great success for Ankara for three distinct reasons. The first is the content of the trilateral memorandum signed with Sweden and Finland: No arms embargo on Turkey, an affirmed commitment to address Turkish security concerns, no aid to the PKK or (significantly) the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), the Gulen movement mentioned as a terror concern, collaboration on the defense industry, working groups to follow—it’s hard to see what they missed. Of course, these are statements of principle, and execution or a final commitment will play out over time. But that is as true for Ankara approving accession as it is for the specified cooperation. The second reason is the ringing endorsement from the White House not only for the trilateral memorandum, but for the strengthening of Turkish air power and specifically a commitment to press Congress to approve F-16 fighter jet sales and upgrades. Notably, Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) has already weighed in with a strong endorsement of the deal. The in-person meeting of presidents Biden and Erdogan was notable, too. The third reason is more subtle: the inclusion in the new, slimmed-down Strategic Concept of language on countering terrorism “in all its forms and manifestations.” This language, and the prominence given both terror concerns and the Russian military threat, address Turkish concerns and highlight the value Turkey adds to the Alliance.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ – Turkey-West Coop Now
Bekdil 6/6 (Bekdil, B. E, Burak Ege Bekdil is a Turkey correspondent for Defense News. He has written for Hurriyet Daily News, and worked as Ankara bureau chief for Dow Jones Newswires and CNBC-e television. He is also a fellow at the Middle East Forum and regularly writes for the Middle East Quarterly and Gatestone Institute (2022, June 6). Turkey seeks to repair ties with Western Procurement Club. Defense News. Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/06/06/turkey-seeks-to-repair-ties-with-western-procurement-club//RM)
“Turkey is a NATO ally and will remain one. The war between our two partners Russia and Ukraine has created a new understanding in favor of strengthening procurement ties with our NATO allies,” a presidential aide told Defense News, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss Ankara’s diplomatic tightrope walk. The war has once again put Turkey in a pivotal broker position within NATO. Ankara has cultivated ties with both Russia and Ukraine that officials hope will provide dividends in future negotiations. Turkey’s approval is also needed to advance Sweden’s and Finland’s respective NATO membership applications, which grew out of their fear that Russia would work to permanently isolate them from the alliance. But there is some history to overcome. In 2020, Turkey paid $2.5 billion for the Russian S-400 air defense system. But fearing further isolation and sanctions from its allies, Turkey decided against making the system operational. In response to the acquisition, the U.S. suspended Turkey’s membership in the multinational consortium that builds the fifth-generation F-35 fighter jet. Turkey’s down payment of $1.5 billion for a first batch of the stealth aircraft, which Ankara never received, remains to be reimbursed. In March of this year, a senior Turkish diplomat who deals with NATO and security affairs told Defense News that the Russo-Ukrainian war has practically killed all potential Turkish-Russian deals related to strategic weapon systems. With Russia off the table as a military supplier, Turkish leaders are back to surveying the Western market. A senior Turkish procurement official said earlier this spring that the Eurofighter Typhoon is one option, involving the sale of about 80 aircraft — a purchase that would give Turkish industry an edge as it builds the country’s indigenous fighter jet in the making, the TF-X. The Typhoon was originally designed as an air superiority fighter. It is manufactured by a consortium made up of Airbus, BAE Systems and Leonardo, which conducts the majority of the aircraft project through a joint holding company, Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH. The NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency, representing the U.K., Germany, Italy and Spain, manages the project and is the prime customer. Turkey also has moved to acquire 40 F-16 Block 70 aircraft and upgrade kits for its 80 older F-16s. The Turkish request went to Congress in April. Earlier in May, the Biden administration asked the House of Representatives to approve the upgrade of Turkey’s F-16 fighter jet fleet. A potential deal may include high-tech missiles, radar systems and electronic warfare suites for the planes. In addition, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed hope in March that the trilateral talks between Turkey, France and Italy to co-produce the European air and anti-missile defense system SAMP/T, built by Eurosam, would resume after the French elections in April. In similar optimism, Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said in late March that Italy and France were thinking “more seriously” now on co-producing the SAMP/T systems in Turkey. Meanwhile, Britain took steps to ease Turkey’s return to the Western procurement system. Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Faruk Kaymakcı said in February that Britain had lifted a ban on arms sales to Turkey, imposed after a unilateral Turkish offensive in northern Syria in 2019. The ease in trade restrictions was kept secret from the public, and some observers say Canada might follow suit. But most Western restrictions remain in effect. For instance, the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden imposed full arms embargoes on Turkey since 2019 over its military interventions in Syria. France has placed restrictions on an array of defense and aviation subsystems, and Italy has barred the sale of certain products. Germany has suspended plans to sell engines to power the Altay, Turkey’s first indigenous main battle tank in the making. “Turkey’s careful balancing act between its NATO allies and Russia has generally been recognized in the West, sometimes with much praise. How Turkey will maneuver between clashing Western and Russian interests in the near future will shape Western appetite for Turkey’s return to their procurement system,” said Ozgur Eksi, a defense analyst in Ankara. Some Western diplomats think Erdoğan may try to use Turkey’s veto power in NATO for a reset in procurement ties with the West. He said May 13 that his country is “not favorable” toward Finland and Sweden joining the alliance, indicating Turkey could use its membership to veto moves to admit the two countries. The issue was unresolved at press time. “The Turks appear to be preparing for a tough bargaining process, which may include the transfer of certain weapons system,” said a U.S. diplomat in Ankara. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine prompted Finland and Sweden to reconsider their traditions of military nonalignment. Eksi said that because of the war in Ukraine, Turkey would unlikely consider touching major arms deal with Russia that were previously on the table. “That includes any Turkish intention to buy the Russian-made Su-35 or Su-57 aircraft,” he said. Erdoğan has previously said Turkey was interested in buying the Russian-made fighter jets.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ – Turkey-Russia Relations Low
Got 20 (Antoine Got is based in Europe and works on security and defense issues. The views expressed in this article are his own, and do not reflect the views or positions of any organization with which he is affiliated, 11-19-20, “TURKEY’S CRISIS WITH THE WEST: HOW A NEW LOW IN RELATIONS RISKS PARALYZING NATO”, War on the Rocks, SC)
Ultimately, however, fears of a Turkish realignment with Russia are likely overblown. Moscow and Ankara’s relations have historically been fraught, and the recent rapprochement stems more from opportunism and coinciding interests than a major reorientation in Turkish foreign policy at the expense of its traditional alliances. In fact, Turkey’s forceful posturing is making it steadily more at odds with Russia in conflict environments where both operate, including Nagorno-Karabakh, Syria, and Libya. Its growing involvement in the Caucasus, for instance, has brought it dangerously close to armed confrontation with NATO’s primary contestant, Russia, which supports Armenia under the Collective Security Treaty Organization framework. This was highlighted by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s underscoring of Russia’s “obligations to Armenia.” Though the violence ended there, Turkey’s proxy saber-rattling contributes to increase risks of accident or miscalculation leading to armed confrontation with Russia — something all parties are eager to avoid. With antagonistic security interests at stake, Turkey and Russia are ultimately more likely to balance against rather than align with each other, though several NATO allies continue to regard Ankara’s ties to Moscow with a deep-seated sense of suspicion.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ – Russia Isolated
Kim 5/11 (Kim, L. Kim was born in Charleston, Illinois. He earned a bachelor’s degree in geography and foreign languages from Clark University, studied journalism at the University of California at Berkeley and graduated from Central European University in Budapest with a master’s degree in nationalism studies.(2022, May 11). Russia isolated in its postimperial phantasm. Wilson Center. Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russia-isolated-its-postimperial-phantasm//RM)
From a strategic point of view, Putin’s attack on Ukraine has thrown back Russia to its weakest position since World War II. Ukrainians have shown they are ready to fight and die, and that they will never accept a Russian puppet regime. In a best-case scenario for the Kremlin, Russia ends up controlling swaths of eastern Ukraine, including a land corridor from Russia to Crimea, allowing Russian forces to continue threatening Ukraine’s Black Sea coastline and the country’s center. Yet even this state of play would hardly improve the Kremlin’s hand compared to what it was before the February invasion, when Russia already occupied Crimea and had the Ukrainians tied down in a low-level war in the eastern part of the country. Strategically speaking, the status quo ante was favorable to Russia, since the simmering conflict was draining Ukraine’s scarce resources and hobbling its aspirations to join the EU and NATO. Germany and France, signatories to the stalled Minsk peace process, were uninterested in inflaming tensions with Russia over Ukraine—as was the United States. After taking office, President Biden tried to patch up relations with Moscow so that he could focus on his main foreign policy priority, China. Biden held a summit with Putin, refused to give Ukraine any clearer guidance on NATO membership, and ignored calls to sanction Russia’s Nord Stream 2 pipeline. In the leadup to the attack, Putin, the eternal tactician, may have been under the impression that he was on a roll in Russia’s “near abroad.” In 2020, when mass protests broke out in Belarus, wedged between Poland, the Baltic region, and Russia, Putin offered dictator Alexander Lukashenko financial support and riot police. After a flare-up in a bitter territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan that same year, the Kremlin inserted itself into the fight by dispatching Russian peacekeepers to the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. In January the Kremlin briefly deployed a Russian rapid-reaction force to Kazakhstan to help a friendly regime shore up its authority amid antigovernment demonstrations and violence. Though all are dependent on Russia, none of the beneficiaries of recent Kremlin support has returned the favor by actively backing the war against Ukraine. Russia’s Isolation To varying degrees, Putin’s attack on Ukraine sent shocks through every former Soviet republic as Russia showed itself to be an unpredictable, revanchist power. Russia’s isolation in its own neighborhood has nothing to do with NATO; its lack of true allies is a strategic disaster entirely of Putin’s own making. In light of their history as Soviet vassals, the desire of former Warsaw Pact countries to join NATO was understandable and, in view of what’s happening in Ukraine, completely sensible. On emerging from behind the Iron Curtain three decades ago, these countries didn’t have the luxury to wait and see whether their former overlord would first develop into a peace-loving, democratic neighbor. That the Russian establishment even before Putin was opposed to NATO expansion is also understandable, given Russia’s past domination over Central and Eastern Europe. The irony is that NATO membership for the region’s small, insecure nations made Russia’s western border the most stable it has ever been. Although Putin fulminated about U.S. missile defense installations in Romania and Poland, it was unclear how they were supposed to neutralize Russia’s vast nuclear arsenal, the largest in the world. In fact, before Russia launched its first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the United States was drawing down its military presence in Europe and attempting to pivot to Asia. The case of Ukraine is the most egregious example of how Russia’s postimperial phantom pains have clouded the Kremlin’s strategic thinking. Ukraine, with its close cultural, linguistic, economic, and religious ties to Russia, should have been a natural ally. While most Ukrainians were proud of their distinct identity, they were generally well-disposed toward Russia and deeply ambivalent about NATO before 2014. The Alliance itself was divided over Ukraine’s membership precisely because of the country’s deep connections to Russia. Even as Putin’s attack on Ukraine eight years ago spurred the United States, Britain, Canada, and Germany to send troops to NATO allies in Eastern Europe, it did not solidify support for Ukrainian membership within the Alliance. When Putin ordered a full-scale invasion in February, Ukraine was not significantly closer to joining NATO than it had been in 2008, when the issue was hotly debated, together with Putin, at the annual NATO summit. What has changed since 2014 is that a majority of Ukrainians support NATO membership and have no doubts that Russia has become their mortal enemy. As for NATO, member states such as the United States and Britain began arming and training the Ukrainian military. Putin’s fears of an increased U.S. presence in Ukraine—and Eastern Europe more broadly—became a self-fulfilling prophesy. The reputational damage to Russia that Putin’s belligerence has caused is staggering. Finland and Sweden are considering NATO membership, and even Switzerland has ended its traditional neutrality and adopted EU sanctions against Russia. Germany, once Russia’s most faithful partner in Western Europe, is determined to stop relying on Siberian natural gas, ending an energy relationship that began during the Cold War. Trust and economic synergies that took decades to build have been sacrificed for Putin’s delusional war. The Kremlin may retort that it has friends in other parts of the world. But even in the United Nations, Russia has been ostracized, with a large majority of countries calling on Moscow to end its offensive in Ukraine. Putin received explicit support only from Belarus, Syria, Eritrea, and North Korea, with China and India abstaining. The isolation of Putin’s Russia is linked to the country’s inability to articulate an attractive message about what it stands for beyond being the self-proclaimed antipode to the United States. At least during the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the bearer of a powerful ideology that found adherents around the world. During his two decades in power, Putin has squandered the possibilities of Russian soft power. With a tiny fraction of Russia’s oil windfall, he could have established a global network of institutes, like Germany’s Goethe-Institut or Spain’s Instituto Cervantes, to tap into widespread interest in Russian culture. Instead he focused on Russian hard power, turning the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II into the regime’s ideological foundation. The untold human sacrifice in World War II was the source of the Soviet Union’s legitimacy as a UN Security Council member and worthy rival to the United States. With his unprovoked war against Ukraine, Putin has surrendered the last piece of moral high ground Russia, as the successor state of the Soviet Union, held as a leading member of the coalition that defeated Hitler. Putin’s savage attack on Ukraine will taint and overshadow the memory of Russian heroism in World War II for generations to come. In May 2005, leaders from more than fifty countries, including the United States and Ukraine, attended the Victory Day celebrations marking the sixtieth anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat. The number of foreign guests has since decreased inversely to Putin’s mounting aggression. Last year, only the leader of Tajikistan paid Putin the honor of attending his parade. This May 9, in a striking symbol of Russia’s isolation, no foreign guests came at all.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Turkey-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ – Russia Isolated
Rochlitz 3/16 (Rochlitz , M. ,Michael Rochlitz is Professor for Economics with a focus on institutional change at Bremen University.(2022, March 16). Russia's slide into international isolation. Zentrum für Osteuropa- und internationale Studien (ZOiS). Retrieved July 1, 2022, from https://www.zois-berlin.de/en/publications/zois-spotlight/russias-slide-into-international-isolation//RM)
On 24 February 2022, Russian president Vladimir Putin ordered a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine. The decision was based on a series of fatally flawed situational assessments, including an overestimation of the fighting abilities of the Russian army, an underestimation of the determination of the Ukrainian army and people, and a faulty evaluation of the West’s willingness to impose serious economic sanctions. The massive sanctions that have since been imposed on Russia’s economy have led to a freeze on half of the central bank’s reserves, a fall in the value of the rouble of more than 40 per cent, and an exodus of most Western companies from Russia. Increasing political repression and a fear of border closures caused several hundred thousand Russians – a significant part of the country’s intellectual elite – to flee abroad. The economic consequences of these developments will be disastrous. At the moment, neither the Russian government nor most Russian people seem to realise the extent of the economic catastrophe that is already sure to happen. In the best scenario, Russia’s economy will shrink by 10 to 20 per cent this year, a somewhat worse decline than during the 2008 financial crisis. But if the war continues, and new war crimes lead to additional sanctions, the economic disaster might be comparable to that caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. A self-inflicted catastrophe There are few, if any, politicians in recent history who have inflicted such massive harm on their own country in such a short time as Putin has done in the last 20 days. Three weeks ago, Russia was a middle-income country well integrated into the global economy, with a large part of its population enjoying a standard of living comparable to that of some European states. Russians could choose from a similar range of consumer goods to people elsewhere in the world, occasionally travel abroad for a holiday, and expect to lead a relatively stable and peaceful life. Today, Russia has become an almost completely isolated pariah state. Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, and Syria were the only countries that voted against a UN resolution condemning the Russian war in Ukraine. According to a list compiled by researchers at Yale University, by 13 March, 350 foreign companies had ceased or curtailed their operations in Russia, with only 34 overseas firms continuing to operate normally. As both Airbus and Boeing are no longer servicing Russian planes, Russia’s airlines were forced to stop international flights and might soon be forced to stop domestic flights as well. Travel within the country will be pushed back to where it was in the early twentieth century. It is unlikely that any of these companies will return to Russia if the current situation continues or deteriorates. As a consequence, the country will be deprived of many of the high-technology and consumer goods it has been importing until now. As Russia produces very few hi-tech goods, this will seriously affect the Russian economy, disrupting supply chains and making the country’s situation similar to that of Iran during the last 30 years. A similarly heavy blow will be the brain drain caused by the recent wave of repression. Most of the hundreds of thousands of people who have fled Russia in recent weeks are highly qualified specialists and researchers who are difficult to replace. The remaining scientists in Russia will be cut off from international networks, as worldwide academic institutions have cut all ties with Russian universities. The consequences for science, research, and innovation in Russia will be devastating. Dark prospects for the future Even in the best possible scenario of immediate peace, it would take several years to repair the damage already caused. Such a scenario would probably require the fall of the Putin regime, and a new government that ends the war and takes responsibility for Russia’s actions, to open up the possibility of bringing the country back into the international community. Even in this highly unlikely scenario, however, Russia’s population will have suffered substantial economic harm, and the horrors already committed in Ukraine will leave deep scars for Ukrainians and Russians alike. In what is unfortunately a more likely scenario, the war will drag on for a considerable time, potentially leading to a complete end of Western oil and gas imports from Russia. Although China might be willing to jump in, Russia will not be able to significantly increase its oil and gas exports in the near future, as the existing infrastructure in the Far East is already operating at full capacity. Moscow will thus have to rely on Chinese loans to import Chinese consumer goods. As a result, Russia might turn into some large-scale version of North Korea: economically dependent on China and with a government that through tight control of travel and information will try to prevent its population from finding out the true reasons for the disaster that has befallen it.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Impact Turn
Siegle ’22 [Joseph Siegle; ; 2-2-2022; The future of Russia-Africa relations; Brookings; https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/02/02/the-future-of-russia-africa-relations/; 7-16-2022; SK]
Russia has been aggressively pursuing its strategic objectives in Africa in recent years—securing a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean, gaining naval port access in the Red Sea, expanding natural resource extraction opportunities, displacing Western influence, and promoting alternatives to democracy as a regional norm.
Africa, thus, is a “theater” for Russia’s geostrategic interests rather than a destination itself—a perspective reflected in the means that Russia employs. Unlike most major external partners, Russia is not investing significantly in conventional statecraft in Africa—e.g., economic investment, trade, and security assistance. Rather, Russia relies on a series of asymmetric (and often extralegal) measures for influence—mercenaries, arms-for-resource deals, opaque contracts, election interference, and disinformation.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Libya Impact
Gaouette & Browne, 19
[Nicole & Ryan; journalists for CNN; 11-26-2019; US says Russian troops are destabilizing Libya; https://www.cnn.com/2019/11/26/politics/us-russia-destabilizing-libya/index.html]
Russia has deployed military forces to Libya that are “de-stabilizing” the North African country, a top State Department official warned Tuesday. David Schenker, the State Department’s assistant secretary for near eastern affairs, told reporters that Russia is deploying troops in “significant” numbers to support Libyan Gen. Khalifa Haftar, whose Libyan National Army launched an April offensive to seize Tripoli from the UN-backed Government of National Accord. US officials have previously told CNN that they believe hundreds of Russian mercenaries affiliated with the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization with ties to the Kremlin, have been in Libya for some time, working on behalf of Moscow and helping Haftar in his bid to capture Tripoli, however Schenker said that Russia is now deploying regular uniformed personnel there as well. “Russian regulars are being deployed in significant numbers to support the LNA,” Schenker said, describing their presence as “incredibly destabilizing.” The presence of the Russian troops “raises the specter of large-scale casualties among the civilian population,” Schenker said. His comments come days after a senior US delegation met with Haftar on Sunday to “discuss steps to achieve a suspension of hostilities and a political resolution to the Libyan conflict,” according to a State Department statement issued Monday.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Libya Impact
Klapper ’21 [Rebecca Klapper; ; 6-23-2021; Russia, Turkey reach agreement to remove troops from Libya, U.S. official says; Newsweek; https://www.newsweek.com/russia-turkey-reach-agreement-remove-troops-libya-us-official-says-1603508; 7-19-2022; SK]
A senior U.S. official said Russia and Turkey have tentatively reached an agreement to begin the process of withdrawing foreign troops from Libya in agreement with Germany's Foreign Minister pledging to remove foreign forces from Libya.
The official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, told the Associated Press that the deal is not yet done, but each country is prepared to discuss an incremental withdrawal of about 300 troops by both sides.