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2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Internal Link Turn

Russia has a history of torturing and killing African civilians.

Human Rights Watch, 5/3

[Human Rights Watch investigates and reports on worldwide human rights violations; 5-3-2022; Central African Republic: Abuses by Russia-Linked Forces; https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/03/central-african-republic-abuses-russia-linked-forces]

(Nairobi) – Forces in the Central African Republic, whom witnesses identified as Russian, appear to have summarily executed, tortured, and beaten civilians since 2019, Human Rights Watch said today. National authorities, the country’s Special Criminal Court (SCC), or the International Criminal Court (ICC), should investigate these incidents as well as other credible allegations of abuse by Russia-linked forces with a view to criminal prosecution. Several Western governments, and United Nations experts and special rapporteurs have found evidence that the forces linked to Russia operating in the Central African Republic include a significant number of members of the Wagner Group, a Russian private military security contractor with apparent links to the Russian government. On April 15, the United Nations announced it would investigate the circumstances in which at least 10 people were killed in the northeast, with some initial reports alleging Russian forces may have been involved. “There is compelling evidence that Russian-identified forces supporting the Central African Republic’s government have committed grave abuses against civilians with complete impunity,” said Ida Sawyer, crisis and conflict director at Human Rights Watch. “The failure of the Central African Republic government and its partners to forcefully denounce these abuses, and to identify and prosecute those responsible, will most likely only fuel further crimes in Africa and beyond.” Between February 2019 and November 2021, Human Rights Watch interviewed 21 people in person and 19 others by phone, including 10 victims and 15 witnesses, about abuses they said were committed by men with white skin speaking Russian, a language the witnesses recognized. Witnesses said that the men were carrying military-grade weapons and wearing beige khaki clothes, scarves to cover their faces, military boots, gloves, and sunglasses. In August 2018 the Central African Republic and Russian authorities signed an agreement under which “primarily former military officers” from Russia, also called “specialists”, would train Central African Republic forces. Russia-linked forces in the Central African Republic do not wear a designated uniform with official insignia or other distinguishing features. Twelve people spoke about an incident on the morning of July 21, 2021, in which apparent Russian-speaking forces killed at least 12 unarmed men near the town of Bossangoa. Human Rights Watch obtained the names of those killed from the United Nations and others who knew the victims. Bossangoa officials said the Central African authorities concluded that 13 people were killed in the attack. Witnesses said that men speaking Russian set up a roadblock, stopped the men, beat, and shot them dead, and then put at least eight of the bodies in a shallow hole next to the road. On August 2 the government said that it would set up a special commission of inquiry to establish responsibility and take appropriate measures. On October 27, in a joint statement, 16 UN Working Group experts and special rapporteurs referred to the special commission finding earlier that month that “Russian instructors” had committed human rights and laws of war violations. However, the commission has not published its findings. Human Rights Watch also spoke with six men who said that Central African army forces accused them and fifteen other men of being rebels and unlawfully detained them for several days or weeks between June and August 2021 in inhuman conditions in an open hole at a national army base in Alindao, in Basse Kotto province, in the south. They said both national army and Russian-speaking forces beat five of the men and that both forces may have executed two who were rebel combatants. Human Rights Watch was unable to independently verify the allegations of extrajudicial executions. Human Rights Watch also documented cases of detention and torture by Russia-linked forces in Bambari in 2019.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Internal Link Turn

Russia only intervenes in North Africa to further its interests. Russia supports autocratic, corrupt leaders which is destabilizing and detrimental to African People

Siegle, PhD, 2/22

(Joseph, leads the Africa Center’s research program, which produces security briefs and research papers with the aim of generating policy relevant analyses that contribute to addressing Africa’s security challenges. He has written widely for leading policy journals and newspapers and is a regular media analyst, The future of Russia-Africa relations, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2022/02/02/the-future-of-russia-africa-relations/)

Russia has been aggressively pursuing its strategic objectives in Africa in recent years—securing a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean, gaining naval port access in the Red Sea, expanding natural resource extraction opportunities, displacing Western influence, and promoting alternatives to democracy as a regional norm. Africa, thus, is a “theater” for Russia’s geostrategic interests rather than a destination itself—a perspective reflected in the means that Russia employs. Unlike most major external partners, Russia is not investing significantly in conventional statecraft in Africa—e.g., economic investment, trade, and security assistance. Rather, Russia relies on a series of asymmetric (and often extralegal) measures for influence—mercenaries, arms-for-resource deals, opaque contracts, election interference, and disinformation. PARTNERSHIP WITH WHOM? Russia’s Africa-focused initiatives are typically concentrated on propping up an embattled incumbent or close ally: Khalifa Haftar in Libya, Faustin Archange Touadéra in the Central African Republic (CAR), and coup leaders Colonel Assimi Goïta in Mali and Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Sudan, among others. To assess the future of Russia-Africa relations, therefore, it is necessary to be clear that the “partnerships” that Russia seeks in Africa are not state- but elite-based. By helping these often illegitimate and unpopular leaders to retain power, Russia is cementing Africa’s indebtedness to Moscow. This strategy works for Russia and the respective leaders who gain international diplomatic cover, resources to consolidate power domestically, a mercenary force, arms, and revenues from resource deals. However, Russia’s opaque engagements are inherently destabilizing for the citizens of the targeted countries, resulting in stunted economic development, human rights abuses, disenfranchisement of African citizens, the perpetuation of illegitimate governments, and social polarization. Through this model, Russia has been able to advance its objectives with limited financial and political costs. Accordingly, we can expect to see Moscow continuing to expand its influence on the continent in 2022. FOCAL POINTS FOR AFRICA-RUSSIA RELATIONS IN 2022 Libya. Russia retains Wagner mercenary forces (former Russian defense intelligence troops) and military assets on the ground in support of its proxy, warlord Khalifa Haftar. Russia can be expected to try and steer the outcome of the postponed presidential and legislative elections with the aim of emerging as the principal powerbroker in this geo-strategically important territory—with access to oil reserves and deep-water ports in the eastern Mediterranean and a permanent presence on NATO’s southern flank. Sudan. Russia has been striving to gain naval port access in the Red Sea, especially Port Sudan. It also has longstanding ties to the Sudanese military, elements of the ousted Bashir regime, and gold trafficking networks in the west. Continuation of the military government in Khartoum provides a ready entry point for expanded Russian influence. Mali. The military coup in Mali has provided Russia an opportunity to become a pivotal actor in the Sahel. We can expect Moscow to provide political cover to the junta of Assimi Goïta as it seeks to avoid a transition back to a democratic government. Indications are that Wagner mercenaries have already been deployed in support of the junta. Guinea. Russia has long been a patron of former president Alpha Condé, who had been a strong supporter of Russia’s extensive mining (bauxite) interests in Guinea. Following Condé’s ouster in a coup in September 2021, Moscow can be expected to refocus its diplomatic efforts on propping up the military junta of Colonel Mamady Doumbouya in return for Moscow’s continued political sway and unencumbered access in the mining sector. Gulf of Guinea. Having consolidated its position in the CAR in 2021, Russia is set to expand its influence in nearby Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Gabon in 2022. Moscow has been cultivating ties with leaders of all three countries with an eye on becoming a more significant player in the lucrative oil and mineral networks of Central Africa. Angola. President João Lourenço is contending for a second term in office in 2022 amid a long recession, criticisms for increasing authoritarianism, and divisions within his ruling party. Russia’s opportunistic strategy of coming to the aid of isolated leaders as a means of enhancing Moscow’s leverage makes Lourenço an attractive target. His military academy training in the USSR, Russia’s extensive Cold War era ties to Angola, and Angola’s vast diamond, oil, gold, and mineral resources will all factor into increased Russian attention on Lourenço in 2022. CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT AND SCRUTINY Since Russia’s engagements in Africa are typically predicated on co-opting leaders facing limited checks and balances, they are nearly always detrimental to African citizens who must endure deepened institutionalized corruption, diverted public revenues, unaccountable leaders, and instability. Reform, therefore, will not come from these leaders but from African citizens, which will entail greater civil society engagement, enhanced transparency around contracts, and higher levels of scrutiny of any deals struck with Russia. Building more mutually beneficial Africa-Russia relations depends on changes in both substance and process. Such a shift would require Russia to establish more conventional bilateral engagements with African institutions and not just individuals. These initiatives would focus on strengthening trade, investment, technology transfer, and educational exchanges. If transparently negotiated and equitably implemented, such Russian initiatives would be welcomed by many Africans.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
North Africa-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Ukraine Thump Libya Impact

Ukraine war has caused de-escalation in Libya.

Abdullah 4/20 [Bilal Abdullah; ; 4-20-2022; Russia-Ukraine War and the De-escalation in Libya; No Publication; https://epc.ae/en/details/featured/russia-ukraine-war-and-the-de-escalation-in-libya; 7-19-2022; SK]

Libya has been relatively calm since the Russian war on Ukraine started on February 24. Although this North African nation has long been viewed as a potential arena for settling scores between Russia and the West, the situation in Libya is currently moving in the opposite direction. Its political disputes have become less severe, and the flashpoints between the political rivals have decreased.

This analysis touches on three main areas of conflict between Russia and the West in Libya in the post-February 24 period – oil, the UN mission’s future, and military deployment. The analysis also examines the impact of these points of contention on the local dispute and any local party’s ability to seize the transitional authority or manage any settlement.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Impact Turn – JCPOA

Russia is killing the nuclear deal and relations overall with it.

Golnaz Esfandiari 3/10, a senior correspondent for RFE/RL focusing on Iran. She has reported from Afghanistan and Haiti and is one of the authors of The Farda Briefing newsletter. Her work has been cited by The New Yorker, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and other major publications, 3/10/2022, “Will Russia's Invasion Of Ukraine Derail The Iran Nuclear Deal?,” , RES

After nearly a year of painstaking negotiations, Iran and world powers were on the brink of agreeing to restore the landmark 2015 nuclear deal. But last-minute demands from Russia, one of the parties to the deal, have threatened to derail efforts to revive an agreement that curbed Tehran’s nuclear activities in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions. Moscow has demanded guarantees from Washington that Western sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine will not affect its trade and military cooperation with Tehran. The United States has described Russia's new demands as "irrelevant." France, another signatory of the original deal, warned they could dash hopes for a revived nuclear accord. Moscow’ actions have been met with surprise and anger in Tehran. Iran’s foreign minister told lawmakers on March 7, without naming Russia, that Tehran would not let its interests be undermined by “foreign elements.” Experts warn that Russia’s demands could complicate and ultimately scuttle the already fraught negotiations between Iran and world powers. If the talks collapse, Iran could further advance its sensitive nuclear activities. It could also lead to Western countries further tightening sanctions against Tehran. Observers say Iran and world powers could sideline Russia from the negotiations, although it is unclear whether Tehran would be willing to risk jeopardizing its relationship with Moscow, an ally. Iran and world powers have been holding negotiations in Vienna since April 2021, with the United States taking part indirectly. In 2018, then-U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew Washington from the deal. Tehran responded by gradually exceeding the limits imposed by the pact on its nuclear activities. U.S. President Joe Biden has said he is willing to rejoin the pact if Iran return to full compliance. 'Stabbed In The Back' Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group, says that by inserting the war in Ukraine into the complicated nuclear negotiations, Russia appears to be determined to upend the talks and take Iran down with it. He suggested that Russia appears no longer to be interested in reviving the nuclear deal, which would allay Western concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities and allow Tehran to sell its oil. And that could bring global oil prices down. “Neither Iran's return to the oil market nor the peaceful resolution of a Western security concern in the Middle East benefits the Kremlin,” Vaez told RFE/RL. “The leadership in Tehran is waking up to the reality that you often get stabbed in the back by those you believed to have your back.” 'Tank The Talks' Analysts say the scope of Russia’s demands will determine whether they complicate or scuttle the negotiations entirely. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on March 5 said that Moscow wanted written guarantees that sanctions ‘‘launched by the U.S. will not in any way harm our right to free, fully fledged trade and economic and investment cooperation and military-technical cooperation with Iran.” Russia’s new demands coincided with mounting international pressure on Moscow over its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on February 24, a move that has resulted in unprecedented Western sanctions. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken dismissed Russia’s demands on March 6, saying U.S. sanctions that are “being put in place and that have been put in place on Russia have nothing to do with the Iran nuclear deal.” “If it is simply exemptions that allow Russia to help Iran meet its nuclear obligations in the deal, that is one thing,” Eric Brewer, a senior director at Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a Washington-based think tank, told RFE/RL. “But Lavrov's comments suggest Russia is after something much bigger. I don't see the United States giving Russia that type of sanctions relief, even if it endangers a revival of the [nuclear deal],” he added. Brewer says the United States and Russia have been able to cooperate on shared nonproliferation interests in the past, even when tensions have been high. But he says it is possible that Russia’s recent demands "tank the talks." 'Critical Decision' Vali Nasr, a professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University, says Russia’s demands have forced Iran to make a difficult choice: to stick by Russia and incur the diplomatic and economic costs of the talks collapsing or to ditch Moscow and endanger its ties with an ally. “Iran would have to decide how important an agreement is to its national interest, and whether it will allow talks it has invested so much in and built its economic and foreign policies around [to] be taken hostage by Russia,” Nasr, who served as a senior adviser to the Obama administration, told RFE/RL. “It will be a critical decision for Tehran.” Nasr suggested that sidelining Russia was possible. “The nuclear side of things is in Iran’s hand. The sanctions are in the hands of the U.S. and Europe. Russia's only leverage is to prevent a deal,” Nasr said. Brewer says the other parties to the deal would have to find ways to replace Russia’s technical role under the deal, including removing excess enriched uranium from Iran. “Given enough time, you could probably come up with some workarounds for other parties to take Russia's place on these technical areas,” he says. "But it won't be easy, and time is in short supply. "At a practical level, it would be incredibly challenging to reimplement the deal if Russia, the United States, and Europe are not in alignment on the [nuclear deal] and if Russia is actively trying to play the role of spoiler.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Impact Turn

Turn---Russo-Iranian cooperation over Syria causes conflict---it’s a cover for their own interests.

Seth G. Jones 19, Senior Vice President; Harold Brown Chair; and Director, International Security Program; Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., Senior Fellow for Imagery Analysis, iDeas Lab and Korea Chair, 7/16/2019, “Dangerous Liaisons: Russian Cooperation with Iran in Syria,” , RES

The Issue As tensions escalate between the United States and Iran in the Middle East, Russia is engaged in covert and overt cooperation with Iran in ways that undermine U.S. national security interests. This analysis of commercial satellite imagery at Tiyas Airbase in Syria indicates the scope and proximity of Russian and Iranian military ties. If Washington wants to contain Tehran and prevent further Iranian expansion, U.S. policymakers will need to increase pressure on Moscow to curb Tehran’s activities in countries like Syria. Introduction Following a June 2019 meeting with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Kyrgyzstan, Russian President Vladimir Putin remarked that “relations between Russia and Iran are multifaceted, multilateral.” In characterizing the primary areas of cooperation, Putin noted: “this concerns the economy, this concerns the issues of stability in the region, our joint efforts to combat terrorism, including in Syria.”1 One example of Russian-Iranian cooperation is in Syria. This brief analyzes satellite imagery of Tiyas Airbase (or T-4) in Syria, which is used by Iran and Russia. It highlights what we assess to be the Iranian movement of weapons, other material, and personnel to Syria with the awareness and support of Moscow. This cooperation, which has allowed Iran and its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) to increase their capabilities and influence in Syria, should be concerning for the United States as tensions increase between Washington and Tehran. Yet Moscow’s cooperation with Tehran is double-edged. Our analysis also highlights Israeli attacks against Iranian or Iranian-linked targets at T-4 Airbase in close proximity to Russian aircraft. These developments suggest that Moscow is playing a delicate game in Syria. It supports Iranian activity and aid in Syria, but also explicitly or tacitly allows Israeli military actions against Iranian targets. The rest of this brief is divided into four sections. The first provides an overview of Russian-Iranian relations. The second section analyzes satellite imagery of T-4 Airbase, focusing on the possible Iranian movement of arms, other material, and personnel. The third section highlights Israeli airstrikes in Syria, including at T-4 Airbase, in close proximity to Russian aircraft. The fourth provides a brief conclusion. Russian-Iranian Partnership in Syria Russia and Iran have developed a complex—and sometimes contentious—historical relationship. During World War II, for example, the Soviet Union occupied northern Iran, creating deep suspicion and mistrust among many Iranians.2 Yet Moscow and Tehran have developed a working relationship in Syria, even though they have their own interests. Moscow’s decision to become directly involved in the Syrian civil war—including to work with Iran—was motivated by several concerns. First was a growing fear that Washington was preparing to overthrow the Assad regime and replace it with a friendly government, much like the United States had done in Afghanistan in 2001, Iraq in 2003, and Libya in 2011.3 The possibility of losing Syria was particularly alarming because Moscow had just lost its ally in Ukraine. The 2014 Ukrainian revolution had ushered in a pro- Western government in Kiev, further fueling Russian fears of U.S. activity. Second, Syria had long been an important ally of Moscow. In 1946, the Soviet Union supported Syrian independence and provided military assistance to the Syrian Arab Army. This cooperation continued during the Cold War and endures under Russian President Vladimir Putin today.4 Third, Russian leaders were concerned that Assad’s collapse would allow the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and other terrorists to use territory in Syria and Iraq to attract more fighters, improve their capabilities, and spread terrorism in and around Russia. After all, over 9,000 individuals from Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia traveled to Syria and Iraq to join Salafi-jihadist groups like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda.5 Iran has its own interests in Syria. Following the onset of the Syrian civil war in 2011, Iranian leaders became alarmed at the rise of Sunni extremist groups like the Islamic State and U.S., European, and Gulf support to rebel groups.6 In addition to providing light and heavy weapons to the Syrian regime and militias, up to 3,000 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) helped plan and execute campaigns such as the 2016 Battle of Aleppo (or Operation Dawn of Victory).7 The IRGC-QF worked closely with the Assad regime and the Russian military, which conducted strikes from Russian combat aircraft and naval vessels in the Mediterranean Sea.8 Syrian forces and militias supported by the IRGC-QF shelled rebel positions in Aleppo as Russian close air support and Kalibr cruise missile strikes reduced entire neighborhoods to rubble. By December 2016, ground forces routed rebel forces, who departed under an agreement brokered by Russia, Turkey, and Iran.9 Iranian support continues today. In addition, Iranian leaders have tried to use their activity in Syria to counter Israel. Perhaps the most significant example is by encouraging the expansion of Lebanese Hezbollah and other militia groups in Syria. Lebanese Hezbollah deployed up to 8,000 fighters to Syria and increased its arsenal with greater numbers and ranges of rockets and missiles from Syrian territory.10 Hezbollah also trained, advised, and assisted Shia and other non-state groups in Syria. Today, the IRGC-QF works with thousands of trained fighters in Syria operating in local militias. Many of these groups like Lebanese Hezbollah possess advanced stand-off weapons, improved cyber capabilities, more recruits, and more expansive forces in Syria capable of striking Israeli targets. While Russian-Iranian cooperation has been contentious at times, both countries have collaborated in Syria in ways that serve their own interests. One example of this cooperation is at T-4 Airbase, which is located in eastern Homs Governorate and roughly 100 miles northeast of Damascus. T-4 Airbase and Flight Tracker Data Figure 1 shows the base using satellite imagery. On the east side of the base is an apron (ramp) where aircraft, helicopters, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are frequently parked. On the west side is an apron where transport aircraft have been located and where Israeli aircraft have struck targets. Figure 1: T-4 Airbase Satellite imagery in Figure 2 highlights a Russian-made Ilyushin Il-76-MD cargo aircraft on the base. This aircraft is likely the former Russian Airforce Il-76 registered RA-76634, as indicated by the number painted underneath the cockpit and livery of the aircraft.11 The imagery shows the freighter being loaded or unloaded under the protection of multiple Syrian air defense systems, including three SA-2 systems and a Pantsir-S1— all of which were provided by Russia.12 We assess that the Il-76 and other commercial aircraft may have been used to transport weapons, other material, or personnel from Iran into Syria, based on the regular use of Il-76s for these purposes in Syria.13 Figure 2: Il-76 on T-4 Runway Flight tracker data of the Il-76 aircraft indicates a recent history of flights between Tehran and Damascus. As indicated on the wing, the plane is registered as YK-ATD. The Prefix (YK) is the Syrian country code. Other Syrian-owned Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft have similar registry codes, such as YK-ATA, YK-ATB, and YK-ATC. Publicly available flight tracker data indicates the YK-ATD makes regular flights between Tehran and Damascus. As illustrated in Figure 3, on May 13, 2019, YK-ATD departed Damascus International Airport. On May 14, 2019, the day we observed YK-ATD at T-4 Airbase, flight records indicate the plane left Tehran Mehrabad International Airport in the morning, arrived at what we assess to be T-4 based on imagery analysis, and then departed for Damascus International Airport in the afternoon. Our analysis of flight history for other Syrian-owned Il-76 aircraft indicates similar flight patterns between Iran and Syria for other aircraft, possibly for the purpose of clandestinely transferring weapons, other material, and personnel into Syria.14 Figure 3: Flight Data Tracker Map for YK-ATD As shown in Figure 4, we identified four Russian fixed-wing Su-25 ground attack aircraft with full weapons loads at the same site as the Il-76 aircraft, as well as an Mi-17 Hip transport helicopter and an Mi-24 Hind attack helicopter.15 The proximity of Russian aircraft to the Il-76 suggests that Russia was highly likely aware of Iranian activity. It is virtually inconceivable that Iran would transport and unload arms, other material, and personnel to a base frequented by Russian aircraft and government officials—and protected by Russian-made air defense systems— without Moscow’s knowledge and approval. Figure 4: Russian Su-25, Mi-24, and Mi-17 Aircraft on Runway The imagery also indicates three active air defense sites around the perimeter of T-4 Airbase. Figure 5 highlights one of these sites. All of the air defense sites are equipped with Russian-made weapons systems. The first SA-2 air defense site is situated to the north, another SA-2 air defense site is located to the northwest, and a third SA-2 air defense site is to the south. The SA-2 Guideline (Russian designation S-75 Dvina) is a high-altitude, command guided, surface-to-air missile system (SAM) capable of 360-degree coverage. The SA-2 Guideline is designed for the defense of fixed targets and field forces.16 The guidance system of an SA-2 site can only focus on one target at a time but can direct three missiles against a target simultaneously.17 This likely explains the need for multiple SA-2 systems around the airbase. Figure 5: SA-2 Air Defense System Also observable in the imagery is a Pantsir-S1 (NATO name—SA-22 Greyhound) transloader. The Panstsir-S1 is a short- to medium-range missile and anti-aircraft artillery weapon produced by Russia. The Pantsir-S1 provides point air defense for various installations and provides protection to air defense units. Figure 6 illustrates the Pantsir-S1 air defense system. Figure 6: S-1 Pantsir Air Defense System All military assets in the imagery are Russian made. We assess that the YK-ATD was likely either leased or sold to Syria.18 The Su-25 combat aircraft, as well as the Mi-17 and Mi-24 rotary-wing craft, are likely Russian operated.19 The SA-2 Guideline and Pantsir-S1 are Russian-built SAM systems.20These air defense systems are just two of numerous air defense systems provided by Russia to the Assad government. Others include S-75s, S-200s, S-300s, and Strela-1/-10s.21 With Russian support, Iran has used these types of activities to expand its presence in Syria. Today, the IRGC-QF works with thousands of trained fighters in Syria who are operating in local militias, including Lebanese Hezbollah. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War demonstrated Israel’s difficulty of rooting out Hezbollah sites in Lebanon. Iran’s activity in Syria has only expanded the nature of this problem for Israel’s military. Israeli Airstrikes in the Shadow of the Bear Despite Russia’s collaboration with Iran, Moscow has also attempted to placate Israeli concerns about Iranian expansion. This section highlights Israeli attacks against Iranian or Iranian-linked targets—including at T-4 Airbase in close proximity to Russian aircraft. These developments suggest that Moscow supports Iranian activity and aid in Syria, but also condones some Israeli military actions against Iranian targets. Russia and Israel have established deconfliction mechanisms, including a hotline between the Israeli and Russian militaries. As one Israel Defense Force official remarked, “We are very strict about informing the Russians about our activities and that their operational picture is up to date.”22 This cooperation is particularly important to avoid incidents like the one in September 2018. Following an Israeli strike against Iranian-linked targets in western Syria, Syrian gunners accidentally shot down a Russian IL-20 surveillance aircraft. Russia complained that Israel had given Russian leaders less than a minute of advanced warning and Israeli aircraft used “the Russian airplane as a cover.”23 Despite some improvements in cooperation, Russia has occasionally condemned Israel for its actions in Syria. In July 2019, for example, Russia publicly criticized a series of Israeli strikes, saying that that they “grossly violate[d] Syria’s sovereignty.24 Figure 7 plots the location of Israeli airstrikes against Iranian and other targets in Syria. The darker shades of blue in the heat map indicate a higher concentration of Israeli strikes. Most of Israel’s attacks have been in southwestern Syria, near the Israeli border. But a few attacks have been against major bases used by Iran and Iranian-linked groups, including T-4 Airbase, the airbase north of al-Qusayr, and Damascus International Airport. Figure 7: Israeli Strikes in Syria On June 2, 2019, Israel conducted an airstrike on T-4 Airbase.25 This strike, along with similar strikes conducted in 2019, indicate that Israel is still committed to contesting attempts by Iran to entrench itself and its non-state partner forces in Syria. As highlighted in Figure 8, satellite imagery taken before and after the Israeli airstrike indicates that a UAV control vehicle, launch ramp, and ground equipment were likely targeted. This airstrike, which was conducted in close proximity to Russian infrastructure on the base, highlights the ongoing challenge Israel faces when conducting strikes near Russian forces. Figure 8: Before and After Imagery of Israeli Strike Against Iranian-Linked Target at T-4 Conclusion The Trump administration has expressed significant concern about Iran’s nuclear ambitions, its missile program, and the activities of the IRGC-QF and its partner forces in the Middle East. One of the countries where Iran has been most active is Syria, where Tehran has increased its military presence to aid the Assad regime; supported Lebanese Hezbollah, which has been directly involved in the Syrian ground war; and expanded the number of rockets and missiles in the country to establish a second front (along with Lebanon) in a future war with Israel. Yet Iranian actions in Syria have been possible, in part, because of Tehran’s cooperation with Moscow. Containing Iran and preventing further Iranian expansion in the Middle East will be difficult without increasing pressure on Moscow. If Washington wants to be more effective in containing Iran, U.S. policymakers need to put greater pressure on Moscow to curb Tehran’s movement of arms, material, and people— as this case study of T-4 Airbase highlights.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – AT: Syria Impact

Syria war wont go nuclear, Israel destroyed their ability to use them

Farley 22 (Robert Farley, a frequent contributor to TNI, is author of The Battleship Book, January 26, 2022, “How Israel Prevented Syria From Developing Nuclear Weapons”, )

On September 6, 2007, Israeli fighter-bombers destroyed a mysterious installation near the Euphrates River in the Deir-ez-Zor region. The strike incurred curiously little response from Damascus. A cyber-attack reportedly pre-empted a defensive Syrian military mobilization, and even the diplomatic outcry was muted. No other Arab governments commented on the attack, and even the Israelis did not acknowledge the operation for quite some time. Destroying the facility was not regarded as a slam-dunk decision, either in Israel or the United States. Anxiety over the strength of the intelligence in the wake of the Iraq debacle stayed the hand of the latter, while concern about international blowback, not to mention a Syrian military response, worried the former. What if cooler heads had carried the day, and Israel had never undertaken the strike? Nuclear Progress It’s difficult to assess how far Syria would have been from developing a nuclear weapon if its efforts had gone unhindered. Although we may never have the complete story regarding Syria’s interest in a nuclear program, it probably stemmed from the growing gap in conventional capabilities between Syria and Israel, as well as the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Although Syria has always denied that the installation was part of a nuclear program, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) later confirmed that the site appeared to be a nuclear reactor. There is little question that Syria’s program was rudimentary compared to those of Iran or North Korea. However, it is entirely possible that Syria could have relied upon technical assistance from both countries; indeed, it is highly likely that North Korea supplied technical assistance for the development of the reactor on the Euphrates. But Damascus would have needed to master a series of technical challenges, and there is little indication that Syrian economic infrastructure was up to the challenge of managing the very serious industrial and bottlenecks that it would have encountered. Although the Syrian economy is larger than that of North Korea, it is more dependent on resource extraction, making it less capable of managing the technical challenges associated with the nuclear pivot. Syria also lacks the enormous oil wealth enjoyed by both Iran and Iraq during their nuclear drives. It became clear after the destruction of the box that Assad wasn’t all that committed to paying the costs necessary to develop nuclear weapons. Unlike Iraq and Iran, Damascus made little effort to disperse and harden nuclear facilities. Indeed, given Syria’s proximity to Israel, it’s difficult to imagine how anyone in the country believed that the project could go undetected. As Anthony Cordesman has argued, the nuclear program would have been extraordinarily vulnerable at multiple points in its development. This suggests that the bureaucratic politics of the nuclear program were complicated, and that Syria might not have gone through with its development even in absence of the strike. Nevertheless, Israel felt that even the remote possibility of a nuclear Syria was worth curtailing, and that the strikes would have the added benefit of reinforcing the Begin Doctrine. The Arab Spring In any case, it is extremely unlikely that even an unmolested Syria could have successfully developed a nuclear weapon by the beginning of the Arab Spring. The oset of the Syrian Civil War taxed the Assad regime so dearly that it’s unlikely it would have continued a nuclear program. Would the nature of the war have changed if Syria had still been actively pursuing nuclear weapons? The war developed, to some extent, out of the expectation of Western intervention. Anti-regime forces took risks and made commitments out of the hope that the United States and Europe would step up with active military support. The West offered rhetorical support for toppling Assad, but only limited and measured military assistance for anti-regime forces. Clearly, the program itself would not have deterred the West; it could not have produced a viable weapon by 2011. However, knowledge of an existing nuclear program might have reduced Assad’s standing in the West even further, potentially making intervention more attractive. Moreover, the program would presumably have achieved some degree of technical success in terms of the production of plutonium, the development of associated nuclear technologies, and the training of a cadre of scientists and engineers. This very success might have made the West nervous—perhaps nervous enough to take a more assertive policy against the Assad regime. The question is what impact the war might have had on the knowledge and infrastructure developed around the program, and how engineers and materials might have found their way into the hands of ISIS or other rebel groups. ISIS took control of the site in 2014, although the Syrian government likely would have defended it more vigorously if an active reactor had remained. ISIS would not have been able to construct a useable weapon, and either the United States or Syria likely would have destroyed any facilities before they fell into the hands of the group—but it still would have been cause for concern. And while ISIS could not have used the expertise or equipment directly, it might have tried to export either, with dangerous consequences. In any case, forces friendly to the United States captured the area in 2017. Conclusion The strike on Syria was probably not decisive in preventing Syria from getting a nuclear weapon; the program was a long-shot from the beginning, and in all likelihood would have ended at the onset of the Syrian Civil War. However, the strike helped to confirm the regional sense of Israeli military power after the failures of the war against Hezbollah, and undoubtedly also convinced both Washington and Tehran that Israel would consider using military force to prevent Iran from acquiring nukes. This, in turn, informed the negotiating strategies of all of the parties to the JCPOA, which continues to govern Iran’s relations with the international community. Whether that legacy will outlast 2018 remains in question.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn

Russia and Iran are only brought together because of NATO and the US’ expansion

Tasnim News Agency, 5-17-2022, "Iranian Spokesman Blames Ukraine Crisis on NATO’s Expansion," https://www.tasnimnews.com/en/news/2022/05/17/2712467/iranian-spokesman-blames-ukraine-crisis-on-nato-s-expansion

Iran's envoy to Russia has said NATO's expansion is not in the interest of Tehran and Moscow, and there is a global synergy against Western “unilateralism.” The comments came as Iran has supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine by blaming the United States and NATO for the ensuing crisis. During a webinar about bilateral relations and regional developments, Kazem Jalali urged closer cooperation with Moscow under President Vladimir Putin, saying, “We are working with Russia on regional issues, and have a successful experience in Syria’s case”, Jamaran News in Tehran reported on Monday. "Obviously, neither we nor the Russians see NATO expanding to our borders in our interest," said Tehran’s ambassador in Moscow. Turkey, a NATO member borders Iran in the northwest but has followed a neutral policy between the Washington and Tehran. Jalali added that Russia has stood up to American unilateralism, noting that this is the same approach that the Islamic Republic has taken since the 1979 revolution. Jalali noted that Iran did not have good relations with the Tsarist Russia, the Soviet Union, and in the post-Soviet period, adding, “The fourth era is the Putin era, which I think should be paid more attention to”. Judging by the history of Iran-Russia relations, “some people ask why we should have relations with the Russians when we have such a history with them. We should know that during the Soviet era 25 million people were killed in the war with Germany” but that didn’t stop them to cooperate on the Nord Stream --the system of offshore natural gas pipelines in Europe that runs under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany. He added that “we should look at the realities of today”, underlining that Iran’s new government prioritizes relations and strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries, and “Russia is a large economy.” Jalali went on to say that “our foreign policy should serve Iran’s national interests”, urging to keep a balance between the West and the East. In fact, in the past 30 years under Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei Iran’s foreign policy has increasingly tilted toward Russia and China. In the 1980s, when the founder of the Islamic Republic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was Supreme Leader, the country followed his dictum of “Neither West Nor the East.” During the same event, former member of the parliament Elaheh Koulai described ties between Iran and Russia as one of the most important issues in Eurasia. “There are bitter events in the history of Iran-Russia relations that have caused pessimism and Russophobia in Iranian society” she added. She called for a balancing approach with Russia, Europe and the United States, saying, “we must try to use Russia to our advantage”. Referring to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Koulai said, “Iran must condemn Russia's military action against Ukraine and demand that the two sides sit down at the negotiating table”. As debate about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues in Iran, of various factions over Tehran’s foreign policy. Hardliners close to the core of the regime fiercely defend a pro-Russia policy, while their rivals within the regime argue for more balanced relations between the West and the East, meaning Moscow and Beijing. Many ordinary Iranians and opponents of the Islamic Republic invariably and condemn the government pro-Russia policies on social media.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Turn

Turn - NATO expansion improves Iran Russia relations

O’ Connor 22 (Tom O'Connor is an award-winning senior writer of foreign policy at Newsweek, where he specializes in the Middle East, North Korea and other areas of international affairs and conflict. He has previously written for International Business Times, the New York Post, the Daily Star (Lebanon) and Staten Island Advance, July 17, 2022, “As NATO Grows, China and Russia Seek to Bring Iran, Saudi Arabia Into Fold”, )

Finland and Sweden's green light to join NATO is set to bring about the U.S.-led Western military alliance's largest expansion in decades. Meanwhile, the G7, consisting of NATO states and fellow U.S. ally Japan, has adopted a tougher line against Russia and China. In the East, however, security and economy-focused blocs led by Beijing and Moscow are looking to take on new members of their own, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, two influential Middle Eastern rivals whose interest in shoring up cooperation on this new front could have a significant impact on global geopolitical balance. The two bodies in question are the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS. The former was established in 2001 as a six-member political, economic and military coalition including China, Russia and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan before recruiting South Asian nemeses India and Pakistan in 2017, while the latter is a grouping of emerging economic powers originally consisting of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) upon its inception 2006, and including South Africa in 2010. "The BRICS and the SCO share one important ideological quality: they are both focused on multipolarity, and their summits have even been held back to back with one another at times," Matthew Neapole, an international affairs expert and contributor to the Macdonald-Laurier Institute in Canada, told Newsweek. "Both are angling to act as force multipliers for this drive for multipolarity, to help along with alternatives [i.e, in currency or banking]," he added. "It could, in theory, facilitate economic linkages and step into gaps that U.S. institutions are not filling due to sanctions, such as those laid on Russia." Iran, already an SCO observer, began its formal membership ascension process amid the latest leaders' summit in September. On Monday, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced the Islamic Republic would also seek to join BRICS. Across the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia has also reportedly considered applying for BRICS membership, as revealed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov during his visit to the kingdom in late May. The announcement followed Saudi Arabia joining Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Senegal, Thailand and the United Arab Emirates at China's invitation for a "BRICS+" discussion, after which Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin announced members had "reached consensus on the BRICS expansion process." Of these candidates, Argentina has already applied for membership, potentially advancing the group's status toward being a major player in international economic relations. And with the SCO seeking to grow as well, Beijing and Moscow might be poised to advance their effort to sway the international influence equilibrium toward a broader group of countries that do not necessarily sign on to an explicitly U.S.-led international order. And while Neapole argued that there would be "big hurdles to get over" in trying to transform this vision from ambitious talk to substantive action, he said a cohesive SCO-BRICS bloc could have a huge impact on reshaping the world order. "If it can be successful in positioning itself as the standard-bearer of the Global South or G20, develop strong organizational mechanisms and integrate more thoroughly," he said, "it could be quite influential." BRICS' multipolar approach to international affairs has proven attractive to both Iran and Saudi Arabia alike. The two nations, however, have their own unique reasons for seeking membership. For Riyadh, the move would likely be less about choosing sides against the close ties it has fostered for decades with Washington and more about the kingdom's own growing status as an independent player. "China's invitation to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to join the 'BRICS' confirms that the Kingdom has a major role in building the new world and became an important and essential player in global trade and economics," Mohammed al-Hamed, president of the Saudi Elite group in Riyadh, told Newsweek. "Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 is moving forward at a confident and global pace in all fields and sectors." This vision, unveiled by Prince Mohammed bin Salman a year before being appointed as heir to the throne and de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia in 2017, outlined a plan to diversify his country's oil-dependent economy and present a new image of the kingdom to the international community. And while Crown Prince Mohammed has sought to enhance cooperation with the U.S., especially as President Joe Biden prepared this month for his first visit to the monarchy he once branded a "pariah" over alleged human rights abuses, the Saudi royal has also expanded ties with Russia and China in recent years. Joining BRICS would demonstrate a commitment to Riyadh's resolve in dealing with other major powers and mark a significant win for the effort to boost economic frameworks established outside of the auspices of the U.S. and its immediate allies. "This accession, if Saudi joins it, will balance the world economic system, especially since the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the largest exporter of oil in the world, and it's in the G20," Hamed said. "If it happens, this will support any economic movement and development in the world trade and economy, and record remarkable progress in social and economic aspects as Saudi Arabia should have partnerships with every country in the world." This approach came in stark contrast to that of Washington, which has regularly shut out countries it disagreed with through a growing list of sanctions. The U.S.' dominant position in the global financial system has traditionally left few options for these nations, but that situation has gradually changed as frameworks like BRICS offer potential ways to dodge these restrictions. Among those countries looking to counter U.S. economic pressure is Iran. International sanctions against the Islamic Republic in response to its nuclear activities were lifted in 2015 after a multilateral nuclear deal was reached with the U.S. and other major powers, including China, France, Germany, Russia and the United Kingdom, but then-President Donald Trump abandoned the deal in 2018, severely impacting Tehran's ability to trade with the international community. Biden has set out to negotiate a potential return to the accord that was reached during his vice presidency under former President Barack Obama. However, a series of negotiations held since April of last year has left the U.S. and Iran at an impasse and another set of talks held in Qatar this week appeared to end early with no sign of a breakthrough. Frustration over shifting politics in Washington has led Tehran to increasingly look to its own region for strategic partnerships, which it has increasingly forged with Beijing and Moscow. "Iranian officials have come to the conclusion that the U.S. and its Western allies will never allow the Islamic Republic of Iran to play its well-deserved regional role as a middle power," Zakiyeh Yazdanshenas, a research fellow at the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran, told Newsweek. "Therefore, they have decided to neutralize U.S. attempts to isolate Iran by further closing to non-western bodies like SCO and BRICS," she added. "In addition, Iranians consider the future world order to be Eastern and they are trying to get closer to organizations in which Eastern powers such as Russia and China play a significant role." This doesn't mean that the two blocs are necessary anti-Western in nature. Though a concerted effort has emerged to empower countries outside of the traditional G7 grouping from which Russia was suspended in 2014 as conflict first erupted over Ukraine and other major economies such as China and India have not been invited, the SCO and BRICS, which are not formal military alliances like NATO, saw themselves as inherently inclusive. "The SCO and the BRICS have not been established as an alternative to Western organizations," Yazdanshenas said, "and their specific function has not been defined on the basis of confrontation with the West or the existing world order." Still, she argued that growing international competition has only intensified "the balancing function of non-Western organizations" such as the SCO and BRICS. And here, she said Iran could serve as an important asset for both coalitions. "Joining a moderate power with an anti-Western approach such as Iran to these bodies can strengthen this aspect of SCO and BRICS," Yazdanshenas said. "Iran has been under the most severe sanctions in the last decade, yet it has been able to significantly expand its power in the region." And, like Saudi Arabia, Iran's oil and gas reserves make it an important strategic partner, especially given the worsening frictions over global energy that have been exacerbated by Western sanctions on Russia, and heated rivalry between Beijing and Washington. "Iran is the only producer of energy resources in the Persian Gulf that is not an ally of the United States and will not refuse to supply energy to China in the event of an escalation of the trade war between Beijing and Washington," Yazdanshenas said. "In addition, Iran's geopolitical position has been strengthened in the wake of Russia-Ukraine war and that is of great importance for great powers in these bodies i.e. Russia and China." The energy problem plays into two key reasons having both Iran and Saudi Arabia on board for BRICS would be a "major gain" for the organization, according to Akhil Ramesh, a fellow at the Hawaii-based Pacific Forum. "For countries like China and to an extent India, import dependency for oil has been a major headache, both from an economic standpoint of trade deficits and from a geopolitical standpoint of having to make security and strategic sacrifices for the sake of oil imports," Ramesh said. "Having three large oil producers in the grouping [Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia] could possibly give these countries the option of securing oil at discounted rates or through alternative arrangements [barter]." Tehran and Riyadh's oil reserves would also lend BRICS a stronger hand in taking on the U.S. dollar's hegemony over the world financial system as Ramesh argued that, "in order to replace the USD as the global reserve currency you would need to have more commodity-exporting countries, especially oil exporting ones buying into the idea." "Moreover," he added, "China and Russia are expanding the grouping to create a coalition of countries that have pending disputes with the West or have been humiliated by the West in the past [thinking Argentina and Falklands]." And in this respect, Ramesh expressed that the U.S. and its allies had committed "a grave error" in overlooking the importance of BRICS, as well as the SCO, emerging financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the National Development Bank and China's broader Belt and Road Initiative, which counts some 148 countries and 32 international organizations as partners. "The U.S. and its allies are grossly underestimating China, in particular," Ramesh said. "BRICS, SCO, development banks such as AIIB, NDB, and infrastructure initiatives such as China's BRI are all different platforms for engaging mostly poor countries that do not get a say in world affairs or have a seat at the high table." As internal divisions have threatened to derail NATO's agenda, feuds among members also serve as a complicating factor for organizations led by China and Russia. And even if Iran and Saudi Arabia were to both join BRICS, it would not necessarily prove a breakthrough in their bitter rivalry. The two nations have pursued quiet diplomacy over the past year, but their regional bout for influence has continued to rage across the Middle East, most violently so in Yemen, which has been devastated by a years-long war between a Saudi-led coalition in support of an exiled government on one side and the Iran-aligned Ansar Allah, or Houthi, rebels on the other. The conflict has only quieted in recent months as a result of a fragile three-month truce and not necessarily because of any lasting solution. But China and Russia have demonstrated a capacity to bring enemies together under a common banner as seen with the SCO's simultaneous admission of India and Pakistan five years ago. Yaroslav Lissovolik, a Moscow-based Russian International Affairs Council expert and Valdai Discussion Club program director, said BRICS too has the capacity to host countries with clashing worldviews, mentioning the specific case of China and India, whose rivalry has turned occasionally turned violent, and even deadly, along their disputed Himalayan border. And while he said that the "expansion of the BRICS core membership may indeed result in greater challenges in attaining consensus on key decisions going forward," he felt there was ample room to work together on broader questions. "In this respect, the addition of Iran and Saudi Arabia would not change matters fundamentally within BRICS as there is scope for a divergence in views," Lissovolik told Newsweek, "and while there may be disagreement on particular local/regional problems, there may be greater unity on global issues." He argued that disputes among members have not stopped BRICS from managing "to advance with an increasingly ambitious development agenda, including with respect to launching the BRICS+ initiative and the pragmatic cooperation within the BRICS development institutions." "What this means is that the BRICS offer the possibility of development on the basis of divergence in economic models and approaches to economic modernization rather than convergence towards one particular universal model," Lissovolik said. "While allowing for the differences in views and approaches among their members," he added, "BRICS economies can move decisively forward in tackling those global challenges where they manage to forge a consensus."

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Ukraine Thumper

Ukraine thumps

Mark N. Katz, 3-23-2015, "Russian-Iranian Relations in the Shadow of Ukraine," Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/russian-iranian-relations-the-shadow-ukraine

On March 23, 2015, the Middle East Program and the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center hosted an event, “Russian-Iranian Relations in the Shadow of Ukraine” with Katz, also a former scholar of the Woodrow Wilson Center. Haleh Esfandiari, Director of the Middle East Program, Woodrow Wilson Center, moderated the event. Katz began by stating that the character of Russian-Iranian relations is much different since the election of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani than it was in the past. He noted the tension between the United States and Russia has increased because of the escalating crisis between Russia and Ukraine. However, he emphasized that for the first time since the 1979 Iranian Revolution there is hope for an improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations. It is not likely that U.S.-Russian relations will improve in the coming years, however. Katz then explained how the nuclear negotiations are playing a large role in the three countries’ relations with one another. He said Russia would not interfere in the nuclear talks because it is not in a position to stop them but argued that Russia would not benefit from improved U.S.-Iranian relations because sanctions against Iran would be lifted with a deal, allowing for Iranian oil imports. Furthermore, Katz stated that despite the illusion of a stronger alliance created by the visits of Russian officials to Iran and vice-versa, there is still a significant amount of history between the two countries. For example, the division of the Caspian Sea is still an unresolved conflict between Russia and Iran, and Iran remains resentful of Russia for Soviet support of Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War. Katz emphasized that while the media may portray U.S.-Iranian relations as strained, Russian-Iranian relations are much more hostile. Katz argued that despite the differences Russia and Iran may have, they share the same view on multiple issues. He stated that both countries are fearful of the Taliban regaining control and influence in Afghanistan. In addition, both countries support Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and provide military assistance to Assad. Russia and Iran also both have a common interest in joining the fight against ISIS, which poses a threat to both countries’ national security. Regarding a potential nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1, Katz stated that Russia is very conflicted—Russia does not see Iran acquiring nuclear power as the worst case scenario but is concerned about an improvement in U.S.-Iran relations. Although Russia is not in a position to block the nuclear deal, it hopes it will benefit from the failure to secure a deal. On the topic of Russia-Iran relations with regard to the Ukrainian conflict, Katz argued that Iran is not concerned with the issue and has kept its distance from the matter. Katz stated that Iran would benefit from the crisis because it gives the country more leverage with the West, considering that the West will want to reduce their dependence on Russian gas and would be more likely to turn to Iran for support. In response to a question from Jane Harman, President of the Wilson Center, on whether Russia will benefit from taking Iran’s reprocessed fuel if the negotiations succeed, Katz said that Russia would benefit greatly from this because it would produce a profit, but whether or not this will put Russia in the good graces of the West is questionable because of the escalation and severity of the Ukraine crisis. Esfandiari asked what effect Russia’s rush to sign agreements on additional nuclear power plants with Iran will have on the talks. Katz answered that Russia views the negotiations as an opportunity for the United States to gain commercial profit rather than a national security issue. Therefore, Russia is attempting to sign as many agreements as possible with Iran before the United States has an opportunity to lift the sanctions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Ukraine Thumper

Ukraine war destroys Russia and Iran relations

Emil Avdaliani, 5-13-2022, "Iran Gives Russia Two and a Half Cheers," CEPA, https://cepa.org/iran-gives-russia-two-and-a-half-cheers/

For Iran, the invasion of Ukraine is closely related to the very essence of the present world order. Much like Russia, Iran has been voicing its discontent at the way the international system has operated since the end of the Cold War. More broadly, Iran and Russia see the world through strikingly similar lenses. Both keenly anticipate the end of the multipolar world and the end of the West’s geopolitical preponderance. Iran had its reasons to think this way. The US unipolar moment after 1991 provoked a deep fear of imminent encirclement, with American bases in Afghanistan and Iraq cited as evidence. Like Russia, the Islamic Republic views itself as a separate civilization that needs to be not only acknowledged by outside players, but also to be given ana suitable geopolitical space to project influence. Both Russia and Iran are very clear about their respective spheres of influence. For Russia, it is the territories that once constituted the Soviet empire. For Iran, it is the contiguous states reaching from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean — Iraq, Syria, Lebanon — plus Yemen. When the two former imperial powers have overlapping strategic interests such as, for instance, in the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea, they apply the concept of regionalism. This implies the blocking out of non-regional powers from exercising outsize economic and military influence, and mostly revolves around an order dominated by the powers which border on a region. This largely explains why Iran sees the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity that, if successful, could hasten the end of the liberal world order. This is why it has largely toed the Russian line and explained what it describes as legitimate motives behind the invasion. Thus the expansion of NATO into eastern Europe was cited as having provoked Russian moves. “The root of the crisis in Ukraine is the US policies that create the crisis, and Ukraine is one victim of these policies,” Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei following the invasion. To a certain degree, Iran’s approach to Ukraine has been also influenced by mishaps in bilateral relations which largely began with the accidental downing of a Ukrainian passenger jet by Iranian surface-to-air missiles in January 2020, . The regime first denied responsibility, and later blamed human error. Iran, like several other of Russia’s , the ideal scenario would have been a quick war in which the Kremlin achieved its major goals. Protracted war, however, sends a bad signal. It signals that the liberal order was not in such steep decline after all, and that Russia’s in international relations have been far from realistic. The unsuccessful war also shows Iran that the collective West still has very significant power and — despite well-aired differences — an ability to rapidly coalesce to defend the existing rules-based order. Worse, for these countries, the sanctions imposed on Russia go further; demonstrating the West’s ability to make significant economic sacrifices to make its anger felt. In other words, Russia’s failure in Ukraine actually strengthened the West and made it more united than at any point since the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US. A reinvigorated liberal order is the last thing that Iran wants, given its own troubled relations with the collective West. The continuing negotiations on a will be heavily impacted by how Russia’s war proceeds, and how the US and EU continue to respond to the aggression. Iran fears that a defeated Russia might be so angered as to use its critical position to endanger the talks, vital to the lifting of the West’s crippling sanctions. And despite rhetorical support for Russia, Iran has been careful not to overestimate Russia’s power. It is now far from clear that the Kremlin has achieved its long-term goal of “safeguarding” its western frontier. Indeed, the Putin regime may have done the opposite now that it has driven Finland and Sweden into the NATO fold. Western sanctions on Russia are likely to remain for a long time, threatening long-term Russian economic (and possible regime) stability. Moreover, Russia’s fostering of separatist entities (following the recognition of the so called Luhansk and Donetsk “people’s republics” and other breakaway entities in Georgia and Moldova) is a highly polarizing subject in Iran. True there has been a shift toward embracing Russia’s position over Ukraine, but Iran remains deeply committed to the “Westphalian principles” of non-intervention in the affairs of other states and territorial integrity. This is hardly surprising given its own struggles against potential separatism in the peripheries of the country. Many Iranians also sympathize with Ukraine’s plight, which for some evokes Iran’s defeats in the early 19th century wars when Qajars had to cede the eastern part of the South Caucasus to Russia. This forms part of a historically deeply rooted, anti-imperialist sentiment in Iran. Iran is therefore likely to largely abstain from endorsing Russia’s separatist ambitions in Eastern Ukraine. It will also eschew, where possible, support for Russia in international forums. Emblematic of this policy was the March 2 meeting in the United Nations General Assembly when Iran, rather than siding with Russia, abstained from the vote which condemned the invasion. Russia’s poor military performance, and the West’s ability to act unanimously, serve as a warning for the Islamic Republic that it may one day have to soak up even more Western pressure if Europe, the US, and other democracies act in union. In the meantime, , Iran will hope to benefit from the magnetic pull of the Ukraine war. With so much governmental, military and diplomatic attention demanded by the conflict, it will for the time being serve as a distraction from Iran’s ambitions elsewhere.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Ukraine Thumper

Russia is moving away from Syria to Ukraine now---the impact is inevitable.

Dr. Hamdan Al-Shehri 6/4, a political analyst and international relations scholar, 6/4/2022, “Russia’s Syria withdrawal a boon for Iran’s regional project,” , RES

The echoes of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which is less than four months old, have reached our region. Our talk is not about units or militias affiliated with Tehran joining the fight there. Rather, we are talking about geopolitics, as well as the void we have begun to notice as a result of the gradual military retreat and withdrawal of Russia from Syria, with the Iranian presence filling this void. Russia moved into the region in the shadow of the American withdrawal as it sought to achieve its interests. This led to Moscow improving its trade and investment balance, besides using the port of Tartus and playing an important role in the Middle East. Russia’s military presence in Syria — to support the Damascus regime — was considered a counterbalance and check on Iran, even though it is an ally of the Iranians there. Its presence has also become a reason for the regional acceptance of the spread of Iran’s militias in Syria. However, the theory of the foreign balance inside Syria is on the verge of disruption. In recent weeks, there have been reports of Russian troops leaving, possibly to the front line in Ukraine. We will likely see further Russian withdrawals, creating more space for the Iranians. The Russian withdrawal from Syria could end up as a repeat of America’s withdrawal from Iraq. This might mean the Iraqi scenario — with its sectarian war, demographic changes, armed terrorist militias, killings and displacement — is replicated in Syria.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

Iran-Russia relations low – nuclear deal

Golnaz Esfandiari 3/10, a senior correspondent for RFE/RL focusing on Iran. She has reported from Afghanistan and Haiti and is one of the authors of The Farda Briefing newsletter. Her work has been cited by The New Yorker, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and other major publications, 3/10/2022, “Will Russia's Invasion Of Ukraine Derail The Iran Nuclear Deal?,” , RES

After nearly a year of painstaking negotiations, Iran and world powers were on the brink of agreeing to restore the landmark 2015 nuclear deal. But last-minute demands from Russia, one of the parties to the deal, have threatened to derail efforts to revive an agreement that curbed Tehran’s nuclear activities in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions. Moscow has demanded guarantees from Washington that Western sanctions over its invasion of Ukraine will not affect its trade and military cooperation with Tehran. The United States has described Russia's new demands as "irrelevant." France, another signatory of the original deal, warned they could dash hopes for a revived nuclear accord. Moscow’ actions have been met with surprise and anger in Tehran. Iran’s foreign minister told lawmakers on March 7, without naming Russia, that Tehran would not let its interests be undermined by “foreign elements.” Experts warn that Russia’s demands could complicate and ultimately scuttle the already fraught negotiations between Iran and world powers. If the talks collapse, Iran could further advance its sensitive nuclear activities. It could also lead to Western countries further tightening sanctions against Tehran. Observers say Iran and world powers could sideline Russia from the negotiations, although it is unclear whether Tehran would be willing to risk jeopardizing its relationship with Moscow, an ally. Iran and world powers have been holding negotiations in Vienna since April 2021, with the United States taking part indirectly. In 2018, then-U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew Washington from the deal. Tehran responded by gradually exceeding the limits imposed by the pact on its nuclear activities. U.S. President Joe Biden has said he is willing to rejoin the pact if Iran return to full compliance. 'Stabbed In The Back' Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group, says that by inserting the war in Ukraine into the complicated nuclear negotiations, Russia appears to be determined to upend the talks and take Iran down with it. He suggested that Russia appears no longer to be interested in reviving the nuclear deal, which would allay Western concerns over Iran’s nuclear activities and allow Tehran to sell its oil. And that could bring global oil prices down. “Neither Iran's return to the oil market nor the peaceful resolution of a Western security concern in the Middle East benefits the Kremlin,” Vaez told RFE/RL. “The leadership in Tehran is waking up to the reality that you often get stabbed in the back by those you believed to have your back.” 'Tank The Talks' Analysts say the scope of Russia’s demands will determine whether they complicate or scuttle the negotiations entirely. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on March 5 said that Moscow wanted written guarantees that sanctions ‘‘launched by the U.S. will not in any way harm our right to free, fully fledged trade and economic and investment cooperation and military-technical cooperation with Iran.” Russia’s new demands coincided with mounting international pressure on Moscow over its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine on February 24, a move that has resulted in unprecedented Western sanctions. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken dismissed Russia’s demands on March 6, saying U.S. sanctions that are “being put in place and that have been put in place on Russia have nothing to do with the Iran nuclear deal.” “If it is simply exemptions that allow Russia to help Iran meet its nuclear obligations in the deal, that is one thing,” Eric Brewer, a senior director at Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a Washington-based think tank, told RFE/RL. “But Lavrov's comments suggest Russia is after something much bigger. I don't see the United States giving Russia that type of sanctions relief, even if it endangers a revival of the [nuclear deal],” he added. Brewer says the United States and Russia have been able to cooperate on shared nonproliferation interests in the past, even when tensions have been high. But he says it is possible that Russia’s recent demands "tank the talks." 'Critical Decision' Vali Nasr, a professor of international affairs and Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins University, says Russia’s demands have forced Iran to make a difficult choice: to stick by Russia and incur the diplomatic and economic costs of the talks collapsing or to ditch Moscow and endanger its ties with an ally. “Iran would have to decide how important an agreement is to its national interest, and whether it will allow talks it has invested so much in and built its economic and foreign policies around [to] be taken hostage by Russia,” Nasr, who served as a senior adviser to the Obama administration, told RFE/RL. “It will be a critical decision for Tehran.” Nasr suggested that sidelining Russia was possible. “The nuclear side of things is in Iran’s hand. The sanctions are in the hands of the U.S. and Europe. Russia's only leverage is to prevent a deal,” Nasr said. Brewer says the other parties to the deal would have to find ways to replace Russia’s technical role under the deal, including removing excess enriched uranium from Iran. “Given enough time, you could probably come up with some workarounds for other parties to take Russia's place on these technical areas,” he says. "But it won't be easy, and time is in short supply. "At a practical level, it would be incredibly challenging to reimplement the deal if Russia, the United States, and Europe are not in alignment on the [nuclear deal] and if Russia is actively trying to play the role of spoiler.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

Relations are impossible---centuries of bad blood.

Michael Rubin 21, Senior Fellow at AEI, 12/2/2021, “Why the Russia-Iran Alliance Will Backfire,” , RES

For all its talk of leading a “resistance front,” the Islamic Republic of Iran has historically had few allies. When Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led his revolutionaries, “Neither East nor West but Islamic Republic” was a foundational slogan of the Islamic Revolution. Khomeini also described the United States and Russia as being “two blades of the same scissors.”[1] He meant it: While the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran symbolized the Islamic Republic’s hostility toward the United States and its European allies, Khomeini was equally distrustful of the Soviet Union and its eastern bloc satellites. Iran’s isolation was cemented when every Arab state with the exception of Syria sided with Iraq during their 1980-88 war. Tehran’s ties with Damascus have remained tight, but Syria’s influence is limited inside the Middle East and its diplomatic weight is nonexistent outside it. The Iranian authorities sought to cultivate African states and were able to purchase the occasional vote on an international body, but Tehran’s declining resources limited its success. Today, that isolation is over. Whereas Khomeini was wary lest Moscow take advantage of Iran’s vulnerability, Ali Khamenei, who succeeded him in 1989, took the risk to align with Russia in pursuit of a broader, anti-U.S. agenda. In this, he found success. But, the question for Iranians is, at what cost? Distrust Centuries in the Making Iranian leaders were aware of Russia by the fifteenth century as many European traders, seeking to bypass the Ottoman Empire on their overland journeys into Asia, traveled to Persia via Moscow.[2] Iranians worried little about their distant neighbors to the north: they viewed Russians as illiterate and cultureless peasants and worried more about Uzbeks and the independent khanates of the Central Asian steppes, which occasionally raided into Iran. The Russians were equally uninterested in the Persians. Russian tsar Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725) withdrew Russian troops from the Caspian coast, believing Iranian forces posed little threat. Such neglect would be short-lived. In 1796, Catherine the Great (r. 1762-96) sent a 50,000-strong force into the North Caucasus, which at that time was part of Iran. Her death gave Iran a reprieve and saved it from what might have been a far greater conquest. As the Russians conquered more territory in Asia, British leaders grew increasingly concerned about the security of India and, by extension, Iran, which had become the only power separating Russia from India. It was this fear that led London to first dispatch an ambassador to the shah’s court in 1800. Both the Russians and the French soon followed suit. It was not long before disputes between Moscow and Tehran resumed. Between 1804 and 1813, Iranian and Russian forces fought repeatedly in the Caucasus. The campaigns drained the shah’s treasury and, in the end, the Russians forced him to cede much of what today is the Republic of Azerbaijan and eastern Georgia. Resentment simmered, and in 1826, the Iranians attacked Russia to regain what the shah had lost. The gamble failed and, in the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchai, the shah ceded much of Armenia. For Iranians, these were not some peripheral territories but rather part of the heartland and the territory over which the crown prince would serve as governor. In 1829, an Iranian mob sacked the Russian embassy in Tehran, slaughtering its thirty-seven Russian diplomats.[3] Russia became a favorite bogeyman for both nationalists and clergy, and Russians in Iran suffered occasional mob violence over subsequent decades.[4] Still, the Russian government saw commerce as a source of influence and encouraged businessmen to move to Iran. Russian leaders, like their British competitors, also sought to further their leverage with debt traps: Both powers would tempt the shah with loans to fund his profligate lifestyle but then call in their extortionate terms, the expense of which the shah would often pass to his subjects. This led to a pattern in which the Russian rulers often successfully wooed the shah while Iranian public opinion continued to harden against them. The Twentieth-century Unrest The twentieth century’s first decade was a time of upheaval in both Russia and Iran. First, the Japanese defeated Russia in war, ending Moscow’s image of invincibility. Then, first in St. Petersburg and then across Iran, revolutionaries successfully won parliamentary constraints on monarchies. In Iran, Muzaffar ad-Din Shah conceded to a constitution just five days before his death. His successor, Mohammed Ali Shah, was unhappy to see what he believed to be his birthright diluted before he could even take power. He quickly turned to Russia where Tsar Nicholas II also sought to preserve his traditional powers. As the shah worked to consolidate power and roll back reforms, the Russian government worked to cement its position in Iran. Mohammed Ali Shah continued the practice of tax farming and office selling, so Russian officials used their resources to ensure pro-Russian candidates won advantageous positions, much to the chagrin of more liberal Iranian nationalists in Tehran’s new parliament.[5] The 1907 Anglo-Russian convention divided Iran into spheres of British and Russian influence. An editorial cartoon of the time depicts the Russian bear sitting on Persia while the English lion looks on. The Russians were blatant in their disrespect of Iranian sovereignty. On August 31, 1907, they shocked Tehran when they, alongside their British competitors, unveiled the Anglo-Russian convention, which effectively divided Iran into spheres of influence. While Iranians remained angry at both parties for the affront, Britain’s main strategic interest at the time was its telegraph lines across southern Iran, and so it ceded most major Iranian population centers to Russian control. Here, the Russians chafed the population more, using proxies and pressure to force closure of Iran’s nascent civil society groups and secret societies and to impose broader censorship on Iran’s exploding newspaper scene. Even the affront of Russia’s secret agreement to divide Iran into different spheres did not break Mohammed Ali Shah’s tilt toward Russia. His ambitions were too great and so, in December 1907, he made his move against the Iranian Constitutionalists. His guards—and a detachment of Russian-trained Persian Cossacks—surrounded the parliament. Parliament’s supporters resisted and soon Iran was on the brink of civil war. As far as most Iranians were concerned, there were two sides: nationalists and Russian-backed Iranian autocrats. That perception largely remains unchanged today. Fighting erupted in July 1909 and, within two weeks, it was over. The shah and his retinue fled first to the Russian embassy and then to Russia itself. The nationalists put Ahmad, the shah’s 12-year-old son, on the throne. Still, Mohammed Ali Shah did not give up. Two years later and, again with Russian support, he invaded Iran from the north. He failed, but the episode cemented Russia’s reputation inside Iran as hostile to Iranian sovereignty. During World War I, Russian forces drove south from the Caspian Sea reaching as far south as Qom. By 1917, British and Russian forces had occupied most of Iran, leaving Mohammed Ali Shah as a titular leader. Grievance went beyond bruised pride. During World War I, Iran lost more than 20 percent of its population to disease, famine, and violence. The Soviets refused to leave Iranian territory following World War II and supported Kurdish separatism in Iran during the Cold War. The Bolshevik Revolution did not change the uneven power dynamic. In 1921, the Soviet authorities imposed a new treaty on Iran in which Moscow renounced earlier agreements and forgave Russian loans but also reserved the right to intervene should Iran host forces intent on interfering in the Soviet Union. The Soviet authorities interpreted this literally and, within weeks, Moscow demanded that Tehran expel all Germans. Joseph Stalin would repeatedly cite the treaty to justify Soviet ultimatums. Indeed, Stalin used the 1921 Treaty to justify invading Iran two decades later. The Soviets were not alone in this—British and subsequently U.S. forces took part—but the Red Army was alone in refusing to leave Iranian territory when World War II ended. Not only did Iranian Azerbaijan become the focal point of the first Cold War crisis, but Moscow also sought to encourage and support Kurdish separatism in the Mahabad Republic in northwestern Iran. This was high among the reasons why Tehran tripled its defense budget in the next decade and joined the Baghdad Pact.[6] The direct military threat the Iranians felt from across their 1,100-mile border with the Soviet Union loomed large in public consciousness through the remainder of the Cold War. This is why, even as Ayatollah Khomeini railed against “The Great Satan” America during the 1979 Islamic Revolution, his suspicions and those of his followers remained just as deep toward the Soviet Union.[7] Reconsidering Russia While Khomeini did not waiver on his connection to Russia throughout the Iran-Iraq war despite the isolation Tehran faced, toward the end of his life, he signaled Iran’s need not to treat the Soviet Union with the same enmity as the regime did the United States. In May 2009, Hassan Rouhani, at the time a former secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and a member of the Assembly of Experts, spoke at a roundtable on “Iran, Russia, and the West.”[8] While critical of Moscow’s posture toward Iran prior to the Islamic Revolution, he suggested then-parliamentary speaker Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s 1989 visit to Moscow had laid the foundation for a new partnership.[9] Ali Khamenei, Khomeini’s successor as supreme leader, continued Tehran’s quiet outreach justified on shared enmity with the Russians toward Washington and on economic opportunism. Some Iranians raised questions about inherent ideological compromise, but regime officials tried to explain this away. In 2012, for example, a website affiliated with the supreme leader denied any parallels between the Palestinian plight and Muslim minorities in Russia or China. The difference, it said, was that Israel was alone in having “confiscated” Palestinian lands.[10] Other outlets acknowledged the problem but assured critics that Tehran continued to provide “emotional support” for the Chechens.[11] That same year, however, Rafsanjani—by then a senior statesman—threw cold water on the comfort some Iranian officials felt about their anti-U.S. alliance with Russia even if he was credited with its revival. In an interview, he noted the constraints Russia felt from U.S. pressure and acknowledged, “Like Western countries, Russia is also concerned about Iran becoming a power by acquiring nuclear weapons.”[12] As president, however, Rouhani disagreed, arguing both that the growing U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and the Caucasus and U.S. human rights advocacy provoked Russia enough to cause it to put other concerns aside.[13] Other officials were less sure. In 2014, Behrouz Nemati, a conservative who represents Tehran in parliament, said that the history of Russo-Iranian relations demonstrates a tendency toward Russian subterfuge and warned Iranian leaders to be careful “shaking Russia’s hand.”[14] Russian soldiers stand watch over Afghans during the Soviet invasion, December 1979. Former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani claimed that the invasion “left a bad memory of Russians in Iranians’ minds.” In contrast to Rouhani, Rafsanjani suggested that Afghanistan remained a source of distrust between Tehran and Moscow rather than a catalyst for tighter ties. “The Soviet Union’s record on invading Afghanistan left a bad memory of Russians in Iranians’ minds,” he explained. “It is too often overlooked that the Islamic Republic’s relationship with Russia was formed in such an environment.”[15] Sadegh Kharrazi, Iran’s former ambassador to France, also cast doubt on a Russian gamble. “Historically, there is a national distrust in Iranians’ nature against Russia. We haven’t been harmed by Americans like we have been by Russians,” he argued.[16] This appears to be a common attitude among some senior Iranian diplomats. Ali Khorram, a former Iranian ambassador to China, wrote that Russia was not trustworthy. “The Russians are good to Iran as long as it is in their interest,” he explained, but “as soon as Americans and Western countries [court Russia], [the Russians] will turn their back to their commitments to the Islamic Republic of Iran. … History has shown whenever we have relied on them [Russians], they have immediately abandoned us,” he added.[17] One Iranian diplomat argued, “The Russians are good to Iran as long as it is in their interest.” While Khamenei and later Rouhani may have been eager for ties to Moscow, Russia’s historical baggage in Iran continued to intrude. Both countries supported the same side in the Syrian civil war, and yet, when a Russian ship launched cruise missiles from the Caspian Sea into Syria that overflew Iranian territory, even sympathetic Iranians such as senior members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) reacted with outrage.[18] Other Russian actions have antagonized ordinary Iranians. After Moscow provided its Iranian counterpart with technology to jam Persian-language broadcasts from diaspora stations, ordinary Iranians reacted with vitriol. Internet commentary submitted to the conservative daily Asr-e Iran webpage on the story included comments such as, “May God give Russia Death,” “Russia is the biggest jerk,” and “the Russian embassy is a nest of spies.”[19] Outside the constraints of the official press, Iranian bloggers let loose, questioning the value of alignment with a declining economic power and the stability of any alliance with Russia.[20] An Iranian doctoral student in Moscow, meanwhile, observed—correctly—that the Kremlin always acted in its own national interest, but Iranian proponents of the alliance somehow expected the Russians to act in Tehran’s national interest instead.[21] Can Trade Overcome Distrust? While Washington and its Middle Eastern allies may worry primarily about Russia-Iran military ties, the trade relationship between the two countries could potentially be broader. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia entered a deep, multi-year recession. At the time, Tehran was already heavily sanctioned and, after a series of executive orders issued by President Bill Clinton, soon became more so. Both Tehran and Moscow, however, found an outlet in the other. In 1995, for example, Russia’s Atomstroyexport became the chief contractor for the Bushehr nuclear program at a time when few countries wanted Russian nuclear assistance given the stigma of the Chernobyl disaster, and Iranian contracts were toxic for Western firms. Still, initial optimism in Tehran that Russian trade might salvage Iran’s economy quickly faded. In 2012, Rafsanjani explained, In the past quarter century … Iran and Russia have never been able to set and create a visible trade partnership. The most important commodity [oil] that Iran has to offer other countries is not attractive to the Russians, and many Russians commodities and technologies have always been the lowest priority for the Iranian side.[22] Russian exports to Iran decreased by nearly two thirds, from $3.4 billion to $1.2 billion, between 2010 and 2013, while Iranian exports to Russia grew only modestly and remained under $500 million.[23] Nor did either country’s non-military trade with the other increase appreciably over the next decade.[24] Even the arms trade did not fully reassure those in the Iranian government unsure about whether to trust Moscow. In 2007, Tehran agreed to purchase the S-300 system for $800 million. Prior to the development of the S-400, the S-300 was still Russia’s premier anti-aircraft missile system, and so the announcement of the deal was a high stakes affair. Soon, however, Iranians who expressed doubt about Russia’s reliability felt vindicated: Moscow suspended the sale under international pressure. The dispute carried on for another eight years with the Iranian government demanding a $4 billion breach of contract penalty against Russia’s Rosoboronexport. And while Tehran dropped the suit in 2015 when Rosoboronexport finally delivered the hardware, cynicism and doubt remained.[25] Shortly after the signing of the 2015 Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), Moscow agreed to license the manufacture of Russian tanks inside Iran. Russia and Iran also now hold joint military exercises. Ironically, it was the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), President Barack Obama’s signature Iran nuclear deal, that breathed new life into the Russia-Iran arms trade. In order to reach agreement, Obama agreed not only to end prohibitions on Iran’s military trade but also to provide a windfall for Tehran in terms of sanctions relief and enabling foreign investment. It was not long, for example, before Moscow agreed to license the manufacture of Russian tanks inside Iran.[26] The two countries likewise appear to be cooperating in the cyber sphere with drones, and, despite Russian president Vladimir Putin’s denials, with satellites as well.[27] That appears to be the tip of the iceberg.[28] Russia and Iran also increasingly hold joint military exercises, sometimes with Chinese participation.[29] The IRGC also frequently participates in Russia’s annual military games.[30] Will the Russian-Iranian Alliance Last? For Khamenei, hatred of the United States trumps animosity toward Russia. In November 2015, he visited Moscow for the first time in more than a decade, nominally to attend a summit for gas-exporting countries. After a meeting with his Russian counterpart, Khamenei declared, “America’s long-term scheme for the region is detrimental to all nations and countries, particularly Iran and Russia, and it should be thwarted through vigilance and closer interaction.” He praised Putin for “neutralizing [Washington’s] policy.” Putin was also affable. “We regard you as a trustworthy and reliable ally in the region and the world,” he told Khamenei.[31] Putin also looks to the future; he was the first world leader to call Ebrahim Raisi upon his win in the June 2021 presidential elections, a victory that many observers believe confirm his frontrunner status to replace Khamenei upon the aging supreme leader’s death.[32] For Khamenei, hatred of the United States trumps animosity toward Russia. Still, centuries of Iranian distrust and hostility do not easily dissipate. Perhaps this is why, in June 2021, the Russian and Iranian foreign ministries agreed to waive visas.[33] Few countries allow Iranians such access, and the decline of the Iranian rial makes it increasingly expensive for those that do. But a desire to bolster tourism may not be the only basis for the agreement. There is likely hope at a more senior level that enabling Iranians and Russians to meet and mix might breakdown the hostility that overshadows Iranian public opinion of Russia and its aims. While the JCPOA helped reinforce Khamenei’s flailing attempt to build a Russia-Iran strategic alliance, the drive by both Tehran and Moscow’s dictatorial regimes to cement an anti-U.S. alliance will backfire. Decades of official Islamic Republic hostility to the United States have not eroded and, indeed, likely may have encouraged a general friendliness by the Iranian public toward America. To try to push Russia upon the public will likely accelerate that trend while Moscow’s close association with an increasingly unpopular Khamenei and Raisi will reinforce Iranian public hostility toward Russia for decades to come. The nature of dictatorship, however, means that in the short term, such sentiments will not affect policy as both Tehran and Moscow work to erode the post-World War II liberal order and U.S. dominance on the regional and global stage.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Iran-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

Russia Iran relations decreasing now

Fathollah-Nejad 22 (Dr. Ali Fathollah-Nejad is an Associate Fellow and the author of the Iran in Focus brief at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy & International Affairs (IFI) at the American University of Beirut (AUB), March 21, 2022, “Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the nature of Iranian-Russian relations”, https://www.mei.edu/publications/russias-invasion-ukraine-and-nature-iranian-russian-relations)

However, the Islamic Republic’s pro-Kremlin narrative has not remained unchallenged. There have been important cracks even with some major media outlets and especially so across Iranian society. Those seeking to bring forth counter-narratives, however, face daunting obstacles. Russian tutelage over Iranian media reporting — a demonstration of neo-colonialism After the Russian embassy in Tehran condemned a report by the Tasnim News Agency — which, curiously, is affiliated with the pro-Moscow IRGC — as “fake news” for characterizing Putin’s operation in Ukraine as an “invasion,” the report was taken offline and replaced with one that closely mirrors the Kremlin’s official wording. In another instance, the embassy lashed out against an Iranian reformist daily that criticized Russia for threatening to derail the JCPOA negotiations. Later, on March 9, Russia’s ambassador to Tehran held a press conference urging Iranian media not to use the terms “war” or “invasion” in their coverage, a blatant interference in Iranian domestic affairs that has stoked anger in the country. These cases bring to mind similar interventions by China’s embassy in Iran against unfavorable media reporting and official statements, most recently about China’s alleged stationing of security forces in Iran to protect its investment interests. Earlier, in the pandemic’s first year, the Chinese embassy had stepped in to silence skeptics of Beijing’s official COVID-19 statistics. Such interference by ambassadors from both non-Western great powers into Iran’s domestic affairs reflects the nature of Tehran’s relations with Russia and China, upon which Iran’s entire “look to the East” geopolitical strategy depends. A yawning power gap results in chronic Iranian weakness and dependency, raising the specter of a neo-feudal arrangement whereby Tehran’s leadership follows the diktats of their masters in Moscow and Beijing. However, Russia’s newfound pariah status may improve Iran’s standing in bilateral ties, but only if Tehran plays its cards carefully and doesn’t degenerate into a power that simply follows Putin’s whims. At its core, Iran’s “look East” policy has as its goal not only economic development and political support against Western pressure, but the very survival of a regime whose domestic support has been hollowed out. Moscow and Beijing hold up this teetering regime from the outside. Hence, the Islamic Republic finds itself granting concessions to Russian or Chinese interests, and sometimes even trying to anticipate their apparent desires. In this context, fears associated with Iran’s already signed 25-year comprehensive cooperation agreement with China are mirrored by those over the planned 20-year deal with Russia. Both long-term agreements, which are branded as “strategic,” lack transparency and have therefore stoked wild speculation. Theories abound that the Islamic Republic’s leadership is potentially selling out the country only to cement its own power amid unprecedented domestic and international pressures with the help of these non-Western great powers and their U.N. Security Council vetoes. As a core pillar of the deal with Russia, which Iran’s foreign ministry said last December was “almost finalized,” Moscow will reportedly protect Tehran’s interests at the U.N. Security Council and with the JCPOA, and finally provide it with advanced military hardware (such as the S-400 missile defense system and Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets) in exchange for Russia obtaining favorable deals on Iran’s oil and gas fields. Coinciding with this 20-year agreement is another reported deal between the two countries from last fall, granting Russian companies the largest share in the recently discovered giant Chalous gas field in Iran’s Caspian Sea territory (followed by Chinese companies and only then Iranian ones, more concretely those affiliated with the IRGC). For Russia, Iran has been a true trump card, enabling it to leverage the “Iranian threat” vis-à-vis the West while also benefitting economically from ties with Tehran, including re-energizing its nuclear industry through its prominent role in Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore, if Iran normalizes relations with the West, that would likely sharply curtail Russia’s influence. In other words, a Western-oriented Iran would constitute a larger threat to Moscow’s interests than a “nuclear Iran.” Societal and geopolitical concerns The nature and possible ramifications of Iran’s relationship with Russia are hotly debated across Iranian society. Iranian fears emerge from the unevenness of bilateral ties and the perceived disconnect between national and regime interests vis-à-vis Russia — or China for that matter. These concerns about Russia are rooted in both history and geopolitical realities. The bitter memories of the 1908 bombardment of Iran’s parliament by the Russia-led Persian Cossack Brigade meant to torpedo the Constitutional Revolution as well as the 1941 Anglo-Soviet invasion linger in the collective consciousness as a reminder of the Kremlin’s willingness to run roughshod over Iran in pursuit of its interests. Moreover, some elements of Iran’s foreign policy community see Russia as flip-flopping when it comes to the perennial conflict between Iran and the West. For them, Moscow is an opportunistic actor focused solely on achieving its own aims, even if it means contradicting official rhetoric that lambasts the U.S. and the West, including its propensity to keep the flame of the Iran-West conflict alive as a means to maximize Moscow’s standing in that conflictual triangular relationship. Among other things, Russia is accused of breaking arms supply contracts, sabotaging the JCPOA process, and maintaining close ties with Iran’s regional foes (Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia). Furthermore, there are also broader concerns within society over the long-term alliance the Iranian regime hopes to forge with the like-minded autocracies of Russia and China. Although sparsely attended, anti-war protests in front of the Ukrainian embassy in Tehran, complete with chants of marg bar Putin (“death to Putin”), illustrate the anti-Moscow sentiment. Such reservations about Russia also pertain to China. Yet there is no organized opposition to the regime’s deepening of ties with either. The interests of the regime and those of Iranian society clash over Russia. While the former sees Russia as a formidable military-security guarantor of its stability and survival, the latter sees in such support a looming threat to democratic aspirations. Pro-democracy Iranians fear that Moscow could boost their country’s repressive apparatus, and potentially even deploy its military if popular protests ever were to imperil the regime — as witnessed in both Syria and Kazakhstan. The relationship between the Russian and Iranian regimes is also strengthened by their parallels: Both are petro-states with mafia-style ruling classes helmed by all-powerful autocrats unafraid of using a heavy hand and guided by their nostalgia for the glory days of empires past.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2NC – AT: Oil Impact

The EU has already adopted large sanctions–they are working now–it hasn’t collapsed the economy

Borrell 7-16 (Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the European Commission, 7-16-22, “The sanctions against Russia are working”, SC)

Since Russia brutally invaded Ukraine, the EU has adopted six packages of sanctions against Moscow – and we are about to finalise a “maintenance and alignment” package to clarify a number of provisions to strengthen legal certainty for operators and align the EU's sanctions with those of our allies and partners of the G7. Our measures already now target nearly 1,200 individuals and almost 100 entities in Russia as well as a significant number of sectors of the Russian economy. These sanctions were adopted in close coordination with the G7 member, and the fact that over forty other countries, including traditionally neutral countries, have also adopted them or taken similar measures enhances their effectiveness. Sanctions require strategic patience because it may take a long time for them to have the desired effect. Now, as the war drags on and the costs of energy rises, people in Europe and elsewhere ask whether these sanctions are working and/or whether the side effects are too great. Without underestimating different problems that could occur, including attempts made to bypass them, sanctions remain an important instrument of political action. But for sure we need to use them in a well targeted manner, and, above all, they require strategic patience because it may take a long time for them to have the desired effect. One of the main sanctions adopted is to stop buying 90% of EU oil supplies from Russia by the end of 2022, depriving Moscow of corresponding revenues. Yes, Russia is able to sell its oil to other markets, however this benefit is limited by the fact that Russia is forced to give high discounts on each barrel (Russian oil is sold at around $ 30 less than the global average). In addition, and this is perhaps the most important point, this gradual oil embargo and the scaling back of the import of gas, liberates Europe from its energy dependence on Russia. We have discussed this issue at the EU level for years, but now we are implementing it. Cutting our structural energy dependence on Russia matters a lot because this dependence has been an obstacle to developing a strong European policy towards Moscow’s aggressive actions. Cutting our structural energy dependence on Russia matters a lot because this dependence has been an obstacle to developing a strong European policy towards Moscow’s aggressive actions. This dependence probably played an important role in Putin's initial calculations in Ukraine. He may have believed that the EU would never sanction Russia seriously because it was too dependent on energy. This is one of his most important blunders when launching this war. Of course, this rapid detoxification from Russian energy involves significant costs for a number of countries and sectors that we will have to face. However, it is the price to pay to defend our democracies and international law. We have to handle these consequences by reinforcing our internal solidarity and that is what we are doing. By breaking its energy dependence, in line with its climate ambition, the EU is learning that interdependence is not always a neutral instrument that is beneficial to all or a mean to guarantee peaceful international relations. The Ukraine war confirmed that interdependence can be used as a weapon. This rapid detoxification from Russian energy involves significant costs for a number of countries and sectors that we will have to face. However, it is the price to pay to defend our democracies and international law. Are the sanctions really hurting the Russian economy? Some observers have argued they are not very effective because the exchange rate of the Russian currency is very high. But this interpretation is dubious. The exchange rate of the Rouble simply reflects the fact that Russia has a massive imbalance between the high volume of oil and gas exports and the parallel collapse of imports that has followed the sanctions. This trade surplus is not a sign of good economic health, especially for an economy like Russia. While exporting unprocessed raw materials, Russia must import many high-value products that it does not manufacture. For advanced technology products, Russia depends on Europe for more than 45%, the United States for 21% and China for only 11%. Russia may of course try to limit the effects of sanctions by substituting imports through domestic products. This was done, not without success, in the agricultural sector after the 2014 sanctions. However, for high-tech products, import substitution is much more difficult to achieve. Russia will try to substitute imports through domestic products. This was done, not without success, in the agricultural sector after the 2014 sanctions. However, for high-tech products, it is much more difficult to achieve. Sanctions on semiconductors imports for instance have a direct impact on Russian companies that produce consumer electronics, computers, airplanes, cars, or military equipment. In this field, which is obviously crucial in the war in Ukraine, sanctions limit Russia's capacity to produce precision missiles. On the ground, the Russian army is not making much use of this type of precision-guided missiles, not out of moderation, but out of necessity, as it does not have enough of them. In addition, the Russian air force has underperformed in Ukraine, also because it lacks precision-guided munitions. The automotive sector is another sector that is very much feeling the effects of the sanctions. Almost all foreign manufacturers have decided to withdraw from Russia and production was last May down by 97% compared with 2021. In addition, the few cars that Russian manufacturers still produce will not have airbags or automatic gearboxes. The Russian oil industry will suffer Russia as the world’s second largest oil producer is still earning large sums from selling its oil worldwide, notably to Asian customers and this helps it to keep financing the war. But over time, the Russian oil industry will suffer not only from the departure of foreign operators but also from its increasing difficulty in accessing sophisticated technologies such as horizontal drilling. In fact, the capacity of Russia to put new wells in production will be limited, which will lead to a drop in production. Finally, there is the airline industry, which plays a very important role in such a vast country. Around 700 of Russia's 1,100 civilian aircraft are of foreign origin. Russia will have to sacrifice a large part of its fleet, to find spare parts, so that the remaining aircrafts can fly. Even the Russian-produced aircrafts are dependent on technologies and material from western countries. As Alexander Morozov, the head of the research department of Bank of Russia recently wrote: ”The restrictions will lead to decreases in technological and engineering sophistication and in labour productivity in the sanctioned industries. Industries that rely on the most advanced foreign technologies and those with highly digitalized business processes risk being hit harder than others”. The list could go on with other important factors: the loss of access to financial markets; the disconnection of Russia with the major global research networks such as CERN for example; the massive brain drain of Russian elites with thousands of highly qualified professionals having left the country. The effects of such moves are not immediately visible. However, the scientific, economic and technological isolation of Russia is a major loss for the country in the medium term. The scientific, economic and technological isolation of Russia is a major loss for the country in the medium term. Moscow may claim that its relations with many countries remain intact. However, in reality, sanctions against Russia are also hurting its trade with non-sanctioning countries like China. The alternative offered by China to the Russian economy remains indeed limited. Although Beijing seems to want to make ideological gestures by siding with Moscow; refusing to condemn its invasion; or taking up the Russian narrative on the threat of NATO, it is overall rather careful regarding helping Russia circumvent the sanctions. While its imports from Russia have risen (mainly through greater energy imports), Chinese exports to Russia have decreased in proportions that are comparable to those of Western countries. Even if it does not admit it publicly, China is probably worried that this war could strengthen the position of the United States not only in Europe but also in Asia, with the strong involvement of countries such as Japan and South Korea in responding to Russia’s aggression. This is not exactly what China is aiming at. As a result, the latest Russian figures released by Bank of Russia show that transactions through the Russian payment system are down 7.2% in June compared to the first quarter of 2022. This is a real-time indicator of the important slowdown in the Russian economy. Of course the biggest question of all is this: will the sanctions and the real effects they have, lead Putin changing his strategic calculations and if so when? Here we need to be cautious and recognise that his actions have always been disconnected from economic considerations. Putin believes in the magical power of political voluntarism. However, this cannot last forever. Hence Europe must show strategic patience. The war will be long and the test of strength will last. We have no other choice. Allowing Russia to prevail would mean allowing it to destroy our democracies and the very basis of the international rules-based world order. Europe must show strategic patience. The war will be long and the test of strength will last. Allowing Russia to prevail would mean allowing it to destroy our democracies and the very basis of the international rules-based world order. Even if sanctions do not change the Russian trajectory in the short-term, that does not mean they are useless for they do affect sheer amount of resources it has to wage its war. Without sanctions, Russia would ‘have its cake and eat it’, as the expression goes. With sanctions, it will be forced to “choose between butter and guns” locking Putin in a vice that is gradually tightening. Finally, let me raise here as well the issue of the alleged or real impact of our sanctions on third countries, particularly African countries, which depend on Russian and Ukrainian wheat and fertilisers. Here it is very clear where responsibility lies for the food crisis. Our sanctions do not target Russian wheat or fertiliser exports. And it is until now Russia’s aggression and its blockade of the Black Sea that is preventing Ukraine from exporting its wheat. We hope however that the negotiations led by the Secretary General of the United Nations will enable this issue to be resolved quickly. I have informed my African counterparts that we are ready to assist them with any difficulties they may encounter related with our sanctions while urging them not to be fooled by the Russian authorities' lies and disinformation regarding this subject. I have informed my African counterparts that we are ready to assist them with any difficulties they may encounter related with our sanctions while urging them not to be fooled by the Russian authorities' lies and disinformation regarding this subject. There is a “battle of narratives” going on internationally over who is responsible global food and energy crisis as was clear at the last G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. But the real answer is to bring an end to the war and this can only be achieved by Russia's withdrawal from Ukraine. I keep reminding all our international partners that respect for the territorial integrity of states and the non-use of force are not Western or European principles. They are the basis of all international law and Russia is blithely trampling on them. To accept such a violation would open the door to the law of the jungle on a global scale. Europe must become a real power The war in Ukraine makes clear that, contrary to what many thought rather naively just a few years ago, economic interdependence does not automatically guarantee peaceful international relations. This is why Europe must become a real power, as I have been calling for since the beginning of my mandate. Faced with the invasion of Ukraine, we have moved from debates to concrete actions, showing that, when provoked, Europe can respond. Since we do not want to go to war with Russia, economic sanctions and the support of Ukraine are at the core of this response. And our sanctions are beginning to have an effect and will do so even more in the months to come.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Thumper

NATO and Greece are already working together now

ET 3-25 (The Economic Times is an Indian English-language business-focused daily newspaper. It is owned by The Times Group, 3-25-22, “Greece is a critical partner and NATO ally of the US, Blinken says”, SC)

US Secretary of State, Anthony J. Blinken, acknowledged Greece’s role as a critical partner to the US. According to the US, Greece is a strategic partner and a crucial NATO ally. Blinken highlighted the historical ideals and democratic rights that bind the people of both countries on Greek Independence Day. Blinken also expressed gratitude to Greece for its response to the Ukraine conflict, which entered its 30th day on Friday. Greece and the US have enhanced cooperation across a range of vital topics. Last year, the relationship became more robust as the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement modification strengthened their defense and security cooperation for years to come. A proclamation honoring Greek Independence Day was issued by US President Joe Biden President Joe Biden also expressed his heartfelt gratitude towards the US and Greece partnership by signing a proclamation today. Biden emphasized Greece's leadership role in supporting peace and prosperity from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Black Sea and the Western Balkans and the solid historical and current relations between Greece and the US. He also mentioned that Greece and the US are working together to address the problems of our day, including managing the climate catastrophe and diversifying the region's energy supplies, demonstrating that democracies work for people and combating the growing menace of authoritarianism. Blinken’s statement on Greek Independence Day Blinken pointed out the crucial importance of the partnership that both the countries share at the present moment of the Russian-Ukraine war. He also thanked Greece on behalf of the United States for its unwavering and unwavering support for Ukraine's people, authority, and democracy. Both Greece and the US have a stronger relationship, boosting security and prosperity for both the nations and the broader transatlantic connection. Lastly, Blinken stated that the US carries on to support Greece to strengthen and expand the strong and significant relationship governed by democratic values that originated in Greece.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Thumper

Greece is firmly in NATO’s camp

Dr. Jake Sotiriadis and John Sitilides ’22, *is Director of the Center for Futures Intelligence at National Intelligence University and an Air Force Intelligence Officer, **is a geopolitical strategist at Trilogy Advisors and diplomacy consultant to the State Department under a U.S. government contract., “U.S. and Greece Take Strategic Partnership to New Heights”, The National Interest, 5/16/22, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/us-and-greece-take-strategic-partnership-new-heights-202444

President Joe Biden is hosting Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in the Oval Office today, but this is no ordinary visit. The Biden-Mitsotakis meeting showcases Greece’s enhanced role as one of Washington’s closest allies, with U.S.-Greece cooperation advancing American foreign policy objectives across Southern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. Underscoring this historic visit will be Mitsotakis’ address to a joint session of Congress at the invitation of Speaker Nancy Pelosi—a rare honor reserved for prominent international leaders—and the first ever to Congress by a Greek prime minister. The timing of Mitsotakis’ visit comes at a critical moment, as the largest conflict in Europe since World War II rages in Ukraine. Mitsotakis has burnished Greece’s Atlanticist credentials, voting to sanction Russia, sending weapons to Ukraine at considerable domestic political cost, and expelling Russian diplomats suspected of espionage. Greece is a small country in terms of territory and population, yet its outsized impact on world history, culture, and civilization has shaped the values that define America’s constitutional republic. Thus, the joint session also celebrates the bicentennial of Greece’s 1821 declaration of independence from the Ottoman Empire, and the shared Western ideals of freedom, democracy, and respect for human rights. Indeed, U.S.-Greece diplomatic relations have never been better. Last week, Athens ratified the U.S.-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement, extending the current agreement by five years and solidifying and expanding the U.S. military presence in Greece under the Strategic Dialogue launched by President Donald Trump and continued by President Biden. Greece’s northern port of Alexandroupolis, near the Dardanelles Straits entry to the Black Sea, is taking on a significant role in America’s forward defense footprint. The port is now a U.S. and NATO defense hub, hosting the largest-ever U.S. military shipment in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve, to deter and defend against regional aggression and augment NATO’s air, ground, and naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea regions. Alexandroupolis is also becoming a key energy hub in Europe, with a new liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility set to expand the gas supply grid for Europe and reduce reliance on Russian energy. Greece’s heightened defense and energy roles posture Athens to defend the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean as well as to cooperate with NATO allies Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania to constrain Russian naval and air forces in the Black Sea. Greece is a strong advocate of European Union accession for Western Balkan countries, to boost the regional economy, advance democratic reforms, and combat malign Russian influence, especially in Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro. The United States greatly benefits from Greece’s network of strategic alliances beyond Europe’s borders. Despite the lack of White House support for the EastMed natural gas pipeline project, the 3+1 mechanism of Cyprus, Greece, Israel—the three most democratic states in the Eastern Mediterranean—along with the United States, represents a key cooperation framework in trade, technology, energy security, counterterrorism, and interconnectivity in an extremely volatile region. Greece is strengthening ties to the Persian Gulf as well, hosting a Saudi Air Force exercise on Crete and a diplomatic gathering called the “Philia Forum,” including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as well as Egypt and Cyprus. In 2021, Greece deployed a Patriot battery along with 130 troops for operations in Saudi Arabia, and concluded a military cooperation agreement with the UAE. Two major hurdles—the unresolved Cyprus problem and Turkey’s challenges of Greek sovereignty in the Aegean Sea—present perilous dilemmas for the region. While the war in Ukraine highlights U.S. and NATO efforts to keep Turkey in the Western camp, heightened Turkish-Greek tensions are counterproductive for the security alliance. Ankara is seeking to mend fences in its immediate periphery, with Egypt, UAE, and Israel, but has been escalating direct overflights of Greek islands in recent weeks. Greece and Turkey have a long and troubled history, and nearly came to blows over maritime disputes in the Aegean in 2020, as they nearly did in 1976, 1987, and 1996. These sovereignty disputes are not Washington’s alone to help resolve. Greece’s key NATO allies, such as France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, also have important roles in resolving conflicts in Southern Europe. The Ukraine crisis clearly emphasizes the criticality of continued stability, security, and cooperation on NATO’s southern flank. Prime Minister Mitsotakis’ visit presents an opportunity to elevate these regional and functional issues to Biden, the U.S. Congress, and the American public. Washington can use its indispensable influence carefully to reinforce this key alliance and dial down regional tensions where solidarity within NATO is of the utmost importance, and where its seams are under greatest stress.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Link Thumper

The link is non-unique – the US has already designated Greece as a important ally for security cooperation – draws them away from Russia

Edmond Y. Azadian 6/9/22, Senior editorial columnist EDMOND Y. AZADIAN is Advisor to the Alex and Marie Manoogian Museum in Detroit, Michigan; Advisor from the Diaspora to the Ministry of Culture in Armenia; member of the Republic of Armenia’s Academy of Sciences, “Armenia, Greece and Cyprus Triangle May be in the Offing”, The Armenian Mirror-Spectator, 6/9/22, https://mirrorspectator.com/2022/06/09/armenia-greece-and-cyprus-triangle-may-be-in-the-offing/

More recently, Greece’s former socialist government had reduced the country into a basket case. But Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ center-right New Democracy Party won a landslide election in 2019 and brought about a turnaround to the country’s economy and politics. Although Turkey brags that it has the second strongest army after the US in the NATO structure, Greece no longer lags far behind. As Turkey continues to abuse its power and thus erode its standing in NATO, sympathy and support is shifting to Greece. After Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias met US Secretary of State Antony Blinken in May, a spokesperson called the two countries to resolve their problems through diplomacy and characterized Greece as “an irreplaceable ally and key ally of the United States in NATO,” while describing Turkey as “an important US partner and important ally in NATO.” The characterizations are very subtle but clear enough to make clear their place in US foreign policy.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – Sanctions Thumper

Greece struck down Russians ships in support of EU sanctions

RFERL 4-19 (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) is a United States government funded organization that broadcasts and reports news, information, and analysis to countries in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Caucasus, and the Middle East where it says that "the free flow of information is either banned by government authorities or not fully developed", 4-19-22, “Greece Seizes Russian Tanker As Part Of EU Sanctions Over Ukraine”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, SC)

Greek authorities say they have seized a Russian oil tanker in the Aegean Sea as part of European Union sanctions imposed against Russia for its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. The Russian-flagged Pegas, with 19 Russian crew members on board, was seized on April 19 near the coastal city of Karystos on the southern coast of the island of Evia. "It has been seized as part of EU sanctions," a shipping ministry official said. The coast guard said the seizure order concerned the ship itself and not its cargo. The vessel had experienced mechanical issues and was being escorted by a tug to the Peloponnese so that its cargo could be transferred to another ship. However, rough seas forced it to Karystos. The European Union, of which Greece is a member, has adopted a wide range of sanctions against Moscow over its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, designed to cripple the Russian economy and pressure President Vladimir Putin into ending the war against Ukraine. The sanctions include import and export bans for a wide array of goods and a ban on access to EU ports by Russian-flagged ships.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Greece-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ

Relations are dead

Tasos Kokkinidis ‘22, author at Greek Reporter, “What Has Russia Ever Done For Greece?”, GreekReporter.com, 4/28/22, https://greekreporter.com/2022/04/28/what-russia-ever-done-greece/

Recently, Russia’s Foreign Ministry warned Greece that relations between the two nations that “share the same faith” have been “reduced to almost nothing.” Maria Zakharova, director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, warned in a statement released on social media that the “historical parallels” between Greece and Russia were in danger of becoming “a solid double line between us.” Greece has joined its EU and NATO allies in condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine and has sent military and humanitarian aid to Kyiv. Relations reached a nadir when Greece expelled 12 Russian diplomats in early April. However, recent opinion polls show that more than one out of two Greeks do not support the government’s policies. While refugees from Ukraine are welcomed with open arms in Greece, many Greeks reject the EU measures against Russia. According to one survey, more than 60 percent are decidedly opposed to arms shipments; they see culpability for the war in both Moscow and Kyiv. Greece is also concerned about the close ties between Turkey and Russia. Moscow has been providing Ankara with weapons, including the controversial S400 missile system and has been financing a nuclear power plant built in Turkey.