2022
Michigan
Counterplan
EU-Russia Relations › Aff Answers › 2AC – UQ
EU Neighbors East 7/21 ("War in Ukraine: EU adopts ‘maintenance and alignment’ package against Russia", 7-21-2022, EU Neighbors East, https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/war-in-ukraine-eu-adopts-maintenance-and-alignment-package-against-russia/, DOA: 7-21-2022)//sposten
In response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the European Union today adopted new measures intended to tighten existing economic sanctions targeting Russia, improve their implementation, and strengthen their effectiveness.
This ‘maintenance and alignment’ package introduces a new prohibition to purchase, import, or transfer, directly or indirectly, gold, if it originates in Russia and it has been exported from Russia into the EU or to any third country after. This prohibition also covers jewelry.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › AFF Answers › 2AC – Ukraine Thumper
Brix 2-24 [Emil; the Director of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien – Vienna School of International Studies since 2017. After joining the Austrian diplomatic service in 1982, Mr. Brix worked as political secretary for the parliamentary group of the Austrian People’s Party. In 1986, he was appointed Head of Cabinet at the Ministry of Science and Research. From 1990 until 1995, he served as Austrian Consul General in Cracow, Poland. Subsequently, he was Director of the Austrian Cultural Institute in London, a position he held for four years. In 2002, Mr. Brix was appointed Director-General of Foreign Cultural Policy at the Ministry for European and International Affairs of Austria. After serving five years as the Austrian Ambassador to the UK from 2010-15, he became Austrian Ambassador to the Russian Federation in 2015. He is deputy chairman of the Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe and member of the governing board of the Austrian Research Association. He holds a PhD from the University of Vienna and was awarded by the University of Drohobytsch, Ukraine and by the University of Cluj-Napoca, Romania. He is an alumnus of the Diplomatische Akademie Wien and published numerous books and articles on Austrian and European history of the 19th and 20th century; 2-24-2022; "Interview with Ambassador Emil Brix"; Central European Network for Teaching and Research in Academic Liaison; https://central-network.eu/news-events/interview-with-ambassador-emil-brix/; Accessed 7-16-2022; RL😊]
Ambassador Brix, February 24, 2022 marked a change in Europe's relations with Russia. Before that, there was a period of economic integration and a hope for peaceful, prosperous neighbourly relations. This hope seems to have been destroyed. How do you see the further development of Europe's relations with Russia?
February 24 was a decisive turning point in the relations between Europe and Russia. The reason for this was that it marked the destruction of the hope that through close cooperation – between universities, civil society, but also economic partners – we could achieve a reasonable relationship between Russia and Europe. The war of aggression is proof that one side does not want that. Therefore, we have to assume that a rather impenetrable new wall is being created here in Europe between Russia and the rest of Europe. And this also raises the question: what does this mean for Central Europe, for those states that are relatively recent members of the European Union, that have had decades of experience with communism, with the Soviet Union? To what extent have these countries now become a region in Europe that can, on the one hand, help us to understand what's going on; and on the other hand, actually help us defend what European values are?
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › AFF Answers › 2AC – Cyber Thumper
Hakmeh & Naylor 3-7 [Joyce; a senior research fellow for the International Security Programme at Chatham House; Esther; a research analyst at the International Security Programme; 3-7-2022; "How the tech community has rallied to Ukraine’s cyber-defence"; Guardian; https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/mar/07/tech-community-rallied-ukraine-cyber-defence-eu-nato; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]
In response to the Russian threat, there have been unprecedented efforts by private and government entities – and even individuals – to support Ukraine’s cyber resilience.
Responding to cyber-attacks and building national cyber resilience has never been – and will never be – the sole responsibility of governments. It requires a whole-of-society approach grounded in international cooperation efforts. For the first time since its inception, the EU rapid cyber response team, with capabilities to detect and respond to a variety of threats, and headed by Lithuania, was deployed to help defend against cyber-attacks targeting Ukraine. The Romanian national cybersecurity agency and a cybersecurity company called Bitdefender launched a public-private partnership to provide pro bono technical support and threat intelligence to Ukraine’s government, businesses and citizens for “as long as it is necessary”. NATO, which has been working for a number of years with Ukraine to increase its cyber defences, signed an agreement a few weeks before the invasion aimed at enhancing cyber cooperation with Ukraine.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › AFF Answers › 2AC – China Thumper
McCarthy 6-30 [Simone; correspondent for China for CNN Digital Worldwide; 6-30-2022; "Europe sees China through a Russian lens, and Beijing is not happy"; CNN; https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/29/china/china-nato-g7-russia-ukraine-intl-hnk-mic/index.html; Accessed 7-16-2022; RL😊]
China’s concerns have been clear this week, as its Foreign Ministry pushed back on the NATO designation in regular scheduled press briefings. “China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. It does not interfere in other countries’ internal affairs or export ideology, still less engage in long-arm jurisdiction, economic coercion or unilateral sanctions. How could China be labeled a ‘systemic challenge’?” ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said on Tuesday. “We solemnly urge NATO to immediately stop spreading false and provocative statements against China,” he said, adding that NATO should “stop seeking to disrupt Asia and the whole world after it has disrupted Europe.” But that rhetoric – blaming NATO for “disruption” in Europe – is part of what is driving a shift in European perspectives, analysts say, as Beijing has refused to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, including the killing of civilians, while actively blaming the US and NATO for provoking Moscow. China “very quickly and very clearly lined itself up – at least in words, not so much in deeds – with Russia,” while transatlantic partners came together against Russia and in support of Ukraine in the wake of the invasion, said Pepijn Bergsen, a research fellow in the Europe Program at the Chatham House think tank in London. The contrast between the two has helped drive an emerging “democracies versus autocracies” narrative in Europe, he said, adding that internal politics also play a role. “In Eastern and Central Europe, where Russia is regarded as by far the number one security threat, relations (with China) had already been starting to fray, but the fact that China so clearly lined up with Russia has accelerated a shift,” Bergsen said. China, for its part, appears to have underestimated the extent to which its stance would reverberate through its relationship with Europe, one that was already on shaky ground following European concerns over alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang, erosion of freedoms in Hong Kong and China’s economic targeting of Lithuania over the Baltic nation’s relations with Taiwan.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › AFF Answers › 2AC – UQ
Strozewski 6-29 [Zoe; correspondent at Newsweek, citing Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III; 6-29-2022; "U.S. establishing permanent troops in Poland amid fears of NATO-Russia war"; Newsweek; https://www.newsweek.com/us-establishing-permanent-troops-poland-amid-fears-nato-russia-war-1720384; Accessed 7-19-2022; RL]
The U.S. will station its first permanent forces on NATO's Eastern flank, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III announced Wednesday, as fears mount over a potential war between Russia and the 30-member alliance.
In a Twitter thread detailing several new commitments from U.S. President Joe Biden to bolster security in Europe, Austin said that the V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post, an Army garrison headquarters and a field support battalion will be stationed in Poland, which shares a border with non-NATO member Russia.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › AFF Answers › 2AC – UQ
Wigura & Kuisz ’22 [Karolina; sociologist and historian of ideas; Jaroslaw; a political analyst who is writing a book about Poland’s illiberal turn; 3-25-2022; "America Thinks the War Is About Ukraine. Russia’s Neighbors Disagree."; NYTimes; https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/25/opinion/nato-russia-poland-europe.html; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL]
WARSAW — The symbolism was striking. On March 12, two weeks into Russia’s brutal bombardment of Ukraine, the leaders of France and Germany held a joint call with President Vladimir Putin. Just days later, three prime ministers from post-Communist Europe — Polish, Czech and Slovenian — traveled to Kyiv by train, despite the danger.
This divergence exposed a sharp divide in how Eastern and Western NATO member states view the war in Ukraine. For Western countries, not least the United States, the conflict is a disaster for the people of Ukraine — but one whose biggest danger is that it might spill over the Ukrainian border, setting off a global conflict.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Central Europe-Russia Relations › AFF Answers › 2AC – UQ
Tůma ’22 [Petr; visiting fellow at the Atlantic Council's Europe Center, a Czech career diplomat with an expertise on Europe, Middle East and transatlantic relations, previously worked at the Czech Embassy in Washington, DC, posted as a Deputy Chief of the Czech Embassy in war-torn Syria and held the same position in Ramallah; 3-30-2022; "Central Europe leads the way in backing Ukraine. Here’s its game plan for what’s next."; Atlantic Council; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/central-europe-leads-the-way-in-backing-ukraine-heres-its-game-plan-for-whats-next/; Accessed 7-8-2022; RL]
As the West scrambles to maintain its united front against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union (EU) member states of Central and Eastern Europe have led the way as some of the continent’s loudest moral voices, sending arms and humanitarian aid to Ukraine while receiving streams of refugees.
But while neighboring Poland has perhaps been most visible—hosting both US President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris in recent weeks while absorbing more than two million refugees—geography isn’t the only factor that determines who is a frontline state.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Misc. › Multipolarity now
Lee 22 – article is a summary of BU Global Development Policy Center representatives interviewing Professor Jeff Colgan, Associate Professor of Political Science at Brown University and Director of the Climate Solutions Lab at the Watson Institute of Public and International Affairs (Yaechan, 3-17-2022, "Webinar Summary – Partial Hegemony: Oil Politics and International Order," Boston University, https://www.bu.edu/gdp/2022/03/23/webinar-summary-partial-hegemony-oil-politics-and-international-order/)//KH
On Thursday, March 17, 2022, the Boston University Global Development Policy Center hosted Professor Jeff Colgan, Associate Professor of Political Science at Brown University and Director of the Climate Solutions Lab at the Watson Institute of Public and International Affairs, to discuss his new book, ‘Partial Hegemony: Oil Politics and International Order’, as part of the 2022 Global Economic Governance Book Talk Series.
In his book, Colgan touches upon a core debate in the international relations literature on what constitutes international order and why or how that definition is informed by the distinct change of order in oil politics since the Oil Shock in 1973. Colgan finds the change was not driven by factors commonly considered to be major catalysts for change, such as existing dominant hegemons or a major global war. Rather, it was driven by a group of non-major powers, or the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and this fundamentally changed the initial dominance that Western powers and their private companies (the so-called Seven Sisters) had over the oil industry. In this respect, the conventional perception of how politics works, that the hegemon sets up and sustains international order, particularly following war, doesn’t hold. In response to this apparent observational discrepancy between theory and reality, Colgan argues the international order should be perceived as a collection of multiple subsystems, where no single power dominates the entire system. Hence, change within subsystems may occur, hinging on the conditions and power relations unique to each subsystem.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Misc. › First strike solves/China war good
Green and Talmadge – *Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati; **Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (Brendan Rittenhouse* and Caitlin**, July/August 2022, "The Consequences of Conquest," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-16/consequences-conquest-taiwan-)//KH
If a war in the Pacific were to break out today, China’s ability to conduct effective over-the-horizon attacks—that is, attacks targeting U.S. ships at distances that exceed the line of sight to the horizon—would be more limited than commonly supposed. China might be able to target forward-deployed U.S. aircraft carriers and other ships in a first strike that commences a war. But once a conflict is underway, China’s best surveillance assets—large radars located on the mainland that allow China to “see” over the horizon—are likely to be quickly destroyed. The same is true of Chinese surveillance aircraft or ships in the vicinity of U.S. naval forces.
Chinese satellites would be unlikely to make up for these losses. Using techniques the United States honed during the Cold War, U.S. naval forces would probably be able to control their own radar and communications signatures and thereby avoid detection by Chinese satellites that listen for electronic emissions. Without intelligence from these specialized signal-collecting assets, China’s imaging satellites would be left to randomly search vast swaths of ocean for U.S. forces. Under these conditions, U.S. forces operating in the Philippine Sea would face real but tolerable risks of long-range attacks, and U.S. leaders probably would not feel immediate pressure to escalate the conflict by attacking Chinese satellites.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Misc. › No Taiwan war
Nathan 22 – professor at Columbia polisci, Ph.D., Harvard, MA, Harvard, BA, Harvard (Andrew J. Nathan, 6-23-2022, "Beijing Is Still Playing the Long Game on Taiwan," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-23/beijing-still-playing-long-game-taiwan)//KH
Concern is growing in Taiwan, in the United States, and among U.S. allies in Asia that China is preparing to attack Taiwan in the near future. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee last year, Admiral Philip Davidson, then the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, warned that Beijing might attempt to seize the island in the next six years. Unifying Taiwan with mainland China is a key element of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream.” And as the political scientist Oriana Skylar Mastro has argued in these pages, Xi wants “unification with Taiwan to be part of his personal legacy,” suggesting that an armed invasion could come before the end of his third term as secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party in 2027 and almost certainly before the end of his probable fourth term in 2032.
Putin’s war in Ukraine has intensified these concerns. Xi’s announcement just before the Russian invasion of a “no limits” partnership with Moscow, coupled with his failure to condemn Putin’s actions and the Chinese media’s endorsement of Russian propaganda, seem to signal Beijing’s support for Russia’s territorial aggression. Beijing may see a strategic opening now that U.S. political and military resources are tied up in Europe. Moreover, Chinese leaders may have interpreted the West’s response to the Russian attack as an indication that the United States will not intervene militarily to defend a country to which it is not bound by a defense treaty, especially against a nuclear-armed adversary. As David Sacks of the Council on Foreign Relations has argued, “Chinese policymakers may conclude that Russia’s nuclear arsenal effectively deterred the United States, which would be unwilling to go to war with a nuclear power over Taiwan.”
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Misc. › Yes Taiwan War
Green and Talmadge – *Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati; **Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (Brendan Rittenhouse* and Caitlin**, July/August 2022, "The Consequences of Conquest," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-16/consequences-conquest-taiwan-)//KH
Of all the intractable issues that could spark a hot war between the United States and China, Taiwan is at the very top of the list. And the potential geopolitical consequences of such a war would be profound. Taiwan—“an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender,” as U.S. Army General Douglas MacArthur once described it—has important, often underappreciated military value as a gateway to the Philippine Sea, a vital theater for defending Japan, the Philippines, and South Korea from possible Chinese coercion or attack. There is no guarantee that China would win a war for the island—or that such a conflict wouldn’t drag on for years and weaken China. But if Beijing gained control of Taiwan and based military assets there, China’s military position would improve markedly.
Beijing’s ocean surveillance assets and submarines, in particular, could make control of Taiwan a substantial boon to Chinese military power. Even without any major technological or military leaps, possession of the island would improve China’s ability to impede U.S. naval and air operations in the Philippine Sea and thereby limit the United States’ ability to defend its Asian allies. And if, in the future, Beijing were to develop a large fleet of quiet nuclear attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines, basing them on Taiwan would enable China to threaten Northeast Asian shipping lanes and strengthen its sea-based nuclear forces.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Misc. › Yes Taiwan War
Mastro 21 – Center Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University and a Senior Nonresident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. (Oriana Skylar, July/August 2021, "The Taiwan Temptation," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-03/china-taiwan-war-temptation)//KH
For more than 70 years, China and Taiwan have avoided coming to blows. The two entities have been separated since 1949, when the Chinese Civil War, which had begun in 1927, ended with the Communists’ victory and the Nationalists’ retreat to Taiwan. Ever since, the strait separating Taiwan from mainland China—81 miles wide at its narrowest—has been the site of habitual crises and everlasting tensions, but never outright war. For the past decade and a half, cross-strait relations have been relatively stable. In the hopes of persuading the Taiwanese people of the benefits to be gained through a long-overdue unification, China largely pursued its long-standing policy of “peaceful reunification,” enhancing its economic, cultural, and social ties with the island.
To help the people of Taiwan see the light, Beijing sought to isolate Taipei internationally, offering economic inducements to the island’s allies if they agreed to abandon Taipei for Beijing. It also used its growing economic leverage to weaken Taipei’s position in international organizations and to ensure that countries, corporations, universities, and individuals—everyone, everywhere, really—adhered to its understanding of the “one China” policy. As sharp as these tactics were, they stopped well short of military action. And although Chinese officials always maintained that they had a right to use force, that option seemed off the table.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Misc. › Yes Taiwan War
Brands 22 – Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor at the Henry A. Kissinger Center for Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Hal, 4-22-22, "Putin’s Struggles in Ukraine May Embolden Xi on Taiwan,” Asharq Al-Awsat, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3605626/hal-brands/putin%E2%80%99s-struggles-ukraine-may-embolden-xi-taiwan)//KH
One of the biggest questions of the Ukraine war concerns tensions half a world away: What lessons will China draw from the Russian invasion?
Western observers hope that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s faltering invasion of Ukraine will convince China to go slow — that it will discourage President Xi Jinping from undertaking an invasion of Taiwan. Yet there’s a real possibility that it could actually induce Beijing to go fast — to use force more harshly and decisively in hopes of avoiding the type of quagmire into which Moscow has stumbled.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Hegemony is bad! › AT: Transition wars
Leonard 22 – Director of the European Council on Foreign Relations (Mark, 6-13-2022, "The Real End of Pax Americana," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2022-06-13/real-end-pax-americana)//KH
Greater German and Japanese assertiveness is likely to go hand in hand with U.S. retrenchment (and a shrinking of Washington’s relative economic and military might) over the long haul, a trend that is unlikely to change with the war in Ukraine. The United States will be forced to concentrate its limited resources on the challenges posed by China. Analysts such as Robert Kagan have argued that Pax Americana could give way to global chaos. That is definitely possible. But it is not what has happened in much of the Middle East, where the United States was most engaged for the last two decades and where it is now pulling back most dramatically. Julien Barnes-Dacey and Hugh Lovatt of the European Council on Foreign Relations have described how there was an initial surge in regional competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia and in military conflicts that drew in outside powers, such as Russia and Turkey. But then many of these conflicts slowed down, and more locally driven reordering processes began, exemplified by the August 2021 Baghdad conference that brought key regional actors into dialogue with one another.
In Europe, U.S. retrenchment could yield greater sovereignty once Europeans finally realize that the war in Ukraine will not stop Washington’s long-term pivot to Asia. One reason that Europeans have failed to develop a common foreign policy is their lack of trust in one another. But Moscow’s aggression has brought Europeans together, convincing countries that previously favored engagement with Russia, such as Germany and Italy, to embrace a policy of containment. If this convergence holds, one could see a real European strategic alignment, backed eventually by a European armaments industry and even conceivably by a more common European nuclear deterrent (or at least a willingness by France to share its deterrent). In the long term, Europe could forge a common framework to manage relations with other powers, such as Russia and Turkey, including through deterrence, selective decoupling to minimize tensions, and some form of dialogue to prevent escalation. Instead of continuing to expand the EU and NATO, Europe might opt for smaller, more flexible multilateral arrangements involving some of the most important players, much like the Quad in Asia. In short, the European order might become more Asian.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Hegemony is bad! › AT: Kagan
Bacevich 22 – Professor Emeritus of International Relations and History at Boston University (Andrew J. Bacevich, April 13, 2022, "Robert Kagan's Selective Memory," American Conservative, https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/robert-kagans-selective-memory/)//KH
In the pages of Foreign Affairs, the indefatigable Robert Kagan recently weighed in with yet another fervent appeal on behalf of empire. Ever the true-blue American, Kagan avoids using the offensive E-word, of course. He favors the term hegemony, which, he explains, is benign, involving neither domination nor exploitation but willing submission—“more a condition than a purpose.” Scratch the surface, however, and “The Price of Hegemony” offers a variation on Kagan’s standard theme: the imperative of militarized U.S. global primacy, whatever the price and with little regard for who pays.
Few would charge Kagan with being a deep or original thinker. As a writer, he is less philosophe than pamphleteer, albeit one possessing a genuine gift for packaging. Recall, for example, his famous assertion that “Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.” Once deemed to express a truth of Lippmannesque profundity, this warriors vs. wimps formulation has since lost much of its persuasive appeal, not least because the warriors, a.k.a. “the troops,” have not fared especially well when dispatched to liberate, pacify, or depose.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Hegemony is bad! › AT: China Rise
Bader 16 – the senior director for Asian affairs on the National Security Council in the Obama Administration and a former United States Ambassador to Namibia (Jeffrey, February 2016, “How Xi Jinping Sees the World . . . and Why,” Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/xi_jinping_worldview_bader-1.pdf)//KH
China’s rise has rightfully been drawing attention since long before Xi Jinping assumed office. But questions about whether China is a threat to the international system, a revisionist power, and a would-be regional hegemon have become much sharper in the three years since he assumed leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. How valid are such concerns?
Xi is certainly a more forceful, assertive, and ambitious leader than his predecessor. He has behind him a China with greater capacity—economic and military—than any of his predecessors.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Hegemony is bad! › AT: China Rise
Nathan 22 – professor at Columbia polisci, Ph.D., Harvard, MA, Harvard, BA, Harvard (Andrew J. Nathan, 6-23-2022, "Beijing Is Still Playing the Long Game on Taiwan," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-23/beijing-still-playing-long-game-taiwan)//KH
Concern is growing in Taiwan, in the United States, and among U.S. allies in Asia that China is preparing to attack Taiwan in the near future. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee last year, Admiral Philip Davidson, then the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, warned that Beijing might attempt to seize the island in the next six years. Unifying Taiwan with mainland China is a key element of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “Chinese dream.” And as the political scientist Oriana Skylar Mastro has argued in these pages, Xi wants “unification with Taiwan to be part of his personal legacy,” suggesting that an armed invasion could come before the end of his third term as secretary-general of the Chinese Communist Party in 2027 and almost certainly before the end of his probable fourth term in 2032.
Putin’s war in Ukraine has intensified these concerns. Xi’s announcement just before the Russian invasion of a “no limits” partnership with Moscow, coupled with his failure to condemn Putin’s actions and the Chinese media’s endorsement of Russian propaganda, seem to signal Beijing’s support for Russia’s territorial aggression. Beijing may see a strategic opening now that U.S. political and military resources are tied up in Europe. Moreover, Chinese leaders may have interpreted the West’s response to the Russian attack as an indication that the United States will not intervene militarily to defend a country to which it is not bound by a defense treaty, especially against a nuclear-armed adversary. As David Sacks of the Council on Foreign Relations has argued, “Chinese policymakers may conclude that Russia’s nuclear arsenal effectively deterred the United States, which would be unwilling to go to war with a nuclear power over Taiwan.”
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Hegemony is bad! › Sustainability
McCoy 22 – Alfred McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (Alfred, 2-25-2022, "Will the Fight for Hegemony Survive Climate Change?," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/environment/climate-china-usa-beijing/)//KH
A planet ever more battered by climate change, one in which neither an American nor a Chinese “century” will have any meaning, will certainly need a newly empowered world order that can supersede national sovereignty to protect the most fundamental and transcendent of all human rights: survival. The environmental changes in the offing are so profound that anything less than a new form of democratic global governance will mean not just incessant conflicts but, in all likelihood, disaster of an almost-unimaginable kind. And no surprise there, since we’ll be dealing with a planet all too literally on the brink.
Whenever you hear senior US officials tout Washington’s determination to “shape” the world order pursuant to America’s vision of all that is right and good, make sure you have your flak jacket handy. In practice, “shaping” typically culminates in exchanges of gunfire.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Hegemony is bad! › Sustainability
McCoy 22 – Alfred McCoy is the J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison (Alfred, 2-25-2022, "Will the Fight for Hegemony Survive Climate Change?," Nation, https://www.thenation.com/article/environment/climate-china-usa-beijing/)//KH
Consider us at the edge of the sort of epochal change not seen for centuries, even millennia. By the middle of this century, we will be living under such radically altered circumstances that the present decade, the 2020s, will undoubtedly seem like another era entirely, akin perhaps to the Middle Ages. And I’m not talking about the future development of flying cars, cryogenics, or even as-yet-unimaginable versions of space travel.
After leading the world for the past 75 years, the United States is ever so fitfully losing its grip on global hegemony. As Washington’s power begins to fade, the liberal international system it created by founding the United Nations in 1945 is facing potentially fatal challenges.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
Hegemony is bad! › Sustainability
Bello 22 – PhD, Princeton, sociology, professor at Cal Berkeley, former member of the Philippines House of Reps (Walden, 1-12-2022, "Bin Laden and Trump: Two Bookends to America's Imperial Decline," Foreign Policy In Focus, https://fpif.org/bin-laden-and-trump-two-bookends-to-americas-imperial-decline/)//KH
The end of 2021 and the beginning of a new year is a convenient time to take stock of the causes of America’s decline.
This past year saw both Washington’s inglorious exit from Afghanistan after 20 years in the country that had served as the launching pad for its direct military intervention in the Middle East and an historic insurrection at the very heart of the empire. Add to this the absolute lack of traction for President Biden’s recent “Democracy Summit” in contrast to Beijing’s surefooted diplomacy, the erosion of an already weak U.S. economy by COVID-19 followed by uncontrolled inflation, and the deepening of the country’s informal but very real civil war — and it is hard to avoid the sense that we are indeed at the end of an era.