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2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- AT: China War

No China rise impact – numerous checks on aggression.

Eikenberry, 15 (Karl W, retired United States Army lieutenant general who served as the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from April 2009 to July 2011, "China’s Place in U.S. Foreign Policy," , CMR)

For all its ambition, China’s strategic options are not unlimited. Indeed, its foreign policy choices are severely constrained both by formidable domestic problems and by unfavorable international factors that the United States would be wise to consider when formulating its response to China’s increasing influence.

Internally, Beijing’s leaders face an interwoven array of daunting social, environmental, economic, and political problems that, left unresolved, will limit the state’s ability to generate national power and could even threaten the Communist Party’s monopolistic grip on political and societal control. A brief look at five of these issues makes clear the severity of the situation.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- AT: China War

China can’t fight – imperial overstretch

Blumenthal, 17 - Daniel Blumenthal is director of Asian Studies at the American Enterprise Institute (“A Strategy for China’s Imperial Overstretch” The American Interest, 3/1,

Notwithstanding the facile talk of China’s “gains” from Donald Trump’s imagined withdrawal from the world, Beijing is no position to lead the world. Instead it is very close to imperial overstretch. A new U.S. strategic approach should hasten a Chinese reckoning with its geopolitical troubles.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 1ar --- AT: China is Benevolent

China’s not a benevolent hegemon – refusal to open national market, rejects free trade and island building

Danner and Martin 19 - Research Associate at the Miami-Florida Jean Monnet European Center of Excellence, Florida International University (FIU), USA, and Honorary Research Fellow at the East Asia Security Centre, Bond University, Australia, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations at Florida International University (Lukas K. and Félix E., “China's hegemonic intentions and trajectory: Will it opt for benevolent, coercive, or Dutch-style hegemony?,” Wiley Online Library, 4-18-19, , Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)

This article attempted to decipher and explain China's rise and its future direction as a significant leader in the international system. First, consistent with the benevolent-hegemon type, we observed how China's active involvement in the management of the global environment and the UN PKMs indicate this possibility. Nonetheless, these are mainly political activities rather than economic. The benevolent-hegemon type would suggest proactive and liberal sociopolitical and economic practices. Thus far, China does not appear willing and able to implement these in the immediate future. First, it refuses to open its national market fully to the foreign competitor. Second, it maintains a very tight grip on its currency value and fluctuation for narrow, selfish, national interests. Third, it rejects promoting freer and fairer trade among all actors, irrespective of their level of reciprocity. To be sure, China is a hugely wealthy actor, but one that practices a type of neomercantilist approach in the international market as evidenced by its business practices in the global economy. Second, we also observed China's island-building policy and its drive for the establishment of a Sino-Russian Entente to neutralise a potential regional and systemic enemy. These are actions that we categorise as consistent with the coercive-hegemon type, similar to the cases of Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan and in the 19th and 20th centuries, respectively.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- China is Aggressive

Russia-China alliance – now is key to prevent it

Danner and Martin 19 - Research Associate at the Miami-Florida Jean Monnet European Center of Excellence, Florida International University (FIU), USA, and Honorary Research Fellow at the East Asia Security Centre, Bond University, Australia, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations at Florida International University (Lukas K. and Félix E., “China's hegemonic intentions and trajectory: Will it opt for benevolent, coercive, or Dutch-style hegemony?,” Wiley Online Library, 4-18-19, , Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)

6.2 Model Case 2: The emerging Sino-Russian Entente as a form of coercive hegemony At the end of the Chinese Revolution in 1949, the PRC and the Soviet Union became close allies. Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Josef Stalin formally instituted this political, ideological, and military alliance by negotiating and signing the Treaty of Moscow in 1950. At this juncture, the Soviet Union was the senior partner whereas the newly established PRC was the junior member of the alliance. China was still recovering from the Japanese occupation and protracted civil war. A decade after the signing of the Moscow Treaty, it became evident that political interests and ideology were not sufficiently strong to keep these two actors together in an alliance. Thus, from 1960 onward, the Sino-Soviet split became increasingly evident and pronounced, even including a 7-month undeclared military border conflict in 1969 that exacerbated further the Sino-Soviet split. The tense rivalry and differences between these two communist actors ultimately led to a de facto end to the alliance in 1979. At this point, China's tendency to side with the West and the United States became more evident, too. It led to the official opening of relations with the United States in the same year. Already several years prior, in 1972, unofficial diplomatic ties under President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger opened the door to China. Renewed relations led to China's gradual embrace of the market economy. This decision was fundamental in China's development and economic success from the early 1980s to approximately 2014. Interestingly, though, China has grown closer to Russia more recently. 11 We identify two interconnected examples to highlight and underscore better the recent Chinese and Russian connection: First, it is China's tacit support for Russia's annexation of Crimean, and, second, the treaty on energy cooperation negotiated and signed by China and Russia concomitantly to the annexation of Crimea and the escalation of the Eastern Ukraine war in 2014. First, China's reaction to the Russian annexation of Crimea was mute (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2014). We must emphasise that before 2005, the PRC would have severely condemned and sternly opposed Russia. Russian annexation of Crimea was anathema to China's fundamental principles and priorities (Sun, 2015). On the one hand, it was a violation of sovereignty and the noninterference in the internal affairs of another country. On the other hand, the annexation challenged China directly on two additional fronts: First, its zealous commitment to defend its territory against aggression and, second, its commitment to protect minorities within Chinese borders. Notwithstanding, China remained uncharacteristically distant and quiet. Second, the media outlets reported the energy treaty with Russia as the deepening of the Sino-Russian relationship amid the Eastern Ukrainian crisis and Western sanctions against Russia. It was also a Russian carrot extended to China for its allegiance, tacit political support of the Crimea annexation, and the significant Chinese financial package. This agreement was crucial for Russian prowess at a juncture when it was simultaneously fighting an undeclared war in Eastern Ukraine and escalating its military involvement in the Syrian civil war to protect the government of its political ally, President Bashar al-Assad. In exchange for its advanced hefty financial package, Russia agreed to sell oil and natural gas at rates considerably lower than current market prices. 12 It is plausible to argue here that the PRC agreed to the terms of the 2014 energy agreement on two grounds. First, the economic benefits accruing to China were too vast and attractive to ignore. Second, the agreement granted the PRC the first opportunity and greatest satisfaction to become the senior partner in the Sino-Russian alliance since the signing of the Treaty of Moscow in 1950, when the Soviet Union was the senior partner. The trend in China's international relations examined thus far would suggest a Chinese move toward revisionism, aggressiveness, and coerciveness insofar as the PRC condoned Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. Besides, China and Russia appear to share their opposition against united actions by the West's politico-military alliance. The Sino-Russian universal resistance against the West seems to be supported by evidence from the West's sanctions against Russia in the aftermath of the Eastern Ukrainian crisis. China's reaction suggests that it is preparing the grounds in case of future challenges to its rise by the West. It appears as if China is signalling to the West and the entire world that it is prepared to defend its place among great powers, even if it entails the use of force and mass violence. Such actions are consistent with the violent ascent of rising great powers in the history of the world such as Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan. From this vantage point, the previous analysis suggests that China is on track to follow the footsteps of those other yesteryear revisionists and coercive rising hegemons.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- China is Aggressive

Island Building

Danner and Martin 19 - Research Associate at the Miami-Florida Jean Monnet European Center of Excellence, Florida International University (FIU), USA, and Honorary Research Fellow at the East Asia Security Centre, Bond University, Australia, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations at Florida International University (Lukas K. and Félix E., “China's hegemonic intentions and trajectory: Will it opt for benevolent, coercive, or Dutch-style hegemony?,” Wiley Online Library, 4-18-19, , Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)

6.1 Model Case 1: Island building in the South China Sea as a form of Coercive hegemony China continued to pursue through 2018 an aggressive strategy to expand and maintain a foothold in the South China Sea. It claimed rocks, islets, and archipelagos in this body of water to enlarge its maritime territory and reach deep into Southeast Asia, close to the Malacca Strait. China achieved this objective at the expense of several Southeast Asian states who also claim jurisprudence in this area. These are Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. These states' claims clash with China's in the area that the Chinese refer to as the “Nine-Dash-Line.” China bases its territorial claim on historical maps, albeit they are not entirely conclusive. A 2016 verdict by an International Tribunal based in The Hague ruled negatively against China: In a case where the Philippines filed a complaint against Chinese conduct disregarding its maritime borders, the verdict ruled against China and in favour of the Philippines. China, of course, ignored and disavowed the ruling, as well as making clear that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the matter (Phillips, Holmes, & Bowcott, 2016). China has gone beyond publicly announcing its territorial claim. Instead, it has actively started to produce real and tangible facts by engaging in the process of “island building.” The construction process begins by China taking an islet, which sometimes is not larger than a rock, and transferring building materials via ship to create helipads, harbours, and airstrips. Some have compared these artificial islands with sort of China's stationary aircraft carriers. China wants to send a loud and clear signal to regional neighbours and the rest of the world, particularly to other great powers. It wants to underscore its maritime territorial claims, with absolute and full vigour and unwavering resolve. Hence, rather than leaving unperturbed uninhabited and partially submerged islands, rocks, and islets, without any physical signs of territorial claim and sovereignty, China builds this new-aged military bases. These are all projections of China's geostrategic reach. China's fortification drive and island-building program in the South China Sea is consistent with revisionist and coercive policies. It deliberately revises borders. This trend is reminiscent of the violent rising by other great powers in history. France, Germany, and Imperial Japan in the 18th and 20th centuries, respectively, pursued such territorial expansion and aggressive practice. This aggressive territorial expansion constitutes the type of evidence that many analysts will cease on to conclude that China is on a collision course with other great powers and neighbours. The policy will lead to diplomatic and possibly military conflict over these territories. In this sense, it will be a harbinger of China's violent rise.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- No Mindset Shift

Ceding to China destroys US influence AND no mindset shift – policymakers are locked in

Layne 18 - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, , Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)

The lock-in strategy also assumes that if the Pax Americana’s institutions are reformed, Beijing (and other non-western emerging powers) will find it more attractive to remain in the post-1945 international order than to overturn it. That assumption, however, is logically flawed: achieving lock-in by reforming the existing international order presumes that the United States can have its cake (preserving the Pax Americana) and eat it too (reforming the current international system’s legacy institutions). But, as we all know, when the cake is eaten, it’s gone. Reform—at least, any kind of reform that would appeal to China—would mean the United States yielding significant power in international institutions to accommodate Beijing. However, doing so would reduce US ability to shape outcomes, diminish Washington’s voice in international institutions, and impose constraints on US autonomy in foreign and domestic policy.79 As University of Birmingham lecturer Sevasti-Eleni Vezirgiannidou observes with respect to insti- tutional reform: ‘It is questionable whether this will really preserve US influence or rather, on the contrary, diminish it, as the United States will have to share power in a reformed order and thus will be restricted in its ability to act unilaterally.’80 The US foreign policy establishment may talk the talk of reforming the interna- tional order (and the institutions that underpin it), but it is doubtful it will walk the walk with respect to reform, because that would mean accepting a downsized American role in international politics. On the contrary, Washington’s opposition to the AIIB indicates that the United States is not prepared to see its influence in the international order diminished. And, with respect to reforming the post-1945 international order to accommodate the reality of a risen China, this is the nub of the problem: instead of preserving the Pax Americana, reform would lead to changes in the international order that would undermine it. Of course, regardless of whether there is institutional reform, the coming decades are likely to witness major changes in the international order irrespective of America’s preferences.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- Deterrence Works

The perception of resolve is a greater predictor of how war starts than any other factor – China prioritizes it over capabilities

Mastro 15-an assistant professor of security studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Why Chinese Assertiveness is Here to Stay”, The Washington Quarterly, 21 Jan 2015, italics in original

These efforts are commendable—the United States rightly works to preserve its military superiority and retain its ability to project power in the region. During the Cold War, when the greatest pacing threats were land conflicts, forward deploying U.S. forces in Europe and Asia were sufficient to demonstrate the credibility of the U.S. commitment to peace in those regions. But China is currently testing the waters not because its leaders are uncertain about the balance of power, but because they are probing the balance of resolve. This means that staying ahead in terms of military might is insufficient in contemporary East Asia.

China’s strategists are betting that the side with the strongest military does not necessarily win the war—the foundation of the deterrent pillar of its A2/AD strategy. Indeed, China’s experience in fighting the Korean War proves that a country willing to sacrifice blood and treasure can overcome a technologically superior opponent. The belief that balance of resolve drives outcomes more so than the balance of power is the foundation of China’s new, more assertive strategy; but U.S. responses to date have failed to account for it. Canned demonstrations of U.S. power fail to address the fundamental uncertainty concerning U.S. willingness, not ability, to fight.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- China Leadership Fails

No other power can replace the US – retrenchment guarantees global conflict

Haass, 17 – president of the Council on Foreign Relations (Richard, “America and the Great Abdication” The Atlantic, 12/28, http://www.washingtonspeakers.com/images/pdfs/America%20and%20the%20Great%20Abdication%20-%20The%20Atlantic.pdf

An optimist would also hope that other countries would pick up where the United States left off in promoting international order. The fact is, though, that there is no alternative great power willing and able to step in and assume what has been the U.S. role. China is often suggested, but its leadership is focused mostly on consolidating domestic order and maintaining artificially high rates of economic growth, lest there be popular unrest. China’s interest in regional and global institutions (including both its regional trade mechanism and its “One Belt, One Road” infrastructure initiative) seems more designed to bolster its economy and influence than to help set rules and arrangements that would be broadly beneficial. China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea (including its rejection of an international legal ruling challenging its claims) and its unwillingness to do all it could to rein in North Korea casts further doubts as to its readiness to fill the shoes of the United States.

There is no other candidate. Russia under Vladimir Putin is a country with a narrowly based economy that is focused on retaining power at home, reestablishing Russian influence in the Middle East and Europe, and interfering in the internal politics of Western democracies. It is mostly a spoiler prepared to use those instruments of power it possesses (military, energy, and cyber) to advance its aims. India is preoccupied with the challenge of economic development and is tied down by its problematic relationship with Pakistan. Japan is held back by its declining population, domestic constraints, and the suspicions of its neighbors. Europe is limited in what it can do by a lack of defense capability, and is distracted by questions revolving around the relationship between member states and the EU. The cold truth is that the alternative to a U.S.–led international order is less international order.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- China Leadership Fails

Chinese leadership fails and can’t replace the US

Beeson, 17 - Professor of International Politics at Murdoch University in Perth, Western Australia (Mark, “Why Has Leadership in the Asia–Pacific Proved So Elusive?” Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev. (2017) 2:567–581 https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111-017-0074-y

Paradoxically enough, however, in the aftermath of the election of Donald Trump, China has emerged as an unexpected champion of ‘globalization’. In part, this reflects a recognition on the part of China’s leaders that the country has been one of the principal beneficiaries of an open international economic order. At the same time, however, Xi (2017) in particular clearly sees an opportunity for China to reposition itself as precisely the sort of ‘responsible stakeholder’ that some have long called for (Zoellick 2005). At a time when the Trump administration seems to be abandoning the traditional American role in favor of a more instrumental, nationalistic approach to trade and even security policy (Browne 2017; Hodge 2017), Chinese officials have been quick to seize the moment and the initiative.

There are, however, continuing constraints confronting China that raise real questions about its ability to offer a leadership at the regional, much less the global level. First, the extant international order will not be easily replaced, nor will America’s role within it. The fact remains that the US is still the world’s preeminent economic and military power, albeit one with diminished status and damaged authority. Second, China has shown little desire or capacity to articulate an alternative vision for the international system, thus far, and seems willing to work within existing institutional architecture and avoid the costs associated with leadership (Wang and French 2014). Third, leaders need followers, and at this stage—despite an apparently growing diplomatic influence in Southeast Asia—it has few allies and friends. Indeed, the fourth point to make is that China’s continuing pursuit of its own nationalistic goals, especially its claims in the South China Sea dispute, look certain to make its future relations and role divisive and contentious.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- China Leadership Fails

China’s overreliance on economic power prevents it from effectively exercising leadership

Zhao, 18 – Suisheng Zhao is professor and director of the Center for China-US Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver (“A Revisionist Stakeholder: China and the Post-World War II World Order” Journal of Contemporary China, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2018.1458029

Beijing’s overreliance on its economic prowess as the key diplomatic instrument reveals the shortage of normative power. Despite its growing economic and military might, China’s efforts to use economic ties to influence other state’s behavior have only achieved limited success because money cannot buy loyalty. Influence does not simply derive from a country’s coffers. While closer economic ties are important, they are hardly sufficient to build strong trust between countries—especially those with conflicting security interests. This is clearly reflected in China’s relationship with Japan, characterized as hot economics and cold politics. it is reflected in China’s relations with North Korea, a country that is widely perceived as economically dependent on China for its own survival but has often taken actions against China’s strategic interests. To play a global leadership role, China has to build the ability to inspire other countries to share its vision. The leadership will not work itself out only through economic ties. Building common identity and value is equally, if not more, important.

Unable to construct shared values, China may change nothing of substance in the global order. While China’s insistence on the Westphalian principles looks attractive to some countries where intense interventionism by the US often ends in chaos and chronic instability, many of China’s neighbors view China’s great power aspiration with a wary eye, worrying that, as Chinese power rises, China’s imperial past can produce an undue pressure on its leaders to restore the old Chinese hierarchical order. One reporter took note that at the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference that gave birth to the Five-Principles, only two notable leaders turned up. One was President Xi, who used the occasion to portray China as the leader of the non-western world. The other was Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who suggested that the threat to the sovereignty of smaller countries no longer came from the West.50

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- China Leadership Fails

Chinese leadership fails – the US is successful

Zhao, 18 – Suisheng Zhao is professor and director of the Center for China-US Cooperation at Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver (“A Revisionist Stakeholder: China and the Post-World War II World Order” Journal of Contemporary China, DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2018.1458029

But China is not ready. First, as one Chinese scholar admitted, ‘China does not have the comprehensive national strength to change the current global order led by the US and other Western countries for more than 70 years’.41 A fragile rising power much weaker than most outsiders think, China is a middle-income country, facing immense internal hurdles, such as the environmental destruction, rampant corruption, inequality, and huge local government debt, all of which have the potential to derail its rise. Preoccupied by mounting challenges, Chinese leaders have to fight an uphill battle to mobilize resources and internal support for the global leadership role. China is far from achieving the donor status of many OECD countries. For one prominent Chinese scholar, the most dangerous challenge is the extreme-leftist policy-line and ‘the false-large-empty’ (假大空) slogans, making international promises and setting strategic objectives beyond the reach of China’s national strength.42 China’s international initiatives do not play a critical role in China’s rise but are the consequences of its rise.

Although some scholars have claimed that the US power was declining so that the post-World War II order was suffering from an acute case of Anno Domini, they may have to recant their predictions. With the world’s largest concentration of capital and technology, the US remains the most powerful nation. China has faster GDP growth than the US, but its net national wealth, i.e. the resources available to pursue national interests, is still not in America’s league. From 2000–2012, Chinese net wealth jumped from $4.66 trillion to $21.7 trillion. American net wealth over the same period rose from $42.3 trillion to $67.5 trillion. From 2012 to 2017, while Chinese net wealth climbed to $29 trillion, American net wealth reached to over $93 trillion. Claiming that China is about to eclipse the US is untenable in the face of $64 trillion less in net wealth. The resource advantage rests overwhelmingly with the US.43

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac --- China Great Power War

The risk of great power war is high – it could cause nuclear escalation

Brands, 18 – Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Hal, “Great-Power Rivalry Is Back. The U.S. Is Playing Poorly.” Bloomberg View, 2/28,

Having reconstituted its military power, Russia has been reasserting its dominance along its Central Asian and Eastern European peripheries, challenging NATO and undermining the European Union, and projecting its military power deep into the Middle East -- all in addition to seeking to weaken and divide the U.S. through information warfare and other means.

Riding an economic and military rise unprecedented in modern history, China has been seeking to re-establish its former mastery in the Asia-Pacific and perhaps eventually compete with the U.S. on a global scale as well. All this is normal enough; it is the warp and woof of great-power rivalry. Yet it has uniquely dangerous implications for the U.S. and the international system it leads.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- AT: China Tech Inevitable

China tech is not inevitable--- regulations killed the industry.

James Cooper and Kashyap Kompella [James Cooper is professor of law and director of International Legal Studies at California Western School of Law in San Diego and a research fellow at Singapore University of Social Sciences Kashyap Kompella, a technology industry analyst, is CEO of RPA2AI, a global artificial intelligence advisory firm, The Hill, “No, China is not winning the AI race,” https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/592270-no-china-is-not-winning-the-ai-race///ZW]

The global competition between the United States and China continues apace. Technology is rightly seen as providing unique leverage to win this geopolitical race. The U.S. long has been the global technology powerhouse, but not surprisingly, we have heard much about the Chinese government’s ambition to dominate high-tech industries such as 5G telecommunications, autonomous vehicles, blockchain, and semiconductor chips. In this light, as a horizontal technology that can be applied across all sectors, artificial intelligence (AI) has become a strategic priority and the Chinese focus on superiority in this field is touted as something about which the U.S. should be concerned. Some have gone so far as to conclude that the West has already lost the AI race. Don’t believe the hype. To be sure, the availability of large amounts of data is at the heart of AI success. It is tempting to think that less-democratic regimes that amass huge amounts of data about their citizens and have scant regard for privacy can develop better AI systems using that data. However, all other things being equal, better and higher quality AI systems emerge from countries with strong data privacy and data protection regulations because AI systems must undergo greater scrutiny during their development and deployment. An example of this can be seen in the United States regarding fair lending practices and consumer protection from credit bureaus. Further, the market for AI is global, and such high-quality AI systems find buyers in other countries as well. Around the globe, Big Tech’s rising power has resulted in calls for more oversight. In a drastic move that stunned the industry and analysts alike, the Chinese government recently rewrote the rulebook for the country’s technology industry. In effect, China is vacating entire swaths of digital and creative industries, arenas that serve as training grounds and talent factories for other industries. This more restrictive approach may not bode well for China’s AI industry in the long term. China may find itself constrained on the extent of automation and AI in its manufacturing sector — labor-intensive manufacturing remains China’s main strength, and a high degree of automation can result in job losses, labor unrest, and instability. Meanwhile, there is bipartisan support for AI in the United States. Former President Trump proposed increasing funding for AI development through the National Science Foundation. The National AI Initiative Act of 2020 signaled a sense of urgency and suggested that several federal agencies create a national strategy on artificial intelligence. The Biden administration has formed the Artificial Intelligence Research Resource Task Force to develop a roadmap to foment AI research and spark innovation nationwide. There is draft legislation, at both the state and federal level, to promote responsible use of AI and prevent its misuse. Strong objections to the use of facial recognition and other AI systems by law enforcement in the U.S., raised by civil liberties advocates, have led some local authorities, such as the City of San Francisco, to ban such systems. To use a Silicon Valley phrase, these debates are “not a bug, but a feature.” They shine a light on the limitations of AI systems and help to set the “rules of the road” for proper use of AI. This will establish the U.S. as a global leader in AI regulation, once lawmakers and regulators do their work. China, meanwhile, has faced strong global criticism for using facial recognition software to monitor and surveil Uyghurs in its Xinjiang region. China has outlined a set of AI ethics principles, but the jury is still out on enforcement and how they function in practice. The increasing number of AI research papers and patents by Chinese researchers is often cited as proof that China has caught up with the United States in this field. The increased focus is good for the Chinese AI ecosystem, and it will help them solve China-specific problems. But dominance in this emerging strategic industry is not guaranteed. The U.S. has several strategic advantages, including: the strengths of its higher education and research institutes, which attract the best STEM talent from across the world; the largest venture capital ecosystem; and the largest number of technology unicorns (start-ups with private valuations greater than $1 billion). China is not overtaking the U.S. in artificial intelligence. The current evidence and trajectory paint a clear picture: The conditions for AI to flourish, such as incentives to experiment, freedom to pursue opportunities without restrictions, and the coming guardrails to prevent misuse, favor U.S. leadership. This is still the United States’s game to lose — though maybe both countries could win through collaboration. To solve planet-scale problems such as climate change, we are going to need AI solutions from both competitors.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- AT: AI Impact

The benefits of AI outweigh the risks.

Daniel Joseph 05-14-2016 [Writing for PH, PH, “Artificial Intelligence Danger: Are Fears Over AI Exaggerated? IBM Scientist Explains Benefits of AI,” https://www.parentherald.com/articles/43575/20160514/artificial-intelligence-panic-fears-ai-exaggerated-ibm-scientist-explains.htm//ZW]

The progression of artificial intelligence has made many notable people concerned. Alphabet CEO Larry Page noted how artificial intelligence will change how we think about jobs; Telsa Motors and SpaceX CEO Elon Musk commented on the existential threat posed by artificial intelligence; and Bill Gates also expressed his concern about super-intelligent machines. However, Murray Campbell, IBM research scientist and senior manager, says that fears over the progression of artificial intelligence have become "overblown." He also noted that there are plenty of benefits that humans could gain from having super advanced artificial intelligence. "Because the benefits are so huge, that if we don't use AI technologies we're going to be losing out on all of these beneficial effects in health care, in self-driving cars, in education," Campbell told Time. The scientist also added that workers and employees who have artificial intelligence as their work assistant can become more effective and efficient with their jobs. Clarifying the uses of artificial intelligence in the enterprise https://t.co/4cRDban3Af — TechCrunch (@TechCrunch) May 12, 2016 But will people lose potential jobs due to advanced artificial intelligence? Campbell explained that new technology always takes away human jobs but creates new opportunities as well. He added that the biggest danger is not following up on advancing artificial intelligence because humans could really lose out on all of the benefits of this new technology. However, there are many aspects of artificial intelligence that scientists and researchers need to figure out better. "I think it's worthwhile to think about these research questions around AI and ethics, and AI and safety," Campbell explained. Because of the increase in interest regarding artificial intelligence, the White House has announced four public workshops about the technology. These workshops will focus on the potential pros and cons of using advanced artificial intelligence, Fortune reports.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- AT: AI Impact

China can’t develop AI--- lack of innovative talent and restrictive legislation.

Michael Wade and Amanda Bris 10-2018 [Wade is director of the Global Center for Digital Business Transformation at IMD, Amanda Bris is a computer science student at Boston College and Chief Information Officer at Canor, and was an intern at the IMD Global Center for Digital Business Transformation, IMD, “The Chinese AI Innovation Chasm, https://www.imd.org/research-knowledge/articles/the-chinese-AI-innovation-chasm///ZW]

The Chinese AI advantage Leading economies in the world understand the importance of artificial intelligence (AI) in generating economic growth. China is no exception. In July 2017, the Chinese State Council declared that AI was a top priority and created the Next Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan to catch up with the West by 2020 and overtake it by 2025. Investment is not only coming from the government. In April 2018, SenseTime Group Ltd, backed by Alibaba, became the world’s most valuable AI start/up, having raised $600 million. By 2030, it is predicted that AI will increase China’s GDP by 26.1%. In addition to massive investment, China has other distinct characteristics that put it at an advantage in the development of AI. With more than 700 million internet users, China has a clear advantage in data volume that can be used to train AI-learning algorithms. Its unique brand of socialist market economy gives the government substantial control over market forces, creating a closer cooperation between businesses and the government, and giving Beijing economic leverage to expand its AI initiatives across many industries. Additionally, China has relatively few privacy protection laws, providing the government with extensive access to consumer data, a key to AI development. China’s innovation talent gap Despite heavy investment and easy access to data, however, we believe China will struggle to realize its AI ambitions. The main obstacle for AI development in China is not lack of funding, but lack of innovative talent. China is not short on raw technical talent – quite the opposite. The number of STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) graduates has been particularly explosive as part of the government’s push to develop a technical workforce. In 2013, 40 percent of Chinese graduates finished a degree in STEM, more than twice the U.S. average. Nevertheless, we believe that AI advancements will plateau as China struggles with its lack of innovative talent. This limiting factor cannot be easily overcome by government legislation, as it must be fostered through a culture of entrepreneurship, something that the country is sorely missing. In recent years, China has been importing its AI talent from overseas. According to LinkedIn’s Global AI Talent report published in July 2017, 44% of the overseas AI talent working in China comes from the US, followed by the UK and France as the second and third source countries. Roughly 90% of AI positions advertised in Mainland China go unfilled unless companies offer them to overseas workers. The number of Chinese AI job postings on LinkedIn surged from about 50,000 in 2014 to 440,000 in 2016, according to Wang Di, vice-president of LinkedIn China. China ranked 40th and 31st out of 63 countries in the IMD World Talent Report and Digital Competitiveness Report, respectively. Educational barriers The Chinese AI innovation chasm Inhibiting creativity starts in school and carries through higher education. Jack Ma, founder of the Alibaba Group, suggests that the Chinese education system does not give students enough time to have fun, explore and experiment. It is often in these moments that great ideas are born. Chinese students, especially at university level, are so consumed by academics that they rarely get an opportunity to experiment with outside-the-classroom learning and growth. A study conducted by researchers from Kyungpook National University in South Korea to analyze creativity in Chinese and Korean universities concluded that Chinese students at top-ranked institutions were less creative than those at less prestigious institutions. Once they enter the workforce, these graduates struggle to step out of their disciplined and rigidly structured environment. As a consequence, they tend to produce superficial, mechanical innovations that require little imagination. Students who enter top Chinese universities, through China’s brutal Gaokao entrance exams, have their creativity muted by a system that rewards rote memorization over original thinking. While China produces twice as many college graduates as the United States, it fails to cultivate entrepreneurial and creative spirit in these highly educated workers. Overcoming cultural barriers Culture also plays an important role. Whereas risk-taking and entrepreneurship are woven into the fabric of many Western cultures, the Chinese mentality is imbued with unity, obedience and reputation. Both China’s current communist system and its ancient culture have long stressed the importance of social cohesion. Rather than prioritizing their own interests, people are encouraged to think collectively, placing the majority over the individual. The stress placed on saving face means that people are scared to take risks out of fear of damaging their social standing. These powerful cultural norms are a threat to the development of courageousness in innovation, which is a necessary condition for creating new ideas. Moreover, Confucianism highlights the importance of showing obedience to superiors. Thus, workers will often blindly follow their leaders without question. These cultural factors thus become a limitation to what Chinese companies can produce qualitatively. It cannot help that, because of government censorship, AI researchers in China do not have access to key research tools, like Google. Chinese digital giants, like Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu, have compensated for these cultural barriers with speed and agility. Frequent tiny, incremental changes can add up to large innovations over time. Tencent’s WeChat started out as a direct copy of WhatsApp, but through thousands of rounds of iterative improvement, it has become something much more impressive. However, AI is unchartered territory, and innovations tend to be less linear than for apps, games, and marketplaces. It is unlikely that Chinese giants can use fast, incremental approaches to compensate for a lack of AI innovation. Crossing the AI Innovation Chasm China has the potential to become the preeminent global superpower in AI innovation. Money and other resources are available and its people have boundless intellectual capacity. At the moment, however, the cultural climate with respect to innovation is very restrictive. By fostering creativity from an early age, and reducing structural barriers, China’s model for AI development would become more sustainable. Heavy R&D investment will boost the economy for a while, but a continued lack of innovative talent may leave it at standstill.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- AT: AI Impact

Chinese tech control causes extinction.

Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig 2019 [Ash Jain is a senior fellow with the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, where he oversees the Atlantic Council’s Democratic Order Initiative and D10 Strategy Forum, Dr. Matthew Kroenig is the deputy director for strategy in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. In this role, he supports the director in overseeing all aspects of the Center’s work and manages its strategy practice area, Atlantic Council Strategy Papers, “Present at the Re-Creation: A Global Strategy for Revitalizing, Adopting, and Defending a Rules-Based International System, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Present-at-the-Recreation.pdf//ZW]

Yet, AI is also transforming economies and societies, and generating new security challenges. Automation will lead to widespread unemployment. The final realization of driverless cars, for example, will put out of work millions of taxi, Uber, and long-haul truck drivers. Populist movements in the West have been driven by those disaffected by globalization and technology, and mass unemployment caused by automation will further grow those ranks and provide new fuel to grievance politics. Moreover, some fear that autonomous weapons systems will become “killer robots” that select and engage targets without human input, and could eventually turn on their creators, resulting in human extinction. The other technologies on this list similarly balance great potential upside with great downside risk. 3D printing, for example, can be used to “make anything anywhere,” reducing costs for a wide range of manufactured goods and encouraging a return of local manufacturing industries.61 At the same time, advanced 3D printers can also be used by revisionist and rogue states to print component parts for advanced weapons systems or even WMD programs, spurring arms races and weapons proliferation.62 Genetic engineering can wipe out entire classes of disease through improved medicine, or wipe out entire classes of people through genetically engineered superbugs. Directed-energy missile defenses may defend against incoming missile attacks, while also undermining global strategic stability. Perhaps the greatest risk to global strategic stability from new technology, however, comes from the risk that revisionist autocracies may win the new tech arms race. Throughout history, states that have dominated the commanding heights of technological progress have also dominated international relations. The United States has been the world’s innovation leader from Edison’s light bulb to nuclear weapons and the Internet. Accordingly, stability has been maintained in Europe and Asia for decades because the United States and its democratic allies possessed a favorable economic and military balance of power in those key regions. Many believe, however, that China may now have the lead in the new technologies of the twenty-first century, including AI, quantum, 5G, hypersonic missiles, and others. If China succeeds in mastering the technologies of the future before the democratic core, then this could lead to a drastic and rapid shift in the balance of power, upsetting global strategic stability, and the call for a democratic-led, rules-based system outlined in these pages.63 The United States and its democratic allies need to work with other major powers to develop a framework for harnessing emerging technology in a way that maximizes its upside potential, while mitigating against its downside risks, and also contributing to the maintenance of global stability. The existing international order contains a wide range of agreements for harnessing the technologies of the twentieth century, but they need to be updated for the twenty-first century. The world needs an entire new set of arms-control, nonproliferation, export-control, and other agreements to exploit new technology while mitigating downside risk. These agreements should seek to maintain global strategic stability among the major powers, and prevent the proliferation of dangerous weapons systems to hostile and revisionist states.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- AT: AI Impact

They’ve got it backwards--- AI singularity solves threats.

Rick Hayes-Roth 10-02-2006 [Rick Hayes-Roth is a professor in the Information Sciences Dept. at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, “Puppetry vs. Creationism: Why AI Must Cross the Chasm,” https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/1705420/authors#authors//ZW]

Most of the visions for self-modifying and self-improving AI have been a bit scary or a bit shallow. Much discussion has occurred around the concept of the singularity, first explained by Vernor Vinge2 and now a theme popularized by Ray Kurzweil,3 among others (for example, see www.aleph. so/Trans/Global/Singularity). Roughly, the singularity is a point in history when technology accelerates beyond human capacity to master it. With regard to AI, this could mean that computers learn and communicate with one another faster than they can with humans. At that point, they might not be willing to slow down or engage further. In such a case, the machines would reach a kind of escape velocity, enabling them to leave human culture behind. I'm suggesting that we should actively seek to create the capabilities underlying such a possibility, because the potential gains are exponentially greater than what traditional puppetry can produce. But this surely entails risks, as readily suggested in most of the scary movies about rogue AI and robots gone haywire. We obviously have limited insight into both the positive and negative capabilities of self-improving AI systems. Although the road will be somewhat long, we ought to consider ways to identify and mitigate the risks before they afflict us. Fortunately, many people interested in the singularity and future visions of robots have given these issues serious consideration. We'll want to incorporate their ideas and related technologies into the new creationism agenda. This will help prevent predictable problems and provide additional insurance against the unforeseen. Although I consider these risks serious, I think we can de-emphasize or defer them a bit. To get out of the puppetry business will require a major shift in investment, orientation, and technology. By focusing mostly on the required new capacities for model-based learning and improvements in operational contexts, we put first things first. Like the master puppet makers of the classic folktales, AI engineers have built some marvelous machines. These machines are surely valuable, but our puppetry won't cross the chasm separating us from a world of artificially intelligent creatures. To get there, we need a singularity of artificial creationism, where we launch artificial beings that can adapt, learn, and evolve. We need to emphasize the development of continuously self-improving systems that interact with and perform tasks in the physical world. Creation of those systems will mark a singularity in the punctuated evolution of artificial intelligence.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- China Regs Don’t Work

New regulations create steep barriers for tech companies.

Ellen Lu and Ryan Fedasiuk 12-13-2021 [Ellen Lu is a research assistant at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University, Ryan Fedasiuk is a research analyst at the Center for Security and Emerging Technology at Georgetown University, The Diplomat, “Will China’s Regulatory “Great Wall” Hamper AI Ambitions,” https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/will-chinas-regulatory-great-wall-hamper-ai-ambitions///ZW]

In September the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) announced a three-year plan to regulate predictive algorithms, and Chinese companies scrambled to comply with new regulations. News of the plan came on the heels of two other stringent policies – the Data Security Law (DSL) and Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) – which were passed earlier this year and came into full effect in November. China’s push for data security and algorithmic governance should be viewed as a new chapter in the country’s storied attempts to regulate the technology sector. In all likelihood, these moves will minimally affect state security bureaus’ data collection capabilities, but will create steep compliance costs for internet companies that could hamper the state’s long-term development goals. The DSL is designed to curtail invasive data collection by Chinese tech companies. Specifically, it restricts the collection of data by Chinese companies within and outside of China that may “harm the national security or public interests of the PRC.” Given the ambiguous nature of the law, many Chinese companies have erred on the side of over-compliance, rather than risk facing exorbitant penalties – which range from $1,000 to over $150,000, and may result in the suspension or revocation of a business’ license. The PIPL imposes even more day-to-day compliance costs on Chinese tech companies that work with personal data. Under the law, Chinese companies are now obligated to create cybersecurity teams, conduct training sessions, and classify data according to the potential for national security threat. The sweeping regulatory framework consists of 74 articles, and it applies to any company that handles individual Chinese citizens’ personal information. Taken collectively, the DSL and PIPL should be viewed as a new chapter in Beijing’s push to regulate the Chinese technology sector. At first glance, the steep limits they place on data collection stand at odds with Beijing’s long-standing ambition to become the world leader in AI by 2030. But the laws’ long-term effects will hinge on two hotly debated questions about how China’s national tech champions interact with the state. The first question is whether the new regulations will actually apply to China’s “national AI champions,” or whether the special relationship between big tech and the state might exempt them from the most onerous requirements. On the one hand, the Communist Party under Xi Jinping seems adamant about curtailing the massive power China’s tech companies have accumulated over the past decade, and is using these data governance regulations to reassert control. For their part, investors do expect China’s internet titans to take a hit. Immediately after the DSL was passed, the Hang Seng Tech index measured a 2.5 percent decrease in China’s largest internet and e-commerce stocks, to include those of Tencent and Alibaba, amounting to a loss equivalent to tens of billions of U.S. dollars. In the same month, when China’s most popular ride sharing app Didi Chuxing filed for an IPO on the New York Stock Exchange, Chinese regulators yanked it from app stores, citing violations of DSL’s data security regulations. The company has since lost 30 percent of users and seen its share value decline by more than 40 percent. On the other hand, however, the Chinese government has historically relied on Chinese internet giants Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent to aid in intelligence and police work, by collecting and processing troves of information these companies collect about Chinese netizens. Through Article 7 of China’s National Intelligence Law, Article 77 of the National Security Law, and Article 28 of the Cybersecurity Law, the government is able to deputize internet companies to assist with intelligence gathering. The codependent relationship between Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and Chinese security services could imply that China’s AI champions are too big to regulate. But if they are subject to the full force of the DSL and PIPL, the second question is whether the limitations set out in these laws will materially limit Chinese tech giants’ ability to collect and process data at scale. Neither the DSL nor PIPL constrains data collection by China’s state security apparatus – only internet and data companies. But it’s not clear to what extent state security offices rely on data collected data in-house or outsourced to these firms. If public security bureaus have immediate and unfiltered access to the collection platforms operated by private companies, as has been claimed about Huawei 5G platforms and Lenovo computers, then the government would have little incentive to spare Chinese AI companies from stringent restrictions on data collection. But, because of their special relationship with the state, it’s possible that China’s internet companies will benefit from data collected and provided by Chinese security services to continue their AI development. Under the auspices of China’s national security and cybersecurity laws, Chinese businesses are compelled to work with the state’s security apparatus. Companies that handle data related to “national security” are further required to allow the Ministry of State Security access to their companies’ servers. Even if Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent face data collection limitations, they could theoretically continue to rely on data provided by Chinese security services to fine-tune their AI products. Although it’s not clear how exactly China’s large internet companies may be affected by new regulations on data and algorithms, the composition of China’s private tech industry will be fundamentally altered. The DSL and PIPL will make it substantially harder for existing businesses to continue operating with the same degree of autonomy they had enjoyed in the past, and may create steep barriers for new players hoping to enter China’s tech market.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- China Regs Don’t Work

China led AI strangles innovation---American standards are key.

Arijit Sengupta 09-15-21 [Founder and CEO of Aible, Fast Company, “China’s new proposed law could strangle the development of AI,” https://www.fastcompany.com/90676516/china-ai-law-problems//ZW]

China’s internet watchdog, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC), recently issued a draft proposal of regulations to manage how technology companies use algorithms when providing services to consumers. The proposed law mandates that companies must use algorithms to “actively spread positive energy.” Under the proposal, companies must submit their algorithms to the government for approval or risk being fined and having their service terminated. This is an incredibly bad and even dangerous idea. It’s what happens when people who don’t understand AI try to regulate AI. Instead of fostering innovation, governments are looking at AI through their unique lenses of fear and trying to reduce the harm they worry about most. Thus, western regulators focus on fears such as violation of privacy, while Chinese regulators are perfectly okay with collecting private data on their citizens but are concerned about AI’s ability to influence people in ways deemed undesirable by the government. If the Chinese law is adopted, it will create a lengthy bureaucratic process that will likely ensure that no small company or startup will survive or even enter the market. The moment you allow government regulators to be the final arbiters of what emerging technologies can and cannot do, you’ve strangled innovation. The only people who will profit under such a law are large companies that can invest in unproductive bureaucratic activities due to massive cash reserves and bad actors because they’ll ignore regulators and do whatever they want. Cash-starved startups who wish to follow the law will be most disadvantaged by this approach. China is not alone in taking bureaucratic approaches to AI. In April, the European Union released a draft Artificial Intelligence Act that would ban certain AI practices outright and mandate that AI applications deemed “high risk” meet strict data governance and risk management requirements. This includes requirements on testing, training, and validating algorithms, ensuring human oversight, and meeting standards of accuracy, robustness, and cybersecurity. Businesses would need to prove that their AI systems conform with these requirements before placing them on the European market. Imposing algorithm requirements or requiring companies to justify approaches can sound less onerous than the outright banning of technologies. The reality is that in either case, startups do not have the resources to participate in such bureaucratic slow processes. Smaller companies will be forced out of the arena even though they are most likely to create true innovations in this space. Imagine a world where startups had to get patents on their technology before building their software. Only about half of U.S. patents are approved, which is not terrible, but it takes about two years for approval to come through. Algorithms are more difficult to examine than patents—especially deep learning algorithms which very few experts understand. Based on the lengthy timelines in the patent office, we can surmise that algorithm approval processes are likely to take longer than two years. This is simply not fast enough: Technology in a rapidly evolving space like AI would already be outdated by the time it was approved. Any approach that involves regulators preapproving algorithms would strangle innovation in this space. There’s another reason why such legislation would be more onerous for small companies. For startups reliant on venture capital investments, typical funding cycles are 18 months long, which means that investors expect to see tangible results from the investment in less than 18 months. Thus, current investment approaches would not support waiting years to get algorithms approved before launching a product. While some VCs may adopt a different investment approach, similar to medical investments for example, many entrepreneurs would simply turn away from AI and pursue other opportunities. The U.S. is in a unique position to get AI guidelines right. While China and the European Union outline ever-stricter guidelines banning certain types of AI, the U.S. has an opportunity to establish ethical guidelines without inhibiting innovation. The only appropriate approach to regulating AI is one where we make our societal goals clear from the start and hold companies liable if they violate those goals. For example, we don’t force every company to undergo Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) inspections before being able to operate. However, labor safety expectations are enshrined in law and violators are prosecuted. If companies find alternative approaches to keeping their employees safe, they are not penalized as long as the societal goals are achieved. Giving government regulators the power to limit broad technology categories is not the approach that built the internet or the smartphone. That’s why the U.S. should tackle AI regulation by making our societal goals clear and giving organizations flexibility in achieving such goals.

2022 Michigan Evidence
China Heg Good AFF › 2ac/1ar --- China Regs Don’t Work

China’s regulations for AI aren’t feasible.

Makenzie Holland 03-17-2022 [News writer covering big tech and federal regulation, Tech Target, “China’s AI regulations face technical challenge,” https://www.techtarget.com/searchenterpriseai/news/252514781/Chinas-AI-regulations-face-technical-challenge//ZW]

China is one of the first countries to regulate AI algorithms -- a regulation that may prove technically difficult for businesses to adhere to. China's AI algorithm regulations took effect March 1, requiring businesses to provide explainable AI algorithms and be transparent about their purpose, such as for recommending products or services. The new regulations also prohibit businesses reliant on AI algorithms from offering different prices to different people based on personal data collected. Technical feasibility will be one of the most challenging aspects facing the new regulations, said Russell Wald, director of policy for Stanford University's Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI). Explainable AI has proven to be difficult for businesses to offer up. In this Q&A, Wald talks about the AI regulations' impact on businesses, as well as how they're unlikely to affect the Chinese government's own use of AI when it comes to surveilling its citizens. What do you think about China taking this step? Wald: What I find most interesting is China has done this first. We can see and watch in real time what happens to some of these businesses now being regulated for the first time. Questions remain about the technical feasibility of this. The question is, are we seeing regulation in theory or regulation in practice? One key part is a continuing need for human-centered AI. How do you define human-centered AI? Wald: AI that is inspired by the human brain and comes from what you've seen in human development. AI that doesn't replace humans but augments human capability. And the third part of that is AI that doesn't harm but rather benefits humanity … technology fostering instead of eroding democratic aspects. That's the key part. It's a recognition of the rights of everyone to be able to go in and look at these technologies and have fair access to them and the rights to challenge their governments when they're in use. How will requiring AI algorithmic accountability and transparency impact businesses? Wald: There is the technical issue here of whether that's feasible. That's one layer that has a big question mark hanging over it. Then there's the aspect of following regulation where you could and being in compliance with that. To that end, whether or not those companies will be able to do it, I think they'll have to. I don't think they have a choice. The larger question is not whether Chinese businesses are able to comply with this, it is whether other international companies will now be affected by this. If you're selling into the Chinese market, you are going to have to work on that. That's where a unique tension is going to come through. What if China says, 'It is technically feasible'? Then there will be other countries that say 'No, it's actually not, we've had these problems.' Will these regulations apply to the Chinese government's use of AI? Wald: The government will not cede, from my view at least, its surveillance of its citizens. Because of that, I think it'll always have access to that technology. It's too tempting. It even remains tempting for local law enforcement in the U.S. But here, at least in the United States, we're having a debate about an AI bill of rights. We're debating about facial recognition use by police, by the federal government at the border. There is this open debate. That debate is not happening in this case of the [Chinese] government's use of it. Do you think there needs to be more debate before moving forward with AI regulations? Wald: The EU or U.S. system of open debate around this is ultimately driving us in the right space. Not fast enough, but still a better pathway forward. What I do have concerns about in the U.S. is we are woefully behind. You're starting to see an increase in legislation. You're starting to see a Federal Trade Commission that's trying to lean a little more forward on some of this. But I think the best way to have these dialogues and national debate is through legislation where all the interest groups, all the advocacy organizations, everyone comes to the table and hashes it out. Are there aspects of the Chinese legislation you'll be paying attention to, like how they handle consumer complaints about potential harms caused by AI algorithms? Wald: I mentioned that technical feasibility part, that's really important. I'm more curious about what the petition process will be. I'd like to watch that space more than anything. Is it significant, is it public, are a lot of people openly complaining? I would be curious to see the registration of these complaints. That would be important for when Europe or the U.S. starts to get into this model. What's the mechanism for them to be able to do this? If we all had a contact at the FTC or the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, they'd be flooded and overwhelmed and unable to manage that process appropriately. The logistics of managing that has huge application towards ultimate effectiveness. Editor's note: Responses have been edited for brevity and clarity.