2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Offensive Realism Mearsheimer
Kuhn 21 – undergraduate student at Goethe University studying International Relations (Frank, “Offensive Realism and the Rise of China: A Useful Framework for Analysis?,” E-International Relations, 7-9-21, , Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)
The Foundation for Offensive Realism appears doubtful. The fundamental assumption of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism is a bold one. He portrays great powers as revisionist predators in pursuit of survival. The ultimate goal for any powerful state is to attain regional hegemony—that is, being the strongest nation in its part of the world. In addition, great powers also want to make sure there are no contenders dominating other regions (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 363). This image is both persuasive and parsimonious, but not backed by empirical evidence. In fact, rising states do not always seem to employ aggressive strategies toward their declining competitors. Rather, history suggests that rising states even cooperate with their declining peers. Although Wilhelmine Germany competed with Great Britain for maritime primacy, it also provided Austria-Hungary with diplomatic and military support in the years before 1914. Both the United States and the rising Soviet Union attempted to support a weakening United Kingdom after the end of World War II. Eventually, Britain received remarkable economic, military and diplomatic assistance from the United States (Shifrinson, 2020, pp. 176–177). But the Soviet Union was also eager to cooperate with the UK; it even explored the feasibility of a formal military alliance with Britain in early 1947—more than one year before the United States started to discuss a similar proposal (Shifrinson, 2018, p. 90). Similarly, a large body of literature on power transitions apparently calls into question Mearsheimer’s offensive realist worldview, since there appears to be only a weak link between power shifts and the outbreak of war (Shifrinson, 2020, p. 180). For example, Lebow and Valentino (2009) not only found that power transitions are fairly uncommon, but also that power shifts are usually the effect of armed conflicts—not their cause. Great powers traditionally eschew making war against their peers. Instead, they prefer to attack smaller states or gravely declining nations. It is true that these smaller wars have repeatedly escalated in ways that dragged other great powers into the conflict as well (Lebow and Valentino, 2009, p. 406). But these conflicts—inadvertent escalations, so to speak—differ considerably from the intense security competition which Mearsheimer is anticipating. Most importantly, there is even research indicating that dominant military powers are more likely than rising states to start major conflict, provided that they are apprehensive about their loss of status (Copeland, 2000, p. 3). In sum, empirical evidence suggests that rising states adopt much more nuanced strategies than offensive realism would predict. This seems to hold true even for great powers with revisionist propensities (Shifrinson, 2018, p. 181). One possible explanation for this divergence between reality and what offensive realism teaches could be case selection. Indeed, Mearsheimer’s case studies have been suspected of selection bias by various scholars (Snyder, 2002, p. 161; Toft, 2005, pp. 395–396). It is also worth noting that—at odds with Mearsheimer’s predictions—NATO has yet to collapse (Kaplan, 2011). Neither has Germany acquired nuclear weapons, nor is there a vicious great power competition in Europe (Toft, 2005, p. 396). In other words: Mearsheimer has been off the mark by a great margin. Given the rather weak empirical basis and the theory’s debatable predictive ability, it would seem reasonable to assume that offensive realism is not particularly useful when it comes to the analysis of the rise of China. In fact, the People’s Republic of China does not seem to harbour expansionist proclivities. It is true that China’s territorial claims—e.g. Taiwan or large swaths of the South China Sea—are substantial. In addition, Chinese efforts to build artificial islands in the South China Sea have been widely regarded as expansionist and aggressive by China’s neighbours. However, Chinese territorial claims are all firmly rooted in historical possession or exploration, not in offensive realist thinking (Nathan and Scobell, 2014, p. 21; Yergin, 2020). Besides that, theoretical insights from balance of power theory would also cast doubt on offensive realism’s core tenet, as Shifrinson (2020) has noted. If rising powers were to engage in all-out predation on their declining peers, they may expedite the formation of a sizable counterbalancing coalition. In multipolar systems, a rising power may also need assistance from other nations in its proximity to offset challengers. All-out predation on declining countries would seem to foreclose future cooperation with other states and thus appears strategically unwise (Shifrinson, 2020, pp. 181–183). For these reasons, rising states would seem to pursue more nuanced strategies toward their declining peers. More to the point, one would expect rising powers to follow either predatory or supportive strategies in varying intensities—depending on the decliner’s strategic value and military posture, respectively (Shifrinson, 2018, chap. 2). Since China faces several challengers in its neighbourhood with both India and Japan, and the United States is likely to retain a robust military posture for the foreseeable future, it appears probable that China will exercise restraint—or, in fact, may even want to cooperate with the United States (Shifrinson, 2020, p. 199).
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Offensive Realism
Kuhn 21 – undergraduate student at Goethe University studying International Relations (Frank, “Offensive Realism and the Rise of China: A Useful Framework for Analysis?,” E-International Relations, 7-9-21, , Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)
Mearsheimer’s Unduly Focus on Military Capabilities The third and final reason why offensive realism would seem to be of rather limited utility in the analysis of the rise of China is the theory’s unduly focus on military capabilities. Mearsheimer grasps at the concept of power only in a very narrow sense—states’ capabilities are measured in purely military terms (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 363). Although military potential is certainly easy to estimate, this view disregards other ways to wield power and coerce one’s adversaries—for instance by means of economic warfare (Toft, 2005, p. 384). In the context of US-China relations, an unabating focus on military force appears problematic; Mearsheimer’s anticipated security competition may actually play out in the economic arena, not in the military domain. Indeed, a tech competition between China and the United States is already well underway. Especially under Donald Trump’s four-year tenure as United States president, previously uncontroversial economic cooperation has been increasingly considered through the lens of national security. This has led to a significant reappraisal of US-China relations; the United States believes that it is losing its competitive technological and military edge due to close commercial ties with the PRC (Foot and King, 2019, p. 47). Looking more closely at the rhetoric of the Trump administration, it appears that both economic and civil society ties have been successfully securitised (Abb, 2020). That is, a reference object—i.e. economic relations with the PRC—has been defined as an existential security threat that warrants emergency measures outside the scope of normal political procedures (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde, 1998, pp. 23–26). One of the most apparent examples for this securitisation seems to be the 2017 US National Security Strategy because it frames economic security explicitly as a national security issue (United States, 2017, p. 17). The Trump administration has acted accordingly. It imposed tough sanctions on the Chinese tech giant Huawei, cutting the company off from technology manufactured in the United States, including microprocessors (Abb, 2020, p. 2). After that, in summer 2020, politicians in Washington discussed whether or not TikTok—a social network owned by a Chinese company which is especially popular among young teenagers—could pose a threat to national security (Schuman, 2020). Some have even suggested that the White House should declare a national emergency and invoke the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) if the ownership company ByteDance is not willing to sell its service to a non-Chinese enterprise (Thompson, 2020). Subsequently, the People’s Republic of China placed TikTok’s recommendation algorithm on its export control list (Mozur, Zhong and McCabe, 2020). As the Biden administration is reviewing Trump’s China policy, the tech war is currently on hold—at least with regard to TikTok (Kruppa and Sevastopulo, 2021). But given that Joe Biden (2020) has also embraced technological competition with China, it seems reasonable to assume that the arms race for high-tech superiority is here to stay. Other trends, for example the transition toward renewable energy, would also suggest that control over technology and intellectual property rights will become increasingly more important (Overland, 2019, p. 38).
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Offensive Realism
Kuhn 21 – undergraduate student at Goethe University studying International Relations (Frank, “Offensive Realism and the Rise of China: A Useful Framework for Analysis?,” E-International Relations, 7-9-21, , Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)
A comprehensive analytical framework found wanting In addition to the empirical and theoretical issues presented above, offensive realism precludes two important levels of analysis when used as a tool for studying the rise of China. In his influential book Man, State, and War, Waltz (1954) conceived of three “images” of international relations: individuals, the state, and the international system. Now, offensive realism is a structural theory. It holds that state behaviour is determined by the anarchic structure of the international system. Individual leaders and domestic politics are excluded from consideration—offensive realism is an oversimplification of reality. As a consequence, the theory will be of limited utility when personal beliefs or domestic politics are the predominant variables which shape a state’s foreign policy (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 10). When it comes to China, reasonable evidence suggests that individuals and their ideas may indeed dominate the decision-making process. Chinese foreign policy has always been shaped by its supreme leader’s personal ideas. Although it is true that the leader’s role has become less significant from Mao Zedong to Hu Jintao (Nathan and Scobell, 2014, pp. 37–38), there can be no doubt that the rise of Xi Jinping, China’s supreme leader since 2012, has reversed this trend. “Xi Jinping thought” has been included in the Chinese Communist Party’s constitution in the 19th National Congress in October 2017 (Corre, 2018). And after an unprecedented centralisation of power, Xi holds more sway than any other Chinese leader since Mao. He has quelled dissenting voices, removed the term limit for his office as president and established a personality cult that bears resemblance to authoritarian leaders such as Vladimir Putin in Russia or even Kim Jong Un in North Korea. Hence, a sound understanding of Xi is of much greater significance than it has been for any of his immediate predecessors (Wasserstrom, 2021). Xi’s rise to power has been accompanied by what is described as an increasingly assertive Chinese foreign policy. This was first noted in 2009 by various Chinese and foreign pundits (Friedberg, 2014, p. 133), and has culminated in an unparalleled Chinese diplomatic offensive in 2020. The Chinese Communist Party tightened its grip on Hong Kong and passed a controversial national security law that has effectively terminated the principle of “one country, two systems.” Chinese soldiers started a deadly brawl on the disputed border with India. The Chinese military repeatedly probed Taiwan’s air defences and increased its patrols around the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which are claimed by both China and Japan. Likewise, maritime presence in the South China Sea was intensified. Domestically, Beijing stepped up its clampdown against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang in what many have described as an attempt of cultural genocide. Finally, the Australian government’s request for an independent investigation into the roots of the COVID-19 pandemic was met with harsh trade sanctions and cyberattacks, and Chinese diplomats started using very belligerent language (Campbell and Rapp-Hooper, 2020). What may account for this dramatic change of direction in the PRC’s foreign policy? Campbell and Rapp-Hooper (2020) have suggested that both Xi’s belief that the time to restore China’s historical might has arrived and this consolidation of power likely played a key role, while staunch nationalism may have served as a catalyst. H. R. McMaster (2020), former White House national security adviser, has similarly argued that the Chinese leadership is under the impression that its window of opportunity to accomplish the “China dream” is narrowing. He has also emphasised the importance of history when it comes to understanding China. Small and Jaishankar (2020) have put forward four conceivable explanations for the PRC’s new assertiveness. These theories hold that weaknesses in the rest of the world, an internalisation of the Chinese leaders’ own success, a reaction to current challenges posed by the pandemic or internal and external insecurity could be the reason of China’s diplomatic offensive. To date, there is no systemic analysis which would attribute Beijing’s newest assertiveness to specific determinants on the individual, domestic or structural level. However, Liao (2016) has employed a classical levels of analysis approach to make sense of China’s assertiveness after 2009. According to his assessment, prevalent structural and domestic explanations are not supported by empirical evidence and thus fail to offer a plausible explanation. Most importantly, there was no correlation in time between adjustments of international or domestic preconditions and China’s increased assertiveness. Thus, the analysis suggests that the perceptions and ideas of China’s elite and the state leader’s preferences are the most convincing explanation for the changes in Chinese foreign policy (Liao, 2016, pp. 831–833). It is true that China’s new assertiveness could also be part of a larger plan to achieve the PRC’s strategic objectives, as Friedberg (2014, pp. 143–146) has argued. In addition, the leadership argument is almost impossible to refute (Liao, 2016, p. 829). But regardless of that, the evidence presented above strongly suggests that a single-level perspective as offensive realism may be too parsimonious when it comes to the analysis of the rise of China. In fact, even Mearsheimer has dedicated one section of his chapter on China’s rise to “hypernationalism,” which he expects to exacerbate the US-Chinese security competition—whilst maintaining that realist logic will remain the key factor (Mearsheimer, 2014, pp. 399–403). In this regard, realism appears to be not just a theory, but also an ideology, as McFaul has so aptly noted: Realism is devised as a descriptive and a prescriptive theory; states ought to follow its lessons in order to be successful in international affairs. Yet, this would seem to undercut the core argument of realism—namely that leaders and their beliefs are irrelevant (McFaul, 2020, p. 113).
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Cling to Heg/Transition Wars
Schweller, 18 - Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University (“Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003
By passing the costs to more threatened allies, offshore balancing aims to preserve US primacy far into the future and safeguard liberty at home. As John Glaser points out, ‘A globe-straddling forward-deployed military presence is a costly burden that elevates peripheral interests to the level of vital ones, takes on security responsibilities that can and should be fulfilled by other states, and produces negative unintended consequences for U.S. interests.’91 The trick, however, is implementing a retrenchment strategy—that is, how to wean the world off of American power while avoiding a hard landing (e.g. regional arms races and intense security dilemmas). Even with the most skilled leadership, we should expect a very bumpy ride.
We see this happening already. Trump’s visit to Asia created unease among allies about the role the United States will play in the Asia-Pacific region. Seeking Beijing’s help to deal with North Korea, President Trump failed to press China on its military buildup in the South China Sea, reinforcing the perception that America is beginning to retreat from the region and, quite understandably, fueling Japan’s underlying fear of abandonment. Tokyo now strongly suspects that the United States may make some kind of deal with China that could put Japan at a disadvantage.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- AT: Cling to Heg/Transition Wars
MacDonald and Parent, 18 – Paul MacDonald is Associate Professor in Political Science at Wellesley College. Joseph M. Parent is associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame (Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment, p. 2-3
In this book, we argue that the conventional wisdom is wrong. Specifically, we make three main arguments. First, relative decline causes prompt, proportionate retrenchment because states seek strategic solvency. The international system is a competitive place, and great powers did not get to the top by being imprudent, irrational, or irresponsible. When their fortunes ebb, states tend to retain the virtues that made them great. In the face of decline, great powers have a good sense of their relative capability and tend not to give away more than they must. Expanding or maintaining grand strategic ambitions during decline incurs unsustainable burdens and incites unwinnable fights, so the faster states fall, the more they retrench. Great powers may choose to retrench in other circumstances as well, but they have an overriding incentive to do so when confronted by relative decline.
Second, the depth of relative decline shapes not only how much a state retrenches, but also which policies it adopts. The world is complex and cut- throat; leaders cannot glibly pull a policy off the shelf and expect desired outcomes. Because international politics is a self-help system, great powers prefer policies that rely less on the actions of allies and adversaries. For lack of a better term, we refer to these as domestic policies, which include reducing spending, restructuring forces, and reforming institutions—all to reallocate resources for more efficient uses. But international policies may also help, and they include redeploying forces, defusing flashpoints, and redistributing burdens—all to avoid costly conflicts and reinforce core strong- points. The faster and deeper states fall, the more they are willing to rely on others to cushion their fall. Retrenchment is not a weapon but an arsenal that can be used in different amounts and combinations depending on con- ditions and the enemies faced.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
Manning 22 — Robert A. Manning, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and its New American Engagement Initiative. “Locking China Out of the Global Order Could Backfire” Foreign Policy. May 9th, 2022. WMK
Both Russia’s scorched-earth invasion of Ukraine and the swift fury of the U.S. and European Union-led global response seem to have come as a shock to Beijing. China’s ambiguous stance—clearly anti-American but not explicitly pro-Russian or anti-Ukrainian—in part comes because the West’s surprisingly strong response has frustrated Chinese ambitions.
It may not have fully sunk in yet in Beijing, but the resurgence of an economic and strategically unified West, and the risk of the financial and political liability of protecting a dependent, wrecked petrostate, should lead Chinese President Xi Jinping to see the wisdom of cooperating with the global economic order, albeit with a larger Chinese voice and modest distancing from its partner in Moscow. Despite its echoing of Russian disinformation, Beijing has cautiously cut off Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank loans and trade financing to Moscow, and China’s state-run Sinopec halted gas and petrochemical projects in Russia. With $3 trillion in mostly dollar and euro assets and watching the United States disappear Russian Central Bank assets overnight, Beijing’s caution is understandable.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
Zelikow 22 — Philip Zelikow Professor of History at the University of Virginia. A former U.S. diplomat and Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, he has worked for five presidential administrations., “The Hollow Order,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 22 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-06-21/hollow-order-international-system, accessed 7-1-2022, WMK
It may be easy, and perhaps natural, for the would-be architects of the new system to organize it around Washington. But that would be a mistake. The enemies of this new order, united by their resentment of the United States, will seek to discredit it as just another effort to dominate global affairs. For this new order to be viable, it must be conceived in such a way that the charge is false.
The new order must also be decentralized to be effective; the resources and wisdom needed to solve many vexing problems are not concentrated in the United States. For instance, on the enormous issue of defining rules for a digitized world, Washington has been confused and passive, despite—or perhaps because of—its dominance in such commerce. It is the European Union that has led the way. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, its Digital Services Act, and its Digital Markets Act created the standards that influence most of the world, including the Americas. Decentralized leadership has also proved critical to responding to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. The nucleus of the emerging pro-Ukraine coalition, for instance, is not just the United States but the entire G-7, including the European Commission. South Korea and Australia should be invited to join this coalition as well.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
Schweller 18 — Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003 Advance Access Publication Date: 8 February 2018 WMK
A ‘flatter’ international structure compels the United States to play a less central role in providing functional services—generating public goods, stabilizing mar- kets, and promoting cooperation. Pax Americana—the integrated militarized sys- tem of alliances and economic relationships that institutionalized American leadership of the non-Communist world—is coming to a close. Global leadership is costly; it means asking your citizens to pay for others’ well-being, to send young soldiers to die in faraway places. So far, China has shown little interest in replacing the United States as a kind of chairman of planet Earth, in the words of Daniel Russel, an American diplomat who served as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2013 to 2017; the Chinese display ‘no intention of emulating the U.S. as a provider of global goods or as an arbiter who teases out universal principles and common rules’.88 As it enters this new leaderless age, Washington must devise a grand strategy that properly deals with the new situation, one that fundamentally alters America’s role in the new world.89
Realists have proposed just such a change in American grand strategy—a foreign policy approach that essentially falls under the rubric of ‘offshore balancing’. Under this grand strategy, the United States would no longer attempt to police the planet. Instead, Washington would encourage other countries to take the lead in checking rising powers in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf, interven- ing itself only when absolutely necessary to preserve the regional balance of power. Calibrating its military posture according to the distribution of power in the three key regions, the United States would allow regional forces to be its first line of defense in the event that a potential regional hegemon emerges. This means, as Barry Posen maintains, ‘demobiliz[ing] most U.S. Army troops based abroad’ and closing most US bases across Europe, Asia, and the Middle East— about 800 of them in more than 70 countries.90
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
Schweller 18 — Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003 Advance Access Publication Date: 8 February 2018 WMK
Then came the global financial and economic crisis of 2007–2008. The world no longer seemed unipolar as far as the eye could see. The Great Recession— coupled with the rise of China, India, and a resurgent Russia—cast doubts on the state of American relative power that found official expression in the US National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025 and Global Trends 2030 reports.72 It has become commonplace to claim that the unipolar era is over or fast winding down. Predictions of continuing unipolarity have been superseded by premonitions of American decline and emerging multipolarity.73 Indeed, a February 2016 Gallop poll found Americans evenly split when asked if the United States is No. 1 in the world militarily, with 49% saying ‘yes’ and 49% saying ‘no’. The poll also showed that half of Americans see the United States as one of several leading mili- tary powers.74 This widely held perception of coming structural change largely explains the appeal of Donald Trump’s ‘American First’ doctrine. Simply put, the American era is over, and Washington must devise a new grand strategy to deal with the new situation.75 Realism, which the American body politic has sup- ported for decades, offers just such a strategy.76
An Inward-Looking Nationalism Takes Root
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
White, 17 – Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University in Canberra, Australia, (Hugh, “Without America”, Quaterly Essay 68, November, https://www.quarterlyessay.com.au/essay/2017/11/without-america/extract
For almost a decade now, the world’s two most powerful countries have been competing over which of them will dominate the world’s most important and dynamic region. America has been trying to remain East Asia’s primary power, and China has been trying to replace it. Their contest is playing out over trade deals and infrastructure plans, in the diplomacy of multilateral meetings, and above all through military gamesmanship in regional hotspots like the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Korean Peninsula. But all these are really just symptoms of their underlying rivalry.
How the contest will proceed – whether peacefully or violently, quickly or slowly – is still uncertain, but the most likely outcome is now becoming clear. America will lose, and China will win. America will cease to play a major strategic role in Asia, and China will take its place as the dominant power. War remains possible, especially with someone like Donald Trump in the Oval Office. But the risk of war recedes as it becomes clearer that the odds are against America, and as people in Washington come to understand that their nation cannot defend its leadership in Asia by fighting an unwinnable war with China. The probability therefore grows that America will peacefully, and perhaps even willingly, withdraw. Indeed, this is already happening, and Asia is changing as a result. The old US-led order is passing, and a new China-led order is taking its place.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
Ward, 17 - Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University (Steven, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers, p. 217-218
The former approach is one that few policymakers and scholars openly promote.23 If the United States is interested in avoiding the creation of a deeply revisionist, anti-Western China, it needs to accommodate China’s status claims. Since these likely include the right to a sphere of influence in East Asia, accommodation would likely have to involve a reduction of the American military presence and American influence in that region. This does not mean conceding global leadership to China. Rather, the aim would be to acknowledge that China, as a great power, deserves the same rights that the United States does in world politics – including the right to manage East Asia and the South China Sea the way that the United States manages Latin America and the Caribbean.
This approach carries with it great risks and costs as well.What would be the effect on navigation and trade through the South China Sea? Would important American allies like Japan and South Korea turn into Beijing’s vassals? What if an American withdrawal from East Asia produces a regional arms race? And what if China grows more ambitious rather than more satisfied as the United States withdraws overseas?
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
Layne 18 - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, , Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)
What will happen to the international order as China continues to rise, and America’s relative power continues to decline? As Yogi Berra, the greatest of all American philosophers (immortalized in baseball’s Hall of Fame), said: ‘Making predictions is hard. Especially about the future.’ However, one thing seems pretty certain: China is not on the verge of either of ruling the world, or becoming a global hegemon comparable to the United States after the Second World War; not yet, anyway. Thus, for the next several decades (at least) it will be neither China’s world nor America’s: international leadership will be contested.81 During this period, China can be expected to act pretty much as one would expect any Great Power to act while making the shift from rising to risen: it will use its newfound power to seek a much greater voice in managing—and shaping—the interna- tional order, and its underlying norms. For example, China will want others to acknowledge its ‘core interests’, including respect for its territorial integrity and its sovereignty. Beijing has expanded the geographic scope of its core interests beyond Tibet and Taiwan to include the South and East China Seas and Xinjiang. And, reflecting its insistence that states should refrain from intervening in others’ internal affairs, preservation of its political, economic and social systems also has been defined as a core interest.82 During the period of contested international leadership there is unlikely to be wholesale abandonment of the post-1945 international institutions. For example, as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Beijing is an acknowledged part of the Great Power club. Similarly, we should not expect to see a dramatic overhaul of the international economic system. As the world’s top-ranking exporter and trading state, China benefits hugely from economic openness. However, the state plays a much greater role in China’s economy than it does in the United States and Europe. Beijing will want rules that protect its semi- mercantilist economic policies and also ensure that its state-owned industries are not disadvantaged. Beijing will continue pressing for an even greater voice, both for itself and for the developing world, in institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (unless or until they are superseded by new ‘made in China’ institutions). In this respect, China will position itself as the developing world’s champion—a role for which it is well suited. Like many nations in the developing world— but unlike the United States—China has been a victim of western Great Power policies of imperialism and colonialism. As such, China has a claim to prominence in constructing a new international order that reflects the values of the developing world rather than those of the United States and the West.83
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
Layne 18 - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, , Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)
What will happen to the international order as China continues to rise, and America’s relative power continues to decline? As Yogi Berra, the greatest of all American philosophers (immortalized in baseball’s Hall of Fame), said: ‘Making predictions is hard. Especially about the future.’ However, one thing seems pretty certain: China is not on the verge of either of ruling the world, or becoming a global hegemon comparable to the United States after the Second World War; not yet, anyway. Thus, for the next several decades (at least) it will be neither China’s world nor America’s: international leadership will be contested.81 During this period, China can be expected to act pretty much as one would expect any Great Power to act while making the shift from rising to risen: it will use its newfound power to seek a much greater voice in managing—and shaping—the interna- tional order, and its underlying norms. For example, China will want others to acknowledge its ‘core interests’, including respect for its territorial integrity and its sovereignty. Beijing has expanded the geographic scope of its core interests beyond Tibet and Taiwan to include the South and East China Seas and Xinjiang. And, reflecting its insistence that states should refrain from intervening in others’ internal affairs, preservation of its political, economic and social systems also has been defined as a core interest.82 During the period of contested international leadership there is unlikely to be wholesale abandonment of the post-1945 international institutions. For example, as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, Beijing is an acknowledged part of the Great Power club. Similarly, we should not expect to see a dramatic overhaul of the international economic system. As the world’s top-ranking exporter and trading state, China benefits hugely from economic openness. However, the state plays a much greater role in China’s economy than it does in the United States and Europe. Beijing will want rules that protect its semi- mercantilist economic policies and also ensure that its state-owned industries are not disadvantaged. Beijing will continue pressing for an even greater voice, both for itself and for the developing world, in institutions such as the IMF and World Bank (unless or until they are superseded by new ‘made in China’ institutions). In this respect, China will position itself as the developing world’s champion—a role for which it is well suited. Like many nations in the developing world— but unlike the United States—China has been a victim of western Great Power policies of imperialism and colonialism. As such, China has a claim to prominence in constructing a new international order that reflects the values of the developing world rather than those of the United States and the West.83
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
Danner and Martin 19 - Research Associate at the Miami-Florida Jean Monnet European Center of Excellence, Florida International University (FIU), USA, and Honorary Research Fellow at the East Asia Security Centre, Bond University, Australia, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations at Florida International University (Lukas K. and Félix E., “China's hegemonic intentions and trajectory: Will it opt for benevolent, coercive, or Dutch-style hegemony?,” Wiley Online Library, 4-18-19, , Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)
The episode discussed above is instructive for present United States–Chinese relations and economic rivalry. Because they are competing for global hegemony, they must be careful about whom they trade with and how this may or may not undercut the political and strategic interests of the other. It is mainly the case with China who chooses to ignore U.S. sanctions against some rogue states such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela. In terms of present general probability, it does not seem likely that China will take over the leadership of the U.S.-instituted liberal economic and political global order as the Americans did from the British in the early 20th century. Notwithstanding, much of China's hegemonic trajectory could also depend on how it will develop internally in terms of its economy and politics. In this sense, for example, Shambaugh (2016) argues in his China's Future for reforms of the Chinese party-state to softer authoritarianism. Further, it seems unlikely that China will institute its leadership and global hegemony via violent conflict, much like Napoleonic France, Wilhelmine Germany, and Imperial Japan. Instead, as expounded above, the Dutch-style (or “Third Way”) global hegemony appears to be a more likely trajectory. Provided, of course, China remains to exhibit strictly trade-oriented, politically neutral, and self-interested pecuniary intentions in the next decade.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
Danner and Martin 19 - Research Associate at the Miami-Florida Jean Monnet European Center of Excellence, Florida International University (FIU), USA, and Honorary Research Fellow at the East Asia Security Centre, Bond University, Australia, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations at Florida International University (Lukas K. and Félix E., “China's hegemonic intentions and trajectory: Will it opt for benevolent, coercive, or Dutch-style hegemony?,” Wiley Online Library, 4-18-19, , Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)
Also, China's incomplete and unbalanced power inventory renders it too weak militarily as a near-hegemon to compete aggressively against the United States. Further, China would be considerably less competitive if it has to face a potential military alliance among the United States, Western Europe, India, and possibly Russia. In summary, China must remain commercially active and militarily peaceful on the bases of its economic prowess and its conventional military competitive disadvantage 13 vis-à-vis the United States and its potential allies. Hence, Dutch-style hegemony is a perfect fit for China's immediate and mid-range future. Accordingly, the study concludes that, although it is exceedingly difficult to predict with a high degree of certainty which way China will go in the future, Dutch-style hegemony is the most plausible explanation of China's direction and role in the international system. However, plausibility does not mean certainty; thus, we are mindful of conflicting evidence that simultaneously points to either China's peaceful (benevolent intentions) or violent rise (coercive intentions). Despite the evidence supporting all three possible future trajectories, the Third Way or the Dutch style is more congruent with China's international behaviour since 2001. China does not truly challenge the existing order in terms of political values, ideological norms, or regime types. The “Beijing Consensus” promotes trading with any country, irrespective to the political system, that is, governments raging from liberal democracies, such as the United States, to staunch totalitarian dictatorships such as Cuba, North Korea, and Venezuela. China's focus is on sovereignty and not on regime type. As Suisheng Zhao argues, China is in fact “[e]mbracing the Westphalian principles of state sovereignty, (…) while adapting to the liberal norms of globalization, China is (…) dissatisfied not with the fundamental rules of the order but its status in the hierarchy of the order” (2018, p. 643).
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
Danner and Martin 19 - Research Associate at the Miami-Florida Jean Monnet European Center of Excellence, Florida International University (FIU), USA, and Honorary Research Fellow at the East Asia Security Centre, Bond University, Australia, Ph.D., is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations at Florida International University (Lukas K. and Félix E., “China's hegemonic intentions and trajectory: Will it opt for benevolent, coercive, or Dutch-style hegemony?,” Wiley Online Library, 4-18-19, , Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)
Third, we identified signs of a possible “Third Way.” It is similar to the type of global hegemony defined and practised by the Dutch from the late 16th to the mid-18th centuries. It would be a global hegemony solely focused on trade and financial concerns, without the interference of violent conflicts or impositions of political and ideological norms and values. From the Dutch-style vantage point, a Chinese hegemon would be relatively neutral in terms of ideology, partially uninvolved in the management of the international state system, and mostly interested in profit-maximisation, without the use (or threat) of military actions. In sum, calm and stable political, economic, and security environments are welcome news to Chinese strategists in the short and medium run. Why is that the case? Ideologically speaking, China cannot be a benevolent hegemon, and militarily and politically speaking, it lacks the type of conventional power and reputation for exerting the kind of global influence necessary to manage the international state and market systems. Regarding ideology, Yan Xuetong argues, for example, that China will have to go beyond the current trajectory of “combin[ing] Marxism with Chinese traditional values” and instead “shape the international order by combining some Chinese traditional values with selected liberalist values (…) [which] could be acceptable to most countries because of their universality” (Yan, 2018, p. 1). It is difficult to define China's future hegemonic role and its general systemic behaviour accurately. However, as this article argued, the “Third Hegemonic Way” or Dutch-style hegemony is highly instructive in this context. Accordingly, this third alternative proposition adds to the current debate and inventory of plausible explanation of China's peaceful or violent rise as either a benevolent or potentially coercive hegemon. We argued that Dutch-style hegemony might be the most viable way for China to proceed in its global hegemonic ascendancy. Although China has registered a substantial economic and financial growth since 1989, its population still possesses, relative to other global great powers, lower per capita income and relatively small purchasing power. In this vein, the relatively inexpensive labour cost and its mainly export-oriented economy still figure as China's main engine of economic and financial growth. Further, China's national market remains quite small in terms of per capita purchasing power. Hence, it needs peaceful, stable, and relatively prosperous international economic and state systems to continue to thrive and to grow. We project that China's leadership will make sure to keep it that way.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
MacDonald and Parent, 18 – Paul MacDonald is Associate Professor in Political Science at Wellesley College. Joseph M. Parent is associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame (Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment, p. 197
We predict the rejection of retrenchment would result in foreign policy crises of escalating frequency and severity. Rising powers or regional aggressors would be more likely to call the United States' bluff, and deterring these adversaries would require greater commitments of resources and more dramatic demonstrations of resolve. Foreign interventions would be more likely to turn into quagmires, as American ambitions escalate and local opposition hardens. The gap between foreign commitments and available resources would widen, requiring growing deficits and crash rearmament programs rather than steady budgets and sensible reforms. The evidence suggests that declining powers throughout history have tried to avoid this dismal fate, but that they are not always able to do so. Minor disputes can spiral into major confrontations; domestic rancor can get out of hand; leaders can make poor decisions; things fall apart. Whether cur- rent U.S. policymakers will dodge these dangers depends on how well they learn the lessons of retrenchment.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
Layne, 18 – Christopher Layne is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, and, Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (“The US–Chinese power shift
and the end of the Pax Americana” International Affairs 94: 1 (2018) 89–111; doi: 10.1093/ia/iix249 LRBIO = Liberal Rules Based International Order
When the balance of power swings—or is perceived to swing—in its direction, a rising power becomes increasingly dissatisfied with the international order, and seeks to revise it. The challenger wants to change the rules embodied in the existing international order—rules written, of course, by the once dominant but now declining Great Power that created it. It also wants the allocation of prestige and status changed to reflect its newly acquired power. The incumbent hegemon, of course, wants to preserve the existing international order as is—an order that it midwifed to advance, and consolidate, its own interests. The E. H. Carr Moment presents the incumbent hegemon with a choice. It can dig in its heels and try to preserve the prevailing order—and its privileged position therein; or it can accede to the rising challenger’s demands for revision. If it chooses the former course of action, it runs the risk of war with the dissatisfied challenger. If it chooses the latter, it must come to terms with the reality of its decline, and the end of its hegemonic position.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
Kopits, 16 - Steven Kopits is a President of Princeton Energy Advisors. He consulted to government, state-owned enterprises and private clients in post-socialist Eastern Europe from 1990 to 2005, and monitors developments in China for his firm’s clients (“China Should Push for American-Style Hegemony” The National Interest, 8/3,
On the other hand, if China behaves as a legitimate system operator, then squeezing out the United States becomes an attainable goal. It would do so by providing hegemonic services to the East Asian community better and cheaper than the United States does. Such services include protecting and assisting in the clarification of regional property rights, as well as the creation of impartial, credible and competent institutions to foster the development of shared resources. It may also imply backstopping the United States to ensure that critical East Asian imports—for example, Saudi and Iranian oil—continues to flow to the region, even if the United States fails to provide security services in the Middle East.
China is well placed to play this role. The country specializes in providing manufactures and services of good quality much cheaper than do the western powers. Playing regional hegemon would simply be an extension of existing commercial strategy to the diplomatic sphere. And China has huge advantages, because an authoritarian regime with ample financial resources can move more quickly and decisively than the protracted and mushy process that characterizes democracy.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Transition Peaceful/Voluntary Abdication
Schweller, 18 - Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University (“Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003
Given the tendency for declining powers, especially those under conditions of low vulnerability, to reduce peripheral commitments and look inward, a few wonder that American citizens, after decades of political consensus, are now questioning their country’s grand strategy of deep engagement with the rest of the world. And, to the shock and dismay of the mainstream media, they elected a President who, in his 2017 inauguration speech, emphasized his winning campaign slogan: ‘From this day forward, it’s going to be only America first. America first. Every decision on trade, on taxes, on immigration, on foreign affairs will be made to benefit American workers and American families.’55
While there is no Trump Doctrine as of yet, the tone is unmistakably one of global retreat or, more accurately, a retreat from globalism. On his third day in office, he withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a 12-nation trade deal designed by the United States as a counterweight to a rising China. In June, he announced that he would pull the United States out of the Paris Agreement on climate change, following through with a key campaign promise. Trump also announced that he intends to withdraw the United States from UNESCO; he abandoned United Nations talks on migration; and he threatened to terminate the 2015 Iran nuclear deal if Congress and US allies fail to amend the agreement in significant ways; he wants to fix or rip up the free-trade agreement with South Korea (known as Korus) and NAFTA—casting both pacts as failures for the United States. Trump has proposed reducing US contributions to the United Nations by 40%, and pressured the General Assembly to cut six hundred million dollars from its peacekeeping budget. His 2018 budget proposes a 42% cut in foreign assistance, or $11.5 billion, and reduces American funding for development projects, such as those financed by the World Bank.56 Of NATO, Trump said that he would ‘certainly look at’ pulling the United States out of the international security alliance, because it is ‘obsolete’ and ‘is costing us a fortune.’57