2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- International Institutions Prefer China
Layne 18 - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, , Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)
The institutional challenge to the Pax Americana Not only is the Pax Americana being whittled away by constraints on Washing- ton’s ability to continue playing its role as the manager of the global economy, and by China’s ever-increasing economic dominance of its region; even more strik- ingly, the institutional framework is being challenged. An important indicator of the Pax Americana’s erosion is the weakening of its legacy institutions amid calls, magnified by the Great Recession, for a major overhaul of the international institutional order. Examples include demands that the IMF and World Bank be reformed to give China (and other key emerging market economies) greater voting power, and a (so far unsuccessful) push to expand the membership of the UN Security Council by adding, among others, Brazil and India. Another indicator of the shifting global balance occurred in November 2008 when the G8 global economic summit was transformed into the G20 by the addition of China and other emerging market states including India, Indonesia and South Africa. The G20’s creation as the new focal point for coordinating international economic policy was a response to the insistence of China, and the other major emerging market states, that they be given a greater voice in interna- tional economic affairs. Implicitly, the G20’s emergence confirmed three trends. First, the necessity of conceding power to the emerging market states—especially China—confirmed that America’s relative power is declining. Second, the G20’s empowerment underscored the shift in power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. Whereas only one Asian nation (Japan) had been a G8 member, the G20 has six members from the region: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and South Korea. Finally, the G20’s emergence as the central organ of international economic management demonstrated that—as a result of the Great Recession— the prestige and authority of the United States and Europe as stewards of the international economy had slipped dramatically.49 The past decade or so also has seen the creation of new institutions that poten- tially could constitute a parallel—‘shadow’—international order outside the framework of the Pax Americana. The most important of these may be the Beijing- backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Other examples include the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organiza- tion, the Eurasian Economic Union and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). The staying power and impact of these institutions are uncertain; but at the very least they are important symbolically. They underscore the decline of the American-designed post-Second World War international order, and the rise of new powers such as China and India—and the resurgence of old ones such as Russia—demanding recognition of their status and prestige, and a concomitant voice in the management of the international system.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Polarization China Heg Inevitable
Xiang 22 (Dr. Lu Xiang is the Director for Research at the Hong Kong-based Chinese Institute of Hong Kong, an affiliate of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Dr. Lu was previously a senior researcher at the Institute of American Studies and the Institute of World Economics and Politics at CASS. From 2012-2013, Dr. Lu was a visiting fellow at CSIS. His research focuses on national strategic communications, world and US politics, Chinese foreign policy, and Hong Kong-related issues, 1-5-2022, "One year after Capitol riot, is the world entering a ‘post American era’?," Global Times, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202201/1245186.shtml)//eli
"We are now living in an age when American dominance is coming to an end, and its security guarantees are losing credibility," writes an article on Russian media RT on the first anniversary of the January 6 Capitol riot in the US. Even if we can't predict exactly when we will enter a "post-American era," the decline of the US will definitely be the general trend. Just a prelude The results of a recent poll from The Washington Post and the University of Maryland are alarming: 34 percent of Americans believe violence against the government is sometimes justified. That's quite a disturbing sign for Washington's domestic affairs. It's unimaginable to think that even half of these people might really take violent actions. In this sense, the Capitol riot might be just a prelude. At the end of June last year, a special committee was established to investigate the "facts, circumstances and causes" of the Capitol riot. However, after more than half a year, no result has come out amid the endless bipartisan tug of war. The attack on the US Capitol and the aftermath reflect growing division in the US. There are also divergent views on the riot in both the Democratic and Republican Parties. For example, Nikki Haley, a member of the Republican Party, has been openly critical of the Capitol riot. It is afraid that there are even more Republicans supporting the Capitol riot in their hearts. Therefore, it's not surprising that the investigation of the incident faces obstacles. According to a new poll from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, nearly one-third of Americans doubt that Joe Biden's victory in the 2020 presidential election was legitimate. As midterm elections approach in late 2022, accusations of electoral fraud and violence are likely to resurge in every state, especially in some of those in the Midwestern and Southern US. And when election results are disputed, it is anticipated that violence may also increase. A divided US Coincidentally, The Wall Street Journal and The Hill respectively published articles on Monday with titles that began with the phrase "to save America." One title read "To Save America, the GOP First Has to Save Itself," the other reading "To save America, we need a council of presidents." There is a severe division within the US. Some people think that political polarization cannot be resolved and can only be controlled. But the US has no effective measures for control at all. Take the pandemic fight as an example. It's fair to say that the federal government has "lied flat" and did nothing to stop the spreading. Biden recently told the nation's governors that there is no federal solution to the pandemic and the next steps in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic had to be taken at the state level. But in fact, many things still need to be done under the leadership of the federal government. The US federal government now appears to be an old man in his twilight years. It looks quite exhausted and helpless to achieve its goals. The US' inaction in both internal affairs and diplomacy is a pretty terrible thing. If I were an American, I would feel that this is a rather depressing time. The root cause for various problems in the US is the contradiction between different social classes. But with the meddling of US politicians, the contradiction has been turned into a bipartisan issue. Under the so-called political correctness, the class contradiction has been converted into other inexplicable controversies. For instance, can Americans own guns? Should people be vaccinated or wear masks? Behind these controversies are the hardships of the people and their discontent. Both the middle class and the grassroots communities feel increasingly hopeless. Their discontent, as a result, will accumulate, further creating more turmoil in the US. The 'post-American era' The US now is no longer capable of dominating the world due to its internal systemic festering. There was a period of time after the Cold War when the US felt as if it was invincible. Indeed, it did have the capability to fight anyone it wanted then. But this is no longer the unipolar era that the US has enjoyed for the past few decades. Americans may also know in their hearts that that time is gone, as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened their confidence. Moreover, there are still two countries that have the absolute ability to protect their own sovereignty: China and Russia. In Washington's strategic view, any country other than the US should not have sovereignty. In other words, the US can theoretically eradicate any person or government that it wants. But Beijing and Moscow have made the US lose the ability to do so, as both are engaging in more cooperation to maintain stability in the world. The end of US hegemony is also proven by the fact that the days when the US could easily bring other countries to their knees by using the stick of sanctions are gone. For example, Washington has been trying to suppress 5G technology from Chinese tech giant Huawei. It did manage to make Huawei lose some of its smartphone business. However, Huawei was not "ended" by the US, and without the former, the latter's 5G technology development is still lagging behind. The US seemed to believe that it could do anything if it was able to control Huawei. But the reality is that it has neither received any substantial benefit nor caused much damage to China. Instead, the country has set a bad example to the world and lost its credibility. Judging from the current global situation, it looks that the US is in gradual decline. But such a trend could be slowed if young, strong politicians come to the stage with the right policies. The US is now like a patient suffering from a chronic disease lying in a hospital bed and barely able to open their eyes. The future of the US depends on a renewal of the "youth" of US politics. If nothing changes, the US will continue to project that it can't open its eyes in the face of difficulties. Even though the two-party system has been working well for almost 100 years in the US, there are still some undercurrents. Democratic and Republican Parties can now barely maintain the two-partite system. It seems that US politics is a matter of coordination between two groups of people, but in reality, it is much more complicated since the spectrum within both parties is complex. For example, the left-wing of the Democratic Party, including the young Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (also known by her initials AOC), holds opinions that are completely different than those of traditional Democrats. If we really enter the "post-American era" one day, I think it will be a better time for consultation, and the world will become a more democratic place. We can't predict when that time will come, but we can be prepared for that day.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Ukraine China Heg Inevitable
El- Shinawy 22 [Marwa El- Shinawy is the Assistant Professor at the International American University for Specialized Studies, 3-29-2022, Opinion, Daily News Egypt, https://dailynewsegypt.com/2022/03/01/opinion-putin-puts-an-end-to-us-hegemony/] Eric
The Ukrainian crisis is showing day after day the weakness of the current US administration headed by Biden in a way that confirms that the era of American hegemony is about to end. President Biden may have made many heroic statements ahead of the military operation in Ukraine, but as soon as Putin decided to opt for a military solution to get to the negotiating table, Biden withdrew from the battle, shamelessly failing the Ukrainian president. The situation provoked the world’s ridicule and the astonishment of the Ukrainian president, who did not have sufficient ability or experience to properly assess the political situation.
President Biden has managed the Ukraine crisis in the worst possible way, showing the whole world that he can deter Russia when the actual truth is certainly the opposite. The United States may have the ability to project its power anywhere in the world, but when dealing with another great power’s sphere of influence, its deterrence capacity is greatly diminished.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Space China Heg Inevitable
Minter 22 [Adam Minter is a columnist at Bloomberg Opinion where he writes about China, technology, and the environment, 6-29-2022, Will China Overtake US on Mars Missions? It’s Up to NASA, Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-06-29/china-is-quickly-challenging-us-on-mars-exploration] Eric
In 2033, a U.S. spacecraft will return to Earth carrying the second cache of rocks ever collected from the surface of Mars. The first cache? It will have been collected by China two years earlier, in 2031, according to plans last week by one of China's top space scientists.
Of course, there's no guarantee that either mission will succeed. But China's impressive recent successes operating on and above the Moon and Mars give the country a better chance at lapping NASA and its partners.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Dollar China Heg Inevitable
Nunes 4-12 [Maria Claudia Nunes serves as a volunteer researcher at the Nucleus of Conjunctural Assessment (NAC), as technology specialist at the Naval War School (EGN) in Brazil, and a Political Science Professor’s Assistant in University of São Paulo, 4-12-2022, A Slow Erosion: The Uncertain Future of the Dollar, Geopolitics, https://thegeopolitics.com/a-slow-erosion-the-uncertain-future-of-the-dollar/] Eric
In other words, the economic challenges posed by various countries during the last decade, such as the creation of the BRICS bank, are a reaction to poor American economic policy. Currency depreciation as a result of Quantitative Easing did not result in large inflation within the United States due to the dollar status as the international trade currency as it exported its . The cascading effect from this exportation created a cycle of escape from the dollar as many central banks sought different currencies with a higher yield as well as started to accumulate gold as a method of preventing these inflationary shocks created by American policies. In fact, according to a report by World Gold Council, gold purchase by a diverse group of central banks last year pushing the total global purchases of the asset to a new 30-year-high; as well as the IMF noting that in the same year, the amount of dollars utilized as reserve currency has reached a .
Twinned Acceleration
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Military China Heg
Freeman, 17 - Senior Fellow, the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University (Chas, “Reimagining Great Power Relations” 3/9,
International reactions to the election of Donald Trump have catalyzed a far swifter collapse of the American-led world order than anyone could have imagined. Interactions between great and middle-ranking powers are undergoing rapid evolution. The political, economic, and military interests and influence of the United States still span the globe, as does American popular culture. Nations and non-state actors in every region continue to worry about American policies, activism, or passivity on matters of concern to them. In short, the United States is still the planet’s only all-around world power. But the clout that status confers is not what it used to be.
The only other polity with the potential to rival America’s worldwide influence at present is the European Union (EU). It has the money but lacks the ambition or political and military cohesion to exert decisive influence beyond its periphery. Until “Brexit,” the EU included two former world powers, Britain and France. Now only France -- which retains a sphere of influence in Africa and overseas territories in the Caribbean, Indian Ocean, and Polynesia – can bring a global perspective to EU councils.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Military China Heg
Layne, 18 – Christopher Layne is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, and, Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (“The US–Chinese power shift
and the end of the Pax Americana” International Affairs 94: 1 (2018) 89–111; doi: 10.1093/ia/iix249 LRBIO = Liberal Rules Based International Order
In a recent report on the Sino-American military balance, the RAND Corporation refers to the ‘receding frontier of US military dominance’ in east Asia.28 According to RAND, the trend lines in the Sino-American military rivalry in east Asia are not favourable for the United States: ‘Although China has not closed the gap with the United States, it has narrowed it—and it has done so quite rapidly. Even for many of the contributors to this report, who track military developments in Asia on an ongoing basis, the speed of change … was striking.’29 In a recent book, Roger Cliff, an east Asian security expert at RAND, says that by 2020 China’s military establishment will be almost on an equal footing with America’s with respect to doctrine, equipment, personnel and training (though still lagging behind in organizational structure, logistics and organizational culture). Consequently, he predicts that by 2020 American military dominance in east Asia will be significantly eroded.30 He predicts that the 2020s will witness a power transition in east Asia and that at this point China will be able to challenge the regional status quo.31
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Military China Heg
David Brown 12-21-2021 [Writing for BBC, BBC News, “Why China could win the new global arms race,” https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-59600475//ZW]
China is building up its armed forces at a rapid pace. Its advances in missile technology, nuclear weapons and artificial intelligence have triggered serious concern among many Western observers, who believe a profound shift in the global balance of military power is under way. President Xi Jinping has ordered China's armed forces to modernise by 2035. They should, he says, become a "world-class" military power, capable of "fighting and winning wars" by 2049. It is a huge undertaking, but the country is on target. Spending big China has been criticised by some international experts for a "lack of transparency" over how much it spends on defence, and an "inconsistent reporting of figures". Beijing does publish official spending data, but Western estimates of China's financial support for its armed forces are often significantly higher. It is widely believed that China currently spends more on its armed forces than any country except the US. The growth of China's military budget has outpaced its overall economic growth for at least a decade, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Boosting the nuclear stockpile In November, the US Department of Defense predicted that China was set to quadruple its nuclear stockpile by the end of the current decade. China, it said, "likely intends to have at least 1,000 warheads by 2030". Chinese state media called the claim "wild and biased speculation", adding that nuclear forces were kept at a "minimum level". However, experts at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, who publish annual assessments of global stockpiles, say China has been increasing the number of its warheads over recent years. China is still a long way short of the US stockpile of 5,550 warheads, but its nuclear build-up is being seen as one of the biggest threats to Western military supremacy. "China's nuclear weapons are the most important issue," according to Veerle Nouwens, of the Royal United Services institute in London. "There is a huge lack of trust on both sides and dialogue is nowhere near the level needed. There are big risks and the off-ramps are difficult to see." Hypersonic future Hypersonic missiles travel at more than five times the speed of sound. They are not as fast as intercontinental ballistic missiles, but they are so difficult to detect in flight that they may render some air defences useless. "The Chinese understand that they are a long way behind, so they are trying to make big breakthroughs to leap-frog other powers," according to Dr Zeno Leoni, of King's College London. "Developing hypersonic missiles is one of the ways they're trying to do this." China has denied testing hypersonic missiles, but Western experts believe that two rocket launches last summer indicate that its military is well on the way to acquiring them. It's unclear exactly what systems China may be developing. There are two main types: Hypersonic glide missiles stay within the Earth's atmosphere Fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) fly in low orbit before accelerating towards a target It is possible that China may have succeeded in combining the two systems, firing a hypersonic missile from an FOBS manoeuvrable spacecraft. Dr Leoni says that while hypersonic missiles may not - on their own - be a game-changer, they will make some targets highly vulnerable to attack. "Hypersonic missiles make aircraft carriers in particular much more difficult to defend," he says. However, he also suggests that that the threat from Chinese hypersonic missiles may have been overstated by some Western officials, who are keen to make as strong a case as possible for the financing of military space technology. "The threat is real. Yet, it is possible that this is being exaggerated." Artificial intelligence and cyber-attacks China is now fully committed to developing "intelligentised" warfare, or future military methods based on disruptive technologies - especially artificial intelligence, according to the US Department of Defense. China's Academy of Military Science has been given a mandate to make sure that this happens, through "civil-military fusion", in other words joining up Chinese private sector technology companies with the country's defence industries. Reports suggest that China may already be using artificial intelligence in military robotics and missile guidance systems, as well as unmanned aerial vehicles and unmanned naval vessels. China has already conducted large-scale cyber-operations abroad, according to a recent expert assessment. In July the UK, US and EU accused China of carrying out a major cyber-attack targeting Microsoft Exchange servers. It is believed that the attack affected at least 30,000 organisations globally and aimed to enable large-scale espionage, including the acquisition of personal information and intellectual property. The world's largest, but not most powerful, navy China has overtaken the US to become the largest navy in the world - but experts point out that a simple comparison of ship numbers leaves out numerous factors which determine a navy's capabilities. But, they say, an examination of the trends can be useful. For now, the US maintains a strong lead in many naval capabilities, with 11 aircraft carriers to China's two, and more nuclear-powered submarines, cruisers and destroyers - or larger warships. But China is expected to expand its navy much further. Former People's Liberation Army Senior Colonel Zhou Bo, of Tsinghua University in Beijing, says he believes it is "critically important" for China to strengthen its navy to counter the sea-based threats which it faces. In particular, he says: "The most outstanding problem we face is what we perceive to be American provocation in China's waters." The US Navy predicts that between 2020 and 2040, the total number of Chinese navy ships will increase by nearly 40%. Uncertain future Is China moving away from non-confrontation towards a more threatening stance? For now, the Chinese approach is still "win without fighting", says Dr Leoni, although he adds that it could change this strategy some time in the future. "Becoming a fully modernised naval power could be one tipping point." But Senior Colonel Zhou insists that Western fears are unfounded. "China has no intention of policing the world, unlike the United States," he says. "Even if China becomes much stronger one day, it will maintain its basic policies." China has not fought a war since 1979, when it went into battle with Vietnam, so much of its military capabilities are completely untested. Many in both the West and in China will hope it stays that way.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Military China Heg
Robert Burns 11-01-21 [Writing for Associated Press, Nomaan Merchant of AP contributed, Associated Press, “Pentagon rattled by Chinese military push on multiple fronts,” https://apnews.com/article/technology-china-asia-united-states-beijing-aea288656fab23253ee0397dc21ba68a//ZW]
WASHINGTON (AP) — China’s growing military muscle and its drive to end American predominance in the Asia-Pacific is rattling the U.S. defense establishment. American officials see trouble quickly accumulating on multiple fronts — Beijing’s expanding nuclear arsenal, its advances in space, cyber and missile technologies, and threats to Taiwan. “The pace at which China is moving is stunning,” says Gen. John Hyten, the No. 2-ranking U.S. military officer, who previously commanded U.S. nuclear forces and oversaw Air Force space operations. At stake is a potential shift in the global balance of power that has favored the United States for decades. A realignment more favorable to China does not pose a direct threat to the United States but could complicate U.S. alliances in Asia. New signs of how the Pentagon intends to deal with the China challenge may emerge in coming weeks from Biden administration policy reviews on nuclear weapons, global troop basing and overall defense strategy. For now, officials marvel at how Beijing is marshaling the resources, technology and political will to make rapid gains — so rapid that the Biden administration is attempting to reorient all aspects of U.S. foreign and defense policy. The latest example of surprising speed was China’s test of a hypersonic weapon capable of partially orbiting Earth before reentering the atmosphere and gliding on a maneuverable path to its target. The weapon system’s design is meant to evade U.S. missile defenses, and although Beijing insisted it was testing a reusable space vehicle, not a missile, the test appeared to have startled U.S. officials. Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the test was “very close” to being a Sputnik moment, akin to the 1957 launching by the Soviet Union of the world’s first space satellite, which caught the world by surprise and fed fears the United States had fallen behind technologically. What followed was a nuclear arms and space race that ultimately bankrupted the Soviet Union. Milley and other U.S. officials have declined to discuss details of the Chinese test, saying they are secret. He called it “very concerning” for the United States but added that problems posed by China’s military modernization run far deeper. “That’s just one weapon system,” he said in a Bloomberg Television interview. “The Chinese military capabilities are much greater than that. They’re expanding rapidly in space, in cyber and then in the traditional domains of land, sea and air.” On the nuclear front, private satellite imagery in recent months has revealed large additions of launch silos that suggest the possibility that China plans to increase its fleet of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, or ICBMs. Hans Kristensen, a nuclear weapons expert at the Federation of American Scientists, says China appears to have about 250 ICBM silos under construction, which he says is more than 10 times the number in operation today. The U.S. military, by comparison, has 400 active ICBM silos and 50 in reserve. Pentagon officials and defense hawks on Capitol Hill point to China’s modernization as a key justification for rebuilding the U.S. nuclear arsenal, a project expected to cost more than $1 billion over 30 years, including sustainment costs. Fiona Cunningham, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Pennsylvania and a specialist in Chinese military strategy, says a key driver of Beijing’s nuclear push is its concerns about U.S. intentions. “I don’t think China’s nuclear modernization is giving it a capability to pre-emptively strike the U.S. nuclear arsenal, and that was a really important generator of competition during the Cold War,” Cunningham said in an online forum sponsored by Georgetown University. “But what it does do is to limit the effectiveness of U.S. attempts to pre-emptively strike the Chinese arsenal.” Some analysts fear Washington will worry its way into an arms race with Beijing, frustrated at being unable to draw the Chinese into security talks. Congress also is increasingly focused on China and supports a spending boost for space and cyber operations and hypersonic technologies. There is a push, for example, to put money in the next defense budget to arm guided-missile submarines with hypersonic weapons, a plan initiated by the Trump administration. For decades, the United States tracked China’s increased defense investment and worried that Beijing was aiming to become a global power. But for at least the last 20 years, Washington was focused more on countering al-Qaida and other terrorist threats in Iraq and Afghanistan. That began to change during the Trump administration, which in 2018 formally elevated China to the top of the list of defense priorities, along with Russia, replacing terrorism as the No. 1 threat. For now, Russia remains a bigger strategic threat to the United States because its nuclear arsenal far outnumbers China’s. But Milley and others say Beijing is a bigger long-term worry because its economic strength far exceeds that of Russia, and it is rapidly pouring resources into military modernization. At the current pace of China’s military investment and achievement, Beijing “will surpass Russia and the United States” in overall military power in coming years “if we don’t do something to change it,” said Hyten, who is retiring in November after two years as vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. “It will happen.” The Biden administration says it is determined to compete effectively with China, banking on a network of allies in Asia and beyond that are a potential source of strength that Beijing cannot match. That was central to the reasoning behind a Biden decision to share highly sensitive nuclear propulsion technologies with Australia, enabling it to acquire a fleet of conventionally armed submarines to counter China. Although this was a boost for Australia, it was a devastating blow to Washington’s oldest ally, France, which saw its $66 billion submarine sale to Australia scuttled in the process. Taiwan is another big worry. Senior U.S. military officers have been warning this year that China is probably accelerating its timetable for capturing control of Taiwan, the island democracy widely seen as the most likely trigger for a potentially catastrophic U.S.-China war. The United States has long pledged to help Taiwan defend itself, but it has deliberately left unclear how far it would go in response to a Chinese attack. President Joe Biden appeared to abandon that ambiguity when he said Oct. 21 that America would come to Taiwan’s defense if it were attacked by China. “We have a commitment to do that,” Biden said. The White House later said he was not changing U.S. policy, which does not support Taiwanese independence but is committed to providing defensive arms.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Economy China Heg Inevitable
Jiayao 22 [Li Jiayao, 06-2-2022, American rules backed up by coercive diplomacy, arbitrary bullying, , http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2022-06/29/content_10167444.htm] Eric
Not long ago, the US Secretary of State Blinken delivered a speech on China policy that highlighted the so-called “China threats”, smeared China’s domestic and foreign policies, and once again accused it of “coercive diplomacy”. Yet this label is best pinned on the US itself.
In practicing its “coercive diplomacy”, the US leverages its superiority in the economic, military and other sectors to force other countries to meet its demands and change their way of action, all for the purpose of achieving its own strategic goals and maintaining its hegemony through improper means.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Economy China Heg Inevitable
Bradt 22 [George Bradt is a senior contributor at Forbes who focuses on executive onboarding and leading through points of inflection, 6-7-2022, Why Economic Self-Sufficiency Is Imperative In The Coming US-China Reset, Per Ram Charan, Forbes, https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgebradt/2022/06/07/why-economic-self-sufficiency-is-imperative-in-the-coming-us-china-reset-per-ram-charan/] Eric
The Charan doctrine is that the rivalry between national spheres of influence is a three-legged stool made up of political, military and economic strengths. Like a three-legged stool, the legs are interdependent. Without relative economic strength, the sphere’s political and military strength will decay over time. As the autocracies’ relative economic strength increases, so will their political and military strength.
Just as no nation can compete over time with another nation on which it is dependent for military resources, no nation or sphere can compete effectively with its rival who controls its supply chain and accumulates trillions of trade surplus and hard dollar currency.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Economy China Heg Inevitable
MacDonald and Parent, 18 – Paul MacDonald is Associate Professor in Political Science at Wellesley College. Joseph M. Parent is associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame (Twilight of the Titans: Great Power Decline and Retrenchment, conclusion)
Unless trends in relative power reverse, however, our theory suggests the incoming administration will find it difficult to abandon retrenchment. Given the sluggish performance of the American economy relative to its rivals, continued deficits, and concerns about the national debt, there will be limits on the ability of the incoming administration to ramp up defense spending. Already, there have been clashes between deficit and defense hawks in Congress over the size and method of funding Trump's proposed defense increases.53 The continued increase of Chinese economic influence and military capacity in Asia presents analogous geopolitical constraints on U.S. policy in that region. Despite tough talk on the campaign trail, the real- ity is that any lasting solution to the North Korean nuclear program, mari- time disputes in the South China Sea, or the status of Taiwan will require some accommodation of Chinese interests. More broadly, efforts to remake failed states or underwrite stability in regions such as the Middle East are likely to be met with skepticism. There is little enthusiasm within either Congress or the public to undertake such ambitious projects, and it seems likely that the favored counterterrorism instruments will remain the familiar ones: standoff airpower, assistance to local allies, the selective use of special operations forces, and regional diplomacy. Given the limits on America's resources, time, and attention, the new administration will prob- ably imitate the old, seeking to keep existing wars contained, while looking to fight them on the cheap.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Economy China Heg Inevitable
Layne, 18 – Christopher Layne is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, and, Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (“The US–Chinese power shift
and the end of the Pax Americana” International Affairs 94: 1 (2018) 89–111; doi: 10.1093/ia/iix249 LRBIO = Liberal Rules Based International Order; italics in original
During the past decade, signs of waning US economic power—and China’s growing economic muscle—have become too numerous to ignore. Since the onset of the Great Recession, China has successively taken top position in the world in exports (passing Germany); in trade (passing the United States); and in manufacturing (claiming a title the United States had held for a century). In 2014 the World Bank made the stunning announcement that China had vaulted past the United States to become the world’s largest economy (measured by purchasing power parity (PPP);32 and in the early to mid-2020s China is predicted to overtake the United States in GDP measured by market exchange rate.33 These shifts in the relative economic power of China and the United States have enormous economic and geopolitical implications. Indeed, in July 2017 Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, stated that in ten years’ time the organization’s headquarters—which are required by its by-laws to be located in its member country with the largest economy—could be in Beijing.34 Taken together, these indicators paint a clear picture of relative economic decline.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Economy China Heg Inevitable
Layne, 18 – Christopher Layne is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, and, Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security, at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University (“The US–Chinese power shift
and the end of the Pax Americana” International Affairs 94: 1 (2018) 89–111; doi: 10.1093/ia/iix249 LRBIO = Liberal Rules Based International Order; italics in original
During the past decade, signs of waning US economic power—and China’s growing economic muscle—have become too numerous to ignore. Since the onset of the Great Recession, China has successively taken top position in the world in exports (passing Germany); in trade (passing the United States); and in manufacturing (claiming a title the United States had held for a century). In 2014 the World Bank made the stunning announcement that China had vaulted past the United States to become the world’s largest economy (measured by purchasing power parity (PPP);32 and in the early to mid-2020s China is predicted to overtake the United States in GDP measured by market exchange rate.33 These shifts in the relative economic power of China and the United States have enormous economic and geopolitical implications. Indeed, in July 2017 Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, stated that in ten years’ time the organization’s headquarters—which are required by its by-laws to be located in its member country with the largest economy—could be in Beijing.34 Taken together, these indicators paint a clear picture of relative economic decline.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Economy China Heg Inevitable
Jennings 22 - English news from the Voice of America (Ralph, “China’s Economy Could Overtake US Economy by 2030,” Voice of America, 1-4-22, , Accessed 7-1-22, LASA-AH)
China’s economy will increasingly rely on state investment, high-tech development and domestic consumption – with less input from its past staple of export manufacturing – as it stands to overtake the United States in the coming decade, analysts predict. China’s GDP should grow 5.7% per year through 2025 and then 4.7% annually until 2030, British consultancy Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) forecasts. Its forecast says that China, now the world’s second-largest economy, would overtake the No. 1-ranked U.S. economy by 2030. Credit insurance firm Euler Hermes made a similar forecast. Chinese leaders have pushed over the past decade to rely more on value-added services over traditional factory exports, state media have said. The Sino-U.S. trade dispute and early 2020 workplace closures due to COVID-19 have added pressure on manufacturing. Reducing factory output in China, foreign multinationals have been expanding outside China, targeting places such as Vietnam to avoid rising wages and environmental compliance costs. By offshoring in multiple countries they hope to head off any repeat of China's early 2020 COVID-19 lockdowns that shut down factories. China’s economy totaled $15.92 trillion in 2020, and market research firm IHS Markit estimates that it reached $18 trillion last year on export manufacturing growth and capital for new projects. The U.S. economy reached about $23 trillion last year, the market research firm said. State investment The country that’s already known for fast economic growth over the past 20 years would see the state take more control over key sectors after intervening in several, including the internet, in 2021, economists expect. “Beijing has the funds and the unfettered domestic political power to use China’s large public treasury to make strategic investments in the service of the leadership’s national and global objectives,” said Denny Roy, senior fellow at the East-West Center think tank in Honolulu. China scored 2.98 in 2018, up from 2.45 eight years earlier and approaching about three times the world average, on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development policy forum’s Direct Control Over Enterprises index. That means the government’s direct control over enterprises “well exceeded the open economy average” and “reflects China’s increasing emphasis on the role of the state in the economy under Xi Jinping,” the think tank Atlantic Council says in its October report China Pathfinder: Annual Scorecard . Growth in tech hardware Chinese leaders will probably prioritize tech, especially hardware that does not require constant innovation, as a growth engine, economists say. State intervention in the internet sector won't hobble [inhibit] expansion in semiconductors and infrastructure software, said Zennon Kapron, founder and director of the Shanghai-based financial industry research firm Kapronasia. “If the country does become self-sufficient in terms of technology and then is able to sell and export those products and services that are based on the technology, then that would be a huge bump to its economy, because [that] is a key driver certainly of the U.S. GDP now,” Kapron said. The U.S. economy will keep growing but without spurts through 2030, Kapron predicts. China has a “huge base of engineers,” albeit less creativity than it needs to foster the “zany ideas” that drive development of new technology, said Douglas McWilliams, founder and executive deputy chairman of CEBR. Consumer spending Domestic spending has driven most of China’s economic growth before 2021 as the country reduced its exposure to the world in view of the Sino-U.S. trade dispute, McKinsey & Co. says in its China consumer report 2021. Supply chains have “matured and localized, and its innovation capabilities were enhanced” in turn, McKinsey & Co says. That trend is likely to continue despite hits to income under lockdowns during the first year of COVID-19, analysts say. China’s population exceeds that of the United States by 3.5 times, though American consumers are wealthier on average. “In the past five years, domestic consumption has … become a more significant growth driver as China’s domestic consumer market has grown dramatically in size,” said Rajiv Biswas, Asia-Pacific chief economist with IHS Markit. Beijing’s leadership “aims to create more than 11 million new urban jobs and expand domestic demand and effective investment,” the official Xinhua News Agency said in mid-2021. Those measures, it said, “are expected to put the economy firmly back to pre-pandemic vibrancy.” What if China overtakes US economy? Status as the world’s largest economy does not confer any automatic advantages over others, economists said, but countries dependent on the Chinese economy would take note. “There is no gold medal or anything like that,” CEBR’s McWilliams told VOA. “But when you’ve got more money to spend, you do have the ability to influence things, and China will have that ability to influence things.” China would be better placed, he said, to advance its Belt and Road Initiative, a 9-year-old effort aimed at building land and sea trade routes through Asia, Europe and Africa in the form of infrastructure projects and investments. Officials in Beijing are already leveraging their economy in disputes with other countries, said Roy of the East-West Center. China vies with four Southeast Asian governments over maritime sovereignty, contests a group of islets with Japan and has gotten into territorial standoffs with India since 2017. “The result of that expectation (China surpassing the United States economically) has been a bolder PRC (People's Republic of China) foreign policy that seeks to settle regional disputes in China’s favor and to de-legitimize U.S. regional and global leadership under the assumption that China is destined to set the new rules of international relations,” Roy said.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Economy China Heg Inevitable
Layne 18 - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, , Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)
Washington’s inability to persuade Berlin to adopt a policy of economic stimulus highlighted America’s flagging ability to act as the leader of the interna- tional economy. The then Treasury Secretary Jack Lew implicitly admitted this at the October 2015 IMF–World Bank biannual meetings when, echoing President Obama, he stated that the United States could not be the ‘sole engine’ of global growth. And the Trump administration, although it has complained loudly that Germany exports too much and imports too little, has like its predecessor been unable to push or persuade Berlin into reducing its trade surplus while simultane- ously increasing its consumption. Even as the US ability to manage the international economy is decreasing, China’s growing economic clout has profound implications for the Sino-American strategic balance. For example, the Obama administration’s ‘pivot’ to Asia was intended to reassure the nations of east and south-east Asia that the United States would use its military power to offset China’s growing economic influence in the region. As Jeffrey Bader, the Obama administration’s National Security Council director for Asia, put it: China’s emergence, China’s rise, is the focus of attention not only of the United States but among all countries in the region. None of them wants to have hostile or adversarial relations with China. At the same time, none wants to be dominated by China. The countries in the region welcome the US presence as, if you will, a kind of balance against China.47 However, the outlook for this ‘balancing’ strategy is clouded. Doubtless, Bader was correct: regional states do not want to be forced to choose between aligning either with China or with the United States. But economic trends suggest that they will be inexorably drawn into Beijing’s geopolitical orbit by the overpow- ering magnetic pull of the Chinese economy. The lessening of America’s regional economic influence, and the corresponding jump in that of China, have been dramatic. In 1993 China accounted for only 2 per cent of ASEAN’s trade in goods, and the United States accounted for 18 per cent. By 2013, however, the American share of ASEAN trade in goods had shrunk to 8.2 per cent while China’s had skyrocketed to 14 per cent.48 Growing economic dependence on China is reflected in geopolitical alignments. Since 2016, Malaysia, Cambodia, Myanmar and the Philippines have all tilted away from the United States and towards China. Even Australia, long a staunch US ally, is debating the merits of taking a more equidistant political stance between Washington and Beijing because of its economic dependence on China. In the coming years these trends are likely to continue, and China will be able to leverage its economic power to enhance its geopolitical position in east and south-east Asia—and diminish that of the United States.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Economy China Heg Inevitable
Layne 18 - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, , Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)
American economic decline and the impairment of US economic hegemony During the past decade, signs of waning US economic power—and China’s growing economic muscle—have become too numerous to ignore. Since the onset of the Great Recession, China has successively taken top position in the world in exports (passing Germany); in trade (passing the United States); and in manufacturing (claiming a title the United States had held for a century). In 2014 the World Bank made the stunning announcement that China had vaulted past the United States to become the world’s largest economy (measured by purchasing power parity (PPP);32 and in the early to mid-2020s China is predicted to overtake the United States in GDP measured by market exchange rate.33 These shifts in the relative economic power of China and the United States have enormous economic and geopolitical implications. Indeed, in July 2017 Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, stated that in ten years’ time the organization’s headquar- ters—which are required by its by-laws to be located in its member country with the largest economy—could be in Beijing.34 Taken together, these indicators paint a clear picture of relative economic decline.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Economy China Heg Inevitable
Layne 18 - professor at Texas A&M University's. George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The US–Chinese power shift and the end of the Pax Americana,” 2018, , Accessed 6-30-22, LASA-AH)
American decline redux Today the military, economic, institutional and ideational pillars that have supported the Pax Americana are being challenged by China. This raises two fundamental and intimately connected questions: if China surpasses, equals or even approximates the United States in these dimensions of power, can the Pax Americana endure? And, if it cannot, what will replace it? Posing these questions raises the contentious issue—contentious at least in the US—of whether American power is, in fact, declining. During his abortive 2012 run for the Republican presi- dential nomination, Jon Huntsman—President Obama’s Ambassador to China, and now President Trump’s Ambassador to Russia—succinctly expressed the prevailing view of the US foreign policy establishment when he said: ‘Decline is un-American.’ Leading US security studies experts agree. These primacists argue that the extent of China’s rise—and hence of America’s decline—are, like prema- ture reports of Mark Twain’s death, greatly exaggerated. Primacists believe the international system is still unipolar, and that US power will keep it that way for a long time to come. This claim is increasingly dubious. Indeed, the case made by the ‘declinists’ of the 1980s—notably Paul Kennedy, Robert Gilpin, David Calleo and Samuel P. Huntington—looks stronger every day.23 Contrary to the portrayal of their argument by many of their critics, the 1980s declinists did not claim either that America’s post-Second World War power advantages had already dissipated, or that the United States was on the brink of a rapid, catastrophic decline. Rather, they pointed to domestic and international economic drivers that, over time, would cause American economic power to diminish relatively, thereby shifting the balance of power. In essence, the declinists believed that the United States was experiencing a slow—‘termite-like’—decline caused by fundamental structural weaknesses in the American economy that were gradually nibbling at its founda- tions.24 Kennedy himself was explicitly looking ahead to the effects this termite decline would have on the US world role in the early twenty-first century. As he wrote: The task facing American statesmen over the next decades ... is to recognize that broad trends are under way, and that there is a need to ‘manage’ affairs so that the relative erosion of the United States’ position takes place slowly and smoothly, and is not accelerated by policies which bring merely short-term advantage but longer-term disadvantage.25 The unwinding of the Pax Americana Decline may be ‘un-American’, but that does not mean it isn’t happening. Ameri- ca’s ‘unipolar moment’ has turned out to be rather—well, momentary.26 The Great Recession that began in 2007–2008 did not end America’s unipolar ascen- dancy. It did, however, focus attention on, and accelerate, the ebbing of American power—the evidence of which has cumulated rapidly over the ensuing ten years. This slippage of US dominance is chipping away at each of the four pillars on which the Pax Americana was erected: military power; economic power; institu- tions; and soft power. As these pillars erode, it becomes increasingly doubtful that the Pax Americana can endure. China’s challenge to American military power Until now the dominant view within the US foreign policy establishment has been that military strength is the one area in which America’s advantage is insur- mountable (at least within any meaningful time-frame). American military power is considered by US policy-makers and many security studies scholars to be the geopolitical trump card—no pun intended—that will ensure continuing American dominance even if China closes the economic and technological gaps separating it from the United States.27 However, some within the foreign policy establish- ment are beginning to question this viewpoint. Important recent studies of the Sino-American military balance suggest that some analysts are taking a fresh look at the question of how long it will take China to catch up with the US militarily. China and the United States face different grand strategic challenges. As self- styled global hegemon, America must be able project decisive military power to the three regions it considers vital to both its security and its prosperity: Europe, the Middle East and east Asia. In contrast, China’s strategic goals, at least for now, are more limited. China aims at dominating its own geographic backyard: that is, it seeks regional hegemony in east and south-east Asia, which have become the focal points of Sino-American geopolitical competition. Even if China is not at present able to mount a global challenge to the US, there is evidence that it is beginning to draw level with the United States in regional military power in east Asia. In a recent report on the Sino-American military balance, the RAND Corporation refers to the ‘receding frontier of US military dominance’ in east Asia.28 According to RAND, the trend lines in the Sino-American military rivalry in east Asia are not favourable for the United States: ‘Although China has not closed the gap with the United States, it has narrowed it—and it has done so quite rapidly. Even for many of the contributors to this report, who track military developments in Asia on an ongoing basis, the speed of change ... was striking.’29 In a recent book, Roger Cliff, an east Asian security expert at RAND, says that by 2020 China’s military establishment will be almost on an equal footing with America’s with respect to doctrine, equipment, personnel and training (though still lagging behind in organizational structure, logistics and organizational culture). Consequently, he predicts that by 2020 American military dominance in east Asia will be significantly eroded.30 He predicts that the 2020s will witness a power transition in east Asia and that at this point China will be able to challenge the regional status quo.31
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Economy China Heg Inevitable
Schweller, 18 - Randall Schweller is Professor of Political Science and a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow, The Ohio State University (“Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2018, 23–48 doi: 10.1093/cjip/poy003
China’s new assertiveness and the sudden inward turn of the United States are a function of causes located in both the second and third images. The key secondimage variable is nationalism, which combines with the power trajectories (a third-image variable) of both China and the United States to define how their relationship will unfold in the coming years. The interaction between nationalism and power trajectory produces entirely different foreign policy orientations in rising and declining powers—the former embraces an outward-looking, extroverted foreign policy of expansion, while the latter adopts an inward-looking, introverted foreign policy of restraint and retrenchment.
Why the focus on nationalism? Nationalism provides a natural complement to structural realist theory; it is rightly viewed as realism’s domestic-level counterpart.3 The constant struggle among nations over issues of power, security, and prestige that animates realism is in no small part a consequence of nationalism, which ‘fuels interstate rivalry and by its sharp delineation of in- and out-groups, abets status rivalry, accentuates stereotyping, and deepens and perpetuates perceived grievances.’4 This seems obvious enough.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
China Heg Good NEG › Block › 2nc --- Economy China Heg Inevitable
Ralph Jennings 01-04-2022 [Writing for VOA, Voice of America, “China’s Economy Could Overtake US Economy by 2030,” https://www.voanews.com/a/chinas-economy-could-overtake-us-economy-by-2030/6380892.html//ZW]
SAN FRANCISCO — China’s economy will increasingly rely on state investment, high-tech development and domestic consumption – with less input from its past staple of export manufacturing – as it stands to overtake the United States in the coming decade, analysts predict. China’s GDP should grow 5.7% per year through 2025 and then 4.7% annually until 2030, British consultancy Centre for Economics and Business Research (CEBR) forecasts. Its forecast says that China, now the world’s second-largest economy, would overtake the No. 1-ranked U.S. economy by 2030. Credit insurance firm Euler Hermes made a similar forecast. Chinese leaders have pushed over the past decade to rely more on value-added services over traditional factory exports, state media have said. The Sino-U.S. trade dispute and early 2020 workplace closures due to COVID-19 have added pressure on manufacturing. Reducing factory output in China, foreign multinationals have been expanding outside China, targeting places such as Vietnam to avoid rising wages and environmental compliance costs. By offshoring in multiple countries they hope to head off any repeat of China's early 2020 COVID-19 lockdowns that shut down factories. China’s economy totaled $15.92 trillion in 2020, and market research firm IHS Markit estimates that it reached $18 trillion last year on export manufacturing growth and capital for new projects. The U.S. economy reached about $23 trillion last year, the market research firm said. State investment The country that’s already known for fast economic growth over the past 20 years would see the state take more control over key sectors after intervening in several, including the internet, in 2021, economists expect. “Beijing has the funds and the unfettered domestic political power to use China’s large public treasury to make strategic investments in the service of the leadership’s national and global objectives,” said Denny Roy, senior fellow at the East-West Center think tank in Honolulu. China scored 2.98 in 2018, up from 2.45 eight years earlier and approaching about three times the world average, on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation Development policy forum’s Direct Control Over Enterprises index. That means the government’s direct control over enterprises “well exceeded the open economy average” and “reflects China’s increasing emphasis on the role of the state in the economy under Xi Jinping,” the think tank Atlantic Council says in its October report China Pathfinder: Annual Scorecard . Growth in tech hardware Chinese leaders will probably prioritize tech, especially hardware that does not require constant innovation, as a growth engine, economists say. State intervention in the internet sector won't hobble expansion in semiconductors and infrastructure software, said Zennon Kapron, founder and director of the Shanghai-based financial industry research firm Kapronasia. “If the country does become self-sufficient in terms of technology and then is able to sell and export those products and services that are based on the technology, then that would be a huge bump to its economy, because [that] is a key driver certainly of the U.S. GDP now,” Kapron said. The U.S. economy will keep growing but without spurts through 2030, Kapron predicts. China has a “huge base of engineers,” albeit less creativity than it needs to foster the “zany ideas” that drive development of new technology, said Douglas McWilliams, founder and executive deputy chairman of CEBR. Consumer spending Domestic spending has driven most of China’s economic growth before 2021 as the country reduced its exposure to the world in view of the Sino-U.S. trade dispute, McKinsey & Co. says in its China consumer report 2021. Supply chains have “matured and localized, and its innovation capabilities were enhanced” in turn, McKinsey & Co says. That trend is likely to continue despite hits to income under lockdowns during the first year of COVID-19, analysts say. China’s population exceeds that of the United States by 3.5 times, though American consumers are wealthier on average. “In the past five years, domestic consumption has … become a more significant growth driver as China’s domestic consumer market has grown dramatically in size,” said Rajiv Biswas, Asia-Pacific chief economist with IHS Markit. Beijing’s leadership “aims to create more than 11 million new urban jobs and expand domestic demand and effective investment,” the official Xinhua News Agency said in mid-2021. Those measures, it said, “are expected to put the economy firmly back to pre-pandemic vibrancy.” What if China overtakes US economy? Status as the world’s largest economy does not confer any automatic advantages over others, economists said, but countries dependent on the Chinese economy would take note. “There is no gold medal or anything like that,” CEBR’s McWilliams told VOA. “But when you’ve got more money to spend, you do have the ability to influence things, and China will have that ability to influence things.” China would be better placed, he said, to advance its Belt and Road Initiative, a 9-year-old effort aimed at building land and sea trade routes through Asia, Europe and Africa in the form of infrastructure projects and investments. Officials in Beijing are already leveraging their economy in disputes with other countries, said Roy of the East-West Center. China vies with four Southeast Asian governments over maritime sovereignty, contests a group of islets with Japan and has gotten into territorial standoffs with India since 2017. “The result of that expectation (China surpassing the United States economically) has been a bolder PRC (People's Republic of China) foreign policy that seeks to settle regional disputes in China’s favor and to de-legitimize U.S. regional and global leadership under the assumption that China is destined to set the new rules of international relations,” Roy said.