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2022 Michigan Affirmative
Solvency Cards

Cooperation with Estonia is key – promotes cybersecurity for all of NATO

David Shedd 20, professor at the Patrick Henry College, former acting director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and Ivana Stradner, Visiting Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, J.S.D. from the University of California, Berkeley,8/11/2020, "Countering Russia’s Influence Operations in the Balkans," https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/countering-russias-influence-operations-the-balkans, RMax

Even the pandemic has the potential for fomenting political unrest. 

In recent days, thousands of Serbs have taken to the streets to protest Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s announced strict curfew in response to a surge in Covid-19 cases. Many have pointed a finger at pro-Russia ultra-right groups and foreign intelligence services for fueling the violent riots.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Solvency Cards

The plan models NATO cybersecurity after the Baltics – empirically dissuades Russian attacks and secures US infrastructure.

Atalayar 7-20 [Atalayar, 7-20-2022, "The Baltic States, a defence model for the future of cyberwarfare", https://atalayar.com/en/content/baltic-states-defence-model-future-cyberwarfare, DOA: 7-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

The world is moving towards a digitised global society full of cyber opportunities. However, as a fully cyber-connected society, this future society will also have to cope with new patterns of conflict, such as cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare.

The Baltic countries - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania - which for years were under the control of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and then forced to fight on the front line of digital warfare, have been forced to take the lead in this process of cyber-innovation. Moscow's attacks on the three pioneers of independence from the USSR have been a constant for years. And they have grown exponentially since the early 2000s.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Modeling Advantage Cards › Modeling---Middle East

The Middle East models.

Belmonte 7-20 [Nerea Belmonte, reporter; 7-20-2022; "The Baltic States, a defence model for the future of cyberwarfare"; Atalayar; https://atalayar.com/en/content/baltic-states-defence-model-future-cyberwarfare; KL]

The world is moving towards a digitised global society full of cyber opportunities. However, as a fully cyber-connected society, this future society will also have to cope with new patterns of conflict, such as cyber-attacks and hybrid warfare.

The Baltic countries - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania - which for years were under the control of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and then forced to fight on the front line of digital warfare, have been forced to take the lead in this process of cyber-innovation. Moscow's attacks on the three pioneers of independence from the USSR have been a constant for years. And they have grown exponentially since the early 2000s.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Modeling Advantage Cards › Taiwan

China-Taiwan war goes nuclear. Deterrence is key.

Pettyjohn and Wasser 5-20-2022, *senior fellow and director of the defense program at the Center for a New American Security, **fellow in the defense program and co-lead of The Gaming Lab at the Center for a New American Security (Stacie and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear,” Foreign Affairs,

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives. AN OUNCE OF PREVENTION The clear lesson from the war game is that the United States needs to strengthen its conventional capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to ensure that China never views an invasion of Taiwan as a prudent tactical move. To do so, the United States will need to commit to maintaining its conventional military superiority by expanding its stockpiles of long-range munitions and investing in undersea capabilities. Washington must also be able to conduct offensive operations inside the first and second island chains even while under attack. This will require access to new bases to distribute U.S. forces, enhance their survivability, and ensure that they can effectively defend Taiwan in the face of China’s attacks. Moreover, the United States needs to develop an integrated network of partners willing to contribute to Taiwan’s defense. Allies are an asymmetric advantage: the United States has them, and China does not. The United States should deepen strategic and operational planning with key partners to send a strong signal of resolve to China. As part of these planning efforts, the United States and its allies will need to develop war-winning military strategies that do not cross Chinese red-lines. The game highlighted just how difficult this task may be; what it did not highlight is the complexity of developing military strategies that integrate the strategic objectives and military capacities of multiple nations. Moving forward, military planners in the United States and in Washington’s allies and partners must grapple with the fact that, in a conflict over Taiwan, China would consider all conventional and nuclear options to be on the table. And the United States is running out of time to strengthen deterrence and keep China from believing an invasion of Taiwan could be successful. The biggest risk is that Washington and its friends choose not to seize the moment and act: a year or two from now, it might already be too late.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Modeling Advantage Cards › Taiwan

***Chinese cyberattacks destabilize Taiwan

Cyber - -> invasion and PRC can destabilize/counter US forces

Sacks 22 (David, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where his work focuses on U.S.-China relations, U.S.-Taiwan relations, Chinese foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and the political thought of Hans Morgenthau. “Enhancing U.S.-Japan Coordination for a Taiwan Conflict”, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Enhancing%20U.S.-Japan%20Coordination%20for%20a%20Taiwan%20Conflict_DP_1.pdf)LR

Adding to the worry, over the past five years China has steadily increased its pressure on Taiwan, reducing the number of mainland tourists who can visit the island, stripping away its few remaining diplomatic partners, placing an embargo on certain Taiwanese exports, ramping up military activities in its vicinity, conducting cyber-attacks, and interfering in Taiwan s democratic process. While Xi continues to publicly stress his commitment to peaceful reunification” with Taiwan and has not introduced an explicit timeline for achieving this objective, he has also said that the Taiwan issue cannot be passed on from generation to generation.”2 He has set 2049 as the date by which China must achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” and achieving reunification” with Taiwan is a core condition for that project.3 Still, it remains unlikely that Xi has already decided to use force against Taiwan, which provides an opening for the United States to adjust its policies and work with its allies to help prevent such an outcome. Although there is debate over whether China will resort to force, China is clearly developing capabilities needed to invade and occupy Taiwan. Preparing for a conflict over Taiwan has driven China s military modernization campaign for the past two and a half decades. China has invested significant resources in developing the tools to defeat Taiwan and prevent the United States from coming to its aid, principally an arsenal of accurate ballistic missiles, the world’s largest navy, hundreds of modern fighter aircraft and bombers, and advanced cyber and counterspace assets The recommendations proposed, while ambitious, are feasible in the current political climate in both Washington and Tokyo, and, with sustained focus in both capitals, can be implemented in the next five years. While China has a number of options it could take to put pressure on Taiwan—seizing an offshore island, initiating massive cyberattacks, firing hundreds of ballistic missiles to take out critical infrastructure, and conducting a quarantine of the island—this paper focuses squarely on how to deter and respond to an invasion of Taiwan. It does so in the belief that Japan s appetite for assisting the United States in countering Chinese aggression against Taiwan short of a full war is politically challenging and likely limited. China is not relying on its inherent advantages, however, and has instead spent the last two and a half decades developing capabilities designed to neutralize U.S. power in the Taiwan Strait. Its military budget has grown from $14.3 billion in 1996 to $252.3 billion in 2020, a nearly eighteenfold increase (see figure 2).7 Preparing for a conflict over Taiwan has consistently driven Beijing s procurement decisions, and China can now bring significant capabilities to bear. The PLA Navy (PLAN) is now the largest navy in the world (as measured by the number of ships, although the United States continues to exceed it by tonnage), with 355 ships and submarines, and is set to grow by nearly 100 ships by the end of the decade.8 The PLA Air Force is the largest air force in the region and is rapidly catching up to Western air forces” and eroding U.S. advantages, according to the U.S. Department of Defense.9 The PLA has one thousand short-range ballistic missiles and six hundred medium-range ballistic missiles in its arsenal.10 China has also established an advanced integrated air defense system on its east coast that can cover Taiwan.11 The PLA is now turning its attention to addressing previous gaps that have persisted, such as anti-submarine warfare, while also rapidly developing information, cyber, and space and counterspace capabilities.12 Taiwan, however, is belatedly recognizing the need to dramatically rethink and invest in its defense. In 2017, its military leadership introduced the Overall Defense Concept(ODC), which aims to develop asymmetric approaches to fend off a Chinese invasion and calls for investing in a large number of smaller, cheaper, and more mobile weapons.23 Rather than seeking to defeat the PLA through attrition, ODC focuses on a decisive fight near Taiwans shores and the prevention of a successful PLA landing. Taiwan has steadily increased its defense budget in recent years, which is now the highest it has ever been in absolute terms.24 More important is using these funds to resource an asymmetric strategy, purchasing missiles, drones, and howitzers.25 There remain obstacles to ODC s implementation, however, and more traditional thinking could well make a comeback.26 All of this means that U.S. intervention on Taiwan s behalf would be a risky and costly proposition, as China can now challenge the United States across all domains and place U.S. aircraft, surface vessels (including aircraft carriers), and bases throughout the Indo-Pacific at risk. In addition, the United States would for the first time be fighting a nuclear-armed opponent with precision standoff weapons, extensive cyberwarfare capabilities, and the ability to target its satellites.27

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Modeling Advantage Cards › Taiwan

Strengthening Baltic cyber security spurs Taiwan-Lithuania cooperation

Cole 21 (J. Michael Cole, Senior Advisor, Countering Foreign Authoritarian Influence (CFAI) at the International Republican Institute (IRI); Global Taiwan Institute, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, Prospect Foundation. Senior Non-Resident Fellow @ Global Taiwan Institute, Masters in War Studies @ Royal Military College of Canada, International Diploma in Humanitarian Assistance @ Fordham University. “The Lithuanian model for expanding Taiwan’s ties with Baltic States”, https://www.caribbeannewsglobal.com/the-lithuanian-model-for-expanding-taiwans-ties-with-baltic-states/)LR

The establishment of a representative office in Lithuania constitutes a victory for Taiwan in its efforts to counter both international isolation and the Chinese narrative of Taiwan’s supposedly inevitable international isolation. By focusing on a part of the world that has not traditionally been an area for Taiwanese presence and engagement, Taipei has also demonstrated the virtues of an asymmetrical approach to combating China on the world stage. This development also exposes the fact that Beijing is willing to break its own rules on “One China,” in that it is now willing to punish states even when they continue to abide by their “One-China Policy” by not establishing official ties with Taiwan. Although the object of Beijing’s ire is ostensibly related to the nomenclature used for Taiwan’s office in Vilnius (which uses the word “Taiwan”), at a deeper level, the source of its anger is the gains that Taiwan has made in Europe, an area where China had hoped to increase its influence. Lithuania has taken some risks in placing its bets on Taiwan, and besides the retaliation it is currently facing, the move may also have cost it future economic opportunities. Consequently, it will be crucial for Taiwan to demonstrate that Vilnius’ risk-taking was not in vain. Already, a large Taiwanese trade and investment delegation has visited the country, with a total of 240 online and offline trade talks involving more than 150 Lithuanian firms and various Taiwanese ones. Taiwan must build on the complementarity of the two economies to replicate its successes in countries like the Czech Republic, where despite much Chinese propaganda, Taiwan has been a much more substantial investor and job creator. Lithuania has a hard-working, highly educated and productive workforce in the manufacturing sector, with strengths in areas such as the laser industry—which has also become a target for Chinese retaliation, with China deciding to halt cooperation between its laser industry bodies and Lithuania. Trade forms the basis of bilateral relations and must be mutually beneficial. Lithuania has made it clear that it expects to reap the benefits of engagement with Taiwan, a country with an economy approximately 11 times larger than its own, as well as a highly advanced tech sector. Lithuania therefore represents a golden opportunity for Taiwan to showcase the advantages of engagement and to demonstrate that small and medium states not only can afford to defy China but can actually benefit materially from doing so. Conversely, failure to build upon and to sustain this momentum could dissuade prospective partners from going down that path. Thus, Taipei must demonstrate a commitment to building prosperous and mutually beneficial ties with its new Baltic ally, and the tangible results must materialize as expeditiously as possible. The potential for engagement between Taiwan and the Baltics goes well beyond trade and investment, however. Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia all have traditions of resistance to external aggression and, by virtue of their proximity to Russia, have developed their own strategies to counter the security threat posed by their much more powerful – and like China, expansionist neighbor. Taiwan and the Baltic states, therefore, have much to learn from each other, in areas ranging from cyber and hybrid warfare to the implementation of an asymmetrical defense posture. While Russia poses the more immediate threat to the Baltic region underscored by apprehensions across the region that Moscow could launch an invasion of Ukraine as early as next January – it is also clear that China has become a more active player in the region, with all the risks of espionage, cyberattacks, co-optation, and hybrid threats that this new presence entails. Countries like Lithuania that have already defied Beijing are now bracing for the very real possibility of cyberattacks against their institutions, and this is an area where Taiwan’s expertise in addressing such threats can come in handy. Appropriate intelligence-sharing mechanisms must therefore be established to facilitate communication, threat mitigation, and response; these are areas where, again, Baltic states can make real gains from a deeper relationship with Taiwan, whose capabilities in the cyber sector are larger by orders of magnitude. The fledgling relationship with this part of Europe also creates opportunities for Taiwan’s indigenous defense industry, particularly in the unmanned vehicle sector: for example, Taiwan donated 10 police drones to Lithuania in October to assist the country as it deals with an influx of refugees from Belarus. For its part, Taiwan has much to learn from the Baltic states in non-traditional military areas, particularly in areas of state resilience and the concept of total defense. For example, as it explores ways by which to increase its deterrence against a Chinese attack, the Taiwanese military could learn important lessons from the Lithuanian Lietuvos Šaulių Sąjunga (“Riflemen’s Union”), the Estonian Defense League, and the National Guard, initiatives that blend traditional military forces with a militia and civilian component. Among other things, Taiwan could learn from those countries’ experiences in providing training to these additional layers of defense, as well as how and where to safely store weapons so that they can be quickly accessed by paramilitary forces in times of national emergency. No doubt Taiwan could learn a thing or two about forming and training a proper Reserve Force. Taiwan and the Baltics can also identify areas for the joint training of special forces and other units charged with waging asymmetrical war against a much more powerful and better-equipped opponent. Latvia and Lithuania, in particular, have clearly signaled their willingness to engage Taiwan more closely on such matters. For this to happen, the Taiwanese government will have to be willing to go beyond its traditional areas of engagement on security issues, and civilian authorities will have to contend with a culture of historical resistance within the ministry of national defense to the idea of giving the population a role in national security (especially one that involves arming them). But as with trade, Taipei will need to overcome those difficulties and, as rapidly as possible, demonstrate to its potential partners that it is ready to engage them in a way that is mutually beneficial. As the experience with Lithuania shows, an unprecedented window of opportunity has been created for Taiwan in the Baltics -one that will not remain open indefinitely. While we cannot expect results overnight, especially on security matters, Taipei cannot afford to drag its feet – and must therefore be proactive in its efforts to turn this potential into a source of real benefits for all the countries involved. It has natural and willing partners in the Baltics; Taipei, too, must demonstrate that it means what it says. If it does well in that area, there is a high likelihood that countries elsewhere will take notice. Failure to seize this moment, however, could have long-term detrimental effects on Taiwan’s appeal, and thereby strengthen China’s ability to deter engagement with Taiwan. The ball, therefore, is very much in Taipei’s court. The main point: A window of opportunity has opened for Taiwan to deepen its engagement with the Baltic states, a grouping of small nations that also faces an existential threat from a powerful authoritarian neighbor. In areas ranging from trade to non-traditional defense, these states are natural allies for Taiwan, and provide a chance for Taipei to showcase the real benefits of closer ties despite threatened retaliation by Beijing.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Modeling Advantage Cards › Taiwan

5G cyber is the new battlefield, mutual cooperation between US-NATO with the Baltics key to combat China and Russia

Wierenga 22 (Louis Wierenga Junior Research Fellow, Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies, University of Tartu | Lecturer in International Relations, Department of Political and Strategic Studies, Baltic Defence College. “Cybersecurity and Hybrid Threats in the Digital Baltic states: A state of the art”, https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/publications/Hybrid%20Threats_LIIA.pdf)LR

In light of power competition vis-à-vis cooperation with the US, NATO, and the EU, and small states standing up to larger powers with nefarious intentions, the drawback is that no entity is capable of defeating all cyberattacks; rather, in order to succeed in cyberspace, the key is learning how to adequately cope.24 When it comes to information warfare, and one of the reasons for which it is so dangerous, is that the antagonist need not win – they succeed if they are able to successfully cloud the issue.25 It is no secret that Russia has waged numerous information warfare campaigns in the Baltics and show no sign of giving up. Recommendations and policy developments Keep on the cusp of cyber hygiene and widely promote amongst citizens: General H.R. McMaster notes the importance of American efforts to conduct reconnaissance in cyberspace and preempt attacks.26 Strive to continuously be one step ahead of hackers. Although this is a daunting, if not (nearly) impossible task, it is one which would involve both governments and the general public. One aspect which has greatly contributed to the success of Estonia in becoming a world leader in cyber defence is investing in people.27 Promoting cyber hygiene is one aspect at which Estonia excels. Raising further awareness about media literacy to combat disinformation and misinformation also helps to win the battle against information warfare. McMaster also advocates for the US to learn from countries which were on the receiving end of Russian aggression.28 As one of the strengths which Estonia possesses is its investment in people, Estonia is a success story in cyber and IT education and training, ranging from kindergarteners to the elderly.29 In an increasingly multipolar world order, the rise of China presents a serious security challenge to Europe and the Transatlantic alliance and can be seen on a number of fronts. One of the most pressing, especially when it comes to cybersecurity, is 5G. If seen through the lens of ‘the West’, then a united front should consist of the US and NATO, plus PfP countries, along with the EU in cyber policy. When it comes to 5G, this is especially important. The Baltic states have taken strides to become leaders in 5G policy and can use this opportunity to take a leading role in a Western front in the battlegrounds for 5G policy. Keeping focus on both China and Russia as threats to the security of NATO and the EU: For valid reasons – both historical and contemporary – the Russian Federation is identified as the primary security threat to the 3 Baltic states. The most contemporary events in the neighborhood do not indicate any change in the consistency or persistence of the threat, nor its digital nature. Cyber and hybrid threats directed towards the Baltic states from the Russian Federation will not cease and military, government, and civilian entities need to continue with vigilance, adapt to the rapidly changing nature of cybersecurity and cyberwar, as well as anticipate future changes, staying ahead of the curve. However, despite the very valid concerns over Russian cyber activity, the Baltic states should not neglect such concerns as they relate to China. Indeed, as aforementioned, the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, have taken a firm stance towards China, in cyberspace and beyond, and should continue to use their growing digital prowess to expand their influence in the EU and NATO. Lithuania, under the leadership of Foreign Minister Gabrielius 63 Landsbergis, has increasingly stood up to China.30 Minister Landsbergis’s stance towards China led to him being named as one of Politico’s ‘most influential people in Europe’ – and the only one to make the list from any of the Baltic states.31 Latvia has called upon China to respect the rules of international cyberspace.32 It should be noted that this is certainly not the first time that leaders from the Baltic states have appeared on similar lists, granting small states representation on lists where the usual larger powers within Europe enjoy substantial representation. Such leadership should be emulated, and the digital advances made by the Baltic states provides an ideal way to achieve this, as many countries look to the Baltics as digital leaders. Demonstrating leadership to allies: If ever there was a time, as well as a concrete area for the Baltic states to showcase their strengths as small states, demonstrating leadership in the cyber and tech fields presents the perfect opportunity. Estonia has been the Baltic champion for cybersecurity and e-governance. Lithuania, and to a lesser extent Latvia have shown signs of catching up. Much like offline matters, the three Baltic states use opportunities to meet with US and EU leaders to highlight the dire security situation which the Transatlantic alliance faces from a resurgent Russia – they know from experience and contemporary matters. As the security of cyberspace is one of the acute questions of global politics this century33, cybersecurity and matters of digital warfare will be issues which merit pressing resolve, which is constantly changing. Being on the cutting edge will require countries to remain that way. While member of the United Nations Security Council for the first time, Estonia made cybersecurity a priority, along with the overall security of the region.34 As well, when a member of the UN Security Council, Estonia made it a point to align with the US and the UK to call Russia out over a cyberattack directed at Georgia.35 Latvia and Lithuania have also been active on such fronts. In 2021, Latvia signed an agreement with Poland which establishes a framework for cooperation between Latvia’s Military Information Technology Security 64 Incident Team (MilCERT) and Poland’s National Cyber Security Center.36 Latvia is also taking the opportunity to reach out to the United States to discuss cybersecurity in the region.37 Lithuania has, as aforementioned, developed their own cyber center the RCDC, which is a bilateral LithuanianUS initiative.38 Conclusion To conclude, the domain of cyberspace will be an arena for battle for the foreseeable future. All countries, governments, militaries will be faced with such threats, and the likelihood of businesses and private individuals being faced with such threats is high. The Baltic states are no strangers to such threats and have been leaders in facing up to them. Given the nature of threats faced and the manner in which the Baltics have faced up to them, it is safe to say that the Baltic states will continue to rise up to the challenges and keep up with the rapidly changing nature of cyber threats. However, the last point is the most persisting challenge any entity faces in cyberspace – the need to not only consistently keep up but remain steps ahead of adversaries. The bi- and multilateral agreements made as well as the leadership demonstrated, and the digital awareness can go a long way to not only meet contemporary and future challenges but serve as examples and demonstrate leadership. Cyber and hybrid threats are ominous, but on a positive note, the Baltic states have achieved many remarkable accomplishments in this field.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Modeling Advantage Cards › Taiwan

Taiwan models. They face similar risks.

Sprūds 22 [Andris Sprūds, Director of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs; Una Aleksandra Bērziņa Čerenkova, Head of the Asia program at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs; Sintija Broka, Researcher at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs; 2022; "Note From the Editors"; Hybrid Threats in Baltics and Taiwan: Commonalities, Risks and Lessons for Small Democracies; https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/publications/Hybrid%20Threats_LIIA.pdf#page=38; KL]

The year 2022 brings the globe into a period of what could be described with the oxymoron “stable uncertainty”. Societies around the world are adapting to living their lives and making decisions against the backdrop of the everdeveloping COVID-19 pandemic, and the constant lingering feeling of not knowing what tomorrow holds is neither new nor shocking anymore. The conundrum of “stable uncertainty”, however, exacerbates and facilitates other diverse challenges, to which we commonly refer as hybrid threats.

The Baltics as well as Taiwan have been facing uncertainties caused by risks to political legitimacy, societal resilience, critical infrastructure, energy security, and cyber security long before the world went into lockdown – and long enough to have developed a certain resilience. It is a resilience that stems from unique, but translatable experiences of small, yet resourceful democracies. The goal of the Latvian Institute of International Affairs publication “Commonalities, risks, and lessons for small democracies: hybrid threats in Baltics and Taiwan” is to take stock of these experiences and their regional manifestations, to draw parallels between the threats that caused them, to map the risks we’re still facing, and to present wider lessons based both on the successes and tribulations of the Baltic states and Taiwan. The volume is designed to provide an overview of how the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia on one side and Taiwan on the other face, combat and conceptualize hybrid threats.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Modeling Advantage Cards › Warming

European transition checks warming---else, all other renewables fail

EEA, European Environment Agency 8-1-2017, "Energy and climate change," European Environment Agency, https://www.eea.europa.eu/signals/signals-2017/articles/energy-and-climate-change//DG

The global climate is changing and that is posing increasingly severe risks for ecosystems, human health and the economy. The EEA’s recent assessment ‘’ shows that Europe’s regions, too, are already facing impacts of a changing climate, including rising sea levels, more extreme weather, flooding, droughts and storms.

These changes are happening because large amounts of greenhouse gases are released into the atmosphere as a result of many human activities worldwide, including, most importantly, burning fossil fuels for electricity generation, heating and transport. Combustion of fossil fuels also releases air pollutants that harm the environment and human health.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Modeling Advantage Cards › Warming

Baltic renewables k2 european green energy transition

Lukas Trakimavičius, 3-19-2021, Trakimavičius works at the Research and Lessons Learned Division of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence "The untapped green energy potential of the Baltic States," euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/opinion/the-untapped-green-energy-potential-of-the-baltic-states//DG

As the global energy transition gathers speed, the Baltics may not seem like its obvious frontrunners. Despite making great strides in making their energy systems cleaner, fossil fuels still remain a staple of their energy diet. However, growing evidence suggests that the Baltics have a massive offshore wind energy potential, which could have a game-changing effect for the entire region. Chances are, wind turbines could not only propel the Baltics to the forefront of the energy transition, but also to the ranks of clean energy exporters. As things stand, few would argue that the Baltics are on the cutting edge of the clean energy transition. Like most of their European peers, they get the bulk of their energy from fossil fuels such as oil and natural gas. These are either imported from far abroad or, as is the case with Estonian oil shale, mined from deep underground. Meanwhile, renewables such as onshore wind, solar or hydropower still account for a tiny fraction of their overall energy needs. In 2019, these energy sources met some 2.6 percent of ’s, 4.6 percent of ’s and 1.3 percent of ’s total primary energy demand. Granted, the overall share of renewables is vastly greater once biomass is added into the mix. Yet, some scientists  that fuels such as firewood or wood pellets may not be the most environmentally sustainable sources of energy. However, what the Baltics lack in fossil fuels, they make up for with an abundance of wind in the Baltic Sea, which can be harnessed and converted into electricity. Though currently none of the Baltics have any windmills in the open seas, all three have major offshore wind plans for the future. Lithuania, for example, intends to  at least 700 megawatt (MW) of offshore wind farms in operation by 2030. Latvia and Estonia are also eying to co-develop a  1,000 MW wind farm in the Gulf of Riga. On top of that, Estonia  to have a 1,000 MW offshore wind park near the island of Saarema by 2028, in addition to a slew of other projects that are under .All of this sounds great, but it could just be the beginning. According to a recent WindEurope , the Baltic Sea could be the next big thing for Europe’s energy transition. It is estimated that Lithuania  have up to 3,600 MW, Latvia up to 2,900 MW and Estonia up to 1,500 MW of offshore windfarms by 2050. If this generation capacity could be met, the study claims that the Baltics could potentially  around half of their offshore wind electricity to neighboring states. Obviously, it is difficult to say with certainty just how much electricity would the Baltics be able to export and others would like to import. After all, to get to a zero-carbon future, the Baltics and their neighbors will have to  tremendous changes by 2050. Not only will they have to make energy use more efficient, but they will also have to decarbonize and electrify large portions of their economies. Still, if the Baltics would harness their full offshore wind potential and would continue to develop other renewable sources of energy, there are few doubts that a good chunk of their electricity might still be available for export. To get more bang for the buck, the Baltics could also take some of this newfound electricity and transform it into green hydrogen using a process known as electrolysis. Green hydrogen could be used for manufacturing, transport, heating or  back into electricity to back up the grid. Or it could simply be exported to neighbouring states. This step would prevent excess electricity from being wasted and also help decarbonise those sectors of the economy where electrification is difficult.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Modeling Advantage Cards › Warming

NATO involvement is key to overcome dependence

ÇAlışMa Grupları, Diplomasigeneluluslararası, which is a very important job in another language İLişKiler· 4-28- 2022·, "The Energy Security of the Baltic States and the Tensions with Russia," TESAD, https://www.tesadernegi.org/the-energy-security-of-the-baltic-states-and-the-tensions-with-russia.html//DG

The last term applies to the interconnection between the Baltic States and Russia as the Baltics are considered vulnerable and a trade war could drag them down in a crisis[45]. Since the Baltic market is not economically important to Russia, the interdependence is considered asymmetrical. Russian exports for the year 2020 to Latvia were 2.23B, Estonia $2.59B, and Lithuania $2.39B[46]. Nevertheless, from the opening of the Balticconnector and other interconnections belonging to the European network the region plays an important role in gas and petroleum transit, ensuring the uninterrupted flow of energy to further European destinations. Consequently, the Kremlin started to look around for solutions and has developed a strategy comprising the construction of alternative routes, namely the Nord Stream 1 and 2, the Turkish Stream and the Power of Siberia pipelines.

However, the complex situation must be framed inside a broader strategic vision according to Keohane’s and Nye’s interdependence theory. Russian weight in the Baltic energy security undergoes military security conditions. The Baltic States are part of the eastern flank of NATO, therefore their integration into the Russian energy infrastructure is meant to balance the presence of the Western military alliance in the region[47]. Moreover, the Baltics register a high presence of Russian immigrants in their populations, thus energy is used as a weapon to prevent any kind of discrimination.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Cyber---AT: Squo Deployments

Deployments are symbolic and aren’t going to the Baltics.

Birnbaum and Rauhala 22 [Michael Birnbaum, reporter covering climate and security; Emily Rauhala, Brussels bureau chief; 6-29-2022; "Those 300,000 high-readiness NATO troops? ‘Concept,’ not reality."; Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/29/those-300000-high-readiness-nato-troops-concept-not-reality/; KL]

On Monday, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced plans to put 300,000 troops at high readiness as part of the “biggest overhaul of our collective defense and deterrence since the Cold War.”

By Wednesday, as NATO leaders gathered at a summit in Madrid, the vast new mobilization appeared to be more fearsome on paper than in reality, more of an aspiration than a dramatic new commitment to defend Europe.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Cyber---Baltic War

Disads are thumped, but war is still likely. NATO cohesion is key.

FT 22 [The Editorial Board of Financial Times; 6-27-2022; "Nato must show it is serious about defending its eastern flank"; Financial Times; https://www.ft.com/content/8c45da56-e8af-465b-882a-7fc8455a03d5; KL]

Would Vladimir Putin send Russian troops into one of the Baltic states, knowing this would trigger a direct war with Nato? There is no room for complacency; until Russian tanks rolled across Ukraine’s borders on February 24, that too seemed unthinkable. EU and G7 summits in the past few days have committed to stepping up support to Ukraine — which on Monday suffered a horrific missile attack on a shopping centre in Kremenchuk — and to tightening sanctions that have sapped Russia’s economy and put it on course for its first debt default since 1998. Tuesday’s Nato summit in Madrid is a moment for the alliance to demonstrate that it comprehends the magnitude of the threat from the Kremlin — and is ready and equipped to defend against any Russian attempt to go beyond Ukraine and attack Nato’s eastern flank.

Estonia’s prime minister Kaja Kallas warned last week her country would be “wiped off the map” under existing Nato plans that would allow the Baltic republics to be overrun in any Russian invasion, before liberating them after 180 days. Even as she spoke, Moscow was threatening “serious negative” consequences to nearby Lithuania after it barred rail transfer of some goods to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad — though Vilnius said it was merely applying EU sanctions.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Cyber---AT: Alt Cause

No natural hazards in the Baltics.

Juurvee 22 [Ivo Juurvee, Head of Security & Resilience Programme and Research Fellow at the International Centre For Defence and Security; 2022; "Energy and Critical Infrastructure Security: The Case of the Baltic States"; Hybrid Threats in Baltics and Taiwan: Commonalities, Risks and Lessons for Small Democracies; https://www.baltdefcol.org/files/files/publications/Hybrid%20Threats_LIIA.pdf#page=38; KL]

With the highest peak of only 318 m over sea level, the Baltic states are flat. The countries are not situated in a seismically active region, neither are they threatened by tsunamis or tornados. However, there are still some natural hazards to critical infrastructure and power supply, mostly caused by the cold or stormy Northern European weather. While floods are usually not dangerous and at some places even considered to be a tourist attraction (Pamarys region  in Lithuania and Soomaa in Estonia), the autumn and winter storms can be more dangerous, especially in Estonia. While short term power cuts and the inaccessibility of roads are usual and appear every year with both the authorities and population well prepared for them, from time to time things get more extreme. In December 2010, almost 600 people were stuck in their cars in the snowstorm on Tallinn– Narva road. One of the main roads of the country was blocked for a day and it was a close call that nobody froze to death. Rough weather in Southern Estonia in December 2019 disrupted the power supply of over 50  000 clients and took days to fix. However, although events like these do happen in the Baltic states, they do not have disastrous effects on infrastructure.13

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Cyber Attacks › Critical Infrastructure Scenario

CI – extinction.

Delacourt 22 [ 02-01-2022, "Cyberattacks on Critical Infrastructure as the New WMD", Hstoday, https://www.hstoday.us/featured/cyberattacks-on-critical-infrastructure-as-the-new-wmd/, DOA: 7-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

Should the acronym WMD, which stands for “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” be updated to “Weapons of Mass Disruption?” I think it is a timely question in this Digital Age as we connect and integrate billions of new digital devices into our lives and business processes and when a cyber-attack against one supply chain provider can lead to cascading effects on entire communities across the globe. Cyberattacks on Critical Infrastructure (CI) can cause mass economic and societal impacts. Fewer strategies than cyber-attacks can offer better plausible deniability and can cause greater anxiety and instability to our society than targeting the systems and networks that enable our day-to-day activities. Consider that 20 years ago terrorists killed 3,000 Americans and disrupted the entire U.S. and global economies with only four planes. Given the growth and ubiquity of technology today we must consider how the exponential growth of cyberattacks on CI might be similarly leveraged by adversaries and criminal actors as Weapons of Mass Disruption, the new WMD.[1]

Cyberattacks take many forms, often progressing through multiple phases as they escalate in severity. Malicious actors often initiate a network intrusion through phishing campaigns or the purchase of compromised user credentials on the dark web. What begins as the hijack of a single user profile expands in severity. Intruders move laterally across internal systems, conducting surveillance and gathering intelligence on network environments before escalating to data theft, service disruptions, and ransomware extortion.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Cyber Attacks › Critical Infrastructure Scenario

Russian and Chinese cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure is coming now – laundry list of impacts – NATO cohesion, CI, trust in institutions, Saudi energy.

Dupay et al 21 [Dr Arnold C. Dupuy is a Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) employee and Chair of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s program to study hybrid warfare. Dr Dan Nussbaum is a faculty member at the Naval Postgraduate School, the Chair of the NPS Energy Academic Group, and is the Mentor of the NATO Science and Technology Organization’s program to study hybrid warfare. Vytautas Butrimas works in the area of industrial cybersecurity for the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence. Alkman Granitsas is a communications consultant at Kyklos Associates with a focus on public policy issues. 1-13-2021, "NATO Review", NATO Review, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/01/13/energy-security-in-the-era-of-hybrid-warfare/index.html, DOA: 7-20-2022 //ArchanSen]

Hybrid warfare is roughly defined as ‘grey area’ warfare, which often exists just beneath the threshold of armed conflict. It is designed to erode public confidence in civil society and democratic foundations, primarily through cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, including energy, or targeted disinformation methods. In this regard, it poses a potential threat to sovereignty, as it gives nations, terrorist organisations and criminal actors relative anonymity via a low-cost, high-yield method to influence the politics and policies of other states.

Russia is one of the most active perpetrators of hybrid warfare and implemented it most effectively in its 2014 illegal annexation of Crimea. The Kremlin continues to use it today, notably in some countries to realise desired political outcomes such as undermining pro-Western governments, dividing and weakening the NATO Alliance, or advancing its own economic interests. China too has recently engaged in cyber attacks and disinformation campaigns aimed at NATO Allies and poses a grave risk to critical infrastructure, including energy infrastructure, as highlighted in the recent NATO 2030 experts’ report.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Cyber Attacks

Draws in NATO and the US

Zemelyte 6-27 (Beatrice, BA in Administration, Human Resources, and Marketing at University of Vermon, interviewing Agnia Grigas - Dr. Agnia Grigas is an energy and political risk expert. She specializes in energy and foreign policy of the U.S. and Eurasia including Europe, Russia, China, the states of the former Soviet Union, and the Baltic States. She has fifteen years of experience as a business development and political risk advisor to corporations and government agencies. She is an author of three critically acclaimed books The New Geopolitics of Gas (Harvard University Press, 2017), Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire (Yale University Press, 2016), and The Politics of Energy and Memory Between the Baltic States and Russia (Ashgate 2013). Dr. Grigas graduated cum laude with a BA in economics and political science from Columbia University, New York, NY and earned her Master’s and Doctorate in international relations from the University of Oxford, UK where she is an alumna of St Antony’s and Brasenose colleges. “Kaliningrad standoff could reveal if Russia wants to ‘escalate’”, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/6/24/achilles-heel-of-nato-tensions-amid-kaliningrads-transit-ban)LR

Al Jazeera: Russia has said Lithuanian citizens will “feel the pain” over Kaliningrad. How might Moscow respond? Grigas: Russia could enact its own sanctions on the sale of goods to Lithuania. The key Russian exports are oil and gas, and electricity, and Lithuania has already made a decision much earlier before this conflict, that it will not be purchasing any Russian energy sources. There could be a question of fertilisers and other elements but there is already a broad blanket of European sanctions against Russian goods. I view Russia’s statements more as threats and posturing for the Russian domestic audience because a lot of [Russian President Vladimir] Putin’s statements tend to be aimed to show the resolve and the strength of the Kremlin, rather than necessarily specifying any sort of actions they would take or for the external audience. What is concerning is that Russia used or the Kremlin use the terms that Lithuania has enacted a blockade, either the word choice is important, because blockade could be perceived as a military already action, and therefore, Russia could try to, you know, justify some sort of [military action], as well.” Al Jazeera: How do you think the Kaliningrad situation can impact the war in Ukraine? Grigas: I think this situation in Kaliningrad will show whether Russia is willing to escalate further this conflict against the West, the European Union and NATO. Al Jazeera: The United States has said that it will stand behind Lithuania and its NATO commitments to defend it … Grigas: NATO, the United States and European Union countries have been very cautious not to get involved in this war. There’s a real fear of potential escalation of conflict with Russia directly because one, Russia remains a nuclear state. Second, because of the fact that it’s controlled essentially by a single man with a very small circle of advisers, who has essentially a free hand to take whatever decisions he may wish. Al Jazeera: Lithuania and Russia already had weak diplomatic relations, and the war in Ukraine has worsened them. How will their ties be affected by the ban? Grigas: Lithuania has been a very vocal supporter of Ukraine since the very start of the war this February and, frankly, since Russia’s occupation of Crimea [in 2014] and the initial invasion of the Donbas. Earlier this summer, Russia and Duma deputies were discussing whether they should revoke Lithuania’s independence that was agreed to by the Soviet Union in 1991. This is part of kind of a broader package of the Kremlin’s threats on a smaller neighbouring country. I don’t think Lithuanian-Russian relations will improve in the near future. Frankly, European and Russian relations will not improve in the near future, nor will NATO and Russian relations, particularly as long as the ongoing war in Ukraine continues.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Cyber Attacks

Lithuania facing onslaught of intense Russian hacks

Manthorpe 6-28 (Rowland, studied History at Cambridge and Political Theory at the London School of Economics, and has been awarded the Ben Pimlott Prize for Political Writing by the Guardian and The Fabian Society. Rowland is Technology correspondent, reporting on the many areas tech is transforming lives. “Could the Russian cyber attack on Lithuania draw a military response from NATO?”, https://news.sky.com/story/could-the-russian-cyber-attack-on-lithuania-draw-a-military-response-from-nato-12641986)LR

A NATO member is under attack. The NATO member in question is the Baltic state of Lithuania, which was targeted on Monday by Russian hackers. According to the hackers, the attack is still going on. Transport and media websites have been hit, as have the websites of various state institutions such as the Lithuanian tax service, which had to pause its operations yesterday. A Russian hacker group known as Killnet claimed responsibility for the attacks, claiming on its Telegram channel that the attack was retaliation for Lithuania's decision to stop the transit of some goods to the Russian territory of Kaliningrad on the Baltic coast. The politics of this situation are extremely complicated. Kaliningrad is Russian-owned, but it isn't connected to the main body of Russia - it's a small piece of Russia surrounded by NATO countries. The Lithuanian government says it is simply enforcing European Union sanctions on goods, but Russia has responded with outrage, saying it is being stopped from accessing its sovereign territory. Russia promised to respond in a way that would "have a serious negative impact on the population of Lithuania". Then, a few days later, came this cyber attack. Does that mean Russia attacked a NATO member? Not so fast. For a start, the group that claimed responsibility denies any connection to the Russian state, saying it is "not affiliated with any law enforcement authorities". The Russian government has long used third-party criminal groups to conduct hacks and cyber attacks, so it would not come as a surprise if it was involved. Nevertheless, on the surface at least, its hands are clean. Then there's the nature of the attack. Reports so far suggest that it's a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack, a crude attack which involves throwing huge amounts of traffic at a website until it is forced offline. The attack has been described as "massive", which is technically true, because in order to work a DDoS attack has to be large, but that doesn't mean it will have a massive effect. DDoS attacks are so common that most websites nowadays have protection against them as standard. Even if an attack does work, it won't steal any data. It's a blunt force instrument, little more. Yet that does not mean we aren't moving towards that point, nor that a cyber attack cannot lead us there. Another way in which cyber attacks are different to physical attacks is that once they are started they can spiral out of control. Unlike a bomb or a bullet, a virus can spread in ways that even its makers don't intend. Almost exactly five years ago, the costliest ever cyber attack was launched: a malware attack called Not Petya. It is believed to have begun when Russian operatives infected a small piece of Ukrainian accounting software, intending to disrupt Ukrainian businesses. But from there it spread to companies around the world, including shipping giant Maersk and food conglomerate Mondelez. By the time it was done, Not Petya had caused $10bn in estimated damages.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Hybrid War Disinformation › escalates

Goes nuclear.

Hal Brands 19, Hal Brands is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, where he studies US foreign policy and defense strategy. Concurrently, Dr. Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion, November 2019, "How Russia Could Force a Nuclear War in the Baltics," https://www.aei.org/op-eds/how-russia-could-force-a-nuclear-war-in-the-baltics/ //AShah

Would the US fight a nuclear war to save Estonia? The question would probably strike most Americans as absurd. Certainly, almost no one was thinking about such a prospect when NATO expanded to include the Baltic states back in 2004.

Yet a series of reports by the nonpartisan RAND Corporation shows that the possibility of nuclear escalation in a conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Russia over the Baltic region is higher than one might imagine. The best way of averting it? Invest more in the alliance’s conventional defense.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Cyber Advantage Cards › Hybrid War Disinformation › escalates

The Russian Baltic cyber threat will escalate---internal documents prove intent and capabilities

Fraszka 20. Bartosz Fraszka is a graduate of the Centre for Europe and the Faculty of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Warsaw. He also studied at the Euro-American faculty of the Institut d’Études Politiques in Reims. “Baltic States Versus Russian Hybrid Threats”; Warsaw Institute; October 26, 2020; //BY

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 corroborated Moscow’s imperialist pursuits to restore its role amongst the world’s actors it had lost after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Crimea case seems now a good starting point for current thoughts on the very essence of hybrid threats. This is what pushed the Baltic republics towards adjusting their security policies to genuine hybrid threats from the Russian Federation, a blow to their sovereignty, independence, and integrity with Western security agencies[4]. Baltic special services precisely identified these threats in their reports, which confirms how situationally aware they are. This also places Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia on the list of participants of an unofficial albeit ongoing hybrid conflict between EU/NATO states and Russia.

As a conflict, Russia’s hybrid warfare against European Union (EU) nations and the North Atlantic Alliance, or NATO, is uneasy to define. What awakens research curiosity is the adjective hybrid. It is difficult to find a more dynamically developing concept in security studies than hybrid threat. Linguists define hybrid as “something that is a mixture of different elements, often not matching each other[5].” Thus, in military strategy, hybrid activities are a combination of symmetric and asymmetric war[6]. Among the available definitions of a hybrid threat, perhaps the most complex one is that of the European External Action Service, labeling hybrid threats as a combination of “conventional and unconventional, military and non-military activities that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific political objectives.” Their diversity consists in the use of tools and tactics “designed to be difficult to detect or attribute,” and “seeking to create confusion to hinder swift and effective decision-making” targeting “critical vulnerabilities.” Hybrid threats “can range from cyberattacks on critical information systems, through the disruption of critical services such as energy supplies or financial services, to the undermining of public trust in government institutions or the deepening of social divisions[7].”