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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Russian Chem, Bio, or Nuke Weapon

Russia using a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon is absurd

NATO 7/7 [NATO, 07-07-22, "NATO's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine," ] // st

Russia’s threatening nuclear rhetoric in its war on Ukraine is dangerous and irresponsible. The Kremlin sees nuclear threats as an all-purpose response to setbacks. NATO is not a threat to Russia and does not seek confrontation with Russia. The Alliance’s actions are defensive and a response to Russia’s aggression. So there is no reason for Russia to increase the readiness of its nuclear forces. Any use of nuclear weapons by Russia would fundamentally change the nature of the conflict, and it would have unprecedented consequences for Russia. Russia must understand that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. The Russian foreign ministry’s claims about a Ukrainian biological weapons programme are baseless and absurd. Russia is once again inventing false pretexts in an attempt to justify its invasion of Ukraine. NATO will continue to call out Russia’s disinformation and lies for the world to see. Any use by Russia of a chemical or biological weapon would be a violation of international law and a war crime, and result in severe consequences.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Reclaiming Territory

The current status of the war proves that Russia is uncapable of victory or further expansion as a great power

Green 22 [Mark Green (A physician and combat veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq where he served three tours. He interviewed Saddam Hussein for six hours on the night of his capture. He serves on the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees.), April 4, 2022, "How Putin’s isolation mirrors ‘The Fall of the House of Usher’," Washington Times, ] // st

In war, miscalculations can lead to disaster. Mr. Putin and his military leaders both overestimated their forces’ capabilities and severely underestimated the strength of the Ukrainian resistance. The Russian army has thus far been plagued by poor logistical operations, careless tactics and significant difficulty in executing a multi-front invasion. Likewise, the Russians have not yet gained air superiority over Ukraine despite having a substantial advantage in airpower. Although the Russians have made advances, particularly in the south, their progress has been sluggish, and the fighting has exposed severe vulnerabilities in Russia’s military strategy and tactics. Conversely, the Ukrainians, armed with Western weapons and fighting fiercely to defend their homeland, have put up a stiff resistance that has exacted a steep price from Russian troops. Furthermore, it seems that Mr. Putin did not expect and was not prepared for the robust international response to his invasion. This may drive him further into his paranoiac isolation. The sanctions against Russia’s economy are some of the harshest ever imposed on a country of its size, threatening to devastate an economy that is highly dependent on the export of natural resources, especially oil and gas. This puts Mr. Putin in a dangerous position, as his isolation from even his closest advisers could lead him to escalate the conflict and make further ill-considered decisions. Just last week, Mr. Putin had one of the top generals of his invading units arrested for allegedly leaking intelligence and squandering fuel. If his invasion continues to encounter setbacks and higher-than-expected casualties, Mr. Putin’s paranoia could lead him to further miscalculations. What was supposed to be a prime opportunity for Russia to reassert its dominance over a former Soviet territory has instead revealed its weakness. Mr. Putin is more than just a paranoid ruler backed into a corner. He is an evil dictator obsessed with power and has been for a long time. But will Mr. Putin isolate himself further and allow his paranoia to fuel greater mistakes? In the Poe story, the reclusive Usher’s growing suspicion steers him into catastrophic mistakes that end in tragedy and the collapse of the house. Mr. Putin would be foolish to let his obsession to reunite the Soviet Union drive him to double down on his errors and insist on a decisive military victory in Ukraine. Instead, he should cut his losses and call off the invasion to bring an end to this destructive and needless war.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Reclaiming Territory

Putin won’t attempt to rebuild the Soviet Union – oligarchs, desire, NATO membership, and military capabilities prevent expansion

Stanton 5/16 [Andrew Stanton (A Staff Writer for Newsweek and Boston Globe Metro Correspondent with a graduate degree in journalism from Emerson College), 5-16-2022, "Putin allies' wealth will keep him from reviving USSR," Newsweek, ] // st

Russian President Vladimir Putin's reliance on oligarchs could prevent him from reviving the Soviet Union, experts said. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, some raised concerns that Putin could be seeking to revive the Soviet Union. But a return to Soviet-style economics could threaten the wealth of his allies in Russia's oligarchical class, so it's unlikely he would seize their assets, Bryon Moraski, a professor of Russian politics at the University of Florida explained to Newsweek. Putin relies on both popular and elite support for legitimacy, Moraski explained. This means that any efforts to seize the assets of Russian oligarchs could cause him to lose the support of his closest allies, potentially leaving him in a difficult position as the president. "There wouldn't be an ideological reason for Putin to go through some kind of process for the redistribution of property," Moraski said. Brian Taylor, a professor of Russian politics at Syracuse University, offered a slightly different view, saying that Russian oligarchs would have little recourse if Putin were to seize their assets—though he agreed it remains unlikely he would reconstruct the Soviet Union. "If Putin decides that it has to be nationalized, the legal system is not going to stop him from doing that," he told Newsweek. Moraski, however, said that even if Putin tried to seize oligarchs' wealth, much of it rests offshore, so he would have a difficult time obtaining it. Taylor explained how Putin trying to bring back the USSR in geographic terms would harm the wealth of Russian oligarchs. Putin attempting to retake some of the former Soviet Republics would cause these oligarchs to take on additional sanctions—in addition to those already imposed amid the Ukraine invasion. The oligarchs would also likely have to take companies seized by Russia during the war, but this would not be a "welcome gift," as they would need to invest money into these businesses that would have been ravaged by war, Taylor said. "Who are they going to ship the product to? Because it's not from a legally recognized part of Russia so it would be immediately sanctioned by everyone," he said. Both Moraski and Taylor agreed there are other reasons Putin remains unlikely to revive the Soviet Union—including that the president has no ideological desire to do so, as the current political system in Russia is more pragmatic or "personalist," rather than having the same communist or Marxist ideology as the former Soviet Union. The Russian military's mounting setbacks in Ukraine mean it would be difficult to invade other former Soviet republics, some of which (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) are "off the table" because they are now members of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Taylor said. Any attack on these countries would spark a strong Western response. "I don't actually think he has any particular interest in some of the other republics of the former Soviet Union, as opposed to keeping them in the Russian sphere of influence," he added. "I don't think he wants to annex Tajikistan or Armenia or something like that."

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT: NATO-Russia War

Russia doesn’t have the resources to take NATO head on – risk for conflict is low

Culp 7/6 [Wesley Culp (A Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress. He regularly writes on Russian and Eurasian leadership and national security topics and has been published in The Hill as well as in the Diplomatic Courier.), 7-6-2022, 19FortyFive, "The Russian Military After the Ukraine War: On the Brink of Disaster?", ] // st

In the short-term, the risk of direct confrontation between the Russian military and NATO is low, save for accidental escalation, in large part due to the fact that the Russian armed forces are so thoroughly committed to the so-called “special military operation.” Instead of being increasingly concentrated on Russia’s border with Norway and Finland following Finland’s official decision to apply for NATO membership, Russian forces in the area actually appear to be increasingly taking part in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Even before Moscow’s invasion, Western military analysts had good reason to be skeptical of Russia’s ability to conduct massive military operations outside the confines of the former Soviet Union. In its existing state, the Russian military are highly dependent on rail links to ensure that its armed forces are properly supplied. Given the fact that only former Soviet countries and Finland use the same rail gauge as Russia, any sustainment operation of Russian forces outside the former Soviet Union would face significant logistical hurdles. Russian Military Will Learn from Ukraine War Mistakes While some of the baked-in weaknesses of the Russian military model have been exposed by its invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. and NATO still have good reason to take competition from Russia as well as the prospect that Russia will learn from its mistakes seriously. For example, while the Deputy Commander of the Estonian Defense Forces has claimed that Russia is likely too weak to put pressure on or seize the strategic Suwałki Gap (a source of some anxiety given ongoing drama surrounding Lithuania’s enforcement of EU sanctions on overland transport of certain Russian goods to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad), he also cautioned that Russia is no stranger to learning from its mistakes and adapting.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT: NATO-Russia War

No chance of a NATO-Russia war

Bose 22 [Nandita Bose (A White House correspondent for Reuters), 2-28-2022, "Biden says Americans should not worry about nuclear war after Russian actions," Reuters, ] // st

President Joe Biden said on Monday Americans should not worry about a nuclear war after Moscow put its nuclear deterrent on high alert amid a barrage of Western reprisals over Russia's invasion of Ukraine. In response to a question about whether U.S. citizens should be concerned about a nuclear war breaking out, Biden said "no." He was responding to a shouted question at the end of an event at the White House. White House officials said earlier in the day the United States sees no reason to change its nuclear alert levels at this time, a point press secretary Jen Psaki reiterated during her briefing with reporters. "We are assessing President Putin's directive and at this time, we see no reasons to change our own alert levels," Psaki said. Russia's defence ministry said on Monday its nuclear missile forces and Northern and Pacific fleets had been placed on enhanced combat duty, the Interfax news agency reported, in line with an order the previous day from President Vladimir Putin. Psaki said the United States and the 30-member NATO alliance have no "appetite or desire" for conflict with Russia. "Provocative rhetoric like this regarding nuclear weapons is dangerous, adds to the risk of miscalculation, should be avoided and we'll not indulge in it." Biden held a call with U.S. allies and partners on Monday, as a U.S. official said a nuclear war must never be fought. Joining the call with Biden were leaders from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom along with NATO's chief and top officials from the European Union. A White House official told Reuters that Russia and the United States have long agreed that use of nuclear weapons would have devastating consequences. "A nuclear war cannot be won, and must never be fought," the White House official said. The White House also pointed out Russia has signed on to joint statements affirming a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Russian and Ukrainian officials met on the Belarusian border to discuss a ceasefire on Monday while invading Russian forces encountered determined resistance from Ukrainian troops and civilians on a fifth day of conflict. read more Russia calls its actions in Ukraine a “special operation” that it says is not designed to occupy territory but to destroy its southern neighbour's military capabilities and capture what it regards as dangerous nationalists. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has also triggered a Western economic and corporate response unprecedented in its extent and coordination. The United States on Monday blocked Americans from engaging in any transactions involving Russia's central bank, dealing a crushing blow to the country's economy. read more

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Food Prices Impact

No impact to food insecurity

Vestby 18 [Jonas Vestby (Senior Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). His research focuses on the link between environmental change and violent conflict, including forecasting models that predict the future risk of conflict, taking climate change into consideration.), 5-18-2018, "Does hunger cause conflict? – Climate and Conflict," ] // st

It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests. Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex – linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems – where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations – such as drought or famine – for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Russia Strong

The war in Ukraine is draining Russia’s military power. Russia won’t be at pre-war military capacity for several years

Culp 7/6 [Wesley Culp (A Research Fellow at the Center for the Study of the Presidency and Congress. He regularly writes on Russian and Eurasian leadership and national security topics and has been published in The Hill as well as in the Diplomatic Courier.), 7-6-2022, 19FortyFive, "The Russian Military After the Ukraine War: On the Brink of Disaster?", https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/the-russian-military-after-the-ukraine-war-on-the-brink-of-disaster/] // st

Open-source tracking from blogs such as Oryx reveals that Russia has lost a considerable amount of equipment to date in its invasion, including more than 800 tanks and almost 500 armored fighting vehicles at the time of writing. Besides the losses Russian forces have taken, the ammunition expended by Russian forces is considerable and will take some time to replenish. According to Ukrainian sources, Russia is firing 60,000 artillery shells per day in Ukraine, a rate that would be taxing on the defense industrial base on any country that has not mobilized its economy for wartime production, which Russia has so far refused to do. Russia’s arsenal of precision-guided munitions also appears to have been significantly depleted over the course of the invasion, limiting Moscow’s ability to strike certain military or transportation targets, especially those that are mobile. For years, Russian military doctrine has held that precision-guided munitions are a key tool alongside more conventional, unguided munitions. The Russian Military: What Happens Next? To recoup its materiel losses in Ukraine, the Russian military will need several years of serial production of everything from armor to munitions to reach pre-war reserve levels. According to Pavel Luzin, an expert on Russian military affairs, organizational issues in Russia’s defense production base and disruptions to Russian defense supply chains as a result of sanctions placed on Russia following its 2022 invasion mean that it will likely take a minimum of four years for Russia’s armed forces to rebuild its arsenal of armored vehicles to January 2022 levels. Reserves of precision-guided munitions will take even longer to reach prior levels as a result of similar pressures – Luzin estimates that it would take at least ten years for such stocks to be replenished.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › AT: Russia Strong

Russia’s military is weak – Ukraine proves

Freedman 7/5 [Lawrence Freedman (An emeritus professor of war studies at King's College London.), 7-5-2022, "Can Ukraine win the war?," New Statesman, ] // st

In this second stage of the war, Russian forces have not been able to rely so much on manoeuvrability because of armoured vehicle losses. They have sought to make up for their losses with vehicles from the reserves, including, as widely reported, vintage tanks that were in use in the 1960s. New tank production may have ground to a halt because of the lack of key components, such as microchips, which have been sourced from the West and are now sanctioned. Russia also seems to be running low on stocks of precision weapons, evident in some of their recent long-range strikes. It is likely, for example, that it did not intend the deadly attack on the shopping mall in Kremenchuk, and instead had a nearby target in mind, which it also failed to destroy. This demonstrated, in addition to the inaccuracy of its weapons, the general Russian carelessness when it comes to collateral damage and their inability to take responsibility for mistakes (as always, suggesting that for some reason the Ukrainians did this to themselves). Coming as the G7 was meeting, it helped to boost support for Ukraine, reminding the leaders about why it is important that Russia fails. Their response to past troop losses has been to scramble around to find more troops where they can. One option for Putin would be to announce a general mobilisation but he has been reluctant to do that because he knows how unpopular such a move would be. There are indications of shortfalls in the current call-up of conscripts, even though they are not supposed to be sent to the front. Instead, the aim is to encourage conscripts, and anyone with military experience, to contract into the military, often for financial reward. There is anecdotal evidence that many of those who have been in the thick of the fighting have been looking for ways to get out of their contracts. According to the military analyst Michael Kofman, Russian commanders are increasingly reliant on front-line fighting forces from the enclaves in Donbas, mercenaries from the Wagner Group, volunteers and reserve battalions manned by recently contracted servicemen. The fighting for Severodonetsk was largely undertaken by units from Luhansk, who appear to have suffered terribly in the process, and may now appreciate that they are being used as cannon fodder by the Russians. Kofman suggests that other units are being used for offensive manoeuvres, with the most capable being moved “around the battlefield to attempt localized advances”.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › No Tradeoff---2NC

The DOD has more than enough resources, Congress just massively increased the budget and earmarked funding for Ukraine and other priorities

Connor O’Brien 22, defense reporter, POLITICO, “Senators tack on $45B onto Bidens Defense Budget”, 6-16-2022, , 7-9-2022

The Senate Armed Services Committee has endorsed a $45 billion increase to President Joe Biden’s military spending plans in its annual defense policy bill, blowing past the administration’s Pentagon budget for a second straight year.

The rebuke of Biden’s budget plans, which occurred during the panel’s closed-door markup of the National Defense Authorization Act this week, comes after lawmakers added roughly $30 billion to the White House’s previous defense spending proposal.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF – OSCE CP › 2AC – INB – OSCE Fails – Ukraine

OSCE is has structural problems their failure in Ukraine proves

Semeniy 22 [Oleksiy Semeniy, June 2022, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE FOR THE OSCE,”<<Dr Semeniy is a Direct of Institute for Global Transformations>>, OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions,

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is a vital test for the OSCE. For many years the OSCE has been seen as failing to prevent or de-escalate (not to even mention sustainably settle) conflicts in Europe. It now needs to be united and deliver feasible results to remain a useful element of European security. However, its activity in Ukraine from 2014 until 24 February 2022 was also partially successful in organizational terms. It is worthy of astonishment how swiftly the OSCE succeeded in reorienting its country office and launched its special monitoring mission (SMM) in Ukraine in 2014. For those eight years the SMM was mostly an effective tool for many de-escalatory efforts and a number of successful solutions were implemented to tackle problems on the line of contact. But these successes were not enough and were underpinned by a lack of political backing in Vienna, due to growing political drifts and conflicts among some participating States, as well as a number of problems with efficiency at the Secretariat level. This assessment does not deny the efforts undertaken by OSCE institutions or the Secretariat, but mainly refers to the tempo and quality of reactions to negative developments in and around Ukraine. The quite destructive role of a number of OSCE participating States that wanted to block some productive initiatives also needs to be recognized. Many of the problems relate to the lack of adequate institutional capacity of the OSCE, because participating States for many years could not agree on necessary reforms, tolerating possible inefficiencies of the OSCE in critical situations. Therefore, Ukraine doubts that the OSCE can help settle the war and conflict with Russia. This negative attitude is less visible by people or organizations who have co-operated with the OSCE in different formats or been confronted with its activities – they have had possibilities to see the concrete impact of OSCE activities. However, the OSCE has not sufficiently promoted its results (even if moderate) and their practical value to key stakeholders inside Ukraine, especially to wider Ukrainian society. On the other hand Ukrainian authorities and society have expected much more clarity (i.e. on stating the facts and identifying the perpetrators without using general diplomatic phrases) and prompt reaction from OSCE representatives (either in the SMM or the office in Kyiv) to the violations from the Russian side (including its puppets in Donetsk and Luhansk). It may be these expectations were too high for OSCE staff because of the Organization’s general policy to be viewed as a neutral and impartial actor (in order to keep Russia on board), but this also damaged the Organization’s image.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF – OSCE CP › 2AC – INB – OSCE Fails – Ukraine

OSCE is a complete failure – an OSCE state has invading Ukraine proves

Bloed 22 [Arie Bloed, 02-25-2022, “Is this the death of the OSCE Decalogue?”, Security and Human Rights Monitor, https://www.shrmonitor.org/is-this-the-death-of-the-osce-decalogue/]\\pairie

At the same time it also means that an organization like the OSCE has failed in all respects to ensure the fulfillment of its key function, i.e. ensuring a stable environment in the OSCE area through its cooperative and comprehensive security approach. In particular in the post-Cold War period the OSCE became an impressive ‘community of values’ and ‘community of responsibility’. At the Astana Summit, just 11 years ago, there was even talk of a joint vision of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security. By adhering to a constantly developing number of basic norms and values in the OSCE region, the East-West divide turned into a region with largely common norms and values, not only in the area of peace and security, but also in the areas of the human and the economic and environmental dimensions.

What is more, OSCE participating states did not only aim at the development of a highly sophisticated system of norms and rules, but also at a system that aimed at providing each other support, whenever countries were considered to be in need of help. This ‘joint responsibility’ for the fulfilment of the basic norms and standards, based on the idea of “indivisible security” has been fatally affected in the case of the Russian military attack against Ukraine since a key OSCE state refused to comply with the most fundamental rules which it had helped create itself.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF – OSCE CP › 2AC – INB – OSCE Fails

OSCE structurally fails – deep internal divisions and political crises can’t be resolved by the counterplan

Günther 22 [Mirco Günther, 02-15-2022, “We have an institution to ensure peace in Europe,” <<Mirco heads the FES Regional Office in Asia>>, IPS,

The OSCE is mired in permanent crisis, verging on paralysis. Because of the OSCE’s deep internal divisions and the prevailing consensus rule, however, far-reaching decisions are rather the exception. When they do happen, OSCE decisions carry considerable normative weight – as with the establishment of the OSCE monitoring mission at the onset of the Ukraine crisis in 2014. Sadly, such diplomatic success stories are rare. The OSCE is mired in permanent crisis, verging on paralysis. The Swedish chairmanship in 2021 ended with few substantive achievements. The OSCE-hosted Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, Europe’s largest human rights conference, was blocked by Russia. Election monitoring missions are regularly disputed. Agreements are reached only with great difficulty, if at all, even on largely operational matters, such as the annual budget or the agenda for the annual security conference. In 2020, the Organization stared into the abyss when, in an unprecedented leadership crisis, its four most important posts lay vacant for several months, including that of secretary general. What is the OSCE? All these challenges stem from fundamental differences concerning the OSCE’s core purpose. Western states emphasise the Organization’s uniquely comprehensive approach to security, encompassing political-military, economic, environmental, and human rights issues, which emerged from Helsinki. A number of eastern participating countries have strong reservations about its human rights agenda. If the OSCE were to be founded today, it is almost inconceivable that an agreement could be reached on its very principles, including the Paris Charter for Europe’s post-Cold War order. Over the years, there have been more than one attempt to bring about meaningful reforms, but to little avail. It seems unlikely that future OSCE chairs will have more success: Poland this year, followed by North Macedonia, Estonia (to be confirmed) and Finland. The price of peace Many actors bear responsibility for the OSCE’s sorry state. Moscow, for example, has repeatedly weakened OSCE mandates and operational capabilities, while at the same time lamenting the Organization’s lacking relevance. Countries like Armenia and Azerbaijan often obstruct even the simplest decisions on procedural matters, following a logic of national rivalry. Various host countries have limited the mandates of OSCE field operations, although it needs to be recognised that this is their sovereign right. Western countries, too, have sold the OSCE short, preferring other organisations or bilateral formats. Moreover, many states continue to prioritise austerity policies and fail to give the Organization the financial resources it needs. The presence of unarmed international observers along the contact line in Eastern Ukraine has made a significant difference. At the same time, there is rarely any other organisation in the world that offers security at a more reasonable price. Its regular annual budget of around €138 million is modest by international standards. The Ukraine observation mission has a separate budget of around €100 million. In 2020, the OSCE had more than 3,500 staff from 51 countries in 20 locations. Its achievements are considerable, as the Ukraine conflict highlights. A key role in Ukraine The presence of unarmed international observers along the contact line in Eastern Ukraine has made a significant difference, albeit often far away from public awareness. Local Ukrainians have worked side by side with Americans, Russians, and Europeans. According to a report by the observers, between July 2019 and October 2021 the OSCE mediated more than 3,000 local ceasefires. Repair works on critical water and electricity infrastructure have given millions of civilians access to fundamental services. In publicly available daily reports, the OSCE documents compliance (and any non-compliance) with the 2015 Minsk Protocol and is an indispensable neutral voice on the ground. With this in mind, it is greatly worrying that some participating states have decided to pull out their observers fearing further escalation. There are a number of reasons why the OSCE’s important work does not receive broader attention. For one thing, its observers are often subjected to obstructions. They are denied access to the relevant regions and sites, their freedom of movement is restricted, and OSCE unmanned aerial drones are interfered with or shot down. The Organization registered a total of 93,902 ceasefire violations in 2021, which exceeds its capacity to broker ceasefires many times. Moreover, given the current geopolitical dynamics and fast-paced high-level diplomacy on the world stage, the often cumbersome de-escalation work in the very conflict zone tends to get less attention. A future platform for European security In light of all this, what role can the OSCE play in pursuit of a future European security order? As in any organisation, this ultimately comes down to the political will of the participating states. A number of OSCE key actors currently exhibit a lack of such will. As things stand, the most obvious approach – namely not to re-invent the wheel but to dust off the organisation and reinvigorate it – is therefore hardly an option. In the long run, however, we will need a joint platform for European security. The crisis of the OSCE is not of operational or technical nature, but deeply political. Needless to say that this is profoundly regrettable, given its unique wealth of experience in early warning and conflict prevention, as well as crisis management and resolution, and its tried-and-tested toolbox of confidence-building measures – among them the mechanism about ‘unusual military activities’ under the OSCE Vienna Document Ukraine is using to seek clarification from Russia.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF – OSCE CP › 2AC – INB – OSCE Fails

It fails – every country has an effective veto power which makes punishing aggressors impossible

Garibov 16 [Azad Garibov, 05-11-2016, “Why the OSCE Keeps Failing to Make Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh, The National Interest,

Above all, it should be noted that the OSCE is an intergovernmental organization with no supranational powers. This intergovernmentalism means that any OSCE activity in any member country, and any mission deployed on behalf of the organization, is subject to unanimous approval from all member states, and particularly the country to which the activity or mission pertains. Thus, every country in the organization has an effective veto power on any decision. In 1996 the OSCE was unable to include the famous “three principles” (the territorial integrity of both countries, self-determination for Nagorno-Karabakh in the form of the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan, and guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population) in the Lisbon declaration due to Armenia’s objection, despite winning the support of 53 out of 54 member states. This essential systemic weakness constrains the OSCE’s effectiveness in many cases, including in conflict areas when there is need to punish aggressors and protect victims.

In considering shortcomings peculiar to Minsk Group itself, the biggest problem is that it tries not to hurt anyone. The Minsk Group tries to seem neutral, and this near-obsession with neutrality does not allow it to be fair and impartial. It is claimed that openly naming Armenia as an aggressor country and calling for the fulfillment of U.N. Security Council resolutions—which entails unconditional withdrawal of forces from Nagorno-Karabakh—might discredit the OSCE Minsk group in the eyes of Armenian side. However, it does not mean that OSCE can play this game of neutrality over justice forever. The Minsk Group’s co-chairs avoid making clear-cut statements about their positions on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They avoid bringing up the fact of occupation; they make general and vague statements at best, or indeed make contradictory declarations depending on whether they are in Baku or Yerevan. In so doing, they claim that they are addressing the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, when there is need for a firm position, the co-chairs state that Armenia and Azerbaijan should find a solution themselves since it is their problem, and that the Minsk Group will support any decision they make. This attitude and the visible failure of shuttle diplomacy has resulted in such widespread distrust in OSCE Minsk Group’s activity that the Azerbaijani media has begun to re­fer to the co-chairs’ visits to the region as “tourist excursions.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF – OSCE CP › 2AC – INB – Not Key

OSCE not key to Moldova conflict prevention – past empirics prove

Khorolskaya 22 [Maria Khorolskaya, 01-01-2022, “OSCE’s Involvement in Conflict Resolution Across the Post-Soviet Space, moderndiplomacy, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/01/01/osces-involvement-in-conflict-resolution-across-the-post-soviet-space/]\\pairie

The OSCE participated in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict once its most acute phase had been overcome. In particular, the organisation was puzzled by the signing of a ceasefire agreement and the establishment of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), consisting of representatives of the armed forces of Moldova, Russia and the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. According to its mandate, the mission should assist in laying the groundwork for dialogue between Chisinau and Tiraspol, collecting information about the situation in the region, providing consultations, and encouraging negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement on the status of the PMR and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Late in 1999, the mandate of the OSCE mission was expanded with the additional task of “ensuring transparency of the removal and destruction of Russian ammunition and armaments”.

The participation of the OSCE mission in the settlement of the crisis is ensured both through observers and through involvement in the negotiation process. The OSCE, along with Russia and Ukraine, is a guarantor of the 5+2 format. Over 28 years, the mission has helped to resolve a number of issues, including the opening of traffic on the bridge across the Dnieper River near the village of Gura Bîcului, providing Moldovan farmers with access to plots in the Dubăsari District of Transnistria, recognition of documents and license plates, etc. However, one cannot speak of a substantial intermediary contribution by the OSCE to the conflict resolution process. Progress in this process can only be achieved by changing the policies of the leading actors. Thus, the proposals of the mission representatives on possible ways out of the crisis did not find support in Chisinau and Tiraspol (1993 Report No. 13 by T. Williams, Head of Mission, proposing a special status for Transdniestria) [4].

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AFF – OSCE CP › 2AC – Perm do the CP

All NATO member’s are in the OSCE – the counterplan engages with their individual member states that is obviously a way the plan could be done

GLOBE [GLOBE, “NATO/EU/OSCE Membership overlap,” GLOBE,

The membership of NATO, the EU and the OSCE overlap to a large degree (figures A and B). Moreover, this membership overlap has increased, especially after NATO’s and the EU’s eastern expansions, driving increased interaction, but also causing several interorganizational problems.

NATO, with a total of 30 member states, and the EU, consisting of 27, share 21 member states (figure C). The member states that are only a member of the EU and not of NATO are five neutral EU states (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden) as well as Cyprus. The member states that are only a member of NATO and not of the EU are six European states (Albania, Iceland, North Macedonia, Norway, Turkey and the UK), as well as the two North American members: Canada and the USA.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › External NB – NATO Bad › 2NC – AT: Russia Bad – OSCE

Effective relations with Russia are key to an effective OSCE

Friesendorf & Wolff 22 [Cornelius Friesendorf & Stefan Wolf, 05-11-2022, “Options for dealing with Russia in the OSCE,” <<Cornelius is the Head of Centre for OSCE Research (CORE)>>, <<Stefan is a German political scientists>>, Security & Human Rights Monitor, https://www.shrmonitor.org/options-for-dealing-with-russia-in-the-osce/]\\pairie

Option 1: Not taking decisions with Russia anymore One way of solving the dilemma would be a refusal by other participating States, in cooperation with Ukraine, to take decisions jointly with Russia. The most aggressive version of this policy would be to declare that Russia is suspended from the OSCE. This would mirror Russia’s suspension from the UN Human Rights Council and its expulsion from the Council of Europe. The OSCE’s predecessor, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), also offers lessons for sanctioning norm violators. In October 1991, in Moscow, CSCE States agreed on allowing missions of independent experts to investigate violations of human dimension commitments, if necessary without the consent of the accused state (the “Moscow Mechanism”). The mechanism has only been used ten times over the past three decades—and was activated most recently by 45 participating States in the context of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, resulting in a highly critical expert report on violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Potentially also relevant is the 1992 decision of the CSCE to suspend the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) for the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was based on a decision at the Prague Council Meeting in January 1992 to allow for political steps to be taken “in the absence of the consent of the State concerned, in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of relevant CSCE commitments.“ Yugoslavia was only readmitted in 2000, after the end of the Milošević regime, and after the Yugoslav government committed to respect OSCE principles and standards. There is even a provision for consensus-minus-two. In Stockholm in December 1992, the CSCE added provisions to the so-called Valletta Mechanism, to direct two participating States engaged in a dispute to seek conciliation. Unfortunately, these mechanisms are not a panacea for dealing with Russia now. Consensus-minus-two was never used because the provisions are complicated and politically contested. With regard to the suspension of Belgrade: Yugoslavia at the time had no strong allies and was not a powerful participating State, in contrast to Russia. There were also doubts whether the suspension was legally and politically warranted. Moreover, the early 1990s were the heydays of the Organization when states created rules that lost traction shortly afterwards. Thus, the 2006 Rules of Procedure above all stress the consensus principle, which goes back to the 1973 Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations. If the West now tried to apply mechanisms limiting the consensus rule, Russia would most likely argue that the West had destroyed the OSCE by violating one of its core principles. Moscow could also be prompted to withdraw from the OSCE itself. As an indication of its insistence on consensus, Russia called the Human Dimension mechanisms “outdated and redundant for the most part” after the recent activation of the Moscow Mechanism. More important than this formalistic perspective: without Russia, the OSCE would lose much of its purpose. The permanent security dialogue between Western states and Russia is a unique value of the OSCE. To be sure, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its intervention in the Donbas in 2014 reduced dialogue in the Vienna conference halls to mutual accusations. One of the victims was conventional arms control and military transparency. For example, Russia refused for years to update the 2011 Vienna Document, which provides among other measures for mutual inspections. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on 24 February has reinforced the policy of Western participating States and their allies of “no business as usual”, in place since 2014. Nevertheless, even meetings where diplomats ritualistically present antagonistic positions are valuable at a time when there is a serious risk of a war between Russia and NATO states. The original aim of such meetings – to build trust – now seems naive, but simply informing the other side of one’s position helps to channel information to the 57 capitals and avoid misunderstandings that could spiral into nuclear war. Taking decisions without Russia, and thus effectively suspending Russia from the OSCE, may also not be effective in ensuring the Organization’s survival. Moscow’s allies, above all Belarus and potentially Armenia (which depends on Russia keeping Azerbaijan at bay) and Tajikistan (which has a Russian military base on its territory), could still frustrate decision-making. In addition, should Russia formally leave the OSCE, its allies would likely follow suit, as might other participating States sharing the Kremlin’s concerns about OSCE support to democratization, such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. The result would be a rump OSCE. If the nationalist Serbian government joined the Russian camp, the OSCE would lose much of its still significant remit in the Western Balkans, too. Participating States could also sideline Russia without formally suspending Russia. Delegations could refuse to sit in meetings with Russian diplomats, similar to Ukraine’s decision not to attend any meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation between April and July when Belarus chairs the Forum. They could also set up alternative meetings where they take decisions without Russia. The Rules of Procedure allow the Chairperson-in-Office, the Chair of the Forum for Security Co-operation, or an executive structure (such as the Secretariat) to organize events without agreement from all participating States. But such events, unless based on a consensus decision, are not official OSCE events, and documents adopted at such events do not count as OSCE documents and therefore lack normative traction. Hence, there are no tricks for bypassing the consensus rule. Any attempt to do so would risk the survival of the OSCE.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › External NB – NATO Bad › 2NC – Avoids NATO Bad – Russia

Working through the OSCE solves triggering Russia – they are a more helpful forum for preventing conflict than NATO

Rojansky 18 [Matthew Rojansky, 10-17-2018, “Can a US-Russia conflict be contained?,” European Leadership Network, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/can-a-us-russia-conflict-be-contained/]\\pairie

Bad news about the state of US-Russia relations is hardly new. Bilateral relations are in a deep and likely enduring crisis, arguably their worst since the early 1980s, if not 1960s. The reflexive postures of Moscow and Washington are adversarial and distrustful on nearly every major international issue, and poisonous domestic politics on both sides appear to exclude any possibility of repairing ties. Most worrying is the return to de facto military confrontation, from Northern Europe to the Middle East, with the very real risk of escalation to an unintended but catastrophic nuclear exchange. Russians and Americans deeply and fundamentally disagree on a host of major issues. Washington, awaiting the outcome of the Mueller investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election, continues to experience Russian meddling in everything from social media trolling to real-world cloak and dagger escapades. Russians have fired back with old tropes about US imperialism and hostile NATO encirclement, but also with novelties such as the claim that a US-funded bioweapons lab in the Republic of Georgia killed 73 people.[1] Both sides have embraced sanctions, mutual isolation, and information warfare as if they are cost-free, with the result being that trade and exchanges between the two countries have collapsed. Disagreements over regional conflicts now extend to a global posture of mutual counterbalancing and containment, reminiscent of the Cold War. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for Donbas separatism has become the new dividing line within Europe, with millions displaced, tens of thousands dead, and nearly zero prospect of a peaceful resolution on the horizon. In Syria, Russia has effectively ended US aspirations for a transition from Assad’s bloody regime to electoral democracy, while empowering Iran and its proxies on the border with US ally, Israel. This military intervention has upended the politics and security relations of the Middle East, reviving the half-century-old prospect of “superpower rivalries” in that crucial, explosive and energy-rich region.

Commentary

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › External NB – NATO Bad › 2NC – Avoids NATO Bad – Russia

OSCE can pursue cooperation with Russia and create good relations

Friesendorf & Wolff 22 [Cornelius Friesendorf & Stefan Wolf, 05-11-2022, “Options for dealing with Russia in the OSCE,” <<Cornelius is the Head of Centre for OSCE Research (CORE)>>, <<Stefan is a German political scientists>>, Security & Human Rights Monitor, https://www.shrmonitor.org/options-for-dealing-with-russia-in-the-osce/]\\pairie

Option 2: Being open to pursuing minimal cooperation Alternatively, participating States might pursue minimal cooperation with Russia, including by adopting the annual budget. This policy is made easier by the OSCE rule that a decision only requires that no participating State actively opposes the decision. As article 69 of the 1973 Final Recommendations of the Helsinki Consultations states: “Consensus shall be understood to mean the absence of any objection expressed by a Representative and submitted by him as constituting an obstacle to the taking of the decision in question.” Similarly, the 2006 Rules of Procedure allow for a so-called silence procedure for decisions by the Permanent Council, the Forum for Security Co-operation, and the Ministerial Council whereby a decision can be adopted if no participating State expresses an objection to the decision within a pre-determined period of time. Hence, participating States could adopt a lowest common denominator approach towards Russia: they would be open to adopt decisions that Russia also supports, rather than being against everything Russia supports and refusing to take any decisions with Russia. This approach to critical decisions would potentially keep the OSCE functioning. A similar approach was recently adopted at the United Nations Security Council when a Presidential Statement was issued by the Council President, Ambassador Leah Thomas-Greenfield of the United States. Merely reminding UN member states of their “obligation to settle their international disputes by peaceful means”, the statement also reflects the potential problems with such an approach in potentially legitimizing Russian aggression or creating a moral equivalence between Russia and Ukraine. It would therefore be important to minimize any Russian legitimacy gains from such an approach in the OSCE context by delegations walking out when Russian delegates speak (which happened both in the Permanent Council and in the Forum for Security Co-operation), at least when no decisions need to be taken. Moreover, OSCE States can continue condemning Russia’s war during debates in the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Co-operation, and also issue interpretative statements after making joint decisions. As part of the official record of meetings of the Permanent Council and the Ministerial Council, such statements help opponents of Russia’s war to signal norms-based positions, also to parliaments and the public back home. The lowest common denominator approach could also be applied to other issues beyond the adoption of the budget. The OSCE still does not have agreement on the Chair-in-Office in 2024 (after Russia, late last year, blocked Estonia’s bid). Moreover, the mandates for OSCE field operations in the Western Balkans, Moldova, and Central Asia need to be renewed by the end of the year. Failing agreement among all 57 participating States, one option would be to fund such missions through extrabudgetary contributions (ExB) that do not require consensus. To be sure, Russia could then rightly argue that these are no longer OSCE activities. Yet, ExB may be a way to buy time. However, the lowest common denominator may be too small to keep the OSCE going. The mandate of the Project Coordinator in Ukraine, which now provides primarily humanitarian aid in Ukraine’s West, expires at the end of June. Russian agreement to extend the mission is unlikely, given that Moscow pulled the plug on the Russia-based OSCE Border Observation Mission last year and in March this year refused to extend the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (SMM). The OSCE might therefore soon no longer have a presence in Ukraine, despite its contribution to mitigating some of the effects of war. Hanging on a thread, too, is Europe’s largest human rights conference. Annually organized by ODIHR in Warsaw, the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting was canceled in 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic and in 2021 because of Russian opposition. If the meeting does not take place a third time in a row it would probably have to be consigned to the dustbin of history. The future of ongoing OSCE mediation efforts is unclear, too. The Geneva International Discussions over the conflicts in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) are on hold, although the OSCE and EU facilitated Incident Response and Prevention Mechanism in Ergneti has continued to meet regularly. On hold, too, is the Minsk Group, which mediates in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh and is co-chaired by France, Russia, and the United States. Even in Transnistria where conflict management has looked most promising over recent years, the OSCE’s role may wane if Russia expands its war to Moldova via Transnistria. Without agreement on HDIM, a mediation role, and potentially some or all field operations, the OSCE could still survive, even if in a truncated form. But time is running out and as it does, uncertainty will increase: there is no precedent for how the Organization would continue to function without agreement on a budget (needed, at least according to a standard interpretation of the rules, before the end of 2022) and on a Chair for 2024 (needed early in 2023 in order to give the chosen state enough time to prepare). Moreover, the mandate of the current Secretary General – Helga Maria Schmid – expires at the end of 2023. The prospect of a repeat of the leadership crisis of 2020 could be the death knell of the Organization. Thus, there is no alternative to minimal cooperation with Russia, at least in the form of the lowest common denominator approach to critical decisions. The cost of legitimizing Russian aggression is relatively minimal and outweighed by the ability to retain an organization that can still help to reduce the risk of a wider war. Being realistic about the consequences As long as Russia is pursuing an expansionist policy and continues to act as an imperialist and revisionist power, deterrence and defense are reasonable responses. But the Cold War taught us that dialogue on mutual interests, such as preventing avoidable wars, is a vital complement to deterrence and defense.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › INB – OSCE › 2NC – INB – AT: Fails – Ukraine

OSCE is still helpful in other instances and provides a platform for settlement – even if they couldn’t prevent the Ukraine conflict

Vigano 22 [Marta Silvia Vigano, Edited by: Sonya Diehn, 05-23-2022, “OSCE, crippled debilitated in Ukraine, could fulfill its potential after the war ends,” DW,

When Helga Maria Schmid spoke with DW in Vienna about the end of the OSCE's special monitoring mission to Ukraine, the words she chose were "very unfortunate" and "heartbreaking." Schmid, the secretary general of the Vienna-based Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, had decided to evacuate international staff members and relocate local employees when Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24. "This mission has done an incredibly good amount of work," said Schmid, who is German. "Not only in terms of observing the cease-fire — but our more than 1,300 monitors were really our eyes and ears on the ground," she added. The OSCE is the world's largest security body, with 57 member countries from North America, Central Asia and Europe, including Ukraine and Russia. Helga Maria Schmid Helga Maria Schmid, a German diplomat, has been OSCE secretary general since 2020 After Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, this was an important factor in positioning the organization as a neutral mediator — or "the only organization acceptable by everyone; first responders, so to say," as Schmid put it. Also with the flaring up of armed conflict between Russian-backed separatists and the Ukrainian military in the Donbas region, the OSCE stood ready to fulfill one of its key tasks: working to rebuild peace and security in Europe. But in Ukraine, it's been thwarted. Now the question remains: How can the organization live up to its potential? Useful role under a limited mandate The mission in Ukraine was the OSCE's largest to date. Antje Grawe, the mission's acting head, told DW the unarmed monitors had been working 24 hours a day, seven days a week. They went on patrols, mainly in eastern Ukraine, observing what was going on and reporting on developments on the ground. Nikola Golubov joined the mission as a monitoring officer from his home country of North Macedonia almost right from its start. "While on patrol, we would always talk to civilians and ask them what challenges they were experiencing," he said. They checked whether Ukrainians still had access to medical services, or running water, electricity and gas. Could their children attend school, and were they able to cross the contact line and meet with their relatives? Jamie Shea of Friends of Europe Jamie Shea, a senior fellow at Friends of Europe, said the OSCE continues to be a platform for dialogue Over its eight years of existence, the OSCE's mission also had its weaknesses. For example, it lacked the necessary staff to cover such a vast area, and at times Russia denied access to the border area. However, despite these weaknesses, experts like Jamie Shea — a senior fellow at the Brussels-based independent think tank Friends of Europe — confirmed the mission had "played a useful role in terms of monitoring the cease-fire, recording violations, reporting on the humanitarian situation and ringing the alarm bell if a war was likely to restart." Grawe said that, of course, the Ukraine monitoring mission had reported on the buildup of tensions, particularly in the months of January and February this year. "But the developments that happened as of February 24 were obviously far beyond the mission's mandate," she said. Men walk past an OSCE car damaged in the course of Russia's war in Ukraine in Mariupol Many observers think the OSCE played an important role in Ukraine right up until Russia invaded Consensus design could promote dialogue One of the OSCE's key missions is to prevent conflict and war in Europe. Did it fail? When asked this question, Schmid said it's always easy to blame international organizations. The OSCE offered an instrument, a platform for dialogue. "But ultimately, we are not a defense alliance, if there is no political will," she said. If one participating state, in this case Russia, chooses force and violence over dialogue, this is not the fault of the organization, she added. Unsurprisingly, it was also Russia that vetoed extending the Ukraine monitoring mission at the end of March. Due to the OSCE's consensus design, a single member may block decisions taken by the 56 other countries. This structure also makes it difficult to suspend Russia from the organization, as it has been from other international organizations like the Council of Europe. Even with a "consensus minus one" procedure available when one member commits gross human rights violations, Belarus would likely vote with Russia, further foiling any such exclusion. But for many, the fact that Russia and Ukraine remain together in this international organization has value in and of itself. All 57 ambassadors to the OSCE continue to meet every Thursday in their so-called permanent council. "The OSCE is still a platform for dialogue," said Shea. "But not really with an operational role at the moment." The organization has provided a platform for Russia to explain its position to the members. And, of course, for members to express grave concerns regarding Russia's invasion to Moscow via its OSCE membership. OSCE's time will come The OSCE traces its origins back to the Cold War era in the 1970s, created as an attempt to improve relations between East and West. Ever since, it has focused on issues such as arms control, freedom of the press, human rights and free elections. "The hope then of a Europe free of conflict hasn't quite materialized," admitted Schmid. "But there are huge achievements."

2022 Michigan Counterplan
OSCE CP › INB – OSCE › 2NC – Impact – Moldanova

Moldanova conflict causes WW3 – extinction

Ellyatt 22 [Holly Ellyatt, 04-29-2022, “Could there be war between Russia and the West? Strategists Predict what could happen next”, <<Holly studied European Social & Political Studies at University College London (UCL)>>, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/29/russia-ukraine-war-should-the-west-prepare-for-war-with-putin.html]\\pairie

“I think it’s outside the realm of possibility right now that there’s going to be a nuclear war or World War III that really spills over that far beyond Ukraine’s borders,” Samuel Ramani, a geopolitical analyst and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, told CNBC. “If there’s a border spillover right now, we’re still probably most likely looking at something like Moldova being vulnerable to an invasion,” he said. U.S. Army Spc. Colton Davis, an infantryman assigned to Company C, 2nd Battalion, 198th Armor Regiment, 155th Armored Brigade Combat Team, Mississippi Army National Guard, fires a Javelin shoulder-fired anti-tank missile during a combined arms live fire exercise as part of Exercise Eastern Action 2019 at Al-Ghalail Range in Qatar, Nov. 14, 2018. A U.S. infantryman at a combined arms live fire exercise at Al-Ghalail Range in Qatar, on Nov. 14, 2018. Spc. Jovi Prevot | U.S. Army He noted that Russia has a long history of using “nuclear brinkmanship” as a way of preventing the West from pursuing security policies that it doesn’t like, with the escalation in hostile rhetoric aimed at deterring NATO members from making heavy arms deliveries to Ukraine. Moment of danger Nonetheless, Ramani noted the threat posed by Russia could become more acute if it felt humiliated on the battlefield. In particular, military setbacks in Ukraine around May 9 could pose some danger. That’s Russia’s “Victory Day” — the anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat by the Soviet Union in World War II. “Putin has had a history of escalating unpredictability if he feels that Russia is being humiliated in some way ... and if there are major setbacks, especially on around the 9th [of May] then there’s a risk of unbreakable action,” he said. “But also there’s a logic of mutually assured destruction that hopefully will rein everybody in.” Threatening nuclear attacks is part of Putin’s “playbook,” said William Alberque, director of strategy, technology and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank.