Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Evidence
net benefit › us fails

Jan 6 ruined US demo-cred

Soare 21, PhD in Political Science, Senior Associate Analyst at EUISS from 2019 to end May 2021. Her research focused on United States security policy, transatlantic security and EU-NATO relations. Prior to joining EUISS, Simona served as advisor to the Vice-President of the European Parliament (2015-2019) and as an analyst with the Romanian Ministry of Defence, working on transatlantic and European security. She has also been a research associate with the Institut d’Études Européennes (IEE) at Université Saint Louis-Bruxelles (Simona, Biden’s Security Policy: Democratic Security or Democratic Exceptionalism?,

More broadly, Biden's team will emphasise human rights and democratic principles and shift from a transactional to a more traditionally conditional US pressure on partners. This could take the form of leveraging US strategic relations with challenging allies like Poland, Hungary and Turkey to achieve concessions on respect for the rule of law and human rights (Harvard-DGAP, 2020, 4). However, following the 6 January 2021 storming of the US Capitol by pro-Trump rioters, experts argue: 'The power of America's example will be dimmer than it once was; American arguments will be harder to hear' (Applebaum, 2021). Some have called on President Biden to abandon the idea of an international Summit for Democracy and instead focus inwards on American democratic renewal e.g. (Goldgeier and Jentlesen, 2021).

2022 Michigan Evidence
net benefit › squo solves

Countries other than the US solve

Jonathan Katz, director of Democracy Initiatives and a senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Torry Taussig, research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, 2018 “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” Brookings Institute, , (accessed 6-2-2022)

Regardless of U.S. leadership or support, other NATO states such as the Nordic countries, Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other members must play a role in prioritizing NATO’s core values at the Brussels Summit and strengthening democratic institutions. In speaking to diplomats from several member states, it is clear that they recognize the growing democracy deficit in the alliance, and that the United States will likely not lead the charge on championing democratic institutions. In response, officials from such member states can use bilateral meetings and sideline conversations with the Hungarians, Poles, and Turks to raise concerns. Already the European Union is pressing Poland on its violation of EU democratic principles with the threat of sanctions and suspension of voting privileges. The security implications of their transgressions give NATO a role in maintaining this pressure, too.

2022 Michigan Evidence
net benefit › squo solves

The United States already did the counterplan under Trump

Jonathan Katz, director of Democracy Initiatives and a senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Torry Taussig, research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, 2018 “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” Brookings Institute, , (accessed 6-2-2022)

In developing the communiqué’s language, the United States and its NATO allies should use momentum from Assistant Secretary for Europe and Eurasia Wess Mitchell’s recent remarks at the Heritage Foundation, where he reaffirmed that when it comes to NATO, “[w]e have to be clear that we stand for strong democracy as the foundation of our security and prosperity.” Based on this positioning, Washington would likely support NATO allies if they insist that democracy, human rights, and rule of law be a focus of the NATO summit and its communiqué.

2022 Michigan Evidence
competition › perm do counterplan

It’s not a mandatory obligation

Gil Fried, University of New Haven and Robin Ammon, Slippery Rock University, 2001

“What is Appropriate Signage for the Sport Industries?,” Journal of Legal Aspects of Sports, p. 190

The everyday use of signage affects the efficient and safe flow of vehicular traffic. Tort liability for traffic signage related issues is predicated upon standards established by each states' Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). Under these guidelines government entities are required to develop uniformity in communicating safety concerns. Uniformity means that the same type of device should be used for the same type of road condition, which helps drivers to develop and maintain certain expectancies (Blashke, 1990). The MUTCD uses terms such as "shall," "should," and "may" to suggest or demand the application of traffic control devices. If the word "shall" is used it is a mandatory term and the state has to follow the guidelines. In contrast, the term "should" indicates only a strong recommendation, but not a mandatory recommendation. A good example of this difference can be seen with stop signs. The MUTCD states that stop signs "shall" be an octagon and further provides that when two highways intersect the stop sign "should" be posted on the minor street (Blashke, 1990). The difference between "shall" and "should" is very significant for traffic sign cases since liability is harder to prove if the state was not required to post a sign when compared with instances where the state failed to post a required sign.

2022 Michigan Evidence
competition › perm do counterplan

Should means encouragement, not requirement

Ryan Williams, received his law degree in 2008 from Louisiana State University , graduating with honors. He was a member of the Law Review and served as a Senior Editor during his Senior year, 2008

“Reputation and the Rules: An Argument for a Balancing Approach under Rule 8.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct”, 68 La. L. Rev. 931, p. 936

As in Canon 29, use of the permissive "should" implies that the Georgia Rule is merely hortatory; it encourages reporting misbehavior without requiring it. Georgia Rule 8.3 goes a step further than Canon 29, in fact, by explicitly disclaiming any threat of disciplinary proceedings for failure to comply.

2022 Michigan Evidence
competition › perm do counterplan

The term “should” carries flexibility and discretion

Sam Foster Halabi, Assistant Professor, University of Tulsa College of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 2010

“ARTICLE: THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION'S FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL: AN ANALYSIS OF GUIDELINES ADOPTED BY THE CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES”, 39 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 121, 136

The purpose, scope, and applicability of the guidelines variously declare that States "should," "should consider," "should endeavour," "should ensure," and "should require" the measures adopted by the COP. 66The text of the FCTC uses the word "shall" as to certain of Parties' obligations. 67The use of the word "should," in most contexts, is "precatory, not mandatory." 68Yet the word "should" may also be used to express a duty or obligation albeit with a degree of flexibility or discretion. 69FCTC Article 11.1(b)(iv) illustrates this distinction, requiring that warnings and messages "should be 50% or more of the principal display areas but shall be no less than 30% of the principal display areas." 70Furthermore, many of the measures adopted without objection by the COP are styled "recommendations," the ordinary meaning of which does not entail mandatory action. 71In the following sections, the treaty language is juxtaposed with key language from the guidelines in an effort to sort out obligations imposed by the treaty language, obligations clarified by virtue of guidance from the guidelines, and non-obligatory provisions of the guidelines that are precatory or recommendatory. 72

2022 Michigan Evidence
competition › perm do counterplan

Should does not mean absolutely mandatory, it’s a discretionary term

Judge Mulrroney, Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration Chief Administrative Law Judge and Katherine Legel, Judicial Law Clerk at the Drug Enforcement Administration, 2017

“CURRENT NAVIGATION POINTS IN DRUG DIVERSION LAW: HIDDEN ROCKS IN SHALLOW, MURKY, DRUG-INFESTED WATERS,” Marquette Law Review, p. 384

The Agency disagreed with the ALJ's interpretation of the Oklahoma provisions, and held that "should" does not really mean "should," at least in those provisions, but actually means "must," and connoted a mandatory obligation in the context of the provisions at issue. 292 The Agency based its decision on its interpretation of cases from the Seventh Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, a federal district court in Florida, and a dictionary definition of "should," as well as an analysis of the Oklahoma Medical Practice Act and a Policy Statement. 293 Interestingly, a Tenth Circuit (which includes Oklahoma) case which held that ""should' indicates a recommended course of action, but does not itself imply the obligation associated with "shall,'" received no mention in the Agency's decision in Pope. 294 Thus, contrary to the Agency's view, the pertinent Circuit Court of Appeals holds the view that the most reasonable interpretation of the word "should" is really "should" - a discretionary term. 295 The Agency did not discuss the fact that there is some level of conflict in the circuit courts about whether to treat "should" as mandatory or permissive, 296 but the Agency has apparently taken the position that, if the state law supplying the practice standard in a DEA case uses the word "should," the Agency is likely to read that word as "must," irrespective of federal circuit law on the issue. 297

2022 Michigan Evidence
solvency – say no › backlash – russia

Putin is uniquely emboldened by democratization

West 22 – John West, adjunct professor at Tokyo’s Sophia University, executive director of the Asian Century Institute (“Saving democracy from Russian rage”, The Interpreter, 3/14/2022, ) FGY

Much is being written about Russia’s invasion of the Ukraine, and much more will surely be said in the months and years ahead of this potentially epoch-defining event. But some of the most insightful and almost prescient analyses were made well before the conflict, such as in Larry Diamond’s excellent 2020 book, .

Diamond, a professor at Stanford University, documents the political transformation of the world through the “third wave of democratisation”, beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by a big bang after the fall of the Berlin wall, with the democratisation of central and eastern Europe. But then began a global democratic recession.

2022 Michigan Evidence
solvency – say no › backlash – russia

Putin lashes out to boost self-preservation – he fears democratic expansion, not NATO

Tafuri 22 – David Tafuri, international lawyer at Arent Fox, opinion contributor to The Hill, served as the US Department of State’s Rule of Law Coordinator for Iraq at the US Embassy in Baghdad and an outside foreign policy advisor to President Barack Obama (“Putin doesn’t fear NATO or Ukraine – he fears democracy”, 2/10/2022, ) FGY

As the world waits to learn if will order a full-scale military offensive in Ukraine, Washington seems to be stumbling over a simple question: How much does Russian aggression in Europe matter to U.S. interests? One  is that Ukraine’s status is more important to Russia than to us, especially because Ukraine is not a part of NATO. Others go further, questioning whether even NATO members, guaranteed protection by , are worth defending. 

Media have  Tucker Carlson’s growing influence in Republican circles on this question. Two years ago, he previewed his stance when I  him on his show. He argued that NATO members Estonia and Latvia, are, like Ukraine, not worth defending if invaded by Russia. I countered, as I explain in more detail here, that it’s in America’s vital interest to support these sovereign nations — precisely because Putin is targeting them for their decision to turn away from the governance model on offer from Russia.

2022 Michigan Evidence
solvency – say no › --- gwinn rehighlgiht

Conditioning fails – delays critical cooperation with partner countries, causes Russia and China to fill in – we’re green

“security assistance” and “security cooperation” used interchangeably

Gwinn 22 – Jeremy Gwinn, director of Army and Special Missions Team at OSC-I at the United States Department of Defense, Ph.D. in international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, B.A. in military science from Penn State University (“Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking US Security Assistance”, 4/19/2022, ) FGY

Hard Is Not Impossible

2022 Michigan Evidence
solvency – say no › backlash – general

Strategic interests, not human rights, should guide US policy

Oleg Svet, PhD and Defense Analyst, 2017

“When Pushing Democracy On Others Backfires,” The American Conservative, , (accessed 6-2-2022)

In her July 13 op-ed in Foreign Affairs, “How U.S. Officials Can Craft Innovative Human Rights Policy,” former Ambassador Sarah Mendelson recalls her work as a senior, politically-appointed foreign policy official in the Obama administration. Her personal mission, as she recalls, was to “elevate human rights”–first within USAID, and later when she worked for the US Mission to the United Nations. Her initiatives to promote civil society and human rights within small powers such as post-Ben Ali Tunisia are admirable. However, her implicit suggestion that we ought to elevate human rights in our relations with great powers such as China and Russia is strategically incorrect. Our country’s policies vis-a-vis great powers (and to some extent medium powers, such as Turkey) must be guided, first and foremost, by a grand strategy rooted in our strategic interests, not one that aims to reflect our values.

2022 Michigan Evidence
solvency – say no › backlash – general

Countries can’t easily democratize in response to political conditionality

Samiratou Dipama, PhD Candidate at Marmara University and Emel Parlar Dal, Professor at Marmara University, 2015

“The Effectiveness of Political Conditionality as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion by the EU: Case Studies of Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Niger,” Perceptions, Volume 10, No. 1, (accessed 5-24-2022)

Finally, the one-model-fits-all approach commonly used by the EU in the application of political conditionality limits the effectiveness of conditionality policy and can no longer be used. Indeed, in the context of democratizing a country, several factors might infuence the outcome other than just the willingness of the government. These include the presence or absence of a strong opposition and civil society, the degree of development of the country, the socio-economic situation in the country, and the country’s history.80 The complexity of these intervening factors clearly indicates that a countrybased democracy promotion’s approach appears a must in order to enhance the effectiveness of political aid as an instrument of democracy promotion in SSA. A great step has been made in this sense by the EU in the revised CPA (in 2010), where more attention is given to flexibility and to the individual circumstances of each ACP country.

2022 Michigan Evidence
solvency – say no › backlash – general

The counterplan promotes backlash, which undermines alliance solidarity

Rachel Ellehuus, deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Pierre Morcos, visiting fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, 2021

“NATO Should Finally Take its Values Seriously,” War on the Rocks, , (accessed 6-1-2022)

Admittedly, pursuing a tougher course of action on values and principles comes with risks. Even measured steps could create serious rifts among allies, with the potential of paralyzing the alliance. Because NATO operates by consensus, any punitive action on an ally could provoke retaliatory action on other NATO business. In reaction to Norway’s stark criticisms against the Portuguese and Greek regimes at a June 1971 foreign ministers meeting, then-NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio warned that “if we undermine our solidarity, we run the risk of undermining the substance of our alliance.” Overcoming this dilemma between prioritizing values and preserving unity requires a graduated, collective, and dispassionate approach. First, NATO will need to be proportionate when dealing with an ally violating trans-Atlantic values. Allies should start with discussions behind closed doors rather than publicize the dispute. Open and frank dialogue among allies should always be the first step before adopting restrictive measures. If NATO moves too quickly or aggressively, it risks being counterproductive by widening divisions in the alliance. At the end of the day, this progressive approach should have a deterrent effect on NATO countries, especially on those that value their membership in the alliance and do not want to be singled out as “bad allies.”

2022 Michigan Evidence
solvency – general › uneven enforcement

Uneven enforcement [holding some allies accountable, but not others] damages broader democratic cred

Barone 22, MA in Public Management @ JHU (John, “A PROPOSAL FOR THE REVISION OF THE LEAHY LAWS TO ALIGN HUMAN RIGHTS AND SECURITY COOPERATION POLICIES WITH NATIONAL STRATEGY,” https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/66912/Barone-Capstone%20Project-2022.pdf?sequence=1)//BB

Enforcement of human rights initiatives will often damage relations when the US finds that a foreign partner has violated them and then imposes military aid restrictions or sanctions on the guilty units or nations. The issue is compounded when the US does not hold states equally accountable to the US code on foreign aid and policy standards. Until recently, many US embassies did not share vetting results with partner nations, despite legal requirements to share the data with the host nation to avoid damaging relationships.2 As of 2017, the DOS publishes an annual list of suspended units on its website.3 This year, an advisor to the Supreme Court of Bangladesh disclosed that the country is debating whether it should follow procedures established by the Leahy Laws that would remediate Bangladeshi units sanctioned from receiving aid, noting that Bangladesh would then go to the PRC for support. The advisor identified inconsistencies in how the US administered its human rights policies to close allies such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others.4 The US must stand up for human rights abroad but must evenly enforce a policy that does not damage relations, ultimately preventing the US from influencing partners to adhere to human rights concepts.

2022 Michigan Evidence
solvency – general › conditioning fails

Positive conditionality fails because recipients pretend success

Samiratou Dipama, PhD Candidate at Marmara University and Emel Parlar Dal, Professor at Marmara University, 2015 “The Effectiveness of Political Conditionality as an Instrument of Democracy Promotion by the EU: Case Studies of Zimbabwe, Ivory Coast and Niger,” Perceptions, Volume 10, No. 1, (accessed 5-24-2022)

Negative conditionality is generally criticized to be ineffective because sanctions imposed as a result of conditionality might hit the poor instead of the targeted government25 and the recipient country’s government might easily find access to alternative funding resources. In contrast, the application of positive conditionality is much less contested in the critical discussion. The EU’s enlargement strategy is generally used as a clear example of the effectiveness of positive conditionality to boost the democratic space in the Eastern European countries. In fact, the desirability of EU membership appears to have prompted candidate countries to adhere to a host of conditions contained in the so-called Acquis Communautaire. Yet, there are still problems with the way EU uses positive conditionality: it does not always deliver the incentives promised (extra aid, for example), or at least it does not deliver them quickly. Governments may even pretend progress without actually achieving a policy change.26

2022 Michigan Evidence
solvency – general › conditioning fails

Countries will not allow intrusive monitoring

Andrew Boutton, assistant professor of political science at the University of Central Florida, 2018 “POLICY ROUNDTABLE: THE PROS AND CONS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” Texas National Security Review, , (accessed 5-24-2022)

Positive conditionality requires the United States to verify the efforts undertaken by the partner government, which in turn necessitates more intrusive monitoring. Many countries will balk at this as a violation of sovereignty, but the United States should insist upon it as a condition of military assistance. A larger presence will not only enable better monitoring of the host government’s coup-proofing actions, but may also mitigate the internal security dilemma that drives such behavior. The worst paranoid excesses of the Maliki regime did not occur until after 2011, when the United States was no longer present on the ground as a safety net protecting his regime.

2022 Michigan Evidence
solvency – general › conditioning fails

Conditioning assistance rarely changes behavior

Stephen Tankel, assistant professor at American University and Melissa Dalton, senior fellow and the deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2017 “How to Improve Return on Investment for Security Assistance,” Lawfare, , (accessed 5-24-2022)

Wielding influence and securing tactical cooperation is the second. This may translate into trading assistance for access to bases, airspace, or other transit routes. The United States sometimes uses assistance to incentivize short-term tactical cooperation against shared threats. In other cases, assistance is intended to reassure allies and partners of America’s commitment to its security, either in general or against common enemies. Here it is worth noting that plans to slash the State Department’s budget and cut foreign assistance compound concerns about U.S. abandonment and further reduce American influence. Finally, the United States has tried, often without success, to use assistance as a lever to shape a recipient’s behavior either domestically or internationally. Some U.S. objectives overlap with one another. Others conflict. And lest we forget, our partners also get a vote. American objectives for security assistance often do not align with theirs, due in large part to differences in how the United States and a recipient prioritize and perceive threats. The number of different objectives at play complicates efforts to condition assistance; enforcing conditions to achieve one set of objectives could hamper efforts to achieve another set. For example, after the Bahraini government’s security forces launched a major crackdown on protesters during the Arab uprisings, the United States temporarily restricted arms sales to the country. Some members of the Obama administration also argued for placing conditions on security assistance. Others worried that this would undermine Bahrain’s support for U.S. basing and access, which is important for Afghanistan, Iran deterrence, and counterterrorism operations. As a result of competing priorities, the United States often chooses not to condition assistance, as was the case with Bahrain, or attempts to do so in an ad hoc manner. Worst of all, the United States sometimes imposes conditions, but then blinks first and backs down when they are not met.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AT: Turkey DA › 2AC – Erdogan Bad – Climate

Erdogan’s authoritarian state causes climate change.

Clément Girardot 7/21, French freelance reporter who writes mainly in-depth stories about the Caucasus region and Turkey, “Turkey’s authoritarian development ignores planetary boundaries”, https://news.mongabay.com/2022/07/turkeys-authoritarian-development-ignores-planetary-boundaries/ \\SYang

Turkey, an increasingly autocratic country since Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his AKP political party came to power in 2002, was the very last G20 nation to ratify the Paris climate agreement, doing so in October 2021. It has failed so far to take meaningful action against the steady increase of its greenhouse gas emissions.

Turkey may also be exceeding limits to many of the nine planetary boundaries critical to the survival of civilization. In addition to unregulated carbon emissions, experts are concerned over the nation’s worsening air and plastic pollution, altered land use due to new mega-infrastructure projects, and biodiversity harm.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AT: Turkey DA › 1AR – UQ – AT: No F-16s

This is a joke – Biden can step over Congress.

The National Herald 7/18, English-language weekly newspaper, based in New York City, focusing on the Greek-American community, “Pappas Amendment Gives Biden Out to Sell Turkey F-16’s, Skirt Greece” \\SYang

WASHINGTON – A US Congressional amendment pushed by New Hampshire Democrat Chris Pappas aimed at preventing the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey gives US President Joe Biden a way to get around it and get his way.

Biden wants the US to let Turkey buy the jets at the same time the US has said it supports Greece against provocations including Turkish fighter jets constantly violating Greek airspace.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
AT: Turkey DA › 1AR – UQ – AT: Gen-Z Voter Base

Gen-Z flows aff – heavy opposition means it’s impossible for Erdogan to win 2023, and link turn – they don’t like Erdogan’s ultra-nationalist language.

bne IntelliNews 7/11, business media company focusing on emerging markets, July 11, 2022, “80% of Turkey’s Gen Z tell pollster they won’t vote for Erdogan”, https://intellinews.com/80-of-turkey-s-gen-z-tell-pollster-they-won-t-vote-for-erdogan-250221/ \\SYang

The opinion polling data continues to look bleak for Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who must face the electorate by next June at the latest.

Some 80% of Turkey’s Generation Z—those born after 2000—say they will not vote for Erdogan’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), according to a study by Gezici Research.