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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › SC Links › L – Defense Unpopular Public

Distrust and polarization of the military ensures no DoD action can go undetected by the public

Schogol 21 - senior Pentagon reporter with Task & Purpose (Jeff, “Americans used to trust the military more than the rest of the government, but now even that’s fading,” Task & Purpose, 12-3-21, ) //sg

Americans are quickly losing trust and confidence in the U.S. military, according to the staggering results of a recent survey conducted by the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation and Institute. The survey found that the number of Americans who said they have a lot of confidence and trust in the military has dropped from 70% to 45% in just the past three years, and that includes a steep 11 percentage point drop since February, a Reagan Institute news release says. Roughly 2,500 people took part in the survey, which was conducted between Oct. 25 and Nov. 7. The precipitous drop in Americans’ confidence in the military comes amid debates about how to deal with extremism in the ranks, criticisms from lawmakers that the military is becoming too “woke,” fierce arguments about whether troops should be required to get vaccinated for the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), and the fall of Afghanistan. However, it’s clear that the survey is not a sign that Americans are turning against the troops. Of those respondents who said they have a “great deal” of confidence in the military, 29% cited troops and enlisted service members as their reason why they felt that way and 15% said their confidence stems from the military’s ability to keep them safe, according to data provided by the Reagan Institute. “Affection for the rank and file has been a hallmark of the AVF [all-volunteer force] ever since the Reagan years – think his ‘The Boys of Pointe du Hoc’ speech and the revival of interest in the ‘greatest generation,’” said Peter Feaver, a political science professor at Duke University in North Carolina. “This survey shows that that still persists.” It is more likely that the survey results indicate that Americans are increasingly viewing the military — as an institution — through the lens of partisan politics. Among the people who indicated they have a low degree of confidence in the U.S. military, 13% cited “political leadership” as a reason; 9% said “scandals/sexual assault/lies/cover-ups”; and 8% said they felt the military was too expensive and had the wrong priorities, according to the data. Another 15% provided other reasons that were not specified in the data and 8% said they didn’t know why they were not very confident in the military. “The fact that ‘political leadership’ was the plurality response among those with low confidence (albeit only a 13% plurality) may be an indication of the corrosive effects of political polarization in the body politic generally bleeding over into attitudes towards the military,” Feaver said. The survey indicates that Republicans in particular are losing confidence in the military. For the Reagan Institute’s 2018 survey, 87% of Republican respondents said they had a great deal of confidence in the military, compared with 53% in 2021.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › SC Links › L – Congressional Oversight

Prior Pentagon secrecy ensures the plan’s attempt to skirt oversight magnifies the link

Berger 19 Rick Berger, 7-16-2019, "The Pentagon should treat Congress as a partner, not an obstacle," Defense News, Rick Berger is a research fellow with the American Enterprise Institute. He previously served as a staff member on the Senate Budget Committee.

A strong U.S. military rests upon broad, bipartisan support among the American people translated through their representatives in Congress. Yet, amid the onset of great power competition and a generational conflict against jihadis, the Pentagon’s atrophied outreach to Congress has undermined support for the U.S. military. Although the Pentagon’s “” has rightly garnered a great deal of attention, the American public isn’t the only audience getting the cold shoulder from the Department of Defense. The Pentagon has failed to treat Congress as a partner in executing America’s defense strategy. In explanations both of budget choices and policy decisions, senior defense leaders have repeatedly neglected to invest in relationship building with Capitol Hill or to provide sufficient information to lawmakers and senior staff. This administration’s penchant for secrecy at the Pentagon further strains an already dysfunctional relationship based on mutual distrust. If Congress believes it hasn’t received sufficient answers to its oversight questions, it responds with public excoriations, punishments and regulatory actions that levy inefficiency on the daily operations of the Pentagon. The building, fearing such outcomes, refuses to share adequate information with Congress, hoping that such information can be kept secret, or that congressional complaints will blow over in time. If nothing else, the silence emanating from the building engenders mistrust and cynicism about the choices the military makes. Clearly, Congress understands that some of these strategic messaging and outreach snafus stem from the White House. In particular, anemic information flow about the president’s decision to border wall funding through the military or the Office of Management and Budget’s abuse of the overseas contingency operations account cannot be laid at the Pentagon’s feet. But Capitol Hill has proven much less forgiving of the Pentagon’s failures of communication and lack of outreach. The department even to provide a basic account of how the 2020 military budget request matched the new defense strategy. This year’s congressional defense legislation is  expressing severe bipartisan displeasure over the Pentagon’s lack of documentation and insufficient justifications for important acquisition decisions. In early March, Congress learned of the plan to decommission the aircraft carrier Harry S. Truman from the press, and the rationale behind the decision remained opaque for weeks.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › NATO Links › L –GOP Fight NATO

GOP support for NATO has wavered – supporting NATO has become politically partisan

Parker 22 [Ashley Parker is the White House Bureau Chief, Marianna Sotomayor is a Congressional reporter covering the House of Representatives, and Isaac Stanley-Becker is a National political reporter, "Inside the Republican drift away from supporting the NATO alliance", Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/04/29/nato-republicans-trump/] GBS-HW

In early 2019, several months after President Donald Trump threatened to upend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization during a trip to Brussels for the alliance’s annual summit, House lawmakers passed the NATO Support Act amid overwhelming bipartisan support, with only 22 Republicans voting against the measure.

But this month, when a similar bill in support of NATO during the Russian invasion of Ukraine again faced a vote in the House, the support was far more polarized, with 63 Republicans — 30 percent of the party’s conference — voting against it.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › NATO Links › L –GOP Fight NATO

Trump has made NATO controversial – his congressional allies will follow the example

Benitez 19 [Jorge Benitez is a nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He specializes in NATO and transatlantic relations, European politics, and US national security, "U.S. NATO Policy in the Age of Trump: Controversy and Consistency", The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, pg. ProQuest] GBS-HW

Relations between the United States and its European allies are at an unprecedented stage in transatlantic history. President Donald Trump has privately and publicly expressed a very negative view of NATO and the behavior of U.S. allies toward the United States. According to NATO's former highest military commander, retired Admiral James Stavridis, "The alliance is at a moment of high tension.... Something is new and dangerous."2

The tone of Trump's criticisms of NATO is new and much more divisive than the disagreements between previous presidents and U.S. allies. They sometimes exchanged sharp words, but these were usually in private . and directed at specific allies rather than NATO itself. Trump's approach to NATO is dangerous because no other president has questioned NATO's key role as a fundamental part of U.S. national security.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › NATO Links › L –GOP Fight NATO

Ukraine sparked more, not less, anti-nato sentiment---plan draws backlash from America first lobby

Jonathan Bernstein, 4-7-2022, Opinion columnist for bloomberg "Analysis," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/are-republicans-turning-against-nato/2022/04/07/46c1e36e-b66f-11ec-8358-20aa16355fb4_story.html//DG

Indeed, that commitment outlasted the Cold War. Trump didn’t care much about public policy when he was president. But he did undermine this internationalist consensus, even using the old “America First” slogan from an isolationist (and anti-Semitic) movement from the 1930s. And while he had little success actually implementing his foreign-policy preferences — as he was repeatedly rolled by Congress, the bureaucracy and allied nations — it’s quite possible he could have the last laugh. Earlier this week, an astonishing 63 House Republicans opposed a resolution supporting NATO. That’s still not a full third of the Republican conference, but it’s not exactly a tiny fringe, either. To be fair, some of those objecting claimed to oppose the non-binding, symbolic resolution because of some of its specific wording rather than because they opposed the alliance — but quite a few seem to be wary of the whole concept of an alliance of democracies against authoritarianism.These lawmakers are only reflecting where their party appears to be heading. In two recent polls, strong minorities of Republicans — 40% of respondents in one survey — supported leaving the alliance altogether.If a Republican committed to the old consensus wins the 2024 nomination and is elected president, I’d expect all of that to dissipate pretty rapidly. Both parties will once again be strong supporters of NATO in particular and of the general overarching direction of U.S. foreign policy since the 1940s. But if Trump is nominated, and especially if he wins the presidency, it’s hard to see the party working as hard to constrain his foreign-policy choices as it once did. And if Democrats remain in the White House for another four years (or more)? It’s easy to imagine partisan polarization extending into this area, as it has so many others, with Republicans automatically opposing whatever it is that Democratic presidents are doing — including participation in the alliances that Eisenhower, Nixon, Gerald Ford, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush all strongly supported. Preventing that result would require strong, responsible leadership from Republican politicians. I’m not optimistic that will happen.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › NATO Links › L – Domestic Focus k/

Domestic focus is Biden’s top priority---he’s actively avoiding international concerns

Kaitlan Collins and Kevin Liptak, Cnn, 5-31-2022, "White House unveils a monthlong focus on the economy as prices rise and poll numbers fall," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/31/politics/white-house-inflation-economy-joe-biden/index.html//DG

"It's ambitious. It reflects the fact the President has made fighting inflation his top economic priority," National Economic Council director Brian Deese said in an appearance on CNN. "We can do that from a position of economic strength because of the historic recovery that we have seen, strongest job market rebound in modern history, most small businesses created ever during a recovery and household balance sheets have improved." "Now," Deese said, "the question is how do we make progress?" The new push is another attempt by the White House to show voters Biden is working to address higher prices. He delivered a speech earlier this month where he went on the defensive over rising gas and food costs and criticized Republicans at length. Recently, in between meetings with world leaders during his first trip to Asia since taking office, Biden also spent a considerable amount of time focused on the economy back at home, visiting a semiconductor facility to underscore the importance of repairing the supply chain and touting a massive new electric vehicle plant to be built by Hyundai near Savannah, Georgia. Yet Biden's efforts over the past year to highlight an improving economy have not persuaded voters that his plans are working. A majority of voters say the government isn't doing enough to fight inflation, and a Gallup poll released Tuesday showed 14% of US adults rate economic conditions as "excellent" or "good," with 46% calling them "poor" and another 39% rating them as "only fair." That's worse than a month ago, when 20% of Americans rated conditions as good or better and 42% said they were poor. Early administration descriptions of inflation as "transitory" have not borne out, and opened Biden to criticism that the price spike caught his team by surprise. The President, meanwhile, has sought to balance taking credit for strong job growth and improving economic indicators with acknowledging the pain many families are feeling from higher prices of gas, groceries, housing and more. Recently, he has also sought to pin blame for higher prices on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, labeling the sticker shock "Putin's price hike." And he has accused Republicans of resisting his efforts to bring costs down in favor of pursing an "ultra-MAGA" agenda. An official told CNN to expect to see this effort to focus on the economy to continue for the rest of the month as officials want to convey to voters that Biden is paying attention to their concerns, while also preparing them to see fewer job-creation numbers as the economy stabilizes.

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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › NATO Links › L – Domestic Focus k/

Biden’s trying to direct focus away from the war---plan goes the opposite direction

Kevin Liptak and Phil Mattingly, Cnn white house reporter/correspondants, 4-9-2022, "Biden turns his focus from Ukraine war to kitchen table issues at home as midterms loom," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2022/04/09/politics/biden-domestic-issues-ukraine-war/index.html//DG

(CNN) and his aides are actively working to refocus on the litany of domestic issues threatening Democrats' prospects in the midterm elections following weeks of the President's days being  Since Biden returned from, he's held no scheduled events about Russia's invasion -- a stark contrast to the previous weeks, when the President emerged regularly to update Americans on new sanctions, intelligence and Western military assistance. Even as the atrocities of Bucha played out on television screens across the world this week — including in the West Wing, where an outraged Biden and his team watched with horror — there were no specific events to address the grim footage. Instead, Biden's focus  From the cost of health care to supply chain bottlenecks to prices at the pump and a robust economic recovery — one that officials believe simply hasn't broken through — Biden's public focus has lately been guided entirely by domestic issues. The shift comes as Biden and his team assess a concerning political landscape complicated by the ripple effect of severe economic sanctions imposed on Moscow. Other recent developments -- including a decision to lift pandemic-era restrictions on the border -- have contributed to growing unease among Democrats about November's elections. And a recent surge of Covid-19 cases among Biden's circle has acted as a reminder of the virus' continued presence. Biden's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has done little to boost his sagging political standing, despite generating unprecedented unity among Western allies. As the White House settles in for what officials believe will be a prolonged conflict, there has been a clear effort to try and break through wall-to-wall war coverage with Biden's domestic priorities.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › NATO Links › L – Domestic Focus k/

The plan ruins Biden’s domestic focus---appeal to crucial portions of the electorate is contingent on perception of refocusing away from Europe

Laura BarrÓN-LÓPez, 4-18-2022, Lopez is Politico’s white house correspondant "Biden’s been consumed by Ukraine. His team wants to bring the focus back home.," POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/04/18/biden-domestic-policy-shift-00025862//DG

The rest of the world might not allow it. But Joe Biden wants to return his focus to matters happening at home. With the war in Ukraine entering its second month and continuing to dominate global headlines, White House allies are expressing concern that voters may see the president as more consumed by international affairs than domestic ones. The White House itself is keenly aware that voters’ perceptions about the economy are still likely to determine the outcome of November’s midterm elections. And as they warily watch the president’s poor poll numbers, two senior administration officials said a concerted effort is being launched to reemphasize to Americans that the president understands their pain and is trying to help. In the coming weeks, Biden will travel more inside the country and further stress that Russia’s invasion isn’t some far-off crisis but one with deep economic ramifications in the United States “Voters, as sympathetic as they are to Ukraine, are getting a little fatigued,” said Celinda Lake, a veteran Democratic pollster. “And they’re wondering: We’re spending all this money abroad, but what are we spending here at home?” Lake said it was imperative that the president spend the seven months remaining before the midterms explaining his record and promising to do more. “Half of voters,” she suggested, still don’t know what Biden has accomplished to date. “They don’t know what’s in the infrastructure package. They don’t know the full extent of the rescue package. They don’t know the executive orders that he’s taken on inflation,” she said, referring to the coronavirus stimulus money sent to states, and the $1 trillion bipartisan infrastructure law to rebuild roads, bridges and more. The scope of Biden’s presidency will be impacted by Democrats’ ability to keep control of at least one, if not both, chambers of Congress this November. And the White House knows it needs to both hammer home Biden’s accomplishments and show Americans it is trying to do more, even at the margins. The war in Europe will continue to dominate Biden’s time, but aides do not want it to occupy all of his attention. In fact, some of Biden’s advisers believe they only need to look across the Atlantic to find a warning sign of a president perceived to be focused too much on global diplomacy and not enough on domestic pocketbook issues. Many French voters believe that French President Emmanuel Macron prioritized trying to negotiate with Russian President Vladimir Putin and that he neglected domestic issues, leading to tight poll numbers heading into the presidential runoff election later this month. As it looks to refocus on domestic issues, the White House is eyeing faster, tangible actions to tackle kitchen table issues, namely inflation. This month, Biden issued executive orders allowing the use of an ethanol blend this summer to lower gas prices and to jumpstart a new regulation fixing the Affordable Care Act’s so-called family glitch, which would lower health insurance costs for millions. And late last week, the administration announced plans to resume the sale of leases for oil and gas drilling on federal lands. Having gone overseas to address the conflict in Ukraine, Biden, for the first time in weeks, boarded Air Force One to promote the steps he’s taken to battle inflation and the economic impact of that war. Last week, he traveled to Iowa to promote an effort to lower gas prices and North Carolina to tout measures to ease supply chain bottlenecks.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › NATO Links › L – Costs PC

NATO engagement drains Biden’s pc

WPR, 6-22-2022, Editorial Staff for the World Politics Report "U.S. Security Policy Under Biden," No Publication, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/29564/for-biden-s-security-policy-look-beyond-us-defense-budget//DG

Upon taking office, President Joe Biden made it a priority to repair the damage his predecessor, Donald Trump, had done to relationships with the United States’ long-standing allies and partners, including South Korea and Japan, but particularly in Europe. Early on, Biden reassured European allies of Washington’s commitment to their security, promising them, “America is back. The trans-Atlantic alliance is back.” Despite some missteps along the way, the political capital Biden invested in shoring up ties with Europe, in particular, has paid off during the current standoff with Russia over Ukraine. NATO’s cohesion in the runup to the invasion and the robustness of the U.S.-led economic and security response in its aftermath are testament to the alliance’s value to the U.S.—as well as the importance of U.S. leadership in times of crisis.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › Humanitarian Assistance › L – Aid Unpopular

Assistance sparks fights---Ukraine was the absolute brink, new budgets include cuts to avoid drawing funding-related backlash---plan reverses that

Rachel Oswald, 3-15-2022, Staffwriter at Roll Call "Congress cuts humanitarian spending despite billions for Ukraine," Roll Call, https://rollcall.com/2022/03/15/congress-cuts-humanitarian-spending-despite-billions-for-ukraine//DG

While fiscal 2022 defense spending saw an increase of 5.6 percent over last year’s levels, the nondefense spending accounts got a boost of 6.7 percent — but not the foreign aid portfolio. Multiple lawmakers have pointed to the over $4 billion in emergency humanitarian funding for the Ukraine crisis to argue Congress has provided ample taxpayer assistance this year for foreign aid. Still, budget experts do not believe the Russia-Ukraine war, which has dominated Capitol Hill’s attention in recent weeks, is the reason other humanitarian disasters did not see a funding injection. For one thing, Appropriations subcommittee spending levels, known as 302(b)s, were set in early February, weeks before Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine. Even as appropriators like Coons have pledged to push for higher foreign aid spending levels in fiscal 2023, advocates are nervous about those prospects. Considering that Democrats might lose unified control of the White House and Congress after the November midterm elections, the fiscal 2022 appropriations levels were viewed as the high-water mark for Democrats to lock in robust spending increases. That would help cushion the blow of probable GOP pushes for cuts to foreign aid, which remains unpopular with an outspoken minority of Republican fiscal hardliners. Any supplemental aid for Ukraine, and possibly for the global coronavirus pandemic, will likely have a fleeting impact on the overall budget, experts say. “At the end of the day, we all know that an emergency supplemental is exactly what it says it is. It is an emergency supplemental that is not part of the regular budget and so there is an artificially low baseline for humanitarian assistance moving forward, just looking at the numbers, and that is concerning for conversations around what is needed for the coming fiscal year,” said one foreign aid professional, who did not have authorization to speak candidly about the budget.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › Disinformation › L – GOP Backlash

Can’t build consensus---right-wing politicans are in on it!

Peter Stone, 4-6-2022, Investigative journalist at the Guardian "US rightwing figures in step with Kremlin over Ukraine disinformation, experts say," Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/apr/06/us-right-wing-republicans-russia-ukraine-disinformation//DG

Disinformation specialists say that the phoney narratives by the US right and the Kremlin during the war have displayed some new twists that have increased the flow of conspiracy-heavy news, but also spurred more criticism from experts for being patently false. “We often see a two-way flow of conspiratorial narratives moving from the rightwing American information ecosystem to the Kremlin and back again, in a way that creates a feedback loop that reinforces and bolsters messaging from both groups,” said Bret Schafer, who leads the Alliance for Securing Democracy’s information manipulation team. We often see a flow of narratives from the rightwing US information ecosystem to the Kremlin and back Schafer noted the feedback loop seems “best evidenced by the recent effort to connect Hunter Biden to a US-led bioweapons program in Ukraine, where one can clearly see the merging of a favored domestic narrative into a foreign disinformation campaign that makes it feel more familiar, and therefore more plausible, to certain target audiences”. Schafer added that “influential American pundits and conspiracy theorists first pushed the narrative, only to then have it amplified and legitimized at the highest levels of the Russian government”. Some members of Congress likewise see a crossover effect between elements of the American right and Moscow. “Putin and his oligarchs are well aware of the dark channels of influence in rightwing American politics today, and they exploit them whenever they can – just as corporations and rightwing billionaires do here at home,” the Democratic senator Sheldon Whitehouse told the Guardian.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › Disinformation › L —Sovereignty Concerns

Plan’s perceived as deputizing broad surveillance---backlash to fighting illiberalism

Abby Livingston, 4-6-2022 Washington Bureau Chief, Texas Tribune"Texas Republicans who opposed resolution supporting NATO criticize and question its language," Texas Tribune, https://www.texastribune.org/2022/04/06/congress-nato-support-texas-representatives//DG

U.S. Rep.  of Fort Worth said the resolution’s language about such a center was vague and she criticized Democratic leadership for rushing the vote before members could understand it better. “Some of the things they’re asking us to vote on now seemed to be hurried up so much that there seemed to be very little presentation and very little time to really analyze it and know how important those things are,” she said. “I could’ve made a mistake on that one. It was a call.” U.S. Rep.  of Austin in a statement described the center as a “distraction to NATO’s mission.” He argued the “center will be weaponized against member countries — such as the United States — who enact policies contrary to the leftist orthodoxy that now unfortunately permeates most of Western Europe.” Roy didn’t elaborate on how he thought the center would be used in such a way. He said in his statement that “it is imperative for the United States to stand side by side with our NATO allies” rather than “passing toothless resolutions.” “NATO should be focused on military strength — not on empowering international organizations to target the internal activities of sovereign nations under the vague guise of illiberalism or human rights,” he said. The resolution was a show of moral support and did not include any funding mechanisms or measures that would have sent aid to NATO or Ukraine.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › Disinformation › L – Partisan Fights

Massive backlash to disinformation policy---Biden’s disinfo board was literally shut down over this exact issue

Konner Mcintire and Courtney Rau, 3-15-2022, Reporter at Sinclair and political journalist at M3 "Fact Check Team: The Biden administration's new disinformation task force," WPDE, https://wpde.com/news/nation-world/fact-check-team-the-biden-administrations-new-disinformation-board-vice-president-kamala-harris-white-house-task-force-to-address-online-harassment-and-abuse-disinformation-governance-board-department-of-homeland-security-dhs-task-force-president-biden//DG

The new disinformation board has six months to submit a plan so right now, these would only be recommendations. But we’ve seen this before: the president's disinformation board with the Department of Homeland Security was been put on pause because of all the backlash it received. According to the Biden administration, that board was intended to crack down on disinformation that threatened homeland security but Republicans were skeptical that the term “disinformation” was too broad and would be used as a vehicle to censor conservatives or any kind of speech that did not align with the administration’s agenda.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › Disinformation › L – Partisan Fights

Russian disinfo works because of political backlash---congress likes weaponization against opponents

Elena Yi-Ching Ho et al Hillary Mansour, Khwezi Nkwanyana and Matthew Page 3-24-2021, Policy and research officer for purpose.com, "The threat spectrum," No Publication, https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/document/teaserdocument/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=879788ba-2422-4dc9-a484-2d4eca77b5f8&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A628T-WDJ1-JCMN-Y55M-00000-00&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A628T-WDJ1-JCMN-Y55M-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=299488&pdteaserkey=h1&pditab=allpods&ecomp=szznk&earg=sr0&prid=60e8dd36-47cb-430b-a826-b436479ac40f//DG

And if low-lying islands are abandoned, the UNCLOS framework would reclassify them as uninhabitable 'rocks', nullifying EEZ claims and opening these areas up for international use. This issue exposes limitations in UNCLOS[2]'s ability to respond to the impacts of climate change on territorial jurisdiction. The intersection of climatic, economic and maritime territorial issues has consequences for coastal regions globally as sea levels continue to rise. Democracy watch People across the US have gathered to protest[3] against anti-Asian hate crimes, following the Atlanta spa shootings on 16 March and an assault on a 75-year-old Asian American woman the following day. Racially motivated hate crimes have been more common since the outbreak of Covid-19. The US Asian community has been increasingly targeted[4] over the past year, in part as a consequence of President Donald Trump's framing of the pandemic as the 'China virus'[5]. The recent attacks and ongoing harassment of Asian Americans have once again highlighted the handling of racial discrimination in America and renewed awareness[6] of race-based conflict. Information operations A report[7] declassified by the US National Intelligence Council has assessed foreign threats to last year's election. The report identifies several nations that considered or attempted online influence campaigns, but pays particular attention to Russian intelligence operatives' use of US media organisations and people linked to the Trump administration to promote damaging narratives about presidential candidate Joe Biden and his family to US officials. Writing for The Atlantic[8], Anne Applebaum notes that the report highlights broader issues beyond the political climate created by Trump. It shows that Russian disinformation succeeds because of the willingness of many Americans to accept sensational information when it suits their partisan frames and can be used against their opponents, and an unwillingness of institutions like the FBI, the Department of Justice and the US Congress to investigate and prosecute Americans linked to disinformation attempts for fear of political backlash. Unless accountability for Americans involved in election influence and disinformation bridges the partisan political divide, Russian influence operations will continue to pose a serious threat to democracy in the US. Follow the money The UK parliament's Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee has urged[9] the government to amend the 2015 Modern Slavery Act to protect ethnic minorities in Xinjiang. This action comes after an ASPI report[10] on Uyghur forced labour in supply chains used by companies in the technology, fashion, media and cotton industries. The committee asked[11] a number of corporations to clarify their relationships with forced-labour supply chains in Xinjiang. Most companies claimed to have strong protections on human rights but failed to prove that their supply chains weren't involved in forced labour. Nike and H&M, for example, said that, while they couldn't identify connections to forced labour, they would strive to improve their practices. The committee also recommended[12] that the government put the onus on companies to prove that they have no ties to forced labour. And despite global attention on human rights violations in Xinjiang—which China denies—real progress to end forced labour has yet to be seen. Terror byte Last week, ASIO Director-General Mike Burgess announced that his agency will use different terminology to identify violent extremist threats[13]. Instead of labelling terror groups as 'right-wing' or 'Islamic', ASIO will now classify threats as 'ideologically motivated' or 'religiously motivated' violent extremism. In delivering his annual threat assessment, Burgess said 'language needs to evolve' to include extremist groups that recruit members online and do not typically fit within the parameters of the previous terms. Some have welcomed the change[14] in the hope that it will decrease prejudicial language directed at Muslim communities. Others have described the decision as part of a continued political effort[15] to avoid using terms like 'right-wing' or 'far-right' to describe the groups that now account for 40% of ASIO's counterterrorism cases[16]

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › OCO Links › L —Turf War (NSA)

Offensive cyber action sparks turf wars – the plan guarantees backlash from non-DoD agencies and committees

Chalfant 18 – White House reporter for The Hill (Morgan, “Federal ‘turf war’ complicates cybersecurity efforts,” The Hill, 4-29-18, ) //sg

Lawmakers are concerned that bureaucratic turf wars are complicating the federal response to cyber threats. The issue took center stage this week, as senators on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee fretted that they had been unable to pass key cyber legislation requested by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) because of a disagreement with the Senate Intelligence Committee. {mosads}“The reality of the situation is there is conflict here,” said Chairman Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) at a hearing Wednesday. “This threat is too significant to allow turf wars to get in the way of as efficient an operation as possible in terms of dealing with a very complex and serious problem.” The dust-up illuminates the broader issue of turf wars over cybersecurity in the federal government. The executive branch has no one single agency assigned to handle cyber. Instead, authorities are spread out over various agencies, including the Justice Department, which investigates and prosecutes cyber crime, and the Pentagon and broader intelligence community, both of which handle what is considered “offensive” cyber activity. While Homeland Security is broadly recognized as the main agency defending federal networks and critical national assets from cyberattacks, individual agencies also play a major role in guarding their own networks and personnel from malicious cyber actors. The set-up means that virtually every congressional committee has a say in the federal government’s cybersecurity efforts.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › OCO Links › L – AT Plan Secret

Congressional authorization necessary – Title 50 to Title 10 transfer

Chesney 18 - Charles I. Francis Professor in Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the University of Texas School of Law (Robert, “Title 10 and Title 50 Issues When Computer Network Operations Impact Third Countries, Lawfare, 4-12-18, ) //sg

From a legal perspective, the issue this highlights is that operations abroad implicate the UN Charter and related claims about international law protection of sovereignty. So how does this become part of the Title 10/Title 50 debate? Intelligence agencies can more easily act in this setting when operating under Title 50 authority, as covert action status carries with it a statutory obligation to comply with the U.S. Constitution and U.S. statutes—but no more than that. Title 10, in contrast, carries with it no such implicit statutory shield against international law objections, and of course there is a general Defense Department policy of international law compliance. Thus CYBERCOM operating under Title 10 would run into the full thicket of international law concerns. There may be good and sufficient answers to those concerns in particular cases—so this should not be understood as an absolute bar—but it does make sense to say that the legal friction is greater in that setting (that is, operations with effects on servers in third countries and without consent from those countries) than it would be for an entity acting under color of Title 50.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › OCO Links › L – AT Plan Secret

Number of agencies involved ensures broad congressional oversight

Chalfant 18 – White House reporter for The Hill (Morgan, “Federal ‘turf war’ complicates cybersecurity efforts,” The Hill, 4-29-18, ) //sg

Lawmakers are concerned that bureaucratic turf wars are complicating the federal response to cyber threats. The issue took center stage this week, as senators on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee fretted that they had been unable to pass key cyber legislation requested by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) because of a disagreement with the Senate Intelligence Committee. {mosads}“The reality of the situation is there is conflict here,” said Chairman Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) at a hearing Wednesday. “This threat is too significant to allow turf wars to get in the way of as efficient an operation as possible in terms of dealing with a very complex and serious problem.” The dust-up illuminates the broader issue of turf wars over cybersecurity in the federal government. The executive branch has no one single agency assigned to handle cyber. Instead, authorities are spread out over various agencies, including the Justice Department, which investigates and prosecutes cyber crime, and the Pentagon and broader intelligence community, both of which handle what is considered “offensive” cyber activity. While Homeland Security is broadly recognized as the main agency defending federal networks and critical national assets from cyberattacks, individual agencies also play a major role in guarding their own networks and personnel from malicious cyber actors. The set-up means that virtually every congressional committee has a say in the federal government’s cybersecurity efforts.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › OCO Links › L – Secrecy Concerns Backlash

Intell sharing concerns deck political and public support

Porter ’19 [Christopher and Klara Tothova Jordan; Feb 14; nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council; assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative; Lawfare, “Don’t Let Cyber Attribution Debates Tear Apart the NATO Alliance,” https://www.lawfareblog.com/dont-let-cyber-attribution-debates-tear-apart-nato-alliance]

The United States still struggles to find effective policies for deterring cyberattacks. Suggestions run the gamut from more widespread use of indictments and economic sanctions, despite their lackluster record of success, to less traditional but more risky policies that emphasize the asymmetric advantage America has in conventional military power. Most of the discussion of cyber deterrence focuses on preventing a single catastrophic or cascading cyberattack that would threaten lives (like disruptions to electricity transmission or clean water)—or our way of life—altering election outcomes or grinding global finance to a halt. Yet the reality is that in the event of such an attack, the response would likely not come from the U.S. alone but from the NATO alliance in concert. NATO’s cyber-defense mandate has evolved over time to update its collective defense commitment under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty for the era of cyberattacks. In the latest effort to collectively impose costs on adversaries, the 2018 NATO Summit saw a commitment from heads of state and government “to integrate sovereign cyber effects, provided voluntarily by Allies, into Alliance operations and missions, in the framework of strong political oversight.” The newly updated White House National Cyber Strategy likewise envisions working together with a “coalition of like-minded states” to “ensure adversaries understand the consequences of their malicious cyber behavior.” Therein lies the rub. Both formal alliances, such as NATO, and more ad hoc arrangements, such as what the Cyber Deterrence Initiative imagines, will require members to share intelligence and eventually, to the best of their ability and perhaps in different domains, contribute to joint action against a presumably well-armed foreign aggressor. States including the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Estonia, and Denmark have publicly declared their willingness to lend sovereign offensive cyber effects to deter, defend against and counter the full spectrum of threats. Sharing intelligence and information is a key element of NATO’s core decision-making process enshrined in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Political consultations are part of the preventive diplomacy between member states, but they are also an avenue to discuss concerns related to the security threats member states face. These consultations can be a catalyst for reaching a consensus on policies to be adopted or actions to be taken—including those on the use of sovereign cyber effects to support a NATO operation. The alliance has a track record of collective action and cooperative security measures. For example, Operation Active Endeavour helped to deter, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity in the Mediterranean in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in solidarity with the United States. For the seventh time, the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative will be among the organizations privileged to organize an event on the sidelines of the Feb. 15–17 Munich Security Conference. This year in particular, the Atlantic Council’s event, “Defending Human Dignity: Limiting Malicious Cyber Activity Through Diplomacy,” will complement the topics high on the agenda of the main conference, such as transatlantic collaboration, the consequences of a resurgence of great power competition and the future of arms control. In the United States, the greatest failures of response and deterrence to foreign aggression in cyberspace have not been caused by a lack of intelligence, capability or imagination. Rather, U.S. policy has been serviceable in theory but impotent in practice because of an inability to translate technical findings and intelligence into public support for sufficiently tough responses ordered by elected political leaders. North Korea’s repeated operations targeting U.S. companies and critical infrastructure have been met with public skepticism over their culpability, limiting the strength of retaliatory options needed to deter further events. Chinese cyber economic espionage continued for years despite widespread knowledge of China’s activities because political leaders found it difficult to confront Beijing without undermining U.S. companies in return. Russian information operations did not sow enough doubt to mislead experts, but they succeeded in exacerbating the partisan polarization of an already-divided electorate and its leaders. That inability to translate the findings of cyber experts into public sentiment and therefore political action has sidelined America’s cyberwarriors, by far the most technologically advanced and well-resourced in the world. Imagine the political response of an ally that is asked to burden-share in response to cyber aggression but is probably much closer to any resulting kinetic fight than the United States. Now imagine the response of that ally when it’s being asked to take causus belli on faith: The United States is presenting attribution for a cyberattack elsewhere in the world, but perhaps is depending on the ally lacking critical details due to classification, and is presenting that information alongside a request for help that might well put the ally in the crosshairs of its own cyberattack or lethal action. How can allies with different capabilities to collect, analyze and understand intelligence be part of a consensus on using sovereign cyber effects to support a NATO operation? How can a commander achieve a common operational picture to authorize the use of sovereign effects in a NATO operation if all the allies are not on the same page with respect to critical attribution and other technical information needed for a use of effect in an operation? We all know what a tank looks like on a shared satellite image, but if you ask three cyber experts to interpret the attribution for a set of indicators, you are likely to get at least four answers. For most U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere, there is simply a dearth of technical know-how within the government when it comes to cyber attribution and operations. This is already a challenge for the United States, with a massive defense budget, Silicon Valley innovation and an educated workforce to pull into government service. But for many U.S. allies, tech-savvy public servants will have long fled for the private sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academia before reaching ministerial positions. To its credit, the U.S. National Cyber Strategy does propose capacity-building measures to support allies. This means building up law enforcement, intelligence, and military operational and investigative capability. But even with successful capacity-building programs, many nations could, in a crisis, end up in the same place the United States is—with good options stuck on the shelf while political leaders and their electorates lack a critical mass of informed voters to trust, understand and act on expert findings. For countries weighing whether to risk their own blood and treasure in support of an ally’s cyber attribution findings, this hurdle could well prove insurmountable if not addressed well before a crisis emerges. Many such countries will no doubt recall being burned when placing too much confidence in U.S. technical and human sources without an ability to evaluate the evidence for themselves, as with the Iraq weapons of mass destruction findings. The private sector will probably play a crucial role in providing intelligence to support alliance responses to cyberattacks, especially as a stopgap over the next few years. FireEye and its peer competitors and partners regularly produce analyses of major world cyber events—many that fly below the radar of Western leadership, in fact—sometimes at a near-government quality and often covering much of the same “classified” evidence. More important, private-sector analysts are accustomed to writing for impact with both their technical counterparts, like chief information security officers (CISOs) and threat hunters, and nontechnical stakeholders such as boards of directors, CEOs and other persons controlling the purse strings. In this sense, unclassified, private-sector and NGO-driven cyber threat intelligence can become the lingua franca of discussions. Relying on commercial reporting generated by international teams, rather than declassified government-generated reports, both broadens the audience enough to make alliance discussions feasible and mitigates against disparities in terminology across national lines—the tendency of even closely integrated allies to describe cyber “attack,” “information operations,” and attribution findings with different implicit assumptions or implications. Long-Term Thinking In the long run, though, the U.S. and its more technologically advanced allies—such as its fellow Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the U.K.), France and Japan—will have to make important policy changes in the interests of furthering alliance cooperation in cyberspace: a willingness to sometimes risk sensitive sources and methods in order to get cyber threat intelligence into the hands of other countries better positioned to take policy action, an end to classifying public information like IP addresses solely because of their acquisition via classified means, and greater transparency on their own decision-making. Government cyber leaders within the alliance should consider taking another page out of the private-sector playbook as well: running cyber-crisis exercises that involve more than the IT department. In the commercial world, the more successful practice runs involve leaders at both the CISO level and some presence from nontechnical teams that would weigh in during a crisis, such as communications and legal. The best exercises involve executives, too, who despite their busy schedules must see for themselves how their companies would survive and respond during a potentially ruinous cyberattack, and work through the minutiae of leading a response themselves. The experience and confidence is invaluable if ever called on during a real-life crisis, and the organizational introspection by involving decision-makers at all levels is irreplaceable. Military-to-military cyber training as part of cross-country force standardization and joint operational planning could pull in more senior national leadership, beyond battlefield commanders, and be coupled with increased funding for foreign affairs-led training for nontechnical leaders. The private sector could also meaningfully contribute during NATO consultations when developing Allied Joint Publications to make sure that definitions and requirements for threat intelligence incorporate the best practices of NATO member countries’ private sectors. If a U.S. diplomat reaches out to his or her counterpart in an allied country to ask for assistance responding to malware that’s damaging critical infrastructure, and that counterpart has to ask what malware is, the response isn’t going to happen. *** NATO’s essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Tolerating cyberattacks, especially those deliberately targeting civilians and the political legitimacy of governments—without the alliance having the capability to jointly discuss attribution and have the confidence to act and assist one another—undermines this core purpose of the alliance. Likewise, pursuing only deterrence and response without an active role for the alliance in reaching peaceful diplomatic agreements with potential adversaries abrogates member responsibilities to their citizens but is impossible without a common language and operational picture to discuss enforcement of such agreements. The U.S. is stronger with allies, and with attention to these issues its cybersecurity can be too.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › OCO Links › L – Secrecy Concerns Backlash

US cyber capabilities are kept top secret – any systems sharing will spark backlash from the NSA

Vinik 15 – former assistant editor of The Agenda (Danny, “America’s secret arsenal, The Agenda, 12-9-15, “https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/12/defense-department-cyber-offense-strategy-000331/) //sg

That’s not what happened. In fact, cyber weapons exist in a realm not unlike the early days of the nuclear program, shrouded in secrecy, with plenty of curiosity but very little public information. In part this secrecy is integral to the whole concept: a cyberattack is useful insofar as the enemy is unaware of it. The more the government reveals about what’s in its arsenal, the more our adversaries can do to protect themselves.

"If you know much about it, [cyber is] very easy to defend against," said Michael Daniel, a special assistant to the president and cybersecurity coordinator at the National Security Council. "Therefore, that’s why we keep a lot of those capabilities very closely guarded."

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Negative › OCO Links › L – OCOs 2nc/1nr

The link is massive and outweighs the link turns – their ev is that development of OCOs is politically popular – that is our argument – the plan’s sharing of those highly coveted mechanisms guarantees the backlash is substantial – a host of other political obstacles magnify the link – interoperability, sovereignty, and attribution requirements mean the link alone turns the case – these fights doom standardization and cohesion

Blessing 2021

Jason Blessing is a Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. During the 2020-2021 academic year, he served as a DAAD Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Program on “The United States, Europe, and World Order” at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Blessing has previously worked as a Consulting Fellow for the Cyber, Space and Future Conflict Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and was a USIP-Minerva Peace and Security Scholar with the United States Institute of Peace. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs at Syracuse University, an MA in Political Science from Virginia Tech, and a BA in Government from The College of William & Mary. “Fail-Deadly, Fail-Safe, and Safe-to-Fail: The Strategic Necessity of Resilience in the Cyber Domain,” NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, (172-191) 2021. dmr

Attribution difficulties present further challenges to the ‘who’ of deterrence. Adversaries with rapidly changing tactics, techniques, and procedures—along with the ability to easily conceal an operation’s origin and perpetrator—can pose hurdles to technical attribution.41 Technical difficulties can weaken deterrent postures by delaying the timeliness of retaliatory punishment. Moreover, the effects of an operation that a defender notices may actually be second- or third-order effects. This can add additional time between attribution and punishment.42 The larger attribution issues, however, are political. NATO lacks common standards or guidance for attributing cyber operations in either a technical or political sense. Indeed, attribution remains a member state prerogative. Not only are the targeted member states responsible for attribution, but those members looking to contribute to collective defense must perform independent attribution assessments, and the political decision for a collective defense response must come from the NAC.43 Reaching a consensus decision to trigger collective defense in response to cyberspace operations is likely to be politically contentious, and member states will have few incentives to risk revealing the intelligence sources and methods that underlie attribution decisions. These dynamics are likely to intensify when additional links in the attribution chain are required, such as when a perpetrator is encouraged or sponsored by an adversarial state but lacks direct ties. Attribution is less likely to be politically controversial across the Alliance once a conventional conflict is underway as contextual clues from kinetic attacks can reduce uncertainty. This discussion points to a greater role for deterrence-by-denial. Deterring an adversary by taking measures to deny potential gains does not hinge on attribution and thus possesses a potentially wider scope of application.44 A second and related hurdle for cyber deterrence is determining which actions the Alliance seeks to deter. Much of the activity in cyberspace falls below the physical effects thresholds associated with the disruption, degradation, or destruction of computers and networks. Such considerations complicate decisions to invoke Article 5—specifically, the types of cyberattacks to which Article 5 should apply. Indeed, cyber operations targeting military assets or critical civilian infrastructure can be incredibly costly but may not reach damage levels associated with conventional attacks.45 Moreover, espionage via network exploitation is widespread, varied, and falls well below the threshold of armed conflict.46 Problematically, such exploitation can be nearly indistinguishable from operations that eventually seek to attack computers or networks and produce effects. Network exploitation can even be precursor to conventional military operations.47 Determining how to deter presents a third obstacle to NATO’s cyber deterrence efforts. Threatening conventional military means in response to cyber operations poses dilemmas of proportionality and can risk unintended escalation.48 Retaliation with cyber tools carry their own problems. First, the Alliance faces issues of political reliability, particularly in the context of the SCEPVA framework. Legally, Allies retain different constitutional restraints on offensive cyber operations that can hamper the ability to volunteer sovereign effects. Strategically, states may be hesitant to volunteer their ‘best’ cyber effects for fear of burning an exploit that could have had a greater payoff when used in a national context. Volunteering sovereign effects can also inadvertently give unwanted insight to an adversary regarding an Ally’s techniques, tactics, and procedures. Second, the temporary and transient nature of cyber capabilities makes it incredibly difficult to establish repeatable and predictable effects required of deterrent threats.49 Finally, signaling in cyberspace is generally ambiguous and rarely straightforward.50 For instance, an adversary may not even recognize a signal, believing it instead to be a technical glitch. Even if a costly signal is received, there is no way to ensure that it has interpreted as intended. In addition to deterrence, NATO’s fail-safe cyber defense efforts face political and technical challenges. Because NATO will not undertake any active defense measures, actions to mitigate the effects of a cyberattack are limited to NATO networks or to individual member state networks when requested. This forecloses the possibility of developing an institutional strategy to mitigate the costs of a cyberattack upstream by disrupting the source of an attack, much like US Cyber Command does with its “defend forward” posture.51 More problematically, Allies have and will continue to have different legal, strategic, doctrinal, and threat frameworks for cyberspace that complicate defensive measures for the Alliance. Most immediately this means that Allies will locate resources to different aspects of cyber defense based on individual country circumstances. Different strategic focuses have the potential to intensify disparate threat perceptions, capabilities, and skillsets. This can also exacerbate interoperability problems; for example, during an operation or crisis, some systems will be controlled by NATO while others will be controlled by an ally or a group of allies with different skill and knowledge levels. In the longer term, disparate legal understandings, particularly regarding sovereignty in cyberspace, will become more impactful as a greater number of allied nations develop forward defense strategies and the requisite capabilities for out-of-network operations. An out-of-network operation can in and of itself cause operational friction. However, differing definitions of sovereignty in cyberspace—and what violates it—inevitably create political friction between Allies as some look to operate and produce effects on other Allies’ networks.52 This political friction will contribute to even greater hesitancy over cyber-intelligence sharing and complicate the coordination of defensive mitigation measures across the Alliance.