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Aff Answers › Uniqueness Answers › Non-UQ --- SC = EDTs
Dolan 6-8 -- (Chris Dolan, 6-8-2022, "NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept Must Enhance Digital Access and Capacities," Just Security, https://www.justsecurity.org/81839/natos-2022-strategic-concept-must-enhance-digital-access-and-capacities/, accessed 6-20-2022) -- nikki
This month in Madrid, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will update its Strategic Concept, the principal document that guides the alliance’s political-military strategy and collective defense operations. The war in Ukraine has put resilience in the face of Russian aggression front and center, especially in the cyber and information operation domains. Over the years, NATO has digitized and enhanced its security platforms, emphasizing interoperability of systems among its now 30 current member states. If NATO is to become more resilient against advanced persistent threats, hackers, and the maligned states that sponsor them, then the 2022 Strategic Concept must infuse multinational warfighting and deterrence against hybrid threats with methods that facilitate access to data and information sharing on its platforms and across multiple domains, namely in air, cyber, information, land, maritime, and space operations. The 2022 Strategic Concept The Strategic Concept is among NATO’s most important documents as it informs alliance planning, resource allocation, and programming based on changes in the threat environment. But the document has not been updated since 2010. The 2010 Strategic Concept, entitled “Active engagement, Modern Defense,” contained just one brief sentence about cyber attacks and did not even mention China. It also stated that “Today, the Euro-Atlantic area is at peace,” even though Russia had invaded Georgia two years before and the threat of a return to great power competition loomed. To argue that a lot has happened between 2010 and 2022 would be an understatement. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 shattered any illusions of a lasting peace with Russia. China’s territorial ambitions, economic assertiveness, threats against Taiwan, and military modernization threaten the rules-based order. Emerging technologies – in the form of hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and machine learning – have intensified great power competition. The 2022 Strategic Concept should highlight the essential role of technology in collective defense. To build greater digital capacity while also emphasizing resilience, NATO must adopt a new technological orientation on the military strategic level of command, especially within the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, Virginia and the Allied Command Operations (ACO) in Mons, Belgium. ACT leverages advanced technologies for security and defense in capabilities, procedures, public-private partnerships, civil-military relations, and at NATO’s Centers of Excellence. Led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, ACO is responsible for collective defense through direction, requirements, planning, and execution at the strategic level. However, the Strategic Concept 2022 should focus less on the emergence of new technologies and more on how NATO’s military and civilian personnel use them. ACO and ACT must emphasize greater accessibility to information and data for its multinational warfighters, cyber operators, and civilian professionals. NATO must reach out to experts in the private sector, academia, and non-governmental organizations to harness ways to expand access and emphasize flexibility in multi-domain operations. NATO can do this by providing more grants to private sector partners and establish a new center of excellence on data and information sharing. ACO and ACT should also enable personnel and partners to readily access data and information in DIMEL domains: diplomatic, information/cyber, military, economic, and legal. This would expand the range of measures needed by ACT and ACO to connect and correlate deterrence with evolving hybrid threats. To deter hybrid threats across multiple domains, with enhanced access on different digital platforms, NATO members should develop smarter and lethal capabilities to confront threats from state and non-state actors. This would allow ACT and ACO to prepare for any contingency and respond to adversaries in battlefields and battlespaces. Plug and Play The 2022 Strategic Concept encourages collaboration in the implementation of guidelines and procedures through a “plug-and-play” concept, in which platforms and systems are optimized for readiness and response at lightning speed. Plug-and-play is based on approaches used in commercial software that allow for innovation and easy access to networks and systems through secure platforms. The NATO School Oberammergau should offer platform training and education courses programs in mobile access for ACT and ACO personnel with appropriate security clearances. This would allow them to access the appropriate platform and utilize data and information necessary for their tasks and responsibilities. For example, NATO’s Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Mine Action (MA) Information Sharing Platform contains rich and publicly available datasets on the roles played by the alliance in mitigating the illicit trade in small arms, tanks, aircraft, and naval vessels. It reports and updates NATO-funded projects to prevent adversaries from acquiring these weapons. However, the SALW-MA platform is outdated and not user friendly, impeding its functionality in practice. Put simply, NATO’s ACT and ACO should focus as much on easing access to information as it does on advanced technologies and conventional weaponry. This would provide NATO with useful tools to access data and intelligence on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels and in land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains using devices and platforms that can seamlessly connect in different locations. But NATO Commands cannot simply expect its existing personnel to adapt. They must be trained and educated on a regular basis to use digital infrastructures in ways that make their jobs easier. On the strategic level, the 2022 Strategic Concept must provide NATO’s political and military leaders with flexibility and resources to discern the diversity of hybrid threats in the environment. NATO’s strategic planners, cyber operators, and warfighters should be trained and educated in relevant digital platforms, access, and sharing data and information in ways that improve collaborative decision-making and collective defense. On the operations level, personnel must be given enough space to share data and intelligence as well as to train tactical level personnel on software that enables them to collect, analyze, process, and disseminate information quickly and easily across multiple domains. Addressing these challenges is difficult for just one nation-state, let alone for all 30 NATO members. Therefore, the 2022 Strategic Concept should emphasize connectivity between member states in multi-domain operations and in collaboration with the private sector and academia. Accessibility to information and data sharing among NATO members should be securitized and harmonized. Essential Role of Artificial Intelligence The challenge for NATO is not necessarily adopting and investing in emerging and disrupting technologies for collective defense. Rather, the question is whether ACT and ACO can enhance accessibility to digital platforms and ease communications between platforms. Here, artificial intelligence (AI) can play a role in overcoming critical obstacles. AI is now occupying a greater space in NATO’s collective defense orientation. The challenge in the 2022 Strategic Concept will be delineating the degree to which AI will enhance the ability of the alliance to analyze information and assess data. Moreover, AI is only as good as the data it relies on. To maintain its technological edge, in 2021 NATO released an Artificial Intelligence Strategy, a good step toward maximizing interoperability of weapons systems, improving infrastructure, and building resilient hybrid defenses. While it emphasizes collaboration with the private sector and academia, the strategy needs further refinement as AI would help NATO’s military and civilian personnel interlink devices on different platforms, perform rigorous data analytics, and quicken response time in response to a conventional or hybrid attack. One innovation is the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). DIANA leverages partnerships among academics, technology companies, start-up firms to address the full spectrum of threats in the security environment. Private sector firms utilizing DIANA can access innovation sites and test centers that focus on artificial intelligence, machine learning, quantum computing, autonomous machines, and biotechnology. In the past, alliance members supported the creation and development of a venture capital Innovation Fund for technology companies and start-ups. The Strategic Concept should support the initiative with sustained public funds in ways that allow for strategic-level planning at ACO and ATO to communicate more effectively at the operational and tactical levels. DIANA and the Innovation Fund are models for the alliance. An existing partnership that is proving effective is NATO’s collaboration with Klarrio, a firm that provides the alliance with innovative real-time data analytics and streaming services to combat disinformation and fake news. Klarrio has partnered with NATO’s Strategic Communications Center (StratCom) to assist the alliance in the information domain by streaming data analysis, processing, and applications analytics to identify and eradicate disinformation for NATO’s strategic-level planners. It supports and updates dashboard services to track suspicious activities in social media platforms, maintains an interactive user interface, generates analytical reports, and uses machine learning to analyze data and information.
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Aff Answers › Uniqueness Answers › Non-UQ --- SC = EDTs
Harper 6-1 -- (Jon Harper, 6-1-2022, "Emerging tech to have prominent role in NATO's new strategic concept," FedScoop, https://www.fedscoop.com/emerging-tech-to-have-prominent-role-in-natos-new-strategic-concept%ef%bf%bc/, accessed 6-20-2022) -- nikki
Emerging and disruptive technologies will be a key focus area of NATO’s new Strategic Concept which will be unveiled later this month, the U.S. ambassador to the alliance told reporters Wednesday. The document is expected to be adopted at the upcoming NATO summit in Madrid, marking the first time in more than a decade that the transatlantic military pact has released a new Strategic Concept. The guidance sets the alliance’s strategy and security tasks, outlines the challenges and opportunities it faces in a changing security environment, and provides direction for its political and military implementation. There will be “a lot on new threats and challenges, a heavier emphasis on things like emerging and disruptive technologies, heavier emphasis on new domains like cyber and space, more on climate change,” U.S. Ambassador to NATO Julianne Smith told the Defense Writers Group in Washington. Smith did not elaborate on what the emerging technologies are, and FedScoop did not have the opportunity to ask her about them before the meeting with reporters ended. However, individual members of NATO have already their signaled interest and concerns about unmanned systems, AI, autonomy and hypersonics, among other emerging capabilities. For example, last week senior Pentagon officials and their U.K. counterparts signed an Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Statement of Intent, setting shared strategic objectives related to AI readiness. The agreement “will deepen AI cooperation between the two Allies, maintaining and increasing interoperability and promoting values-based global leadership for the responsible development, procurement, and use of AI in defense,” according to a DOD news release. Non-NATO members from the Asia-Pacific region will also be attending the summit for the first time, including Australia, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. The threat posed by Russia and China will be addressed during discussions and in the new Strategic Concept. At the meeting leaders will have an opportunity “to have a conversation about what we’re both seeing. It’s been interesting for me to watch, say, countries in the Asia-Pacific talk about hybrid threats on their side of the Pacific, how are they grappling with disinformation, cyberattacks, the aggressive tactics that they’re seeing, acts of intimidation from China. And then you pair that with an Estonian or a Lithuanian and they talk about some of the challenges that they’re seeing from Russia,” Smith said. “It’s about sharing lessons learned, sharing new policies that we’re developing. We’ve had a number of conversations about emerging and disruptive technologies [and] how are we grappling with that,” she added. Other topics expected to be discussed at the confab include NATO’s force posture in Eastern Europe, and Sweden and Finland’s plans to join the alliance.
2022
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Aff Answers › Uniqueness Answers › Non-UQ --- SC = EDTs
Tucker 6-17 -- (Patrick Tucker, 6-17-2022, "New NATO Strategic Concept Will Broaden Vision of Deterrence," Defense One, https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/06/new-nato-strategic-concept-will-broaden-vision-deterrence/368366/, accessed 6-20-2022) -- nikki
The new NATO Strategic Concept set to be unveiled later this month will press alliance members to envision deterrence as a matter not just of tanks and bombs but of supply chain security, cyberattacks, climate change, innovation, and more. “The strategic concept needs to be able to live for the next decade, so it looks far beyond the current crisis in Ukraine. It looks at the implications for our security of…climate change, innovation, the use of…hybrid warfare, cyber war and the role of cyber in our societies. But also resilience. How resilient are our Western societies to these kind of attacks and what do we need to do in order to tackle that?” David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said on Friday during the Defense One Tech Summit. Much has changed since NATO’s most recent strategic concept document came out in 2010, Van Weel said. Even before Russia launched a brutal war on the alliance’s doorstep, its members had growing concern about China’s rise, its influence over emerging technology, and its outsized share of the world’s electronics supply. The new concept will reflect the fact that future threats to alliance members won’t be purely military. “Supply chain was not an issue 10 years ago. We were still globalizing. We were working on the basis of just-in-time, just-enough logistic routes. And now we've seen with the pandemic, with the economic vision that China tends to use against countries or the fact that a simple container vessel can get stuck in the Suez Canal for two weeks, how fragile we are,” he said. “Safety and security is much more than building a border and having soldiers behind it. It's also about being able to…look after yourself and be independent.” While the strategic concept will bring new emphasis to non-military threats, it won’t short-change military deterrence, a need dramatically demonstrated by the ongoing Russian war on Ukraine. “I don't think it's either/or. We see now in Ukraine that what they need, mostly, now in order to stop the advancements of Russia in the Donbas is heavy artillery. And I think many people would have said two years ago that heavy artillery is probably not something we'll see in a conflict in the near future in Europe,” Van Weel said. “So we shouldn't be quickly drawing conclusions on what means are obsolete, or needed. But I think it is safe to say that in addition to that classical military deterrence and defense, there is an aspect to deterrence and defense that needs to take into account all these other [things] whether they are in energy supplies, supply chains, cyber, or in innovation and technology that can be used against us. “I'm pretty confident that all these aspects will feature prominently in the new strategic concept.”
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EU NB Cards › Uniq --- Focus Key/EU Best Forum
Larsen 21 [Henrik Larsen, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.; “Henrik Larsen is a Senior Researcher in the Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team at the Center for Security Studies (CSS). “Henrik Larsen is a Senior Researcher in the Swiss and Euro-Atlantic Security Team at the Center for Security Studies (CSS). “; Center for Security Studies; June 2021; https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/PP9-7_2021-EN.pdf]//eleanor
NATO is not the organization that is best positioned to lead on global trade and technology-related issues. It can insist that US and European economic dealings avoid aiding China’s efforts in areas of advanced technology. It can also contrast its own policies with China’s authoritarian approach to autonomous systems and data storage. On the other hand, NATO is not the forum to solve EU-US regulatory issues or to devise industrial policy for its allies. If NATO wishes to stretch further into non-military aspects of security without harm to the integrity of its core business, it needs to enhance the use of its European partnerships. This concerns especially the EU due to the exclusive trade competencies that are needed for transatlantic harmonization (standard setting, investment screenings, export controls) as well as the significant civilian capacities it coordinates with relevance for gray-zone defense. NATO may perhaps see relevance in deepening its partnerships with Switzerland, Finland, and Sweden due to the high-tech industries they host (robotics, quantum computing, 5G). As NATO definitively winds down its operations in Afghanistan, it must restrain itself from renewed global engagements in view of China’s rise. Stoltenberg has emphasized the relevance of like-minded partner countries in the Asia-Pacific in preserving the rules-based international order. However, NATO’s cooperation with these partners should focus primarily on their utility for the alliance’s own efforts at supply-chain and technological decoupling from China. This could also lead to intelligence sharing and joint military exercises without necessarily giving NATO a global reach.
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Links › Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves › Impacts --- EU Solves
Franke ’21 -- (Ulrike Esther Franke, 1-1-2021, “ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI,” European Council on Foreign Relations, ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI, , accessed 6-19-2022) -- nikki
European digital autonomy The most important aspect of transatlantic estrangement, however, is not the loss of trust between the US and Europe – which they will eventually reverse. Rather, during the four years of the Trump administration, and partly in response to isolationist tendencies in the US, Europeans have become much more comfortable talking about European strategic autonomy or sovereignty. Without encouraging the narrative that these efforts are directed against the US, or were primarily an answer to Trump, Europeans aim to empower Europe as an actor in its own right. In the technological realm, this led to the idea of European digital sovereignty, the aim of which is to build up European technological capabilities. Although European digital sovereignty is not specifically targeted at the US, it has led, among other things, to efforts such as the possible regulation of American technology companies and concerns over American firms acquiring European start-ups. European campaigners and some policymakers believe US tech giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon are forces to protect against. European thinking on technology partly developed in opposition to the US and US companies. Thus, European efforts to build up digital sovereignty may impede transatlantic cooperation. The EU’s effort to strengthen ethical AI, and to make ‘trustworthy AI’ a unique selling point for Europe, might also end up creating problems for transatlantic cooperation. Many EU policymakers believe that the EU’s insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI ‘made in Europe’ rather than elsewhere. In this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand, Europeans want to ensure that AI is developed and used in an ethical way. Partnering with a powerful player such as the US on this matter should be an obvious way to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe’s uniqueness. Finally, many Europeans have expressed scepticism about the extent to which Europe and the US are indeed aligned on ethical AI principles. For example, the Danish national AI strategy argues for a common ethical and human-centred basis for AI. It describes ethical AI as a particularly European approach: “Europe and Denmark should not copy the US or China. Both countries are investing heavily in artificial intelligence, but with little regard for responsibility, ethical principles and privacy.” Many Europeans feel that the US “has no idea how to regulate” cyberspace and continues to show little enthusiasm for doing so. The EU, however, likes to think of itself as a trailblazer when it comes to digital rights, such as the 2014 “right to be forgotten” or the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation. Differing views on China As noted, only a few European states look at AI through a geopolitical lens, and EU efforts on this matter focus primarily on strengthening the EU as a global player. This means that the American interest in using transatlantic cooperation as a means to curb Chinese power is likely to have only limited traction in Europe. And US companies, rather than Chinese ones, currently remain the primary ‘other’ for Europe to measure itself against. European regulation efforts still concentrate on US companies rather than Chinese firms. In light of recent changes in language on China in both NATO and the EU, which describe the country as a “strategic competitor” and “systemic rival”, European and American views of China may converge eventually. But, at the moment, Europeans do not feel the same urgency as the US when it comes to pushing back against China. Unfortunately for those in the US who favour greater transatlantic cooperation, the European nation that most often thinks in geopolitical terms, France, is among those most sceptical of the US. Brexit Finally, the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU may further complicate transatlantic cooperation on AI. Even if the EU and the UK were to decide to work as closely as possible, the EU would no longer be able to speak as much of Europe as previously. Any transatlantic cooperation on AI will, therefore, require coordination between three, rather than two, actors. Given the UK’s strong technology and AI credentials (AI leader DeepMind is based in London, although it is now owned by Google’s parent company, Alphabet), the country is likely to want to play an important role in any future negotiations on AI standards and use.
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Links › Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves › Impacts --- EU Solves
EU Council ’22 -- (Council of the EU, 3-21-2022, "A Strategic Compass for a stronger EU security and defence in the next decade," Council of the European Union, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/21/a-strategic-compass-for-a-stronger-eu-security-and-defence-in-the-next-decade/, accessed 6-18-2022) -- nikki
Today the Council has formally approved the Strategic Compass, at a time when we witness the return of war in Europe. The Compass gives the European Union an ambitious plan of action for strengthening the EU's security and defence policy by 2030. The more hostile security environment requires us to make a quantum leap forward and increase our capacity and willingness to act, strengthen our resilience, and invest more and better in our defence capabilities. The strength of our Union lies in unity, solidarity and determination. The objective of the Strategic Compass is to make the EU a stronger and more capable security provider. The EU needs to be able to protect its citizens and to contribute to international peace and security. This is all the more important at a time when war has returned to Europe, following the unjustified and unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine, as well as of major geopolitical shifts. This Strategic Compass will enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy and its ability to work with partners to safeguard its values and interests. A stronger and more capable EU in security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members. It will also intensify support for the global rules-based order, with the United Nations at its core. Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy The threats are rising and the cost of inaction is clear. The Strategic Compass is a guide for action. It sets out an ambitious way forward for our security and defence policy for the next decade. It will help us face our security responsibilities, in front of our citizens and the rest of the world. If not now, then when? Josep Borrell, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy The Strategic Compass provides a shared assessment of the strategic environment in which the EU is operating and of the threats and challenges the Union faces. The document makes concrete and actionable proposals, with a very precise timetable for implementation, in order to improve the EU's ability to act decisively in crises and to defend its security and its citizens. The Compass covers all the aspects of the security and defence policy and is structured around four pillars: act, invest, partner and secure. Act In order to be able to act rapidly and robustly whenever a crisis erupts, with partners if possible and alone when necessary, the EU will: - establish a strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops for different types of crises - be ready to deploy 200 fully equipped CSDP mission experts within 30 days, including in complex environments - conduct regular live exercises on land and at sea - enhance military mobility - reinforce the EU's civilian and military CSDP (Common Defence and Security Policy) missions and operations by promoting a rapid and more flexible decision-making process , acting in a more robust way and ensuring greater financial solidarity - make full use of the European Peace Facility to support partners Secure In order to strengthen its ability to anticipate, deter and respond to current and fast-emerging threats and challenges, and safeguard the EU's security interest, the EU will: - boost its intelligence analysis capacities - develop Hybrid Toolbox and Response Teams bringing together different instruments to detect and respond to a broad range of hybrid threats - further develop the Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox and set up an EU Cyber Defence Policy to be better prepared for and respond to cyberattacks - develop a Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Toolbox - develop an EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence - strengthen the EU’s role as a maritime security actor Invest Member states have committed to substantially enhance their defence expenditures to match our collective ambition to reduce critical military and civilian capability gaps and strengthen our European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. The EU will: - exchange on national objectives on increased and improved defence spending to match our security needs - provide further incentives for member states to engage in collaborative capability development and jointly invest in strategic enablers and next generation capabilities to operate on land, at sea, in the air, in the cyber domain and in outer space - boost defence technological innovation to fill strategic gaps and reduce technological and industrial dependencies Partner In order to address common threats and challenges, the EU will: - strengthen cooperation with strategic partners such as NATO, the UN and regional partners, including the OSCE, AU and ASEAN - develop more tailored bilateral partnerships with like-minded countries and strategic partners, such as the US, Canada, Norway, the UK, Japan and others - develop tailored partnerships in the Western Balkans, our eastern and southern neighbourhood, Africa, Asia and Latin America, including through enhancing dialogue and cooperation, promoting participation in CSDP missions and operations and supporting capacity- building Background and next steps The first version of the Strategic Compass was tabled by the High Representative in November 2021, based on the first ever threat analysis to which the intelligence services of the 27 EU member states contributed and a structured dialogue phase amongst EU member states, EU institutions and experts. Successive versions were discussed in February and March 2022 to reflect the debate between member states and to take into account the Commission's package on defence and space of 15 February and the latest international developments, including in particular Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. It contributes directly to the implementation of the Versailles agenda. Once approved, the Strategic Compass is then expected to be endorsed by the European Council on 24-25 March 2022.
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Links › Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves › Internals --- Unity over DIANA
Edward H. Christie 22, Defence Economist and Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit, lead author of NATO’s policy White Paper on Artificial Intelligence and lead consultant to NATO for the development of the Alliance’s Artificial Intelligence Strategy, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” European View, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 13–21, doi:10.1177/17816858221089372/micahw
Building on these considerations, the NATO Innovation Unit has developed two new instruments for Allied use which were announced to the public in October 2021 (NATO 2021a; 2021b). Both instruments aim to foster technological innovation with a deliberate focus on dual-use applications and on enterprises with mixed (potential) revenue streams. The first instrument is the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which is a NATO instrument, that is, it involves the participation of all 30 NATO Allies. The second instrument is the NATO Innovation Fund, which in NATO terminology is a ‘multinational’ instrument, namely one that Allies freely opt into.
DIANA will aim to accelerate the adoption of dual-use technological solutions through several interlocking components.6 First, it will develop a network of national organisations, in particular test centres and innovation accelerators. Second, it will competitively select private-sector innovators and allow them to use national organisations in the network to interface with military end users and military capability-development specialists. Third, it is envisaged that DIANA will provide mentorship and education services for private innovators to familiarise them with the opportunities and responsibilities inherent to the defence and security sector. Fourth, DIANA will develop a database of trusted financial investors from Allied nations and support matchmaking between investors and innovators. Fifth and finally, DIANA will also provide expert advice on defence and security innovation to all relevant stakeholders, including private-sector and academic entities.
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Links › Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves › Internals --- Must be OUTSIDE Mil-Mil
Nelson ‘21
(Nicholas, Nicholas Nelson is a Senior Fellow for Emerging Tech and Policy with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). Nicholas Nelson is an experienced leader in aerospace and defense (A&D), working at the nexus of innovation and national security. In addition to his work at CEPA, Mr. Nelson is Senior Technology Advisor at the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI), focused on emerging defense and dual-use technologies. He also advises a range of deep tech venture-backed startups. Previously, he was the Director of Strategic Development at a six billion dollar A&D and technology company, leading strategy, mergers and acquisitions, and corporate venture capital initiatives. Prior to this, Mr. Nelson worked in management consulting and technology scouting in Europe and North America, as well as civilian roles with the U.S. Department of Defense. His research and writing are focused on emerging defense technology, hypersonics, unmanned systems, and great power competition.“Getting NATO Innovation Right,” pg online @ //um-ef)
The Defense Innovation Accelerator and NATO Innovation Fund announced at the NATO Summit are welcome developments, but they require new authorities and differentiated talent. Swift technological change has meant governments and the military created new organizations and approaches to innovation and rapid acquisition. Unfortunately, many do not have the necessary authority, budget, or workforce to succeed, meaning that meaningful change and impact have been sacrificed for theater. For the newly announced Defense Innovation Accelerator North Atlantic (DIANA) – with planned locations in Toronto and Cambridge, UK – and the NATO Innovation Fund (NIF) to succeed, they must address authority and budget concerns, and then bring in the right personnel to lead and staff them. Authorities There are three key authorities that NATO must get right for DIANA and NIF: reporting lines, patience (or willingness to accept failure), and decision making. First, DIANA and NIF should operate independently with a direct line into the most senior decision-makers (the Secretary General, SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation — SACT, etc). Second, they need to be allowed to fail. The most impactful defense organizations (and indeed commercial organizations, particularly in the startup world) normalize taking big bets, with the knowledge that many will likely fail, and even the ones that succeed may take years to realize their full impact. Third and finally, these new NATO bodies need to invest in or provide support to initiatives and startups without requiring external permission or consensus. At the same time, they also need a clear transition partner for promising capabilities to be handed off to (e.g. DARPA transitioning tech to the U.S. Department of Defense), which can move from development to deployment. This will enable the Alliance to more readily identify, develop, and deploy emerging and disruptive technologies. Similar efforts including the U.S. Department of Defense’s DARPA and Defense Innovation Unit, CIA’s In-Q-Tel, and USAF’s Strategic Capabilities Office, are effective because they exist outside of traditional bureaucracies, leverage non-traditional talent strategies, and have consistent budgets. Budget Allocating funding seems obvious, but too often limited forethought is given to this issue. To ensure success, organizational funding must be significant, multi-year, and consistent or include inbuilt annual growth. A number of high-potential initiatives have either been announced with no dedicated funding or have had sizable funding gaps in subsequent years damaging their brand and relationships with defense companies and startups alike. The NIF in particular will likely rely on the willingness of Alliance members to make contributions beyond other NATO obligations. If so, multi-year commitments are crucial, as are success metrics, such as return on investment, which are rarely used within NATO or national government departments. Talent Finally, and most overlooked, is getting talent right. External talent is crucial. It is not enough to simply construct new organizations staffed in the traditional manner. To realize their full potential, NATO must attract talent with startup and/or venture capital (VC) experience, and pair them with top subject-matter experts from R&D communities, both government, and commercial. This cannot be done with NATO’s current Byzantine, long, drawn-out hiring process, which can last six months or even longer, and advantage insiders versus external candidates. As such the Alliance must engage and attract this talent. The good news is NATO has a number of potential examples to draw on for potential hiring pathways. In the U.S. the Defense Digital Service hires design and technical experts for one-to-two “tours of duty,” using their skillsets and operate outside the traditional civil service. In the UK, strategy and technology professionals are seconded into the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Trade, and intelligence organizations such as GCHQ, to provide experience or skills that may not exist within the current civil service workforce. But providing pathways alone is not enough: attracting this talent to apply and convincing them to join is just as important. This requires identifying areas where they might work, including industry, academia, and startups, and VC. At the same time, other steps are needed. Upskilling existing NATO civilians – among the international and international military staff (IS and IMS) — and Alliance service members are needed to address this skill and understanding gap. To do so, it is helpful to expose them to startup and VC environments. Programs like Shift’s Defense Ventures Program in the U.S. have succeeded in building understanding between the Department of Defense’s civilian and military workforce and startups and VCs. They’ve done so by bringing in high-performing defense personnel for eight-week immersions with growing venture-backed startups or VC firms. This cultivates the necessary connective tissue between startups, VCs, and the military. NATO could readily follow a similar process by providing its highest performers the opportunity to temporarily work alongside leading North American and European startups and investors. What’s Next? Accelerating the development, deployment, and integration of emerging and disruptive technologies into the strategic and tactical environments is at the core of future NATO operations. The Alliance’s move to build DIANA and NIF, along with incorporating the right language into strategic documents are significant first steps. But building these initiatives from scratch will require significant planning to establish the right authorities, budget, and talent environment to enable these organizations to thrive. In order to do so, they need to build outside of traditional NATO structures and models while creating a differentiated talent and organizational culture.
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Links › Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves › Impacts --- Solves Aff (DARPA)
By , and 21, Borchet directs Borchert Consulting and Research AG, a consulting boutique focusing on strategic affairs, John Rutherford Allen is a retired United States Marine Corps four-star general, and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces, Marcin Zaborowski is the Former Executive Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), 12/13/21, “Emerging technology, the geo-economic Achilles’ heel NATO needs to address,” Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/emerging-technology-the-geo-economic-achilles-heel-nato-needs-to-address/
To ensure NATO’s relevance and to keep “our people safe”, the Alliance “must continue to strengthen and modernize our deterrence and defence,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said at the Riga Summit on 30 November 2021. Innovation plays a critical role in modernizing armed forces amid a complex strategic environment.
To this purpose, Stoltenberg unveiled the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) on 22 October 2021. DIANA shall bring defence and commercial companies together with military users to develop novel solutions that meet the needs of the future battlefield. He also launched the NATO Innovation Fund to invest up to €1bn to support innovators developing emerging technologies.
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and 22, Goda holds a bachelor’s degree in communication from the University of Nottingham and a master’s degree in data journalism from Cardiff University, Fintan have a BSc in Biotechnology and an MSc in Science Communication, both from Dublin City University, 4/12/22, “NATO to launch €1B fund for high tech start-ups in dual use technologies,” Science Business, , JH
NATO has launched a new research programme called DIANA to bring industry, start-up companies and academia together to research new dual-use technologies that address both societal problems and national security issues.
The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is focusing on technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, autonomy, biotechnology, novel materials and space.
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Machi ‘21
(Vivienne Machi is a reporter based in Stuttgart, Germany, contributing to Defense News' European coverage. She previously reported for National Defense Magazine, Defense Daily, Via Satellite, Foreign Policy and the Dayton Daily News. She was named the Defence Media Awards' best young defense journalist in 2020, “NATO hopes to launch new defense tech accelerator by 2023,” pg online @ https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/06/22/nato-hopes-to-launch-new-defense-tech-accelerator-by-2023/ //um-ef)
STUTTGART, Germany — In less than two years, NATO hopes to have its own, modified version of the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) up and running. Alliance members agreed at the 31st annual summit, held June 14 in Brussels, to launch a new initiative dubbed the Defence Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic, or DIANA, meant to speed up trans-Atlantic cooperation on critical technologies, and help NATO work more closely with private-sector entities, academia and other non-governmental entities. The goal is to have DIANA reach initial operating capability (IOC) by 2023, David van Weel, assistant secretary-general for emerging security challenges, said at a Tuesday virtual roundtable with reporters. By next year, the hope is to have “the initial parts … starting to come up into fruition,” he added. In the long term, DIANA will have headquarters both in North America and in Europe, and link to existing test centers throughout NATO member countries that will be used for “validating, testing, and co-designing applications in the field of emerging and disruptive technologies,” van Weel said. DIANA will also be responsible for building and managing a network meant to help relevant startups grow and support NATO’s technology needs via grant programs. The focus will be on national security and defense purposes, and DIANA will not ask for or solicit companies’ intellectual property, van Weel noted. While he singled out artificial intelligence, big-data processing, and quantum-enabled technologies, DIANA is meant to support all seven of the key emerging and disruptive technologies — or EDTs — that NATO has identified as critical for the future. The other four include: autonomy, biotechnology, hypersonics and space. Sometimes a technology company may not realize that their product could be viable for the defense community, he added. One key component of DIANA will be a trusted capital marketplace, where smaller companies can connect with pre-qualified investors who are interested in supporting NATO’s technology efforts. Ensuring that investors are vetted ahead of time will allow NATO to ensure “that the technology will be protected from illicit transfers,” van Weel said. The fund is modeled after a The U.S. Defense Department set up its own trusted capital marketplace in 2019 as a tool that then-DoD acquisition czar Ellen Lord said could help encourage domestically based venture capitalists to fund national security and defense projects. That marketplace served as inspiration for the announced NATO trusted capital marketplace, per the alliance. Members also agreed for the first time to build up a venture capital fund to support companies developing dual-use and key technologies that could be useful to NATO, and which will be optional for member-nations to participate in. The NATO Innovation Fund, as it’s called, would have a running time of about 15 years to start, and would be underwritten by about 70 million euro (about $83 million) per year, per van Weel. The goal is not for NATO headquarters or for its member-nations to run the innovation fund, he noted. “The actual running of a venture capital fund, we believe, should be done by companies that have a broad range of experience in the field.” He cited the U.S.-based capital venture firm In-Q-Tel as an example of the type of partner NATO would seek to run the “day-to-day” business of the fund. “I read somewhere that NATO is not a bank—we’re not,” van Weel said. “But it will be the nations providing the funds, and giving the general direction.” These two initiatives of a technology accelerator and innovation fund are “hopefully going to … bring the alliance forward into the 21st century,” van Weel said. NATO has previously invested in information technology (IT) and software through the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), but the difference with the innovation fund, and DIANA, is that the alliance wants to better connect with early-stage startups, rather than larger software companies or traditional defense firms, van Weel said. “DIANA is not about taking over innovation for the NATO enterprise,” he said. “It’s a different community, and requires different funding mechanisms and different types of engagement.” These two initiatives have been long awaited and demanded by NATO observers, and versions of both a “DARPA-like” technology accelerator and an alliance-wide investment bank were included in a 2020 list of recommendations by NATO’s advisory group on emerging and disruptive technologies. But it is still early days. While the IOC goal is 2023, “step one is we want to know from allies what they want to offer to DIANA,” van Weel said. Once the NATO Innovation Fund has its participating members, for example, a charter will be set up that will lay out the funding models, rapid contracting processes, and leadership guidelines. “We are trying to do this as fast as we can,” van Weel assured, but then noted, “we do want to get it right, because … with the startup community, you only get one chance.”
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Goda Naujokaitytė & Fintan Burke 22, Senior Journalists for Science|Business, “NATO to launch €1B fund for high tech start-ups in dual use technologies,” https://sciencebusiness.net/news/nato-launch-eu1b-fund-high-tech-start-ups-dual-use-technologies/micahw
NATO has launched a new research programme called DIANA to bring industry, start-up companies and academia together to research new dual-use technologies that address both societal problems and national security issues.
The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is focusing on technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, autonomy, biotechnology, novel materials and space.
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Shea ‘16
(Jamie Shea, 3-30-2016, "Resilience: a core element of collective defence," NATO Review, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/03/30/resilience-a-core-element-of-collective-defence/index.html, accessed 6-18-2022) -- nikki
In a globalised but also more confrontational and complex world, resilience will remain an ongoing concern for Allies, requiring constant adaptation as new vulnerabilities and threats emerge. Virtual vulnerabilities Cyber space is perhaps the most extreme form of this vulnerability as it interconnects the entire planet in real time, making it possible for anybody to attack any electronically operated target from anywhere at any moment. This vastly complicates the task of defenders, who can rarely know in advance that an attack is being launched, where it will strike or where it will originate. So the defender has to try to protect every important part of the national economic or military infrastructure all the time, while the attacker can choose the individual segment or vulnerable fault line that he wishes to disrupt. SCADAs – or automated control systems for electrical grids or energy pipelines – are just one example of how infrastructure that we depend on for the normal functioning of our lives is increasingly automated, remotely controlled or integrated into ever more complex networks, which are vulnerable to attack. SCADAs – or automated control systems for electrical grids or energy pipelines – are just one example of how infrastructure that we depend on for the normal functioning of our lives is increasingly automated, remotely controlled or integrated into ever more complex networks, which are vulnerable to attack. As we move from the internet of things to the internet of everything, more and more of the infrastructure that we depend on for the normal functioning of our lives is being automated or controlled from remoter distances or integrated into ever more complex networks. The SCADAs – or automated control systems for electrical grids or energy pipelines – are but one example. So are cross-border grids which means an energy blackout in Italy can immediately turn off the power in parts of Switzerland, or an overload at one transmission plant in India can plunge 400 million people into temporary darkness, to cite just two recent examples. The globalisation of networks and the increasing integration of physical infrastructure into the virtual world, for instance the storage of data not in machines but in ‘clouds’, has certainly brought about efficiencies and savings. But it has also greatly magnified the consequences of a disruption and the number of key nodal points and attack surfaces that malevolent actors can exploit. Civil preparedness A second tendency increasing the sense of societal vulnerability is the state of civil preparedness within the Alliance. The delivery of forces and military capabilities that NATO needs to uphold collective defence or to project forces beyond its territory relies on civilian resources. During the Cold War, many of these, such as railways, ports, airfields, grids or airspace were in state hands and easily transferred to NATO control in a crisis or wartime situation. Today, by contrast, 90 per cent of NATO’s supplies and logistics are moved by private companies and 75 per cent of the host nation support for NATO forces forward deployed on the territory of the eastern Allies comes from private sector contracts. Similarly, when facing distributed denial of service cyber-attacks against its outward-facing networks, NATO has relied on cooperation from the telecoms sector and the internet security companies to filter and capture data, identify malware and provide extra bandwidth. Without doubt the transfer of ownership and responsibility to the private sector has brought cost-efficiencies; but the quest to reduce costs and overheads to increase profitability has also led to less redundancy and less resilience. In addition, as hybrid threats below the threshold of NATO’s collective defence clause (Article 5 of its founding treaty) blur the traditional distinction between peace and war, government special powers based on wartime emergency legislation have become less practical to implement or even obsolete. Whether it be for mobilizing troops for collective defence or to strengthen the ability to defend against – or recover from – hybrid attack, NATO is increasingly dependent on infrastructure and assets in the private sector. Whether it be for mobilizing troops for collective defence or to strengthen the ability to defend against – or recover from – hybrid attack, NATO is increasingly dependent on infrastructure and assets in the private sector. As a result, NATO faces two distinct but inter-related resilience challenges: first, to ensure that it can speedily move all the forces and equipment required to any part of the Alliance facing an imminent threat or attack, ensuring full and unimpeded access to all the infrastructure it needs for this purpose; and second, to be able to anticipate, identify, mitigate and recover from hybrid attacks with minimum disruptive impact on the Alliance’s social, political and military cohesion. Civil preparedness is, above all, a national responsibility, in the same way that Allies must ensure adequate cyber defence for their critical information technology networks, especially the ones that NATO depends on for its own operations. This said, Allies’ security relies on individual nations upholding this commitment; and NATO has an interest in obtaining as much transparency as possible, so that it can assess potential vulnerabilities or gaps and accurately measure progress. Avoiding unpleasant surprises in crisis situations when the Alliance needs swift and reliable information and the capacity to analyse, decide and respond swiftly has to be the goal. Consequently, the theme of ‘resilience’ – how to define it, assess it and enhance it across the Alliance – has become a leading topic for the NATO Summit in Warsaw, in July. Resilience is increasingly seen as the corollary of deterrence and reassurance measures in the classical military sphere as part of a comprehensive security strategy for the Alliance. The seven baseline requirements to be assessed are: 1) assured continuity of government and critical government services; 2) resilient energy supplies; 3) ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people; 4) resilient food and water resources; 5) ability to deal with mass casualties; 6) resilient communications systems; and finally 7) resilient transportation systems. These seven areas apply to the entire crisis spectrum, from an evolving hybrid threat all the way up to the most demanding scenarios envisaged by Alliance planners. So how can NATO make its contribution to improving resilience within its 28 Allied nations? Five specific areas come to mind: Cyber defence The first is cyber defence. NATO experiences 200 million incidents on its networks every day and around 200 more serious intrusion attempts every month. This level of hostile activity is also what Allies are experiencing as the ‘new normal’ in the cyber domain. NATO’s first task has been to upgrade the protection of its own networks by giving the NATO Cyber Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) additional capabilities for earlier detection and more rapid response to cyberattacks. Two Rapid Response teams have also been created to assist Allies, as well as to manage incidents affecting NATO itself. NATO has now moved on to help Allies improve their cyber resilience by introducing capability targets into the NATO defence planning process and devising a new memorandum of understanding between NATO and individual Allies to establish secure connectivity and arrangements for information-sharing and crisis management. A number of Allies have come together to develop specific capabilities in fields such as a malware information-sharing platform, training and education, and systems configuration for effective decision-making. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia has helped NATO to organize state-of-the art annual exercises to improve the skills of cyber operators using a cyber range that Estonia has transferred to NATO. Finally, and given the importance of industry that owns 90 per cent of the networks NATO and the Allies depend on, the Alliance is developing a NATO-industry cyber partnership to encourage information-sharing and best practices. This will give NATO a better grasp of the rapid pace of innovation in the sphere of information technology and how it can better integrate emerging technologies and new concepts into its cyber defence. The proposal to create an ‘innovation hub’ at the NATO Communications and Information Agency should facilitate this dialogue and mutual understanding between NATO and the small-and-medium-size technology providers that are often the most innovative in this area. As the Alliance looks towards the Warsaw Summit, some further measures are on the table. One is a ‘cyber defence pledge’ or commitment to speed up national implementation of the NATO capability targets, which requires sustained national focus and adequate resources. A second idea is to look into the political, legal and operational consequences of declaring cyber as a domain, as many Allies have done already in terms of their national cyber strategies. This reflects the increasing awareness that most conflicts and crises these days have a cyber dimension and that – as NATO increases the momentum of its military activities for collective defence – NATO commanders need the requisite tools and authorities to defend against advanced cyberattacks and to operate across the cyber spectrum. Hybrid threats A second area of resilience is a strategy to respond to hybrid warfare which NATO foreign ministers approved last December. NATO is improving its intelligence-sharing and early warning processes in order to better anticipate and map hybrid warfare activities. It is developing in this respect a set of early warning indicators that can trigger a number of crisis-response options. This is because rapid identification of a hybrid attack (as opposed to an isolated or random incident) and speedy decision-making are essential to nip these attacks in the bud and block escalation. NATO ambassadors and defence ministers have held simulation and scenario-based exercises to fine-tune their situational awareness and responsiveness vis-à-vis threats, which are specifically designed to be ambiguous and difficult to attribute. Effective strategic communications to dispel false information, propaganda, lies and myths is also an essential part of coping with hybrid attacks that seek to confuse public opinion, aggravate social tensions and undermine trust in governments. All this does not mean that Allies are as vulnerable to a hybrid attack as Ukraine proved to be during Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. However, Allies are now encouraged to map potential vulnerabilities that can arise from Russia’s involvement in business, financial, media or energy concerns, for example, and to share the lessons learned from resilience stress testing more broadly within NATO. Civil-military readiness A third area under discussion concerns NATO’s ability to fully implement its Readiness Action Plan for the reinforcement and defence of Allies, whether to the east or to the south. NATO members have to adjust their territorial defence mechanisms and infrastructure to the new security environment and revive the planning fora that existed during the Cold War. In particular, NATO planners require cross-border transit arrangements for the rapid deployment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and NATO Response Force. As new Graduated Response Plans for detailed collective defence arrangements are adopted, the Allies must ensure that elements such as transport, flight corridors, civil-military airspace coordination, fuel stocks, pre-positioned equipment, port access and legal agreements are fully integrated into military planning. Crisis-response measures to activate civil emergency measures will need to be updated and civil defence requirements will need to be given more attention, based on the military requirements for the Readiness Action Plan and associated capability packages for its deployment. A more sustained dialogue between military commanders and national civil emergency authorities is now being established. Stepping up cooperation with the EU A fourth area is the relationship between NATO and the European Union (EU). The two organisations occupy different parts of the resilience spectrum but there is also considerable overlap in the middle. A joined-up approach based on a shared situational awareness and coordination of responses is key to a successful response. Currently NATO is talking with the EU on enhanced cooperation in four areas: civil-military planning; cyber defence; information-sharing; and analysis and coordinated strategic communication to spot disinformation and communicate a credible narrative. One early deliverable is a technical arrangement between the NATO NCIRC and the EU Computer Emergency Response Team (EU CERT) for the exchange of information, which was concluded in early February. Up to the Warsaw Summit, NATO and the EU are continuing their discussions at the staff level, as the EU finalises its own strategy to respond to hybrid threats. The aim is to harmonise procedures and to support each other’s efforts in responding comprehensively. The ambition is to identify pragmatic, flexible approaches which could be reflected in a joint declaration by NATO and the EU at the Warsaw Summit. NATO and the EU are also developing compatible ‘playbooks’ to ensure more participation in each other’s activities, such as exercises and training. It is also important that NATO and the EU work together to tackle other resilience challenges that do not result from deliberate attacks. The most urgent of these is the migration crisis. NATO has recently deployed a maritime task force in the Aegean to work with Greece and Turkey and the EU border agency, Frontex, to monitor the flow of refugees and migrants and in this way help to curb the illegal activities of smugglers and traffickers. Working with partner countries Finally, NATO’s partners can also help to improve the Alliance’s overall resilience. Not only Ukraine but many other partners have been the victim of hybrid operations. Their experiences and lessons learned can help NATO to better understand the type and impact of hybrid tactics. More information-sharing and early warning can help NATO decision-makers to identify incipient attacks that could start in a partner country but rapidly spread to NATO territory. Conversely, NATO’s experience and expertise can help partners improve their own capacity for resilience. Unsurprisingly resilience areas like cyber defence and civil emergency planning are increasingly featuring in defence capacity building packages for partners such as Georgia, Moldova, Jordan and Iraq. In the Baltic region, Sweden and Finland – two of NATO’s most active partners, which have enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation – have also faced hybrid pressures from Russia. These Nordic partners have drawn closer to NATO through consultations, training and exercises, including the conclusion of host nation support arrangements for crisis assistance. In conclusion, Allies need to adapt constantly as new vulnerabilities and threats emerge from non-state actors such as so-called Islamic State, as much as from state actors like Russia. Resilience is here to stay as a core element of collective defence. That is why NATO will stay focused on reducing its exposure to threats to its cohesion, independence and security.2
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Maria Vitoria Santana, 3/8/21,”Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA),” European Army Interoperability Centre, https://finabel.org/defence-innovation-accelerator-for-the-north-atlantic-diana/
When the Covid-19 crisis led to a lockdown of all activities, the lack of digital literacy from governmental bodies and defence personal exposed both a new threat and an opportunity. Bearing this situation in mind, NATO members (NM) have agreed at the 31st annual summit, held in June 2020 in Brussels, to initiate the Defence Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic (DIANA) that aims to reach full operability capacities by 2023. DIANA is NATO’s version of the U.S Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). It will reinforce transatlantic cooperation regarding critical technologies to assure the security and defence digital literacy of NM.
This initiative is a joint effort between private-sector entities, non-governmental entities, and academia. NATO’s Assistant Secretary-General David van Weel explains that although financial support from companies and start-ups are crucial for funding the research projects, intellectual property will not be requested (Vivienne Machi, 2021). This is where academia joins the operation, providing the necessary technical knowledge for the development and creation of technologies to improve Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs): Artificial intelligence (AI), quantum-enable technologies, and big-data processing. This takes place on top of supporting the remaining EDTs: Data and Computing, Autonomy, Biotechnology and Human enhancements, Hypersonic technologies, and Space (Tania Latici, 2021).
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Goldgeier 10 – James M. Goldgeier, James Goldgeier is a Professor of International Relations and Robert Bosch Senior Visiting Fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. He was a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations from 2017-19 and in 2018-19, he held the inaugural Library of Congress Chair in U.S.-Russia Relations at the John W. Kluge Center. Ph.D., Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; M.A., Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; A.B., Government, Harvard University, Febuary 2010,“The Future of NATO,” Council on Foreign Relations Press,
If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not exist today, the United States would not seek to create it. In 1949, it made sense in the face of a potential Soviet invasion to forge a bond in the North Atlantic area among the United States, Canada, and the west European states. Today, if the United States were starting from scratch in a world of transnational threats, the debate would be over whether to follow liberal and neoconservative calls for an alliance of democracies without regard to geography or to develop a great power concert envisioned by the realists to uphold the current order. The United States is not, however, starting from scratch, and NATO should not disappear. While the bonds across the Atlantic may be frayed, they are stronger than those tying the United States to other parts of the world. Common history and values matter, as do the resources (both financial and military) that Europe possesses. The NATO allies share a common interest in preventing disruptions to the global economy, including attacks on freedom of navigation. As a community of democracies, the member states are threatened by forces such as Islamic extremism and the rise of authoritarian states. For the United States, the alliance is a source of legitimacy for actions in places like Afghanistan. For Europe, NATO is a vehicle for projecting hard power. While NATO alone cannot defend against the range of threats facing the member states, it can serve as the hub for American and European leaders to develop the ties with other institutions and non-European countries necessary to provide for the common defense. For all its faults, NATO enables the United States to partner with close democratic allies in ways that would be difficult without a formal institution that provides a headquarters and ready venue for decision-making, as well as legitimacy and support for action that ad hoc U.S.-led coalitions do not. As has been true since the fall of the Berlin Wall two decades ago, the United States (and Europe) should want NATO to succeed. After the Cold War, the alliance dramatically redefined itself. In the 1990s, it fostered stability across Europe by beginning its process of enlargement to the formerly communist east and by intervening to stop genocide in the Balkans. In the 2000s, it broadened its scope through the mission in Afghanistan as well as a counterterrorist operation in the Mediterranean and counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa (in addition to continuing the enlargement process). But as NATO has broadened its scope, some members have grown concerned that the alliance is shifting its attention away from Europe. These members seek to return NATO to a more traditional understanding of its role defending against threats on the continent, particularly as an increasingly authoritarian and assertive Russian government has sought to reclaim a sphere of influence lost in the Soviet collapse. In November 2010, NATO will release a new “strategic concept” to guide the alliance going forward. That document must state clearly that providing for collective defense in the twenty-first century goes well beyond defending against the “armed attack” of Article V. To remain relevant, NATO must expand its traditional understanding of collective defense to confront the twenty-first-century threats of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to both states and nonstate actors, and cyberwarfare. By necessity, the United States has turned its attention away from Europe in order to counter these modern threats, which largely emanate from Africa, the broader Middle East, and Asia. If NATO fails to accept a growing global role, then the United States will lose interest in investing in the alliance’s future. But Europe faces these threats too and must recognize that a more robust NATO offers it the chance to counter them. Given the varied nature and source of threats today, NATO can be successful only if the Europeans agree to stronger NATO-European Union (EU) cooperation and to closer ties with major non-European democracies, particularly those in the AsiaPacific region.
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Adrian Bonenberger 17, Vocativ Staff, Where Could The European Cold War Go Hot Again? Think a war in Europe won't happen? Here's a look at the issues most likely to spur a military confrontation, 1-27-17,
Since 2014, however, and the West’s failure to protect an avowedly pro-European Ukraine, it has become increasingly popular to describe the West’s relationship with Russia as a new Cold War. Reading the headlines, it certainly seems like Moscow and Europe are one badly-aimed missile or bomb away from World War III. As political realities in the US and abroad are challenged, what are the lines or issues most likely to lead to war in Europe? Imperial Russia By A Different Name One variable that seems constant right now is Russia. Whether one sees things from Russia’s perspective (wherein Russia is surrounded by hostile neighbors intent on its destruction) or those of its nearest neighbors (which see Russia as an aggressive and expansive imperial bully), Russia’s actions are indisputable. It has invaded and occupied portions of Ukraine and Georgia. It has countenanced cyberattacks on Estonia, Ukraine (which included the first deaths attached to cyberwarfare), the U.S., Georgia, Azerbaijan and NATO. It is pursuing a long game to undermine and destabilize any and all political alliances that do not include it, as well as those that do include it. The weaker everyone else is, the greater the room for Russian opportunism. Russia has also taken the side of America’s primary antagonists in the Middle East. This has made it the friend of isolationists, nationalists, and left-wingers who (paradoxically, given Russia’s own actions) oppose an American and European hegemony, backed by the increasingly questionable threat of military intervention. Whether it is lashing out in righteous self-defense or as part of an unethical attempt to grow larger and more powerful at the expense of its smaller and weaker neighbors, there is no question that Russia is looking to expand its brand. The Return Of Nationalism Across Europe, explicit nationalism is on the rise at levels unseen since the early 20th century. While hard to quantify, the success of so-called “populist” political parties with nationalist agendas suggests a growing dissatisfaction with NATO, the EU, and the U.S.. Over the last two years, far-right parties have won political power, gained credibility, or advanced substantial nationalist agendas in Poland (Law and Justice), Hungary (Jobbik), Romania (the recent founding of a new nationalist party) Austria, Italy (rejection of judicial and legal reform), the U.S. (Trump/Alt-Right), Germany (Alternative for Germany), UK (Brexit), France (Le Pen’s National Front) and others. Nationalism overlaps well with Russia’s agenda, because it erodes federalism—the idea that different people in different countries could lay aside tribal instincts like linguistic or ethnic affinities to cooperate. This makes it easier for Russia to project power at a local or regional level without sacrificing much in the way of money or manpower. Even nationalists like those in Poland and Germany who tend to dislike Russians for a variety of actual and perceived historical slights seem to receive financial support from Russia. This seems based on the principle that a Europe of many countries will be less unified in opposing Russia’s agenda. In principle, those countries that have a strong nationalist political voice end up pursuing policies that strengthen (relatively) Russia. For people who believe that NATO, the U.S., or the EU are too strong, that may not be a particularly troublesome issue. Immigration There are at least three different types of national responses to the question of (largely Middle Eastern and African) immigration into Europe. The first draws on 20th century legal precedents guaranteeing humans fair and dignified treatment regardless of their national background. This response, exemplified by Germans and Scandinavians, tends to view immigrants as refugees fleeing war or economic oppression for which Europe or the West have some kind of responsibility given the global economy. Nations like Germany, Denmark and Sweden are considered among the most generous to refugees. Germany especially has embraced modern attitudes toward immigration, in the wake of its catastrophic spasm of ethnic cleansing during WWII. Other countries with colonial legacies have maintained generous post-colonial policies. Absent active restitution, countries like France, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Portugal—any country that had its finger in the exploitative pie that was 17th-20th century Africa, South America, and Asia—provide expedited or dual-citizenship options for many people living in countries formerly touched by European sails and soldiers. This is similar to the posture of countries like Germany. It also results in specific ethnic and religious traffic flowing from the formerly colonized to the colonizer. A critical difference between the experience of countries like Germany and those like France or the UK (for example) is that Germany’s posture toward immigration and citizenship embraces an assumed modern, cosmopolitan future, and exists without any natural enemies safe for the white supremacists and Neo-Nazis who nearly destroyed Europe during World War II (until recently, not a credible source of dissidence). Colonialism did not die easily in the UK, France, or other similar countries, and much military blood and cash was expended in attempting to keep colonial holdings within the fold. Groups nostalgic for former imperial glory tend to see immigration as an affront to national dignity, beyond being unwise policy. Groups that evaluate immigration through the lens of colonial nostalgia are not Nazis or necessarily white supremacists, though the practical implications of their attitudes end up being similar enough to warrant comparison. Finally, there are nations in Central and Eastern Europe whose attitudes on immigration were shaped by their experiences in WWI and WWII, as well as life behind the Iron Curtain. Ethnic cleansing and population movements by the Nazis and the Kremlin-led USSR left countries with the idea that ethnic homogeneity was an absolute good, and ethnic diversity was an existential threat. During the first part of its life, the USSR viewed ethnicity as threatening to the ideal of a classless society, although that slowly devolved into a view that non-Russian ethnicities were dangerous. This is not to diminish or excuse a powerful racial element in resistance to immigration, simply to frame it in the context of places that experienced the Holocaust firsthand, often actively participating in it in a way that ended up shaping every subsequent generation. Religion The European immigration “crisis” is complicated by the issue of religion. There are two key fault lines at play here: Orthodox versus non-Orthodox, and Christian versus Islam. Countries like Germany, Hungary, Croatia, Poland and Slovakia tend to be Catholic. The primary factor in considering their political preferences is their experience with Soviet-style governance, wherein Orthodox Christianity was a proxy for Russian intelligence agencies, and Catholicism was part of resistance to totalitarianism and Russian nationalism. Orthodox countries tend to be pro-Russian: Greece, Bulgaria Macedonia and Serbia all share religious and cultural affinity for one another, as well as Russia. They tend to be hostile to the idea of immigration from the Middle East and Africa based on religious grounds, given the relationship between church and state. This has been the case for centuries. Religious constituencies within all European countries tend to view the EU’s stance toward religion with skepticism, and see efforts to resettle non-Christians within their borders as direct attacks on both their Christianity and ethnicity. Still, there are substantial differences between Orthodox countries (which tend to be pro-Russian) and Catholic countries that spent time behind the Iron Curtain (which tend to be anti-Russian). Countries Formerly Occupied Or Annexed By Russia Polish voters empowered the “Law and Order” party based partly on its promises to block non-Christian (most importantly, Islamic) immigration and the expansion of EU power at the expense of Polish autonomy. At the same time, Poland is among the most staunch and enthusiastic NATO member-states. Its army is the fourth largest in Europe behind Russia, Ukraine, and France. Its chief foreign policy priorities have nothing to do with Middle Eastern immigration, and everything to do with preventing a repeat of the 20th century, where Poland was occupied by Russian soldiers on three separate occasions, and forced to adopt Soviet governance at bayonet-point. Similar in their opposition to recent Russian militancy to Poland are the Baltic States, as well as countries like Sweden, Finland, and Romania. The fate of the Baltics and Finland were determined as part of agreements between Nazi Germany and the USSR to enforce German and Russian “spheres of influence” according to Hitler and Stalin’s vision for Europe. The Baltics were made into independent SSRs within the USSR, while Sweden maintained its independence. Finland was invaded and had large portions of territory annexed into Russia, and Romania was partitioned before and after WWII, first by agreement between the USSR and the Nazis, and later by conquest. Within the Baltics, anti-Russian attitudes are tempered by former Russian citizens of the USSR who lost their national standing when the USSR collapsed. This is most conspicuous in Latvia, but is also true for Lithuania and Estonia. Broadly speaking, any country with an ethnic or Russian-speaking population that borders Russia or was part of the USSR’s sphere of influence. It is a visible reminder of Russia’s de facto colonization of other nations within the USSR, the consequences of which—the current war in Ukraine, as well as the past war in Georgia—explain why national security is among the most urgent priorities for these countries now (satirically represented here, though more recent developments suggest that Germany would remain part of the EU and France perhaps would not). Another way of stating this European dynamic would be thus: countries with no direct experience of the USSR tend not to see Russia as an imminent military threat. Those with direct experience of the USSR (and which therefore have vocal Russian-speaking minorities as viable political entities) see Russia as an existential threat. Economic Ideals Those countries that have had difficulty adjusting their economies to meet the EU’s standards, or which have not prospered during their time in the EU have become powerful passive allies of Russia. Greece, Italy, Spain and Bulgaria have all come to view sanctions on Russia as damaging to their own economies. They view competition with Russia as harmful to their economic interests, either “someone else’s problem” or somehow the fault of the U.S.. The EU’s structure (exposed during Greece’s economic crisis of 2012) does not privilege every country equally, nor is it designed to—its design offers benefits to those countries that are best able to leverage Europe’s many markets and industries. Those in favor of the EU would stress that each country that joined the EU did so transparently and freely, and expected to benefit from its structure by investing time and energy—these people would say that countries failing to maximize their income within the EU have themselves to blame. Those opposed to the EU (many Greek nationalists) believe that it is an exploitative system. Energy Dependence The final factor that determines a country’s relationship with Europe versus Russia is its dependence on Russian oil and gas. After the fall of the USSR, some countries that had existed behind the Iron Curtain were able to maintain privileged relationships with Russian energy producers. Dependence on the Russia used to be the single greatest European weakness, and still is for certain countries (most conspicuously Hungary, which goes out of its way to propitiate Russia, but also other Central European powers as well as Ukraine itself). Lately, though, low oil prices, longtime pushes for energy independence using renewable sources, as well as the opening of alternate energy markets in the Middle East have made it increasingly difficult for Russia to monopolize Europe’s energy, and therefore have reduced its political influence there. This places Russia in a serious bind, as the US’s development of new technology to access additional energy reserves means that as the price of oil and gas rises, it becomes profitable for it to reenter the energy market—meaning European countries will never again be entirely dependent on Russia for energy. The Prospect of War Although there are many fault lines that could lead to conflict, it still seems unlikely that European war will spread west from Ukraine. Still, it’s worth paying attention to these various collisions between Russian and European countries. No century in history has seen a Europe free from war—the question is always one of degree and intensity. So far, the 21st century still has all the elements in place for a truly epic struggle between European countries and Russia. And this conflict, unlike those of the last century, may be adjudicated by nuclear weapons.
2022
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Littlefield and Lowther 15, Alex Littlefield is Senior Editor at Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Adam Lowther is a Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) at Maxwell Air Force Base, (8/11/15, Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/)
For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, China’s aggressive efforts to assert questionable claims in the South and East China Sea, enforce a disputed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), build the rocket/missile and naval capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and build a substantial ballistic missile capability all work to create a situation where conflict between the U.S. and the PRC could occur and rapidly escalate. Given that American political and military leaders have a poor understanding of Chinese ambitions and particularly their opaque nuclear thinking, there is ample reason to be concerned that a future conflict could escalate to a limited nuclear conflict. Thus, it is worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward offering insight into Chinese motivation and thinking when it comes to how a possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Chinese Capabilities In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess that the Second Artillery Corps possesses forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike the United States if fired from China’s eastern seaboard and an additional twenty that could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East Coast – home to the nation’s capital and largest economic centers. To overcome this challenge China is also developing its JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which is a sea-based variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-class submarines. China may also be developing a new mobile missile, the DF-41, which will carry multiple warheads, giving the Chinese a way to potentially defeat an American ballistic missile defense system. It is worth noting that the quantity, though not the quality, of China’s nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons grade plutonium. This raises the question; to what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal? Chinese Motivation The textbook answer is straightforward. China seeks a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability that will serve to deter an American first strike. As China argues, it has a “no-nuclear-first policy” which makes its arsenal purely defensive – while its other capabilities such as cyber are offensive. Potential nuclear adversaries including Russia, India, and the United States are fully aware that China’s investment in advanced warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems bring Delhi, Moscow, and, soon, Washington within reach of the “East Wind.” While not a nuclear peer competitor to either Russia or the U.S., China is rapidly catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear warheads each year. While American leaders may find such a sentiment unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear that the United States will use its nuclear arsenal as a tool to blackmail (coerce) China into taking or not taking a number of actions that are against its interests. China’s fears are not unfounded. Unlike China, the United States maintains an ambiguous use-policy in order to provide maximum flexibility. As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United States certainly planned to use overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and its positioning of ballistic missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China sees its position and ability to deter the United States as vulnerable. Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States.
2022
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Feng 3/9/22
(John, “China Is Learning Lessons From West's United Response to Russia,” pg online @ //um-ef)
China is watching the West's collective response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and is learning lessons that may change its own calculations as it seeks to annex Taiwan, according to senior officials in Washington and London. When the threat of economic sanctions failed to deter Vladimir Putin and the first of Russia's 150,000 troops began pouring into Ukrainian territory on February 24, Taiwan became a trending topic as observers feared China's President Xi Jinping would be emboldened to make good on his vow to capture the democratic island of 23.5 million people. However, as Putin's forces failed to achieve their blitzkrieg goals and the war entered its second week, the thinking changed. Ukraine's leaders remained in Kyiv; its armed forces fought back and ordinary civilians joined the resistance. A galvanized NATO and the early effects of the West's unprecedented punishment on Russia's economy began to give China watchers pause. Taiwan's Foreign Minister Joseph Wu called the Ukrainian resistance an inspiration for the Taiwanese people. Taipei joined several Asian governments in imposing export controls on Russia and landed on Moscow's list of "unfriendly" countries this week. Russia's forces continue their march toward Ukraine's capital and may eventually achieve their military objectives even as political goals—regime change and the submission of its public—remain out of reach. But the events of the past days have already made China more reluctant to invade Taiwan than just several months ago, Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence, told the House Intelligence Committee on Tuesday. "The view is both that it is likely to reinforce China's perspective on the seriousness with which we would approach an infringement on Taiwan and in the unity that they've seen between Europe and the United States, particularly in enacting sanctions," she said. "Not just that unity, but the impact of those sanctions I think are both things that are critical to their calculus and something that will be interesting for us to see how they learn those lessons." In her opening remarks, Haines said China—"an unparalleled priority"—would prefer "coerced unification that avoids armed conflict." The Chinese government has been working to isolate Taiwan and undermine its elected leaders for years, she said. "At the same time, Beijing is preparing to use military force if it decides this is necessary." In answer to a similar question, CIA Director William Burns said he "would not underestimate President Xi and the Chinese leadership's determination with regard to Taiwan." However, Burns said Beijing has been "surprised and unsettled" by the difficulties the Russians have encountered in Ukraine. "Everything from the strength of the Western reaction, to the way in which Ukrainians have fiercely resisted," he said. "I think there's an impact on the Chinese calculus with regard to Taiwan." Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, who heads the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, told lawmakers at the Russia-focused hearing that Taiwan and Ukraine were "two different things completely." He then hinted at the considerable U.S. military presence in Asia. "I also believe that our deterrence posture in the Pacific puts a very different perspective on all of this," said Berrier. "We do know that [China] is watching very, very carefully what happens and how this plays out." At a similar briefing of the U.K.'s Foreign Affairs Select Committee on Monday, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said Beijing "does not want to associate too closely" with Russia's new status as a "global pariah." She left little doubt that NATO was setting a precedent with its united response and sending a message to China in the process. "There's also the issue of the importance of showing strength as NATO," Truss said, "because the rest of the world will be watching, including China, on how the West continues to respond." "Of course, if we see a weak NATO, that is likely to embolden China. So I see a tough policy on Russia and a tough policy on China as being complementary," she said.
2022
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Mierzwa and Tomaszycki ‘21
(Danuta, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, Marek, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, “Imperial policy of the Russian Federation versus cohesion and coherence of NATO’s new strategic concept,” International Politics, pg SpringLink //um-ef)
Summing up the provisions of the consecutive NATO Summits and the declarations in Brussels of 2018, it can be concluded that they were crucial to the strategy pursued by NATO nowadays. The Alliance’s new command structure has become more suited for undertaking effective joint defence operations. Definitely, assessing the consecutive provisions, it can be stated that by introducing the standby initiative, NATO has become capable of putting into operation a greater number of troops almost instantaneously. The Alliance’s forward-looking presence in Central and Eastern Europe has also been modified, which should translate into a major increase in the Alliance’s defence capabilities in the event of potential enemy aggression (Graf 2018). The most recent NATO Summit in London of December 2019 reaffirmed the Alliance’s unity and commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty stating that an attack on one ally would be considered an attack on all. “In difficult times, we are stronger as an Alliance, and our citizens are safer. Our bond and mutual commitment guarantee our freedoms, our values and our security for 70 years to come. We are working to ensure that NATO guarantees these freedoms, values and security for future generations”.—The Alliance’s declaration proclaims.Footnote17 The leaders reaffirmed that NATO guarantees security and fundamental human rights as well as the rule of law on the territory of the Member States for the people living there. “Solidarity, unity and cohesion are the fundamental principles of our Alliance. As we are working together to prevent conflicts and preserve peace, NATO remains the foundation of our collective defence and the basic forum for consultation and security decisions among the allies. We reaffirm the lasting transatlantic relationship between Europe and North America, the observance of the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter and our solemn commitment as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty that an attack on one Ally will be considered an attack on all of us”—they reaffirmed in the declaration. Most importantly for Poland and the Baltic states, NATO leaders agreed on the updated defence plans for Poland and the Member States. They also expressed their criticism of Russia’s aggressive actions (Gotkowska and Szymański 2017).Footnote18
2022
Michigan
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Links › Cohesion Impacts › Impacts --- Cohesion k Deterrence
Mierzwa and Tomaszycki ‘21
(Danuta, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, Marek, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, “Imperial policy of the Russian Federation versus cohesion and coherence of NATO’s new strategic concept,” International Politics, pg SpringLink //um-ef)
Chart removed for brevity The direct comparison between the military capabilities of Russia and NATO indicates that there is no real threat in terms of quantitative or qualitative advantage in Russia’s favour. On the contrary, NATO is in the lead, with a huge advantage of both equipment and personnel as well as technology, quality and quantity. However, there are areas in favour of Russia. These include WRE (radio-electronic warfare), aviation and air defence capabilities, radar systems as well as nuclear carriers and weapons. Needless to mention other types of mass destruction weapons which, according to the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (IHL), ought to cease to exist, whereas Russia is highly likely to possess them (chemical weapons were used in counter-terrorism operations and special combat operations). Over the past two decades, the Russian defence industry has developed, researched and introduced dozens of radio-electronic warfare systems capable of disrupting and completely immobilizing most of the forces in the areas of land, air and water. Russian technologies are effective at fighting aircrafts, cruise missiles, radars, conventional missiles and unmanned aircrafts. The latest implemented system is the Palantin system, which has been deployed in the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea. This system is able to disrupt the operation of AWACS at a distance of 250 km. Probably, it is also able to disrupt all radio, GPS and mobile systems as well as create the so-called apparent targets that mask the correct flight paths of projectiles fired from the Iskander launcher. Thus, combating and destroying Iskander missiles have become even more difficult. Moreover, the system also functions as a reconnaissance platform (Cranny-Evans 2019; Hodges et al. 2019). The deployment of Iskander and Krasucha (Gawęda 2015), as well as Palantin and aeronautical defence systems in the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea, including the S-300 and S-400, create strong Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) nodes with the simultaneous capability to strike by means of airborne and land forces within the depth of their practical impact range (A2/AD nodes). Another threat worth noting, particularly important for NATO Eastern Wall states, is Russia’s conduct of operations which cannot be immediately repelled by the Alliance due to their little scale. They take place in the form of quick, limited or offensive operations giving Russia the advantage of “facts made” and allowing it to join into the peace talks from that position. Figure 4 presents the summary of the estimated military capabilities, presented earlier in individual innovation trends, of the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces in Europe at the end of 2019. It illustrates the deployment of the Strategic Connected Commands, the army and corpses as well as “inaccessible areas” and potential targets to be attacked in the event of a conflict (air bases, airports and radar systems). It is worth noting that almost the entire area of Poland is an anti-access zone (A2/AD) (Gawęda 2018), which means that any allied defence support from the air, at least in the first phase of a conflict, will be very difficult. Operations of the Polish aviation and capability to command them also seem highly problematic. Unfortunately, that confirms the likelihood of limited offensive capabilities as described above. **Chart removed** Russia’s significant asset is also the fact that it constitutes a single entity in contrast to NATO whose forces, which guarantee the security of Central and Eastern European states, are distributed throughout the world (including the US and Canada). Thus, the distance gives Russia a big advantage. The USA, being the major pillar of NATO, have several sensitive security spots and, therefore, have to operate on many levels, not just watching over their own national and NATO’s interests, but also, in particular, European states neighbouring with Russia. Moreover, the distance and response time create problems, while Russia has the freedom to choose the time and space to provoke and attack. However, it is not the military threat that is the most dangerous for NATO. The main threat are the attempts made by Russia to bring individual member states into conflict with each other in order to break down NATO’s cohesion. Success of such attempts could create a space for Russia to undertake possible military actions. The tools provided by the supplemented Gerasimov doctrine entitle Russia to use all methods and measures of combat such as: pre-emptive attacks, impacts on civilians and administration centres (psychological and information operations), as well as the use of nuclear weapons. In other terms, it entitles Russia to wage a total war at a convenient time and place.