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Hamilton 21. PhD, Associate Professor of Eurasian Studies (Robert, “Taking Stock of US Military Assistance in Georgia,” Foreign Policy Research Institute,
A corollary to the problem of contractor-led assistance is the problem of “supply-side assistance.” This occurs when organizations involved in institutional capacity-building (ICB) in the U.S. “market” their services to partner nations, rather than assistance being contingent upon a demand signal from the partner nation, validated by the Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the U.S. Embassy. Most partner nations, unwilling to appear ungrateful, will gladly accept whatever assistance is offered, even if it doesn’t address an important national interest and even if the partner nation lacks the ability to absorb and sustain it. While such “marketing” allows ICB-providers to claim relevance and secure funding, for the [Security Cooperation Organization ] SCO, it represents a drain on its finite resources without the payoff of achieving important U.S. or partner nation interests.
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Gold 21, researcher at CNA (Zack, “A Better Way to Measure Returns on U.S. Security Cooperation Investments,” Defense One News,
Second, even if the returns were quantifiable, the real costs of security cooperation for the U.S. military are often unmeasurable. For example, past analysis indicates that the structure of the Navy’s cost accounting system makes it impossible to know the full, exact cost of any security cooperation deployment or activity. Additionally, there is opportunity cost in every decision about security cooperation. In Washington, the focus in recent years has been on realigning resources for great power competition. However, each geographic combatant command has dozens of partners. How, for example, can one accurately calculate the real and opportunity costs of conducting a bilateral exercise with Brazil as opposed to Colombia; or even with the UAE navy versus the UAE armed forces?
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Munson 13, senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer (Peter, “The Limits of Security Cooperation,” War on the Rocks,
SC does work to build capacity in certain, relatively elite units that perceive a real need for improvement and hard training. Likewise, it works to build interoperability between already-capable partner forces and U.S. and coalition militaries. SC in the right doses can be a good way of showing solidarity with allies against other regional threats. But SC [Security Cooperation] is not a panacea and must be applied with significantly more discernment than the usual some-is-good-more-is-better logic of U.S. military spending. Planners should go to great lengths to ensure that SC is seen as a tool for a specific purpose, not a reward to condition behaviors. SC-as-a-conditioning-tool becomes bribery with diminishing returns. If policymakers want a quid pro quo, they need to admit as much and use much more precisely targeted incentives: paying a fee for access or head-of-the-line transit privileges for example. This becomes a much more predictable business transaction than trying to use SC funds, winks, and nudges to get one’s way. Finally, in the land of perverse incentives, SC is often seen as a means to drive defense business to U.S. contractors. This is true. By creating arms races and supplying prestige weapons, however useless, to unstable areas of the world, they are creating U.S. jobs. But wouldn’t taxpayer money and efforts be better spent if officials more precisely targeted domestic concerns with taxpayer funds rather than hoping that efforts trickle down predictably from collaboration with corpulent and unsavory foreign generals? In the land of perverse incentives, SC funding is one of the most egregious—and in the post-9/11 era, many officials see SC as a critical tool of strategic positioning. However, the premises of SC must be reconsidered before the U.S. military squanders more resources on white elephant projects.
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Moulton 20, Congressman from Mass. (“Transcript: Rising to the Challenge: Regaining US Military Superiority During a Time of Uncertainty,” Hudson Institute, )
Rep. Seth Moulton: And part of the criteria is going to have to be cost. That’s just the budgetary environment that we’re facing. It’s very easy to sit in Congress and say, “I’m always going to spend more on national security, I’m always going to couch it in terms of supporting our troops or whatever. But the reality is, we, like every country in the world have finite resources. And what’s most important is that we make the tough decisions to spend those resources as wisely as we can to support our troops and to support our national security, that’s going to be tough.
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Reynolds 19, et al, Commandant, Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (Ronald, “The Management of Security Cooperation,” http://cebw.org/images/docs/Legislacao_Webinar/Greenbook_39_0.pdf)//BB
The above 1973 historical quote highlights the evolution of SC and underscores the extraordinary changes to SC issued in by the FY 2017 NDAA. The increasing scope of SC activities to include all DoD international programs and those FAA/AECA authorized programs administered by DSCA is testament to increased DoD policy responsibilities and the imperative to develop the SC workforce. Execution of foreign policy in terms of SC reaches from the Secretary of Defense through DSCA to the CCMD, and finally to the in-country SDO/DATT, DAO and SCO. Increasingly, almost every community within DoD and its respective leadership is recognizing the role they play in SC and the pivotal role SC plays in achieving U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives.
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1AC Jankowski '21 – Political Adviser and Head of the Political Section at the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO [Dominik, " NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge” in NATO in the Era of Unpeace: Defending Against Known Unknowns, pp 99-102]
While the suggestion that EDTs will enable a new class of weapons that will modify the strategic landscape remains to be realised, a number of unresolved security puzzles underlying the emergence of these new technology areas have implications for NATO. As one looks to the future, new adversaries and new science and technology will emerge. The extent to which these EDTs may exacerbate or mitigate the global security and governance challenges that Russia currently poses to NATO Allies will remain an integral question as policy-makers navigate the complex global environment.
NATO is a natural forum for deliberations about EDTs, especially in a transatlantic context. It also has vast experience, going back to the Cold War, in working towards standardisation and interoperability among Allies. However, the results achieved have been mixed, which underscores the challenges the Alliance now faces – there are not only 30 Allies with disparate levels of capability, but also a backdrop of rapid technological advances where some of its competitors and adversaries may hold significant advantages.
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Wolff 22, associate professor of cybersecurity policy at The Fletcher School at Tufts University (Josephine, “Why Russia Hasn't Launched Major Cyber Attacks Since the Invasion of Ukraine,” TIME Magazine,
It’s likely that the combined efforts of Microsoft, the U.S., and many other countries and companies to ramp up cyber defenses both in and outside of Ukraine has undoubtedly helped curb the damage caused by these efforts. But if Russia really had on hand a stockpile of previously undetected vulnerabilities and sophisticated malware designed to exploit them, these lines of defense simply would not be enough to prevent some significant damage and disruption. Updating critical infrastructure networks and systems is slow, expensive, complicated work and it’s impossible that every potential target has been hardened to the point where it is no longer vulnerable to Russian cyberattacks—unless those cyberattacks were never all that impressive to begin with.
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Schneier and Wheeler 21, * fellow at the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School and a fellow at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, **information security executive, social scientist in the area of international conflict, author, and poker player. She is CEO of information security consultancy Red Queen Dynamics, and a Cyber Project Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University‘s Kennedy School of Government. She is an International Security Fellow at New America leading a new international cybersecurity capacity building project with the Hewlett Foundation’s Cyber Initiative and a US/UK Fulbright Scholar in Cyber Security (Bruce and Tarah, “Hacked drones and busted logistics are the cyber future of warfare,” Brookings,
An updated GAO report from earlier this year found some improvements, but the basic problem remained: “DOD is still learning how to contract for cybersecurity in weapon systems, and selected programs we reviewed have struggled to incorporate systems’ cybersecurity requirements into contracts.” While DOD now appears aware of the issue of lack of cybersecurity requirements, they’re still not sure yet how to fix it, and in three of the five cases GAO reviewed, DOD simply chose to not include the requirements at all. Militaries around the world are now exploiting these vulnerabilities in weapons systems to carry out operations. When Israel in 2007 bombed a Syrian nuclear reactor, the raid was preceded by what is believed to have been a cyber attack on Syrian air defenses that resulted in radar screens showing no threat as bombers zoomed overhead. In 2018, a 29-country NATO exercise, Trident Juncture, that included cyberweapons was disrupted by Russian GPS jamming. NATO does try to test cyberweapons outside such exercises, but has limited scope in doing so. In May, Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO secretary-general, said that “NATO computer systems are facing almost daily cyberattacks.” The war of the future will not only be about explosions, but will also be about disabling the systems that make armies run. It’s not (solely) that bases will get blown up; it’s that some bases will lose power, data, and communications. It’s not that self-driving trucks will suddenly go mad and begin rolling over friendly soldiers; it’s that they’ll casually roll off roads or into water where they sit, rusting, and in need of repair. It’s not that targeting systems on guns will be retargeted to 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue; it’s that many of them could simply turn off and not turn back on again. So, how do we prepare for this next war? First, militaries need to introduce a little anarchy into their planning. Let’s have wargames where essential systems malfunction or are subverted—not all of the time, but randomly. To help combat siloed military thinking, include some civilians as well. Allow their ideas into the room when predicting potential enemy action. And militaries need to have well-developed backup plans, for when systems are subverted. In Joe Haldeman’s 1975 science-fiction novel The Forever War, he postulated a “stasis field” that forced his space marines to rely on nothing more than Roman military technologies, like javelins. We should be thinking in the same direction. NATO isn’t yet allowing civilians not employed by NATO or associated military contractors access to their training cyber ranges where vulnerabilities could be discovered and remediated before battlefield deployment. Last year, one of us (Tarah) was listening to a NATO briefing after the end of the 2020 Cyber Coalition exercises, and asked how she and other information security researchers could volunteer to test cyber ranges used to train its cyber incident response force. She was told that including civilians would be a “welcome thought experiment in the tabletop exercises,” but including them in reality wasn’t considered. There is a rich opportunity for improvement here, providing transparency into where improvements could be made. Second, it’s time to take cybersecurity seriously in military procurement, from weapons systems to logistics and communications contracts. In the three year span from the original 2018 GAO report to this year’s report, cybersecurity audit compliance went from 0% to 40% (those 2 of 5 programs mentioned earlier). We need to get much better. DOD requires that its contractors and suppliers follow the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification process; it should abide by the same standards. Making those standards both more rigorous and mandatory would be an obvious second step. Gone are the days when we can pretend that our technologies will work in the face of a military cyberattack. Securing our systems will make everything we buy more expensive—maybe a lot more expensive. But the alternative is no longer viable.
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1AC Lonergan and Moller 22, *Erica D. Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute and a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, **Sara B. Moller is a former Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College and will be joining the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University later this year.
The views expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government.
(Erica and Sara, “NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea.,” Politico, )
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Sanger 16, White House and national security correspondent, and a senior writer @ NYT (David, “As Russian Hackers Probe, NATO Has No Clear Cyberwar Strategy,” New York Times,
At United States Cyber Command, which has expanded rapidly since the United States carried out cyberattacks against Iran in 2010, Russia’s networks are a regular target of surveillance. By next year, Cyber Command will have more than 130 teams fully in operation around the world, integrated into Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units, in addition to teams that work alongside the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Md. It has built up a vast early warning network, placing tens of thousands of “implants” — sensors that can also be used to insert malware — into networks around the world. But NATO is only beginning to explore what it delicately calls “active defense,” and says it is not focused on offensive cyberweapons. The Russians have no such compunctions. But it is unclear what Russian hackers hope to achieve here in the Baltics, other than to make the point, as they did in 2007 when they brought Estonia to an electronic halt, that they can get into any system, anytime. “Whatever the Russians have in mind — mostly intimidation — it usually fails,” said Estonia’s president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who grew up in New Jersey before coming here to turn this small NATO country into a pioneer in introducing new web-based technology for governing a nation. The 2007 attacks backfired, he noted, because they drove Estonians far more solidly into the European and NATO camps. In Sweden and Finland, neutral nations in the Cold War, the politics are more complex. As the NATO exercise began in Finland last week, the Finnish foreign minister was in Moscow, meeting his Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov. The more Sweden and Finland turn to NATO, the more their networks, their news sites and their government ministries come under cyberattack. As Adm. John Richardson, the chief of United States naval operations, said at an event at the Council on Foreign Relations in May, “The fact is it’s a pretty hot war in the cyber domain going on right now.” A hot war, but a kind that suits Russia well: It is part of what military strategists call “gray zone” combat. For Mr. Putin, cyberespionage and cyberattacks keep NATO and its partners off balance. They are enormously difficult and expensive to defend against, and, at least for now, they have operated below the line that is likely to prompt a military or economic response. “It stays below the radar,” Martin Libicki of the RAND Corporation told a conference sponsored this month by the NATO cyber center here, officially known as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. For the Russians, Mr. Libicki said, cyberespionage and weaponry are part of a larger strategy of information warfare and a blitz of propaganda that makes sorting out fact from fiction — say, the causes of the Malaysia Airlines crash in Ukraine — all the more difficult. But the attacks also remind the smaller nations here of their vulnerability, even if Russia’s troops stay on their side of the border. So far, NATO has found few effective means of deterring attacks.
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Wiggers 21 (Kyle, “AI Weekly: AI model training costs on the rise, highlighting need for new solutions,” Venture Beat,
Like other large AI systems, MT-NLG raises questions about the accessibility of cutting-edge research approaches in machine learning. AI training costs dropped 100-fold between 2017 and 2019, but the totals still exceed the compute budgets of most startups, governments, nonprofits, and colleges. The inequity favors corporations and world superpowers with extraordinary access to resources at the expense of smaller players, cementing incumbent advantages. For example, in early October, researchers at Alibaba detailed M6-10T, a language model containing 10 trillion parameters (roughly 57 times the size of OpenAI’s GPT-3) trained across 512 Nvidia V100 GPUs for 10 days. The cheapest V100 plan available through Google Cloud Platform costs $2.28 per hour, which would equate to over $300,000 ($2.28 per hour multiplied by 24 hours over 10 days) — further than most research teams can stretch. Google subsidiary DeepMind is estimated to have spent $35 million training a system to learn the Chinese board game Go. And when the company’s researchers designed a model to play StarCraft II, they purposefully didn’t try multiple ways of architecting a key component because the training cost would have been too high. Similarly, OpenAI didn’t fix a mistake when it implemented GPT-3 because the cost of training made retraining the model infeasible. Paths forward It’s important to keep in mind that training costs can be inflated by factors other than an algorithm’s technical aspects. As Yoav Shoham, Stanford University professor emeritus and cofounder of AI startup AI21 Labs, recently told Synced, personal and organizational considerations often contribute to a model’s final price tag. “[A] researcher might be impatient to wait three weeks to do a thorough analysis and their organization may not be able or wish to pay for it,” he said. “So for the same task, one could spend $100,000 or $1 million.” Still, the increasing cost of training — and storing — algorithms like Huawei’s PanGu-Alpha, Naver’s HyperCLOVA, and the Beijing Academy of Artificial Intelligence’s Wu Dao 2.0 is giving rise to a cottage industry of startups aiming to “optimize” models without degrading accuracy. This week, former Intel exec Naveen Rao launched a new company, Mosaic ML, to offer tools, services, and training methods that improve AI system accuracy while lowering costs and saving time. Mosaic ML — which has raised $37 million in venture capital — competes with Codeplay Software, OctoML, Neural Magic, Deci, CoCoPie, and NeuReality in a market that’s expected to grow exponentially in the coming years. In a sliver of good news, the cost of basic machine learning operations has been falling over the past few years. A 2020 OpenAI survey found that since 2012, the amount of compute needed to train a model to the same performance on classifying images in a popular benchmark — ImageNet — has been decreasing by a factor of two every 16 months. Approaches like network pruning prior to training could lead to further gains. Research has shown that parameters pruned after training, a process that decreases the model size, could have been pruned before training without any effect on the network’s ability to learn. Called the “lottery ticket hypothesis,” the idea is that the initial values parameters in a model receive are crucial for determining whether they’re important. Parameters kept after pruning receive “lucky” initial values; the network can train successfully with only those parameters present. Network pruning is far from a solved science, however. New ways of pruning that work before or in early training will have to be developed, as most current methods apply only retroactively. And when parameters are pruned, the resulting structures aren’t always a fit for the training hardware (e.g., GPUs), meaning that pruning 90% of parameters won’t necessarily reduce the cost of training a model by 90%. Whether through pruning, novel AI accelerator hardware, or techniques like meta-learning and neural architecture search, the need for alternatives to unattainably large models is quickly becoming clear. A University of Massachusetts Amherst study showed that using 2019-era approaches, training an image recognition model with a 5% error rate would cost $100 billion and produce as much carbon emissions as New York City does in a month. As IEEE Spectrum’s editorial team wrote in a recent piece, “we must either adapt how we do deep learning or face a future of much slower progress.”
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Economist 20 (“The cost of training machines is becoming a problem: Increased complexity and competition are part of it,”
The fundamental assumption of the computing industry is that number-crunching gets cheaper all the time. Moore’s law, the industry’s master metronome, predicts that the number of components that can be squeezed onto a microchip of a given size—and thus, loosely, the amount of computational power available at a given cost—doubles every two years. For many comparatively simple ai applications, that means that the cost of training a computer is falling, says Christopher Manning, an associate director of the Institute for Human-Centered AI at Stanford University. But that is not true everywhere. A combination of ballooning complexity and competition means costs at the cutting edge are rising sharply.
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Margarita 1AC Konaev & Husanjot Chahal 21, Research Fellow & Research Analyst, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown University. "The Path of Least Resistance Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment" April. https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Path-of-Least-Resistance.pdf //pipk //BB
Finally, on the technical front, there are numerous challenges to ensuring that hardware and digital systems are interoperable and secure. Creating and maintaining common or interoperable information systems and databases is a massive undertaking considering that in each country, the data resides in repositories lacking standardized formatting or maintained by contractors that keep such information proprietary, especially for data on sensors and weapon systems. Shared information systems and databases are also particularly vulnerable to disruption, manipulation, and data theft in part because of discrepancies in countries’ network security protocols and capabilities.26 These problems are hard to resolve in their own right. But the aforementioned political factors, especially the push toward greater data sovereignty by some of the European allies, only exacerbate these technical challenges for collaborations on AI.
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Christie 22, senior research fellow @ Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Edward Hunter, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” European View, 2.1)
Artificial intelligence (AI) is the ability of machines to perform tasks that typically require human intelligence—for example, recognising patterns, learning from experience, drawing conclusions, making predictions or taking action—whether digitally or as the smart software behind autonomous physical systems (Reding and Eaton 2020, 14). The range of potential military applications is at least as vast as the range of tasks that require human cognition, for example analysing and classifying visual data, organising logistics, operating support vehicles, or tracking and engaging hostile targets (Christie 2021b, 84). States are racing to achieve superiority in the AI domain (Lin-Greenberg 2020). Furthermore, like other digital technologies, AI diffuses rapidly and cheaply across areas of human activity and across borders. Nevertheless, as with other technological transformations, states with greater resources and levels of effort, and better policies, will reap the benefits of technology adoption more rapidly than others. In an alliance context, matters pertaining to cooperation and interoperability take centre stage. The good news is that Europeans are not starting from scratch. European states that are members of NATO can rely on decades of experience with the Alliance’s mechanisms of consultation and collaboration. In addition, European states that are members of the EU can pursue collaborative activities through the European Defence Agency (EDA). Furthermore, EU funding is available through the European Defence Fund for defence research and capability-development activities. At NATO the key processes address, most notably, the areas of defence research, military transformation, capability development, military–technical standardisation, and defence planning and capability targets. For these areas of work, formal consultative mechanisms—committees in which each Ally has a voice—include the Science and Technology Board, the Military Committee, the Conference of National Armaments Directors, the NATO Standardisation Board, and the Defence Policy and Planning Committee. Each of these committees relies on support staffs and structures. Of particular interest when considering AI are the Science and Technology Organisation, which has several facilities and is led by the Office of the Chief Scientist at NATO Headquarters; and, Allied Command Transformation. The latter, including its Innovation Hub, plays a particularly central role in driving innovation and force transformation for the Alliance. In addition, two staff units created in 2019 are of particular importance, namely the Innovation Unit and the Data Policy Unit, both of which are within the Emerging Security Challenges Division of the NATO International Staff. The Innovation Unit provides thought leadership and initiatives to accelerate technology adoption, while the Data Policy Unit provides policy thought leadership on how to treat data as a strategic resource. The Innovation Unit designs new initiatives for the promotion and financing of defencerelated innovation. A notable achievement in this area was the creation of the NATO Innovation Fund (NATO 2021). In the EU context, the EDA plays a central role in several areas of work. Among other activities, the EDA supports defence research cooperation, defence standardisation and pooled procurement programmes, while also contributing to the EU’s Capability Development Plan and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (Fiott 2018, 287). Most of the EDA’s functions are broadly analogous to ones that exist at NATO. Of particular interest is the intention to create a new Defence Innovation Hub within the EDA, as announced in the EU’s November 2021 draft Strategic Compass (European External Action Service 2021, 23). Before proceeding, it is worth spelling out the extent to which European security is dependent on NATO and in particular on the US. Of the EU’s 27 member states, 21 are members of NATO. These countries account for about 93% of the population1 of the EU. Within NATO, those Allies that are also EU members only account for about 20% of total defence expenditure across the Alliance, while the US alone accounts for about 70% of the same total.2 Beyond these aggregate indicators, it is furthermore the case that the US is considerably ahead of the EU in terms of practical adoption of AI. For illustration, in 2020 US private-sector investment in AI was around $23.6 billion, but was only $2 billion in the EU, implying a ratio of 12 to 1 in favour of the US (Zhang et al. 2021, 96). Scientific output indicators offer a more nuanced picture. In 2019, the EU accounted for 16.4% of the world’s peer-reviewed AI publications, ahead of the US with 14.6%, while China occupied the top spot with 22.4% (Zhang et al. 2021, 20). On the other hand, if one measures research output in terms of publications on the Arxiv database, the US is ahead of the EU (Zhang et al. 2021, 33) by a ratio of almost two to one, which is nonetheless much less than the large gap in private investment mentioned above. That the EU performs similarly to the US in terms of scientific research, but far less well in terms of investment and commercialisation of new digital technologies, is an old problem which has proven very difficult to address, whether at national or EU level (Baroudy et al. 2020). In the following sections, I offer reflections on three challenge areas for European and Allied defence institutions: interoperability challenges, international security challenges and investment challenges. These three challenges are effectively interdependent. While interoperability is a permanent goal in an alliance context, be it NATO or the EU, it is particularly salient in cases of rapid technological change, such as with AI, as there is a need for a higher tempo across areas of activity. Heightened international security challenges likewise increase the need for urgency to ensure that Western nations do not fall behind potential adversaries. Investment, in turn, is the engine for rapid change, enabling the dynamic adoption of new technologies, relevant capability-development activities and other adaptations along the value chain of military activities. Overall, my central argument is that the confluence of rapid technological change and heightened international security challenges requires a higher pace of change and adaptation that can only succeed if serious investments are made on both sides of the Atlantic.
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Christie 22, senior research fellow @ Finnish Institute of International Affairs (Edward Hunter, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” European View, 2.1)
Much has already been achieved in terms of new structures, new initiatives and new policy developments to support the collaborative adoption of AI among NATO Allies and EU member states. In addition to pre-existing structures and mechanisms at both the NATO and EU levels, which have ensured that nations are not starting from scratch, national defence institutions are already able to refer to common policy commitments and to options, whether through NATO or the EDA, for research or capability-development activities. At the same time, ensuring a competitive edge in AI is a truly whole-of-government effort which requires considerable cross-over between the military and civilian realms. Large gaps remain between the US and the EU on certain key indicators. At the same time, the gaps pertaining to research are far smaller. To ensure greater European performance and relevance in AI in general, and its defence applications in particular, it seems desirable to focus on two strategic priorities: investment volumes, both public and private, which need to be significantly increased; and the full use of collaborative mechanisms involving the US. To that end, it would be beneficial for nations on both sides of the Atlantic to ensure that a clear and common vision is set out in forthcoming strategic documents, most notably the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s new Strategic Concept. This should include clear political commitments to increasing investment, both in general and in instruments for promoting collaborative innovation. There are opportunities for ‘more Europe’ through the EDA and the European Defence Fund. But while pursuing those avenues, European capitals should prioritise efforts that complement and enhance transatlantic approaches, in recognition of the reality that the US remains the indispensable ally for Europe’s security.
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Bergmann and Schmitt 21, *senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)
DOD officials can work around the State Department’s diplomats. In part due to restrictions from the Budget Control Act and with new programs at the DOD, Pentagon officials had more flexibility on security assistance programs than their State Department counterparts. The DOD had budgetary space to reallocate significant funds from the substantial Pentagon budget to respond to sudden emergencies or new crises, something that is virtually impossible for the State Department, making the DOD often the lead actor in a crisis.44 Regional combatant commands aggressively sought more resources from Congress to conduct their own security assistance programs, giving them added flexibility to work with partners in the field that their State Department counterparts lacked.45 A Government Accountability Office report found that 56 DOD security assistance programs do not require any involvement from the State Department.46
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Kelly 10, principal mathematician at the RAND Corporation (Terrence, et al, “Security Cooperation Organizations in the Country Team: Options for Success,” RAND,
Changes Are Needed to Improve Security Cooperation Effectiveness
The RAND research team found that organizations that currently manage U.S. security cooperation work relatively well in most countries where peacetime engagement is the norm. In particular, current practices and authorities suffice if security cooperation efforts can be planned in advance and there is no need for significant change during a given budget year. However, when unbudgeted requirements arise, whether they are for new programs or for significant changes to existing programs, the current system has trouble working within inflexible authorities and funding mechanisms and what is, at times, less-than-ideal interagency coordination. To help DoD and the State Department overcome these hurdles, the RAND team developed three options that could help improve SAO capabilities and capacity:
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DoD TRADEOFF DA › LINK › Link---General---Arms Sales
Wormuth 20, analyst at RAND, (Christine, “The Role of Allies and Partners in US Military Strategy and Operations,” RAND,
It has become almost a cliché to say that the United States is at a strategic inflection point, standing at a crossroads, or perhaps is even facing the end of the international world order as we know it. Whatever you call it, the period when the United States was the sole superpower is ending, and the country now faces significant challenges ahead—most prominently, competing successfully against a rising China while reducing the risks of war with Beijing. This is going to require the United States to change its national security approach—a challenging assignment under normal circumstances but one that will be even more difficult because national security institutions will almost inevitably face pressure to trim budgets and because many other important domestic problems will compete for policymakers’ time and attention. Allies and partners will remain critically important in this changing landscape, but the United States needs to adapt and strengthen its network of alliances and partnerships to better position itself for this era of great-power competition. The zero-based reviews of the regional combatant commands that Secretary of Defense Mark Esper commissioned a year ago and that are wrapping up at the end of this month will inform DoD’s effort to adjust its overseas footprint and activities. To meet future challenges successfully in an era of finite resources, the United States needs to shore up deterrence in both Europe and Asia while carefully reducing its military footprint in the Middle East without creating more insecurity in that region. The Indo-Pacific Reassurance Initiative concept, included in both the House and Senate versions of the yet-to-be-finalized Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, would be a valuable tool for DoD to shore up deterrence in Asia. 3 The United States also needs its allies and partners to do more for themselves and their own security, as well as more with the United States, in some cases, if all are to meet future challenges successfully. For instance, NATO allies need to continue to spend more on defense and make good on their pledges to do so by 2024, without the United States becoming myopically focused on percentage of gross domestic product as the sole metric of the health of the Alliance. U.S. allies and partners also need to continue working with the United States to share the burdens of providing peace and security around the world—for example, in the Middle East, where France and Australia participate in the maritime coalition interdicting weapon shipments to the Houthis, and in the South China Sea, where Australia and Japan have joined the United States to conduct freedom of navigation operations and hold naval exercises this year. Developing a comprehensive plan to adapt and revitalize the U.S. network of alliances and rebalance the U.S. military footprint overseas is both an essential component of a broader strategy for great-power competition and a homework assignment that will take years to complete. Palau’s recent offer to host U.S. military bases and airfields and the Philippines’ decision to freeze its withdrawal from the Visiting Forces Agreements are positive developments but there is much more work to be done. This is also an area in which DoD needs help from Congress. To compete successfully against China, deter Russian aggression, and recalibrate the U.S. military footprint in an era of finite resources, DoD will need to make difficult decisions about the kinds of systems in which it invests, how it is postured in key regions around the world, and what kinds of capabilities it is willing to sell (or not sell) to its allies and friends. Congress is involved in all these decisions, and without support from Congress for the many tough calls that lie ahead, it will be much harder for DoD to make the strategic adjustments that are so clearly needed.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › LINK › Link---General---US Leadership in Europe
Mearsheimer 3-1-2022, Professor of Political Science at U Chicago (John Mearsheimer, , and Isaac Chotiner, staff writer, March 1, 2022 (“Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine,” The New Yorker, )//BB
I’m talking about the raw-power potential of Russia—the amount of economic might it has. Military might is built on economic might. You need an economic foundation to build a really powerful military. To go out and conquer countries like Ukraine and the Baltic states and to re-create the former Soviet Union or re-create the former Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe would require a massive army, and that would require an economic foundation that contemporary Russia does not come close to having. There is no reason to fear that Russia is going to be a regional hegemony in Europe. Russia is not a serious threat to the United States. We do face a serious threat in the international system. We face a peer competitor. And that’s China. Our policy in Eastern Europe is undermining our ability to deal with the most dangerous threat that we face today. What do you think our policy should be in Ukraine right now, and what do you worry that we’re doing that’s going to undermine our China policy? We should be pivoting out of Europe to deal with China in a laser-like fashion, number one. And, number two, we should be working overtime to create friendly relations with the Russians. The Russians are part of our balancing coalition against China. If you live in a world where there are three great powers—China, Russia, and the United States—and one of those great powers, China, is a peer competitor, what you want to do if you’re the United States is have Russia on your side of the ledger. Instead, what we have done with our foolish policies in Eastern Europe is drive the Russians into the arms of the Chinese. This is a violation of Balance of Power Politics 101.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
DoD TRADEOFF DA › LINK › Link---General---NATO
Shifrinson 21, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor at Boston University's Pardee School of Global Studies. (Joshua, “The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” Quincy Report,
It is easy to get wrapped up in the rhetorical shifts and policy particulars of the moment, but the United States has consistently approached NATO through a combination of opportunism and geopolitics. Since the alliance’s creation in the late 1940s, the United States has attempted to strike a balance between its own contradictory impulses. Going forward, the question is whether this balance is sustainable in practice, if not in declared intent, given the emerging shape of international politics. It is not defeatist to be skeptical. Alliance commitments tend to change when new threats appear and strategic priorities shift. As America’s attention moves toward Asia, its longstanding attitudes toward European security should be reevaluated and accorded lower strategic priority. Western Europe, and much of Eastern Europe, are secure. No European hegemon is on the horizon. A balance of power exists and ought to be allowed to mature. This is good news. America’s postwar commitment to European security went on far longer and became far more expansive than policymakers envisioned in the 1940s and 1950s. Now the mission is accomplished. Western Europe, and much of Eastern Europe, are secure. No European hegemon is on the horizon. A balance of power exists and ought to be allowed to mature. Seventy-two years after NATO’s founding, America’s role in the alliance can change fundamentally with little risk to U.S. or European security — and much to gain for both.