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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Authors › Prodicts › Prodict---Kagan

Robert Kagan is correct about the threats to the LIO. He is brilliant at identifying and clearly explaining the chief forces driving human history,

O’Hanlon, PhD, 18

(Michael, senior fellow and director of research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy, Robert Kagan is right about the threat of the jungle growing back, 10/1/18 https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/10/01/robert-kagan-is-right-about-the-threat-of-the-jungle-growing-back/)

With Bob Kagan’s latest book—“The Jungle Grows Back: America and Our Imperiled World”—now the talk of the town (along with one or two other things!), it is time to say it: I am a Kaganite. To be sure, I have some differences with Bob, but there is no modern author who has taught me more, or changed the way I view the world more, than he has. Often, modern liberalism seems to place too much faith in institutions and in the inevitable progress of human civilization. Realism often errs in the other direction, and can be cynical and deterministic. Neo-conservatism places too much stock in American exceptionalism and tends towards overconfidence about the use of U.S. power. These three paradigms leave me wanting. To my mind, a Kaganite believes most or all of the following: The post-1945 order is indeed “the world America made” and still depends largely on American power to undergird it; For all its failings, and all of America’s many mistakes, that very successful world order has been an historical anomaly and it is now in significant peril; The order’s fragility is due to the facts that humans and their institutions remain deeply flawed. Left unchecked, the jungle will indeed grow back (or, as Bob writes: “The liberal world order is like a garden, ever under siege from the forces of history, the jungle whose vines and weeds constantly threaten to overwhelm it”); Americans are not necessarily smarter or more ethical than others. Indeed, over its history, America has been a “dangerous nation,” especially and at first in our own Western hemisphere. Americans come from mythical Mars in terms of their assertiveness and their willingness to use force. The narrative we often tell ourselves—that Americans would prefer isolationism and pacifism if the world would just leave us alone—is a myth; The geographic position of the United States, and the fact that it is a melting-pot nation deriving its identity and its purpose chiefly from a set of ideas and ideals, mean that it has a special ability—and thus a special responsibility—to undergird the global order, especially in terms of security and economics; Yet most Americans do not understand or accept these realities. They need to be constantly reminded and persuaded; Progress in world politics is not impossible, but it is always difficult and always fragile. It is also reversible; and Despite what is often stated as fact, America is not a status-quo power. It is a disruptive force in world politics, unapologetically promoting democracy and market-based economics as well as human rights. Nor should it apologize. I have my differences with Bob: His new book seems slightly too dark about the state of the world, and nuclear deterrence and memories of the world wars may help us keep the peace more than he thinks. New threats like climate change and massive urbanization around the world may deserve a more central place in his strategic framework. China may merit slightly more empathy as a rising power than he grants it (though only slightly more, I concede). But for identifying and clearly explaining the chief forces driving human history, Bob is brilliant. Few rival him, and few write as well either. At least at this juncture in U.S. and world history, please mark me down as a Kaganite!

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Authors › Prodicts › Prodict---Ikenberry

Biden loves Ikenberry

Hirsh 20 – journalist, 12/5/20. (Michael, “Why Liberal Internationalism Is Still Indispensable—and Fixable”, Foreign Policy, , accessed 7/7/22)//jd

Joe Biden will enter office as America’s 46th president next month in a spirit of confidence for the future—but also with an almost confessional sense of humility about the past. Because Biden and his top advisors seem acutely aware of just how badly they botched things the last time they were in power. One of their chief manifestos for change, as some of the incoming Bidenites have already privately conceded, will be G. John Ikenberry’s new book, A World Safe for Democracy. It is in some ways the crowning achievement of the Princeton University’s scholar’s decadeslong work explaining and defending the liberal international order. Ikenberry’s research traces the origins of the liberal internationalist project—the idea of building a community of nations based on democracy, cooperation, and the rule of law—going back 200 years. He chronicles it from its inception in the Age of Enlightenment and the American and French revolutions to its near-dissolution in the post-Cold War period under the neonationalist banner of its worst nemesis, President Donald Trump. Ikenberry, in an interview, said that his purpose was to “reframe the debate between nationalism and internationalism” and acknowledge that American policymakers are now dealing with a “liberal internationalism for wintertime rather than a Francis Fukuyama-style liberal internationalism for springtime” of two decades ago. (After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Fukuyama, the Stanford political philosopher, famously suggested that the triumph of democratic liberal capitalism over communism was so complete it could constitute a kind of “end of history.” This did not turn out to be the case.) Ikenberry says that it’s long past time for Biden and the Democrats to acknowledge that rampaging American hubris after the Cold War led to some of the worst mistakes ever made by liberal internationalists of the modern era: from a Pollyannaish Reaganite belief that neoliberalism (or capitalist free markets) would solve most problems to the equally self-deluding notion that democracy would achieve the same, especially in the Arab world (hence the disastrous Iraq War). Along the way, he writes in his book, nations and especially Washington lost the “shared narrative” of being a diverse but connected international community and became more of a U.S.-manufactured “public utility” dominated by the interests of multinational corporations. And the former concept is what it must return to, he says. “The book tries to provide the deeper theory of the liberal project that Biden is going to try to renew,” Ikenberry said. “I think it’s the first book that attempts to look at a whole tradition and cull it for usable knowledge we can apply today. And to make the point that the post-1989 years [after the fall of the Berlin Wall] were very much an anomaly. Two centuries on, it’s much more of a world-weary, contested run of democracies struggling to build order.” According to a senior member of the incoming Biden team, speaking on background, the new administration is paying a great deal of attention to Ikenberry’s ideas about readdressing the problems of the American middle class that were sacrificed to overzealous ideas of globalization.According to a senior member of the incoming Biden team, speaking on background, the new administration is paying a great deal of attention to Ikenberry’s ideas about readdressing the problems of the American middle class that were sacrificed to overzealous ideas of globalization. He also said that reinventing liberal internationalism along the lines Ikenberry recommends will be at the forefront of their efforts. The incoming Biden team has already conceded that both they and the Republicans, pre-Trump, lost their way. They erred badly because they “came to treat international economic issues as somehow separate from everything else,” as Biden’s nominee to be national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, wrote in the Atlantic in early 2019. Under both Democrats and Republicans, “U.S. internationalism became insufficiently attentive to the needs and aspirations of the American middle class.” In a remarkable admission, Sullivan, who served as then-Vice President Biden’s national security advisor, confessed: “During the Obama administration, when the national-security team sat around the Situation Room table, we rarely posed the question What will this mean for the middle class? Many other countries have made economic growth that expands the middle class a key organizing principle of their foreign policy.” The United States suffered a dangerous, society-splitting populist backlash because it did not address that same question, instead recklessly embracing global neoliberalism, and engaging in a confident flinging-open of all borders. The result was the loss of any sense that internationalism was also a way of protecting social and economic equity—the kind of compact that existed after World War II. Another result was a series of policies and trade deals that opened the door to the decimation of the American middle class, particularly to Chinese competition. Beyond that, successive administrations, starting with President Bill Clinton (but in which George W. Bush’s administration was particularly culpable in not punishing Chinese dumping and intellectual property theft under World Trade Organization rules) allowed China to flagrantly violate the rules of the game. The post-Cold War internationalists failed equally in thinking they could easily co-opt major illiberal states such as China and Russia fully into the global system, Ikenberry writes. They did not. The answer may be to make liberal internationalism less “offensive” and intrusive. Instead “it must define itself less as a grand vision of a global march toward an ideal society, and more as a pragmatic, reform-oriented approach to making liberal democracies safe.” China, the major rival to the United States, in particular could at least abide such an approach, Ikenberry argues, because even in its rise to global dominance it is still seeking to work within institutions like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the WTO. “In effect this strategy calls for making the liberal international order friendly to China and Russia by stepping back from the vision of a one-world liberal order,” he writes. “The emphasis instead would be on coexistence, building on the ‘defensive’ liberal principles of self-determination, tolerance, and ideological pluralism. Liberal internationalism would be made more conservative.” Or, some would say, more realist. There is little doubt about the direction the Bidenites will go, because all of them know—as Ikenberry argues—that in the end there really is no alternative. As Sullivan wrote last year: Trump’s neoisolationist approach “is dangerous, but he has surfaced questions that need clear answers. Those of us who believe that the United States can and should continue to occupy a global leadership role, even if a different role than in the past, have to explain why Trump is wrong—and provide a better strategy for the future. … “This requires domestic renewal above all, with energetic responses at home to the rise of tribalism and the hollowing-out of the middle class.” Ultimately, the challenges of modernity will require a reinvented liberal internationalism because, Ikenberry argues, there really is no other system available for dealing with “the problems of interdependence” other than through international cooperation. Climate change, pandemics like COVID-19, nuclear proliferation—all can only be solved through the established global system. “The pandemic is the poster child of that problem,” he said in the interview. But even here the United States must adopt more realist approaches to liberal internationalism. “The problem of liberal internationalism is about managing interdependence, not globalizing the world,” he said. Ikenberry concludes that liberal internationalism must recreate itself as a more restrained version of President Woodrow Wilson’s original vision of making the world “safe for democracy.” But this, again, is likely to be more a defensive than offensive approach. And at home, Ikenberry says, it means finding a brand-new way of making internationalism work for average Americans, especially with labor and environmental protections. The idea of “protectionism” can no longer simply be anathema. Indeed, Trumpist populism will not disappear under Biden. He has already advocated a $700 billion-plus “Buy American” plan and conditioned his return to the Trans-Pacific Partnership he once advocated on greater worker protections. His political platform sounds a not a little Trumpian as well, declaring he will “ensure the future is ‘made in all of America’ by all of America’s workers.” Biden will also continue a campaign begun by former President Barack Obama—but turned into a strident war by Trump—pressuring European allies to pay their fair share of the Atlantic alliance and NATO. In the end, Biden’s return to liberal internationalism will be real, but more demanding of other nations, as was Trump’s. Above all, his approach will focus first at home, on the pandemic and joblessness. “Looking over 200 years,” Ikenberry said, “one of the things I found and which the Biden administration intuitively understands is that in every period where a golden era of internationalism that lifted America to greater heights existed, it was tied to a progressive agenda.” Restoring this vision means going back to the nationalist origins of internationalism, how it arose out of the wars of the 19th century, the industrial revolution, and, in hands of proto-internationalists such as the British politician Richard Cobden, how it became a means to global hegemony and economic prosperity for its first great practitioner, Britain. Cobden spoke of free trade and peace as “one and the same cause,” and at the same time new forms of social internationalism also sprung up, pushing for equanimity for all social classes. The new concept of Adam Smith-conceived free trade presaged “the dissolution of empire, the ending of territorial annexation and the abandonment of aristocratic militarism,” as the British historian Anthony Howe argues. It presaged the modern world, in other words, culminating, ultimately, in the international community institutions proposed by Wilson and imposed and perfected by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. But institutions that were always meant to benefit all Americans. These changes in the international system are now so entrenched they cannot simply be undone. Yet they remain badly misdirected at present. Somewhere along the line the idea of internationalism became, rather than a means to achieve the end of national prosperity and peace, instead an end in itself. And this is where policymakers went wrong. In Washington, especially, the domestic impact of liberalization was consistently played down by both Republican and Democratic administrations. The post-Cold War globalization of free trade did indeed create, as the economists predicted, more global equality and prosperity overall. But in the past few decades far more of that equality and prosperity has accrued to developing nations than to the working classes of the champions of globalization like the United States and Europe, where growing inequality has engendered a long-term populist reaction, one that is unlikely to disappear any time soon. As a result, Ikenberry said, “I think we’re in for a kind of managed openness that allows us to protect environmental and labor standards, so as to shore up the democracies.” Even Ikenberry admits there is a long way to go in restoring faith in liberal internationalism in Washington, especially now that the problems of modernity “are like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. There are greater opportunities with technologies and innovation but also greater perils.” Cyber-misinformation, for one thing, that emerged out of the very technology that was supposed to bring us closer together: the internet. “Functioning liberal democracy requires some factual agreed-upon knowledge base,” said Ikenberry, and yet Trump showed that he could exploit the fact that there was no longer such an agreed-upon base—no direction home to broadly established economic and social truths. In the end, Ikenberry calls for a new “Wilsonian moment” but he appears to think it will be something very different from what Wilson himself conceived a century ago. In the interview Ikenberry conceded: “Some will say what we are introducing is a kind of illiberal internationalism instead.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Authors › Prodicts › Prodict---Horowitz

Horowitz is right

Weeks Professor of Political Science and H. Douglas Weaver Chair in Diplomacy and International Relations 17

(Jessica L. P. Weeks, In Why Leaders Fight, Michael Horowitz, Allan Stam, and Cali Ellis approach a fascinating question: To what extent do leaders’ personal experiences and backgrounds influence their decisions about military conflict?, International Politics Reviews volume 5, pages 39–41)

Why Leaders Fight is a monumental contribution to this endeavor. The book introduces the LEAD dataset, a major data collection effort that records the characteristics and life experiences of leaders around the world during 1875–2004. Using these data, the authors study how leaders’ characteristics affect their likelihood of initiating an international military dispute. The book gives scholars and students not only ideas about how the attributes of leaders could matter in international relations, but provides a dataset that scholars can use to make their new own discoveries. The applications of the dataset are virtually unlimited and will allow future scholars to study how leaders’ attributes affect any number of international and domestic policies and outcomes.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Authors › Prodicts › Prodict---Gohz

Eugene Gohz meticulously analyzes the situation – prefer the word of multiple Middle East and Foreign Policy scholars.

Responsible Statecraft (RS) 22, online magazine of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft; publishes outside contributors and reporters as well as staff analysis, opinion, and news to promote a positive, non-partisan vision of U.S. foreign policy and critique the ideologies and interests that have mired the United States in counterproductive and endless wars and made the world less secure; 6-24-2021, ("Symposium: Time to bring all U.S. troops home from the Middle East," https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/06/24/symposium-time-to-bring-all-u-s-troops-home-from-the-middle-east/, kav)

Scholars weigh in on Eugene Gholz’s new paper, which argues that the countries in the region can keep their own powers and rivalries in check.

Is the United States truly ready to get its military forces out of the Middle East? Should it? Considering there are upwards of 60,000 troops in the region today, many of them stationed on bases in Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, this is a question ripe for debate.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Authors › Prodicts › Prodict---Brands

US needs to take policy action against the rising China threat

Dollar & Hass 21 [David Dollar and Ryan Hass, Dollar was the U.S. Treasury’s economic and financial emissary to China. Hass advised President Obama and senior White House officials on all aspects of U.S. policy toward China., 1/25/21, "Getting the China challenge right", Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/research/getting-the-china-challenge-right/// KS]

Rather than aiming at unrealistic targets like containment, decoupling, or regime change that are incapable of solidifying domestic U.S. support or attracting international buy-in, the United States needs to craft a strategy that can be the basis for broad and lasting support. Recent polling suggests that elements of such an approach would include strengthening American economic competitiveness, protecting the credibility of American security commitments to allies and partners, and defending U.S. values. Setting priorities along these lines would have a disciplining effect on the policy process. A coherent policy process would identify realistic objectives and form plans to achieve them. This process could involve both defensive and offensive efforts, for example, by working with allies to limit the adoption of Huawei into 5G systems around the world, as well as coordinating international pressure on China to adopt disciplines on state subsidies. It also could involve joint efforts with European allies to nudge China toward tightening pressure on Iran to return to the nuclear negotiating table, and coordination with Japan and South Korea to push China to increase the cost for North Korea of continuing to pursue its nuclear and missile programs. At its core, though, a coherent policy process would be grounded in a focus on America’s main challenges and opportunities in the world, and an awareness of how China relates to them. Great power competition would be viewed as a means to an end and not as an end in itself. There will be areas where America’s goals will be in direct tension with those of China, such as on Taiwan and the sustainment of America’s alliance network in Asia. There will also be areas where the U.S. and China will have overlapping interests, for example on promoting sustainable global economic growth and curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A sober policy process would be able to discriminate between the two areas in order to manage friction while taking advantage of opportunities to enlist China’s contributions to challenges the U.S. cannot solve on its own.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Authors › Prodicts › Prodict---Beckley

Beckley’s correct—America remains the hegemon now but tech may change LIO

Layne et al 2020 [Christopher Layne, Emma Ashford, Mauro Gilli, Joshua Shifrinson, Michael Beckley, "Roundtable 11-11 on Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower", H-Diplo | ISSF, https://issforum.org/roundtables/11-11-unrivaled// KS]

Gilli also points to another unknown about the future: the possibility of a “technological revolution that changes the global source of wealth and power.” Technological change—what Gilli calls the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”—that is “unfolding in front of our eyes might make current sources of wealth and power obsolete. So if this new industrial-technological revolution does indeed materialize, much will depend on whether it reinforces America’s current economic and military advantages, or, rather, creates opportunities for a rival with a different set of capabilities and institutions more suited to benefit from this revolution.” Gilli thus cautions that although Beckley’s forecast of continuing American unipolar power may be correct, there is always the chance that discontinuous change could lead to a different outcome. In the final analysis, Gilli concludes, “to predict whether the U.S. will maintain its edge in world politics, we thus need to understand whether a technological revolution is indeed taking place, and who will gain and who will lose from it.” Shifrinson joins Ashford and Gilli in saluting Beckley’s contribution to the debates on how best to measure power in international politics, and on the grand strategic implications of China’s rise. Unrivaled, he notes, “joins a series of studies pushing back on the perception that the United States is soon to fall into the dustbin of history.” Moreover, Shifrinson comments, if Beckley is right, his attempt to construct a new framework for measuring power may force security studies scholars and diplomatic historians to re-evaluate great power politics because “much of what we think we know of the link between power and international outcomes could now be suspect.” Indeed, Shifrinson suggests, if Beckley is correct, a “reformation” of the discipline of IR/security studies would be in order. Shifrinson also identifies some flaws in Beckley’s argument, one of which is that Beckley does not provide much guidance for identifying which states qualify for great power status, and which do not.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › AT: Retrenchment Good

Defending Europe from Russia maintains world order

Parker Ceri Parker is an Associate Director, Commissioning Editor of the Agenda at the World Economic Forum. 17

( Ceri Parker 17 Defend the liberal international order’ – top quotes from Joe Biden’s Davos swansong , quoting Biden//KS}

We need to “fight back against the dangerous proposition that facts no longer matter. That the truth holds no inherent power in a world where propagandists, demagogues, and extremists carry sway.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › AT: Retrenchment Good

Europe doesn’t have a nuclear deterrent to fend off Russia.

Meijer and Brooks 21, professor of government at Dartmouth College; CNRS Research Fellow at Sciences Po and Center for International Studies, director of the European Initiative for Security Studies, 4-20-2021, (Hugo, Stephen, "Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back," International Security, 45 (4), pp. 7–43, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00405, kav)

Nuclear deterrence. As a legacy of the Cold War, Russia maintains a formidable arsenal of approximately 6,400 nuclear weapons, which vastly overshadows the combined arsenals of France and the UK (290 and 195 nuclear weapons, respectively).159 In addition to Russia's numerical preponderance, it matters greatly that this force is wielded by a single actor, not a collective one. In contrast, strategic divergences and technological constraints are highly likely to hamper the emergence of a European nuclear deterrent either through the Europeanization of the French and/or British nuclear deterrents and/or through a German nuclear deterrent.

As Ulrich Kühn and Tristan Volpe explain, Germany would have to surmount major technical, political, and security obstacles before acquiring a nuclear deterrent.160 Not only would it face the domestic and international pressures fueled by reviving fears of German hegemony, but it would have “to either repurpose its nuclear energy infrastructure for weapons production or sprint to the bomb from new military facilities,”161 a prospect made even more unlikely given that Germany plans to shut down its entire nuclear fleet by 2022.162 Accordingly, “Germany does not have the required wherewithal for even a rudimentary program.”163

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › 2AC---Russia Fill-In

If the US collapses, Russia fill-in is worse.

Shadi Hamid 22, contributing writer at The Atlantic, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and assistant research professor of Islamic studies at Fuller Seminary, 3/6/2022, "There Are Many Things Worse Than American Power," Atlantic, , kav

If there was any doubt before, the answer is now clear. Vladimir Putin is showing that a world without American power—or, for that matter, Western power—is not a better world.

For the generation of Americans who came of age in the shadow of the September 11 attacks, the world America had made came with a question mark. Their formative experiences were the ones in which American power had been used for ill, in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the Middle East more broadly, and for much longer, the United States had built a security architecture around some of the world’s most repressive regimes. For those on the left, this was nothing new, and it was all too obvious. I spent my college years reading Noam Chomsky and other leftist critics of U.S. foreign policy, and they weren’t entirely wrong. On balance, the U.S. may have been a force for good, but in particular regions and at particular times, it had been anything but.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › 2AC---US Involvement Key

The U.S. has the capacity to deter Russian aggression

Gilliam and Van Wie 22 [Gilliam, John B., Colonel John Gilliam is a chief of staff of the Army senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. In this role, Col. Gilliam facilitates a greater appreciation for the role of land power as well as Army missions and priorities at one of the premier think thanks in the United States., Van Wie, Ryan C., Major Ryan Van Wie serves as an Instructor of International Affairs in the Department of Social Sciences. Ryan commissioned as an Infantry Officer in 2010. He received his Bachelor of Science in International Relations from West Point and a Master of Public Policy from University of Michigan’s Ford School of Public Policy., “Feasible US steps to strengthen NATO deterrence in the Baltics and Poland”, Brookings,

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a renewed assessment of efforts by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deter Russia from taking military action on NATO’s eastern flank has become particularly salient. In the coming weeks, NATO leadership will meet to discuss what longer term force posture adjustments are required to create such a deterrent.[1] This paper proposes several modest policy recommendations which will help inform the discussion and ultimately strengthen NATO’s conventional deterrence posture. Contemporary academic research on conventional deterrence highlights clear gaps in the deterrence capacity of the United States and NATO, despite their concerted efforts to strengthen conventional military capability since Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. For example, studies indicate that the rotational military forces established by the United States’ Operation Atlantic Resolve and NATO’s enhanced Forward Presence, still lack the requisite conventional capability to prevent a Russian fait accompli in the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. However, these studies lack a well-defined formula for what constitutes adequate capability and say little about what adjustments the United States and NATO must make to strengthen NATO’s deterrence posture in the Baltics and Poland. To help clarify capability requirements in the region, we reviewed conventional deterrence theories and models from the Cold War. Though long-standing, this research provides a clearer picture of the ideal defensive force posture and adequate force ratios needed to improve deterrence, compared to recent policy analyses. Focusing on land-based operations, we then applied these correlation of forces models to analyze the current balance of conventional ground forces in the Baltics. Through comparing the relative combat power of NATO’s forces in the Baltics with Russia’s forces in its Western Military District and Kaliningrad oblast, we confirmed that the NATO capability gaps identified in previous studies remain large. We also found that potential NATO high readiness reinforcements would be incapable of closing the gaps for at least a month in a crisis scenario. These capability shortcomings clearly hinder the United States’ and NATO’s ongoing efforts to conventionally deter Russian aggression in the Baltics or to decisively respond in a crisis. Accounting for U.S. military budget limitations, force structure constraints, and competing global requirements, the Department of Defense (DOD) could make several policy adjustments to strengthen U.S. capabilities and rapidly reinforce security in the Baltics. Specifically, the U.S. military could increase U.S. armored forces in Central Europe, enhance the operational readiness of U.S. ground forces, and support upgrades to NATO mobility systems and infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe. These modest recommendations, outlined in this paper, represent feasible options to strengthen NATO’s deterrence against an increasingly aggressive Russia. The ongoing invasion of Ukraine and attempts to coerce NATO members into making concessions underscore the compelling and urgent need to address critical U.S. and NATO capability deficits.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › 2AC---US Involvement Key

U.S. foreign involvement is key to preventing Russian attack

Geller 5/16/22 [Geller, Patty-Jane, Patty-Jane Geller is a senior policy analyst for nuclear deterrence and missile defense in The Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense. She earned a Bachelor of Arts degree in Government and a minor degree in physics at Georgetown University, and received a Master of Arts degree in Military Operational Art and Science from the Air Command and Staff College., “Traditional Victory Over Russia Is Unlikely. Instead, Expect To Manage Competition for the Long Haul”, The Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/traditional-victory-over-russia-unlikely-instead-expect-manage-competition-the]//AA

KEY TAKEAWAYS After many years of U.S. hegemony following the Cold War, Russia has gained—and is exercising—the capabilities to threaten the United States and its interests. In addition to modernizing and numerically increasing existing nuclear capabilities, Russia is building entirely new nuclear capabilities. Managing competition with Russia will require significant investment and effort that the American public and the current administration may be reluctant to make. After many years of U.S. hegemony following the Cold War, Russia has gained—and is exercising—the capabilities to threaten the United States and its interests abroad. Russia invests in military capabilities to confront the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other neighboring states. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea demonstrated its use of hybrid warfare to accomplish its aims and project power across the Black Sea. Moscow is propping up Syrian dictator Bashir al-Assad, defending Iran at the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and amassing military forces in the Arctic. It has authorized multiple cyber-attacks against the United States and continues to target vulnerabilities in the U.S. defense industrial base. It uses political warfare to sow discord in the United States, from interfering in U.S. elections to spreading propaganda about the “dangers” of U.S missile defense. Perhaps most significantly, Russia invests billions of dollars into adding to its nuclear arsenal and developing new nuclear capabilities, disrupting the nuclear balance with the United States. Consequently, the current and previous administrations have framed U.S.-Russia relations as a competition, which involves two states striving for global power and opposing interests. Such a competition implies that actors in opposition to each other are pursuing a victory. But what does it look like to win in a competition with Russia? Based on the U.S. history of war and conflict, Americans typically view winning a competition as a definitive change in status quo, or strategic realignment, that works in the U.S. favor. A model American victory might look like the outcome of the Revolutionary War, which resulted in the independent American state, or Japan’s transformation to a democratic ally after it lost World War II. It once appeared that the United States was making progress toward this model of strategic realignment for Russia after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union fell. Much of U.S.-Russian policy through the 2000’s was rooted in the idea that with a little more nudging, Russia would complete the transition from unfriendly autocracy to democratic member of the rules-based international order. Such policy is evidenced by President George W. Bush’s push for a new era of improved relations with Russia, and President Barack Obama’s attempted Russian “reset.” While the Russian threat has worsened in recent years, one school of thought argues that the United States can still achieve this strategic realignment once Russia achieves full internal political change. Activists like Vladimir Kara-Murza argue such change could occur in the near term. Another camp argues that the United States can end the competition if it stops antagonizing Russia. This school of thought accepts the premise that U.S. capabilities like missile defense provoke Russia to build up its forces and asserts that unilateral concessions will convince Russia to draw back its forces as well. Others go further to argue that the Russian threat is overblown and Russia is too weak to pose a serious threat, so there is no competition to “win;” instead, the United States should redirect unneeded resources away from U.S.-Russia competition. This paper argues that Russia’s fundamental nature and interests will continue to threaten the United States for the foreseeable future and therefore a path to a traditional concept of victory is unlikely. It rejects the idea that Russia will achieve full internal change and become friendly to the United States due to its longstanding nature as an aggressive, paranoid, power-seeking, and autocratic state, no matter its leader. Based on this assessment, concessions or attempts at cooperation with Russia will fail. Indeed, history illustrates that Russia interprets these as weaknesses and exploits the opportunity to advance its position. As a result, the closest the United States can come to “winning” is successfully managing competition with Russia to mitigate the threat it poses and keep Russian aggression at bay. To manage competition, the United States must strengthen its capabilities and posture required to deter Russian mischief in all arenas of competition as well as avoid making concessions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › 2AC---US Involvement Key

U.S. involvement is key to deter and prevent nuclear escalation

Wright 5/1/22 [Wright, Robin, Robin Wright, a contributing writer and columnist, has written for The New Yorker since 1988. Her first piece on Iran won the National Magazine Award for best reporting. A former correspondent for the Washington Post, CBS News, the Los Angeles Times, and the Sunday Times of London, she has reported from more than a hundred and forty countries. She is also a distinguished fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. She has been a fellow at the Brookings Institution and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as well as at Yale, Duke, Dartmouth, and the University of California, Santa Barbara., “Ukraine Is Now America’s War, Too”, New Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/ukraine-is-now-americas-war-too]//AA

America has crossed a threshold in Ukraine, both in its short-term involvement and its long-term intent. The U.S. was initially cautious during the fall and winter as Russia, a nuclear country with veto power at the U.N. Security Council, amassed more than a hundred and fifty thousand troops along the Ukrainian border. It didn’t want to poke the Russian bear—or provoke Vladimir Putin personally. Two days after long convoys of Russian tanks rolled across the border, on February 24th, the U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, still claimed that America’s goal—backed by hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid—was simply to stand behind the Ukrainian people. The White House sanctioned Russia—initially targeting a few banks, oligarchs, political élites, government-owned enterprises, and Putin’s own family—to pressure the Russian leader to put his troops back in their box, without resorting to military intervention. “Direct confrontation between NATO and Russia is World War Three, something we must strive to prevent,” President Joe Biden said, in early March. Yet in just over nine weeks, the conflict has rapidly evolved into a full proxy war with Russia, with global ramifications. U.S. officials now frame America’s role in more ambitious terms that border on aggressive. The goal—backed by tens of billions of dollars in aid—is to “weaken” Russia and insure a sovereign Ukraine outlasts Putin. “Throughout our history, we’ve learned that when dictators do not pay the price for their aggression, they cause more chaos and engage in more aggression,” the President told reporters on Thursday. “They keep moving. And the costs, the threats to America and the world, keep rising.” Having basically run out of appropriated funds, Biden has asked Congress for thirty-three billion dollars—for new military, economic, and humanitarian support—in the latest of several packages for Ukraine. “The cost of this fight is not cheap,” the President acknowledged. (As Politico noted, the new aid is about half the size of the entire Russian defense budget—and also more than half of the U.S. State Department’s annual budget. Over the next five months, U.S. aid to Ukraine will average more than two hundred million dollars a day.) The investment, Biden said, was a small price “to lessen the risk of future conflicts” with Russia. For Putin, the war in Ukraine always seemed to be, at least in part, a proxy fight with NATO and its U.S. leadership. Ahead of his invasion, he publicly expressed deep paranoia about the military alliance and its further expansion into countries once aligned with the Soviet Union. He also brokered a five-thousand-word agreement with the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, to form a de-facto alliance of authoritarian regimes. They jointly opposed NATO enlargement. Biden tried to resist that framing. At the start of the invasion, the U.S. invoked the principles of sovereignty, a democratically elected government, and territorial integrity. During the past week, however, Ukraine’s existential crisis has increasingly appeared to be America’s war, too. On April 24th, Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin took a train with blacked-out windows into Kyiv to meet President Volodymyr Zelensky and symbolically reinforce American support. The stealthy trip reflected the increasingly ambitious U.S. goal. “We want to see Russia weakened to the degree it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,” Austin told reporters, near the border in Poland. Blinken said, “We don’t know how the rest of this war will unfold, but we do know that a sovereign, independent Ukraine will be around a lot longer than Vladimir Putin is on the scene.” On Tuesday, Austin assembled defense leaders from more than forty countries—well beyond the NATO framework—at Ramstein, a U.S. base in southwest Germany, to coördinate support for Ukraine. Austin, a retired general involved in both the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, announced the formation of a new coalition of “nations of good will” that will meet monthly to “intensify” an international campaign to win “today’s fight and the struggles to come.” In appealing for more aid, Biden said, “We have to do our part as well, leading the alliance.” The shift may have been inevitable, given the barbarism of the war, which has claimed thousands of civilian lives, and Russia’s challenge to the conventions and obligations of modern statecraft. “If this is left to stand, if there is no answer to this aggression, if Russia gets away with this cost-free, then so goes the so-called international order,” General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said on CNN. “And if that happens, then we’re heading into an era of seriously increased instability.” On Friday, the Pentagon press secretary John Kirby choked up at a briefing as he discussed Putin’s “depravity.” The U.S. has become more deeply engaged for at least four reasons. Diplomacy between Ukraine and Russia has stalled amid revelations of atrocities committed by Russian troops, notably the execution of civilians in Bucha. Moscow’s early participation in peace talks never seemed credible anyway; Putin is too greedy and historically ambitious. Russia has staked claims to southern Crimea, the eastern Donbas region, and the lands between them along the strategic Black Sea. Putin is not yet ready—or, perhaps, not yet under enough pressure—to negotiate seriously. The U.S. has also been emboldened by the stunning underperformance of the Russian military, the largest in Europe. U.S. intelligence had originally feared that Kyiv could fall within seventy-two hours. But Ukraine held the capital, and Russian forces retreated. Washington is no longer hesitant to poke the bear. Yet time still “is not on Ukraine’s side,” Milley reportedly told the coalition of defense leaders at Ramstein. His concern was reinforced on Thursday, when Russia struck cities across Ukraine just an hour after the U.N. Secretary-General, António Guterres, speaking at a press conference in Kyiv, described the country as the “epicenter of unbearable heartache and pain.” Guterres’s trip to Kyiv followed talks with Putin in Moscow. The U.N. leader, who toured Bucha, took a clear side in the conflict. “The war is an absurdity in the twenty-first century,” he said. “The war is evil.” The growing U.S. involvement also reflects broader fears—long held among countries on or near Russia’s borders —that Putin’s aggression will not stop with Ukraine. On April 22nd, a senior Russian military commander announced that Moscow sought “full control” over eastern and southern Ukraine in part to open the way to neighboring Moldova, a tiny, landlocked country that is supportive of the European Union but dependent on Russian energy. In congressional testimony on Thursday, Blinken cited the urgent need “to seize the strategic opportunities” and address “the risks that are presented by Russia’s overreach as countries reconsider their policies, their priorities, their relationships.” Moscow’s flagrant rhetoric about nuclear weapons has also increasingly alarmed U.S. officials. “Nobody wants to see this war escalate any more than it already has,” Kirby said, on April 27th. “Certainly nobody wants to see—or nobody should want to see—it escalate into the nuclear realm.” The Biden Administration has public support for its expanding role—for now. Despite war weariness after two decades in Afghanistan and Iraq, roughly two-thirds of Americans believe that the U.S. has a “moral responsibility” to do more to stop the killing of civilians in Ukraine, according to a Quinnipiac poll published in mid-April. In a country polarized on most other issues, a majority from both parties agreed. Three-quarters of those polled also fear that the worst is yet to come. And more than eighty per cent believe that Vladimir Putin is a war criminal. Yet the public’s moral outrage “stops at the water’s edge when it comes to committing the U.S. military to the fight,” Tim Malloy, a Quinnipiac University analyst, noted. Only nineteen per cent of Americans believe the U.S. should do more even if it risks getting into a direct war with Russia. That conviction may soon be tested. The U.S. role has evolved—from a reactive response to Russia’s unjustified war to a proactive assertion of American leadership and leverage. Perhaps in desperation, Putin’s rhetoric has become bolder. On Wednesday, he warned that he could launch a “lightning-fast” response to any nation that intervened to thwart or threaten Russia. “We have all the instruments for this, such that no one can boast of,” he said, in an apparent reference to Moscow’s nuclear and missile arsenal. “We’re going to use them if we have to.” The war could now play out in many disparate ways. Each carries its own dangers—for the U.S. as well as Ukraine.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › 2AC---US Heg k2 Deterrence

U.S. troops in Europe deter Russian aggression

Kaufman and Starr 5/20/22 [Kaufman, Ellie, Ellie Kaufman is a Producer in CNN's Washington, DC bureau covering the Defense Department and the US military as a part of CNN's National Security team. She graduated from the College of William and Mary in 2013 with a B.A. in English Literature and Hispanic Studies., Starr, Barbara, Barbara Starr is CNN's Pentagon correspondent, based in Washington, D.C. and appears regularly on The Situation Room with Wolf Blitzer, New Day and other shows across the network regularly breaking big news and delivering exclusive coverage on the U.S. military and political situation on a global scale. Starr graduated from California State at Northridge with a bachelor of arts degree in journalism., “US likely to keep 100,000 troops in Europe for foreseeable future in face of Russian threat, US officials say”, CNN Politics,

(CNN) — The US is expected to keep 100,000 troops stationed in Europe for the foreseeable future unless Russia escalates and threatens Sweden and Finland or NATO members, according to multiple US officials. The numbers could temporarily increase if NATO carries out more military exercises in the region, and the US could add additional bases in Europe if the security environment changes, the officials added. The plans are being considered following Thursday's meeting of NATO's military chiefs in Brussels, the officials said. The military chiefs are making the recommendations to a NATO defense ministers meeting planned for June, and NATO leaders including President Joe Biden will meet in Madrid at the end of that month. The US increased its overall force posture in Europe from about 60,000 troops before Russia's invasion of Ukraine to about 100,000 now, adding troops and military assets to countries along Europe's eastern flank to support NATO and to further deter Russia. The US contributed thousands of troops to NATO's Response Force, which was activated for the first time in NATO's history earlier this spring. These recommendations are consistent with what top military leaders have been telling US lawmakers. In April, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley told members of Congress he endorsed creating permanent US bases in Eastern Europe as a response to Russia's attack on Ukraine. But Milley said he believed US troops at those bases could be rotational. He said he didn't think the US needed to permanently station troops at them to create an effective deterrent. US intel skeptical Putin will be swayed by Russian public opinion over war in Ukraine NATO's military chiefs, including Gen. Tod Wolters who serves as both Commander of US European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, participated in the meetings in Brussels as the war in Ukraine grinds on, nearing the three-month mark since Russia's invasion began. The US added thousands of troops in Europe on temporary rotations, deployed additional military assets to the Eastern flank to support eight new NATO battlegroups, and sent billions of dollars in military assistance to Ukraine, alongside NATO allies. However, the Pentagon recently announced replacement troops for those temporary rotations, signaling the increased US presence will be maintained for some time to come. The Pentagon announced that approximately 10,500 US Army personnel would be deployed to Europe in the coming weeks and months to replace forces that are already there on May 13. As well as the larger NATO meetings Gen. Milley also met military leaders from France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom as well as Finland and Sweden this week, according to readouts from Joint Staff Spokesperson Col. Dave Butler. As Sweden and Finland are poised to join NATO, US officials don't believe additional forces will be needed unless Russia suddenly poses a threat to the two Nordic countries. If Russia were to move weaponry or make serious threats to move weaponry closer, the force posture might have to be further reassessed, the officials said. Sweden and Finland have expressed concerns about their security in the interim period after they submitted their applications for membership, asking certain NATO allies for additional security support while the process plays out. Certain nations have agreed to provide additional support to the two countries, Admiral Robert Bauer, Chair of the NATO Military Committee, said Thursday. Most NATO members have welcomed Finland and Sweden's application to join but Turkey has raised objections. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin met with Swedish Defense Minister Peter Hultqvist at the Pentagon Wednesday, a day before the NATO military chiefs meeting in Brussels. "The secretary made it very clear that we have a comfort level with their military going back many years, and that at a staff level we'll be happy to have a discussion with them about security and capability needs that they might have to help assure them and to deter Russia should that be necessary," a senior defense official said of the meeting between Austin and Hultqvist Wednesday. The official said there would be continued staff level discussions about what the needs of Sweden's might be and how the US could help fulfill them, and that the US has also engaged Finland in similar staff level discussions. The request for additional security needs might not result in additional US troops, the official added. As an example, the US might engage in additional military exercises with Sweden or Finland, according to the official. A more permanent force posture change NATO and US leaders have been hinting at a more permanent change in European force posture in response to Russia's ongoing invasion with a possible announcement at the NATO summit in Madrid next month. It could solidify the 100,000 troop level for some time to come. In April, Austin told US lawmakers that the war in Ukraine and Putin's actions will change the US military footprint in Europe. "This unlawful and unprovoked aggression by Putin has the effect of changing the security architecture in the region for some time to come," Austin said. "We do expect that it will change our footprint. In terms of how much it changes the US contribution, that's left to be seen." Secretary of State Antony Blinken and NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg both hinted at an announcement about a more permanent change in NATO's military posture, specifically in Eastern Europe at the conclusion of the NATO informal foreign ministers ministerial in Berlin, Germany on May 15. "We also spent time here in Berlin laying the groundwork for next month's summit in Madrid," Blinken said during a press conference at the conclusion of the NATO informal meeting in Berlin. "NATO is going to release its new Strategic Concept laying out how the Alliance will sustain and strengthen transatlantic security in the face of President Putin's aggression as well as other emerging threats. And we'll look ahead to our continuing efforts to fortify our force posture on NATO's eastern flank." Stoltenberg said the alliance will "make important decisions to reinforce NATO's deterrence and defense to reflect the new security reality in Europe," during the summit in Madrid next month after the conclusion of the informal meeting in Berlin on May 15.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › 2AC---US Heg k2 Deterrence

US threats of retaliation check Russian aggression

Alcaro 2/2/22 [Alcaro, Riccardo, Riccardo Alcaro is Research Coordinator and Head of the Global Actors Programme of the Istituto Affari Internazionali. His main area of expertise are transatlantic relations, with a special focus on US and European policies in Europe’s surrounding regions. Riccardo has been a visiting fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe of the Brookings Institution in Washington and a fellow of the EU-wide programme European Foreign and Security Policy Studies (EFSPS). He holds a summa-cum-laude PhD from the University of Tübingen., “The Return of US Leadership in Europe: Biden and the Russia Crisis”, Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI),

In dealing with Russia’s aggressive policies towards Ukraine, US President Joe Biden has put up a powerful display of competent crisis management. While it may not be enough to stop President Vladimir Putin from escalating, Biden’s policy has nonetheless re-affirmed US leadership in Europe. Communication strategy Starting last autumn, the Biden administration kept warning its European allies that Russia’s military mobilisation on the Ukrainian border was large enough to make the prospect of an invasion technically possible.[1] US officials have since publicly denounced Russia’s threatening tactics, even going as far as to accuse the Kremlin of planning false flag operations to give itself a pretext for an armed intervention.[2] President Biden himself has said that he expects Putin to move in, although he (and everybody else) remains uncertain as to what form Russia’s actions will take.[3] The Biden administration’s communication strategy is aimed at persuading European allies to close ranks while also preventing the Russian government from taking advantage of an information grey zone to spread fake news and foment confusion and divisions.[4] In spite of Russia’s insistence that it has no hostile intentions, there is little doubt that the risk of a renewed Russian intervention in Ukraine is higher than it has ever been since the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Diplomatic response The Biden administration has rejected Russia’s demands for – amongst other things – a written guarantee that NATO will not expand to include other former Soviet republics and massively reduce (actually, remove) its military deployments in central and Eastern Europe (else, Moscow has threatened unspecific “technical-military” actions).[5] At the same time, Biden has agreed to open negotiations on European security, which has unfolded in three separate but related tracks: a bilateral US–Russia channel, a reactivated NATO–Russia Council, and the pan-European Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, so as to give all parties involved, starting with Ukraine, formal representation.[6] After consulting with allies, the Biden administration has presented Russia with a set of possible arrangements over arms control, missile deployments, military exercises, transparency and confidence-building measures as well as military-to-military contacts.[7] While these are secondary issues for Putin, they are still of interest to Russia. Most importantly, they substantiate a US and NATO commitment to engage in a broad negotiation over European security and start reversing the trend in the abysmal state of West-Russia relations. Diplomatic exchanges have thus far delivered no result. The US offer has disappointed the Russians, who insist that NATO’s enlargement fundamentally undermines their national security. They have nonetheless accepted to keep talking, and the two sides have engaged in a back-and-forth exchange of written proposals for compromise.[8] In the meantime, Russia’s military mobilisation has continued unabated.[9] President Biden, who has used two virtual summits to warn Putin about the terrible consequences of an intervention, has started preparing a multifaceted response.[10] Defence and deterrence Biden has ruled out the use of US troops in defence of Ukraine, to which he has nonetheless pledged full political support and continued military assistance (the US has provided Ukraine with 2.5 billion US dollars’ worth of military assets since 2014, 650 million in 2021 alone).[11] Meanwhile, the US has moved 3,000 troops from Germany to Poland and Romania and put further 8,500 soldiers on heightened alert for a possible deployment to central and eastern Europe.[12] Other NATO member states have followed suit. The United Kingdom has said it will commit more troops to the Baltic area, naval forces to the Black Sea, air patrolling of Bulgaria and Romania’s airspace, as well as rocket systems to Estonia.[13] France has offered to send troops to Romania, Denmark has deployed additional military aircraft to Lithuania and Spain has sent a frigate to the Black Sea.[14] A number of weapons systems would follow NATO and US soldiers, including air defences, artillery, armoured vehicles, warships and aircraft, thereby bolstering the few thousand troops NATO keeps in central and eastern Europe. Most likely, these deployments would lose their rotational nature and become fully permanent. Economic retaliation The policy area that has witnessed greater activism on the part of the United States has revolved around potential economic retaliation.[15] The Biden administration has worked on a wide-ranging set of measures that would cut off foreign lending, ban sales of sovereign bonds and blacklist Russia’s major financial institutions. It is reportedly also considering to ban the export to Russia of products containing US-made or US-designed semiconductors, which are the essential component of computers, smartphones and other electronic devices.[16] The US administration has agreed with the UK government to target the assets (both financial and otherwise) of some of the most prominent Russian oligarchs as well as people belonging to Putin’s inner circle.[17] Further, it has coordinated with the European Union on a set of restrictions that would strengthen the financial sanctions and ban the export of technologies for critical industry, most notably for the development of new gas projects.[18] Even though it has so far ruled out an embargo on energy imports from Russia, the Biden administration has extracted from Germany a pledge to put the activation of Nord Stream 2, the controversial Russian-German gas pipeline under the Baltic, indefinitely on hold.[19] Sustainability and effectiveness problems The Biden administration aims to raise the costs for Russia of any intervention against Ukraine, while also trying to promote a diplomatic way out of the crisis. It remains unclear whether Putin might be content with the high-level security dialogue the US is offering. It is also uncertain whether anything the US and its allies have put on the table may be enough to dissuade Putin from “moving in”, not least because the Russian president can pick amongst multiple options.[20] These span a large-scale invasion, a further militarisation and de facto integration of Donetsk and Luhansk, Ukraine’s eastern regions in which Russia has supported separatist movements since 2014, and a number of hybrid actions, including the intensification of the ongoing cyberattacks against Ukraine.[21] A large-scale attack would make it easier for Biden to keep the cohesion of the Atlantic front, but would create problems of sustainability.[22] Energy prices would likely spiral, thus prolonging the inflationary wave that has been mounting since last year (especially in the United States). Sanctions would wreak havoc on Russia’s economy, but would most likely inflict a heavy cost on Europe too, especially Germany and Italy (the EU’s first and third largest economies respectively), at a time of sustained but uncertain post-Covid recovery. A more limited intervention by Russia would engender an equal and opposite problem, whereby effectiveness could be sacrificed on the altar of sustainability. Western countries hold different views of what the minimum threshold is for them to be willing to absorb the economic pain that comes with the imposition of sanctions on Russia.[23] The measures they could agree upon would therefore be sustainable over time, but would hardly be as tough as the most strident critics of Putin deem necessary. Biden’s response has yet to pass the test of Russia’s intervening in Ukraine, if that indeed comes about. However, his administration has laid solid foundations for continued and intense transatlantic security dialogue. This is all the more important given that the European Union has provided no alternative to France and Germany’s attempt to have a separate dialogue with Moscow.[24] Yet the French have admitted that this diplomatic channel is complementary, rather than conflicting, with the transatlantic one.[25] *** In conclusion, the Biden administration has skillfully used or threatened to use intelligence, diplomatic, defence, deterrence and economic assets to face Russia’s challenge to Europe’s security. Most notably, it has consulted extensively with allies, showing regard for their specific sensitivities while organising a coordinated response.[26] With the spectre of interstate war looming on the continent, history has indeed come back to Europe. With the Biden administration, so has US leadership.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › 2AC---US Heg k2 Deterrence

US heg is key deterring Russia and preventing nuclear war

De Witte 4/20/22 [De Witte, Melissa, Melissa De Witte is the deputy director for social science communications for the Stanford News Service. She attained an M.A. in Media, Culture, & Communication from NYU and a B.Sc. in Sociology from LSE. She was previously the digital communications manager for the Division of Social Sciences at UC Santa Cruz., “The U.S. must do what it can to prevent Russian military from crossing the nuclear threshold, Stanford scholar says”, Stanford News, https://news.stanford.edu/2022/04/20/u-s-must-can-prevent-russian-military-crossing-nuclear-threshold/]//AA

Nuclear weapons are not just a force used to deter another state from attacking – they can also be a shield behind which one can engage in aggression, says Stanford scholar Scott Sagan. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s reminder of Russia’s nuclear arsenal at the beginning of its recent invasion into Ukraine is a warning to the United States and other NATO members that if they get directly involved in the conflict, there could be a risk of nuclear escalation, said Sagan, the co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Here, Sagan discusses Putin’s nuclear threat – it is estimated that Russia’s stockpile includes 4,477 nuclear warheads, according to a report published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists – and what could happen if Russia crosses the nuclear threshold, a line that hasn’t been crossed since 1945, when the U.S. detonated two atomic bombs in Japan. Sagan’s research examines nuclear strategy, nuclear proliferation, the ethics of war, and public opinion of combat. Back in February, Putin publicly ordered his Minister of Defense to put Russian nuclear forces into “special combat readiness.” He also warned in a televised statement that if another nation interferes in the operation, “Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.” Was Putin threatening a nuclear war? Putin was engaging in nuclear saber-rattling, reminding NATO leaders that he has a large nuclear arsenal and that Russian military doctrine holds open the option of using nuclear weapons first if it is losing a war and its vital interests are threatened. However, the order to go into “special combat readiness” was not part of the Russian military lexicon and U.S. officials saw no actual nuclear alert activities underway. But it’s important to understand that nuclear weapons are not just a force used to deter another state from attacking. They can also be a shield behind which one can undertake aggression. The Pakistanis moved soldiers into Indian-held Kashmir soon after Islamabad first tested nuclear weapons. Saddam Hussein wanted nuclear weapons and told his senior generals that if he got them, he would order a conventional attack to take back the West Bank and Golan Heights from Israel. Similarly, Putin was brandishing his nuclear arsenal to remind the U.S. and other NATO powers that if they get directly involved in his war of aggression in Ukraine, there could be a risk of nuclear escalation. Is Putin’s nuclear threat working? Only in part. President Joe Biden did rule out direct engagement when he said the U.S. and NATO would not enforce a “no-fly zone” over the Ukraine. That policy would have meant that NATO aircraft would be shooting down Russian aircraft, which of course is an act of war, creating the risk of escalation. But Putin’s threats did not deter Washington and many NATO governments from “interfering” in Moscow’s attempt to overthrow the Zelenskyy government in many other ways, short of direct combat with the Russians. We have given the Ukrainian government millions of dollars’ worth of weapons, including air defense systems and advanced anti-tank missiles, and have provided intelligence support. Without such rapid resupply of military equipment, the Ukrainians might well have lost the war already. Now they have turned back the Russian assault on Kyiv and Putin appears to have shifted his war aims from overthrowing the elected Ukrainian government to “liberating” the Donbas in Eastern Ukraine and possibly annexing it into Russia as he did with Crimea in 2014. CIA director William Burns recently said, “None of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential [Russian] resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons.” Are you worried about the Russians using nuclear weapons against the Ukrainians if the war continues to go badly for Moscow? Yes. I recently argued in Foreign Affairs that Putin is the most dangerous man in the world. Putin could order the Russian military to drop a single nuclear bomb on a Ukrainian city to try to coerce the Zelenskyy government into immediately surrendering. This frightening scenario is not fanciful. It is, after all, effectively what the United States did to Japan in 1945. We can only hope that in this situation, senior Russian officers would tell Putin that such a strike would be illegal, a violation of the Geneva Conventions, and refuse to comply. Some national security officials are Putin’s cronies, like Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, but the military leadership is more independent. The United States must do what it can to reinforce any reluctance by the Russian military to cross the nuclear threshold. Washington should be prepared to take further military steps if Moscow crosses the nuclear threshold. Senior officials should not specify exactly what kind of military response would be ordered, but a clear statement that crossing the nuclear threshold would bring the gravest consequences for Russia and for Putin might help deter such action. And the U.S. should remind Russian military leaders that any nuclear use against a Ukrainian city will be treated as a war crime and that they, not just Putin, will be treated as war criminals. The Russian military may not mind targeting civilians, as it has shown in its operations in Chechnya, in Syria, and now in Ukraine. But they do care about protecting themselves. Do they really want to live in a world in which they have broken the tradition of nuclear non-use that has existed since 1945? They may think twice about agreeing to drop nuclear bombs if they know that they may one day find themselves permanently imprisoned for their actions. And if Putin gives such a reckless, dangerous order, it may just be the last straw that makes other leaders in Moscow decide that he finally has to go.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › 2AC---US Containment

Reimagined U.S. containment has the ability to check Russian aggression

Daalder 3/1/22 [Daalder, Ivo H., Ivo H. Daalder is President of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and host of World Review with Ivo Daalder. He served as the US ambassador to NATO from 2009 to 2013. Ambassador Daalder was educated at the universities of Kent, Oxford, and Georgetown, and received his PhD in political science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is married to Elisa D. Harris, and they have two sons., “The Return of Containment: How the West Can Prevail Against the Kremlin”, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-03-01/return-containment]//AA

Russia’s unprovoked assault on Ukraine did not come as a surprise. The United States and its European allies learned last fall what Russia planned to do, and even publicized the Kremlin’s plans to the world. Even so, they failed to prevent Russia’s onslaught on its much weaker neighbor. Once they ruled out direct military assistance to Ukraine, deterring a Russia bent on controlling its neighbors and upending the post-1990 European security order was always going to be a tall order. The same threats that failed to dissuade Russia from invading before—severe sanctions, military assistance to Ukraine, and beefing up NATO—are unlikely to compel Russia from changing course now. Instead, Washington and its democratic allies need to embark on a strategy of containment that increases the cost to Russia and eventually forces internal political change that brings the brutal regime of Vladimir Putin to an end. The outlines of this playbook are familiar, first set out in the late 1940s by George F. Kennan, a senior diplomat in the Moscow embassy, and elaborated on in the pages of this magazine. Kennan argued that the Stalin regime’s paranoia and insecurities represented a clear danger to the West and called for steady, forceful counterpressure. But Kennan also believed the Soviet Union was weak and suffered from internal contradictions that would ultimately undo the regime. Containment took 40 years to succeed and involved plenty of needless mistakes by the United States—including launching the Vietnam War and backing the violent overthrow of a number of governments. But the policy ultimately unleashed forces inside the Soviet Union that led to the end of the regime. A return to a robust policy of containment is now the West’s best option. The fundamental goal will remain the same as the old policy: to counter Russian expansionism, inflict real costs on the Russian regime, and encourage internal change that leads to the ultimate collapse of Putin and Putinism. Of course, it needs to be adapted to the realities as they exist today rather than those that prevailed at the end of World War II. In particular, Russia’s close ties to a strong and newly assertive China will have to be addressed proactively. Still, Russia isn’t the Soviet Union, a military and ideological colossus nearly equal to the United States. Although it remains a nuclear power, its military is a shadow of its former Soviet self, and its economy is smaller than Canada’s, which has a quarter of Russia’s population. Meanwhile, the West has grown stronger. The United States retains unrivaled military power and has an economy 13 times larger than that of Russia. Europe, a defeated continent scarred by war and poverty after World War II, has emerged as a cohesive economic giant with a military that, although underfunded, enjoys significant modern capabilities to defend against a stretched Russian military. As a result, although a policy of containment will not deliver swift success or victory, its steady application in the months and years ahead should drive the necessary change in Russia within the next five to ten years. Three Pillars An effective twenty-first century update of containment would consist of three main pillars: maintaining U.S. military strength, decoupling Western economies from Russia, and isolating Moscow. Together, these three elements will steadily increase the cost to Russia of continuing its expansionist policies, foment internal dissent and debate, and ultimately could force a change in governance. To be clear, such change must be driven internally—although the United States seeks an end to Putinism, this will occur only when the Russian people decide the time has come. Also, a return to containment will not lead to an immediate end to the war in Ukraine. That will require additional measures, including providing Ukraine with the military means it needs to defend itself and resist occupation if Russia succeeds in taking over part or all of the country. And it will require massive economic and humanitarian assistance to help the besieged population in Ukraine and those who have been forced to flee the country. Although the United States and other NATO countries maintain significant militaries, two decades of European under-investment and U.S. military engagement in the Middle East and Afghanistan have left NATO profoundly unprepared for a return to a strong deterrent posture. The subordination of the Belarussian military to Russian command and the invasion of Ukraine mean that a new front line is being drawn from the Baltic to the Black Sea—with the eastern borders of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania effectively marking NATO’s new eastern flank. As a result, NATO needs to move swiftly to defend the new front. The alliance has taken steps to bolster deterrence in the East, but these moves fall short of what the situation demands. The United States has doubled its ground presence in Poland, to 9,000 troops, and sent air and naval reinforcements to other countries. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have increased their military presence in Romania, Slovakia, and the Baltic states. NATO has activated its 40,000-strong Response Force for the first time, though current plans do not include full mobilization of the entire force. While these initial steps have strengthened the forces that were deployed East in the wake of Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, they amount to little more than a tripwire that will be unable to offer a robust defense if Russia attacks NATO territory. NATO’s moves have fallen short of what the situation demands. That is why a fundamental rethinking of NATO’s forward force posture is now necessary. NATO needs to deploy tens of thousands of troops, rather than the few thousand that have so far been committed. The most immediate requirement is to deploy two to three combat brigades to eastern Poland and southern Lithuania to defend the Suwalki gap, the 60 miles that separate Russian Kaliningrad and Belarus. If Russian or Belarussian forces were to connect these territories, the Baltic states would effectively be cut off from the rest of NATO. Preparing for a long-term presence in the East will also require making significant investments in ports, rail lines, airfields, roads, fuel supply, and other critical infrastructure to improve NATO’s capacity to rapidly reinforce its troops. Moreover, given Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons, combined with the deployment of nuclear-capable and likely armed missiles in Kaliningrad and other parts of western Russia and possibly in Belarus, NATO will need to consider the adequacy of its nuclear posture. None of this is to suggest that NATO needs to prepare for war. The point is that deterrence now requires greater visibility and forward presence than was the case before Russia attacked Ukraine. Whatever Putin may be thinking about forcefully revising the post-1990 security order in Europe, NATO needs to make clear that he cannot succeed. That requires a strong deterrent presence East and a major commitment to increase spending for the long run. Germany’s decision to spend 100 billion euros now and at least two percent of GDP on defense going forward is a big step in the right direction. Beyond Military Might Although military strength is a core requirement of deterrence, it is not enough. Indeed, the forward deployment of military forces will initially reinforce the divisions in Europe—and would leave the peoples of Ukraine, the Caucuses, and indeed of Belarus and Russia, under Putin’s dominion. The West cannot allow a return of an Iron Curtain dividing Europe. That is why the new containment also needs a policy of economic decoupling and political isolation—measures that are designed to inflict ever increasing costs on Russia and force change from within. The sanctions announced by the United States and its allies are an important first step. Russia has been effectively cut off from credit and financial support, and technology export controls will severely curtail imports into Russia. Meanwhile, sanctions on Putin, his cronies, and their families will leave them isolated in their dachas in Russia, unable to gallivant on their yachts in St Tropez or their London duplexes. Though many have criticized these sanctions as too little, too late, these critiques assume that their purpose is to stop Russia’s military advance. That was never going to happen. Instead, sanctions are designed to inflict costs over months and years to force a change of behavior. The effectiveness of sanctions on Russia will depend on two factors. First, their sting requires that they be applied by as many countries as possible. The Biden administration has been right to walk in lockstep with Europe, even as it has engaged diplomatically for months to push for the maximum possible sanctions. It may make people in Washington feel good for the United States to announce a rash of sanctions, but unless others agree to follow, their impact will be limited. As the case of Iran has shown, coordinated sanctions from 2010 onwards produced a real nuclear agreement; the unilateral maximum pressure from the United States since 2018 has only led Iran to accelerate its nuclear program. Europe gets 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia. Second, energy is key. Former Senator John McCain once memorably described Russia as “a gas station masquerading as a country.” But it is a big gas station, especially for Europe, which still gets 40 percent of its natural gas from Russia. Some countries, including the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Latvia are almost completely dependent for their gas heat and electricity on imports from Russia. Although restricting Russian oil and gas imports would hit the Russian economy, which is highly dependent on fossil fuel exports, the damage such restrictions would do to European economies would be grave as well. True decoupling will thus take years, not weeks or months, as Europe finds alternative sources of gas and reduces its reliance on fossil fuels as part of its climate change commitments. Aside from military strength and economic decoupling, Russia will also need to be isolated politically. Its unprovoked attack represented a blatant violation of the UN Charter and international law and runs counter to Russia’s commitment not to change borders by force—a commitment Moscow repeated numerous times in European security declarations, including the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the Charter of Paris in 1990, and the Astana OSCE Declaration in 2010. And Russia clearly violated its explicit guarantee in 1994 to respect Ukraine’s borders and territorial integrity in return for Kyiv’s commitment to give up its nuclear weapons. There can be no return to business as usual with an outlaw regime. To be sure, diplomatic channels need to remain open, as they were during the Cold War. But Russia’s normal engagement with the rest of the international community must come to an end. The International Olympic Committee’s recommendation that sporting competitions ban athletes from Russia and Belarus was the right call, as was the decision by FIFA and UEFA to ban Russian soccer teams from the World Cup and European championships. The isolation must extend well beyond sports, however. There is no place for Russia in the G20 and the diplomatic dance of European leaders heading off to Moscow that preceded Russia’s attack on Ukraine needs to cease. Aside from Russia’s complete and unconditional withdrawal from all of Ukraine—including the territory it has occupied and annexed since 2014—there is nothing to talk about. That includes suspending the strategic stability talks that were aimed at creating a predictable and stable relationship with Russia. No such relationship is possible so long as Putin is in power. "We will make sure that Putin will be a pariah on the international stage," President Biden declared. At the same time, just as during the Cold War, there needs to be a concerted effort to engage Russian civil society. Inside Russia, opposition to the war is already surprisingly widespread, as evidenced by the demonstrations that erupted in recent days in more than 50 cities. As Russian soldiers return in body bags and sanctions begin to bite, that opposition is bound to grow. Russians will need access to accurate information, which Western governments can provide through social media, the internet, and broadcasting. People-to-people exchanges should continue. The United States has opened doors to refuseniks before. It can do so again. Updating the Playbook To succeed, the new containment policy must be embraced by all Western allies—in Europe, in North America, and even in Asia. Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, is keen to exploit divisions within and between democracies. It has interfered in elections for years and supported far right politics in Europe and beyond. It has used bribes and Western energy dependence to divide Europe. Putin saw the divisions within NATO sown by U.S. President Donald Trump during his four years in office, and the disagreements over Afghanistan and submarine sales to Australia that occurred since, as evidence that the West was weak and divided. Now, he likely thought, was the time to strike. Putin was wrong. The West has been remarkably unified in its response. Even before Russia’s attack, Western unity within NATO and beyond had solidified. The Biden administration, perhaps learning from its Afghanistan stumbles, did a superb job of bringing its allies together by sharing information, consulting frequently, and demonstrating tough, determined leadership. The result has been significant: strong sanctions, bolstered deterrence, and total political solidarity with Ukraine. To preserve this unity, the United States, which has once again emerged as a leader of the West, will need to carefully listen to allies and be willing to change course to keep everyone on board. There will be times when internal divisions will raise questions about the solidity of the coalition. During the Cold War, NATO seemed to be in perpetual crisis—except when it mattered most. There is no place for Russia in the G20. An important difference between the Cold War era and today is the status of China. No longer a bit player on the global scene, Beijing has emerged as the Washington’s biggest competitor and largest geopolitical challenger in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. The Ukraine crisis emerged at a moment when the relationship between Russia and China has become particularly close. Their leaders have met 38 times since Xi Jinping became president of China in 2012, including most recently at the opening of the Winter Olympics. There, they issued a joint statement noting that their partnership had “no limits.” Far from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has blamed the United States and NATO for taking insufficient account of Russia’s security interests. Beijing’s pronouncements, however, contained an undercurrent of unease with Putin’s moves. The joint statement was notably silent on Ukraine, and official statements have consistently stressed China’s principled commitment to sovereignty, territorial integrity, and noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations. China abstained on a UN Security Council Resolution condemning Russia, rather than joining Moscow in voting against. And Beijing has never recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea, suggesting it may keep an open mind on the future of Ukraine. There is scope, therefore, for quiet diplomacy to gauge whether Beijing might be persuaded to help put pressure on Russia. Even if Beijing has its doubts, however, it is hardly in its interest to help the United States against Russia. Indeed, Chinese leaders no doubt welcome the U.S.’s renewed preoccupation with security in Europe because it gives Beijing more freedom of maneuver in its own region. China is also likely to help alleviate some of the economic consequences of sanctions for Russia, though there are limits to how much it can do, especially on the financial side, where transactions largely remain the domain of western currencies from which Russia has now been banned. Containing Russia will therefore require paying attention to China. One way to increase the West’s leverage over Beijing would be to strengthen the political, economic, and military ties between the advanced democracies in Asia, Europe, and North America. An expanded G-7, for example, could include Australia and South Korea as well as the involvement of the heads of the EU and NATO. These nations and organizations will need to devise common strategies and policies not only to contain Russia but also to compete effectively with China. February 24 was a turning point in history. Democratic powers of the West are once again called upon to defend a rules-based order that has been violently uprooted. Fortunately, the Western powers possess the innate strength necessary to contain Russia and outcompete China for influence across the globe. The only real question is whether they have the will and determination to do so in unison.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › 2AC---US Containment

The US is key to checking Russian aggression and escalation in Ukraine through a compellence strategy

Hoffman 4/28/22 [Frank G. Hoffman, Dr. Frank G. Hoffman serves on the Board of Advisors at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and holds an appointment as a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C., where he has served since 2011. Dr. Hoffman graduated from the Wharton Business School at the University of Pennsylvania in 1978. He holds Master’s degrees from George Mason University in Educational Leadership and the U.S. Naval War College in National Security Studies. He earned his Ph.D. in War Studies from King’s College, London., 4-28-2022, "America Needs a Comprehensive Compellence Strategy Against Russia," Foreign Policy Research Institute,

The Biden administration has formulated an unprecedented response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The coordination of transatlantic diplomacy, including the condemnation of Russia at the United Nations and the implementation of a massive sanctions package, is truly impressive. The president’s recent request for an additional $33 billion from Congress in security, economic, and humanitarian aid for Ukraine demonstrates the seriousness of America’s commitment to European security. While the White House should be applauded for its response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, this only tells part of the story. Indeed, none of these diplomatic initiatives would have been necessary had the United States and its allies successfully deterred Russia from attacking Ukraine in the first place. Deterrence failed because the United States and its allies signaled, in advance, that it was not prepared to apply direct military force in Ukraine. It did so because it was afraid of Vladimir Putin’s nuclear threats. America’s risk calculus was framed by the fear of nuclear escalation and Washington’s overestimation of Russian military power. While initial efforts to deter Russia have failed, the West should now pursue a different approach. Rather than deterrence, the United States should focus on compellence. A comprehensive compellence strategy toward Russia would entail the focused integration of covert and overt military power, as well as a greater efforts to conduct information operations inside Russia to weaken Putin’s fragile political control. The goal of such a strategy could be to force Putin to stop the war, not merely help Ukraine stave off defeat. It strives to achieve this by raising costs to Moscow beyond sanctions and political isolation. The strategy would help the West coalesce around the objective of ending the war in the near term, but also forcing a negotiated conclusion to hostilities that would be more advantageous to Ukrainian and Western interests. The West’s aim should be to ensure Putin suffers an operational failure, not accede to Russia’s subjugation of Ukraine or some tortured negotiated compromise. The Need for Compellence Ukraine has, thus far, been brilliant in asymmetric tactics with creative applications of modern tools of warfare. Nevertheless, Russian forces have destroyed much of Ukraine’s infrastructure, while roughly 25 percent of the nation’s population is displaced and hungry. Without support from the United States and the West, Ukraine may still be unable to prevent Russia from achieving its new goals, which likely include seizing the entire southern coast of Ukraine, including Odessa. With the opening of the new phase of the war in Donbas and the Black Sea coastline, both sides of the conflict are now engaged in a race of strategic and operational adaptation. The coming battles will be on different terrain, and require altered tactics and weapons than the initial fighting around Kyiv. This will be a very different battlefield and the results are not preordained. Which side learns faster and altered its strategy and force employment best will determine the course of this war in the second phase. The Elements of Comprehensive Compellence One month before the war started, FPRI’s Rob Lee argued that Moscow’s compellence strategy would include the use of military force directly against Kyiv or more likely by punitive raids deep into the eastern half of Ukraine. He argued, “By inflicting heavy losses on the Ukrainian military, taking prisoners of war, and degrading Kyiv’s defense capabilities, Russia could potentially alter Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s incentive structure sufficiently to induce painful concessions.” Despite Ukraine’s successful effort to turn back Russian forces around Kyiv, Russia’s compellence strategy has not yet failed. As a result, it needs to be undercut by NATO with a more comprehensive approach. A robust U.S. counter to Moscow, what might be called comprehensive compellence, would build on the administration’s defense strategy concept of integrated deterrence to get Putin to alter his misguided effort in Ukraine. Compellence is normally a harder task historically than deterrence, but given Russia’s dysfunctional military effectiveness, the cost-benefit analysis for compellence in this case augurs for success. Deterrence and compellence share some common elements but are conceptually distinct. Deterrence seeks to persuade an adversary to not to take some action that it is capable of. On the other hand, compellence is an effort to persuade the opponent to stop some behavior or change its course due to the threat of coercive force or via incentives. Compellence is often needed in the wake of deterrence failure. While America’s efforts to deter a Russian invasion of Ukraine failed, a compellence strategy would have a greater chance of success. After Russia’s inept military campaign and Ukraine’s effective resistance, the balance of power now favors the United States and its allies. Russian losses on the battlefield and degraded economic strength due to sanctions make the military components of a Western compellence strategy even more credible. A strategy of comprehensive compellence in support of Ukraine would have five elements or lines of effort. Diplomatic and political This element is already being aggressively pursued by the Biden administration in its political and economic isolation of Russia and its leaders. It has successfully made Putin a pariah in most circles, although China, India, and some other states are taking a different approach. The European Union and NATO have been energized and coordinated brilliantly. Efforts similar to the removal of Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council should be pursued, including the forthcoming G20 meeting this year. In any event, after a year or two of sanctions, Russia may be functionally dismissed from the G20 entirely depending upon the price of oil and natural gas. In terms of a new initiative, Finland and Sweden should be offered swift approval of their applications for membership in NATO. While their applications are under consideration by NATO’s 30 member states, the United Kingdom and United States should offer Finland and Sweden immediate security guarantees to protect them from Russian threats. The application process has historically taken over a year, and Russia will undoubtedly apply coercive pressure against the applicants. Additionally, former Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb should be made a NATO official with a chance to become the next secretary general when Jens Stoltenberg’s term ends in 2023. The North Atlantic Council might consider Amb. (ret.) Ivo Daldler’s proposal to admit Ukraine now. However, this would be resisted by key NATO members, and should be left to the final negotiations. Informational The ongoing war has stressed the importance of strategic communications, and Zelensky has proven to be extremely effective in the battle of narratives. Moscow has employed its usual playbook of disinformation and propaganda, but to little discernable effect in Europe and North America. Russia continues to apply its concept of information confrontation against NATO and Ukraine. It persistently seeks to exploit identified vulnerabilities of democratic societies using cyber and information operations. Russia’s goal is to exacerbate existing societal, political, and military divisions. Key targets of this approach are the legitimacy of Ukraine’s government and NATO cohesion. Putin has been outdone by the determined and savvy Zelenskyy in this dimension of the conflict. However, Putin’s efforts gain more purchase in China, in democratic states like India, and parts of Africa. Efforts to pierce the fog of disinformation inside Russia should be intensified. There are few sources for independent news inside the country, but a few techniques seem to still be working. Ukraine has taken a macabre approach with facial recognition technology to identify and contact the families of fallen Russian soldiers to inform them of the fate of their loved one. They have also constructed websites for families to gain information on the status of their family members fighting against Ukraine, and at the same time receive some perspective on the scale of the war that Moscow hides from its own citizens. In Kyiv, the Information Strategies Council of Ukraine, a coalition of activists and think tanks, sent emails and social media messages directly to 15 million Russian men of draft age. It has also targeted older Russians with different tailored messages, using historical references to stimulate a questioning of Moscow-generated news reports and propaganda. NATO and the European Union need to create the capacity to design and conduct an information offensive into Russia and overwhelm Putin’s control of information. Putin seems to be afraid of “fifth columns” at home. That vulnerability should be exploited more. The U.S. Global Engagement Center has the mission to ‘‘lead, synchronize, and coordinate efforts of the Federal Government in countering foreign state and foreign non-state propaganda and disinformation efforts.” It may be a model to build upon, but it will take a collective effort from European states to establish an ability to project truth into Russia, and penetrate Putin’s dominance of his domestic information ecosystem. Russian cyber attacks against Ukraine have not been effective so far. However, Russian intelligence, particularly the GRU-supported Sandworm team, are persistently threatening Ukraine’s electricity generation capacity and its power grid. The Zelensky government is facing an ongoing surge in cyber activity at present. The West can do more to support the Ukrainians in this battlespace with both technical and intelligence support to ensure that their critical infrastructure is preserved and functional. The Ukrainians seem to be holding their own despite Russia’s presumed cyber dominance. Military The principal military stick in this strategy is supplied by the Ukrainians themselves, abetted by Western arms. This will have to be both accelerated and sustained during the next phase which is likely to involve intensive artillery and missile consumption. It will also require mass quantities of supplies, and enough drones to supplement the limited assets now flown by the Ukrainians. Recently, aid was increased by another increment. This new tranche of $800 million sounds enormous and the material is being delivered at an unprecedented timeline. Even with the recent presidential request of $33 billion in aid from Congress, it may be both inadequate and too late. More covert but direct kinetic means will be necessary as this is a war of considerable attrition. Indirect modes of conflict via proxy forces are nothing new (e.g., El Salvador, Angola, and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon). The use of proxy forces has a long history but also a growing salience in an era of strategic competition. One of the evolving modes of warfare that is suited for comprehensive compellence is “surrogate warfare.” In this mode of warfare, state’s avoid the use of their own soldiers as the primary bearer of warfare’s grave costs, and delegate it to proxy forces and the use of remotely fielded technological surrogates to better enable the state to manage the risks of modern conflict. They may also employ paramilitary forces for intelligence support for targeting critical nodes of the attacking force. For this conflict, this would mean the a greater use of allied tools for cyber warfare, greater intelligence sharing, and more unmanned precision strikes on key Russian operational centers and critical supply links inside Ukraine. Finally, NATO’s posture has been prudently enhanced with the deployment of four new NATO battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. More needs to be done to prepare for cross-border contingencies. NATO should posture one or two division-plus sized forces outside Ukraine in case peacekeeping or armed humanitarian intervention is needed. One can anticipate that human security and disaster relief operations may be needed in short order given the scale of the destruction of Ukrainian energy, medical, and water supplies. Economic America and its allies have implemented a massive sanctions package against Russia. As a result, Russian finances may soon be in default and its economy could nosedive. More attention should be paid to Russia’s energy exports. As FPRI’s Chris Miller notes “if you want to hit Russia hard, you’ve got to go after energy. Everything else is really pretty small by comparison.” Since there is little support in some capitals for more intensive sanctions, there may be value in defining their duration and the conditions for tempering them. Some have proposed that the West continue sanctions for as long as Putin remains in power. In essence, this is a call for regime change. Such a threat may not achieve much in real terms but it carries some risk since it directly challenges the Kremlin’s principal power center. It is highly unlikely to be accepted by German or French leaders. A more strategic approach would be to keep sanctions remain in place until Russian forces have departed all agreed territories and military commanders are turned in to appropriate authorities. Comprehensive compellence should also include funding for Ukraine’s restoration. The Economist estimates the reconstruction tab for Ukraine at $200–520 billion. As some scholars have recently written, rather than simply freeze Russia’s hard currency reserves in Western banks, those currency reserves should be liquidated and put to use. These assets should be collected and transferred to the International Criminal Court in escrow for reparations. The West should start proceedings to allot reparations to Kyiv from those funds. This would communicate to the Russian leadership that every day of destruction in Ukraine is simply another day of reconstruction in its future, which Moscow will pay for. Ideally, this might induce them to stop attacking and terrorizing civilians and operate within the law of armed conflict. Legal The West should purse indictments at the International Criminal Court for each division and Army commander whose area of responsibility is shown to have committed crimes against humanity and other violations of international law. Washington should also do the same for corporate and unit leaders of the Wagner Group, the mercenaries purportedly behind the Bucha massacre. Judicial proceedings may be far off, but the intent to prosecute needs to be clear now.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › 2AC---Thumper---Russo-Ukrainian War

US intervention in the Russo-Ukrainian war causes US-Russia war

Carnelos 6/3 [Carnelos, Marco, Marco Carnelos is a former Italian diplomat. He has been assigned to Somalia, Australia and the United Nations. He served in the foreign policy staff of three Italian prime ministers between 1995 and 2011. More recently he has been Middle East peace process coordinator special envoy for Syria for the Italian government and, until November 2017, Italy's ambassador to Iraq., “Russia-Ukraine war: US quest to preserve global hegemony could be its downfall”, Middle East Eye,

When the doyen of foreign policy gurus, Henry Kissinger, is hinting that Ukraine should cede territory to Russia to help end the invasion, you know in your stomach that the West is about to make another major mistake. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Kissinger also urged western countries not to seek an embarrassing defeat for Russia in Ukraine, warning it could endanger Europe’s long-term stability. He seems to be focused on Europe-Russia relations in the longer term, considering that for four centuries, Russia has been an essential part of Europe and a factor in re-establishing its balance. Just 50 years after former US President Richard Nixon’s historic trip to China, Kissinger’s ultimate concern is to avoid driving Moscow into a permanent alliance with Beijing. It is too late for that. As for the Russian economy, it is certainly suffering, but - contrary to what was confidently predicted months ago - it has not collapsed In an ideal world, Kissinger’s solemn warnings would sound alarm bells, prompting European chancelleries - which have followed a script on the Russia-Ukraine war that was hastily drafted in Washington and London - to at least review their overall strategy. They could ask themselves what “winning” looks like for Ukraine, rather than simply accepting Ukraine’s contention that all Russian forces must be pushed back to the lines of 24 February, which appears increasingly unlikely. Instead, the EU has just approved its sixth package of sanctions, agreeing to reduce Russian oil supplies in a last-minute compromise that barely conceals the cracks surfacing within European resoluteness. Nevertheless, the Nato-EU-G7 triad officially continues to believe that Ukraine’s unexpected resistance and the West’s unity in helping it, along with unprecedented sanctions against Russia, will determine Kyiv’s victory and Moscow’s economic collapse. Their “strategists” say more time is needed, and the West should hold its nerve. Italy’s prime minister has said that sanctions will really bite this summer. We’ll see. Major economic test Meanwhile, facts on the ground show that Russia, after initial serious military blunders, is slowly obtaining the upper hand in Donbas, and even media in the West are starting to admit that the situation is getting complicated. Ukrainians are losing up to 100 soldiers a day. As for the Russian economy, it is certainly suffering, but - contrary to what was confidently predicted months ago - it has not collapsed. In the words of the International Monetary Fund’s managing director, the conflict in Ukraine is subjecting the global economy to perhaps its “biggest test since the Second World War”. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, the stage was carefully set to reinforce the Ukrainian message, which essentially expels Russia from the “civilised world”. Yet, it remains unclear as to how this perspective has been welcomed by the world’s top business leaders, who have gathered for decades in the Swiss luxury resort under the motto “make money, not war”. Panelists speak at an event on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on 25 May 2022 (AFP) Davos has been the temple where globalisation and interconnectedness are preached and celebrated. Should we now believe that its participants agree that the right move is to cut a global commodities powerhouse off from the rest of the world economy? Has any reliable economic simulation been conducted to assess the global impact of such a decision? Probably not. Are we thus once again watching the US-led bloc of western democracies sleepwalking towards another miscalculation of unknown proportions - similar to what we saw in western and central Asia over the last two decades? Just a month into the conflict and the collateral damage of sanctions, I wondered who would crash first: Russia or the global economy, due to the underestimated knock-on consequences. While the jury is still out on this, the economic data appear worrisome. Global trade war Supply chain disruptions, food and energy insecurity, unprecedented inflation, and a major stock market collapse: this is the menu on offer, after two dramatic years of the Covid-19 pandemic. Famine could spur new refugee flows from Africa and the Middle East, a prospect of great concern to the EU. BRICS and the so-called Global South have shown no desire to join the sanctions against Russia. Could secondary sanctions against them be adopted to force them to change their minds? Does the Nato-EU-G7 triad really want to inflict upon the whole world the bankrupt blueprint it unsuccessfully applied to Iran over the last four decades? Russia-Ukraine war: The future of the world is being decided in Beijing Is the Davos crowd keen to move from a globalised and interconnected world to conflicting trading blocs, or even a global trade war? What would happen if, after Russia, the US goes after China, as Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently outlined in a comprehensive speech at the Asia Society? American voters could soon be wondering why the Biden administration pushed Congress to approve, in a matter of months, $54bn in aid to Ukraine, while the US struggles to provide formula to its newborns amid soaring inflation. The Democratic Party risks being decimated in November’s midterm elections. Nobody really knows what Washington’s endgame is in Ukraine. If it is Russia’s defeat, this sounds unrealistic. If it is denying President Vladimir Putin a sound victory, this is difficult to define. If it is creating facts on the ground to improve Kyiv’s negotiating leverage - as recently leaked US National Security Council documents indicate - this is possible, but with high costs and unpredictable outcomes. Western double standards The main problem is that the Nato-EU-G7 triad, in yet another moment of cognitive dissonance, has framed the war as an apocalyptic and existential struggle between democracy and autocracy. BRICS and the Global South are not buying it, nor is the narrative fully shared among western public opinion. Contrary to the triad’s spin efforts, there is a growing feeling that the biggest threats to democracy are not China and Russia, but the western neoliberal model’s failure of governance and deep inequalities. Put simply, there have been broad inconsistencies between the words western democracies have uttered in recent decades, and the actions they have taken. They ought to ask themselves what the US represents today; on what are they still placing their hopes? Russia and China certainly represent a problem for the US-led rules-based world order. But this same order has progressively lost its credibility through endless wars and double standards, and by conveying the clear sense that such rules have always been valid for all but the US and its closest allies. The discourse about freedom and human rights sounds increasingly unconvincing when western allies violate it at will. BRICS and the Global South are reluctant to accept that it is the West’s exclusive prerogative to make the rules around which a new world order is based. Unfortunately, US President Joe Biden and his close allies truly believe that this must be the case. In March, Biden said: “Now is a time when things are shifting. We’re going to - there’s going to be a new world order out there, and we’ve got to lead it.” The bare truth is that Washington, regardless of its official rhetoric, rejects a multipolar world. It clings to its global hegemony, brazenly established by the so-called Wolfowitz Doctrine in the early 1990s. But in the last 30 years, the world has changed. Expanding Nato After the Trump era, European countries breathed a sigh of relief over Biden’s slogan, “America is back”. They ought to ask themselves what the US represents today; on what are they still placing their hopes? One of the wisest American diplomats, Chas Freeman, recently noted: “[American] politics are polarised and dysfunctional, we are in a chronic fiscal deficit, our infrastructure is collapsing, our educational system is increasingly mediocre, our social fabric is fraying, our international prestige is declining, and we are more divided internally than at any time since our civil war. We appear to have achieved herd immunity to strategic reasoning.” The topic of a possible new American civil war is no longer taboo. Judging from his claimed intentions of reforming his country, Biden might be good for the US; less so for the rest of the world. The facts, unfortunately, speak for themselves. Ukrainian soldiers stand on a tank near Bakhmut on 15 May 2022 (AFP) Having ignored caution and pushed for Nato’s eastward expansion, the US, through a process that has apparently been ongoing for the last eight years, has emboldened, supplied and effectively trained Ukraine’s armed forces. The net result was the failure of the Minsk II agreement, paving the way for the wretched and bloody Russian invasion. The discomforting impression is that Washington, London and some eastern European capitals seem determined to fight for Russia’s collapse, down to the last Ukrainian soldier and European consumer. Washington has now even taken the escalatory measure of delivering long-range rockets to Ukraine, which could potentially allow it to strike Russian territory. Does this strategy really suit Europe’s interests? Power at any cost Washington also seems to be on a confrontation path with China. During a recent visit to Japan, Biden vowed to militarily defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese threat. This is a guarantee that no US president has ever issued before, and one that undermines four decades of US-Chinese discourse on this delicate topic. Blinken, in presenting the Biden administration’s strategy towards China, asserted that “even as President Putin’s war continues, we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order - and that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China”. At the same time, the chances for a renewed nuclear deal with Iran appear to have almost disappeared. The US will not remove a symbolic listing of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from the State Department’s terrorist entities list, as requested by Tehran, even though the organisation would regardless still be sanctioned by the US Treasury. As a consequence, Iran could soon reach the nuclear threshold, with all the imaginable consequences. The US seems determined to maintain its global hegemony at any cost, and to maintain or re-establish - on its own - the rules-based world order. This ambition may ultimately deliver its coup de grace.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › 2AC---Ukraine

Russian lashout is Putin’s fault, not America’s fault

Hamid ‘22 [Shadi; Shadi Hamid is a senior fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and an assistant research professor of Islamic studies at Fuller Seminary.; 3-8-22; " There are many things worse than American power”; https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/03/08/there-are-many-things-worse-than-american-power/; accessed 7-1-2022; AH]

Blaming America first became all too easy. After September 11, U.S. power was as overwhelming as it was uncontested. That it was squandered on two endless wars made it convenient to focus on America’s sins, while underplaying Russia’s and China’s growing ambitions. For his part, Putin understood well that the balance of power was shifting. Knowing what he knew, the Russian president wasn’t necessarily “irrational” in deciding to invade Ukraine. He had good reason to think that he could get away with it. After all, he had gotten away with quite a lot for nearly 15 years, ever since the Russian war against Georgia in 2008, when George W. Bush was still president. Then he annexed Crimea in 2014 and intervened brutally in Syria in 2015. Each time, in an understandable desire to avoid an escalatory spiral with Russia, the United States held back and tried not to do anything that might provoke Putin. Meanwhile, Europe became more and more dependent on Russian energy; Germany, for example, was importing 55% of its natural gas from Russia. Just three weeks ago, it was possible for Der Spiegel to declare that most Germans thought “peace with Russia is the only thing that matters.” The narrative of a feckless and divided West solidified for years. We, as Americans, were feeling unsure of ourselves, so it was only reasonable that Putin would feel it too. In such a context, and after four years of Donald Trump and the domestic turmoil that he wrought, it was tempting to valorize “restraint” and limited engagements abroad. Worried about imperial overreach, most of the American left opposed direct U.S. military action against Bashar Assad’s regime in the early 2010s, even though it was Russian and Iranian intervention on behalf of Syria’s dictator that bore the marks of a real imperial enterprise, not just an imagined one. Russia’s unprovoked attack on a sovereign nation, in Europe no less, has put matters back in their proper framing. The question of whether the United States is a uniquely malevolent force in global politics has been resolved. In the span of a few days, skeptics of American power have gotten a taste of what a world where America grows weak and Russia grows strong looks like. Of course, there are still holdouts who insist on seeing the United States as the provocateur. In its only public statement on Ukraine, the Democratic Socialists of America condemned Russia’s invasion but also called for “the U.S. to withdraw from NATO and to end the imperialist expansionism that set the stage for this conflict.” This is an odd statement considering that Russia, rather than the United States, has been the world’s most unabashedly imperialist force for the past three decades. But many on the anti-imperialist left aren’t really anti-imperialist; they just have an instinctive aversion to American power. America’s low opinion of its own capacity for good — and the resulting desire to retreat or disengage — hasn’t just been a preoccupation of the far left. The crisis of confidence has been pervasive, spreading to the halls of power and even President Barack Obama, whose memorable mantra was “Don’t do stupid sh*t.” Instead of thinking about what we could do, or what we could do better, Obama was more interested in a self-limiting principle. For their part, European powers — content to bask under their U.S. security umbrella — could afford to believe in fantasies of perpetual peace. Europe’s gentleness and lethargy — coaxing Germany to commit even 2% of its GDP to defense seemed impossible — became something of a joke. One popular Twitter account, @ISEUConcerned, devoted itself to mocking the European Union’s propensity to express “concern,” but do little else, whenever something bad happened. Suddenly, the EU has been aroused from its slumber, and the parody account was rendered temporarily speechless. This is no longer tepid concern, but righteous fury. Member states announced that they would send anti-tank weapons to Ukraine. Germany, for the first time, said that it would ramp up its military budget to 100 billion euros. On the economic front, the EU announced some of the toughest sanctions in history. My podcast co-host, Damir Marusic, an Atlantic Council senior fellow, likened it to a “holy war,” European-style. Sometimes, unusual and extreme events mark the separation between old and new ways of thinking and being. This week, the Berlin-based journalist Elizabeth Zerofsky remarked that the current moment reminded her of the memoir “The World of Yesterday,” written by the Austrian novelist Stefan Zweig as World War II loomed. In it, he recalls the twilight of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with an almost naive fondness. On the first day of the Ukraine invasion, I happened to be speaking to a group of college students who had no memory of September 11. I told them that they may be living in history. Those students, like all of us, are bearing witness to one of those rare events that recast how individuals and nations alike view the world they inhabit. The coming weeks, months, and years are likely to be as fascinating as they are terrifying. In a sense, we knew that a great confrontation was coming, even if we hadn’t quite envisioned its precise contours. At the start of his presidency, Joe Biden declared that the battle between democracies and autocracies would be the defining struggle of our time. This was grandiose rhetoric, but was it more than that? What does it actually mean to fight such a battle? In any number of ways, Russia’s aggression has underscored why Biden was right and why authoritarians — and the authoritarian idea itself — are such a threat to peace and stability. Russia invaded Ukraine, a democracy, because of the recklessness and domination of one man, Vladimir Putin. The countries that have rallied most enthusiastically behind Ukraine have almost uniformly been democracies, chief among them the United States. America is lousy, disappointing, and maddeningly hypocritical in its conduct abroad, but the notion of any moral equivalence between the United States and Putin’s Russia has been rendered laughable. And if there is such a thing as a better world, then anti-imperialists may find themselves in the odd position of hoping and praying for the health and longevity of not just the West but of Western power.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
AT: Hegemony Bad Scenarios › AT: Russia › 2AC---Ukraine

Ukraine is not America’s fault – American hegemony in Europe has ensured stability, prevented nuclear proliferation, and provided protection.

Brands 3/15 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 3-15-22; " Putin’s Biggest Lie: Blaming NATO for His War”; https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3532081/hal-brands/putin%E2%80%99s-biggest-lie-blaming-nato-his-war; Asharq Al-Awsat; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

Now Russian officials, and even President Vladimir Putin himself, have echoed — and sometimes directly cited — American scholars such as political scientist John Mearsheimer, who argues that the current crisis “is the West’s fault.” The “blame NATO” argument tells a story of hubris, arrogance and tragedy. It holds that there was a golden chance for lasting peace in Europe, but the US threw it all away. Rather than conciliating a defeated rival, Washington repeatedly humiliated it by expanding a vast military alliance up to Russia’s borders and even into the former Soviet Union. This pursuit of American hegemony in a liberal-democratic guise eventually provoked a violent rebuke. In this telling, Putin’s wars against Georgia and Ukraine are just the natural response of one great power whose vital interests are being heedlessly threatened by another. The argument isn’t wholly wrong. Putin’s wars are indeed meant, in part, to push Western influence back from Russia’s frontiers. But the idea that NATO expansion is the root of today’s problems is morally and geopolitically bizarre. Far from being a historic blunder, NATO expansion was one of the great American successes of the post-Cold War era. Far from being the act of a domineering superpower, it was part of a long tradition of vulnerable states begging to join America’s liberal empire. And far from posing a mortal threat to Moscow, NATO enlargement actually provided Russia with far greater security than it could have provided itself. NATO was founded in 1949 with 12 members in Western Europe and North America. It gradually added additional states — Turkey, Greece, West Germany, Spain — over the course of the Cold War. But the big bang of enlargement came once the superpower conflict ended. NATO incorporated the former East Germany into the alliance in 1990; it then added three Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic) in 1999; then seven more, including the Baltic states, in 2004. To understand why NATO grew so rapidly, we have to remember something that nearly everyone has now forgotten: There was no guarantee that Europe would be mostly stable, peaceful and democratic after the Cold War. In fact, many of the analysts who now view NATO expansion as a catastrophe once warned that a post-Cold War Europe could become a violent hellscape. It wasn’t an outlandish scenario. A reunified Germany might once again try to dominate its neighbors; the old enmity between Moscow and Berlin could reignite. The collapse of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe could liberate those states to pursue long-suppressed territorial claims and nationalist agendas. Ethnic tensions and nuclear proliferation might explode as the Cold War order crumbled. If the US pulled back once the Soviet threat was gone, there would be no extra-European superpower to put out fires on a continent with lots of geopolitical kindling. “The prospect of major crises, even wars, in Europe is likely to increase dramatically,” Mearsheimer predicted in 1990. NATO enlargement was the logical answer to these fears. Expansion was a way of binding a reunified Germany to the West and surrounding it with democratic allies. Joining NATO required new members to lay aside any revanchist designs, while allowing them to pursue economic and political reforms rather than investing heavily in military capabilities to defend their newly won autonomy. NATO’s move to the east also ensured that Poland and other states that easily could have built nuclear weapons didn’t need to, because they had American protection. Most important, enlargement kept the US firmly planted in Europe, by preventing the centerpiece of the transatlantic relationship from becoming obsolete. No other initiative could have accomplished these objectives. Partnership for Peace — a series of loose security cooperation agreements with former Soviet-bloc states — didn’t offer the ironclad guarantees that came with NATO membership. (If you want to understand the difference between “security partner” and “NATO ally,” just look at what is happening today to Ukraine, one of the former.) The idea of creating a pan-European security architecture (one that included Russia) had the same defect; plus, it would have given Moscow veto power over the security arrangements of the countries the Soviet Union had so recently dominated. Only American power and promises could provide stability in Europe, and NATO was the continent’s critical link to the US. Since 1949, Washington had tamped down rivalries between old enemies such as France and Germany, while also protecting them from external threats. After 1991, NATO expansion took this zone of peace, prosperity and cooperation that had emerged in Western Europe and moved it into Eastern Europe as well. The revolutionary nature of this achievement seemed obvious not so long ago. “Why has Europe been so peaceful since 1989?” Mearsheimer asked in 2010. The answer, he acknowledged, was because “America has continued to serve as Europe’s pacifier,” protecting the continent from dangers within and without. Today, of course, the critics don’t buy this account. They argue that NATO expansion represented crude power politics, as the US exploited the Soviet collapse to engorge its own empire. What resulted, pundits such as Thomas Friedman contend, was a sort of Weimar Russia — a country whose dignity was affronted, security imperiled and democracy undermined by a harsh, humiliating peace. There is a kernel of truth here, too. Once Russian democracy began to wobble in 1993-94, officials in the Bill Clinton administration saw NATO expansion — in part — as a way of preventing a potentially resurgent, aggressive Russia from rebuilding the Soviet sphere of influence. Russian leaders of all stripes griped about NATO expansion from the early 1990s onward, warning that it could jeopardize the peace of the continent. In hindsight, NATO expansion was one of several issues — including disputes over the Balkans and the collapse of the Russian economy in the late 1990s — that gradually soured Russia’s relationship with the West. Yet this story omits three vital facts. First, all policies have costs. The price of NATO expansion was a certain alienation of Russian elites — although we often forget that Clinton softened the blow by continually courting Russian President Boris Yeltsin, bringing Russia into elite Western institutions such as the Group of Seven, and making Moscow a partner in the intervention in Bosnia in 1995-96. Yet the cost of not expanding NATO might have been forfeiting much of the stability that initiative provided. Trade-offs are inevitable in foreign policy: There was no magic middle path that would have provided all the benefits with none of the costs. Second, if NATO expansion was a manifestation of American empire, it was a remarkably benign and consensual form of empire. When Clinton decided to pursue enlargement, he did so at the urging of the Poles, Czechs and Hungarians. The Baltic countries and others were soon banging at the door. The states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were desperate to join America’s sphere of influence, because they were desperate to leave Moscow’s. This, too, was part of an older pattern: The US has often extended its influence by “invitation” rather than imposition. The creation of NATO in 1949 was mostly a European idea: Countries that were terrified of Moscow sought protection from Washington. One reason Putin’s wars to keep countries from escaping Moscow’s empire are so abhorrent to Americans is that the US empire has trouble keeping members out. Putin may not see it that way. All that matters to him is that the mightiest peacetime alliance in history has crept closer to Russian soil. But here a third fact becomes relevant: Russia was one of the biggest beneficiaries of NATO’s move east. Open terrain has often left Russia vulnerable to invasion and instability emanating from Europe. Napoleonic France, Imperial Germany and Nazi Germany all swept through Eastern Europe to wreak havoc on Russian or Soviet territory. This is one reason why the great strategist George Kennan opposed NATO expansion — because it would surely re-activate this fear of encroachment from the west. Yet this was a red herring, because NATO posed no military threat. The alliance committed, in 1997, not to permanently station foreign troops in Eastern Europe. After the Cold War, America steadily withdrew most of its troops and all of its heavy armor from the continent. US allies engaged in a veritable race to disarm. The prospect that NATO could invade Russia, even had it wanted to, was laughable. What the alliance could do was tame the perils that might otherwise have menaced the Russian state. Germany could hardly threaten Russia: It was nestled snugly into an alliance that also served as a strategic straitjacket. NATO, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had candidly said in 1990, could “play a containing role” vis-à-vis Berlin. Moscow didn’t have to worry about a nuclear Poland — Warsaw didn’t need nukes because it had the protection of the United States. Aside from the Balkan wars of the 1990s, Eastern Europe was comparatively free of the geopolitical intrigues and military quarrels that might have made Russia jumpy. NATO expansion hadn’t just alleviated Europe’s security problems; it had protected Russia’s vital interests as well. Moscow might have lost an empire, but it had gained remarkable safety from external attack. Part of the answer is that NATO expansion wasn’t really the problem, in the sense that Russia didn’t need that pretext to seek renewed hegemony in its near-abroad. The Soviet Union, and the Russian empire before it, had traditionally sought to control countries along their frontiers and used brutal means to do it. To say that NATO expansion caused Russian belligerence is thus to make an extremely dubious assertion: that absent NATO expansion, Moscow would have been a satisfied, status quo power. And this is exactly why a bigger NATO has posed a real problem for Putin. After all, safety from external attack isn’t the only thing that states and rulers want. They want glory, greatness and the privileges of empire. For 20 years, Putin has been publicly lusting after the sphere of influence that the Soviet Union once enjoyed. NATO expansion stood athwart that ambition, by giving Moscow’s former vassals the ability to resist its pressure. NATO also threatened a certain type of Russian government — an autocracy that was never secure in its own rule. A democratic Russia wouldn’t so much have minded being neighbors with Western-leaning democracies, because political liberty in those countries wouldn’t have threatened to set a subversive example for anti-Putin Russians. Yet, as Russia became more autocratic in the early 2000s, and as Putin’s popularity declined with the Russian economy after 2008, the imperative of preventing ideological spillover from a US-backed democratic community loomed large. So Putin began pushing back against NATO’s eastward march. In 2008, he invaded Georgia, a country that was moving — too slowly for its own safety — toward the West. Since 2014, he has been waging war against Ukraine, in hopes of rebuilding the Russian empire and halting Kiev’s westward drift. America’s vision of Europe has now run into Putin’s program of violent coercion. To be sure, US officials made mistakes along the way. Because Russia was prostrate, militarily and economically, during the 1990s, Washington acquired a bad habit of issuing security guarantees without really considering how it would fulfill them in a crisis. The Pentagon has thus been scrambling, since 2014, to devise a credible defense of NATO’s eastern flank. As Russia regained its strength, US officials also failed to grasp the danger of provoking Putin without adequately deterring him. When, in 2008, NATO declined to endorse membership for Georgia and Ukraine but issued a vague statement saying that they would someday join the alliance, it created the worst of all worlds — giving Putin both the pretext and the time to pre-empt future expansion by tearing those two countries apart. Yet there is a curious morality in accounts that blame the West, which sought to protect vulnerable states in Eastern Europe, for the current carnage, rather than blaming Putin, who has worked to dismember and intimidate those countries. It is sloppy thinking to tally up the costs of NATO expansion without considering the historic achievements of a policy that served American, European and even certain Russian interests remarkably well. And if nothing else, NATO expansion pushed the dividing line between Moscow and the democratic world to the east after one Cold War — a factor of great significance now that a second cold war is underway. The legacy of NATO expansion isn’t simply a matter of historical interest. Americans’ understanding of the past has always influenced their view of what policies to pursue in the future. During the 1920s and 1930s, the widespread, if inaccurate, belief that America had entered World War I to serve the interests of banks and arms manufacturers had a paralyzing effect on US policy amid the totalitarian aggression that set off World War II. Today, the US faces a long, nasty struggle to contain Putin’s imperial project and protect an endangered world order. Introspection is an admirable quality, but the last thing America needs is another bout of self-flagellation rooted in another misapprehension of the past.