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2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › competition › 2nc – at: perm do counterplan

It’s unconditional entitlement and not a QPQ

Munson 13, senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer (Peter, “The Limits of Security Cooperation,” War on the Rocks,

If SC is incapable in many cases of building meaningful partner capacity or creating real influence, then wonks will argue that SC and especially military aid payments are needed to secure much more black-and-white U.S. interests: overflight and transit agreements and peace treaty compliance. Yet, this is another instance where the bankruptcy of SC ideology is demonstrated. SC [Security Cooperation] funding and services are generally not initiated as a quid pro quo for overflight and transit. Once the flow of cash has started, however, threats of closing off cooperation in the form of overflight, transit, or other agreements become tools of extortion in the hands of the foreign partner. No matter how inefficient or expensive, the U.S. cannot turn the spigot down or off. SC thus is not a tool to condition partner behaviors, but rather an entitlement—a fee for maintaining the status quo—a baseline bribe that creates a market of fees-for-service for the most mundane issues.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › competition › 2nc – at: perm do both

Doing both requires assistance to undemocratic states – undermines democratization

Sullivan 18, associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina (Patricia, et al, “Arming the Peace: Foreign Security Assistance and Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries,” Defence and Peace Economics, doi:10.1080/10242694.2018.1558388)

Only a handful of other studies systematically investigate the impact of military aid on civilian populations outside the context of an ongoing war. This scholarship tends to focus on weapons transfers. Like much of the literature on economic aid, the bulk of the research on arms transfers concludes that major conventional weapons transfers to developing countries increase human rights abuses and impede democratization (Blanton 1999a, 1999b, de Soysa, Jackson, and Ormhaug 2010). More recently, Pamp et al. (2018) find that conventional weapons imports increase the risk of intrastate conflict onset – particularly in countries with other risk factors for political violence. This study echoes results from Craft and Smaldone (2002) who find that arms imports increase the risk of civil war in sub-Saharan Africa. In sum, extant research leans toward a pessimistic outlook on the prospects for foreign assistance to improve human security in fragile and conflict-affected countries. While there is some evidence that economic aid could increase the capacity of governments to deter violent nonstate actors and lessen armed conflict, most studies suggest economic aid, military assistance, and arms transfers all negatively impact governance and human rights conditions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › competition › 2nc – at: perm do both

Security Cooperation should not be a handout to non-democracies

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, *senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress,

While this report calls for realigning U.S. assistance toward democratic allies and partners, it avoids diving into the specific policy debates over what countries should or should not receive security assistance. Those are obviously critical foreign policy debates, but the authors focus on improving the ability of U.S. officials to make coherent policy decisions by first creating an effective management and organizational structure of security assistance. This will also require major reform to the State Department’s own security assistance programs, which routinely and without deliberation provide billions in aid to nondemocracies. Security assistance should not be a diplomatic handout or entitlement; it should serve U.S. foreign policy and be flexible enough in its administration to align with U.S. foreign policy objectives and values. That not only requires consolidating security assistance programs in one place, but also demands significant reforms to the decision-making structure and security assistance system at the State Department.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › competition › 2nc – at: perm do both

The condition must be met prior to US provision of aid, and must be cut-off if backsliding occurs. The perm violates both.

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, *senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress,

Currently, human rights considerations are rarely given significant weight in decisions about who to support and when with U.S. security assistance. In moving resources to the State Department, officials should conduct a full review of a partner’s capability, capacity, and political will to protect civilians and abide by human rights requirements before approving future U.S. assistance.92 These reviews, conducted at the outset of U.S. security relationships, could ensure that a partner is unlikely to abuse U.S. aid. Additionally, to counter the sizeable influence of regional bureaus, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor should be required to review and concur on security assistance projects that involve countries found to have a history or pattern of human rights abuses in the conduct of its security forces or security policy. This determination should be informed by the State Department’s own annual human rights reporting in addition to information from civil society groups. Human rights vetting should also be reformed. Under the current system, partners who purchase U.S. assistance and equipment circumvent Leahy law vetting, and aid that flows directly to ministries of defense, rather than individual units, is not subject to the same human rights restrictions.93 Closing these loopholes would not only bring all U.S. assistance in accordance with existing U.S. law, but it would also make for smarter policy. Researchers have found that when partners commit human rights abuses with known U.S. support, civilians on the ground are more likely to blame American foreign policy.94 Prioritizing partners that are willing to abide by international human rights standards would protect American interests and civilians on the ground. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, in collaboration with the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, should jointly increase the human rights vetting of arms transfers. Finally, the State Department should develop a framework of triggers and indicators on human rights and civilian protection that would require a reevaluation or termination of a security partnership. When partners commit abuses or refuse to abide by international law, the United States must be willing to cut off assistance. This would ensure that the United States is not complicit in abusive behavior and could incentivize partners to clean up security force conduct. This internal trigger should also automatically alert Congress to ensure that proper remediation is done by the executive branch.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › competition › 2nc – at: perm do both

The plan and perm establish no-strings-patronage---that ensures the condition is not met

Tecott 21, PhD in Political Science @ MIT (Rachel, “The Cult of the Persuasive: The U.S. Military’s Aversion to Coercion in Security Assistance,” Proquest Dissertations)

INDUCEMENT. Existing scholarship identifies several conditions for successful inducement. One critical condition for successful inducement based on reciprocity norms is the establishment of a pattern of tit-for-tat exchange.55 In the context of SFA [Security Force Assistance], however, the United States often provides inducements repeatedly, without waiting for intervening concessions. Far from bolstering a norm of reciprocity, the repeated provision of inducements without answer would logically erode any existing norm of reciprocity, establishing a norm of no-strings patronage in its place.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › competition › 2nc – at: perm do both

Perm can’t solve the net benefit – inclusion of the plan’s unconditional cooperation fails to generate reform

“security assistance” and “security cooperation” used interchangeably

Gwinn 22 – Jeremy Gwinn, director of Army and Special Missions Team at OSC-I at the United States Department of Defense, Ph.D. in international law from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, B.A. in military science from Penn State University (“Sweeter Carrots and Harder Sticks: Rethinking US Security Assistance”, 4/19/2022, ) FGY

Security Assistance as Incentive

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – specific › 2nc – say yes – cyber

Allies are already firmly committed to attribution

Marks 21 – Joseph Marks, reporter for the cybersecurity 202 newsletter at the Washington Post, M.S. in foreign service at Georgetown University (“The Cybersecurity 202: The U.S. and allies are taking a stand against Chinese hacking. Here are three takeaways”, 7/19/2021, ) FGY

The Biden administration and a bevy of allies are calling out China this morning for a raft of bad behavior in cyberspace, including a hack into Microsoft email servers that compromised at least 30,000 organizations in the United States alone. 

U.S. officials are formally attributing that to China’s Ministry of State Security, as are allies from the European Union, NATO, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Japan.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – specific › 2nc – say yes – cyber

Allies say yes – shifting towards prioritizing cybersecurity now, builds allied commitments, and key to combat Russia

Herr and Schneider 18 – Trey Herr, visiting fellow at the Hoover Institution; Jacquelyn Schneider, assistant professor and affiliate faculty at the Center for Cyber Conflict Studies at the U.S. Naval War College (“Sharing is Caring: The United States’ New Cyber Commitment for NATO”, Council on Foreign Relations, 10/10, 2018, ) FGY

Given the recent blockbuster headlines about alleged Chinese snooping on server hardware sold to major technology companies and the latest joint-denunciation of Russian cyber operations, you could be forgiven for having missed an important NATO-related development. The Associated Press reports that the U.S. Defense Department will announce a new commitment to use offensive and defensive cybersecurity capabilities on behalf of NATO allies.

The new commitment is notable given how cybersecurity has long been treated as an exceptional domain of operations, and cyber capabilities reserved as strategic national assets to be shared with only the closest of allies. With this announcement, the Pentagon is suggesting that cyber capabilities might be used alongside conventional weapons with allies and indeed, equal weight appears to be given to offensive and defensive operations. Perhaps most significantly, the announcement moves NATO partners closer to what has been a tight coterie of U.S.-favored signals intelligence partners such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, and Canada.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – specific › 2nc – say yes – cyber

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forces NATO allies to remain open to cooperation and strengthen democratic values

Smith 22 – Brad Smith, president of Microsoft and chief legal officer, B.A. from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, J.D. from Columbia Law School, studied international law at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Switzerland (“Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War”, 6/22/2022, ) FGY

This report offers five conclusions that come from the war’s first four months: 

First, defense against a military invasion now requires for most countries the ability to disburse and distribute digital operations and data assets across borders and into other countries. Russia not surprisingly targeted Ukraine’s governmental data center in an early cruise missile attack, and other “on premise” servers similarly were vulnerable to attacks by conventional weapons. Russia also targeted its destructive “wiper” attacks at on-premises computer networks. But Ukraine’s government has successfully sustained its civil and military operations by acting quickly to disburse its digital infrastructure into the public cloud, where it has been hosted in data centers across Europe.  

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – specific › 2nc – say yes – ai logistics

Allies are hyperaware of the mutual benefits of AI intel sharing

Ryseff 20 – James Ryseff, senior technical policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, M.S. in security studies from Georgetown University (“The United States Can Only Achieve AI Dominance with its Allies”, 10/9/2020, ) FGY

First, the Defense Department could create a 10-year roadmap for upgrading data interoperability that lays out specific operational objectives to demonstrate improvements. To ensure these objectives are met, they could be incorporated into the major annual exercises conducted with NATO and East Asian allies. For example, American and South Korean units could draw spare parts and other consumables from each other during their annual training exercises. Throughout the exercise, both sides could confirm their logistics databases can combine to present a unified picture of the allied logistical situation and provide projections of future needs as the simulated combat event evolves.

Establishing tangible objectives and aligning the timeframe with existing multinational exercises will be the key to success. Militaries invest a great deal of time and effort training their personnel to be ready for the fight. They must now learn how to “train” and prepare their data as well. This can mean many things. When training their personnel, militaries spend some of their time imparting specific skillsets that will be useful in combat. In other cases, soldiers learn how to work together to solve unforeseeable problems as they arise — or simply learn how the operational routines of other units or allied militaries differ from their own. Regardless, commanders recognize their soldiers must routinely practice their skills under real-world conditions if they will be expected to work as an effective team on the battlefield.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – specific › 2nc – say yes – ai logistics

NATO allies see AI defense as key to combat China – the US has already started leveraging its lead

Warrell 21 – Helen Warrell, assistant opinions editor at the Financial Times (“Nato allies need to speed up AI defence co-operation”, 6/8/2021, ) FGY

As Russia intensifies cyber hostilities and China weaponises artificial intelligence, joining forces in the field of high-tech warfare will feature high on the list of topics discussed by Nato allies at a summit next week. But the transatlantic alliance’s 30 members will need to move fast if they aim to make up lost ground. Nato is proposing a new tech innovation centre bringing together military personnel with industry to foster digital defence start-ups. Some of these might be financed by a separate initiative, also set to be debated: a venture capital fund for innovation which member states could choose to opt in to. The efforts are belated, as Nato secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg himself acknowledged. “For decades, Nato allies have been leading when it comes to technology, but that’s not obvious any more,” he told the Financial Times in an interview last week. “We see China especially investing heavily in new, disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, big data, and they implement them into new advanced weapon systems, drones, submarines, aircraft and so on.” He is not the first to sound the alarm. Eric Schmidt, the former Google chief executive who now chairs the US’s National Security Commission on AI, warned earlier this year that Beijing was planning to undermine conventional military forces by “leapfrogging” to new technologies. The commission’s report, published in March, raised concerns that China would use AI for “reconnaissance, electromagnetic countermeasures and co-ordinated firepower strikes”. Part of the problem is that western defence institutions have been slow to recognise the potential of innovation beyond their own industry. “For decades, a lot of technological development would happen within the defence sector — the internet, nuclear, GPS, all of that was developed by the defence industry and then shared with the civilian sector,” Stoltenberg said. “Now, it goes the other way around. It’s a civilian sector which is leading in the development of artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and many of the new disruptive technologies.” Some Nato members are ahead of others. The US and France have published military AI strategies, while the UK announced this year that it is to establish a centre for defence AI. For the first time, Britain’s intelligence agency, MI6, is recruiting from the private sector for a new head of its “Q” branch — the technical lab made famous in the James Bond films. Establishing a new Nato hub — known as an “accelerator” — in which tech companies and members of the armed forces can experiment with new ideas has advantages, according to Professor Fiona Murray, co-director of MIT’s innovation initiative. Start-ups and investors do not always have the time to tackle defence challenges when solutions are “hard to test, markets are fragmented and procurement is slow”, Murray said. Working together would create a wider market for new products and enhance collective security, she noted. It was “not enough” for countries to be handling this individually, she said. The US has started marshalling allies on the policy implications of using new technology. The Pentagon’s “AI Partnership for Defense”, comprising 13 countries (including Nato members Canada, Denmark, Estonia, the UK, France and Norway) met virtually for the first time last year to agree joint military standards on AI. Schmidt’s commission has called on the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance (the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) to work more closely on developing AI systems. Ulrike Franke, an expert in military technology at the European Council on Foreign Relations, argues that Nato’s tech centre will be most effective if it prioritises systems designed to facilitate joint military operations. The alliance should look at areas such as AI-enabled command and control, she said, which could give members a unified picture of the battlefield across multiple regions, using intelligent data analysis to sift information. Franke said that in the vast arena spanning drones to quantum computing, there was a temptation to cover too much. “It makes massive sense for Nato to look more at this [technology]”, she said. “The question is, what exactly are they focusing on? There’s a danger of Nato spreading itself too thin.”

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – specific › 2nc – say yes – poland

The US should use SC to leverage Poland. Key to global democracy.

Hegedus 5-12-21, nonresident fellow for Central Europe at the German Marshall Fund. He previously worked at Freedom House, the German Council on Foreign Relations and the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, and has taught at the Institute for Eastern-European Studies at the Free University in Berlin, Humboldt University in Berlin and the Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest (Daniel, “Why the US should meddle in Europe to stop autocratizing NATO allies,” The Hill,

While the Biden administration has elevated the fight against authoritarian trends and corruption to a foreign policy priority, the U.S. now faces a tough challenge to its democracy agenda: the authoritarian developments among its European NATO allies, particularly Hungary and Poland. Both countries experienced the sharpest decline in democratic quality in the Western world since the recent incumbents, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party in Hungary and Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, came to power in 2010 and 2015, respectively. The fact that neither of the world’s two leading democracy-measuring institutions — Freedom House and V-Dem — considers Hungary to be any sort of democracy anymore should raise alarm about the true authoritarian nature of illiberal projects among U.S. allies in Central and Eastern Europe. If Washington turns a blind eye to the authoritarian developments in its own self-described, value-based alliance system, the U.S. risks running into the accusation of double standards, which may significantly weaken its democracy agenda. However, the autocratization of Hungary and Poland poses more challenges for the U.S. than just its credibility when it comes to democracy and rule of law. Besides Turkey, Hungary is the only NATO member state that fails to comply, not only with democratic values that the current administration promotes, but also with the foreign policy priorities and interests of the U.S. regarding China and Russia. In stark contrast to Budapest, Poland’s commitment to NATO has been unshakeable because of the existential security threat stemming from Russia. Warsaw also has been ready in the past to comply with Washington’s main expectations regarding China, in order to keep the U.S. engaged as a security provider on NATO’s Eastern Flank. However, since the Biden administration took office, Poland appears to be distancing itself from Washington’s China policy by seeking a more intense and balanced relationship with Beijing and labeling U.S.-China strategic competition as a “bilateral issue.” Warsaw may believe it has the upper hand in U.S.-Poland bilateral relations if it rests on the assumption that the U.S. won’t reduce its security engagement on the Eastern Flank without undermining its own strategic approach to NATO. According to the Polish perception, the Biden administration cannot credibly threaten Poland with weakening security cooperation if the PiS government further proceeds with its authoritarian agenda. How can Washington then address the autocratization of its Central European NATO allies, Hungary and Poland, and their rapprochement with Beijing? While U.S. influence over Hungary might be limited, Washington still does have significant leverage over Poland because of Warsaw’s substantial interest in security cooperation. Washington should be ready to play out the security card to put pressure on Warsaw. First, it should calibrate its diplomatic and policy moves in a way that drives a wedge between Poland and Hungary. This could allow European Union institutions to address authoritarian developments in both countries, but primarily in Hungary, more effectively. How can such a strategy be realized? U.S. diplomacy should clearly communicate with Poland that Warsaw’s strategic alliance with Budapest poses a heavy burden on any further deepening of the security cooperation. Washington also should use the security cooperation card on the Polish domestic stage to weaken the vanguards of authoritarian politics in the Polish government coalition and strengthen moderate forces. It should communicate the message on all available channels that the policies of Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro pose severe obstacles to deeper transatlantic relations, while Deputy Prime Minister Jarosław Gowin should be backed in parallel. Furthermore, as a strong contrast to former President Trump’s approach to the European Union, President Biden should recognize — and use — EU institutions as potential vehicles for amplifying U.S. interests. In this spirit, the U.S. should elevate the question of autocratizing EU member states to the highest levels of the transatlantic dialogue and create a discourse of reciprocity with regard to the democracy homework that both the U.S. and the EU have to do on the home front. The U.S. recently started working on strengthening democracy at home after Trump’s four-year onslaught on democratic institutions, but the EU largely has failed to do so for a decade. Since the European Union expressed its high expectations for a renewal and reinforcement of U.S. democracy, Washington should not shy away from communicating the same message to EU institutions and key European governments, including Germany. Germany lately has evolved into a key autocracy-enabler within the EU, so Berlin’s policy toward Budapest and Warsaw also should be put on the U.S.-German bilateral relations agenda.To provide the appropriate impetus for U.S.-EU dialogue on authoritarian developments in Europe, and to push EU institutions toward a more activist approach, Washington could consider moves that may ridicule EU passivity, especially towards Hungary. In similar fashion, as it happened recently with former Slovak general prosecutor Dobroslav Trnka, the Biden administration should trigger sanction mechanisms against key stakeholders of political corruption in Hungary — potentially including general prosecutor Péter Polt; the regime’s top oligarch, Lőrinc Mészáros; or Orbán’s son-in-law, István Tiborcz. That would put pressure on the EU to act and could help to push forward the application of the EU’s rule of law conditionality regulation, which is actually suspended. With an eye on the upcoming 2022 elections in Hungary, the U.S. should emphasize the question of electoral integrity both in its dialogue with the EU and within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and should act proactively to put in place a robust international electoral monitoring mission under an OSCE flag. On a bilateral level, the U.S. should renew its commitment to supporting democracy in central and eastern Europe, making financial resources available for the support of critical civil society and free media, and calibrating priorities in a way that will allow for grants to have real impact on the ground. If Washington would like to preserve the credibility of its democracy agenda, it must address the autocratization of its Central European allies in a convincing way. However, it can only succeed if the Biden administration is ready to meddle in European politics in unprecedented ways.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – specific › 2nc – say yes – turkey

2 – positive incentives that bind Turkey to NATO are successful

Kim and Utku 22, *assistant professor of international affairs, **Utku is a research intern at the Brussels School of Governance (Tongfi and Mehmet, “It’s time to bind Turkey to NATO,” The Brussels Times,

Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has had an uneasy dance with both NATO allies and Russia for years. The ongoing war in Ukraine has accentuated Turkey’s ambiguous position in international relations, as Ankara criticizes Russia’s invasion and continues to sell armed drones to Ukraine while also taking distance from Western sanctions against Moscow. This ambiguity is sometimes useful, as can be seen in Turkey’s hosting of peace talks for Russia and Ukraine. NATO allies, however, should now strive to bind Turkey closely to the alliance, through positive economic incentives. One might wonder why NATO allies need to coax Turkey, a formal military ally since 1952, into solidarity, especially when Turkey’s largest external threat is invading Ukraine, a Black Sea neighbour of Turkey. The answer lies in Turkey’s geopolitical position and the recent history of Russia’s wedge strategy ­– the “attempt to prevent, break up, or weaken a threatening or blocking alliance at an acceptable cost.” Turkey plays a critical role in the region around the Black Sea, where ten wars have been fought since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, within NATO, Ankara has demonstrated its foreign policy autonomy from Washington and European allies on issues such as the Cyprus dispute, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, treatment of Kurds, and civil wars in Libya and Syria. Taking advantage of the frictions between Ankara and other NATO member capitals, Vladimir Putin has been driving a wedge between Turkey and NATO allies in recent years. Moscow has a variety of tools to pressure Ankara because of the two countries’ economic ties and involvement in various conflicts. After Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 fighter jet near the Syria–Turkey border in November 2015, for instance, Russia imposed economic sanctions on Turkey in tourism and agricultural trade and raised military pressure against Turkey in Syria. The pressure forced Erdoğan to send a letter of apology. Then came the July 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan, after which Putin immediately expressed support for the Turkish president in contrast to the muted response from NATO allies. Turkey subsequently made a deal to purchase Russia’s S-400 air-defense system, reportedly worth US$2.5 billion, despite U.S. objections. Arguing that Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 system creates security risks, Washington imposed sanctions on the Turkish defense industry in December 2020 and expelled Ankara from its F-35 fighter jet program. Due to concerns over further U.S. sanctions, Turkey has yet to fully activate the S-400 system. In an international environment where Erdoğan was increasingly isolated, Putin offered precious diplomatic victories to him. Some Turkish analysts, for instance, suspect that Putin allowed Ankara to become a power broker in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia “to keep driving a wedge between Turkey and other members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” Turkey’s current role as the mediator between Russia and Ukraine, of course, is also a big boost for Erdoğan in the field of diplomacy. The West has greater leverage The West, however, has its own tools to bind Turkey to NATO. Most importantly, the West has a superior power to reward Turkey. For instance, analysts often refer to close economic ties between Turkey and Russia, but the EU is by far Turkey’s largest trading partner and main source of investments, accounting for 33.4% of Turkey’s imports and 41.3% of its exports in 2020 (and 21 out of the 27 EU member states are also members of NATO). Military relations between Turkey and NATO also favour the West. NATO’s collective defense protects Turkey, and the decades-old alliance ties have made Turkey far more dependent on the West than on Russia. The S-400 system is expensive, but the delivery to Turkey began only in 2019, and Russia accounts for only 5% of arms import by Turkey in the last ten years between 2012 and 2021. During the decade, Russia ranked below other weapons suppliers of Turkey such as the United States (51%), Italy (16%), Spain (13%), and South Korea (6%) according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Arms Transfers Database. For binding Turkey to NATO and wedging Turkey away from Russia, we recommend reward-based strategies rather than coercion. Academic literature suggests that positive sanctions work better and that a coercive approach is chosen by those with weaker reward power. A coercive strategy can easily antagonize the target, whereas a reward-based strategy is unlikely to worsen the status quo. Reward-binding is particularly important in relation to the Turkish public, who have resented the West’s treatment of their country in the aftermath of the Syrian refugee crisis and the 2016 coup attempt against Erdoğan. This anti-Western sentiment has been further exacerbated by pro-government Turkish media. In fact, unlike the seemingly neutral position of the Turkish government in this Russia-Ukraine war, Turkish mass media is dominated by anti-Western discourse and criticism against NATO. A poll in March revealed that 48.3% of Turks blamed the United States and NATO for the current situation in Ukraine and only 33.7% thought Russia was responsible. In the same poll, 51.7% of Turks see the United States as the biggest threat to their country as opposed to Russia (19.4%). As a Turkish scholar points out, anti-Western sentiments that developed for years will not easily disappear from the Turkish public opinion even after Erdoğan’s recent U-turn. In international security and diplomacy, NATO allies have already begun taking a conciliatory approach toward Ankara. This can be seen in the recent Franco-Turkish rapprochement and the Biden administration’s support for “appropriate U.S. defense trade ties with Turkey.” Economic reward-binding by NATO allies is likely to be appreciated by Erdoğan, who faces the presidential election in 2023. More importantly, this is a chance for the West to offer the olive branch to the Turkish public as Turkey experiences the highest level of inflation in 20 years, with Erdoğan’s economic mismanagement, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine creating a perfect storm for the economy. Deepening of the EU-Turkey customs union and other positive economic incentives are useful tools to improve media freedom and human rights in Turkey, and the West should ask for domestic political concessions from Erdoğan. Rather than using Turkey’s political problems as excuses to keep Turkey at distance, however, economic rewards should be employed to bind the hearts of the Turkish public to NATO.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – specific › 2nc – say yes – turkey

1 – the counterplan’s transactional negotiation is a signal of prestige for Erdogan

Rossomondo 6-10-2022 (John, “NATO Must Confront Turkey’s Human-Rights Abuses,” Epoch Times, https://www.theepochtimes.com/nato-must-confront-turkeys-human-rights-abuses_4522853.html?welcomeuser=1)//BB

“The real message he was trying to send to the Biden administration was that he wants to sit around the table and negotiate with them,” Bozkurt told me, noting that Erdoğan likely wants help to stop the upcoming trial of Halkbank, a Turkish state bank, that builds on the earlier Hakan Atilla/Reza Zarrab case that showed the bank was allegedly involved in helping Iran evade sanctions by laundering money through the U.S. financial system. “He is hoping to put pressure on the Biden administration that they will interfere in the judicial process and hush up, like he did in Turkey, the case,” Bozkurt said. Erdoğan fears being directly implicated in the case because he allegedly personally approved using Halkbank to move funds on Iran’s behalf, Bozkurt said. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Casuvoglu last month raised the issue with Secretary of State Antony Blinken, claiming that Halkbank that Atilla worked for was a Turkish-government bank and was immune from U.S. law. President Joe Biden snubbed Erdoğan last fall during the opening of the U.N. General Assembly, and Turkey’s president hopes to get attention from Biden by holding up Swedish and Finnish accession into NATO, Bozkurt said. “He has to play that relationship [with the United States] to the Turkish public and say, ‘I’m a leader that can do a deal here and there with very powerful figures in the world,” Bozkurt said. “He doesn’t care at all about the PKK; Erdoğan would bargain with the Devil for all he cares.” He dismisses rhetoric about the PKK and Gülenists as “packaging,” because Sweden cannot offer anything of value. Former Syrian opposition figure Kamal al-Labwani, who worked with the Turks in the past and likewise lives in Sweden, agrees. Sweden’s Left Party includes PKK supporters according to al-Labwani.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – specific › 2nc – say yes – baltics

Baltic states are already asking for more defense from NATO – the Ukraine invasion makes them perceive danger

LRT 22 – Lithuanian Radio and Television, Lithuanian public broadcaster, media group that is owned by the public (“Estonian PM says Baltic states would be ‘wiped off the map’ under current NATO plans”, 6/23/2022, ) FGY

Current NATO defence plans would not prevent Estonia from being wiped off the map and the capital Tallinn from being razed to the ground, the country’s prime minister, Kaja Kallas, was quoted as telling reporters on Wednesday by the Financial Times.

She said the alliance’s current plans envisage that the Baltic states would be overrun, but then be retaken 180 days later.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – specific › 2nc – say yes – baltics

Baltics states say yes – Ukraine has made them desperate for more defense

Emmott & Sytas 22 – Robin Emmott, diplomatic correspondent for Reuters covering NATO, EU defense, and foreign policy; Andrius Sytas, journalist for Reuters covering Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (“The Baltic states want more NATO. They won’t get all they seek”, 6/15/2022, ) FGY

TAPA MILITARY BASE, Estonia, June 15 (Reuters) - Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February, the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been calling for their region to receive the biggest build-up of combat-ready NATO forces in Europe since the end of the Cold War, to be agreed at a summit on June 28-30 in Madrid.

It will not happen, interviews with seven senior diplomats and officials from leading NATO allies show.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – general › 2nc – at: backlash

Fear of backlash is mistaken

Carothers 21, senior vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Benjamin Press, research assistant in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program (Thomas, “Navigating the Democracy-Security Dilemma in U.S. Foreign Policy: Lessons from Egypt, India, and Turkey,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, )//BB

A persistent tendency in the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy is to assume a negative effect: that pushing the security partner on democracy issues will make it less helpful with regard to U.S. security objectives. This has been the assumption, for example, of many policymakers working on Egypt over the years, undergirding the persistent U.S. reluctance to push the Egyptian government on its antidemocratic and repressive politics. Yet in many, arguably most, cases, the security interests that Washington hopes the partner will help with are mutual interests, not just those of the United States alone. India’s willingness to take an increasingly tough stance vis-à-vis China is not something that it does because Washington wants it to, but out of its own self-interest. Egypt’s brokering of peaceful relations between Hamas and Israel at times of crisis is very useful from Washington’s point of view, but also serves Cairo’s interests, since open conflict between Israel and Hamas could potentially destabilize Egypt. The notion that the security partner is taking a given stance on a certain issue as a favor to Washington—and thereby may abandon that stance if Washington is not nice to it—is frequently incorrect.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – general › 2nc – at: backlash

Member states say yes. Making support conditional is more likely to induce states to join US-led efforts

Gannon and Kent 21, PhD in Political Science @ UC-San Diego, **PhD in Political Science @ Ohio State (“Keeping Your Friends Close, but Acquaintances Closer: Why Weakly Allied States Make Committed Coalition Partners,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 65.5)//BB

Because alliance membership is a club good, not a pure public good, worries about being excluded from the security benefits of an alliance can incentivize a state to try to shore up the alliance by sending a costly signal of their commitment to their alliance partners. “Today, we should expect the European allies to find that the best way to strengthen (or avoid weakening) their bonds with the United States is to contribute to out-of-area operations like ISAF. According to this line of reasoning, the allies who put the highest premium on NATO’s traditional products should be the ones—together with the United States—shouldering the heaviest burdens in Afghanistan” (Ringsmose 2010, 331). Yet the Afghanistan case demonstrates this is not just a story about club goods in formal alliances, but security cooperation more generally. States may use war efforts as a signal of their willingness to accept large costs in the hopes that this will improve their relationship with the coalition leader in the future. States use conflicts that are not of immediate strategic importance to— hopefully—gain the attention and respect of important international players. Closer alignments may be valued inherently, for unspecified reasons, or to help the state acquire side payments or policy concessions on unrelated issues. Henke (2019a) argues that states contribute to coalition conflicts when the “pivotal state”— what we call the coalition leader—provides side payments as incentives to contribute. This highlights our broader logic about variation in club goods and public goods in alliances and coalitions. States contribute to coalition warfare when there are benefits to contributing troops that fall outside the traditionally understood alliance mandates or security concerns. In US-led conflicts since the Korean War, Henke (2019a) find that future benefits offered by pivotal states can induce coalition participation. We extend upon this finding by arguing that states with unrealized alliance potential are most likely to be moved by that logic. Furthermore, they will go above and beyond in their coalition participation to try to secure future benefits— whether side payments or unrelated payments—that extend from a closer relationship with the coalition leader.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – general › 2nc – say yes – EDT-specific

Mounting danger in emerging tech means that NATO allies are willing to cooperate to counter threats

Harper 22 – Jon Harper, managing editor of DefenseScoop covering the Pentagon and military technology (“Emerging tech to have prominent role in NATO’s new strategic concept”, 6/1/2022, ) FGY

Emerging and disruptive technologies will be a key focus area of NATO’s new Strategic Concept which will be unveiled later this month, the U.S. ambassador to the alliance told reporters Wednesday.

The document is expected to be adopted at the upcoming NATO summit in Madrid, marking the first time in more than a decade that the transatlantic military pact has released a new Strategic Concept. The guidance sets the alliance’s strategy and security tasks, outlines the challenges and opportunities it faces in a changing security environment, and provides direction for its political and military implementation.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
DEMOCRACY QPQ CP › solvency – say yes – general › 2nc – say yes – civil society

That’s necessary and sufficient

Rand and Tankel 2015 Dr. Dafna H. Rand is the former Deputy Director of Studies and the inaugural Leon E. Panetta Fellow at CNAS. She formerly served on the National Security Council staff and as a Middle East expert on the Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff. Stephen Tankel is an Assistant Professor in the School of International Service at American University, and an adjunct fellow in the Asia-Pacific Security program at CNAS. He previously served as a Senior Adviser for Asian & Pacific Security Affairs at the Department of Defense. “Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the Return on Investment,” August 2015.

Critics of conditionality within the United States government often argue that it has rarely directly changed the domestic decisionmaking of U.S. allies.50 However, advocates of conditionality within the U.S. government have argued that withholding assistance and cooperation is not always about direct effect; in fact, withholding items to partner governments that they could use to support internal repression signals the broader range of goals and objectives constitutive of U.S. foreign policy, including U.S. values and the role of international norms. There is a signaling function of conditionality, since the United States can use it to send a message of discontent to the local governments in question and, more importantly, to their publics. Therefore, while many within and outside of the U.S. government are debating the relative impact of the recent Bahrain and Egypt conditionality exercises, the larger discussion will continue about the purpose of conditionality. Up for debate is how U.S. policymakers use it, either proactively or retroactively, and how specifically the United States must tie the specific punishment to the desired change of behavior in a partner state. Such discussion must also account for concerns among some that conditioning assistance could deleteriously affect other U.S. objectives in the recipient country or its region. However, because it is nearly impossible to prove that partners have “punished” the United States by reducing cooperation in one area as a direct result of dissatisfaction with U.S. policy in another area, the concern about tradeoffs will remain largely speculative.