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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves › Impacts --- DIANA solves Case (biotech/ai)

Specifically solves AI and Biotech---it’s a new shift on innovation.

Goda Naujokaitytė & Fintan Burke 22, Senior Journalists for Science|Business, “NATO to launch €1B fund for high tech start-ups in dual use technologies,” https://sciencebusiness.net/news/nato-launch-eu1b-fund-high-tech-start-ups-dual-use-technologies/micahw

NATO has launched a new research programme called DIANA to bring industry, start-up companies and academia together to research new dual-use technologies that address both societal problems and national security issues.

The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is focusing on technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, autonomy, biotechnology, novel materials and space.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves › Impacts --- DIANA Solves Case

NATO is already involved in setting Allied targets for emerging technology and building industry partnerships – solves the aff better while avoiding direct engagement.

Shea ‘16

(Jamie Shea, 3-30-2016, "Resilience: a core element of collective defence," NATO Review, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/03/30/resilience-a-core-element-of-collective-defence/index.html, accessed 6-18-2022) -- nikki

In a globalised but also more confrontational and complex world, resilience will remain an ongoing concern for Allies, requiring constant adaptation as new vulnerabilities and threats emerge. Virtual vulnerabilities Cyber space is perhaps the most extreme form of this vulnerability as it interconnects the entire planet in real time, making it possible for anybody to attack any electronically operated target from anywhere at any moment. This vastly complicates the task of defenders, who can rarely know in advance that an attack is being launched, where it will strike or where it will originate. So the defender has to try to protect every important part of the national economic or military infrastructure all the time, while the attacker can choose the individual segment or vulnerable fault line that he wishes to disrupt. SCADAs – or automated control systems for electrical grids or energy pipelines – are just one example of how infrastructure that we depend on for the normal functioning of our lives is increasingly automated, remotely controlled or integrated into ever more complex networks, which are vulnerable to attack. SCADAs – or automated control systems for electrical grids or energy pipelines – are just one example of how infrastructure that we depend on for the normal functioning of our lives is increasingly automated, remotely controlled or integrated into ever more complex networks, which are vulnerable to attack. As we move from the internet of things to the internet of everything, more and more of the infrastructure that we depend on for the normal functioning of our lives is being automated or controlled from remoter distances or integrated into ever more complex networks. The SCADAs – or automated control systems for electrical grids or energy pipelines – are but one example. So are cross-border grids which means an energy blackout in Italy can immediately turn off the power in parts of Switzerland, or an overload at one transmission plant in India can plunge 400 million people into temporary darkness, to cite just two recent examples. The globalisation of networks and the increasing integration of physical infrastructure into the virtual world, for instance the storage of data not in machines but in ‘clouds’, has certainly brought about efficiencies and savings. But it has also greatly magnified the consequences of a disruption and the number of key nodal points and attack surfaces that malevolent actors can exploit. Civil preparedness A second tendency increasing the sense of societal vulnerability is the state of civil preparedness within the Alliance. The delivery of forces and military capabilities that NATO needs to uphold collective defence or to project forces beyond its territory relies on civilian resources. During the Cold War, many of these, such as railways, ports, airfields, grids or airspace were in state hands and easily transferred to NATO control in a crisis or wartime situation. Today, by contrast, 90 per cent of NATO’s supplies and logistics are moved by private companies and 75 per cent of the host nation support for NATO forces forward deployed on the territory of the eastern Allies comes from private sector contracts. Similarly, when facing distributed denial of service cyber-attacks against its outward-facing networks, NATO has relied on cooperation from the telecoms sector and the internet security companies to filter and capture data, identify malware and provide extra bandwidth. Without doubt the transfer of ownership and responsibility to the private sector has brought cost-efficiencies; but the quest to reduce costs and overheads to increase profitability has also led to less redundancy and less resilience. In addition, as hybrid threats below the threshold of NATO’s collective defence clause (Article 5 of its founding treaty) blur the traditional distinction between peace and war, government special powers based on wartime emergency legislation have become less practical to implement or even obsolete. Whether it be for mobilizing troops for collective defence or to strengthen the ability to defend against – or recover from – hybrid attack, NATO is increasingly dependent on infrastructure and assets in the private sector. Whether it be for mobilizing troops for collective defence or to strengthen the ability to defend against – or recover from – hybrid attack, NATO is increasingly dependent on infrastructure and assets in the private sector. As a result, NATO faces two distinct but inter-related resilience challenges: first, to ensure that it can speedily move all the forces and equipment required to any part of the Alliance facing an imminent threat or attack, ensuring full and unimpeded access to all the infrastructure it needs for this purpose; and second, to be able to anticipate, identify, mitigate and recover from hybrid attacks with minimum disruptive impact on the Alliance’s social, political and military cohesion. Civil preparedness is, above all, a national responsibility, in the same way that Allies must ensure adequate cyber defence for their critical information technology networks, especially the ones that NATO depends on for its own operations. This said, Allies’ security relies on individual nations upholding this commitment; and NATO has an interest in obtaining as much transparency as possible, so that it can assess potential vulnerabilities or gaps and accurately measure progress. Avoiding unpleasant surprises in crisis situations when the Alliance needs swift and reliable information and the capacity to analyse, decide and respond swiftly has to be the goal. Consequently, the theme of ‘resilience’ – how to define it, assess it and enhance it across the Alliance – has become a leading topic for the NATO Summit in Warsaw, in July. Resilience is increasingly seen as the corollary of deterrence and reassurance measures in the classical military sphere as part of a comprehensive security strategy for the Alliance. The seven baseline requirements to be assessed are: 1) assured continuity of government and critical government services; 2) resilient energy supplies; 3) ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people; 4) resilient food and water resources; 5) ability to deal with mass casualties; 6) resilient communications systems; and finally 7) resilient transportation systems. These seven areas apply to the entire crisis spectrum, from an evolving hybrid threat all the way up to the most demanding scenarios envisaged by Alliance planners. So how can NATO make its contribution to improving resilience within its 28 Allied nations? Five specific areas come to mind: Cyber defence The first is cyber defence. NATO experiences 200 million incidents on its networks every day and around 200 more serious intrusion attempts every month. This level of hostile activity is also what Allies are experiencing as the ‘new normal’ in the cyber domain. NATO’s first task has been to upgrade the protection of its own networks by giving the NATO Cyber Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) additional capabilities for earlier detection and more rapid response to cyberattacks. Two Rapid Response teams have also been created to assist Allies, as well as to manage incidents affecting NATO itself. NATO has now moved on to help Allies improve their cyber resilience by introducing capability targets into the NATO defence planning process and devising a new memorandum of understanding between NATO and individual Allies to establish secure connectivity and arrangements for information-sharing and crisis management. A number of Allies have come together to develop specific capabilities in fields such as a malware information-sharing platform, training and education, and systems configuration for effective decision-making. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia has helped NATO to organize state-of-the art annual exercises to improve the skills of cyber operators using a cyber range that Estonia has transferred to NATO. Finally, and given the importance of industry that owns 90 per cent of the networks NATO and the Allies depend on, the Alliance is developing a NATO-industry cyber partnership to encourage information-sharing and best practices. This will give NATO a better grasp of the rapid pace of innovation in the sphere of information technology and how it can better integrate emerging technologies and new concepts into its cyber defence. The proposal to create an ‘innovation hub’ at the NATO Communications and Information Agency should facilitate this dialogue and mutual understanding between NATO and the small-and-medium-size technology providers that are often the most innovative in this area. As the Alliance looks towards the Warsaw Summit, some further measures are on the table. One is a ‘cyber defence pledge’ or commitment to speed up national implementation of the NATO capability targets, which requires sustained national focus and adequate resources. A second idea is to look into the political, legal and operational consequences of declaring cyber as a domain, as many Allies have done already in terms of their national cyber strategies. This reflects the increasing awareness that most conflicts and crises these days have a cyber dimension and that – as NATO increases the momentum of its military activities for collective defence – NATO commanders need the requisite tools and authorities to defend against advanced cyberattacks and to operate across the cyber spectrum. Hybrid threats A second area of resilience is a strategy to respond to hybrid warfare which NATO foreign ministers approved last December. NATO is improving its intelligence-sharing and early warning processes in order to better anticipate and map hybrid warfare activities. It is developing in this respect a set of early warning indicators that can trigger a number of crisis-response options. This is because rapid identification of a hybrid attack (as opposed to an isolated or random incident) and speedy decision-making are essential to nip these attacks in the bud and block escalation. NATO ambassadors and defence ministers have held simulation and scenario-based exercises to fine-tune their situational awareness and responsiveness vis-à-vis threats, which are specifically designed to be ambiguous and difficult to attribute. Effective strategic communications to dispel false information, propaganda, lies and myths is also an essential part of coping with hybrid attacks that seek to confuse public opinion, aggravate social tensions and undermine trust in governments. All this does not mean that Allies are as vulnerable to a hybrid attack as Ukraine proved to be during Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. However, Allies are now encouraged to map potential vulnerabilities that can arise from Russia’s involvement in business, financial, media or energy concerns, for example, and to share the lessons learned from resilience stress testing more broadly within NATO. Civil-military readiness A third area under discussion concerns NATO’s ability to fully implement its Readiness Action Plan for the reinforcement and defence of Allies, whether to the east or to the south. NATO members have to adjust their territorial defence mechanisms and infrastructure to the new security environment and revive the planning fora that existed during the Cold War. In particular, NATO planners require cross-border transit arrangements for the rapid deployment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and NATO Response Force. As new Graduated Response Plans for detailed collective defence arrangements are adopted, the Allies must ensure that elements such as transport, flight corridors, civil-military airspace coordination, fuel stocks, pre-positioned equipment, port access and legal agreements are fully integrated into military planning. Crisis-response measures to activate civil emergency measures will need to be updated and civil defence requirements will need to be given more attention, based on the military requirements for the Readiness Action Plan and associated capability packages for its deployment. A more sustained dialogue between military commanders and national civil emergency authorities is now being established. Stepping up cooperation with the EU A fourth area is the relationship between NATO and the European Union (EU). The two organisations occupy different parts of the resilience spectrum but there is also considerable overlap in the middle. A joined-up approach based on a shared situational awareness and coordination of responses is key to a successful response. Currently NATO is talking with the EU on enhanced cooperation in four areas: civil-military planning; cyber defence; information-sharing; and analysis and coordinated strategic communication to spot disinformation and communicate a credible narrative. One early deliverable is a technical arrangement between the NATO NCIRC and the EU Computer Emergency Response Team (EU CERT) for the exchange of information, which was concluded in early February. Up to the Warsaw Summit, NATO and the EU are continuing their discussions at the staff level, as the EU finalises its own strategy to respond to hybrid threats. The aim is to harmonise procedures and to support each other’s efforts in responding comprehensively. The ambition is to identify pragmatic, flexible approaches which could be reflected in a joint declaration by NATO and the EU at the Warsaw Summit. NATO and the EU are also developing compatible ‘playbooks’ to ensure more participation in each other’s activities, such as exercises and training. It is also important that NATO and the EU work together to tackle other resilience challenges that do not result from deliberate attacks. The most urgent of these is the migration crisis. NATO has recently deployed a maritime task force in the Aegean to work with Greece and Turkey and the EU border agency, Frontex, to monitor the flow of refugees and migrants and in this way help to curb the illegal activities of smugglers and traffickers. Working with partner countries Finally, NATO’s partners can also help to improve the Alliance’s overall resilience. Not only Ukraine but many other partners have been the victim of hybrid operations. Their experiences and lessons learned can help NATO to better understand the type and impact of hybrid tactics. More information-sharing and early warning can help NATO decision-makers to identify incipient attacks that could start in a partner country but rapidly spread to NATO territory. Conversely, NATO’s experience and expertise can help partners improve their own capacity for resilience. Unsurprisingly resilience areas like cyber defence and civil emergency planning are increasingly featuring in defence capacity building packages for partners such as Georgia, Moldova, Jordan and Iraq. In the Baltic region, Sweden and Finland – two of NATO’s most active partners, which have enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation – have also faced hybrid pressures from Russia. These Nordic partners have drawn closer to NATO through consultations, training and exercises, including the conclusion of host nation support arrangements for crisis assistance. In conclusion, Allies need to adapt constantly as new vulnerabilities and threats emerge from non-state actors such as so-called Islamic State, as much as from state actors like Russia. Resilience is here to stay as a core element of collective defence. That is why NATO will stay focused on reducing its exposure to threats to its cohesion, independence and security.2

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves › Impacts --- DIANA Solves Case

DIANA increases innovation now

Maria Vitoria Santana, 3/8/21,”Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA),” European Army Interoperability Centre, https://finabel.org/defence-innovation-accelerator-for-the-north-atlantic-diana/

When the Covid-19 crisis led to a lockdown of all activities, the lack of digital literacy from governmental bodies and defence personal exposed both a new threat and an opportunity. Bearing this situation in mind, NATO members (NM) have agreed at the 31st annual summit, held in June 2020 in Brussels, to initiate the Defence Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic (DIANA) that aims to reach full operability capacities by 2023. DIANA is NATO’s version of the U.S Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). It will reinforce transatlantic cooperation regarding critical technologies to assure the security and defence digital literacy of NM.

This initiative is a joint effort between private-sector entities, non-governmental entities, and academia. NATO’s Assistant Secretary-General David van Weel explains that although financial support from companies and start-ups are crucial for funding the research projects, intellectual property will not be requested (Vivienne Machi, 2021). This is where academia joins the operation, providing the necessary technical knowledge for the development and creation of technologies to improve Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs): Artificial intelligence (AI), quantum-enable technologies, and big-data processing. This takes place on top of supporting the remaining EDTs: Data and Computing, Autonomy, Biotechnology and Human enhancements, Hypersonic technologies, and Space (Tania Latici, 2021).

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Impacts --- NATO Good › Impacts --- NATO k Hard Power

An integrated NATO is key to numerous existential threats

Goldgeier 10 – James M. Goldgeier, James Goldgeier is a Professor of International Relations and Robert Bosch Senior Visiting Fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. He was a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations from 2017-19 and in 2018-19, he held the inaugural Library of Congress Chair in U.S.-Russia Relations at the John W. Kluge Center. Ph.D., Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; M.A., Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; A.B., Government, Harvard University, Febuary 2010,“The Future of NATO,” Council on Foreign Relations Press,

If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not exist today, the United States would not seek to create it. In 1949, it made sense in the face of a potential Soviet invasion to forge a bond in the North Atlantic area among the United States, Canada, and the west European states. Today, if the United States were starting from scratch in a world of transnational threats, the debate would be over whether to follow liberal and neoconservative calls for an alliance of democracies without regard to geography or to develop a great power concert envisioned by the realists to uphold the current order. The United States is not, however, starting from scratch, and NATO should not disappear. While the bonds across the Atlantic may be frayed, they are stronger than those tying the United States to other parts of the world. Common history and values matter, as do the resources (both financial and military) that Europe possesses. The NATO allies share a common interest in preventing disruptions to the global economy, including attacks on freedom of navigation. As a community of democracies, the member states are threatened by forces such as Islamic extremism and the rise of authoritarian states. For the United States, the alliance is a source of legitimacy for actions in places like Afghanistan. For Europe, NATO is a vehicle for projecting hard power. While NATO alone cannot defend against the range of threats facing the member states, it can serve as the hub for American and European leaders to develop the ties with other institutions and non-European countries necessary to provide for the common defense. For all its faults, NATO enables the United States to partner with close democratic allies in ways that would be difficult without a formal institution that provides a headquarters and ready venue for decision-making, as well as legitimacy and support for action that ad hoc U.S.-led coalitions do not. As has been true since the fall of the Berlin Wall two decades ago, the United States (and Europe) should want NATO to succeed. After the Cold War, the alliance dramatically redefined itself. In the 1990s, it fostered stability across Europe by beginning its process of enlargement to the formerly communist east and by intervening to stop genocide in the Balkans. In the 2000s, it broadened its scope through the mission in Afghanistan as well as a counterterrorist operation in the Mediterranean and counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa (in addition to continuing the enlargement process). But as NATO has broadened its scope, some members have grown concerned that the alliance is shifting its attention away from Europe. These members seek to return NATO to a more traditional understanding of its role defending against threats on the continent, particularly as an increasingly authoritarian and assertive Russian government has sought to reclaim a sphere of influence lost in the Soviet collapse. In November 2010, NATO will release a new “strategic concept” to guide the alliance going forward. That document must state clearly that providing for collective defense in the twenty-first century goes well beyond defending against the “armed attack” of Article V. To remain relevant, NATO must expand its traditional understanding of collective defense to confront the twenty-first-century threats of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to both states and nonstate actors, and cyberwarfare. By necessity, the United States has turned its attention away from Europe in order to counter these modern threats, which largely emanate from Africa, the broader Middle East, and Asia. If NATO fails to accept a growing global role, then the United States will lose interest in investing in the alliance’s future. But Europe faces these threats too and must recognize that a more robust NATO offers it the chance to counter them. Given the varied nature and source of threats today, NATO can be successful only if the Europeans agree to stronger NATO-European Union (EU) cooperation and to closer ties with major non-European democracies, particularly those in the AsiaPacific region.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Ukraine Impacts › AT: Russia Wont Attack NATO

Assumptions that Russia wont attack NATO are based on faulty logic --- Deterrence by Denial is ESSENTIAL to stop conflict --- wont cause it

Stoicescu 7/14/22

(Kalev Stoicescu Russia Expert, Research Fellow, International Centre for Defence and Security, specializes in issues related to Russian foreign and domestic policy, as well as developments in the field of NATO’s defence and security. Stoicescu served at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1991-2000, including as Ambassador to the OSCE and Ambassador to US and Canada. He was a member of the Estonian delegation in border negotiations with Russia and Latvia. He worked for the Ministry of Defence from 2002-2014, first as civilian-military cooperation department head and then, from 2007, as counsellor on defence policy at the Estonian Embassy in Paris, “Myth 3: ‘Russia wouldn’t attack a NATO member state’,” pg online @ //um-ef)

What is the myth? Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has reminded NATO that President Vladimir Putin sees military aggression as a rational means to achieve his foreign policy aims. It has also triggered widespread discussion of the implications if Russia were to follow this with an attack on a NATO member state. The prevailing view is that this is highly unlikely, because Russia must realize the devastating implications of the entirety of the Western alliance joining the conflict and inflicting intolerable damage on Russia. However, this view is based on a number of questionable premises, and in fact a Russian attack on a NATO member state should not be ruled out. Who advocates or subscribes to it? A wide range of political figures, analysts and commentators have discounted the likelihood of a Russian attack on a NATO member state. This is primarily because, in their view, NATO’s deterrent message of unity is strong, and Russia is fully cognizant of the fact that an attack on one NATO member state would inevitably bring the rest of the alliance into the conflict. Other Western commentary suggests that there is no evident benefit to Russia in an attack on the Baltic states or Poland. Russia, too, has added its assurances that it has no hostile intent against NATO – although these assurances are now recognized as valueless, since the same promises were made regarding Ukraine in the lead-up to the 2022 invasion. Indeed in March 2022 Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, stated once again that Russia had no plans to attack other countries, but in the same interview also claimed that Russia had not attacked Ukraine. Why is it wrong? There are several reasons why it is incorrect to assume that Russia would not attack NATO members. The first lies in the term ‘attack’. Ordinarily, this is understood as the ‘armed attack’ specified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty – implying an overt use of force which would clearly and unambiguously breach the definitional threshold for armed conflict. However, this narrow definition overlooks both the fact that many other forms of coercion have already been practised by Russia against NATO member states in the sphere of warfare commonly referred to as ‘hybrid’, ‘sub-threshold’ or ‘grey zone’, and that Russia has already used military assets to carry out actions against NATO member states that are indistinguishable from those conducted during wartime. In 2014 Russia sent military intelligence officers to the Czech Republic and Bulgaria to sabotage munitions depots. More recently, Russia has persistently used its military electronic warfare assets to trigger disruption in the Nordic and Baltic areas. In fact, the narrower sense of ‘armed attack’ is one of the few ways in which Russia has not already attacked NATO members. Russia has already used military assets to carry out actions against NATO member states that are indistinguishable from those conducted during wartime Second, the entire principle of NATO deterrence rests on an interpretation of Article 5 which does not stand up to close scrutiny. Senior NATO figures and politicians from member states focus on the part of Article 5 which states that an attack on one NATO member state is to be considered an attack against all of them. But this is ordinarily coupled with the assertion, or assumption, that all other member states are obliged immediately to join the conflict by contributing forces to aid the victim of aggression. Yet this is not what Article 5 actually stipulates, and it is highly probable that, unlike many Western politicians, Russia’s military planners have in fact read it. The actual text of Article 5 provides plenty of leeway for any member state that might wish to avoid entering a conflict with an aggressor. The requirement only to take the action that each member state ‘deems necessary… to restore and maintain’ security is far more vague than the clear and direct requirement to support the victim of aggression that is ordinarily assumed. The implication is that Russia might be unlikely to attack a NATO member state if it were indeed convinced that this would trigger retaliation from the rest of the alliance. But there are many circumstances in which Moscow could make a calculated assessment that it could target an individual country while ensuring through other means – political, diplomatic or subversive – that one or more major NATO allies could be effectively deterred from responding, or induced or persuaded not to respond. Third, the assessment that Russia would not attack a NATO member state rests on the assumption that decision-makers in Moscow are assessing their options using the same framework of reality and rationality as the Euro-Atlantic community. However, both the shifting rationales for the invasion of Ukraine and the counterproductive nature of the invasion itself show that this should not be relied on. Many of Russia’s recent actions have achieved the exact opposite of what they were intended to do because of Moscow’s faulty understanding of events and processes in the outside world. For example, Russia makes military threats and launches military action in order to dissuade neighbours from joining NATO – with the only result being to demonstrate to those neighbours precisely why they need to join. The most recent examples are Finland and Sweden: the former a long-time exponent of stable relations with Russia, and the latter a country that enjoyed military neutrality for more than two centuries. Similarly, the possibility of misguided actions by the Russian leadership in the future should not be ruled out solely on the basis of what appears rational based on Western assumptions and the Western understanding of recent history. Fourth, President Putin has clearly laid out the extent of his ambition to roll back history and the borders of the West. He has set out his task as correcting the ‘catastrophic mistakes’ of the end of the Russian empire, and redrawing the international borders that he says came about as a result of those errors. But restoring Russia’s former imperial boundaries can only come at the expense of those nations and peoples that were formerly dominated by Russia and now live in independent sovereign states. That list includes NATO member states, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and – soon – Finland. Given both Russia’s and Putin’s track record of strategic patience and nurturing grievances, and widespread support within the country for wars of reconquest, even military defeat in Ukraine would only postpone, rather than deter, Russia’s next attempt to achieve Putin’s vision. What is its impact on policy? The results of a misguided default assumption that there will be no Russian attack on a NATO member state are inimical to timely and appropriate preparation for that eventuality. Paradoxically, throughout most of NATO’s recent history, failure to prepare adequately for conflict with Russia has resulted not solely from the assumption that Russia did not intend to attack, but also from the self-deterring idea that Russia could be ‘provoked’ into attacking through defensive preparations by NATO. Major European NATO allies therefore self-deterred from doing anything which Russia described as provocative. NATO’s limited contribution to the security of the Baltic states and Poland, the so-called ‘enhanced forward presence’ (eFP), came about only after extensive wrangling over whether this might trigger a Russian attack – a striking indication of the dominant position of Russian narratives about the nature of the security threat in the region. Today, this same pattern of assumptions has deterred a wide range of meaningful and timely assistance to Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. Germany in particular has shown extreme reluctance to provide weapons to Ukraine, or even to allow third countries to do so, using the argument that this – rather than Russian intent – could be the trigger for war with NATO. In addition, despite widespread recognition of the key role played by tactical nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine, nuclear deterrence policy, capabilities and decision-making processes have been allowed to atrophy within NATO because of a preference to treat nuclear use as ‘unthinkable’. This is a highly dangerous assumption when Russia devotes a great deal of thought and resources to the possibility of nuclear use, in addition to extensively employing nuclear rhetoric for intimidating the West. What would good policy look like? Preparations by NATO nations for potential conflict with Russia cannot be premised on the assumption that it will not happen. The defence of NATO nations need not be hostage to interpretations of Article 5. The Joint Expeditionary Force – a coalition of 10 like-minded northern European states that share a similar viewpoint on the threat from Russia – provides a template for cooperative organizations that can respond to aggression by Moscow without relying on support from every member of the alliance. And the existence of NATO does not preclude regional defensive alliances of this kind, tailored to the specific nature of the threat, which varies across Europe. The forward presence of troops and assets from major NATO allies in the front-line states is an essential element for the conventional deterrence of Moscow The forward presence of troops and assets from major NATO allies in the front-line states is an essential element for the conventional deterrence of Moscow. Until now, initiatives such as eFP in the Baltic states and Poland have been sufficient to deter an attack, by eliminating the element of doubt as to whether other allies would respond. But the new situation following the invasion of Ukraine demands forward-deployed forces that are militarily as well as politically significant, in order to offer deterrence of Moscow by denial in addition to the promise of deterrence by punishment. Overall, defensive preparations by NATO must reflect the reality of a belligerent Russia whose hostile intent is no longer in doubt, and NATO’s forward presence in the eastern flank must become a robust forward defence posture.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Ukraine Impacts › Impacts --- Deterrence k Stop Russia

Deterrence focus stops Russia lashout and expansion

Wojick 6/28/22

(Colonel (Ret) Ray Wojcik is a Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), and a 30-year Army veteran, with multiple tactical-strategic assignments culminating as US Army Attaché, American Embassy, Warsaw, Poland, “Forward Defense: Has NATO Finally Gotten the Memo?,” pg online @ //um-ef)

NATO’s Madrid summit will consider (June 28-30) its most consequential defense posture and readiness options since the Cold War. A paradigm shift seems afoot, and robust forward defense along NATO’s eastern front is the top priority.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Ukraine Impacts › Impacts --- Deter k Ukraine/Russia

Concept signals shift to deterrence and defense --- resolve is key to win in Ukraine and Deter Russia from larger escalation

Davis 7/3/22

(Malcolm Davis is a senior analyst at ASPI, “NATO Needs To Mobilize For A Possible War With Russia,” pg online @ //um-ef)

The recognition of Russia’s broader strategic ambitions beyond Ukraine, as noted by Sanders, reinforces the importance of NATO’s decision to return to its traditional role of deterring major-power aggression, specifically as posed by a revanchist Russia. NATO must make firm commitments to avoid the worst-case outcome—a Russian attack on a NATO member such as a Baltic state or Poland. Russia cannot be allowed to achieve any degree of victory in Ukraine, and it’s vital for NATO and its partners across the globe, including Australia, to sustain and expand military support to Kyiv to blunt Moscow’s ability to sustain operations in key areas. This will be challenging given the very long timeframe now emerging. US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines suggests the war will continue and Putin’s objective is still to capture most of Ukraine, with immediate Russian efforts focused on the Donbas. A failure of Western resolve to sustain support for Kyiv and expand the shipment of materiel to defeat Russian advances would probably see a Russian breakout from the Donbas and a renewed offensive towards Kyiv. Defeat for Ukraine would be catastrophic for European security. Accepting any degree of Russian success, including by offering ‘off ramps’ as part of efforts towards a negotiated settlement, would embolden Putin to launch further acts of aggression. And with that requirement to ensure Russia is decisively defeated, NATO must consider a growing risk that Putin will be tempted towards either vertical escalation, by using weapons of mass destruction in Ukraine, or horizontal escalation, by attacking supply lines of NATO support, including those beyond Ukraine’s borders. Moscow could also continue to make implicit and explicit nuclear threats to coerce NATO, such as Putin’s announcement that Russia will transfer nuclear-capable Iskander-M ballistic missiles to Belarus, while also raising the threat of hybrid warfare against NATO members. Lithuania and Norway are already coming under cyberattack from Russian-based hackers and Putin is set to ruthlessly exploit food and energy as weapons to coerce NATO states into stopping support for Kyiv. NATO needs to mobilize for possible war by deploying sufficient force to deter Russian aggression across its eastern frontier while strengthening resilience against hybrid and grey-zone threats. It also needs to boost the credibility of its nuclear deterrence against Moscow. The naming of ‘Operation Mobilise’ is apt, but NATO must face down Russia to avoid an even larger and more disastrous European war.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Ukraine Impacts › Impacts --- Ukraine win k prevent Russia Invade

Ukraine can win --- that’s critical to prevent Russian aggression vs. NATO

Hooker 7/20/22

(R.D. Hooker Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He previously served as Dean of the NATO Defense College and as Special Assistant to the US President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council, “Ukraine can win,” pg online @ //um-ef)

In all likelihood, the appetite for international aid and support for Ukraine would wane over time, abetted by declining interest in sanctions against Russia. In this circumstance, the prospects for eventual EU and NATO membership for what remained of Ukraine would also fade. Instead, Ukraine would fall inexorably into the Russian orbit. Nor would “peace” follow. As Putin has stated many times, Russia has larger foreign policy ambitions that extend far beyond Ukraine. It is certainly true that as matters now stand, Ukraine probably cannot “win,” if victory is defined as recovering all internationally recognized Ukrainian territory and dealing a decisive defeat to Russia in the field. Western financial and security assistance has helped Ukraine to inflict heavy losses on the Russian military in the air, at sea, and on land. However, conscious Western policy decisions to withhold airpower, self-propelled artillery, long range precision fires and main battle tanks from Ukraine are having the intended effect. Without them, Ukraine cannot transition to offensive operations and drive the invaders out. Almost certainly, the West has collectively determined not to “humiliate” Putin. When Latvia is providing more military equipment to Ukraine than France, Italy and Germany, the true intentions of major European states emerge powerfully. The logic of this approach, however, collapses when confronted with the strong probability of further Russian aggression on NATO territory. When that happens, there will be much hand-wringing about “missed opportunities” and “miscalculations.” It is far better to confront the threat now while Russia is reeling from high casualties, depleted stocks of high-tech munitions, low morale, severe losses among senior commanders, and inferior generalship. A careful assessment suggests that given essential capabilities, Ukraine can win. In terms of manpower, President Zelenskyy can eventually put up to a million trained soldiers in the field, despite heavy losses to date. This is far more than Russia can likely generate.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Euro War Impacts › Impacts --- Euro/Russia War Escalates

WWIII

Adrian Bonenberger 17, Vocativ Staff, Where Could The European Cold War Go Hot Again? Think a war in Europe won't happen? Here's a look at the issues most likely to spur a military confrontation, 1-27-17,

Since 2014, however, and the West’s failure to protect an avowedly pro-European Ukraine, it has become increasingly popular to describe the West’s relationship with Russia as a new Cold War. Reading the headlines, it certainly seems like Moscow and Europe are one badly-aimed missile or bomb away from World War III. As political realities in the US and abroad are challenged, what are the lines or issues most likely to lead to war in Europe? Imperial Russia By A Different Name One variable that seems constant right now is Russia. Whether one sees things from Russia’s perspective (wherein Russia is surrounded by hostile neighbors intent on its destruction) or those of its nearest neighbors (which see Russia as an aggressive and expansive imperial bully), Russia’s actions are indisputable. It has invaded and occupied portions of Ukraine and Georgia. It has countenanced cyberattacks on Estonia, Ukraine (which included the first deaths attached to cyberwarfare), the U.S., Georgia, Azerbaijan and NATO. It is pursuing a long game to undermine and destabilize any and all political alliances that do not include it, as well as those that do include it. The weaker everyone else is, the greater the room for Russian opportunism. Russia has also taken the side of America’s primary antagonists in the Middle East. This has made it the friend of isolationists, nationalists, and left-wingers who (paradoxically, given Russia’s own actions) oppose an American and European hegemony, backed by the increasingly questionable threat of military intervention. Whether it is lashing out in righteous self-defense or as part of an unethical attempt to grow larger and more powerful at the expense of its smaller and weaker neighbors, there is no question that Russia is looking to expand its brand. The Return Of Nationalism Across Europe, explicit nationalism is on the rise at levels unseen since the early 20th century. While hard to quantify, the success of so-called “populist” political parties with nationalist agendas suggests a growing dissatisfaction with NATO, the EU, and the U.S.. Over the last two years, far-right parties have won political power, gained credibility, or advanced substantial nationalist agendas in Poland (Law and Justice), Hungary (Jobbik), Romania (the recent founding of a new nationalist party) Austria, Italy (rejection of judicial and legal reform), the U.S. (Trump/Alt-Right), Germany (Alternative for Germany), UK (Brexit), France (Le Pen’s National Front) and others. Nationalism overlaps well with Russia’s agenda, because it erodes federalism—the idea that different people in different countries could lay aside tribal instincts like linguistic or ethnic affinities to cooperate. This makes it easier for Russia to project power at a local or regional level without sacrificing much in the way of money or manpower. Even nationalists like those in Poland and Germany who tend to dislike Russians for a variety of actual and perceived historical slights seem to receive financial support from Russia. This seems based on the principle that a Europe of many countries will be less unified in opposing Russia’s agenda. In principle, those countries that have a strong nationalist political voice end up pursuing policies that strengthen (relatively) Russia. For people who believe that NATO, the U.S., or the EU are too strong, that may not be a particularly troublesome issue. Immigration There are at least three different types of national responses to the question of (largely Middle Eastern and African) immigration into Europe. The first draws on 20th century legal precedents guaranteeing humans fair and dignified treatment regardless of their national background. This response, exemplified by Germans and Scandinavians, tends to view immigrants as refugees fleeing war or economic oppression for which Europe or the West have some kind of responsibility given the global economy. Nations like Germany, Denmark and Sweden are considered among the most generous to refugees. Germany especially has embraced modern attitudes toward immigration, in the wake of its catastrophic spasm of ethnic cleansing during WWII. Other countries with colonial legacies have maintained generous post-colonial policies. Absent active restitution, countries like France, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Portugal—any country that had its finger in the exploitative pie that was 17th-20th century Africa, South America, and Asia—provide expedited or dual-citizenship options for many people living in countries formerly touched by European sails and soldiers. This is similar to the posture of countries like Germany. It also results in specific ethnic and religious traffic flowing from the formerly colonized to the colonizer. A critical difference between the experience of countries like Germany and those like France or the UK (for example) is that Germany’s posture toward immigration and citizenship embraces an assumed modern, cosmopolitan future, and exists without any natural enemies safe for the white supremacists and Neo-Nazis who nearly destroyed Europe during World War II (until recently, not a credible source of dissidence). Colonialism did not die easily in the UK, France, or other similar countries, and much military blood and cash was expended in attempting to keep colonial holdings within the fold. Groups nostalgic for former imperial glory tend to see immigration as an affront to national dignity, beyond being unwise policy. Groups that evaluate immigration through the lens of colonial nostalgia are not Nazis or necessarily white supremacists, though the practical implications of their attitudes end up being similar enough to warrant comparison. Finally, there are nations in Central and Eastern Europe whose attitudes on immigration were shaped by their experiences in WWI and WWII, as well as life behind the Iron Curtain. Ethnic cleansing and population movements by the Nazis and the Kremlin-led USSR left countries with the idea that ethnic homogeneity was an absolute good, and ethnic diversity was an existential threat. During the first part of its life, the USSR viewed ethnicity as threatening to the ideal of a classless society, although that slowly devolved into a view that non-Russian ethnicities were dangerous. This is not to diminish or excuse a powerful racial element in resistance to immigration, simply to frame it in the context of places that experienced the Holocaust firsthand, often actively participating in it in a way that ended up shaping every subsequent generation. Religion The European immigration “crisis” is complicated by the issue of religion. There are two key fault lines at play here: Orthodox versus non-Orthodox, and Christian versus Islam. Countries like Germany, Hungary, Croatia, Poland and Slovakia tend to be Catholic. The primary factor in considering their political preferences is their experience with Soviet-style governance, wherein Orthodox Christianity was a proxy for Russian intelligence agencies, and Catholicism was part of resistance to totalitarianism and Russian nationalism. Orthodox countries tend to be pro-Russian: Greece, Bulgaria Macedonia and Serbia all share religious and cultural affinity for one another, as well as Russia. They tend to be hostile to the idea of immigration from the Middle East and Africa based on religious grounds, given the relationship between church and state. This has been the case for centuries. Religious constituencies within all European countries tend to view the EU’s stance toward religion with skepticism, and see efforts to resettle non-Christians within their borders as direct attacks on both their Christianity and ethnicity. Still, there are substantial differences between Orthodox countries (which tend to be pro-Russian) and Catholic countries that spent time behind the Iron Curtain (which tend to be anti-Russian). Countries Formerly Occupied Or Annexed By Russia Polish voters empowered the “Law and Order” party based partly on its promises to block non-Christian (most importantly, Islamic) immigration and the expansion of EU power at the expense of Polish autonomy. At the same time, Poland is among the most staunch and enthusiastic NATO member-states. Its army is the fourth largest in Europe behind Russia, Ukraine, and France. Its chief foreign policy priorities have nothing to do with Middle Eastern immigration, and everything to do with preventing a repeat of the 20th century, where Poland was occupied by Russian soldiers on three separate occasions, and forced to adopt Soviet governance at bayonet-point. Similar in their opposition to recent Russian militancy to Poland are the Baltic States, as well as countries like Sweden, Finland, and Romania. The fate of the Baltics and Finland were determined as part of agreements between Nazi Germany and the USSR to enforce German and Russian “spheres of influence” according to Hitler and Stalin’s vision for Europe. The Baltics were made into independent SSRs within the USSR, while Sweden maintained its independence. Finland was invaded and had large portions of territory annexed into Russia, and Romania was partitioned before and after WWII, first by agreement between the USSR and the Nazis, and later by conquest. Within the Baltics, anti-Russian attitudes are tempered by former Russian citizens of the USSR who lost their national standing when the USSR collapsed. This is most conspicuous in Latvia, but is also true for Lithuania and Estonia. Broadly speaking, any country with an ethnic or Russian-speaking population that borders Russia or was part of the USSR’s sphere of influence. It is a visible reminder of Russia’s de facto colonization of other nations within the USSR, the consequences of which—the current war in Ukraine, as well as the past war in Georgia—explain why national security is among the most urgent priorities for these countries now (satirically represented here, though more recent developments suggest that Germany would remain part of the EU and France perhaps would not). Another way of stating this European dynamic would be thus: countries with no direct experience of the USSR tend not to see Russia as an imminent military threat. Those with direct experience of the USSR (and which therefore have vocal Russian-speaking minorities as viable political entities) see Russia as an existential threat. Economic Ideals Those countries that have had difficulty adjusting their economies to meet the EU’s standards, or which have not prospered during their time in the EU have become powerful passive allies of Russia. Greece, Italy, Spain and Bulgaria have all come to view sanctions on Russia as damaging to their own economies. They view competition with Russia as harmful to their economic interests, either “someone else’s problem” or somehow the fault of the U.S.. The EU’s structure (exposed during Greece’s economic crisis of 2012) does not privilege every country equally, nor is it designed to—its design offers benefits to those countries that are best able to leverage Europe’s many markets and industries. Those in favor of the EU would stress that each country that joined the EU did so transparently and freely, and expected to benefit from its structure by investing time and energy—these people would say that countries failing to maximize their income within the EU have themselves to blame. Those opposed to the EU (many Greek nationalists) believe that it is an exploitative system. Energy Dependence The final factor that determines a country’s relationship with Europe versus Russia is its dependence on Russian oil and gas. After the fall of the USSR, some countries that had existed behind the Iron Curtain were able to maintain privileged relationships with Russian energy producers. Dependence on the Russia used to be the single greatest European weakness, and still is for certain countries (most conspicuously Hungary, which goes out of its way to propitiate Russia, but also other Central European powers as well as Ukraine itself). Lately, though, low oil prices, longtime pushes for energy independence using renewable sources, as well as the opening of alternate energy markets in the Middle East have made it increasingly difficult for Russia to monopolize Europe’s energy, and therefore have reduced its political influence there. This places Russia in a serious bind, as the US’s development of new technology to access additional energy reserves means that as the price of oil and gas rises, it becomes profitable for it to reenter the energy market—meaning European countries will never again be entirely dependent on Russia for energy. The Prospect of War Although there are many fault lines that could lead to conflict, it still seems unlikely that European war will spread west from Ukraine. Still, it’s worth paying attention to these various collisions between Russian and European countries. No century in history has seen a Europe free from war—the question is always one of degree and intensity. So far, the 21st century still has all the elements in place for a truly epic struggle between European countries and Russia. And this conflict, unlike those of the last century, may be adjudicated by nuclear weapons.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Cohesion Impacts › Impacts --- Cohesion k Taiwan War

US-China nuclear war over Taiwan likely and causes extinction – deterrence and no first use don’t apply

Littlefield and Lowther 15, Alex Littlefield is Senior Editor at Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Adam Lowther is a Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) at Maxwell Air Force Base, (8/11/15, Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/)

For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, China’s aggressive efforts to assert questionable claims in the South and East China Sea, enforce a disputed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), build the rocket/missile and naval capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and build a substantial ballistic missile capability all work to create a situation where conflict between the U.S. and the PRC could occur and rapidly escalate. Given that American political and military leaders have a poor understanding of Chinese ambitions and particularly their opaque nuclear thinking, there is ample reason to be concerned that a future conflict could escalate to a limited nuclear conflict. Thus, it is worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward offering insight into Chinese motivation and thinking when it comes to how a possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Chinese Capabilities In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess that the Second Artillery Corps possesses forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike the United States if fired from China’s eastern seaboard and an additional twenty that could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East Coast – home to the nation’s capital and largest economic centers. To overcome this challenge China is also developing its JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which is a sea-based variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-class submarines. China may also be developing a new mobile missile, the DF-41, which will carry multiple warheads, giving the Chinese a way to potentially defeat an American ballistic missile defense system. It is worth noting that the quantity, though not the quality, of China’s nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons grade plutonium. This raises the question; to what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal? Chinese Motivation The textbook answer is straightforward. China seeks a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability that will serve to deter an American first strike. As China argues, it has a “no-nuclear-first policy” which makes its arsenal purely defensive – while its other capabilities such as cyber are offensive. Potential nuclear adversaries including Russia, India, and the United States are fully aware that China’s investment in advanced warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems bring Delhi, Moscow, and, soon, Washington within reach of the “East Wind.” While not a nuclear peer competitor to either Russia or the U.S., China is rapidly catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear warheads each year. While American leaders may find such a sentiment unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear that the United States will use its nuclear arsenal as a tool to blackmail (coerce) China into taking or not taking a number of actions that are against its interests. China’s fears are not unfounded. Unlike China, the United States maintains an ambiguous use-policy in order to provide maximum flexibility. As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United States certainly planned to use overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and its positioning of ballistic missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China sees its position and ability to deter the United States as vulnerable. Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Cohesion Impacts › Impacts --- Cohesion k Taiwan War

NATO cohesion spurred by Ukraine and Russia prevents Chinese invasion of Taiwan

Feng 3/9/22

(John, “China Is Learning Lessons From West's United Response to Russia,” pg online @ //um-ef)

China is watching the West's collective response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and is learning lessons that may change its own calculations as it seeks to annex Taiwan, according to senior officials in Washington and London. When the threat of economic sanctions failed to deter Vladimir Putin and the first of Russia's 150,000 troops began pouring into Ukrainian territory on February 24, Taiwan became a trending topic as observers feared China's President Xi Jinping would be emboldened to make good on his vow to capture the democratic island of 23.5 million people. However, as Putin's forces failed to achieve their blitzkrieg goals and the war entered its second week, the thinking changed. Ukraine's leaders remained in Kyiv; its armed forces fought back and ordinary civilians joined the resistance. A galvanized NATO and the early effects of the West's unprecedented punishment on Russia's economy began to give China watchers pause. Taiwan's Foreign Minister Joseph Wu called the Ukrainian resistance an inspiration for the Taiwanese people. Taipei joined several Asian governments in imposing export controls on Russia and landed on Moscow's list of "unfriendly" countries this week. Russia's forces continue their march toward Ukraine's capital and may eventually achieve their military objectives even as political goals—regime change and the submission of its public—remain out of reach. But the events of the past days have already made China more reluctant to invade Taiwan than just several months ago, Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence, told the House Intelligence Committee on Tuesday. "The view is both that it is likely to reinforce China's perspective on the seriousness with which we would approach an infringement on Taiwan and in the unity that they've seen between Europe and the United States, particularly in enacting sanctions," she said. "Not just that unity, but the impact of those sanctions I think are both things that are critical to their calculus and something that will be interesting for us to see how they learn those lessons." In her opening remarks, Haines said China—"an unparalleled priority"—would prefer "coerced unification that avoids armed conflict." The Chinese government has been working to isolate Taiwan and undermine its elected leaders for years, she said. "At the same time, Beijing is preparing to use military force if it decides this is necessary." In answer to a similar question, CIA Director William Burns said he "would not underestimate President Xi and the Chinese leadership's determination with regard to Taiwan." However, Burns said Beijing has been "surprised and unsettled" by the difficulties the Russians have encountered in Ukraine. "Everything from the strength of the Western reaction, to the way in which Ukrainians have fiercely resisted," he said. "I think there's an impact on the Chinese calculus with regard to Taiwan." Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, who heads the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, told lawmakers at the Russia-focused hearing that Taiwan and Ukraine were "two different things completely." He then hinted at the considerable U.S. military presence in Asia. "I also believe that our deterrence posture in the Pacific puts a very different perspective on all of this," said Berrier. "We do know that [China] is watching very, very carefully what happens and how this plays out." At a similar briefing of the U.K.'s Foreign Affairs Select Committee on Monday, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said Beijing "does not want to associate too closely" with Russia's new status as a "global pariah." She left little doubt that NATO was setting a precedent with its united response and sending a message to China in the process. "There's also the issue of the importance of showing strength as NATO," Truss said, "because the rest of the world will be watching, including China, on how the West continues to respond." "Of course, if we see a weak NATO, that is likely to embolden China. So I see a tough policy on Russia and a tough policy on China as being complementary," she said.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Cohesion Impacts › Impacts --- Deterrence/Cohesion up&effective

NATO cohesion and deterrence is up --- new command structure and troop adjustments

Mierzwa and Tomaszycki ‘21

(Danuta, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, Marek, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, “Imperial policy of the Russian Federation versus cohesion and coherence of NATO’s new strategic concept,” International Politics, pg SpringLink //um-ef)

Summing up the provisions of the consecutive NATO Summits and the declarations in Brussels of 2018, it can be concluded that they were crucial to the strategy pursued by NATO nowadays. The Alliance’s new command structure has become more suited for undertaking effective joint defence operations. Definitely, assessing the consecutive provisions, it can be stated that by introducing the standby initiative, NATO has become capable of putting into operation a greater number of troops almost instantaneously. The Alliance’s forward-looking presence in Central and Eastern Europe has also been modified, which should translate into a major increase in the Alliance’s defence capabilities in the event of potential enemy aggression (Graf 2018). The most recent NATO Summit in London of December 2019 reaffirmed the Alliance’s unity and commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty stating that an attack on one ally would be considered an attack on all. “In difficult times, we are stronger as an Alliance, and our citizens are safer. Our bond and mutual commitment guarantee our freedoms, our values and our security for 70 years to come. We are working to ensure that NATO guarantees these freedoms, values and security for future generations”.—The Alliance’s declaration proclaims.Footnote17 The leaders reaffirmed that NATO guarantees security and fundamental human rights as well as the rule of law on the territory of the Member States for the people living there. “Solidarity, unity and cohesion are the fundamental principles of our Alliance. As we are working together to prevent conflicts and preserve peace, NATO remains the foundation of our collective defence and the basic forum for consultation and security decisions among the allies. We reaffirm the lasting transatlantic relationship between Europe and North America, the observance of the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter and our solemn commitment as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty that an attack on one Ally will be considered an attack on all of us”—they reaffirmed in the declaration. Most importantly for Poland and the Baltic states, NATO leaders agreed on the updated defence plans for Poland and the Member States. They also expressed their criticism of Russia’s aggressive actions (Gotkowska and Szymański 2017).Footnote18

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Cohesion Impacts › Impacts --- Cohesion k Deterrence

Strict capabilities aren’t enough for COMPLETE Russian deterrence --- Russia can collapse deterrence by creating openings in NATO disagreements --- Cohesion is the only way to ensure Deterrence

Mierzwa and Tomaszycki ‘21

(Danuta, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, Marek, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, “Imperial policy of the Russian Federation versus cohesion and coherence of NATO’s new strategic concept,” International Politics, pg SpringLink //um-ef)

Chart removed for brevity The direct comparison between the military capabilities of Russia and NATO indicates that there is no real threat in terms of quantitative or qualitative advantage in Russia’s favour. On the contrary, NATO is in the lead, with a huge advantage of both equipment and personnel as well as technology, quality and quantity. However, there are areas in favour of Russia. These include WRE (radio-electronic warfare), aviation and air defence capabilities, radar systems as well as nuclear carriers and weapons. Needless to mention other types of mass destruction weapons which, according to the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (IHL), ought to cease to exist, whereas Russia is highly likely to possess them (chemical weapons were used in counter-terrorism operations and special combat operations). Over the past two decades, the Russian defence industry has developed, researched and introduced dozens of radio-electronic warfare systems capable of disrupting and completely immobilizing most of the forces in the areas of land, air and water. Russian technologies are effective at fighting aircrafts, cruise missiles, radars, conventional missiles and unmanned aircrafts. The latest implemented system is the Palantin system, which has been deployed in the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea. This system is able to disrupt the operation of AWACS at a distance of 250 km. Probably, it is also able to disrupt all radio, GPS and mobile systems as well as create the so-called apparent targets that mask the correct flight paths of projectiles fired from the Iskander launcher. Thus, combating and destroying Iskander missiles have become even more difficult. Moreover, the system also functions as a reconnaissance platform (Cranny-Evans 2019; Hodges et al. 2019). The deployment of Iskander and Krasucha (Gawęda 2015), as well as Palantin and aeronautical defence systems in the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea, including the S-300 and S-400, create strong Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) nodes with the simultaneous capability to strike by means of airborne and land forces within the depth of their practical impact range (A2/AD nodes). Another threat worth noting, particularly important for NATO Eastern Wall states, is Russia’s conduct of operations which cannot be immediately repelled by the Alliance due to their little scale. They take place in the form of quick, limited or offensive operations giving Russia the advantage of “facts made” and allowing it to join into the peace talks from that position. Figure 4 presents the summary of the estimated military capabilities, presented earlier in individual innovation trends, of the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces in Europe at the end of 2019. It illustrates the deployment of the Strategic Connected Commands, the army and corpses as well as “inaccessible areas” and potential targets to be attacked in the event of a conflict (air bases, airports and radar systems). It is worth noting that almost the entire area of Poland is an anti-access zone (A2/AD) (Gawęda 2018), which means that any allied defence support from the air, at least in the first phase of a conflict, will be very difficult. Operations of the Polish aviation and capability to command them also seem highly problematic. Unfortunately, that confirms the likelihood of limited offensive capabilities as described above. **Chart removed** Russia’s significant asset is also the fact that it constitutes a single entity in contrast to NATO whose forces, which guarantee the security of Central and Eastern European states, are distributed throughout the world (including the US and Canada). Thus, the distance gives Russia a big advantage. The USA, being the major pillar of NATO, have several sensitive security spots and, therefore, have to operate on many levels, not just watching over their own national and NATO’s interests, but also, in particular, European states neighbouring with Russia. Moreover, the distance and response time create problems, while Russia has the freedom to choose the time and space to provoke and attack. However, it is not the military threat that is the most dangerous for NATO. The main threat are the attempts made by Russia to bring individual member states into conflict with each other in order to break down NATO’s cohesion. Success of such attempts could create a space for Russia to undertake possible military actions. The tools provided by the supplemented Gerasimov doctrine entitle Russia to use all methods and measures of combat such as: pre-emptive attacks, impacts on civilians and administration centres (psychological and information operations), as well as the use of nuclear weapons. In other terms, it entitles Russia to wage a total war at a convenient time and place.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Cohesion Impacts › Impacts --- Cohesion k Baltics/Arctic

Solves war in Baltic Seas, North Atlantic, and Arctic.

Anders Ljunggren & Michal Jarmoluk 21, Ljunggren is the Swedish Ambassador to Estonia and Iceland, Jarmoluk is a political photographer, “Cohesion in the EU and Nato will keep the peace in Baltic Sea,” Frivarld, https://frivarld.se/sakerhetsradet/cohesion-in-eu-and-nato-will-keep-the-peace-in-baltic-sea/micahw

I would argue that in the situation we now are in, in the Baltic Sea Region, cohesion in the EU and in NATO is the most important challenge. The stronger the confidence in the cohesion of the EU and NATO, the lower the likelihood of military use of force in the Baltic Sea region.

Each state is first and foremost dependent on its own will and ability to assert its security. But all states depend on cooperation with others, especially in the case of a potential conflict with a country like Russia. This also applies to the militarily non-aligned states Finland and Sweden.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Cohesion Impacts › Impacts --- Cohesion k Deter China

Solves war with China

Ben Hodges 18, Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “Why the United States Needs a Cohesive NATO,”

If a conflict with China arises, the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond. The United States remains committed to Europe’s security and stability. But it also expects its European allies to pick up their share of the burden for collective security so as to help maintain order in the continent and around the globe. It is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges.

Several things remain to be achieved if Europe and the United States in this regard. First, they must build a common approach not only in defense, but across economic, information, and political domains. Second, they must solve the continued inequity in burden sharing that hinders a stronger relationship between them and erodes the confidence of many Americans in the efficacy of NATO. Third, it is necessary to achieve greater coherence on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the Black Sea region. Fourth, NATO must continue its efforts to improve its deterrence capability against Russia’s aggressive behavior.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Cohesion Impacts › Impacts --- Cohesion k Deter China

NATO cohesion and efficacy -- specifically strong US-Europe relations -- is key to effective response to the rising threat of China.

Hodges ’18 -- (Ben Hodges, 12-7-2018, "Why the United States Needs a Cohesive NATO," GMFUS, https://www.gmfus.org/news/why-united-states-needs-cohesive-nato, accessed 6-19-2022) -- nikki

If a conflict with China arises, the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond. The United States remains committed to Europe’s security and stability. But it also expects its European allies to pick up their share of the burden for collective security so as to help maintain order in the continent and around the globe. It is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges. Several things remain to be achieved if Europe and the United States in this regard. First, they must build a common approach not only in defense, but across economic, information, and political domains. Second, they must solve the continued inequity in burden sharing that hinders a stronger relationship between them and erodes the confidence of many Americans in the efficacy of NATO. Third, it is necessary to achieve greater coherence on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the Black Sea region. Fourth, NATO must continue its efforts to improve its deterrence capability against Russia’s aggressive behavior. The interests and responsibilities of the United States are global, with freedom of navigation on the seas and preservation of the global commons being prime examples. Its allies and partners benefit from these freedoms as well, but these have now come under threat, most notably in the South China Sea and with China’s growing control over much of the infrastructure of the world, particularly in Europe and Africa. The threat from China is real and growing, and if it materializes the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond, while the majority of its forces and capabilities, particularly air and naval ones, are operating in the Pacific theater. The stability, security, and economic prosperity of the United States are directly linked to that of Europe. The bulk of its global economic relationships are in North America and the European Union, and the majority of its most reliable allies and partners are in Europe. To give but one example, the shared intelligence obtained from Europe is essential to the implementation of the recently published U.S. National Defense Strategy. In this context, it is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges. The U.S. Priority: China A war between China and the United States is not inevitable, but the next 15 years could see the eruption of such a conflict. While this may not reach the threshold of full-scale war or a nuclear conflict, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have set their country on a trajectory that will lead to a strategic situation that may result in sustained armed conflict, potentially stretching across the Pacific region, in all domains. Furthermore, the combination of China’s huge population, export-oriented economy, and lack of natural resources could generate an inexorable push towards conflict. The CCP leadership has emphasized the development of military capabilities that could deny the U.S. Navy access to the South China Sea, including long-range air and missile defense and anti-ship capabilities. This anti-access area denial (A2AD) capability does not depend on a large Chinese navy but instead uses well-protected, land-based systems. The creation of artificial islands in the region, most of which are already being armed and garrisoned with A2AD capabilities, are violations of international law and agreements that clearly demonstrate the CCP’s strategy and intentions. Enforcement of freedom of the seas and recognized international waters by the United States and others is necessary to counter these policies. In one recent demonstration of CCP intent, there was a near-collision incident between Chinese and U.S. Navy ships, caused by unsafe and unprofessional behavior by the Chinese one. Statements by the China’s minister of defense during his recent visit to the Pentagon, including demands that the U.S. forces stay away from the articifial islands, indicate that his country will continue to push aggressively its territorial claims. Meanwhile, in Europe China has become an increasingly significant and potentially divisive influence in a variety of aspects; especially in infrastructure, technology transfer, and trade. The Belt and Road Initiative has resulted in dramatic increases in Chinese investment in Europe, control of hundreds of European companies, and ownership or control of more than 10 percent of Europe’s ports. These developments, and the CCP’s strategy and behavior, are cause for concern about the potential for conflict with China within the next 15 years. They also show why the United States must prepare for this eventuality. During the Cold War, the United States used a “two and a half wars” framework for force structure. This was not a strategy, but rather a mechanism meant to assess how much capability and capacity its armed forces needed to deter effectively and, if necessary, win simultaneous conflicts in two different operational theaters and “hold” in a third, minor theater at the same time, for as long as necessary. Today, and for the foreseeable future, the United States can no longer exercise this capability and capacity. Therefore, in the event of conflict with China, it will need a strong, cohesive NATO as well as partnerships around the world in order to continue deterring a revanchist Russia and to carry on counter-terrorism operations in the Middle East while the majority of U.S. forces and capabilities are operating in the Pacific. The U.S. Commitment to Europe Many European leaders have expressed uncertainty about the United States’ commitment to Europe, based on President Barack Obama’s “pivot to the Pacific” and, more recently, President Donald Trump’s questioning of the relevance and value of NATO and the EU. The facts on the ground, however, demonstrate that the United States, including the current administration, is fully committed to its long-time allies and partners in Europe. Everything promised by the Obama administration at the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw is being delivered by the Trump administration: a rotational armored brigade combat team, pre-positioned equipment for an army armored division, and the Enhanced Forward Presence battle group in Poland. The administration just announced an additional 1,500 soldiers in an artillery brigade and short-range air defense battalion that will be assigned to Europe. The operational contingency fund, known as the European Reassurance Initiative, which started during the Obama administration, has increased steadily over the last three years and is now known as the European Deterrence Initiative, reflecting U.S. backing for Europe and deterrence of Russia. Also telling was the Senate vote just prior to this year’s NATO’s summit in Brussels, which affirmed by a 98:2 margin U.S. support for Article 5. The United States’ commitment to European partners like Ukraine and Georgia also remains very strong, as evidenced by provision of the Javelin anti-tank weapon system, other equipment, and training, as well as continued support for these countries’ eventual membership in NATO and the return of their territories from Russia.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Cohesion Impacts › Impacts --- Cohesion k NATO Cred

Lack of unity causes competitors to exploit NATO --- collapses NATO credibility and effectiveness

Morcos ‘21

(Pierre Morcos Visiting Fellow, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, “‘Lifting Up Our Values at Home’: How to Revitalize NATO’s Political Cohesion,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Any of these points of disunity could be used by strategic competitors as venues to destabilize individual allies or NATO as a whole. As highlighted by the 2020 NATO Experts Group report, “a drift toward NATO disunity must be seen as a strategic rather than merely tactical or optical problem.” Despite the importance of preserving NATO’s values base and, in turn, its political cohesion, allies have nonetheless lacked the political will or legal instruments to effectively address in-house tensions and divergences. In contrast to the European Union, which is arguably in a better position to address democratic backsliding through its rule of law mechanism, NATO has no legal provisions for suspending or expelling an ally who violates the alliance’s founding principles. Also, the fact that NATO operates by consensus means that any punitive action against the offending ally risks incurring retaliatory action on other NATO business. Yet however difficult, NATO can no longer afford to turn a blind eye on these internal strains. From its founding, it has been more than just a military alliance. NATO has embraced a political role built on a shared democratic identity. As the alliance seeks to exercise more fully the power of this political dimension, shoring up its values is vital to realizing the full benefits of collective security. A lack of response from NATO on these issues would ultimately undermine its reputation and credibility, most notably toward accession candidates and partners.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Cohesion Impacts › Impacts --- Cohesion Good

NATO cohesion solves a litany of existential threats.

Mike Gallagher & Colin Dueck 19. Represents Wisconsin’s eighth district in the U.S. House of Representatives. Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, and a Kirkpatrick visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “The Conservative Case for NATO”. .

The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American national interests. In an age of great-power competition, as identified by the Trump administration, America’s Western alliance provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The United States, Canada, and their European allies have a number of common interests and common challenges with regard to Beijing, Moscow, terrorism, cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for cooperation on these matters. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, NATO helps keeps America’s strategic competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in Europe is a bit like oxygen. You may take it for granted, but you’ll miss it when it’s gone.

Now consider the alternative. American withdrawal from NATO would be a grave error. Not only would it surrender the above advantages and undo existing progress in Europe. It would also have negative long-term implications globally pertaining to America’s foremost long-term strategic challenge: namely, the People’s Republic of China. As Beijing extends its influence worldwide, U.S. disengagement from NATO would send the signal that the United States is an unreliable friend. America’s allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific would have to rethink the integrated security architecture we have painstakingly built since Eisenhower’s day. This is not to mention the obvious and immediate tactical and operational military advantages that would accrue to Russia in Europe, shifting the balance of power against the United States.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Cohesion Impacts › Impacts --- Cohesion Good

NATO cohesion checks numerous existential crises.

Gallagher ’19 [Mike and Colin Dueck; January 2019; Representative for Wisconsin’s Eighth District in the U.S. House of Representatives; Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University; National Review, “The Conservative Case for NATO,” ]

The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American national interests. In an age of great-power competition, as identified by the Trump administration, America’s Western alliance provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The United States, Canada, and their European allies have a number of common interests and common challenges with regard to Beijing, Moscow, terrorism, cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for cooperation on these matters. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, NATO helps keeps America’s strategic competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in Europe is a bit like oxygen. You may take it for granted, but you’ll miss it when it’s gone.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
IMPACTS › Cohesion Impacts › Impacts --- Cohesion

Solves war with Russia AND China!

Marcus Kolga 21, Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute Center for Advancing Canada’s Interests Abroad, “Improving NATO’s cohesion is critical to combat Russia and China’s threat,” [GRU = Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie]

A united NATO is critically important to projecting credible deterrence. The erosion of domestic trust and confidence in the Alliance among its member states, including Canada, represents a threat to this cohesion. A proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO was tabled at a recent policy conference for one of Canada’s three major political parties. The proposal was defeated, but it represents a fringe anti-NATO narrative within Canada’s illiberal left; if left unaddressed, such a narrative could grow.

If countries like Russia perceive NATO as an atomized collection of states with varied priorities rather than a unified front, the Alliance is exposed to a significant risk of miscalculation in which a foreign adversary might believe they can cross a red line and only face a limited response. Thus, gaps in cohesion within the alliance directly threaten to undermine political and military deterrence. The Alliance and members states must work towards improving communications strategies to foster greater basic general understanding of NATO’s purpose, its missions and its role in protecting its members against external threats.