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2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- Cyber › Links --- Cyber Time Consuming

Cybersecurity cooperation is difficult and time-consuming for the alliance.

Jacobsen 21 [Jeppe T. Jacobsen is a Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. His primary focus is U.S. cyber armament, its motivation and consequences to international security. Jacobsen worked as cyber coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark where he coordinated Denmark’s cyber diplomacy. ; “Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities”; International Affairs; May 10, 2021; https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/97/3/703/6205395]//eleanor

The abovementioned incidents have led cyber-conflict scholars to point to several technical and practical difficulties in the operational integration of cyber effects.29 In the interviews and background conversations that contributed to this study, three of these difficulties were continuously reiterated when discussing successful integration of cyber effects into NATO operational planning: the temporal dimension of developing exploits; the assessment of battle damage; and the problem of confliction. Developing exploits—a matter of time One of the characteristics of cyber attacks that receives most attention is the fact that they hit suddenly and without warning.30 While this is often the case, the central question for operational integration is not the speed at which they hit their target, but the speed with which the tools and techniques that exploit IT vulnerabilities in order to deliver cyber effects can be developed. Like conventional weapons, the cyber tools—the exploits or cyber weapons—take time to develop. However, an exploit is often harder to reuse than a conventional weapon, as it is more dependent on a meticulous analysis and target preparation—in this case, specifically, the target’s IT infrastructure. Without knowing the adversary’s IT systems and its vulnerabilities better than the adversary itself, meaningful cyber weapons are impossible to develop. The fact that knowledge about the target is linked not only to the deployment of a weapon but also to its development influences the extent to which it can be used and reused. Stuxnet, for example, required years of development, testing and perfecting before it could deliver the intended effect on the Iranian centrifuges. Despite the techniques used in the Stuxnet malware having been found in other malware,31 Stuxnet lost its ability to destroy the centrifuges when it was discovered and the IT vulnerabilities that enabled it were patched. Importantly, part of the complexity of Stuxnet relates to the US–Israeli intention to keep the effect secret. In a hot conflict, secrecy in terms of the effect is often less important, and thus the development and deployment of cyber effects do not necessarily have to be as complex and time-consuming. This observation does not necessarily change the fact that the development of exploits often has to precede the military confrontation in which they are intended to be used. NATO states that want to deliver cyber effects in NATO operations must try to gain access to Russia’s or other potential adversaries’ critical military networks to identify and exploit IT vulnerabilities. As several informants emphasized, if states wait for a conflict to escalate before they begin the development of exploits, it is most likely to be already too late.32 The alternative to penetrating adversary networks in peacetime is for states to rely on the exploitation of vulnerabilities in as many commercial off-the-shelf products as possible. This can be done, for example, by purchasing exploits from private companies offering this service, in the hope that it will then be possible to quickly create an overview of the enemy’s IT infrastructure and adapt the exploits to this environment when a conflict escalates. The latter approach is more likely to succeed against adversaries with low network security, which does not apply in the case of Russia, or in contexts where less sophisticated and less closely targeted cyber effects are required. Whether member states develop sophisticated exploits for future targeted effects or stockpile well-known exploits to cause more minor effects, they cannot—as several informants indicated—be certain that they will be able to deliver the cyber effect at the specific time it is requested by CYOC. This is because the IT vulnerabilities upon which exploits depend might not exist for ever. Cyberspace is a dynamic environment: vulnerabilities are patched, systems are updated or replaced and bad IT security practices are identified and improved. This means that exploits are temporary in nature and cannot be stored for later use.33 States must constantly ensure that the exploits still work, which requires minor adjustments when updates take place. As a consequence, the larger the military ‘cyber arsenal’, the more technically skilled human resources are needed for its maintenance. In the current labour market, where recruitment and retention of a cyber workforce is difficult, extensive investment is required for states to be able to stand ready with cyber effects available when requested. In short, if a state is to offer a cyber effect in a NATO operation, then the state is likely to have to be able, first, to predict what Russian IT systems it is going to target months or years in advance, and second, to marshal the necessary resources to develop and maintain a large array of exploits that can be used against these systems. Even if this is successfully done, the state still faces difficulty in ensuring that an effect is delivered as promised.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › Links --- Cyber › Links --- Cyber Troops

And, our cybertroops are stretched thin --- additional operations undermine their effectiveness

Waterman 3/14/22

(Shaun, “Cyber Troops Stretched Thin in Ukraine Response as NATO Builds Common Air Picture,” pg online @ //um-ef)

The war in Ukraine has provided a wake-up call for U.S. military cyber defenders, who are facing hard choices about how to deploy limited resources, said Air Force Brig. Gen. Chad D. Raduege, the chief information officer of U.S. European Command. “There’s been a realization that, quite frankly, we can’t protect everything we have,” Raduege told a virtual luncheon hosted by the Gabriel Chapter of the Air Force Association on March 9. He added that this realization had been growing for some time. In his prior job in 2021 as chief information officer of Air Combat Command, “we found ourselves … identifying the key [IT] components for us to fly, fight, and win. And we were applying mission defense teams from a cyber component against those weapon systems and saying, these are our crown jewels that we need to protect.” But faced with a crisis that is demanding agile U.S. deployments alongside a wide variety of partners, meaning small teams operating from unfamiliar locations, there weren’t enough cyber defense teams to go around, Raduege said, answering an audience question from retired Maj. Gen. Burke E. ”Ed” Wilson, the former deputy assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy, who previously commanded Air Forces Cyber. “I think the area that we’ve got to continue to figure out is this idea that we were going [to] protect the weapon systems themselves, protect those smaller groups, with our mission defense teams. That’s a really great vision. What we found is we didn’t have enough capacity in the cyber realm to even stand up some of those capabilities,” Raduege said. He said the Air Force is deciding which weapon systems it can afford to protect. “The Air Force, right now, through Air Combat Command, is working through a prioritization of which weapon systems we will apply those mission defense teams against,” he said. The overwhelming “demand signal” for cyber protection, Raduege said, was driven by the circumstances of the U.S. response to the Ukraine crisis, which combined NATO military operations with humanitarian relief efforts involving a much wider alliance of partners—all requiring connectivity. “There’s an insatiable appetite to have connectivity. And we’re seeing not only fielded forces at the home stations, but now we have all of these tactical edge airfields and logistics hubs that are standing up,” Raduege said. “We have fielded forces all over the place that have an air picture that they want to share. … We have logistics hubs that are all over the European theater right now. … We’re seeing our own nation want to put donations and goods into the European theater. And so we’re seeing coordination centers stand up” to manage that flow of incoming goods and their onward distribution. Coordination was required, not just with the 30-member NATO alliance, but with “a whole bunch of other allies and partners for this current fight,” he said. “And the ability to track all of that aid, all of that hardware and software that is going into different places … requires information-sharing requirements at a protected military level,” Raduege said. That secure connectivity required developing the mission partner environment, or MPE, “a coalition network,” which could move data, classified as highly as “secret,” securely between the military networks of allied nations. The MPE was an alternative to the “sneaker net”-style of manual exchanges NATO partners had to cope with for many years in Afghanistan, but Raduege suggested that some kinks still being worked out.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › General Links › 2NC --- Links --- Pressure

US pressure undermines cohesion – the plan pushes the fine line

Schnaufer 21 [ Tad, doctoral candidate in Security Studies at the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida ; “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies”; January 15, 2021; DOA: 7/18/22; ; Lowell-ES]

Policymakers must balance the coercion needed to increase contributions of European allies by making them question US intentions, but not distance the United States to the point that it jeopardizes the alliance or the deterrence that the US military power provides. A snapshot of one such policy could involve pulling a significant number of permanently stationed US forces from Europe, while reassuring US commitments to its allies through rotational deployments (not of equal number to the withdrawal) in support of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence and other operations. This concept aims to incentivize allies to build up military strength for initial deterrence and defense on the continent with the backing of US security guarantees, but lacking the tangible comfort drawn from a large permanent US force presence. With the probability that the incoming Biden administration will quickly mend relations in Europe, it runs the risk of reversing the current trend of increasing defense spending across the alliance and fostering free-riding. The United States should not go running back into the arms of the Europeans. Rather, it should maintain blunt political pressure on the Europeans to do more while ensuring its commitment to its allies remains clear to NATO’s potential adversaries.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › General Links › 2NC --- Links --- China Focus

The plan’s focus on china ruptures the alliance

Shifrinson ‘21

(Joshua, PhD in political science/international relations from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor with the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University and a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Shifrinson’s research focuses on U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy, European and Asian security, alliance politics, and diplomatic history, “The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Although Trump has now left office, NATO is nonetheless in for difficult times, as strategic circumstances change and China’s rise draws American attention toward East Asia. Though some European NATO members now express interest in helping to counter Beijing, and the alliance itself is working to stake out a position on China’s rise, as the NATO Reflection Group Report underscored in November 2020, the United States will inevitably be more invested in Asian developments than will other NATO members.16 The net result presents two possible avenues for deeper, substantive divides in the alliance. First, if competition with Beijing escalates, the United States may be impelled to devote fewer resources and attention to European affairs. This would invert the Cold War experience, creating the potential for the alliance to wither away as American attention moves elsewhere and NATO’s European members seek alternatives for their security. Alliances, after all, usually change as new threats appear; as American priorities change, NATO cohesion may decline as well. Then, too, European actors might also be expected to complain about prospective American “abandonment.” Mounting Chinese–American competition may also encourage NATO’s European members to distance themselves, perhaps dramatically, from the United States. During the contest with the Soviet Union, European allies regularly feared that Soviet–American tensions might entangle them in a conflict with Moscow at times and places beyond their control. A U.S.–China contest would carry even greater risks. With less at stake in Asia, NATO’s European members can be expected to separate themselves from U.S. policy. If the United States were to respond by pressuring its European allies to assist against Beijing, an alliance rupture would become possible.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › General Links › 2NC --- Links --- Spending

Deterrence key to stopping Russia --- ineffective alliance spending and focus trades-off

Herem 6/23/22

(Martin, The writer is commander of Estonian Defence Forces Nato must show Putin it is serious about defence,” pg online @ //um-ef)

However, it seems that with every Russian military engagement over the past 30 years, the Kremlin’s threshold for aggression has fallen ever lower. As Moscow’s desire for self-assertion has increased, the west’s response has often been too soft or accommodating. For Nato allies, deterrence has worked so far and we have not experienced military aggression. But since Putin is not prepared to play by the same rules as the rest of us, we have no guarantees. We need a fundamental shift in approach: we need to move from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial. In other words, we me must be ready to prevent Russia taking a single inch of Nato territory, rather than simply trying to reconquer occupied enclaves. We need to rethink our objectives — first and foremost, we must prepare stronger defences. In light of the changed security environment, we need to double the speed and scale of our efforts to boost our military posture across the alliance. The overall aim is to be able to put in place a credible defence capability anywhere on Nato territory, from the very beginning of a conflict. We cannot wait for another massacre such as the one in Bucha to happen before taking action. To do this, Estonia and its fellow Nato members need to shape up. First, governments must trust military personnel to build readiness. Not in drawing up defence or security policy, but in proposing the best solutions according to military science. Those with practical experience on the battlefield can decide how best to invest the allotted money to defend their country. Second, states must invest wisely. There is no point in acquiring the most modern technology if you don’t have the people, the skills or the funds to sustain it, or enough ammunition to use it, in case of a conflict. Unfortunately, these foundations do not sound exciting, and cannot easily be displayed to adversaries. How do you present at a parade the amount of training, ammunition, communication systems or equipment maintenance you have undertaken, which are all critical in warfare? Third, Nato and its allies need to prepare much more comprehensively for swift and viable deployments at the first signs of aggression. We must deny Russia any military success anywhere on the alliance’s territory. The aim is not to intimidate: when deploying forces to Nato countries, we should not measure how much deterrence those aircraft, ships or tanks are providing. Instead, we must assess how ready the forces are to fight in case of need. And if it is not sustainable to keep the necessary number of forces to counterbalance Russia permanently stationed in frontline Nato countries, then we need to have a credible defence plan for emergency deployment.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › General Links › 2NC --- Links --- Info-Sharing

Info-sharing and non-deterrence measures trade-off with NATO deterrence measures and cause overstretch

Moller '20

(Sara Assistant Professor at the School of Diplomacy and International Relations, "It Will Take More Than a Biden Victory to Solve NATO’s Strategic Malaise," pg online @ https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/it-will-take-more-than-a-biden-victory-to-solve-natos-strategic-malaise/)

If and when the Biden team embarks on its grand European tour, it seems virtually certain that, beyond the expressions of gratitude for America’s “return” that will surely follow them wherever they go, the delegation can expect to be met with a lengthy list of items requiring their immediate attention. Moreover, appeals for Washington’s assistance are likely to differ from capital to capital, with each NATO ally arguing that their particular issue or concern represents the most pressing challenge and therefore requires the most attention and resources. In Warsaw and the capitals of the Baltic states, the U.S. delegation will hear that, despite a new U.S. rotational troop deployment, a revanchist Russia necessitates additional NATO (but especially U.S.) military commitments along the Eastern flank of the alliance. In Rome, Athens, and Madrid, U.S. policymakers will learn that the Mediterranean countries represent the “soft underbelly” of NATO and that the alliance must do more to project stability along its southern arc of instability. In Ankara, the message will be one of anger directed at what the Erdogan government perceives as NATO’s collective failure to support Turkish actions in Syria and elsewhere. In Paris, the message for the U.S. delegation will be that the alliance must strengthen its counter-terrorism efforts in the Middle East and North Africa, while in Berlin the focus will be on reforming NATO’s nuclear posture and salvaging expiring arms-control agreements. Meanwhile, securing the Arctic and halting the effects of climate change will be at the top of the agenda in Copenhagen and Oslo. In short, wherever the Biden presidential delegation goes, it will be met with requests that Washington — and with it, the NATO alliance — prioritize everything, thereby fulfilling the old adage that, “When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority.” Given the precarious state of international relations today, the temptation to do more is understandably strong. It is easy to understand why, in the present climate of global instability, calls for the transatlantic alliance to reinforce and strengthen its existing commitments while simultaneously adding new mandates, missions, and programs are popular. Rather than adding more items to its already crowded agenda, however, the time has come for not just the United States but also NATO to consider doing less but doing it better. When More Is Less, and Less Is More For an alliance that has long prided itself on its commonality of purpose and interests, the truth is that NATO is in danger of losing both. On paper and in public, the members still agree the core purpose of the 71-year-old alliance is deterrence and defense of the North Atlantic region. When internal disagreements are aired publicly, other allies are quick to dispel reports of rifts by pointing out that differences of opinion are nothing new. But unlike during the Cold War, when a single adversary occupied all of the alliance’s attention, today’s security environment — as the allies routinely remind each other — is multifaceted and complex. In an effort to address members’ often disparate security requirements, NATO has taken on additional tasks over the past three decades almost as quickly as it has taken on additional members. The NATO-ization of every security challenge has meant that issues once considered the purview of individual nations or other international organizations — such as migration, terrorism, and foreign security force assistance — are now lumped onto NATO’s agenda under the guise of fulfilling its ambitious (and potentially limitless) post-Cold War mandate of “projecting stability.” For far too long now, alliance leaders have tasked the NATO military infrastructure with a seemingly impossible undertaking: weighing down the military organization with new responsibilities like peacekeeping and counter-terrorism while simultaneously allowing members to shirk on contributing the resources required to fulfill old and new alliance missions. To date, much of the criticism surrounding NATO’s current strategic deadlock has focused on the resource issue and the strains caused by uneven burden-sharing within the alliance. Far less attention has been paid to the first part of the “ends-means-ways” formulation of strategy, namely NATO’s original purpose. While addressing “means” and “ways” are crucial elements in any strategic enterprise, it is past time the Allies got around to focusing on NATO’s strategic ends once more. Confronting NATO’s present strategic dilemma will require looking beyond existing strategic documents like the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which proclaimed the signatories’ commitment to the “preservation of peace and security” in the North Atlantic area. As the past three decades of NATO transformation have shown, there is not much that does not fit under the rubric of fostering “peace and security” and consequently cannot be tacked onto the alliance’s agenda. True strategy requires setting (and adhering to) actual goals and priorities, as well as developing plans to achieve them. Although the alliance’s past strategic documents have often sought to define NATO’s evolving strategic purpose with more precision than the founding treaty, the alliance has not adopted a new strategic concept since 2010 for fear that embarking on such an exercise would only further inflame the deep rifts within the alliance that such strategic endeavors are meant to help address. Officially, NATO members still assert collective defense is the alliance’s primary task, despite the inclusion of two other core tasks — projecting stability and cooperative security/crisis management — in all three of its post-Cold War Strategic Concepts (1991, 1999, 2010). The addition of these latter two core tasks — coupled with members’ differing threat perceptions about what rises to the level of an existential security threat — has clouded the organization’s focus. After three decades of continual adaptation, the danger that the alliance’s original raison d’étre of collective defense gets further downgraded to the point where it risks becoming primus inter pares among NATO’s many other responsibilities is real. As with previous critical junctures in transatlantic relations, it will take American leadership to change NATO’s future course. Come January 2021, a Biden administration should move swiftly to announce its intention to commission a new NATO strategic concept by 2022. Should Trump win, all bets are off. Defenders of NATO’s post-Cold War emphasis on projecting stability and collective security argue that NATO has a proven track record of crisis management and capacity-building beyond its borders in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The alliance’s cooperative security track record, however, is hardly stellar. This past June, the NATO-led international peacekeeping force in Kosovo entered its 22nd year of operation. Almost 17 years after the alliance’s Integrated Military Command first assumed responsibilities in Afghanistan, the NATO flag continues to fly in Kabul, where some 15,000 allied troops remain as part of NATO’s Resolute Support mission. Nor can the alliance’s intervention in Libya in 2011 be considered a resounding success, judging by the state of affairs there today. That NATO remains engaged in some of these places decades afterward is not an impeachment of the men and women who served in these operations and performed the tasks demanded of them. It is, howevwer, evidence of NATO’s failure to give sufficient consideration to its core strategic purpose. While one can debate the wisdom of NATO having accumulated such an expansionist security agenda in an era marked by American unipolarity, an all-encompassing approach to security is harder to justify in a time of waning American power. Just as the diminishing threat of great-power competition in the 1990s and early 2000s freed NATO to take on additional security tasks beyond its traditional mission of collective defense, its return should prompt a reexamination to determine whether NATO is still the appropriate entity for handling such tasks. Another center of excellence, special representative, or office will not fix what ails NATO. As the authors of a recent Heritage Foundation report on “NATO in the 21st Century” put it, it is time for NATO to get “back to the basics.” There are limits to what an international institution — even one as successful as NATO — can accomplish: “When policymakers expect or want NATO to do what it was never designed to do, that is when the Alliance risks failure.” The launch of NATO Secretary Gen. Jens Stoltenberg’s #NATO2030 reflection process earlier this year to address political reforms within the alliance presented just such an opportunity to tackle these and other big-picture questions. It is still unclear to what extent the pandemic has delayed the work of the group of experts begun last March. The Biden team will have to move quickly if it hopes to help shape the working group’s deliberations, as Stoltenberg is slated to brief members on the path forward for the alliance at the April 2021 Leaders’ Summit. Back to the Future: Narrowing (Not Broadening) NATO’s Remit Looking ahead, alliance leaders should consider ways to streamline current NATO missions and tasks so that responsibilities that fall below the threshold of existential challenges can be unloaded onto other multilateral institutions or global partnerships. In addition to bringing an end to the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, alliance leaders should consider getting NATO out of the security assistance and stabilization business altogether. Calls for NATO to look for opportunities to do more in the MENA region should also be rebuffed. Few would dispute that this region poses real security challenges to European states or that these challenges are particularly acute for the southernmost members of the alliance, some of whom might even view migration and refugee flows as rising to the level of existential threats. But while the 21st century challenges to the “stability and well-being” of member states may be numerous and growing, there is only one NATO. A single organization cannot tackle every national security challenge its members face. To remain useful, the alliance must choose which threats to prioritize. Doing so requires recognizing that not every security issue rises to the level of an existential threat to the alliance. Terrorist attacks were a common occurrence in many West European nations in the 1970s and 1980s, yet NATO did not fundamentally transform its agenda back then because members recognized that the threat posed by the Soviet Union was greater. While neither Russia nor China as yet represents a threat on par with the Soviet Union, NATO should prepare for the possibility that the latter (either alone or in combination with Moscow) could pose an existential challenge to the Atlantic community in the coming decades. Nor is it evident that NATO was ever the appropriate venue for tackling threats like terrorism in the first place. Effective counter-terrorism requires intelligence-sharing; local policing and counter-radicalization programs; and financial instruments that agencies like Europol, Interpol, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and others are better equipped to lead than an overstretched military alliance. The same is true when it comes to other activities the transatlantic alliance has added to its roster since 1991, like stabilization missions and security sector reform. In fact, organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the European Union provide more appropriate venues for tackling many of the collective security duties the alliance has assumed since the 1990s. As a regional defensive military alliance, NATO’s comparative advantage lies in providing territorial defense against other states or groups of states. This is a comparative advantage that should be preserved, not diluted by the addition of other security tasks. True comparative advantage arises from specialization. Continuing to add more and more security responsibilities to NATO’s already-full plate risks transforming the military alliance into a glorified clearinghouse or administrative apparatus whose sole task is the facilitation of information-sharing rather than the provision of collective defense. Yes, NATO is better equipped to handle the myriad security problems its members face than any other multilateral security organization in existence today. But the proposition that because NATO has the resources and coordinating mechanisms it should automatically take on the latest mission du jour is what has led to a strategically deadlocked alliance. Much like the 1990s, the coming decade will be one of transition for NATO. Back then, proponents of alliance reform argued that the only way forward was to enlarge the alliance and take on new responsibilities. Without such reforms, they claimed, NATO would disappear. The choice facing NATO members today is different: not a world without NATO, but a world in which NATO fails to fulfill its intended purpose. Preparing NATO for China’s rise does not mean sending alliance-flagged vessels to the South China Sea. But the reality is, as Stoltenberg put it last December, China is already “coming closer to us.” Ultimately, NATO possesses few capabilities of its own. Individual allies — and not the alliance itself — retain ownership and control over the military material and personnel assigned to NATO operations and missions. The alliance’s real strength, however, lies in its integrated military command structure. Preserving and protecting the integrated command structure’s organizational bandwidth should be the primary focus in the coming years. Unloading the alliance’s collective security responsibilities onto other international actors would allow alliance military officials to focus on the challenges emanating from China (and, to a far lesser degree, Russia) free of the need to also tackle a host of lower-threshold security concerns, all of which require office space, funding, and personnel billets. Bifurcating collective security tasks from collective defense would also force European leaders once and for all to decide exactly what price they are willing to pay for their own national defense. The Way Forward Instead of seeking to tackle every new security challenge of the 21st century, NATO leaders should work to preserve NATO’s core assets and capabilities for the task that it is uniquely suited for: deterring state-based adversaries and defending the territorial integrity of its members. The time when NATO could be both a collective defense and a collective security organization has passed. Amid the reemergence of great-power rivalries, it no longer makes sense to assign NATO’s limited resources to naval operations in support of the refugee crisis as the organization did back in 2016. Or for the alliance to continue to try its hand at stabilizing war-torn nations. NATO has survived this long by adapting. But unlike in the past, where NATO adaptation has always meant taking on more responsibilities, the reforms needed today are those that involve shedding commitments rather than taking on additional ones. In seeking to reestablish NATO once again as an alliance focused solely on collective defense, and not a collective security organization, the Biden team will need to resist the urge to pick up the phone and call NATO Headquarters whenever a new security challenge emerges, like previous U.S. presidents have done since the end of the Cold War. Jettisoning the collective security responsibilities the NATO alliance has assumed over the past three decades won’t be easy. Nor does freeing NATO from responsibility for tackling issues like counter-terrorism and instability in the near abroad mean that such threats are not deserving of international cooperative efforts by states. It simply means that going forward, countries committed to these kinds of activities will have to look to organizations and venues other than NATO to address them. Rather than expend precious resources and continue to use NATO as an instrument to grapple with all manner of cooperative security issues, a Biden administration should instead reorient the alliance’s strategic focus toward the more pressing task of adjusting to China’s rise. Not doing so risks turning NATO into nothing more than a glorified discussion club. To avoid this fate, the Biden team will have to move quickly. At stake is not just alliance unity but NATO’s future utility.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › General Links › 2NC --- Links --- Info-Sharing

Info-sharing on EDT causes alliance breakdowns --- countries won’t want to share their tech

Bazin and Kunertova ‘18

(Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, doctorate in psychology, specializing in mediation and conflict resolution. He has over twenty years of experience including service with NATO and the U.S. Army Central Command, and operation deployments to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. He previously published “Winning Trust under Fire” in the January-February 2015 issue of Military Review.PsyD, U.S. Army Dominika Kunertova, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada. She holds a BA in political science from Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia, and an MA in international relations from Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. Her research focuses on transatlantic security and defense cooperation, and she has published in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies and European Security. “An Alliance Divided?,” pg online @ //um-ef)

Technology advances. The participants agreed that technology advances are important for NATO’s continued cohesion. Technology will constitute a significant intervening factor in how NATO nations maintain their cohesion in the future for three reasons. First, ever-evolving communication technology can facilitate the spread of risks coming from outside of the Alliance and exacerbate their negative effect. The examples that resonated the most during focus group sessions are information warfare and targeted propaganda against NATO nations. Internet communications technology creates infinite room for alternative media that distort reality, contribute to the emergence of populist and radical movements, and increase the danger of miscommunication among nations. Second, NATO risks losing the innovation game to the commercial defense industrial sector. In the future, private companies will continue to stay ahead of NATO in designing specifications and setting standards for platforms. This can have a major impact on readiness and interoperability among NATO nations if their innovation efforts (e.g., the U.S. Third Offset Strategy) do not materialize.31 Third, some nations may become reluctant to share their latest technology acquisitions, especially if they put private gains above the collective endeavor. This would pose a challenge “for anyone to share information they own without gaining any profit for themselves.” The political unwillingness may feed distrust, which can result in a deepening interoperability gap between allies on the battlefield, and ultimately, a less cohesive Alliance.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › General Links › 2NC --- Links --- Bolt from Blue

Unpredictable, bolt from the blue actions anger allies – that matters more than the substance of any policy.

Lesser 20 [Ian Lesser is vice president at The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and a member of GMF’s executive team, managing programs across the organization. He serves as executive director of the Brussels office of GMF, and leads GMF’s work on the Mediterranean, Turkey, and the wider Atlantic. He also served as interim president of GMF from September-December 2021.; “Great Optimism in the EU and NATO as Brussels Looks to Biden”; The German Marshall Fund of the United States; November 12, 2020; https://www.gmfus.org/news/great-optimism-eu-and-nato-brussels-looks-biden]//eleanor

After years of transatlantic stress, officials and observers in Brussels believe that a Biden administration holds the prospect of profound change in style and policy. There will continue to be areas of disagreement. But the overall approach from Washington is sure to be more engaging and closer to mainstream European policy preferences. From economics to security, Europe values predictability in U.S. leadership, something that has been in remarkably short supply under the Trump administration. The anticipated shift is likely to be most profound from the perspective of the EU and its institutions. Among member states, there was always a spectrum of views about Donald Trump. The outgoing administration’s approach enjoyed a degree of support in right-wing and nationalist circles, including several governments in Central and Eastern Europe. For some, this was a matter of ideology. For others it was a cooler geopolitical calculus. In general, however, the Trump administration was derided for its brash unilateral style as much as its policy choices, most of which were at odds with EU preferences. The list of sharp differences ranged from climate policy to trade, from Iran to the World Health Organization. Above all, Trump and his key advisors were seen as dismissive of, or even opposed to, the idea of the EU itself. For them, international politics seemed to be about nation states, often individual leaders—some seen positively, most seen negatively. The traditional U.S. attachment to the “European project” had become the preserve of a foreign policy elite with little influence on Trump and his circle. A Biden administration should spell a return to the traditional balance in transatlantic relations, with the EU itself taken seriously again alongside relations with France, Germany, and others. On substance, there is a realization that it may not all be smooth sailing across the Atlantic. Trade and digital policy are widely assumed to be the most challenging areas. Indeed, there is some concern that Biden may find it difficult to move away from the protectionist stance that has taken hold in recent years, against the backdrop of similar pressures in Europe and elsewhere. On other fronts, the outlook is for closer consultation and convergence. EU leaders will welcome a U.S. return to the Paris climate accords and the World Health Organization. Biden has signaled a desire to bring the United States back into the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran. A Biden administration is assumed to be more interested in and willing to assist with a host of problems on Europe’s periphery, from Africa to the Eastern Mediterranean. In some respects, NATO was one of the areas least affected by Trump’s approach to the world. The U.S. military presence in Europe has grown modestly but steadily; a trend that began under President Barack Obama. U.S. complaints about defense burden-sharing were nothing new, even if the style was more abrasive. But from the start, Trump spread anxiety about the solidity of the U.S. commitment to European defense. It never quite came to a disavowal of Article V, and Trump would have faced a very tough bipartisan battle if he ever wished to leave NATO as he hinted on more than one occasion. By contrast, it is assumed that a Biden administration would put NATO back at the core of U.S. strategy. In policy terms, the emphasis on increased European defense spending will surely continue. There will be a tougher and more predictable line on Russia, coupled with an interest in new arms-control arrangements. Biden is a well-known figure in NATO circles. For the alliance, a Biden administration will be a return to the known world and an energizing element for the institution.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › General Links › 2NC --- Link Wall

E --- RESOURCES --- the plan consumes them to get a consensus agreement

Koegler et al ‘18

(Torsten Gojowsky, Sebastian Koegler, Bernardus Haspels, Flemming Haar, and Sverre Wetteland,Torsten Gojowsky is a U.S. Army officer. Ben Haspels is a Royal Netherlands Army officer. Flemming Haar is a Danish Navy officer. Sebastian Koegle is a German officer. Sverre Wetteland is a Norwegian officer. All are students at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, “Resistance to Innovation in NATO,” pg online @ https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/8/16/resistance-to-innovation-in-nato)

NATO special operations forces have been slow to adopt innovative solutions such as Tactical Assault Kit, despite its attractive and innovative features. What explains this resistance? Resistance to innovation is at once puzzling, intellectually intriguing, and a commercially interesting phenomenon. In the 1940s, the German psychologist Kurt Lewin was the first to introduce a systemic understanding of the resistance phenomenon. The cause, according to Lewin, is not found in the mind of the individual employee, but in the dynamics of opposing forces, including the behavior of leadership. According to the political economist Josef Schumpeter, “Innovation is the creation of new combinations that represent a departure from established practices.” In other words, a technological tension between the need to innovate and the desire to maintain order and stability will always exist. Wendell Wallach nicely defines the problem as “the pacing gap” between the introduction of a new technology and the establishment of laws, regulations, and oversight mechanisms for shaping its safe development. Wallach believes that modern technological innovation is occurring at an unprecedented pace, making it harder than ever to govern using traditional legal and regulatory mechanisms. NATO as a whole suffers severely from the pacing gap, due to the fact that it consists of 29-member countries. If a new communication technology is proven highly successful by one country, the product still has to be vetted by each country’s security and intelligence services. A process like this takes time and consumes resources, forcing poorer nations to evaluate the importance of a new technology versus the old. This process exacerbates the pacing gap within NATO as standardization becomes a protracted process of having to generate consensus among the member states.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › General Links › 2NC --- Link Wall

D --- FOCUS and PRIORITIZATION

Kochis ‘21

(Daniel, master's in comparative political science from Fordham University in New York, where he received the Richard A. Bennett Graduate Assistantship, senior policy analyst in European Affairs at the Heritage Foundation's Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom in Washington, D.C. He specializes in trans-Atlantic security issues and writes regularly on U.S. policy on Europe, NATO, U.S.-Russia relations and Arctic issues, “Biden Wants NATO To Focus on Climate Change. What About Russia?,” pg online @ https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/biden-wants-nato-focus-climate-change-what-about-russia)

For quite some time, NATO has been grappling with divergent threat perceptions among its member states. The summit did nothing to reconcile or systematize these views. Instead, the alliance opted for an umbrella approach where every threat is deemed equally acute. This oversized umbrella may have kept everyone’s threat perceptions dry for now, however, there is only so much focus, money, and political willpower to go around. Sooner or later the alliance will need to prioritize. For those nearest Russia, it’s crystal-clear Putin is not only NATO’s greatest threat, but also one which the alliance is best suited to confront. In the 21st century, NATO needs to return to basics, with territorial defense as its primary goal. NATO cannot try to be everywhere in the world doing everything all the time. Keeping Russia at bay requires the alliance to address the full range of Russian aggressions against NATO members: aerial incursions, cyber-attacks, energy coercion, espionage, and propaganda. It must also be able to deter Russia’s use of conventional and nuclear arms. Facing daily arrivals of migrants from North Africa, our Mediterranean allies view migration and terrorism as NATO’s greatest security threat. And then there is the gnawing reality of China’s rise, with its implications for transatlantic security. These are secondary threats to the alliance. Nonetheless, NATO has some (albeit limited) role to play in keeping them in check. Yet in the Brussels Summit Communiqué, climate change gets top billing as a threat to the alliance. This suggests that NATO, now with Team Biden calling the shots, views climate as NATO’s greatest threat, or at least as important as the other threats mentioned: Russia, China, instability in Europe’s near abroad, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the summit, NATO adopted a “Climate Change and Security Action Plan.” Among other things, it commits the alliance to conducting an “annual Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment” and to mapping and analyzing greenhouses gases from military installations and military activities. “Furthermore,” the plan states, “data on energy demand and consumption in the military could inform Allies’ investment decisions, help define the role of Emerging Disruptive Technologies and innovative energy efficient and sustainable technologies, as well as inform operational planning.” The Summit Declaration goes further, inviting the Secretary General to “formulate a realistic, ambitious and concrete target for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by the NATO political and military structures and facilities and assess the feasibility of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050.” This is not to say that climate change isn’t real, nor that it has implications for NATO member states or theaters (particularly the Arctic). NATO, however, is not the right organization to lead on addressing these issues. There is now a very real possibility that the alliance’s new climate focus, with its reporting and consultation requirements, will become a distraction which undermines collective defense. Worse yet, NATO’s drive to hit arbitrary emission targets could lead some nations to make choices which weaken transatlantic security. Why invest in emissions belching tanks when you can buy light armored cars? Why invest in fifth-generation fighters when many new aircraft consume more fuel than older platforms? Why invest in capabilities at all when you can invest in carbon capture technology and wind farms? Scaling up to challenge Russia’s increased presence in the High North? Expect headwinds ahead under NATO’s climate turn. How about joint exercises, the lifeblood of NATO’s continued interoperability and readiness? Could they one day be reduced to lower emissions? And what of the alliance’s adversaries? The idea that Russia, the world’s fourth-largest carbon emitter, or China, the world’s largest emitter by far, are going to allow emissions targets and climate change concerns restrain their military acquisitions, basing, or operations is farcical. Many of our NATO allies are still struggling to meet their defense spending commitments. Their militaries suffer from glaring capability gaps. Siphoning scarce resources away toward a green agenda will only further enervate alliance collective defense.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › General Links › 2NC --- Link Wall

D --- EDT Economics

Borchert et al ‘21

(Dr Heiko Borchert directs Borchert Consulting & Research AG, a strategic affair consulting boutique and Marcin Zaborowski is policy director of the future of security program at the Bratislava-based think tank GLOBSEC, General John Allen is President of Brookings and former Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, “Emerging technology, the geo-economic Achilles’ heel NATO needs to address,” pg online @ //um-ef)

The announcement comes at a time when the Alliance is working on a new Strategic Concept. Innovation will be key to preserving NATO’s edge, as the Secretary-General pointed out in his 2030 food for thought paper. Although NATO is a potent defence organization, emphasis on emerging technologies reveals its Achilles’ heel. Artificial intelligence, autonomy, biotechnology, quantum technology, and other technologies are at the heart of geoeconomic competition. Geoeconomic competition unfolds around the projection of economic power within and across the domains of land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace to achieve political goals. Today’s geoeconomic dynamic defines winning business models amid a growing dichotomy between market-driven and state-driven nations. It aims to set the rules, principles, and standards that guide economic activities and access to and ownership of emerging technologies. NATO’s current emphasis on emerging technologies with defence and commercial applications risks making the Alliance subject to this new geoeconomic dynamic. This dynamic can undermine NATO’s innovation agenda and endanger its strategic edge. Therefore, NATO needs to respond. First, NATO needs to embrace the realities of economic security seriously. This call flows logically from Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, encouraging allies’ economic collaborations. In our view, economic security combines national security and economic policy with technology and innovation policy to identify economic disruptions. It also prevents these disruptions from arising and strengthens a coping capacity to deal with economic emergencies. Economic security requires allies, for example, to engage on defence-critical standards, advancing transparency for defence supply chains, and considering the interplay between technology development, foreign direct investment, and export control. Therefore, the new Strategic Concept should incorporate economic security as an essential element. Second, economic security requires NATO to shape mindsets about defence investments and sustainability. Already today, defence companies face financial challenges as banks cancel bank accounts or refrain from covering export risks. The emphasis on environmental, social, and governance criteria (ESG) that increasingly shapes and determines financial investments will reinforce these problems as defence is considered toxic. But a narrow interpretation of ESG that considers defence incompatible with the world view underpinning ESG is detrimental to NATO’s ambition to invest in companies. It also means other investors will likely shy away from investing in the same companies.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › General Links › 2NC --- Link Wall

C --- Lack of INTENSE CONSULTATION

Adebahr et al ‘22

(Adebahr is a nonresident fellow at Carnegie Europe. His research focuses on foreign and security policy, in particular regarding Iran and the Persian Gulf, on European and transatlantic affairs, and on citizens’ engagement, Erik Brattberg was director of the Europe Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He is an expert on European politics and security and transatlantic relations, Lizza Bomassi is the deputy director of Carnegie Europe, where she is responsible for harmonizing Carnegie Europe’s strategic and operational priorities and managing relations with Carnegie’s global centers and programs as well as partner organizations in Europe.“How the Transatlantic Relationship Has Evolved, One Year Into the Biden Administration,” pg online @ //um-ef)

As the EU develops its Strategic Compass and as NATO prepares for its summit in Madrid, intense consultation between the United States, key EU members states, and EU institutions is necessary in order to safeguard Europe’s defense architecture. More broadly, the compatibility of Turkey’s bilateral actions and its participation in NATO is at stake. While the current situation between Turkey and its partners and allies is fraught—to say nothing of Turkey’s huge domestic economic challenges and rising political uncertainty—perhaps close U.S. and European collaboration can find a path to the stronger, more stable relationship that would benefit all three. CORNELIUS ADBEHR: ON IRAN After four years of increasing transatlantic confrontation over Iran policy following America’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal, expectations of a joint approach with the incoming Biden administration were high. The past twelve months have seen solid cooperation, if also underwhelming progress on the dossier. Initially, the concern was that European allies might not be prepared to accommodate a decisive U.S. return to the negotiating table, as announced by Biden on the campaign trail, even though they had been the ones keeping the agreement alive. This turned into frustration over the sluggish pace of the administration to make tangible offers for a reopening of the talks. The Islamic Republic has had its own role in stalling progress, from refusing to conclude the negotiations before a presidential election in June to slow-walking their resumption for five months after. Given the country’s advances in nuclear technology as well as in the stockpiling of highly enriched uranium, the urgency to restore the limits set by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection regime, is obvious. However, with both Iran and the United States constrained by domestic politics that do not reward compromise with an adversary, any agreement to relax U.S. sanctions in return for the reintroduction of stringent nuclear controls will have to be carefully calibrated. The continued focus on the nuclear file, though, belies a reality that is moving on. Israel has been establishing relations with Arab Gulf countries, and its new government is much less opposed to a nuclear accord than the previous one. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in turn, have begun to speak with Tehran directly about their security concerns, sensing that Washington is, slowly but surely, on its way out of the region. Meanwhile, Russia has gained an active security presence in the region via the Syrian theater while maintaining strong ties with Israel. Lastly, China remains a sought-after commercial partner that is gaining political clout as a result of America’s turn toward Asia. It is these shifting geopolitical sands that should make the focus on regional cooperation an imperative for the coming year. Ideally, such a move would follow a revival or renewal of the JCPOA, the “longer and stronger” deal that Washington aspires to. However, the chances of failure increased during 2021, so a push for some kind of security arrangement is critical, especially in case talks should falter. The alternative is another violent conflagration that benefits only a handful of cynics, and not the people in the region itself. ERIK BRATTBERG: ON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY While Biden’s team has removed any doubt about U.S. commitment to NATO after Trump’s threats—and has gone out of its way to support the EU—the past year has also seen some serious transatlantic diplomatic rifts, notably over the haphazard U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August and the sudden announcement of the AUKUS security agreement in September. These two events reinforced European concerns about shifting U.S. strategic priorities to the Indo-Pacific and triggered complaints about the inadequacy of U.S. consultation with transatlantic partners. Biden administration officials have responded by stepping up diplomatic engagement with European capitals. But the recent geopolitical turbulence between Russia and Ukraine also painfully illustrates Europe’s lack of power and influence on the world stage, prompting more voices in Europe to call for investing in European sovereignty. (The Ukraine crisis is also a clear reminder that Europe remains completely dependent on Washington for its own security for the foreseeable future.)

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › General Links › 2NC --- Link Wall

B --- UNPREDICTABILITY

Speranza 12/1/21

(Lauren Speranza, Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “American Leadership in NATO: A Rocky Return but a Firm Future,” pg online @ // um-ef)

Although America is ‘back’ at NATO, Europe remains unsettled about the credibility and longevity of US commitments to the alliance. A cloud of uncertainty hangs over the alliance’s next Strategic Concept and how the two sides will craft a common agenda to endure the coming decade. The Biden administration, despite a few recent transatlantic missteps, recognises the gravity of this moment and has come prepared with a focused set of priorities for NATO’s future. Following his successful first trip to Europe, a string of recent US decisions has undermined President Biden’s early pledges to strengthen cooperation with NATO allies. Whether the tacit approval of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, or the controversial announcement of the AUKUS security pact, these disjointed moves have begun to sow doubt in Europe about America’s willingness and ability to work jointly with Europe, even under an Atlanticist president. While the Biden administration has acknowledged and sought to address these slipups, such unpredictability in the transatlantic relationship has weakened the political cohesion required for building NATO’s next Strategic Concept.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
LINKS › General Links › 2NC --- Link Wall

A --- OVERSTRETCH and MISSION CREEP

Bazin and Kunertova ‘18

(Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, doctorate in psychology, specializing in mediation and conflict resolution. He has over twenty years of experience including service with NATO and the U.S. Army Central Command, and operation deployments to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. He previously published “Winning Trust under Fire” in the January-February 2015 issue of Military Review.PsyD, U.S. Army Dominika Kunertova, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada. She holds a BA in political science from Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia, and an MA in international relations from Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. Her research focuses on transatlantic security and defense cooperation, and she has published in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies and European Security. “An Alliance Divided?,” pg online @ //um-ef)

External risks. The participants found it questionable whether allies will be able to find a common conventional threat that would be perceived as strong enough to “transcend the domestic pressures and the concept of sovereignty.” Although an absence of external threat to the Alliance is very unlikely, the future risk will lie in multiplication of external threats and a lack of common perception of those threats. This underdeveloped common understanding of external threats, accompanied by differential threat assessments, could weaken NATO’s cohesion. To illustrate this point, although the survey participants listed the failure to activate Article 5 in case of attack as a potential risk, further discussions showed that non-Article 5 missions could constitute the real test for NATO’s cohesion. In words of the one of participants, “if there is an operation and only two nations show up, this is not cohesion.” For some nations, this threat multiplication and dissimilar threat perceptions can lead to an operational overstretch or to an eventual “mission creep.” In contrast, other nations might develop an excessive sense of security that would lead them to reduce their attention and willingness to participate in NATO activities. For this reason, terrorism, for instance, cannot constitute NATO’s defining threat. Additionally, the changing nature of threats to allies’ security will require domestic, nonmilitary means to address them, rather than alliance-wide military measures. In other words, “nations will be looking inside to maintain order.”

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
UNIQUENESS › 1NR --- AT: DIANA/Innovation Fund

The result has been investment in the private sector, not NATO security cooperation.

NATO 6-30-2022. "NATO launches Innovation Fund". https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_197494.htm. DL

The Fund will invest 1 billion euros in early-stage start-ups and other venture capital funds developing dual-use emerging technologies of priority to NATO. These include: artificial intelligence; big-data processing; quantum-enabled technologies; autonomy; biotechnology and human enhancement; novel materials; energy; propulsion and space.

The Fund will complement NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic – or DIANA – which will support the development and adaptation of dual-use emerging technologies to critical security and defence challenges. There has also been significant progress for DIANA at the 2022 Madrid Summit where Allies agreed that innovators participating in DIANA’s programs will have access to a network of more than 9 Accelerator Sites and more than 63 Test Centres across Europe and North America. \\\

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
UNIQUENESS › 1NR --- Resolve key/At Risk

Resolve and unity are up post the concept --- but CONTINUED resolve is CRITICAL for effective deterrence

Graham 6/30/22

(Thomas, PhD in political science from Harvard University, distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a cofounder of the Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies program at Yale University and sits on its faculty steering committee. He is also a research fellow at the MacMillan Center at Yale, Foreign Service officer for fourteen years. His assignments included two tours of duty at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in the late Soviet period and in the middle of the 1990’s during which he served as head of the political internal unit and acting political counselor, “Did the summit reveal a newfound sense of NATO unity?” pg online @ //um-ef)

The summit was an impressive show of resolve to counter Russia’s aggression, including through continued diplomatic, economic, and military support for Ukraine. NATO pledged to further expand its military support for its vulnerable allies along the Russian frontier. In particular, the United States announced that it will establish a permanent headquarters for its V Corps in Poland. Most important was the eleventh-hour agreement that Turkey reached with Finland and Sweden, by which Ankara lifted its objections to their joining the alliance and allowed NATO to begin the accession process.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
UNIQUENESS › 1NR --- AT: Uniqueness Overwhelms

It’s the dawn of the alliance, but unity is not guaranteed. We must maintain it to preserve spending.

Alexander Brotman 7-5-2022. political risk and intelligence analyst with a focus on EU politics and security developments. "Opinion – The NATO Madrid Summit and the Alliance’s New Dawn". E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2022/07/05/opinion-the-nato-madrid-summit-and-the-alliances-new-dawn/. DL

After years of its relevance being questioned by former President Trump and even being described as ‘brain-dead’ by French President Macron, NATO is meeting at Madrid at a time of renewed strength and invigoration of the alliance. The past few months have witnessed significant alliance cohesion in the face of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, with two new states, Sweden, and Finland, set to join after Turkey has lifted its opposition. NATO’s cause for existence has never seemed clearer, yet serious rifts remain, and the unity of the alliance is not guaranteed as the war in Ukraine goes on and domestic pressures across member states increase. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has led NATO closer to Russia’s borders, not further away, and more troops will be permanently stationed on NATO’s eastern flank, including a new permanent U.S. base in Poland. For Putin, this is undoubtedly the opposite effect of what he intended, however Ukraine is no closer to joining NATO and the prospect of a prolonged conflict in its disputed territories will likely stall Kyiv’s accession for the foreseeable future.

As NATO members meet in Madrid, there are two main challenges that alliance members will have to contend with. The first is continued isolationism and retrenchment in the U.S. amongst both Democrat and Republican lawmakers, including former President Trump. Washington is increasingly keen to pivot its resources to the Indo-Pacific and its strategic competition with China. As such, the U.S. is eager to see European member states spend more on their own defence to be able to rapidly respond to their security threats should U.S. leadership be absent or directed elsewhere. Defence spending amongst alliance members is increasing, and while Germany’s Zeitenwende or ‘turning point’ marks a notable shift in German defence policy, there is the risk of it being a cosmetic rather than a practical watershed, with tangible results likely years away. Support for an increase in German defence spending remains stubbornly low, with notable resistance coming from Chancellor Scholz’s own Social Democrats as well as other coalition members.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
UNIQUENESS › 1NR --- UQ --- Focus on Russia/China

Deterrence and collective defense-focus now

Simón & Arteaga '22

(Luis Simón Director of the Research Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) & Félix Arteaga, Research Professor in International Security at the Brussels School of Governance, 1/17/22, "NATO gets an update: the Madrid Strategic Concept"; Real Instituto Elcano; https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/nato-gets-an-update-the-madrid-strategic-concept/)

Deterrence and defence NATO endorsed its posture of deterrence and defence after the ratification of the Lisbon Strategic Concept as a means of having a combination of capabilities appropriate to a range of possible scenarios.[7] In the absence of a specific adversary, the capabilities to be established could only be generic, but the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 and its burgeoning hostility forced the Alliance’s military posture to be redefined. NATO had to deploy forces on its Eastern border to reassure the allies and strengthen its capacity for deterrence. The Russian aggression forced the natural procedure to be inverted and, since 2014, NATO has had to adapt its deterrence and defence posture to the new situation without waiting for the formal review of the Lisbon Strategic Concept. It began by strengthening its reassurance and adaptation measures on its eastern flank (its Readiness Action Plan) in 2014,[8] followed by a review of its military strategy (MC 400/4) in 2019, the adaptation of its defence and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic region (Defence and Deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic Area, DDA) in 2020 and NATO’s fundamental concept of combat (NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, NWCC) in 2021.[9] In recent years NATO’s military authorities have thus been establishing the doctrine, goals and capabilities needed to confront the Russian threat before the political concept that will require them is approved. The new military developments are not known in detail given their confidential nature, but amid a specific threat such as Russia’s they will have been tailor-made to address it, and therefore will be less reactive than those envisaged in the current Strategic Concept, which are restricted to awaiting an armed attack before responding. The new military strategy will need to address the new forms of confrontation in all domains (land, sea, air, outer space and cyberspace) and in their conventional and non-conventional forms (hybrid war), a more proactive and anticipatory shift in focus that now requires a political justification. As matters stand, the necessity now arises of reconciling the political component of the Madrid Strategic Concept with the military strategy already adopted, which could present problems if one or several allies disagree with the new terms of military planning. Spain has contributed and will continue to contribute to collective deterrence on NATO’s eastern borders, meaning that it will not be difficult to adapt itself to the new deterrence and defence guidelines from a military point of view. It may be more difficult to acknowledge the Russian Federation as a threat and to act accordingly from the political perspective, because Spanish strategic culture is reluctant to put a name to threats to national security and because adopting the necessary measures would incur major political and economic costs. Russia, China and strategic competition The North Atlantic Council described Russia’s aggressive conduct as a ‘threat’ at its June 2021 meeting in Brussels,[10] together with terrorism and other asymmetrical threats such as hybrid threats, disinformation and cyberattacks. Numerous acts jeopardising Euro-Atlantic security were listed and laid at Russia’s door, and consequently Russia is going to provide the adversary that the Alliance lacked in the Lisbon Strategic Concept. With China, the Council’s communiqué was more cautious: the country was described as a ‘systemic challenge’ to the international order and it was called upon to behave more responsibly within this order. However, while the NATO 2030 report drawn up by a group of experts did not deem China a ‘military threat’ like Russia, it placed it on an equal footing in terms of threat to the security of the Alliance. The allies, including Spain, will need to endorse the characterisations in the Madrid Strategic Concept and the respective measures to reverse these types of behaviour. The measures to be taken against the Russian threat already seem to be defined in the new allied strategy, but it remains to be seen what measures are adopted against China. The allies are faced with the dilemma of how to address the geopolitical rivalry between China and the US and to take preventative measures to deter and defend their security interests against Chinese power in the European region, the scope of its global capabilities and, above all, the application of its disruptive technologies to erode NATO’s military superiority.[11] In this context, the NATO 2030 report warns about China’s strategy of civil-military fusion, whereby Beijing seeks to acquire the intellectual copyright and advances of European and Western research centres and companies with the goal of boosting its own military development. All the foregoing presents the Madrid Strategic Concept with the need to use a public language of diplomacy that explains the reasons and consequences of returning to a strategy of deterrence and containment. This constitutes a significant communication effort because the allies and their citizens have become accustomed over the course of various decades to prioritise crisis management to the detriment of collective defence and deterrence. It was a habit they hurriedly had to abandon in 2014 after the Russian annexation of Crimea and required halting the freefall in military spending and committing to investing 2% of GDP by 2024 (NATO Defence Investment Pledge). Spain is not one of the allies most affected by geographical proximity to Russia or the Asia-Pacific, but it must share its allies’ concern about the growing physical presence of these countries in its space of strategic interest in the Mediterranean and Africa and about the virtual reach of their hybrid capabilities to destabilise national security. The tendency of Spanish strategic culture is inclined to prioritise détente over deterrence, but it will have to revise this inclination if the Madrid Strategic Concept incorporates binding containment measures against the Russian and Chinese threats. The Alliance’s functions NATO has three fundamental functions: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, with none of these taking precedence. The Madrid Strategic Concept will have to address the situation on NATO’s eastern flank and experiences such as Afghanistan so as to prioritise collective defence against the Russian threat, to the detriment of its functions of crisis management and cooperative security. As well as priorities, the allies will have to weigh whether to add new functions to the traditional list, and candidates such as resilience, cybersecurity, pandemics and technological disruption, among others, are all under consideration. Prior to the Lisbon Strategic Concept, the usefulness of crisis management operations –referred to variously as international, humanitarian or, in Spanish terminology, peace-keeping missions– was being called into question. It was agreed in Lisbon to halt combat missions in Afghanistan in 2014 and promote the construction of local capabilities as a way of avoiding new interventions within the function of cooperative security. The outcome of operations in Libya and Afghanistan had the effect of discrediting the crisis management function, at least whenever it involves mass troop deployments on the ground, and the Madrid Strategic Concept should reduce its priority compared to deterrence, which is necessary against the Russian threat, and cooperative security, which is necessary in order to strengthen local partnerships.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
UNIQUENESS › 1NR --- UQ --- Focus on Russia/China

Focus on China and Russia.

DomÈNec Ruiz 7-5-2022. member of the European Parliament. "It’s time for a sweeping transformation of the alliance". POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/time-sweeping-transformation-alliance-nato/. DL

Offering a convincing blueprint for the kind of sweeping transformation NATO will have to go through to address the return of great power competition, the alliance’s freshly agreed new Strategic Concept is the product of inevitable compromise. However, the document adopted at last week’s Madrid Summit also stands out for its comprehensiveness and balance — as well as its ambition.

And yet, on its own, it‘s still not enough.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
UNIQUENESS › 2NC --- UQ --- Cohesion/Focus Now

Cohesion now. Strategic Concept and Turkey.

Atlantic Council 7-1-2022. Non-profit, non-partisan think tank in the field of international affairs. "Experts react: What the NATO summit breakthrough means for Turkey and the Alliance". https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/experts-react-what-the-nato-summit-breakthrough-means-for-turkey-and-the-alliance/. DL

This week at their Madrid summit, NATO allies formally invited Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance. It was the latest step in a whirlwind process initiated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and delayed by Turkey—home to the second-largest military in the Alliance, after the United States—which argued that the Nordic countries did not sufficiently address Turkey’s national-security concerns. After weeks of tough negotiations, Turkey, Finland, and Sweden agreed to a breakthrough trilateral declaration on Tuesday.

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asked experts for their take on the implications of the summit and the trilateral declaration.