2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG › Case › AT: AI Impact---2NC
Meg Young 21, Postdoctoral Fellow at Cornell Tech's Digital Life Initiative, “DLI Debate: Does AI Pose an Existential Threat to Humanity?,” Cornell Tech, 5/16/21, https://www.dli.tech.cornell.edu/post/dli-debate-does-ai-pose-an-existential-threat-to-humanity
Returning to what Salome has asserted, let's pause for a moment to take in the argument that AI poses an existential risk to humanity. An existential threat is one that will destroy life on earth---to literally wipe it out. This argument warns that AI will become super intelligent, overpower its human creators to pursue its own unimaginable ends, and to menace life as it takes over the planet. But what would need to be true for that to be possible? AI would need to be intelligent in a meaningful sense. Meaning it can reason, form its own goals, and pursue those goals across contexts. In other words, it would need to be able to think for itself. The philosopher John Searle refers to this idea that AI will ever be able to do that as quote, “an enormous philosophical confusion about the correct interpretation of AI technology.” He points out that consciousness is essential to intelligence. And that without it, even an advanced system like IBM Deep Blue is not playing chess in the same way a chess master like Garry Kasparov is. Instead, it is just performing a computation. We know that AI is not conscious and not at risk of becoming so, because consciousness is an enduring mystery in philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology. Basic science is not able to characterize consciousness and where it comes from in vivo, so why do we think that computer scientists will be able to recreate it in silico?
Proponents of super-intelligent AI argue that the technology is already on course to emulate human intelligence. They say that because computational power is becoming cheaper and faster, eventually machine learning systems like neural nets will function akin to a human brain and exceed it in unpredictable ways. But this argument mis-apprehends what intelligence is. It is much more than the ability to solve problems. A driverless car, while much more computationally intensive, is no closer to being sentient than a calculator is; both are machines purpose-built to solve problems, and both are equally unlikely to plot to kill humankind. Instead, increases in computational power are merely bringing us a better and more convincing illusion that AI is super intelligent. To people decades ago, Siri and Alexa would have seemed akin to Rosie, the humanoid robot on The Jetsons. But knowing Siri and Alexa as we do today, we know they cannot be called “intelligent” in a meaningful sense at all. So yes, we are on course to get better simulations of intelligence, but they'll have none of the underlying capability necessary for consciousness itself--and as such, they pose no risk of overthrowing humanity.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG › Case › AT: AI Impact---1NC
Amy Zhang 21, PhD candidate at Cornell studying Operations Research and Research Assistant at Cornell Tech, “DLI Debate: Does AI Pose an Existential Threat to Humanity?,” Cornell Tech, 5/16/21, https://www.dli.tech.cornell.edu/post/dli-debate-does-ai-pose-an-existential-threat-to-humanity
First of all, AI as a tool is not smart. It needs you to tell it exactly 1. what is the specific goal to achieve, 2. a success metric that is meticulously defined, and 3. information to use as a basis that you prepare and feed in. Then to what extent can you say that AI does bad things? For example, if a company is allowed to set maximizing the time spent in an app as its ultimate goal, is it the algorithm’s fault for achieving it? Or if we task a model to mimic our speech by showing it all of Twitter to use as example, and it produces language that mirrors some of the toxicity, can we call the model racist? What it really comes down to is in how these systems are designed, and whether it is done with the level of awareness and sensitivity required in really thinking through these human aspects.
Indeed, an important part of this relies on checks and balances put in by the government and other rule-setting agencies. And it is true that it can be frustrating to feel like they're not measuring up, which then could lead to a pessimistic outlook that they never will and this will never work. But there are two important points to consider here. Number one, there will be a lag in legislative actions with any technological advances almost by definition. A nascent technology first needs time to emerge, to grow, and to become widespread enough that it matters to the general public. Then, only once it gets past the point where people are just immersed in the excitement and the benefits - because it does provide real benefits - do problems become apparent and gain attraction. That’s when the agencies can go in and try to understand them, which in itself is not easy. Then a second point to consider is that this is creating a new context, and any change in contexts is very difficult to grapple with for the legislative. Keep in mind that even the processes that seem very established today, have gotten here only after being studied and refined over a long period of time. One should expect this case to be no different. So yes, it will take time, but that does not mean that we will never get there.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG › Case › Governance Fails---2NC
Elsa B. Kania 18, Senior Fellow with the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, “The Pursuit of AI Is More Than an Arms Race”, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2018/04/pursuit-ai-more-arms-race/147579/
In many respects, this particular Pandora’s box is already open, so calls for absolute bans may prove too little, too late. Increasingly, states and even non-state actors are using commercial, off-the-shelf technologies to enable new military capabilities; ISIS cheap commercial drones to gather intelligence and provide close air support. The rapid advances in AI technologies continue, and and available can enable the autonomy and thus scalability of these capabilities.
It seems unlikely that any major military would be willing to tie its hands or constrain its pursuit of technologies and capabilities that are so strategic and evolving so rapidly. Beyond the lack of trust, attempts to enable verification of compliance with any future agreements would also be challenging at best.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG › Case › Governance Fails---2NC
---LAWS = lethal autonomous weapons systems
Kyle Hiebert 22, Senior Program & Policy Analyst @ Enterprise Machine Intelligence and Learning Initiative, deputy editor of the Africa Conflict Monitor, “Are Lethal Autonomous Weapons Inevitable? It Appears So”, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/are-lethal-autonomous-weapons-inevitable-it-appears-so/
The Evolution of Automated Weapons
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG › Case › Governance Fails---1NC
Matt Bartlett 19, Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at the University of Auckland, focuses on the gauntlet of legal and policy issues raised by technology, particularly emerging technologies like AI, blockchain and cryptocurrency, “The AI Arms Race In 2019”,
This piece will show just how ineffective such activism has been, however well-intentioned. The arms race in AI is already underway — and has been for years. It is now 2019, and we cannot waste time pretending Pandora’s Box hasn’t already been opened. This is the time to take stock of the latent evidence of weaponised AI, and consider the geopolitical incentives that produced this quagmire.
Ready, Set, Gone
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG › Case › AT: Russia War Impact---AT: Ukraine---Not Nuclear---Ext
Ryan Faith 3/11, former defense and national security editor at VICE News and congressional staffer, writes about defense and space policy, “Ukraine Isn’t World War III. It’s Not Even Close.,” Daily Beast, 3/11/2022, https://www.thedailybeast.com/ukraine-isnt-world-war-iii-its-not-even-close
However unnerving Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is, the fight is a long, long way from the titanic, globe-spanning conflict that would constitute a “world war.”
For Ukraine, this is an existential conflict for national survival. For the rest of the world, this conflict may seem terrifying, but that’s what all wars look like to anyone paying attention up close—especially one involving a nuclear-armed combatant. The world hasn’t seen a high-intensity conflict between two relatively modern militaries in Europe since World War II. Of course this is a shock to the system.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG › Case › AT: Russia War Impact---AT: Ukraine---Not Nuclear---Ext
Tom Rogan 2/28, foreign policy/national security writer for the Washington Examiner, Bachelor of Arts in War Studies from King's College London, a Master of Science in Middle East politics from SOAS, and a Graduate Diploma in Law from the University of Law, London, “Why Russia is highly unlikely to use nuclear weapons,” Washington Examiner, 2/28/22, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/courage-strength-optimism/why-russia-is-highly-unlikely-to-use-nuclear-weapons
As Russia struggles to conquer Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has moved his strategic nuclear forces to a heightened alert posture.
Satellite imagery also indicates that the Russian Northern Fleet has moved more ballistic missile submarines into Arctic and Barents sea patrol sectors. While U.S. nuclear forces remain at standard readiness levels, the U.S. military has a greater baseline readiness and redundant nuclear strike capability than does Russia.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG › Case › AT: Russia War Impact---AT: Invasion---Defense---Ext
Mitch Clarke 3/16, director of news and content for Jacobs Media, citing Craig Greathouse, associate department head in political science and international affiars at UNG, “UNG prof: Conflict unlikely to expand beyond Ukraine,” AccessWDUN, 3/16/2022, https://accesswdun.com/article/2022/2/1080789/ung-prof-conflict-unlikely-to-expand-beyond-ukraine
Experts are divided over what Russian President Vladimir Putin's end game in Ukraine is, but an international affairs expert at UNG doesn't think he'll try to invade any of the former Soviet bloc countries.
Craig Greathouse, the associate department head in political science and international affairs, believes Putin would like to reconstitute the old Soviet Union. But that might be out of his reach, Greathouse said.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG › Case › AT: Russia War Impact---AT: Invasion---Defense---Ext
Nina Tannenwald 3/10, teaches international relations in the Political Science Department at Brown University, “‘Limited’ Tactical Nuclear Weapons Would Be Catastrophic,” Scientific American, 3/10/2022, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/limited-tactical-nuclear-weapons-would-be-catastrophic/
Since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, Russian President Vladimir Putin has given orders to increase the alert level of Russia’s nuclear forces and has made veiled nuclear threats. The blatant aggression against Ukraine has shocked Europe and the world. The war is a tragedy for Ukraine. It also exposes the limits of the West’s reliance on nuclear deterrence.
Deterrence refers to the idea that possessing nuclear weapons protects a nation from attack, through the threat of overwhelming retaliation. This concept is widely credited for helping prevent war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine casts a harsh light on its downsides. Most obvious is that Putin is using nuclear deterrence not to protect Russia but rather to have his way in Ukraine. Russia’s nuclear weapons deter the West from intervening with conventional military forces to defend Ukraine. Despite scattered calls in the U.S. for the creation of a “no-fly zone” over some or all of Ukraine, the Biden administration has wisely resisted. In practice this would mean shooting down Russian planes. It could lead to World War III. On the other side of the ledger, NATO’s nuclear weapons presumably deter Russia from expanding the war to NATO countries, such as Poland, Romania or the Baltic states. Thus, the nuclear balance of terror likely deters a wider European war but leaves Ukraine to struggle on with only limited support and perhaps eventually to be swallowed. On balance, NATO states do not seem very reassured by their vaunted nuclear deterrence. They continue to worry about the (remote) possibility of a Russian conventional attack beyond Ukraine.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG › Case › AT: Russia War Impact---AT: Invasion
Paul Miller 22, professor of the practice of international affairs at Georgetown University, “Ukraine Is Not World War III,” The Dispatch, 3/8/2022, https://thedispatch.com/p/ukraine-is-not-world-war-iii?s=r
War gets the blood up. Gary Kasparov—former world chess champion turned dissident against Putin’s Russia—claimed on March 3 that “this is already World War III.”
“Putin started it long ago & Ukraine is only the current front,” Kasparov argued. He will escalate anyway, and it's even more likely if he succeeds in destroying Ukraine because you have again convinced him you won't stop him even though you could.”
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG › Case › AT: Russia War Impact---1NC
Limor Simhony 22, policy advisor and researcher based in London, “NATO Intervention in Ukraine Won’t Spark World War III,” Foreign Policy, 4/1/2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/01/nato-intervention-in-ukraine-wont-spark-world-war-iii/
The main concern is any such escalation could lead to World War III. There are two reasons that this is unlikely. The first is that Russia’s military capabilities are poor relative to those of Western armies. Their forces are not sufficiently trained; their equipment and weapons are dated and inferior; they experience major logistical, operational, and tactical difficulties; and their soldiers have low morale.
Damaging economic sanctions also mean that Russia may not be able to fund a wider war. The expectation that Moscow will be able to escalate the war into other theaters in an effective way, especially by conventional means, is unrealistic. It is possible that if the Russian military continues to struggle, Russian President Vladimir Putin will deploy chemical or even nuclear weapons to increase gains and deter the West from interfering—but that is unlikely.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG › Case › Alt Causes---1NC
Eugene Rumer & Richard Sokolsky 4/11, Rumer, a former national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, is a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Sokolsky is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, “Putin’s War Against Ukraine and the Balance of Power in Europe,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 4-11-2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/04/11/putin-s-war-against-ukraine-and-balance-of-power-in-europe-pub-86832
Notwithstanding the allies’ early show of unity in the wake of the Russian attack on Ukraine, some of their differences and challenges to a more robust NATO posture have not disappeared entirely. These include the varying interests and priorities of the EU’s and NATO’s diverse members, as well as likely disagreements over which threats and challenges should be privileged in resource allocation decisions (among issues ranging from the Russian threat, China, climate change, pandemics, immigration, borders, refugees, or diversification of energy supplies). It would be prudent to not take for granted that Europe will forge the political unity and raise the billions of euros it will require to create a first-class military that might substitute for or provide a substantial addition to NATO’s military kit.
Moreover, the unanimity with which Europe came together to impose sanctions on Russia and help Ukraine is likely due to the fact that Ukraine is not a NATO member, and demonstrations of solidarity with it do not involve defense commitments through NATO’s Article 5. In the event of a Russian attack against a NATO member country, the specter of an all-out war with Russia may lead some allies to demonstrate less resolve and more caution and hesitation.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG › Case › Say No---1NC
Zoe Stanley-Lockman & Lena Trabucco 22, Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore; Lena Trabucco is a dual degree candidate pursuing a PhD in political science at Northwestern University and a PhD in Law at iCourts Center of Excellence in International Courts at the University of Copenhagen, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, edited by Justin Bullock et al., Oxford University Press, 03/18/2022, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.013.69
On that note NATO, or any other international organization, is not exempt from these political hurdles. As EDTs increasingly become a focal point in the geopolitical space, any approach of AI governance in the international security environment will have global political undertones. This will undoubtedly be a significant hurdle for NATO as it balances responsible AI development and Allied coordination and cooperation in a changing geopolitical landscape. And certainly, the political realities may well represent the greatest challenge and disincentivize NATO to emerge as a leader in responsible military AI. Nevertheless, the three pillars indicate that NATO is an institution with considerable opportunity to shape responsible AI governance. More specifically, this entails urging and facilitating Allied standards and policies to establish foundations for emerging military technology built on informed and ethical principles and enhance the international security environment.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
NEG › Case › Say No---1NC
HeikkilÄ 22, 7-4-2022, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/
On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way.
The Western military alliance has artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
AFF › DAs › 1AR – No Race
Fred Hu 18, economist and chairman of Primavera Capital Group, 8-22-2018, "The U.S. Is Overly Paranoid About China’S Tech Rise," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/08/22/us-china-3/?utm_term=.ed8dd0d27f82
But much of the fear over China’s technological rise is unfounded. Fundamentally, China is like most emerging economies around the world: still trying hard to close the enormous technological gap with advanced economies led by America. China has undoubtedly made more progress than many of its developing peers in that race. Its tech industries have grown at a faster pace and achieved a global scale beyond those of most developing countries. In a broad range of manufacturing sectors — notably consumer electronics, steel, ship building, high-speed rail systems and solar panels — China has established itself as the world’s leading producer. In areas such as consumer Internet and financial technology, it has arguably overtaken even the United States and now leads the rest of the world. Yet China hawks such as Robert Lighthizer and Peter Navarro charge that whatever progress China has made on the tech front is due to the country’s blatant theft of U.S. technology. Considering the enormous investments China has made in science and technology over recent decades, such claims do not hold water. China has devoted vast resources to research and development — $409 billion in 2015 (21 percent of the global total), according to the U.S. National Science Foundation. China’s investment in research and development grew over 20 percent annually between 2000 and 2010 and almost 14 percent from 2010-2015. U.S. research and development hovered around 4 percent over the same period. For a country with an average per capita income a mere one-sixth of America’s, China’s research and development investments reflect a real and sustained national commitment. At the same time, China has vastly expanded and improved STEM education and has one of the largest pools of STEM graduates in the world. The devotion of significant resources to research and development and human capital has in turn enabled China to reap some of the early fruits of innovation. China now tops the world in new patent filings. As the first country to receive more than 1 million patent applications in a single year — a record the World Intellectual Property Organization said reflected “extraordinary” levels of innovation — China accounts for almost 40 percent of the global total and more than that of the United States, Japan and South Korea combined. China has also significantly boosted venture capital investment, which supports the commercialization of emerging technologies. While the United States attracts the most investment worldwide (nearly $70 billion), venture capital investment in China rose from approximately $3 billion in 2013 to $34 billion in 2016, climbing from 5 percent to 27 percent of the global share — the fastest increase of any economy. China’s start-up ecosystem is both vast and vibrant; it has successfully incubated more tech unicorns than any other country except the United States. Too often, U.S. critics claim that Chinese industrial policies like Made in China 2025 are behind the country’s ascendancy in tech. In fact, virtually none of China’s leading tech firms, such as Alibaba, Baidu and Tencent, are state-owned or meaningful beneficiaries of state support. They are all founded and led by smart and risk-taking private entrepreneurs, just like their Silicon Valley brethren. Tellingly, many Chinese tech start-ups have received U.S. venture financing. And Chinese technology companies and venture firms have made significant investments in U.S. start-ups. Sadly, the virtuous two-way venture capital flows are now in jeopardy because of Washington’s growing paranoia about China. As impressive as China’s innovation and progress may be, however, it is premature to declare that China has caught up with the U.S. tech industry. Interventionist government bureaucracy, stodgy state-owned enterprises, a rigid school system and — above all — harsh restrictions on individual freedoms continue to stifle independent thinking and creativity and constrain China from realizing its full innovation potential. While China is well positioned to succeed in “strategic” industries such as semiconductors, pharmaceuticals and commercial aircraft due to its vast pool of engineering talent and the size of its domestic market, so far it has remained a laggard. China has failed to develop an indigenous chip industry despite a state-led drive to do so, with tens of billions spent over the past four decades. Despite its status as the “world’s factory,” making everything from cell phones and laptops to numerous other devices, China continues to import 90 percent of its microchips from foreign countries, predominantly from the United States. That is why the U.S. threat to cut off critical chip supply to ZTE, a Chinese telecom equipment firm, has been dubbed the “Sputnik moment” in China: a sober reminder of China’s continued weaknesses in critical technologies. While China has made spectacular progress on the tech front, the United States remains the undisputed global leader in science and technology. The United States holds most of the world’s leading research universities; it deploys the highest amounts of both public and private funding in research and development; attracts the most venture capital; awards the most advanced degrees; provides the most advanced business, financial and information services and is the largest producer in knowledge-intensive, high-tech sectors, from pharmaceuticals to semiconductors. The fear that China will displace the United States as the global tech superpower is grossly exaggerated. Unfortunately, such paranoia dominates the minds of protectionist U.S. politicians and China hawks and has already amplified a destructive trade war between the world’s two largest economies. For China’s part, its soul-searching is overdue. Beijing should resist the prevalent yet ill-justified self-complacency and triumphalism that contributed to the fear in Washington in the first place, and it should make serious efforts to reform and open its domestic economy. Unless Beijing amends its heavy-handed statist approach to economic development, China’s potential as a leading nation in science and technology could be seriously curtailed.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
AFF › DAs › 1AR – No Race
Kai-Fu Lee 19, Transcript of Interview by Stephen Orlins, President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, with Kai-Fu Lee, Ph.D. in Computer Science from Carnegie Mellon, Fellow at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, “Kai-Fu Lee on the Future of AI in the United States and China”, 2/6/2019, https://www.ncuscr.org/media/podcast/uschinainsights/kai-fu-lee-future-ai-united-states-china
Kai-Fu Lee: Well, I've been an AI researcher for a long time, and I have worked in the U.S. and China. And I'm seeing a lot of excitement and a lot of challenges ahead of us. I've done AI as a researcher, a product executive, and an investor now. And I think AI is taking off faster than we think. China is becoming an AI superpower. With the U.S. and China, there is a lot of complementarity, and we face a lot of similar challenges. And there are a lot of approaches that could be shared. So I thought I had that unique perspective to write a book that describes that.
Orlins: Is this something which the U.S. and China are going to cooperate on in the future, or compete on?
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
AFF › DAs › 1AR – No Link
Heikkilä 21 - Politico’s AI Correspondent in London
[Melissa, Politico March 31 “AI Decoded: NATO on AI warfare — AI treaty consultation — Unions call for more AI protections” https://www.politico.eu/newsletter/ai-decoded/politico-ai-decoded-nato-on-ai-warfare-ai-treaty-consultation-unions-call-for-more-ai-protections/ Acc 4/9/22 TA]
AI LAWS WHY REGULATION WON’T KILL INNOVATION: The Council of Europe, the Strasbourg-based human rights organization, is hard at work on a draft proposal on artificial intelligence. If ratified, the treaty could become national law in the group’s 47 member countries. AI: Decoded rang up Gregor Strojin, the chair of the group’s committee, called CAHAI, that’s drawing up the rules to hear the latest developments. The goal: CAHAI is working on an AI treaty with additional rules for specific sectors, such as social affairs and justice systems, and problems, like the discrimination of minorities. The plan is to have a draft ready by the end of they year, after which the Committee of Ministers — national representatives to the Council of Europe — will debate it. “In the past, there have been examples of treaties that were adopted in a matter of months. But sometimes it can take years. Sometimes it can be never. But I think we’re making a pretty strong point that in this case, delaying it could lead to irreparable damage,” Strojin said. “We are seeing increasing use of technologies that’s being imported from other parts of the world, without any risk assessment, without any impact assessment in a way that’s actually dumping the technology on certain countries,” he continued. Been there done that: Strojin also pushed back against industry jeremiads that regulation would “hamper innovation.” He said that AI regulators can actually learn a lot from past negotiations around pharmaceuticals and bioethics as an example of how regulation can help innovation. In 1964, the Council of Europe adopted the European Pharmacopoeia, which is the official standard and scientific basis for the quality control of pharmaceuticals. “Before that medical products and also services were like snake oil. There was no common assessment of what are the ingredients [or] what are the side effects of drugs,” Strojin said. (Sound familiar?) “I don’t think we have a problem with the lack of innovation in the pharmaceutical sector at this point,” Strojin said.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
AFF › DAs › 2AC---AT: Military Innovation DA
Lauren A. Khan 21, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, 10/28/21, “US Leadership in Artificial Intelligence Is Still Possible,” https://www.cfr.org/blog/us-leadership-artificial-intelligence-still-possible
Much of the debate over military AI leadership and U.S. technological competition with China hinges on the assumption that there is a significant first-mover advantage when it comes to these technologies, meaning the first to develop them could reap substantial economic and military effects. However, fear of pronounced AI first-mover advantages instead reflects how AI is prone to “overhyping” where incredibly high expectations of capabilities surpass the reality of what is possible. Overhyping can obscure real progress and generate an inappropriate perception of an AI arms race that “misrepresents the competition going on among countries.” Any possible first-mover advantage for AI would be unsustainable.
AI is a general-purpose, enabling technology not dissimilar to electricity. Moreover, the private sector drives its development, rather than the defense sector. While technologies that are singularly applicable to military contexts diffuse more slowly, those that are multi-use like AI have the added prodding of market incentives to speed up their spread.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
AFF › DAs › 2AC---AT: Military Innovation DA
Andrew Imbrie et al. 20, Center for Security and Emerging Technology, “Agile Alliances,” CSET, 2020,
First, the United States and its allies face a trade-off between capability and dependency.10 Showcasing a democratic way of AI will require the United States and its allies to pool resources, coordinate policies, and share best practices and information. Leveraging the capabilities of its allies and partners will amplify U.S. power and influence, but will also create inefficiencies and require compromise. While the United States can manage these challenges, it cannot eliminate them entirely—nor should it. As long as AI-related supply chains are global and AI talent both mobile and globally distributed, innovation in AI requires international collaboration.11 To excel in this new context, America will need to embrace its role as a “systems integrator” among like-minded allies and partners.12 Embedding cooperation in dense, decentralized networks plays to the United States’ strengths as a democratic power that favors market approaches to technological cooperation. By combining top-down vision with dynamic, bottom-up innovation and entrepreneurship, the United States and its allies can foster a competitive ecosystem that enables the best ideas to flourish.
2022
Georgetown
Affirmative
AFF › DAs › 2AC---AT: Military Innovation DA
Zoe Stanley-Lockman & Lena Trabucco 22, Stanley-Lockman is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore; Lena Trabucco is a dual degree candidate pursuing a PhD in political science at Northwestern University and a PhD in Law at iCourts Center of Excellence in International Courts at the University of Copenhagen, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, edited by Justin Bullock et al., Oxford University Press, 03/18/2022, DOI.org (Crossref), doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.013.69
Additionally, infusing AI development with certain ethical principles and values can have operational advantages and benefits, and NATO can, in particular, promote the ethical principles as operational standards for the Allies. A common critique within the ethics debate is that approaching new technology with an ethical or democratic values-driven perspective translates into comparative military disadvantage. Essentially, if your adversary develops technology without the constraints of ethical principles then there will be diminished effectiveness on the battlefield.56 We find this critique unfounded because it assumes there is a false trade-off between ethics and effectiveness; instead, we argue ethical foundations are built into the architecture of modern warfare.57 As such, ethics is a background condition for battlefield effectiveness, which is already infused in military decision-making and helping to guide the boundaries of international humanitarian law. As such, ethical guidelines do not have to detract from a military’s capacity or competency to devise means and methods of warfare that will serve their national or coalition interest.58 If anything, a first-mover advantage can incentivize an ethical and values-driven AI to establish the threshold of technological standards globally.59