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The separation of time and space, disembedding, reflexive modernity, and manufactured uncertainty as distinguishing features of early and late modernity are associated with the emergence and embedding of risk throughout contemporary society and in this context, the work of Ulrich Beck and other sociologists is relevant. It explains how risk is an anticipatory process, global in reach, and shaped by knowledge, social definition, and construction that in turn shapes individual perception. It also explains how risk can be amplified or attenuated by relations of power and how, ultimately, it is we as individuals who must shoulder much of the responsibility for risk management. As a generalisation, all concepts of risk (pre-modernity and modernity) establish the distinction between reality and possibility. If the future is either predetermined (such as in the religious context of fate, predestination, karma, or the will of Allah), or independent of present human activities (such as a bushfire that has no impact on humans or their environment), the term “risk” makes no sense. Therefore, the term “risk” denotes the possibility that an undesirable state of reality (adverse effects) may occur as a result of natural events or human activities sometime in the future. This implies that, as humans, we can and will make causal connections between actions (or events) and their effects, and that undesirable effects can be avoided or mitigated if the causal events or actions are avoided or modified (Krimsky & Golding, 1992). Risk, then, does not mean disaster or catastrophe, but rather the anticipation of disaster or catastrophe, which exists in a permanent state of virtuality, only becoming “topical” to the extent that it is anticipated. Or put another way, risks are not “real,” they are “becoming real.” At the moment in which risks become real—for example, in the shape of a natural hazard event—they cease to be risks and become disasters or catastrophes. At this point, their consequences dictate that risk has already moved elsewhere—to the anticipation of further events such as inflation, supply chain interruptions, or the restriction of civil liberties. Risks are always events that are not yet real. Without techniques of visualisation, symbolic forms, or mass media, risks are nothing at all (Beck, 2009b; Beck et al., 2013). Whilst the term “risk” is generally pertinent to the modern age, its deeper meaning has evolved over time, seeping into European languages in the last 400 years, where there remains a distinct lack of consensus about the etymology of “risk.” Some historians believe that the term derives from the Arabic word “risq,” which refers to the acquisition of wealth and good fortune (Skeat, 1910). Others have claimed that “risk” finds its origins in the Latin word “risco” and was first used as a navigational term by sailors entering uncharted waters (Strydom, 2003).Still others have claimed that these two derivations of risk were soldered together in the 17th century initially through the principle of maritime insur-ance and then extended into banking, finance and health between the 18th and 20th centuries (Hubbard, 2020). In this context, risk came to relate to the bal-ance between acquisitive opportunities and potential dangers (Wilkinson, 2002). In other words, early modernity was dominated by “external risks”—risks that could somehow be perceived as independent of the actions of the individuals, could be reasonably well calculated, and could be subjected to actuarial tables. Calculating the risks associated with unemployment and sickness on institu-tional profitability is but one example (Giddens, 1999b). However, as also argued by Anthony Giddens (1990) and Giddens and Pierson (1998), for the first time in the course of human history late modernity has created the environment to evolve risk to the global level. This includes radio-activity, which completely evades human perceptive abilities, and toxins and pollutants in the air, the water and foodstuffs, together with the accompany-ing short and long-term effects on plants, animals and people (Beck, 1992). Climate change and its deleterious effects on humanity, such as mass migration and monumental shifts in food production and water supply, have also become a truly “global risk” (Baldwin, 2017). Not only are these risks dangerous, but they are also generally not easily per-ceived or understood. They are complex risks which include patterned processes of increased danger, such as background radiation, ozone depletion, global warming and global dimming. They are permanent rather than temporary, global rather than local, and manufactured by us in practical and ideological ways. Also, while some people are more affected than others, for the distribution and growth of the more traditional risks—such as poverty (due to inequalities such as class, race, gender and social strata positions)—risks of late modernity sooner or later also strike those who produce or profit from them. The ecological disaster that these risks create as future consequences (such as climate change and nuclear radiation) ignore the borders of nations and the rich/poor differentials, threat-ening not only the health of humans and the environment but also property and profit. Simultaneously, they undermine the order of national jurisdictions, producing new international inequalities, not only between the Third World and the industrial states but also among the industrial states themselves (Beck, 1992). Hence, these risks are abstract processes in the sense that we cannot necessarily directly see or feel them, but they are material in the sense that they involve the changing form of nature itself or of our societies and their patterns of production and reproduction (Handmer & James, 2007). They are future-oriented and based on causal interpretations, and therefore initially only exist in terms of the (scientific or anti-scientific) knowledge about them rather than through experience. Also, while this knowledge shapes us, paradoxically, so does our denial and/or ignorance of it. Therefore, risks can be changed, magnified, dramatised, or minimised within knowledge, and to that extent, they are particularly open to social definition and construction. As a result, institutions such as governments, the mass media, and the scientific and legal professions in charge of defining risks become key influencers in determining what is or is not “at risk” or “risky” (Beck, 1992, 2009b). The social definition and construction of risks can be viewed as a simultaneous process of the experience of potential risks intersecting with the way institutions and individuals perceive them. These perceptions are informed by social systems and value structures which influence the extent in which risks are either amplified or attenuated (Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996). Social amplification and attenuation of risk occurs through information processes, institutional structures, social group behaviour and individual responses. These intensify or weaken signals that individuals and social groups receive. They also filter the multitude of signals regarding the attributes of the risk and their importance (Kasperson & Kasperson, 1996; Kasperson et al., 1988).This information and filtering are shaped and influenced by scientists, risk management institutions, media, social activists and opinion leaders, personal networks, and public agencies, as well as by us as individuals. It is done through filtering (only processing a fraction of the information coming through), de-coding and processing (interpreting). It is also done by attaching values, in-teracting with social and cultural peers, formulating behavioural intentions, and finally, engaging in individual or group actions to either accept, ignore, tolerate or change the risk (Kasperson et al., 1988).Often, through the process of amplification and attenuation, our “reality” can be dramatised or minimised, transformed, or simply denied, according to the norms which decide what is known and what is not. Our realities can become the products of struggles and conflicts over definitions of risk within the context of specific relations of definitional power (Beck, 2009a). Put simply, in most cases, it is those who are in power who ultimately decide what is “risky” and what is not.

However, there are some benefits to being in a recession, so its not all bad.

A recession is a good antidote for inflation. Inflation occurs when demand outstrips supply – that is, when there is a high level of spending by consumers that suppliers find difficult to keep up with. We have seen this over the last couple of years, with extreme shortages of some goods and services. People have had to go on waiting lists to buy things they want, and have had to wait weeks or months to get a tradesperson. These are signs of an overheated economy, fuelled by low interest rates and massive Government spending. A recession is a cooling off period that takes the heat out of inflation and takes the pressure off suppliers. Inflation has caused considerable pain for people on low incomes or with high expenses, such as young families. For these people, recession is a welcome relief.

The U.S. Copyright Office is looking to overhaul its IT infrastructure, the top agency official said during a Wednesday House hearing.

Appearing before the House Administration Committee, Shira Perlmutter, the register of Copyrights and director of the U.S. Copyright Office, said the agency is modernizing its approach to workflow and services, with a particular focus now on mapping out next steps and timing on registration for its new Enterprise Copyright System.

The first public module within the Library of Congress’ new Enterprise Copyright System launched Aug. 1 and lays the foundation for future components intended to support its entire copyright services ecosystem.

Launching the first module, which is known as the Copyright Recordation System (CRS), was the first step in improving and integrating all of the Copyright Office’s technology systems — which also handle copyright registration, public records and internal licensing — into a platform called the Enterprise Copyright System (ECS).

Economic Benefits of Modernization. A properly modernized Copyright Office can also offer substantial financial and economic benefits that offset and justify the initial capital investment.

One such benefit is the increased efficiency and reduced costs to users of the Copyright Office. Whether as an applicant for registration or a user searching the database, modernized functions will provide for faster and easier filings, quicker agency responses, and more comprehensive, accurate, and relevant search results. All of these translate into reduced costs of regulatory compliance.

Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier, a member of the House Judiciary Committee who was central to the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, once explained that “[t]he proponent of change [to copyright law] should present an honest analysis of all the costs and benefits . . . The argument that a particular interest group will make more money and therefore be more creative does not satisfy this threshold standard or the constitutional requirements of the intellectual property clause.”57 Copyright, as designed, is by definition a limited monopoly, with the direct aim of promoting the public good by securing incentives to creation for a limited time. These incentives are not boundless, and those who seek to expand them bear a substantial burden in proving their case.

The Copyright Office, however, does not adhere to this view of copyright law; instead, history has borne out again and again the observation that it “has tended to view copyright owners as its real constituency.”58 It has repeatedly aligned itself with the policy agendas of major industry groups, seeking to expand the reach of copyright in scope, duration, and ease of enforcement. From seeking to curtail the usability of orphan works, to advocating for expansive moral rights for rightsholders, to supporting copyright expansion in the face of contrary statutory mandates, to outright technophobia, the Copyright Office has repeatedly placed the interests of rightsholders above both the public interest.

Regulatory capture occurs when a government agency “is consistently or repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry, by the intent and action of the industry itself.”1 This risk of “persistent policy bias” is “widely accepted, not only by public interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by some agency members.”2 For example, in a recent series of essays, Senators Elizabeth Warren, Mike Lee, and Sheldon Whitehouse all agree that regulatory capture is a serious and pervasive problem.3

This report examines regulatory capture—both its sources and its consequences—at the U.S. Copyright Office. Capture at the Office is widely recognized among many copyright practitioners and stakeholders. As Professor Jessica Litman noted in 2006, “the Copyright Office has tended to view copyright owners as its real constituency, and has spent the past ten years moving firmly into the content industry’s pocket”—a statement that still holds true today.4 Section I of this report details how, consistent with the extensive academic literature identifying the main causes of regulatory capture, the Copyright Office’s entrenched bias arises from both material and cultural capture, as well as from political incentives for the Office’s leadership.

Copyright laws must be modernized for the digital age. The methods of creating, citing and utilizing creative works have changed dramatically since current laws were written. The definition of “publisher” becomes nebulous when anyone with an internet connection can create and share their work. It is challenging to propose and debate modernization strategies without fully understanding who and what would be affected or how these challenges vary by country, which may harm journalists’ ability to participate in that process. More informed and comprehensive discussions among publishers, technology companies and policymakers are needed to structure new laws in a way that protects journalistic work while also recognizing the ways the public accesses and interacts with creative works in our digital societies.

THE ISSUE

We were pleased to see that the Office is considering these improvements and others. Rights holders have waited much too long for these improvements, and we hope to see them rolled out in 2023. We also think other improvements to the registration system are necessary, such as those aimed at improving and updating the deposit and best edition requirements, and we will continue to push for those changes. And to the extent any of these changes require legislative amendments, we plan to work with Congress, the Copyright Office, and other stakeholders to make them a reality in 2023.

Yet if the international community is going to maximize global innovation—something that is critical if we are to make faster progress on commonly shared global challenges such as climate change, disease prevention and treatment, and economic growth—we will need a stronger and more wide-ranging consensus on the importance of IP to every country throughout the world. To maximize the role intellectual property can play in enabling innovation across the world, the countries that best recognize the essential link between the two—including the United States, Commonwealth nations, European Union members, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and others—need to revise and amplify efforts to build out and strengthen the international framework of intellectual property rules, norms, and cooperation. A new way ahead is needed to overcome and move beyond the status quo stalemate that defines the intellectual debate over IP in the global economy, which remains starkly and deeply divided along developed-developing country lines that were largely set 20 years ago with the signing of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement at the World Trade Organization (WTO).

All those reports make a simple point: the outdated and ineffective IT procurement processes at the Library of Congress have forced the US Copyright Office to try to run a 21st century copyright system with 19th and 20th century technologies. That anachronism disserves the legitimate interests of everyone affected by copyrights – creators, creative industries, content distributors, and users of expressive works. The Copyright Office needs independent IT funding and procurement authority, and internal IT personnel, in order to use the latest technologies to make copyright registration, recordation, and search far more effective, efficient and accessible than they are today.

The potential benefits of doing so extend well beyond mere matters of administrative efficiency. The US copyright system is fairly unique. Before 1978, it required protected works to be registered when they were published. Today, it still strongly encourages, but does not require, copyright owners to register at least potentially valuable works promptly. The resulting continuous flow of applications creates an incentive for the US to design a copyright system that could – perhaps by leveraging some of the expertise of world-leading US technology companies – become a model for what could then become a more globally integrated system that would make it relatively easy to determine a work’s copyright status and ownership in any given jurisdiction. There is no technical or legal reason why such a system cannot exist, and be as easy to use as legal database-and-search services like Lexis or Westlaw.

Whether the pandemic ends soon or is longer-lasting, the global economy and global geopolitics are very likely to have a different shape than they had before its onset. The high likelihood of a world depression and the differential responses across countries – especially those of China and the US – is changing the existing distribution of power across the world.

After going over recent trends in the US’s superpower status, I will discuss the pandemic’s implications for the rise of China as a challenger to the US’s position and a consequent urgent importance for improving global conflict management. Urgency is justified because international institutions have atrophied over the past few decades whereas the possibilities for conflict are expanding.

Young firms' up-or-out dynamics are important for an economy's growth. To perfect novel business concepts, a lot of experimentation is required. Success results in improvements in technology (which promote economic growth), but failure is inherent to the experimentation process to which startups disproportionately contribute. The 2018 paper "Growth Through Heterogeneous Innovations" quantifies that 25.7 percent of aggregate growth that comes through innovation is accounted for by entering firms alone.

Startups need balanced, certain copyright frameworks. Well-tailored laws that focus on enforcement of legitimate rights can support innovation. But it is too easy for those frameworks to get out of whack and become imbalanced, which we’ve seen time and again. For example, right now the law allows bogus infringement allegations to dictate that non-infringing content is (routinely) removed from the Internet. Uncertainty over what copyright law permits, coupled with high litigation costs, slows startups down and has even forced some out of business. And the risk of a startup being sued for something a user does — and something the startup knows nothing about — alone can scare away investors.

But what does balanced, innovation-friendly copyright policy look like? And how does this play out in today’s policy debates? Here are just a few examples:

Although bad-to-worst case scenarios remain underexplored in the scientific literature, statements labeling climate change as catastrophic are not uncommon. UN Secretary-General António Guterres called climate change an “existential threat.” Academic studies have warned that warming above 5 °C is likely to be “beyond catastrophic” (50), and above 6 °C constitutes “an indisputable global catastrophe” (9).

Current discussions over climate catastrophe are undermined by unclear terminology. The term “catastrophic climate change” has not been conclusively defined. An existential risk is usually defined as a risk that cause an enduring and significant loss of long-term human potential (51, 52). This existing definition is deeply ambiguous and requires societal discussion and specification of long-term human values (52). While a democratic exploration of values is welcome, it is not required to understand pathways to human catastrophe or extinction (52). For now, the existing definition is not a solid foundation for a scientific inquiry.

The relationship between culture and climate is becoming increasingly critical in the context of exacerbating climate impacts. Historically, the creative community — especially the fashion and advertising sectors — have been significant drivers of consumption, and have often not acted sustainably1 But we can’t deny that they’re big players, and that we need their superpowers to transform climate communications.

Cultural and creative industries are an influential economic force, generating $2,250 billion in global revenues and providing 29.5 million jobs worldwide — exceeding entire GDPs such as India’s. The industry plays a huge role in shaping cultural identity, and is driven by youth-led innovation.2 But the industry also has a considerable environmental footprint — whether directly through their operations or indirectly through driving consumption — through resource-intensive practices and rapidly changing trends.3

The Copyright Office should reflect the creativity and innovation of the market it serves. The United States has the most prolific knowledge-based economy in the world, and a well-functioning Copyright Office is necessary to promote the continued growth of the creative sector.

Last week, Congressman Tom Marino (PA-10) and Congresswoman Judy Chu (CA-27) took an important step in the right direction by releasing a discussion draft, titled the Copyright Office for the Digital Economy Act or CODE Act. Their work will serve as the basis for a long overdue discussion on how best to bring the Copyright Office into the 21st century. A modern copyright office will reduce friction in the over $1.1 trillion marketplace for copyrighted works, incentivize creativity, innovation, investment and jobs, and represent a meaningful achievement for Congress.

An additional and important consideration in any reform effort is the cost. The Copyright Office has undergone budget and staff cuts. Added to that, the desired modernization of the Office’s functions, particularly with regard to IT operations, can reasonably be anticipated to involve an up-front capital investment. Ironically, we do not have a reliable estimate of those costs because at present the Copyright Office lacks the authority even to study the matter. Nonetheless, this section will compare in broad-brush the costs and benefits of Copyright Office modernization.

To place the matter in context, general taxpayer funds account for only approximately one third of the of the Copyright Office’s annual budget, roughly $15 million. In comparison, there is a $1.1 trillion industry that is supported by the Copyright Office. That’s a return of over $73,000 per tax dollar spent. The Copyright Office may be the best value in the federal government.

A restructured Copyright Office that is autonomous from the Library of Congress and that has authority over its own budget would be better positioned to make long overdue technological upgrades. For example, the Copyright Office needs to build a comprehensive searchable database of copyright registration and transfer records. Prospective purchasers of copyrighted works would benefit from more reliable and less costly searches. And the resulting facilitation of voluntary exchanges would enhance economic values for current copyright owners. Technology-enabled reductions in registration burdens would also benefit creators of copyrightable works.

Additionally, restructuring is needed to alleviate an existing constitutional incongruity: the Copyright Office performs significant executive administrative functions, yet Congress deems the Office a legislative sub-agency within the within the Library of Congress. Long-standing Congressional identification of the Copyright Office as part of the Legislative Branch is at odds with the reasoning of U.S. Supreme Court and lower court decisions involving the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, contained in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2. The Clause is intended to ensure that administrative agencies performing executive functions be accountable to the President through the process of appointment. Decisions in Eltra Corporation v. Ringer (4th Cir. 1978) and Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board (D.C. Cir. 2012) have concluded that the Librarian is an “Officer” and the “Head of a Department” in the Executive Branch and that the Register is an “inferior Officer” in the Executive Branch.

Even when the Office does hear from the public, structural biases tend to favor the perspective of rights holders. In an interview with the American Bar Association, former Register Pallante revealed her fundamental misunderstanding of our copyright system and the Office’s role within it. As she put it, “Copyright is for the author first and the nation second.”257 While it would be a mistake to attribute this constitutionally flawed view to the Office as a whole, it is suggestive of the Office’s long-recognized tendency to prioritize the interests of copyright holders over those of the public.258

In some ways, this tendency is understandable. The Office regularly interacts with copyright holders in its day-to-day operations, and rights holders and their various trade associations and industry groups are regular, repeat participants in every policy process the Office undertakes. Moreover, it is not uncommon for Office personnel to represent those same interests before and after their government service, reinforcing the ties between the Office and industry. 259 More broadly, copyright policymaking faces familiar challenges when it comes to fully accounting for the public interest. While rights holders are a concentrated, organized, and sophisticated constituency, the public interest is diffuse, largely unorganized, and poorly resourced. 260 Although recent years have seen certain technology firms serve as an effective counterbalance to the copyright industries, those firms are often, at best, an imperfect proxy for the interests of consumers.