The counterplan results in successful modernization.

A restructured Copyright Office that is autonomous from the Library of Congress and that has authority over its own budget would be better positioned to make long overdue technological upgrades. For example, the Copyright Office needs to build a comprehensive searchable database of copyright registration and transfer records. Prospective purchasers of copyrighted works would benefit from more reliable and less costly searches. And the resulting facilitation of voluntary exchanges would enhance economic values for current copyright owners. Technology-enabled reductions in registration burdens would also benefit creators of copyrightable works.

Additionally, restructuring is needed to alleviate an existing constitutional incongruity: the Copyright Office performs significant executive administrative functions, yet Congress deems the Office a legislative sub-agency within the within the Library of Congress. Long-standing Congressional identification of the Copyright Office as part of the Legislative Branch is at odds with the reasoning of U.S. Supreme Court and lower court decisions involving the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, contained in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2. The Clause is intended to ensure that administrative agencies performing executive functions be accountable to the President through the process of appointment. Decisions in Eltra Corporation v. Ringer (4th Cir. 1978) and Intercollegiate Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Board (D.C. Cir. 2012) have concluded that the Librarian is an “Officer” and the “Head of a Department” in the Executive Branch and that the Register is an “inferior Officer” in the Executive Branch.