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2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Readiness !

No impact to readiness

George 99 James L. George, former congressional professional staff member for national security affairs, “Is Military Readiness Overrated?” CATO, 5-27-1999, /GoGreen!

Military readiness promises to be a major issue when Congress marks up a defense bill later this year. Some members of Congress are already using readiness as a reason to increase funding in the emergency spending bill for the war in Yugoslavia. Most experts cite the initial stages of the Korean War and the Hollow Force of the late 1970s as cautionary examples of being ill-prepared. A closer look at both those examples, however, shows that they really had little to do with readiness. Moreover, the current crisis in Yugoslavia illustrates once again why readiness may be overrated and the funds better spent elsewhere. Although often used as a generic term for all military capabilities, readiness—defined as the ability to respond with appropriate force with little or no warning—is only one of four pillars of military preparedness. The other pillars are force structure, modernization and sustainability. Thus, an effective military force depends on much more than just readiness. Interestingly, the two favorite examples cited by readiness alarmists fail to prove their case. The performance of Task Force Smith, an ill-prepared battalion quickly sent to the front and fairly easily routed by the North Koreans during the initial days of the Korean War, is often cited as the worst case. “No More Task Force Smiths” has become a mantra for the Army. However, critics of Task Force Smith fail to point out that U.S. commanders made the most basic of military mistakes—including grossly underestimating the enemy and sending TFS to an exposed position. When such blunders occur, the end result will be the same whether it is an ill-trained Task Force Smith in Korea or well-trained Marines in Beirut or elite Rangers in Somalia. Moreover, critics also fail to mention that barely a month later the United States stabilized the situation in South Korea, and in another month the Marines conducted their famous Inchon Landing. In fact, without the Chinese intervention, the United States would have won the Korean War a few months after it began. Not bad for a U.S. force that was supposedly ill-prepared. Similarly, the Hollow Force of the late 1970s was not primarily a readiness problem but a combination of many factors—including a military characterized by low morale after Vietnam, serious drug and racial problems, the erroneous induction of too many mentally substandard recruits and low pay eroded further by high inflation. At the same time, major structural changes were transforming the U.S. military, including the introduction of women into the regular forces, the switch from a draft to an all-volunteer force and the initiation of the Total Force Concept that placed more reliance on the Reserves. Given all of that turbulence, no wonder we had a Hollow Force. Often overlooked, however, is how quickly those problems were solved. In some cases, solutions were found without spending a dime. For example, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Thomas Hayward instituted his “Not in my Navy” program of zero tolerance for drugs. The drug problem was solved almost overnight. The induction of too many mentally substandard recruits by mistake which had lowered standards, was identified and corrected. That correction solved most other personnel problems (and should be a warning to people who want to lower standards today). Some members of Congress are now using the crisis in Yugoslavia to get more funds for readiness by arguing that the military is now stretched “too thin.” (Congress doubled President Clinton’s request for $6 billion in emergency spending for the war.) In fact, the situation is quite the opposite. Leaving aside the question of whether the United States should even be involved in Yugoslavia, the new Clinton Doctrine, which does not plan to use ground troops ( a position that is supported by many Republicans), limits the stress placed on the military. Those decisions are all deliberate political actions that have absolutely nothing to do with readiness. Under a well-conceived strategy, even a modestly capable force will probably perform well; but under a poorly conceived strategy, even a force with the highest degree of readiness will probably have serious problems. The experiences of Task Force Smith and the Hollow Force, as well as the invocation of a Clinton Doctrine that eschews the use of ground forces, have major implications. More forces, for example, could be placed in the reserves and scarce funds spent elsewhere. In addition, the military could switch to what Sen. John McCain (R- Ariz.) has called “Tiered Readiness:” a few forces would be kept on expensive ready status and be augmented by reserve forces that could be mobilized if a substantial threat to U.S. security arose. Military readiness is certainly important, and no one is suggesting a return to the truly shallow force of the late 1940s or the Hollow Force of the 1970s. But a close look at those forces shows that their difficulties involved much more than just poor readiness.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Readiness !

No readiness decline

Reveron 13 Derek S. Reveron, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, “When Foreign Policy Goals Exceed Military Capacity, Call The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, February 2013, /GoGreen! *added [overlooked]

With dozens of treaty allies and a strategic priority of promoting the sovereignty of weak states, the U.S. military has been gradually shifting from a force designed for confrontation to one intended to promote international cooperation. To be sure, the U.S. military retains a technical and doctrinal advantage as a warfighting entity. However, over the past two decades, the military has been incorporating new organizations, doctrine, and training to prioritize efforts to prevent war through security force assistance. This has shifted focus to weak states where sub-national (e.g., gangs in Central America) and trans-national security challenges (e.g., al-Qa’ida) jeopardize sovereignty and regional stability.1 Consequently, countries such as the Philippines, Georgia, Colombia, Uganda, and Pakistan have requested security assistance from the United States. While level of support varies, U.S. forces are enabling partner countries to combat challenges that threaten their own stability.

This shift in focus has raised concerns about the “militarization of U.S. foreign policy,” which began in the 1990s with the recognition that combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are war fighters.2 Generals like Tony Zinni or Wesley Clark epitomized the new breed of warrior-diplomat who directly engaged with foreign heads of state.3 Far from rogue generals, these military leaders were directed by President Bill Clinton to engage with the world and promote security by assisting partners and assuring allies in a security environment freed from the Cold War dynamic. President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama continued the practice of using the military to assist almost every government of the world. As Administrations from both parties came to value the military’s capabilities in peace and war, some contended that defense overshadowed (if not displaced) traditional diplomacy and development efforts.4 Within defense circles, critics assumed that helping weak states jeopardized American military dominance and undercut preparations for major war.5 More recently, critics highlight that in an era of declining budgets, the United States military cannot afford nor overcome unintended consequences of attempting to be a “global force for good.”6 These are valid concerns, but the United States shows no signs of retreating from a global leadership role and instead seeks partnerships as a key component of U.S. strategy.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Miscalc !

No impact – wouldn’t escalate

Quinlan 9 Michael Quinlan, former British defence strategist and former Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons, 2009, p.63-69 /GoGreen!

Even if initial nuclear use did not quickly end the fighting, the supposition of inexorable momentum in a developing exchange, with each side rushing to overreaction amid confusion and uncertainty, is implausible. It fails to consider what the situation of the decisionmakers would really be. Neither side could want escalation. Both would be appalled at what was going on. Both would be desperately looking for signs that the other was ready to call a halt. Both, given the capacity for evasion or concealment which modern delivery platforms and vehicles can possess, could have in reserve significant forces invulnerable enough not to entail use-or-lose pressures. (It may be more open to question, as noted earlier, whether newer nuclear-weapon possessors can be immediately in that position; but it is within reach of any substantial state with advanced technological capabilities, and attaining it is certain to be a high priority in the development of forces.) As a result, neither side can have any predisposition to suppose, in an ambiguous situation of fearful risk, that the right course when in doubt is to go on copiously launching weapons. And none of this analysis rests on any presumption of highly subtle or pre-concerted rationality. The rationality required is plain. The argument is reinforced if we consider the possible reasoning of an aggressor at a more dispassionate level. Any substantial nuclear armoury can inflict destruction outweighing any possible prize that aggression could hope to seize. A state attacking the possessor of such an armoury must therefore be doing so (once given that it cannot count upon destroying the armoury pre-emptively) on a judgement that the possessor would be found lacking in the will to use it. If the attacked possessor used nuclear weapons, whether first or in response to the aggressor's own first use, this judgement would begin to look dangerously precarious. There must be at least a substantial possibility of the aggressor leaders' concluding that their initial judgement had been mistaken—that the risks were after all greater than whatever prize they had been seeking, and that for their own country's survival they must call off the aggression. Deterrence planning such as that of NATO was directed in the first place to preventing the initial misjudgement and in the second, if it were nevertheless made, to compelling such a reappraisal. The former aim had to have primacy, because it could not be taken for granted that the latter was certain to work. But there was no ground for assuming in advance, for all possible scenarios, that the chance of its working must be negligible. An aggressor state would itself be at huge risk if nuclear war developed, as its leaders would know. It may be argued that a policy which abandons hope of physically defeating the enemy and simply hopes to get him to desist is pure gamble, a matter of who blinks first; and that the political and moral nature of most likely aggressors, almost ex hypothesis, makes them the less likely to blink. One response to this is to ask what is the alternative—it can only be surrender. But a more positive and hopeful answer lies in the fact that the criticism is posed in a political vacuum. Real-life conflict would have a political context. The context which concerned NATO during the cold war, for example, was one of defending vital interests against a postulated aggressor whose own vital interests would not be engaged, or would be less engaged. Certainty is not possible, but a clear asymmetry of vital interest is a legitimate basis for expecting an asymmetry, credible to both sides, of resolve in conflict. That places upon statesmen, as page 23 has noted, the key task in deterrence of building up in advance a clear and shared grasp of where limits lie. That was plainly achieved in cold-war Europe. 11 vital interests have been defined in a way that is clear, and also clearly not overlapping or incompatible with those of the adversary, a credible basis has been laid for the likelihood of greater resolve in resistance. It was also sometimes suggested by critics that whatever might be indicated by theoretical discussion of political will and interests, the military environment of nuclear warfare—particularly difficulties of communication and control—would drive escalation with overwhelming probability to the limit. But it is obscure why matters should be regarded as inevitably so for every possible level and setting of action. Even if the history of war suggested (as it scarcely does) that military decision-makers are mostly apt to work on the principle 'When in doubt, lash out', the nuclear revolution creates an utterly new situation. The pervasive reality, always plain to both sides during the cold war, is 'If this goes on to the end, we are all ruined'. Given that inexorable escalation would mean catastrophe for both, it would be perverse to suppose them permanently incapable of framing arrangements which avoid it. As page 16 has noted, NATO gave its military commanders no widespread delegated authority, in peace or war, to launch nuclear weapons without specific political direction. Many types of weapon moreover had physical safeguards such as PALs incorporated to reinforce organizational ones. There were multiple communication and control systems for passing information, orders, and prohibitions. Such systems could not be totally guaranteed against disruption if at a fairly intense level of strategic exchange—which was only one of many possible levels of conflict— an adversary judged it to be in his interest to weaken political control. It was far from clear why he necessarily should so judge. Even then, however, it remained possible to operate on a general fail-safe presumption: no authorization, no use. That was the basis on which NATO operated. If it is feared that the arrangements which a nuclear-weapon possessor has in place do not meet such standards in some respects, the logical course is to continue to improve them rather than to assume escalation to be certain and uncontrollable, with all the enormous inferences that would have to flow from such an assumption. The likelihood of escalation can never be 100 per cent, and never zero. Where between those two extremes it may lie can never be precisely calculable in advance; and even were it so calculable, it would not be uniquely fixed—it would stand to vary hugely with circumstances. That there should be any risk at all of escalation to widespread nuclear war must be deeply disturbing, and decision-makers would always have to weigh it most anxiously. But a pair of key truths about it need to be recognized. The first is that the risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict and whoever may first have used any particular category of weapon. The initiator of the conflict will always have physically available to him options for applying more force if he meets effective resistance. If the risk of escalation, whatever its degree of probability, is to be regarded as absolutely unacceptable, the necessary inference is that a state attacked by a substantial nuclear power must forgo military resistance. It must surrender, even if it has a nuclear armoury of its own. But the companion truth is that, as page 47 has noted, the risk of escalation is an inescapable burden also upon the aggressor. The exploitation of that burden is the crucial route, if conflict does break out, for managing it to a tolerable outcome—the only route, indeed, intermediate between surrender and holocaust, and so the necessary basis for deterrence beforehand. The working out of plans to exploit escalation risk most effectively in deterring potential aggression entails further and complex issues. It is for example plainly desirable, wherever geography, politics, and available resources so permit without triggering arms races, to make provisions and dispositions that are likely to place the onus of making the bigger and more evidently dangerous steps in escalation upon the aggressor who wishes to maintain his attack, rather than upon the defender. (The customary shorthand for this desirable posture used to be 'escalation dominance'.) These issues are not further discussed here. But addressing them needs to start from acknowledgement that there are in any event no certainties or absolutes available, no options guaranteed to be risk-free and cost-free. Deterrence is not possible without escalation risk; and its presence can point to no automatic policy conclusion save for those who espouse outright pacifism and accept its consequences. Accident and Miscalculation Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, or the accidental or unauthorized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme it is absurd to claim, as has been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally dropping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements—it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear detonation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experience would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch—extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution. It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adversary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of its initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Miscalc !

No risk of miscalc

Reveron 13 Derek S. Reveron, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, “When Foreign Policy Goals Exceed Military Capacity, Call The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, February 2013, /GoGreen! *added [overlooked]

With dozens of treaty allies and a strategic priority of promoting the sovereignty of weak states, the U.S. military has been gradually shifting from a force designed for confrontation to one intended to promote international cooperation. To be sure, the U.S. military retains a technical and doctrinal advantage as a warfighting entity. However, over the past two decades, the military has been incorporating new organizations, doctrine, and training to prioritize efforts to prevent war through security force assistance. This has shifted focus to weak states where sub-national (e.g., gangs in Central America) and trans-national security challenges (e.g., al-Qa’ida) jeopardize sovereignty and regional stability.1 Consequently, countries such as the Philippines, Georgia, Colombia, Uganda, and Pakistan have requested security assistance from the United States. While level of support varies, U.S. forces are enabling partner countries to combat challenges that threaten their own stability.

This shift in focus has raised concerns about the “militarization of U.S. foreign policy,” which began in the 1990s with the recognition that combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are war fighters.2 Generals like Tony Zinni or Wesley Clark epitomized the new breed of warrior-diplomat who directly engaged with foreign heads of state.3 Far from rogue generals, these military leaders were directed by President Bill Clinton to engage with the world and promote security by assisting partners and assuring allies in a security environment freed from the Cold War dynamic. President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama continued the practice of using the military to assist almost every government of the world. As Administrations from both parties came to value the military’s capabilities in peace and war, some contended that defense overshadowed (if not displaced) traditional diplomacy and development efforts.4 Within defense circles, critics assumed that helping weak states jeopardized American military dominance and undercut preparations for major war.5 More recently, critics highlight that in an era of declining budgets, the United States military cannot afford nor overcome unintended consequences of attempting to be a “global force for good.”6 These are valid concerns, but the United States shows no signs of retreating from a global leadership role and instead seeks partnerships as a key component of U.S. strategy.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Terror !

No motive, no opportunity

--CBRN = chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons

Koblentz 20 Dr. Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor and Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government; “Emerging Technologies and the Future of CBRN Terrorism;” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 43, 06-16-2020, Issue 2, Accessed through T&F, /GoGreen!

Cautions and Caveats

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Terror !

No nuclear terror and no impact

John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart 21, Mueller is Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, and adjunct professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University, also a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington; Stewart is Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at The University of Newcastle in Australia, “Terrorism and Bathtubs: Comparing and Assessing the Risks,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 33, no. 1, 01/02/2021, pp. 138–163

The likelihood that anyone outside a war zone will be killed by an Islamist extremist terrorist is extremely small. In the United States, for example, some six people have perished each year since 9/11 at the hands of such terrorists—for an annual fatality rate of about one in 50 million for the period.

This might be taken to suggest, as one writer has characterized it, that “terrorism is such a minor threat to American life and limb that it’s simply bizarre—just stupefyingly irrational and intellectually unserious—to suppose that it could even begin to justify the abolition of privacy rights as they have been traditionally understood in favour of the installation of a panoptic surveillance state.” 1 And terrorism specialist Marc Sageman characterizes the threat terrorists present in the United States as “rather negligible.” 2 The vast majority of what is commonly tallied as terrorism has occurred in war zones, and this is especially true for fatalities.3 But even this has been exaggerated by conflating terrorism with war: civil war violence that would previously have been seen to be acts of insurgency are now often labeled terrorism.4

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Demo ! – DPT

No impact to democracy – confounding variables control

Doorenspleet ’19 [Renske; 2019; Political Science and International Studies Professor at Warwick University; Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, “Democracy and Interstate War,” Ch. 3]

This finding or ‘law’ has not only been recognized by scholars of international relations, but also found its way outside academia and has influenced foreign policies to promote peace and democracy, most prominently since the 1990s. However, my book will not draw conclusions based on ‘cherry-picking’ of specific studies showing how peaceful democracies are, but on a systematic overview of studies in this field. Therefore, this book relies on my own database with hundreds of different studies, which are relevant for each chapter; the articles had to engage directly with the chapter’s main research question. The next section will provide more detailed information around the selection criteria. This overview includes both highly cited and recent articles which were selected in a systematic way.

Based on analyses of statistical studies around this topic of democracy and war, it will become clear that the overall statistical support for the democratic peace hypothesis is not strong at all. In the rest of the chapter, I will spell out four reasons why democracy does not cause peace, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak: (1) most studies do not find a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level, and they show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, or even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one, (2) the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear, (3) democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive, and (4) the process of democratization is dangerous and living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Global Demo I/L

No modelling

Miller 21 Aaron David Miller, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department, PhD American Diplomatic and Middle East History, University of Michigan; and Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former director of the offices of Strategic Policy and Negotiations, Policy Analysis, and Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MA Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; “Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the threat isn’t China,” The Washington Post, 12-3-2021, /GoGreen!

It is simplistic to believe, however, that Chinese and Russian foreign policies are driven by the ideological impulse to spread autocracy. Both countries see the United States as their main geopolitical adversary and seek to undermine American influence and alliances wherever they can; the Chinese are also bent on outcompeting the United States in 21st-century technologies.

But the Russians don’t have an authoritarian model for export, and other autocratic-minded governments don’t need inspiration from Moscow to run kleptocratic, corrupt, repressive and misgoverned regimes. Putin’s overriding priority is self-preservation and the preservation of his regime. What evidence is there that he believes these objectives can be achieved only if the rest of the world looks like Russia?

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: NATO Demo I/L

The US is irrelevant – other members and the EU either thump OR solve

Katz 18 Jonathan Katz, director of Democracy Initiatives and senior fellow with The German Marshall Fund of the United States, former deputy assistant administrator in the Europe and Eurasia bureau at USAID, former senior advisor to the assistant secretary in the International Organization Affairs Bureau at the U.S. Department of State; and Torrey Taussig, research director for the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center, former foreign policy advisor in the German Bundestag and in the Transatlantic Division of the German Foreign Office; “An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsliding within NATO,” 7-10-2018, /GoGreen!

Regardless of U.S. leadership or support, other NATO states such as the Nordic countries, Canada, Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other members must play a role in prioritizing NATO’s core values at the Brussels Summit and strengthening democratic institutions. In speaking to diplomats from several member states, it is clear that they recognize the growing democracy deficit in the alliance, and that the United States will likely not lead the charge on championing democratic institutions. In response, officials from such member states can use bilateral meetings and sideline conversations with the Hungarians, Poles, and Turks to raise concerns. Already the European Union is pressing Poland on its violation of EU democratic principles with the threat of sanctions and suspension of voting privileges. The security implications of their transgressions give NATO a role in maintaining this pressure, too.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: NATO Demo I/L

US backsliding thumps

Miller 21 Aaron David Miller, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department, PhD American Diplomatic and Middle East History, University of Michigan; and Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former director of the offices of Strategic Policy and Negotiations, Policy Analysis, and Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MA Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; “Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the threat isn’t China,” The Washington Post, 12-3-2021, /GoGreen!

There’s also the politically inconvenient question of whether the United States is best positioned to lead this effort. Rarely has America’s democracy crusade abroad contrasted more with its commitment to democratic practices at home — where the threats include Trump’s false claims that the presidential election was “stolen,” an insurrection to stop a democratic transition and efforts to restrict voting rights. America has a glass-house problem, and it needs to promote its democratic virtues with considerable humility. According to Freedom House’s annual country-by-country assessment of political and civil rights, the United States continued to experience erosion in democratic practices in 2020;over the past decade, America’s score dropped from 94 to 83 out of 100, among the steepest falls of any country during this period.

It is hard to take seriously the notion that the United States can restore its “soft power” by virtue of the example it is setting at home. A recent Pew Research Center study found that a median of only 17 percent of people in surveyed countries thought U.S. democracy worth emulating, while 23 percent said it had never offered a good example. It is also hard to quibble with the proposition that America’s influence abroad is waning primarily because of its domestic problems, rather than authoritarian muscle-flexing in Moscow or Beijing.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: NATO Demo I/L

Democracy does NOT save NATO

Miller 21 Aaron David Miller, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department, PhD American Diplomatic and Middle East History, University of Michigan; and Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former director of the offices of Strategic Policy and Negotiations, Policy Analysis, and Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MA Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; “Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the threat isn’t China,” The Washington Post, 12-3-2021, /GoGreen!

There are many good reasons to host such a gathering. It’s smart politics, fulfills a campaign commitment and counters the perception, fostered by President Donald Trump, that America is no longer interested in promoting democracy and human rights. But as a geopolitical instrument, drawing lines between democracies and autocracies is not only certain to disappoint — it’s also a deeply flawed organizing principle for America’s approach to the world.

China and Russia, which Biden has also singled out for criticism, are not the main causes of the weakening of democracies around the world. Most of the backsliding, according to a recent study, has been caused by erosion within the world’s democracies, including the United States and many of its allies. Indeed, the upcoming summit includes a number of countries — India, Brazil, the Philippines and Poland among them — marked by growing autocratic movements and infringements on freedom of expression and a free press. And pushing these and other countries to reform their political, electoral or judicial institutions from the outside is hard if not impossible.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: NATO Demo I/L

DoD’s more likely to solve NATO backsliding

McCarthy 19 Deborah A. McCarthy, Visiting Senior Fellow, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “The Militarization of US Foreign Policy,” FIIA Comment 13, November 2019, /GoGreen!

Much has been written on the “militarization” of US foreign policy. Since 9/11, the Department of Defense expanded its non-combat activities into areas normally reserved for traditional diplomacy. In 2005, it was given a mandate to build “indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society”. While the initial focus was on Iraq and Afghanistan, it allowed the Department to do the same in other regions.

In 2009, the Department’s international mandate broadened to “strengthening governance and the rule of law and fostering economic stability and development”. Congress added new authorities, most recently allowing the US military to work with non-military security forces. The Defense Department now manages a greater portion of security assistance than the Department of State. The Trump Administration continues to favor the use of the US military over US diplomacy to address great-power competition. It has increased the defense budget while slashing that for diplomacy; for 2020, it requested a 4.9% increase for the Defense Department and proposed a 21% cut for the State Department. Today, the Department of Defense plays an important role in US foreign policy.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Turf Wars Link

BUT, even if there are, CP alone does NOT solve them – the logic of their “slippery slope” link means DoD will keep pushing regardless – AND DoS can’t and won’t try to stop them, even with more authority

House 16 Carole N. House, former Captain, U.S. Army, served in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, with the 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division as assistant chief of operations and intelligence collection manager, graduate student, Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, B.A. University of Georgia, “Proposal of an Unconventional Warfare Strategy to Dominate the Human Domain,” Small Wars Journal, 3-7-2016, /GoGreen!

Some broader changes necessary to support long-term strategic operations are more elusive to accomplish. Most government agencies and military leadership will resist working under to the State Department’s direction. U.S. leadership must engineer a transformation of the traditions of tension into a tradition of cooperation and respectful understanding of each element’s role in accomplishing the mission. Establishing a regular rotation of joint assignments among government agency and military personnel could support interagency understanding and repair relationships for the conduct of joint operations.[xvii] The State Department must also accept its role as the institution responsible for achieving all U.S. foreign policy objectives and the task of leadership within the government inherent in this responsibility. All of the other departments must embrace their critical role in supporting U.S. foreign policy with direction and expertise in political warfare provided by the OUW.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Turf Wars Link

No turf wars link – AND no impact to minor tensions

Reveron 7 Derek S. Reveron, professor at the U.S. Naval War College, PhD public policy analysis, MA political science, University of Illinois at Chicago, “Shaping and Military Diplomacy,” prepared for delivery at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 8-30-2007, /GoGreen!

Setting this aside, the military’s active involvement in diplomacy does not preclude cooperation with the State Department. In fact, a combatant commander works extremely closely with his Political Advisor (POLAD) and the country teams where his engagement programs occur. With time-limited tours of duty, a combatant commander needs support from outside his military staff. Occasionally, there are tensions with strategic impact. “Left unclear, blurred lines of authority between the State Department and the Defense Department could lead to interagency turf wars that undermine the effectiveness of the overall U.S. effort against terrorism. It is in the embassies rather than in Washington where interagency differences on strategies, tactics, and divisions of labor are increasingly adjudicated.”73 However, both U.S. ambassadors and combatant commanders understand they need each other’s cooperation. If done well, military shaping activities are coordinated with other interagency activities beginning at the national level where both the State Department and Office of Secretary of Defense derive priorities and guidance from the National Security Strategy, which in turn drives theater security cooperation plans and mission strategic plans. 74 Yet an ambassador’s focus on one country and a combatant commander’s focus on an entire region necessitate coordination. A combatant command can serve as a regional hub of not only coordination, but also interagency and combined planning.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Mission Creep Link

No mission creep link – DoD self-restrains – AND fiat solves anyway

Reveron 13 Derek S. Reveron, professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, “When Foreign Policy Goals Exceed Military Capacity, Call The Pentagon,” Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, February 2013, /GoGreen! *added [overlooked]

With dozens of treaty allies and a strategic priority of promoting the sovereignty of weak states, the U.S. military has been gradually shifting from a force designed for confrontation to one intended to promote international cooperation. To be sure, the U.S. military retains a technical and doctrinal advantage as a warfighting entity. However, over the past two decades, the military has been incorporating new organizations, doctrine, and training to prioritize efforts to prevent war through security force assistance. This has shifted focus to weak states where sub-national (e.g., gangs in Central America) and trans-national security challenges (e.g., al-Qa’ida) jeopardize sovereignty and regional stability.1 Consequently, countries such as the Philippines, Georgia, Colombia, Uganda, and Pakistan have requested security assistance from the United States. While level of support varies, U.S. forces are enabling partner countries to combat challenges that threaten their own stability.

This shift in focus has raised concerns about the “militarization of U.S. foreign policy,” which began in the 1990s with the recognition that combatant commanders are as much policy entrepreneurs as they are war fighters.2 Generals like Tony Zinni or Wesley Clark epitomized the new breed of warrior-diplomat who directly engaged with foreign heads of state.3 Far from rogue generals, these military leaders were directed by President Bill Clinton to engage with the world and promote security by assisting partners and assuring allies in a security environment freed from the Cold War dynamic. President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama continued the practice of using the military to assist almost every government of the world. As Administrations from both parties came to value the military’s capabilities in peace and war, some contended that defense overshadowed (if not displaced) traditional diplomacy and development efforts.4 Within defense circles, critics assumed that helping weak states jeopardized American military dominance and undercut preparations for major war.5 More recently, critics highlight that in an era of declining budgets, the United States military cannot afford nor overcome unintended consequences of attempting to be a “global force for good.”6 These are valid concerns, but the United States shows no signs of retreating from a global leadership role and instead seeks partnerships as a key component of U.S. strategy.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Leverage Link

DoS crowds themselves out anyway

Butler 17 Larry Butler, Ambassador (ret.), served nearly 38 years in the Foreign Service in the Balkans, Scandinavia, South America and the Middle East, former deputy assistant secretary of State for Iraq, U.S. ambassador in Macedonia, and acting chief of mission in the former Yugoslavia, “Creeping Foreign Policy Militarization or Creeping State Department Irrelevance?” The Foreign Service Journal, June 2017, /GoGreen!

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall we have seen a steady outpouring of books and articles lamenting the trend in Washington to see foreign policy through a military lens: Rosa Brooks’ How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything, Lorelei Kelly’s Unbalanced Security: The Divide between State and Defense, and Gordon Adams and Shoon Murray’s Mission Creep—The Militarization of U.S. Foreign Policy, among others.

Why might one have this view? Is it that the Defense Department’s huge budget, personnel and other capabilities give it an advantage? Is it due to how the military is organized—with geographic combatant commands that have effective control over policy and activities across their areas of responsibility, whereas State’s regional bureaus are misaligned with military counterparts and assistant secretaries deal via turf-conscious bilateral ambassadors numbering up to 40 or more, and have little say over how USAID spends its money?

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Leverage Link

No leverage link – prefer studies

Morton 18 Christopher A. Morton, Major, United States Marine Corps, MA candidate, Security Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, BSBA, Ohio State University, “How Does United States Security Assistance Affect Host Nation Democratization?” MA thesis, June 2018, /GoGreen!

This thesis asked the question: How does United States security assistance affect host nation democratization in U.S. Central Command’s area of responsibility? Does it support, undermine, or have minimal effect on host nation democratization? I also investigated what U.S. security assistance (SA) is typically designed to accomplish, how those policies came about, and how influential U.S. SA is compared to other factors. I analyzed evidence from case studies on Lebanon and Pakistan to find supporting points and counterpoints for the three main hypotheses: U.S. SA supports host nation democratization, U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization, and U.S. SA has minimal influence on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors. I concluded that United States security assistance has minimal effect on host nation democratization compared to local and regional actors, because it is designed and resourced primarily to accomplish security objectives, not to drive enduring institutional reform.

Generally speaking, there is significantly more support for the third hypothesis in the democratization literature. The case of Lebanon supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA supports host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. The case of Pakistan supported the third hypothesis, but it also supported the “U.S. SA undermines host nation democratization” argument to a lesser degree. It is evident that U.S. SA is capable of affecting host nation governance either positively or negatively, but U.S. SA is significantly less influential than the host nation’s local and regional actors. This is an important point, because a common argument throughout the literature is the belief that U.S. SA is capable of significantly impacting the host nation’s institutions, political culture, civil society, etc. My view is that the influence of U.S. SA on host nation governance is frequently over-stated; but if it was resourced more heavily and designed to emphasize institutional reform, then it could better support host nation democratization.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › AT: NB – AT: Militarization Link

No net benefit – “militarization” is fake news – the structural irrelevance of diplomats in the face of technological change – NOT authority – is what matters

Quainton 18 Ambassador Anthony C. E. Quainton, Distinguished Diplomat in Residence at American University, “Militarization and Marginalization of American Diplomacy and Foreign Policy,” American Diplomacy, March 2018, /GoGreen!

The issue of militarization of foreign policy is a common theme. One of the New York Times 100 notable books of 2016 was Rosa Brooks How Everything became War and the Military Became Everything. In the spring of 2016 Georgetown University Press published a collection of essays entitled Mission Creep designed to explore the Militarization of US Foreign Policy. As far back as 2003 Dana Priest, a journalist for the Washington Post, wrote a book entitled The Mission which asserted that American diplomacy was being outgunned by the military and that the United States was becoming increasingly dependent on the military to manage its role in world affairs. She claimed that “on (president Bill) Clinton’s watch the military slowly, without public scrutiny or debate came to surpass its civilian leaders in resources and influence around the world”. Specifically she identified the regional combatant commanders. (In Europe the Supreme Allied Commander Europe—SACEUR) as sources of increasing diplomatic influence. In the introduction to her book she assets that “U.S. leaders have been turning more and more to the military to solve problems that are often, at their root, political and economic.” This shift she argues “has been going on for more than a decade without much public discussion or debate.” Ms. Priest describes a world in which four star generals and admirals fly around the world in large jet aircraft, accompanied by substantial staffs to engage in diplomatic contacts not just with ministers of defense and force commanders but with heads of state and government as well. She asserts that they were eclipsing the role of hapless Ambassadors who lacked both resources and access.

It was and is still true that the Combatant Commanders have at their disposal substantial resources. They can offer foreign governments materiel, training and in some cases development assistance. They are also a remarkably well-educated and impressive group. Many have doctoral degrees. All have over thirty years of military service. They are not amateurs. In comparison, successive administrations of both political parties have regarded diplomacy as an amateur business, reflected in the fact that about a third of Ambassadors are appointed from outside the career service, often to key posts. In this new Trump administration, politicians or business friends of the President have already been appointed to Moscow, Tokyo, Beijing and London, continuing a practice which goes back across the last five or six presidencies. Even more disturbing from a career Foreign Service point of view is the Administration’s decision to appoint a non-career Director General of the Foreign Service, for the first time in the Department’s history.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › Perm: Do Both – 2AC

There’s no functional difference – especially if they include DoD implementation

Neptune 16 Neptune, veteran owned and operated strategy and advisory firm, “U.S. Security Cooperation Review,” February 2016, /GoGreen!

“Concurrence” vs. “Coordination.” The reality of the shift in authorities is more complex than a simple erosion of State’s traditional authority. The 1206 authority did provide Defense with a “train and equip” authority that had previously been a State responsibility under Title 22, but the 1206 authority did, as does the 2282 authority now, require State “concurrence” with the Defense-developed plan. So while the responsibility for the planning and programming has shifted to Defense, State also has a veto. In practice, this is not profoundly different than a State (Title 22) authority, such as FMS or IMET, which is implemented by DoD through DSCA. Previously, many DoD authorities had required either “coordination” or “consultation” with the State Department, which constituted a relatively weak requirement in practice, as those terms are poorly defined and could mean as little as a phone call notification. Concurrence, on the other hand, is a relatively formal requirement usually requiring written documentation. And the trend is toward joint, or “concurrence” authorities, where State has a stronger hand in the planning.

2022 SDI Counterplan
AFF AT: CP—DoS SA › Perm: Do CP – 1AR

Most comprehensive independent review of both cooperation and assistance authorities agrees

GAO 17 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Building Partner Capacity: Inventory of Department of Defense Security Cooperation and Department of State Security Assistance Efforts,” GAO-17-255R, 3-24-2017, /GoGreen!

House Armed Services Committee Report 114-102, accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2016 (H.R.1735), includes a provision for us to report on an inventory of DOD security cooperation programs intended to build partner security capabilities.3 DOD defines these programs as including DOD-administered State security assistance activities. According to DOD and State officials, no sanctioned U.S. government inventory of security cooperation and security assistance efforts exists.4 In this report, we provide a fiscal year 2016 inventory of DOD security cooperation and State security assistance efforts that may be used by the U.S. government to build foreign partners’ capacity to address security-related threats, including each effort’s name, description, associated legal authorities, and agency involvement as required by the associated authorities. This inventory includes efforts that have building partner capacity (BPC) to address security-related threats as a primary goal as well as efforts that may have BPC as an ancillary goal or effect.

[FOOTNOTE 4]