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Nakamura 6-13-22 Ryo Nakamura, Nikkei staff writer, “U.S., Taiwan set to hold strategic dialogue this month: sources,” Nikkei Asia, 6-13-2022, /GoGreen!
The U.S. and Taiwan are in the final stages of preparation for a strategic bilateral dialogue between security officials, three people with knowledge of the matter told Nikkei.
The dialogue, scheduled to take place by the end of this month in the U.S., is expected to focus on specific measures for weapons provision and military drills.
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AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › Thumper – Ukraine
DoS 6-1-22 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine,” Fact Sheet, 6-1-2022, /GoGreen!
The United States, our allies, and our partners worldwide are united in support of Ukraine in response to Russia’s premeditated, unprovoked, and unjustified war against Ukraine. We have not forgotten Russia’s earlier aggression in eastern Ukraine and occupation following its unlawful seizure of Crimea in 2014. The United States reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters.
Ukraine is a key regional strategic partner that has undertaken significant efforts to modernize its military and increase its interoperability with NATO. It remains an urgent security assistance priority to provide Ukraine the equipment it needs to defend itself against Russia’s war against Ukraine.
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AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › Thumper – Ukraine
Ryan 6-14-22 Missy Ryan, reports on diplomacy, national security and the State Department for The Washington Post; and Emily Rauhala, Brussels bureau chief for The Washington Post, covering the European Union and NATO; “Ukraine battle intensifies as Western backers mull new military aid,” The Washington Post, 6-14-2022, /GoGreen!
Russia intensified its assault on a strategic Ukrainian city on Tuesday as NATO officials prepared to debate increased military support for Kyiv’s attempt to reverse Russian momentum in the country’s east.
Officials in the eastern city of Severodonetsk said that Ukrainian forces were mounting a pitched defense of an area that is now a central focus of Russian firepower. Mayor Oleksandr Stryuk described “constant fighting” for Severodonetsk, which has become increasingly isolated following the destruction of bridges leading out of the city. He said Russian troops so far have been unable to complete their control of the area.
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Lahaye 20 Estelle Lahaye, Senior Financial Sector Specialist at CGAP, former account manager in Luxembourg at Banco Itaú Europa, MS Business, San Francisco State University, BS banking, finance, and insurance, University of Nancy 2 in France; and Alice Nègre, Senior Financial Sector Specialist at CGAP, graduated from ESCP, Paris; “How Can Funders Avoid Chasing Data as the Latest Shiny Object?” CGAP Blog, 12-8-2020, /GoGreen!
We don’t need to preach to the choir: given the plethora of data-related projects that donors and development finance institutions (DFIs) have supported in the past, they clearly know that data is a powerful tool for advancing financial inclusion. And there is a lot to be excited about, given how digital technologies are accelerating the speed, depth and breadth of available data.
We share this excitement. In fact, data is at the heart of CGAP’s work. In recent years, we have talked about data-based segmentation to better serve customers, data sharing to enable innovation, data protection and how data capabilities need to be revamped to implement risk-based supervision.
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Görgens 5 Marelize Görgens, World Bank, HIV/AIDS Monitoring and Evaluation consultant, “Monitoring and Evaluation Systems for HIV/AIDS: chasing data or challenging paradigms?” November 2005, /GoGreen!
Within the international development arena, the past few years has witnessed a move towards measured, progress-focused development, as illustrated by the birth of terms such as “effective aid ” and “managing for development results ” at various international forums. For example, at a global meeting of development partners in 2004, , the discussions centred on how to strengthen an international partnership around the concept of ’managing for development results’. This upped the stakes for monitoring and evaluation (M&E), in the sense that the Joint Memorandum, which was issued by all these global partners at the end of their meeting, focused not only on M&E processes itself, but also on using results for improvement and decision-making.
“[We will] rely on – and strengthen – countries’ monitoring and evaluation systems to track progress and assess outcomes. As agencies with regional or global reach, we pledge to better distill the lessons of countries’ experiences and disseminate knowledge about what gets results in different country contexts.”
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Reynolds 21 Dr. Phil W. Reynolds, visiting scholar at the Center for Futures Studies at the University of Hawaii, “Building Partner Capacity Is Great Power Competition: The Future of 333 Funds,” Small Wars Journal, 2-6-2021, /GoGreen!
Can the U.S. Department of Defense do two things at once: Operate in the gray zone and excel in great power competition? Not according to Tommy Ross and Stephen Tankel who argue that security assistance “is focused on the wrong countries and being used to build the wrong capabilities.” Their idea is that competition with China and Russia - great power competition (GPC) - is the priority and all instruments of national power must be bent to that end, at the expense of all other needs. Ross and Tankel conclude that the “United States is no longer well-positioned to use security sector assistance to “compete with China and Russia — especially in ‘gray zone’ activities short of war.” Ross is a former assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation and should know better.
Changes in administrations are an opportunity to reflect on what works and what doesn’t, but in this case, changes in the name of so-called reform could cause real harm. They suggest, in part, converting what are known as building partner capacity (BPC) funds into general-purpose security assistance funds so they may explicitly be used for Great Power Competition — that is, to block China and Russia. That is a fine goal, but there are greater and more effective tools already in use. Security assistance writ large, about $19 billion dollars in 2019, and the deterrent effect of the U.S. armed forces being forward stationed and deployed around the world. Besides, Congress created specific categories of activities in for BPC which lie in the gray zone like counter terrorism operations, countering illicit drug trafficking, countering organized crime, supporting intelligence operations and supporting multi-national operations- like AMISOM in Somalia and the G5 Sahel. These funds are critical in providing equipment and training support against various insurgent, transnational terrorists and smuggling threats in twenty-one countries. Moving those funds from these conflicts to support great-power competition would result in the abandonment of those partners who are now decisively engaged on the United States’ behalf. There is real danger to a U.S. withdrawal of support to these fragile partners.
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AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › AT: Terror !
--CBRN = chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear weapons
Koblentz 20 Dr. Gregory D. Koblentz, Associate Professor and Director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University's Schar School of Policy and Government; “Emerging Technologies and the Future of CBRN Terrorism;” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 43, 06-16-2020, Issue 2, Accessed through T&F, /GoGreen!
Cautions and Caveats
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John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart 21, Mueller is Woody Hayes Senior Research Scientist, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, and adjunct professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University, also a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute in Washington; Stewart is Professor of Civil Engineering and Director of the Centre for Infrastructure Performance and Reliability at The University of Newcastle in Australia, “Terrorism and Bathtubs: Comparing and Assessing the Risks,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol. 33, no. 1, 01/02/2021, pp. 138–163
The likelihood that anyone outside a war zone will be killed by an Islamist extremist terrorist is extremely small. In the United States, for example, some six people have perished each year since 9/11 at the hands of such terrorists—for an annual fatality rate of about one in 50 million for the period.
This might be taken to suggest, as one writer has characterized it, that “terrorism is such a minor threat to American life and limb that it’s simply bizarre—just stupefyingly irrational and intellectually unserious—to suppose that it could even begin to justify the abolition of privacy rights as they have been traditionally understood in favour of the installation of a panoptic surveillance state.” 1 And terrorism specialist Marc Sageman characterizes the threat terrorists present in the United States as “rather negligible.” 2 The vast majority of what is commonly tallied as terrorism has occurred in war zones, and this is especially true for fatalities.3 But even this has been exaggerated by conflating terrorism with war: civil war violence that would previously have been seen to be acts of insurgency are now often labeled terrorism.4
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AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › AT: Demo ! – DPT
Doorenspleet ’19 [Renske; 2019; Political Science and International Studies Professor at Warwick University; Rethinking the Value of Democracy: A Comparative Perspective, “Democracy and Interstate War,” Ch. 3]
This finding or ‘law’ has not only been recognized by scholars of international relations, but also found its way outside academia and has influenced foreign policies to promote peace and democracy, most prominently since the 1990s. However, my book will not draw conclusions based on ‘cherry-picking’ of specific studies showing how peaceful democracies are, but on a systematic overview of studies in this field. Therefore, this book relies on my own database with hundreds of different studies, which are relevant for each chapter; the articles had to engage directly with the chapter’s main research question. The next section will provide more detailed information around the selection criteria. This overview includes both highly cited and recent articles which were selected in a systematic way.
Based on analyses of statistical studies around this topic of democracy and war, it will become clear that the overall statistical support for the democratic peace hypothesis is not strong at all. In the rest of the chapter, I will spell out four reasons why democracy does not cause peace, and why the empirical support for the popular idea of democratic peace is quite weak: (1) most studies do not find a strong correlation between democracy and interstate war at the dyadic level, and they show that there are other—more powerful—explanations for war and peace, or even that the impact of democracy is a spurious one, (2) the theoretical foundation of the democratic peace hypothesis is weak, and the causal mechanisms are unclear, (3) democracies are not necessarily more peaceful in general, and the evidence for the democratic peace hypothesis at the monadic level is inconclusive, and (4) the process of democratization is dangerous and living in a democratizing country means living in a less peaceful country.
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Miller 21 Aaron David Miller, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department, PhD American Diplomatic and Middle East History, University of Michigan; and Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former director of the offices of Strategic Policy and Negotiations, Policy Analysis, and Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MA Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; “Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the threat isn’t China,” The Washington Post, 12-3-2021, /GoGreen!
There’s also the politically inconvenient question of whether the United States is best positioned to lead this effort. Rarely has America’s democracy crusade abroad contrasted more with its commitment to democratic practices at home — where the threats include Trump’s false claims that the presidential election was “stolen,” an insurrection to stop a democratic transition and efforts to restrict voting rights. America has a glass-house problem, and it needs to promote its democratic virtues with considerable humility. According to Freedom House’s annual country-by-country assessment of political and civil rights, the United States continued to experience erosion in democratic practices in 2020;over the past decade, America’s score dropped from 94 to 83 out of 100, among the steepest falls of any country during this period.
It is hard to take seriously the notion that the United States can restore its “soft power” by virtue of the example it is setting at home. A recent Pew Research Center study found that a median of only 17 percent of people in surveyed countries thought U.S. democracy worth emulating, while 23 percent said it had never offered a good example. It is also hard to quibble with the proposition that America’s influence abroad is waning primarily because of its domestic problems, rather than authoritarian muscle-flexing in Moscow or Beijing.
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Miller 21 Aaron David Miller, Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Senior Advisor for Arab-Israeli Negotiations at the State Department, PhD American Diplomatic and Middle East History, University of Michigan; and Richard Sokolsky, nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, former director of the offices of Strategic Policy and Negotiations, Policy Analysis, and Defense Relations and Security Assistance in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, MA Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies; “Biden is right that global democracy is at risk. But the threat isn’t China,” The Washington Post, 12-3-2021, /GoGreen!
There are many good reasons to host such a gathering. It’s smart politics, fulfills a campaign commitment and counters the perception, fostered by President Donald Trump, that America is no longer interested in promoting democracy and human rights. But as a geopolitical instrument, drawing lines between democracies and autocracies is not only certain to disappoint — it’s also a deeply flawed organizing principle for America’s approach to the world.
China and Russia, which Biden has also singled out for criticism, are not the main causes of the weakening of democracies around the world. Most of the backsliding, according to a recent study, has been caused by erosion within the world’s democracies, including the United States and many of its allies. Indeed, the upcoming summit includes a number of countries — India, Brazil, the Philippines and Poland among them — marked by growing autocratic movements and infringements on freedom of expression and a free press. And pushing these and other countries to reform their political, electoral or judicial institutions from the outside is hard if not impossible.
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AFF AT: DA—DoD O/S › AT: Alliances !
Fisher 16 Max Fisher, foreign editor at Vox, former reporter and founding editor of the WorldViews foreign affair blog at The Washington Post, MA International Relations and Affairs, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, “The Credibility Trap,” Vox, 4-29-2016, /GoGreen!
If reputational credibility has been so repeatedly debunked, both in specific instances and as a theory, why does it continue to loom so large in America's foreign policy discourse?
Tufts University's Michael Beckley hinted at one possible explanation in a much-discussed article last year in International Security: Could it have something to do with America's uniquely broad network of alliances?
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Ashford 21 Emma Ashford, senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, “Great-Power Competition Is a Recipe for Disaster,” Foreign Policy, 4-1-2021, /GoGreen!
“America is back,” blared headlines following President Joe Biden’s speech to the Munich Security Conference in February, an address clearly designed to draw a line under the Donald Trump presidency and mark a new start in trans-Atlantic relations. “We are not looking backward,” Biden promised. “We are looking forward, together.” Yet one big plank of the Trump administration’s foreign policy is apparently sticking around: great-power competition. “We must prepare together for a long-term strategic competition,” Biden told conference attendees, adding that “competition with China is going to be stiff.”
Unfortunately, for all that great-power competition has been Washington’s favorite buzzword in recent years, it remains frustratingly poorly defined. Indeed, most commentators skip right past the big questions (Why are we competing? Competing over what?) and go straight to arguing about how to achieve victory. Since the possible answers to these questions range from the entirely reasonable (i.e., that Western states should engage in collective defense of liberal democracy) to the dangerous and utterly unrealistic (i.e., that Washington should be pursuing regime collapse in Beijing), it’s hardly something we should ignore.
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Nexon 21 Daniel H. Nexon, Professor in the Department of Government and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Against Great Power Competition,” Foreign Affairs, 2-15-2021, /GoGreen!
In his first days in office, U.S. President Joe Biden has worked to signal a clean break with his predecessor. He rejoined the Paris climate accord, offered to extend the New START nuclear weapons treaty, and reversed the “Mexico City” policy curtailing overseas abortion access. His appointees have repeatedly emphasized that the administration will prioritize diplomacy and multilateralism over former President Donald Trump’s “America first” nationalism.
But the fate of a central plank of Trump’s foreign policy remains uncertain: the focus on great-power competition, which according to his administration’s National Security Strategy has “returned.” In a major address at the U.S. State Department, Biden underscored his intention to “work with Beijing when it’s in America’s interests to do so,” but days later noted the likelihood of “extreme competition” with China. This rhetoric may reflect either pragmatism or that great-power competition is on its way to assuming a dominant place in Biden administration policy. Even if Biden aims to de-emphasize competition in certain areas, though, Republicans are certain to criticize the administration for being weak and ineffective in the face of international challenges. Absent some major change in the global threat environment, great-power competition will remain a focal point in debates over U.S. foreign and national security policy.
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NATO Cohesion DA Uniqueness Updates › Neg — AT: Burden-Sharing and Ukraine Thumper
Stoltenberg 7/15 — Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General at NATO, former Prime Minister of Norway, 2022 (“Strategic solidarity after Madrid, a conversation with Jens Stoltenberg,” groupe d’études géopolitiques, July 15th, Available Online at https://geopolitique.eu/en/2022/07/15/strategic-solidarity-after-madrid-a-conversation-with-jens-stoltenberg/, Accessed 07-18-2022)
In this global geopolitical landscape, NATO’s unity remains a key issue. Yet, the ideological divide between democracy and autocracy also runs through the organization, if we look for example at Turkey, but also Hungary or Poland. In addition, there are disputes between members threatening the cohesion of the Atlantic alliance, with renewed tensions for instance between Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean. Is NATO actually as united as it seemed during the Madrid Summit, both in terms of values and interests?
NATO is based on some core principles such as the rule of law, individual liberties and freedom. These values are extremely important – I attach great importance to them myself. At the same time, you are right that we see, both in the European Union and in NATO, that some countries raise concerns about the extent to which they fully adhere to these values. It is not for me to speak for the European Union but I can say that I believe that NATO is an important platform for countries to raise these concerns and to address exactly these issues. Over the years during which I have been Secretary General of NATO, I have raised such concerns in different capitals. I think that it is better if we discuss those issues openly and frankly within the organization because it is the best way to ensure that these values – democracy, freedom – are respected to the highest degree possible.
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NATO Cohesion DA Uniqueness Updates › Neg — AT: Burden-Sharing and Ukraine Thumper
Fazio and Bruno 7/12 — Federica Fazio, Visiting Fellow at the University of South Wales (UK), former European Foreign, Security, and Defence Policy Trainee at the EU Institute for Security Studies (Belgium), holds an M.Sc. in Politics and Government in the European Union from the London School of Economics and Political Science (UK), and Valerio Alfonso Bruno, Fellow at the Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right and Member of the Center for European Future (Italy), 2022 (“Is Russia’s War in Ukraine Creating a New European Security Architecture?,” Fair Observer, July 12th, Available Online at https://www.fairobserver.com/world-news/is-russias-war-in-ukraine-creating-a-new-european-security-architecture/, Accessed 07-18-2022)
Since Russia attacked Ukraine on February 24, we have been witnessing some important changes in not only European but also national foreign, security and defense policies.
In the past, Europeans often appeared reluctant to coordinate their national foreign, security and defense policies. Instead, they preferred to “go it alone”. The Ukraine crisis, however, has elicited a strong, unified response from the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and their member states as never before. To put pressure on the Kremlin and bring the war to an end as soon as possible, the EU, in close coordination with its North American allies, has adopted unprecedented measures. In June, EU member states agreed upon a sixth package of sanctions, which included an embargo on Russian oil imports (currently 90%) and the removal of three Russian banks from the international SWIFT payment platform. They also granted Ukraine and Moldova EU candidate status. This would have been unthinkable only a few months ago.
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NATO Cohesion DA Uniqueness Updates › Neg — AT: Finland/Sweden Thumper
Kaylan 22 — Melik Kaylan, journalist at Forbes and Wall Street Journal, co-author The Russia-China Axis and Return to Winter, 2022 (“Erdogan's Game With Nato Over Finland And Sweden: What He Really Wants,“ Forbes, July 6th, Available Online at , Accessed on 07-18-22)
Everyone's wondering what on earth Erdogan is up to – first he impedes the Nato accession of Finland and Sweden, then he gives the go-ahead after apparently winning concessions on Kurdish terror allegedly hatched by expat Kurds in those countries. Or so it seems. The same Erdogan who defied Russia by selling those devastating drones to Ukraine. Is he pro-West or pro-Moscow? What's his game? He manifestly used the Finland/Sweden accession issue as bargaining leverage. What does he really hope to squeeze from Nato? For the answers, you won't get any real help from authentic Turkish pundits trotted out by big news orgs like the BBC. If they're based in Turkey, they can't be too candid for fear of being persecuted under Erdogan's repressive anti-media laws. And the on-site foreign reporters aren't much better since their HUMINT contacts are watched and the news media they read locally is muzzled.
So, does Erdogan's noisemaking about Kurds reflect his genuine concerns? Yes and no. Mostly no. Anyway, neither Finland or Sweden will hand over anybody that Erdogan asks for extra-judicially with trumped-up accusations – as the BBC outlines. More about the Kurds later. Erdogan has bigger concerns, chief among which is the consolidation of his regime in a time of galloping inflation and economic meltdown at home. With a parliamentary general election coming up in the new year, his party is heading for a major loss. In reality, what Erdogan really wants is a pledge of non-interference from Western democracies in his internal affairs. Likely because he intends to keep power in his hands through various authoritarian maneuvers. In effect, he stays as President and maintains state capture from there. He is saying to the West, 'You need me to co-ordinate on Nato actions? Don't subvert my hold on power and don't be championing political prisoners like Osman Kavala, or any number of jailed journalists and Kurdish politicians. Don't oppose my upcoming anti-democratic ruses.' That's his main condition. But there's more.
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NATO Cohesion DA Uniqueness Updates › Neg — AT: Finland/Sweden Thumper
Gavin 22 — Gabriel Gavin, journalist and writer covering Eurasian politics and culture, one of MHPC's 30 journalists under 30 to watch, 2022 (“With Turkey’s economy in crisis, Erdoğan picks fights abroad,” Politico, June 29th, Available Online at politico.eu/article/recep-tayyip-erdogan-turkey-economy-in-crisis-picks-fights-abroad/, Accessed on 07-18-22)
ISTANBUL — Restaurants have invested in wipe-clean menus so they can update their prices daily. Taxi drivers are asking passengers to top up their fares to meet rising fuel costs. A cappuccino that cost 20 lira earlier this year is now 30 lira.
“It’s ridiculous,” said Osman, who runs a local coffee shop and is trying to keep up with Turkey’s runaway inflation — officially at a 20-year high of 70 percent and, according to the independent Inflation Research Group, more than double that.
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NATO Cohesion DA Uniqueness Updates › Neg — AT: Finland/Sweden Thumper
Ceylan 22 — Mehmet Fatih Ceylan, the president of Ankara Policy Center, served as permanent representative of Turkey to NATO, 2022 (“Experts react: What the NATO summit breakthrough means for Turkey and the Alliance,” Atlantic Council, July 1st, Available Online at , Accessed 07-18-22)
The trilateral memorandum signed among Turkey, Finland, and Sweden on June 28 is a welcome development designed to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and unity, and further strengthen the Alliance.
It is commonplace in NATO to consult on and negotiate over any dispute among allies and would-be allies to find a common ground. That is how NATO plays its role, and at the end a solution accommodating such concerns is found by consensus.
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Emerging Tech Innovation Aff › AT: Unilateral/Domestic CP › 1AR — Domestic Innovation Reform Fails
Farley 21 — Robert Farley, Senior Lecturer in the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, former Faculty Member in the Department of National Security Strategy at the U.S. Army War College, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington, 2021 (“Innovation Offense vs. Defense,” The Diplomat, July 24th, Available Online at https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/innovation-offense-vs-defense, Accessed 07-18-2022)
Washington is awash in proposals to enhance technological innovation, while at the same time limiting the extent to which that innovation spreads to competitors like Russia and China. As the United States cannot rely on massive economic advantage over its adversaries (China, anyway), technological innovation appears to be the way to maintain U.S. military advantages worldwide. In this context, does it make more sense to focus on offense (enhanced innovation) or defense (protecting that innovation from snoopers)?
Many of the proposals for enhanced innovation, whether in legislation or in think tank projects, have a few things in common. They involve developing human capital to pursue high-tech fields, making it easier for government to consistently access high technology, improving government funding for primary and applied research, and laying the infrastructural foundations for further research and development. On the defensive side, they envision better cybersecurity, tighter export controls on advanced technologies, and better monitoring of foreign investment in the technology sector.