Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Top Level › Solvency – China/Russia Counterweight

American leadership in AI is necessary to reclaim the global AI leadership position from China.

Christie Lawrence & Sean Cordey, 2020, (Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence,” , Retrieved 6/12/2022)

United States: The United States views American leadership in AI as necessary to safeguard American values and maintain defense and economic superiority. Recognizing the need to develop a national AI approach and reclaim the AI R&D global leadership position from China, which had already surpassed the US in several research output metrics by 2016,10 the Obama Administration developed an AI R&D prioritization in October 2016.11 Building on this urgency, the Trump Administration has prioritized AI and established the American AI Initiative in February 2019.12 This Initiative identified the need for a whole-of-government approach to prioritize AI R&D and deployment throughout the entire federal government. The Initiative also identifies the need to grow the US AI workforce, set national and global norms and standards, and work with industry and allies to promote an AI environment favorable to the United States.13

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Top Level › Solvency – Plan Allows Building Up of AI

International alliance partnerships allow the overcoming of AI challenges.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 2/12/2019 (“SUMMARY OF THE 2018 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from .)

Evolving international alliances and partnerships. An extended network of mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships provides a durable means of overcoming global AI challenges, deterring aggression, and supporting stability through cooperation. Foreign allies and partners offer critical perspectives and talent that can be leveraged through personnel exchanges, combined portfolio planning, and the deepened interoperability and trust that comes from collaborative AI development and deployment.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Top Level › Solvency – Plan Allows Building Up of AI

Interoperability of AI with allied partners is key to developing the full potential of AI.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 2/12/2019 (“SUMMARY OF THE 2018 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from .)

Become a pioneer in scaling AI across a global enterprise. We recognize the tremendous utility of AI to a wide range of capabilities. To realize this potential fully, we must pioneer AI approaches across the full scale of our global defense enterprise in a manner that is Joint and interoperable with interagency, allied, and coalition partners. Specifically, DoD will identify and implement new organizational approaches, establish key AI building blocks and standards, develop and attract AI talent, and introduce new operational models that will enable DoD to take advantage of AI systematically at enterprise scale.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Top Level › Solvency – NATO Key to AI Development

The NATO framework allows NATO to maintain its technological edge.

Rob Murray, 9/1/2020 (head of the Innovation Unit in NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division, “Building a resilient innovation pipeline for the Alliance,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from )

The first step towards fixing the fragmentation of Allied disruptive innovation is for Allies, through the NATO framework, to focus on agreed innovation priorities. This will allow them to pick winners and invest public patient capital – the private sector is unlikely to invest venture capital as the risk is simply too high (nations tend not to go out of business and can take on such uncertainty). This direction and investment will help to maintain NATO’s overarching technological edge. Indeed, as Keynes and Weber argued, the ability to make things happen that otherwise would not needs a combination of technological, policy and bureaucratic skills matched by investment. Step 2: leverage the comparative advantage of the Alliance If Allies are to achieve most defence at less cost with least delay built with wisdom and efficiency, then it is logical to leverage those natural advantages that geography and skill sets afford NATO member states. A network of the finest universities across the Alliance should be established and resourced to allow cutting-edge multinational research to take place across multiple disruptive technologies simultaneously. Perhaps Stanford could lead on relevant AI research, while Delft and the University of Chicago partner on quantum; maybe Imperial College London looks at biotechnologies with Johns Hopkins University, while Tallinn University centres its efforts on next generation cyber defences; and the École Polytechnique and Massachusetts Institute of Technology examine future telecommunication needs. The point is Allies will need to leverage such networks of universities in conjunction with national government research labs to provide maximum innovation coherence. The diversity of multinational, multi-disciplined defence and security innovation research teams, which NATO can engender, is a huge asset and is the Alliance’s competitive advantage.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Top Level › Solvency – NATO Key to AI Development

NATO’s resources and leadership allow for safe and secure AI development.

Zoe Stanley-Lockman, 2022 (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” , Retrieved 6/11/2022)

NATO has an important role to play in military standardization and Allied policy planning for safe, secure, and interoperable AI. This includes the coordinating role of the Conference of National Armaments Directors and the Command, Control and Consultation Board to implement complementary acquisition processes that fuse AI adoption measures with safety responsibilities. Furthermore, entities including STO and NSO have a significant role setting the technical baseline and promulgating materiel standards that provide the technical framework for safety and security. Although their staffs are themselves small, they both convene hundreds, if not thousands, of subject matter experts in working groups. As such they both offer unique technical networks to help shape safety and security in a way that minimize risk in operations. NATO’s resources and leadership are vital to using standards and coalition policy to instill safe and secure technological development, a necessary condition to interoperable and successful future operations.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Top Level › Solvency – Interoperability

Interoperability is necessary to prevent disruptions from attacks.

Zoe Stanley-Lockman, 2022 (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” , Retrieved 6/11/2022)

The third pillar identifies safety and security of AI systems as prerequisite to trustworthy and responsible AI in any context, but especially so for the conduct of military activity. At the NATO level, Allied forces must ensure their systems interoperate safely and predictably both to ensure effective command and control (C2) internally, and to prevent disruptions from attacks. It is a foundational facet of coordination that shows the overlap between NATO interests in military effectiveness and incentivization for responsible innovation.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › Case – Top Level › UQ – NATO Role In AI Uncertain

NATO’s current role in emerging AI regimes is uncertain.

Zoe Stanley-Lockman, 2022 (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” , Retrieved 6/11/2022)

In this chapter, we explore a role for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the emerging military AI governance architecture. NATO (or the Alliance) is a military and political alliance among 30 contributing member states that are committed to collective security. Much of NATO’s original purpose and current core tasks arguably leave the Alliance’s role uncertain in international governance regimes contending with the impact of emerging technology on international politics.1 As global powers compete for the economic and military capabilities that AI can offer, the Alliance has the enormously challenging task of navigating varying political realities and capabilities of Allies, all while effectively recalibrating strategic relationships in the coming years. Recognizing technological change as a key variable, NATO has begun to adapt its organizational composition and strategic footing to increase the Alliance’s capacity to meet emerging security challenges for military capability development trends of both its own members and those of competitors or adversaries.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – Solvency

Cooperation and alignment among NATO is critical for the alliance to maintain a competitive edge in AI:

Zoe Stanley-Lockman, 2022 (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” , Retrieved 6/11/2022)

As NATO bodies and Allies prepare for the impact of AI on future military operations, the Alliance has its own responsibility to steward AI in ways that, inter alia, promote cohesion between democratic countries, prevent risks, shore up interoperability, project deterrence, and ensure stability.7 To achieve these aims, cooperation and alignment are critical for the Alliance to maintain a competitive edge and promote further innovation in alignment with shared values.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – Solvency

NATO cooperation on AI sets important precedents to significantly boost AI development.

Robert HP Engels, 2022 (Vice President and CTO in Global Business Line Insights & Data, “NATO’s outlook on a responsible military adoption of AI,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

Or as Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, stated: “It’s better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics. (..) If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents.”[2] Training, at all levels of command, is certainly a key factor to cooperatively synchronize the development of maturity in both AI algorithms and operators, thus gradually building increased capacity and professionalism. NATO stresses the importance of an ethical approach and points out that “Allies and NATO must strive to protect the use of AI from such interference, manipulation, or sabotage, in line with the Reliability Principle of Responsible Use, also leveraging AI-enabled Cyber Defence applications.”. Furthermore, they point out the need to develop adequate security certification requirements for AI due to the fact that AI can impact critical infrastructure, capabilities and civil preparedness creating potential vulnerabilities, such as cyberspace, that could be exploited by certain state and non-state actors. The principles mentioned in the NATO strategy allow for modernization and use of AI without stifling innovation, on the contrary even: they might significantly boost the development of areas in artificial intelligence that have not been in focus until now. The AI strategy can point the direction how AI play a decisive role in how NATO’s partners cooperate, analyze and provide vital decision-making information faster and more comprehendible relevant to a wide range of potential challenges and threat situations.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – Solvency

Allies will adopt NATO standards on AI beyond NATO structures and operations.

Zoe Stanley-Lockman, 2022 (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” , Retrieved 6/11/2022)

To enhance legal interoperability, NATO can exert its influence on how Allies can develop and deploy AI consistent with their legal obligations through its unique standardization capacities. Historically, NATO has taken significant steps to bridge the legal gap between Allies on critical procedures that bridge responsible state behavior with such “troop-to-task” considerations. One instructive example from past operations is detention policies in non-international armed conflicts.78 The promulgation of detention standards illustrates the operational significance of NATO’s common legal procedures, even for coalitions of the willing that formally operate outside NATO structures. By way of background, the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan had internal debates regarding the 96-hour security detention time period.79 The United States advocated extending the 96-hour rule, where coalition partners insisted adhering to the NATO standard, even though it was not a NATO operation.80 Generally the detention example illustrates NATO legal standards providing clarity to non-NATO operations; in some cases, Allies adopt NATO standards as accepted thresholds that continue to inform coalition policies beyond NATO structures and operations. Implementing AI in future military operations will almost certainly complicate legal interoperability as there is a lack of uniform standards, as in the detention example. Even some of the more basic implementation measures will garner legal uncertainty and Allies will inevitably navigate with minimal legal clarity and no standard procedures. Despite the roots of the legal debate stemming from the question of lethality, the most pressing (and urgent) legal issues will address the integration of necessary AI-enablers, such as data gathering and sharing. Furthermore, NATO has coordinated initiatives to promote awareness of Allies’ legal obligations and has a dedicated office focusing on legality. This centralizes the institutional capacity to focus on alignment not only between the policies of NATO Allies, but coherence with the international community more broadly. Among others, the NATO Legal Practitioners’ Workshop and inter-organizational dialogue between NATO, the UN, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the latter of which has a delegation to NATO that provides legal training and education to practitioners.81 The NATO Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) itself can also play a central role in navigating the challenges to legal interoperability. As the example of detention standards illustrates, NATO has been successful in implementing legal standards which translated into operational clarity and coalition policy outside NATO operations.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – Solvency

Common ground among NATO on AI is key to ensuring tech leadership on a global scale.

Sebastian Sprenger, 4/27/2021 (Europe editor for Defense News, “NATO tees up negotiations on artificial intelligence in weapons,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

COLOGNE, Germany — NATO officials are kicking around a new set of questions for member states on artificial intelligence in defense applications, as the alliance seeks common ground ahead of a strategy document planned for this summer. The move comes amid a grand effort to sharpen NATO’s edge in what officials call emerging and disruptive technologies, or EDT. Autonomous and artificial intelligence-enabled weaponry is a key element in that push, aimed at ensuring tech leadership on a global scale.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – Solvency

NATO standards on AI are critical to prevent Chinese AI dominance.

Karlijn Jans, 7/10/2018 (holds Masters degrees from Maastricht University and King’s College London, “NATO Needs to Get Smarter About AI,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

The potential large-scale impact of AI has only been acknowledged on the fringes of security debates and by technology experts. The assessment and impact of AI systems, however, cannot be left to the “nerds.” NATO must begin to understand the impact of AI and have discussions about its potential use by and against the Alliance. US Secretary of Defense James Mattis said in his January 19 announcement of the US National Defense Strategy: “success does not go to the country that develops a new technology first, but rather, to the one that better integrates it and more swiftly adapts its way of fighting.” AI debates often devolve into arguments over “killer robots.” AI, however, will have a profound impact on NATO’s organization, operations, and cooperation. Its successful adoption will help the Alliance maintain its competitive edge and deterrence capability. For example, AI will profoundly change military organizational planning and coordination. The implementation of AI in the battlefield would mean advancing into a “hyper war” where current decision-making processes will be disrupted by the enormous speed of development and the ability of machine learning by AI applications. It is, therefore, key for the Alliance to implement AI applications into their militaries’ planning, operations, and coordination. AI also has huge potential for NATO’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities. NATO is already leveraging AI to sift through and exploit the massive amounts of data generated by new and advanced weapon systems. New fifth-generation fighter planes are not only traditional weapon systems, but also important data collectors. AI could also assist in tracking down missile sites. These examples and the few initiatives started by NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) are pursued mainly on the Alliance’s operational and tactical levels. There have still been no direct deliberations about the implications of AI amongst NATO’s top political and strategic leaders. NATO is also at risk of AI being used against it by potential adversaries. As Tomáš Valášek of Carnegie Europe argued, “AI can be effectively deployed to undermine trust among countries fighting on the same side by discrediting their intelligence.” NATO missions and operations, which involve a high number of different countries and military organizations, are already heavily dependent on data and information exchange. Adversarial AI applications could influence, and even alter, information and communication amongst NATO allies while an operation is ongoing, creating confusion and distrust. NATO’s lack of action on AI is in stark contrast to the rise of China as a global AI leader. China released its 2020 AI ambitions and aims to be world leader by 2030. It is already developing complex sensor networks in the private sector with disrupting potential for the military domain. There is a real risk that China will be setting universal legal and technical standards for the use of AI if the Alliance, or nations by themselves, do not set out a clear AI strategy and have a real discussion on AI implementation and exploitation. For example, China requires Apple to adhere to different privacy settings for Chinese iPhone users. Data must be stored on Chinese servers, meaning Chinese intelligence services will have access to this information. Beijing has few privacy and ethical concerns about using AI, for example, facial recognition and surveillance by AI applications, which allows it to implement these technologies in the security sector much faster. Russia also recognizes the disruptive potential of AI, not just on the battlefield, but also in global power relations. Russian President Vladimir Putin said: “artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia but for all humankind…Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” Russia is still lagging behind China and the United States in AI, but it has great ambitions. The Kremlin’s Military Industrial Committee has set a target of making 30 percent of military equipment robotic—and hence (partially) run by AI—by 2025. There are ongoing efforts by some member states to utilize AI and the United States has been ramping up its activities. The Pentagon’s Maven project aims to utilize the latest technology from Silicon Valley for military purposes (despite heavy criticism from the private sector over implementation of AI for lethal purposes) and the United States recently announced it will establish an official AI hub for its military, the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center. In Europe, individual European Union (EU) member states have been working on their individual AI strategies, with one of the most notable being the French. As for the European Union, only this year twenty-five of its members signed a Declaration of Cooperation on AI, declaring their intentions to join forces and engage in a European approach to deal with AI. But is it all too little, too late? “AI is on the verge of becoming a critical part of our societies” says former German State Secretary of Defense Katrin Suder. At the same time, AI and its implications have never been on the agenda at a NATO Summit. As the late French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau once said: “War is too important a matter to be left to the military.” The same rings true for AI: AI is too important to be relegated to discussions on NATO’s operational and tactical levels. NATO’s political and strategic leaders need to lay out a vision for AI’s role in the Alliance, before it is too late.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – Solvency

Facilitating NATO cooperation regarding standards to interoperate AI technology into future operations allows safe development and responsible use of AI technology.

Zoe Stanley-Lockman, 2022 (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” , Retrieved 6/11/2022)

To maintain its relevance in a security architecture increasingly concerned with the way that technology shifts power dynamics and scales threats to international security, NATO has an incentive to foster cooperation, promote standards of practice, and incentivize Allied AI harmonization. It is strategically salient to facilitate a dialogue and engagement among Allies on AI, but it is practically important to use NATO’s position to facilitate Allied cooperation regarding standards to project the Alliance’s ability to interoperate in future operations. NATO standards aim to enhance interoperability among partners and successful implementation of strategy. More specifically, standards and certification are used to establish and implement requirements aligned with safe development and responsible use of technology. In addition to purely technical standards, NATO has operational standards that specify “conceptual, organizational or methodological requirements to enable materiel, installations, organizations or forces to fulfil their functions or missions.”51 In line with the definitions from STS and military innovation scholarship, standards can thus be seen as a mechanism to translate responsibility-derived state and organizational AI policy into actionable functions. In fact, NATO has set certain standards for the Allies and these standards subsequently become the norm. Within NATO, it is the NATO Standardization Office (NSO) that coordinates thousands of experts to align technological development with military requirements that can help enhance effectiveness, interoperability, and cohesion.52 While the NSO is primarily responsible for setting standards, other NATO entities—including in the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO)—play important roles in implementing them and coordinating between national approaches.53 Certification frameworks and the promulgation of best practices can similarly help incentivize the transposition of RRI into military organizations, even if standardization is by no means a purely military governance tool. Both mechanisms, strategic policy planning and standards and certification, provide options for NATO to participate in AI governance regimes focusing on international security. NATO’s operationalization of these tools may hold important implications while implementing successful AI governmental regimes for Allies and other defense stakeholders. In the next section, we consider each mechanism within foundational issues, or pillars, to illustrate NATO’s role in AI governance.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – Conflict Resolution

Cyberattacks against infrastructure risk escalation to a nuclear conflict:

Michael T. Klare, 11/2019 (professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation,” , Retrieved 9/4/2021)

Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes against vital national infrastructure rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key economic systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and transportation networks. As noted, Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.12 The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.13 The danger here is that economic attacks of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing widespread chaos and harm and eventually leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets, risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”14

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – Conflict Resolution

Integration of AI into defense bolsters cybersecurity of critical infrastructure.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 2/12/2019 (“SUMMARY OF THE 2018 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY,” Retrieved 6/12/2022 from .)

Protect our country and safeguard our citizens. AI will be used to protect the safety and security of U.S. citizens and to enable a stronger defense of U.S. critical infrastructure. Specifically, AI can enhance our ability to predict, identify, and respond to cyber and physical threats from a range of sources, strengthening the defense of the homeland from attack and discouraging attempts to disrupt U.S. infrastructure such as financial networks, electric grids, election processes, and medical systems.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – Conflict Resolution

Integrating AI into nuclear weapons systems helps avoid the risks of nuclear escalation.

Jessica Cox, 2021 (Director of Nuclear Policy at NATO, “The Unavoidable Technology: How Artificial Intelligence Can Strengthen Nuclear Stability,” WASHINGTON QUARTERLY)

Traditionally, nuclear deterrence relies on a country having credible nuclear capabilities plus the political will or resolve to use them if necessary (and only if necessary), therefore persuading an adversary to not attack. Integrating AI into nuclear systems can enhance nuclear decision-making, improving percep¬tions of both capability and resolve. Early Warning and Detection: Avoiding Unnecessary Use and Escalation Most significantly, integrating AI into intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais¬sance (ISR) systems and using AI as part of the analytical tool kit for early warning and detection could improve target identification, prevent false positives or close calls, and increase understanding of adversary actions. AI can be used to increase a nation’s ability to understand the nature of its environment as well as speed of analysis and development of courses of action in a conflict, thus improv¬ing its overall capabilities in the nuclear space and reducing the risk of unin¬tended escalation in the midst of a crisis with a nuclear dimension. In a nuclear exchange, national leadership may have just minutes to assess a situation and determine whether to launch its own nuclear response. Nuclear weapons states such as the United States have sought to increase this decision-making time to reduce the potential for misunderstanding or miscal- culation in a crisis, given the immense consequences of using nuclear weapons.21 Incorporating AI into early warning and decision-making analysis may improve both the speed and quality of information processing as well as eliminate potential biases from military leadership, which will be crucial in a crisis to allow time for de-escalation and tension reduction between sides. AI can similarly enhance the ability to discriminate between real and false information, which is critical to preventing miscalculation or mistake in a crisis. A number of “close calls” have occurred throughout the years, in which nuclear weapons use was only avoided through human intervention based on uncertain information.22 In 1983, NATO undertook Command Post Exercise Able Archer to “practice command and staff procedures, with particular emphasis on the transition from conventional to non-conventional operations, including the use of nuclear weapons.”23 At the time, Soviet paranoia about a US nuclear first strike, with preparations under cover of a war game, was at an all-time high. When NATO began its Able Archer exercise, Soviet officials thought the exercise was real and put mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on a three-minute alert.24 The same year, the Soviet early warning com¬puter system signaled five incoming US Minuteman ICBMs. The watch officer on duty, Soviet Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, did not report the incident, concluding that it must be a false alarm. If he had reported that US nuclear missiles were inbound, the Soviets would have followed their nuclear doctrine and retaliated with no time to double-check or negotiate with the United States.25 Petrov ulti¬mately made the right call—as the Soviet early warning system had mistaken sun shining off clouds for incoming missiles. Even after the end of the Cold War, in 1995, a Norwegian civilian research rocket launch was detected by the radar crews from the Russian Missile Attack Warning System (MAWS) and mistaken for a US Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missile. Command and control procedures were enacted, including notification of President Boris Yeltsin and activation of the Russian “cheget” system—essentially its nuclear football. Russian authorities eventually determined that this was not a nuclear-armed ballistic missile launch after reviewing satellite and other intelligence information.26 While these and other incidents were ultimately resolved successfully through the intervention of military experts and political leaders,27 they illustrate the dangers of imperfect systems that rely on human analysts with potentially inac¬curate or inadequate information. As defense researcher Jaganath Sankaran argues, “future applications of AI to nuclear command and control should aspire to create an algorithm that could argue in the face of overwhelming fear of an impending attack that a nuclear launch isn’t happening.”28 Such an approach could both reduce the fog of war and reassure decision-makers that their course of action is correct in the face of uncertain information, either using nuclear weapons or refraining from it. Although most nuclear-armed nations now use multiple systems to reduce the chances of a false positive warning signal, advancements in AI could significantly improve confidence in and functionality of these systems when integrated with human decision-making. AI tools could play a significant role in helping to ident¬ify patterns of life and reduce potential operator biases in conducting analysis. For instance, in order to be able to quickly discriminate between a country’s launch of a sounding/research rocket as opposed to an ICBM, which have very similar radar signatures, big data analytical tools could be used to collate and process massive amounts of electronic data—including signals, imagery, and open source collec¬tion—over time to identify patterns of behavior unique to each type of launch. Then, if there is an ambiguous or unexpected launch, these systems would be able to quickly determine whether or not the current circumstances more closely resemble one type of launch over the other—actually preventing future close calls or misinterpretations of data, as occurred in Able Archer in 1983. A human analyst would likely still need to make a final determination, but through the use of AI and data analytics, they would have a more accurate, timely, and complete picture on which to base any decisions.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – Conflict Resolution

Revitalizing international arms control stops multiple scenarios for nuclear conflict.

Michael Krepon, 11/8/2021 (co-founder of the Stimson Center, “HOW TO AVOID NUCLEAR WAR,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

Arms control has become passé. Russian and U.S. leaders have cast aside treaties as inconvenient to their pursuit of freedom of action. Republican presidents produced great arms control achievements. At present, most Republican senators and aspirants for higher office denigrate arms control and treaty-making as a failed, unnecessary, and unwise pursuit. Arms control provided necessary guardrails in the past. Now, dangerous military practices are on the rise, especially in Ukraine and across the Taiwan Strait. U.S.-Chinese relations are trending toward crisis. Four nuclear-armed states in Asia — China, Pakistan, India, and North Korea — are increasing their nuclear arsenals. Every nuclear-armed competitor is relying increasingly on deterrence as the diplomacy of arms control is in the doldrums. If unaltered, these trend lines point toward tragedy. Many have forgotten what is crucial to remember: Deterrence is dangerous by design and has a track record of failure in lesser cases. There have already been two border wars between nuclear-armed rivals — the Soviet Union and China in 1969 and India and Pakistan in 1999. India and China as well as India and Pakistan clash along disputed borders. As rivals sharpen deterrence, they move toward the next crisis. Deterrence has always needed diplomacy and arms control to avoid nuclear tragedy. Deterrence resulted in five-digit-sized U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Diplomacy reduced superpower holdings by 85 percent. The dictates of deterrence led to almost 2,000 nuclear tests, including over 400 in the atmosphere. Diplomacy produced treaties limiting and then prohibiting nuclear testing. Deterrence generated dangerous military practices like maintaining nuclear weapon delivery vehicles on a high state of alert. Diplomacy produced guardrails, codes of conduct, and rules of the road. When the Soviet Union dissolved, deterrence didn’t provide safeguards against “loose nukes” and “dirty” bombs. The diplomacy of arms control did. Diplomacy also produced treaties curbing nuclear proliferation as well as prohibiting chemical and biological weapons. No hard problem is ever solved in perpetuity by either diplomacy or deterrence. Outliers and norm breakers still exist. Without norms, however, there are no norm breakers. The diplomacy of arms control has kept their number small. Deterrence didn’t establish protective norms. The diplomacy of arms control did. National leaders will again seek arms control in its varied forms for the same reasons as their predecessors. They will reach the conclusion that strengthening measures for deterrence increase nuclear dangers, and that diplomacy is required to reduce them. It might take a major crisis — or something worse — for U.S., Chinese, and Russian leaders to turn to diplomacy the way that John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev did after the Cuban missile crisis. The remarkable journey Ronald Reagan undertook with Mikhail Gorbachev began with Reagan’s realization after the annus horribilis of 1983 — a year of multiple shocks to U.S.-Soviet relations — that a paranoid Kremlin leadership believed that Armageddon was approaching. Eventually — and sooner is far better than later — nuclear-armed rivals will arrive at the same conclusions that Kennedy, Khrushchev, Reagan, Gorbachev, and other leaders before them: Nuclear war has to be avoided, and deterrence by itself is, at best, half the solution. Deterrence needs help that only diplomacy and arms control can provide. A new construction project for nuclear arms control will borrow from the past, but it will take different shape than during the Cold War because the geometry of nuclear competition is far more complicated. The measures of reassurance leaders choose to pursue alongside deterrence will be adapted to suit domestic political purposes and geopolitical realities. Whenever chastened or forward-looking leaders of nuclear-armed states turn to arms control, they will not have to start from scratch. Revival is possible because foundational elements for avoiding nuclear war remain in place. Deterrence is well funded and national vulnerability between nuclear-armed rivals remains inescapable. Key norms continue to constrain the options of deterrence strategists and national leaders. The norm of no battlefield use of nuclear weapons is now over seven decades old. The last tests of nuclear weapon designs of any military consequence by a pairing of nuclear-armed rivals occurred over two decades ago. Since every test of a nuclear weapon constitutes a declaration of military utility, the absence of testing matters greatly. These norms can be broken tomorrow or next year. But these two key norms have survived many days and many years. Because they are the hardest for any national leader to break, their extension is feasible. Leaders who wish to avoid nuclear war can build on these foundational elements. A third critical norm, that of nonproliferation, is codified in a treaty that was indefinitely extended in 1995. This norm requires reinforcement because additional pairings of nuclear-armed rivals would multiply chances of catastrophe. Iran poses a serious challenge to this norm. Reaffirmation can be pursued either through diplomacy or, if diplomacy is vitiated, through military strikes. The follow-on proliferation consequences of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons are so great that this stark choice is unavoidable. Those who denigrate arms control forget that, by the end of the Cold War, conditions for lasting nuclear peace were in hand — not because of strengthened deterrence, but because champions of deterrence adopted the practices of arms control. The United States and Russia were no longer enemies. Crucial norms were in place alongside the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which codified national vulnerability, thereby removing one incentive for increased nuclear force levels. Strategic forces were no longer threatening: Indeed, Boris Yeltsin agreed in the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty to the prohibition of land-based missiles carrying multiple warheads. Conditions for strategic, crisis, and arms race stability were therefore at hand. Deep cuts were envisioned. Dangerous military practices were absent. Major powers respected the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of others. This was the inheritance that Vladimir Putin, George W. Bush, and Donald Trump found unnecessary and inconvenient. Putin initiated the demise of arms control by disregarding provisions of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, prompting, as forewarned, Putin’s withdrawal from the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and its prohibition of land-based missiles carrying multiple warheads. As NATO expanded, Putin became more blatant in violating treaties, most notably the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. Bush announced plans to deploy missile defenses in new NATO countries and to include Georgia and Ukraine in the queue for future NATO membership. Then Putin’s army marched on Tbilisi, after which he carried out hybrid warfare in eastern Ukraine and annexed Crimea. Putin then shed crocodile tears when Trump withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and Open Skies treaties. Where do we go from here? During the Cold War, strategic arms control was built on treaties, and treaties were built on numbers. Treaties and numbers still matter greatly, but they are much harder to negotiate in a triangular, as opposed to a bilateral, context. Because of the complex geometry of nuclear competition and because of domestic politics in the United States, less formal constraints seem unavoidable. More states will have seats at the table, most importantly China. All this will take time. In the meantime, norms matter more than formalities. Norms are easier to extend than new strategic arms reduction treaties are to negotiate, and nuclear numbers are to reduce. A hard focus on extending and reaffirming crucial norms can, over time, establish conditions for far fewer numbers, with or without treaties. If Beijing and Moscow choose to engage in dangerous military practices, arms control, whether by means of norm strengthening or numbers, will not succeed. In this event, the United States will also increasingly engage in dangerous military practices. The dynamics of this competition will invite crises, or worse. Perhaps then, the competitors will become more inclined toward measures of reassurance alongside deterrence. In my book, Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace: The Rise, Demise, and Revival of Arms Control, I propose that we embrace an ambitious goal of extending the three norms of no use, no testing, and no new proliferation to the 100th anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Imagine, if you can, a world in which nuclear weapons have not been used on battlefields for 100 years, and a world in which nuclear weapons have not been tested by major and regional powers for almost five decades. Imagine, too, that North Korea remains the last nuclear-armed state. Now imagine the perceived utility of nuclear weapons in 2045. How many potential mushroom clouds would be required for deterrence? How high would the barriers be against use and testing? Aiming for a century of non-battlefield use, a half-century of not testing nuclear weapons, and another quarter-century of successful nonproliferation might seem too ambitious and even otherworldly. Perhaps, but in 1945 it seemed otherworldly to envision a world in which nuclear weapons would not be used in warfare for three-quarters of a century. When conversations began about limiting nuclear testing in the Eisenhower administration, it was similarly otherworldly to envision a world in which major and regional powers would not conduct tests for a quarter-century. Those who conceived of a global nonproliferation compact more than a half-century ago were rewarded with 62 signatories. Notably absent were China, France, West Germany, other U.S. allies, Brazil, Argentina, and leading non-aligned states. This treaty now has 189 adherents, one dropout, North Korea, and one severe test — Iran. The hardest part of establishing these three bedrock norms is behind us. Further extensions are possible, even in a period of heightened competition, because they are the most difficult norms for national leaders to break. The national leader who authorizes the first use a nuclear weapon since 1945 will live in infamy for the rest of recorded history. The companion norm of no testing signifies recognition of the dangers associated with use. Experiments continue, and those who complain about troubling experiments block on-site inspections by opposing ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Chinese officials have repeatedly said that they will not ratify the test ban treaty until the U.S. Senate consents to do so. India won’t ratify until China does, and Pakistan will wait for India to ratify. Republican senators most concerned by China’s nuclear build up can do something about it: They can consent to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty while demanding that all four instruments of ratification be deposited together. A cascade of ratifications could begin with a super-majority vote in the U.S. Senate. Meanwhile, test moratoria continue because the major power willing to resume testing would set off a very different cascade, as all four nuclear-armed rivalries would follow suit. The greatest nuclear dangers reside in the increase in dangerous military practices between the United States and China, Russia and the United States, India and China, and Pakistan and India. Air and naval operations in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea increase the likelihood of crises, as do military operations in eastern Ukraine. But we’ve been here before, not just with the Soviet Union, but also with China. Despite severe crises and because of diplomacy, the norm of no battlefield use has held, at least so far. Norm strengthening is a matter of daily occurrence. Success happens one day at a time and one crisis at a time. What, then, to do about treaties and numbers? President Joe Biden and Putin quickly agreed to extend verifiable limits in the 2010 Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty for another five years. Negotiating next steps will be challenging. U.S. and Russian negotiators are discussing many agenda items, with some preferences clearly beyond reach. The greatest threats to nuclear peace at present relate to ground, air, and naval forces operating in close proximity, as well as dangerous cyber and space practices. Consequently, Washington’s most challenging and urgent agenda items relate to codes of conduct rather than numerical arms control. This agenda belongs at the top of Washington’s conversations with Beijing as well as Moscow. Another U.S.-Russian treaty mandating further reductions becomes harder to envision as China ramps up its force structure. Trump was right in calling for Beijing’s inclusion and an end to its free riding, but he proposed a trilateral warhead counting exercise rather than effective controls and reductions. Whatever appeal this proposal has in conceptual or visionary terms — or some downsized variant of this idea, such as counting tactical nuclear weapons — it would constitute a very lengthy digression from reducing nuclear dangers. Norm strengthening is needed well before counting is completed and reductions can begin. Where can this most usefully be done? The 65-member Conference on Disarmament in Geneva is too unwieldy to succeed. Its last hurrahs in treaty making occurred during the Clinton administration. Ever since, its procedures have empowered blocking action. There is also scant reason to expect that the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council can become an effective forum to advance important arms control agenda items. The geometry of nuclear competition suggests creation of a new forum to focus on norm building and codes of conduct in which all four pairs of nuclear-armed rivals are represented along with Britain and France, countries with great expertise and practical experience to offer. I would exclude Israel and North Korea from this forum because their addition poses more problems than potential benefits. A seven-nation forum consisting of the United States, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Britain, and France would be hard to steer, but the nuclear dangers we now face are interconnected and unwieldy. When the nature of a problem seems intractably complex, the wisest course might just be to expand the scope of the problem. Even as the four pairs compete, they have the most to lose if key norms are broken and the most to gain if they are extended. Existing bilateral conversations on nuclear risk reduction would, of course, continue, but there are no effective channels of communication and substantive exchanges between India and China and between India and Pakistan, where border clashes are becoming more intense. A non-hierarchical, seven-nation approach to norm building might just succeed. All seven have significant concerns about the intentions and capabilities of states with the most dynamic nuclear modernization programs. Each state has its own reasons to engage, as well as to be wary. If other states are willing to sit at the table, it becomes harder for anyone to hold out. The ground rules for seven-nation talks seem most likely to avoid traps if the agreed focus of conversation is nuclear risk reduction and norm building. Sidebar conversations would be encouraged, as they could lay the groundwork for bilateral agreements. The tabling of bilateral issues would, however, be prohibited. The first order of business might be to affirm the canonical Reagan-Gorbachev pledge that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. Thematic discussions on dangerous military practices might suggest common concerns and remedies, whether bilateral or multilateral. Again, this sounds wildly optimistic. The intensification of rivalries could well foreclose useful discussions — even if all seven states agree to attend. There are many pitfalls, requiring deft multilateral diplomacy. The U.S. State Department would need reinforcements. And yet, for all the manifold difficulties involved, there is sufficient connective tissue to try. Potential benefits include new opportunities to engage China and to open clogged channels of conversation. Over time, if this forum proves its worth, topics could evolve from norm building to the consideration of guardrails, limits, and reductions for nuclear modernization programs. None of the states with the most dynamic modernization programs are willing to relax requirements unless others do. One approach worth considering is a multilateral build-down concept where all seven states would agree to reduce the size of their arsenals as they modernize them. A build-down approach has the advantage of becoming all encompassing, while avoiding a ratio-based, hierarchical, multilateral system that has been tried before for naval arms control and that has no practical chance of success. Lengthening and strengthening norms have to be the first order of business when dangerous military practices are on the rise. Numerically based arms control cannot take an extended holiday, however, especially since Russia is adding new means of delivery to its strategic forces and Beijing is acting with dispatch to significantly increase its deployments of land-based missiles. As if the agenda outlined here isn’t ambitious enough, a new negotiating forum to address trilateral nuclear arms control and reductions seems inescapable. The more China builds up, the harder it becomes to succeed at bilateral controls. There are, no doubt, mixed motives behind the speed of Beijing’s build up, which is reminiscent of the Kremlin’s actions in preparations for strategic arms limitation talks in the Johnson and Nixon administrations. Some deterrence strategists will view Beijing’s activities as early evidence of nuclear war-winning ambitions. Other explanations seem more likely, including the prosaic impulses of seeking to gain leverage in upcoming negotiations and to avoid disadvantage. Beijing surely recognizes that it cannot “just say no” to strategic arms limitations indefinitely. Because Beijing is in a hurry, the Biden administration is obliged to speed up preparations for trilateral negotiations on numerical limitations that serve U.S. national security interests as well as the interests of friends and allies. As with the U.S.-Soviet strategic arms limitation talks, trilateral discussions are likely to encounter stalls and unexpected delays. We have time to do our homework on important matters of scope and limitation. When the Johnson administration was first preparing for negotiations with the Kremlin, its plans included limitations on medium-range, intermediate-range, as well as ocean-spanning missiles. This approach is worth reconsidering, given Putin’s deployment of these missiles in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, U.S. rejoinders, and China’s heavy investments in missiles of less-than-intercontinental-range. Then there is the highly contentious matter of including interceptors for national missile defenses. Depending on what means of delivery are included and excluded, it might be possible to devise an effective arms control regime with equal aggregates of nuclear-capable delivery vehicles and missile defense interceptors. A firestorm of protests to equal aggregates with China as well as Russia can be expected, but depending on units of account, counting rules, and range limits, they might well serve the interests of the United States as well as U.S. friends and allies. Dozens of loopholes would need to be nailed shut, and Beijing would have to accept uncomfortable monitoring arrangements. Success will be very hard to achieve and will likely be followed by setbacks until leaders arrive on the scene who are willing to buck deterrence orthodoxy. When they do, the build-down concept of reducing while modernizing might also apply. If and when norm-strengthening negotiations evolve into numerical accords, the fluidity of trilateral relations and opposition on Capitol Hill will preclude treaty making. If trilateral accords can somehow be reached, they would likely take the form of executive agreements and be term limited. The arguments in favor of formality and agreements of indefinite duration are not persuasive when treaties, like executive agreements, can be discarded after U.S. national elections. The reaffirmation of norms need not await the resolution of discussions about numbers. To the contrary: The reaffirmation of norms is needed if trilateral talks are to succeed over time. Even if agreements are not reachable or as inclusive as we would like, preliminary discussions with Moscow and Beijing could still have utility. At a minimum, it could prod useful assessments of different limitation parameters and on how best to proceed. Those who didn’t recognize winning the nuclear peace will surely notice its loss. Strengthening deterrence provides no guarantee against catastrophic loss. To avoid nuclear war, diplomacy and arms control have to accompany deterrence. Sooner or later, national leaders will revive arms control because our lives depend on it. Reassurance and stabilization begin with lengthening and strengthening norms and can take many forms. Reinvention depends on diplomatic adeptness, creativity, and wisdom. It also depends on the state of relations between major powers. If their competition sharpens, and if national leaders are content to intensify that competition, then no proposals to reverse course will succeed. When leaders decide to pursue course corrections or when leaders change, opportunities will arise. When conditions permit, they’ll need plans on how best to proceed. We face daunting challenges because policymakers have run out of simple solutions. We have much ground to cover since the era of grand treaty making ended with the Cold War. It’s time to plan once again for a future in which nuclear weapons aren’t used in warfare. We’ve succeeded in the past, and we can succeed again by harnessing deterrence with arms control.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – Conflict Resolution

Advances in AI bolster international arms control.

Jessica Cox, 2021 (Director of Nuclear Policy at NATO, “The Unavoidable Technology: How Artificial Intelligence Can Strengthen Nuclear Stability,” WASHINGTON QUARTERLY)

These and other applications will contribute to national technical means (NTM) of verification. Non-interference in NTM for arms control verification protocols is a well-established tool of most major arms control treaties and is also used unilaterally by states to observe others’ activities and behaviors. With advances in AI, states may invest more heavily in NTM, which will have positive implications for future arms control agreements. First, it could give an advantage to countries with more sophisticated AI and NTM capabilities. The United States, for example, would have an advantage over Russia in this area, which might make Russia more interested in traditional verification activities in future arms control agreements.41 Second, states will have to go to greater lengths to hide any cheating activities. And finally, it might reduce the need for on-site inspections, which could make participation in arms control agree¬ments with “closed” societies like China, North Korea, and Russia more attrac¬tive than relying primarily on the current “boots on the ground” procedures. That said, even with enhanced AI monitoring, there remain important benefits of “boots on the ground” inspectors, which have proven to be particularly valu¬able both to observe compliance and build trust between parties to an arms control agreement. But monitoring particularly sensitive facilities with AI-enhanced NTM, like nuclear warhead storage sites, might be especially useful when nations have traditionally been reluctant to allow on-site inspections.42

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – Conflict Resolution

NATO coordination on AI is necessary to prevent accidents and allow de-escalation in conflict.

Zoe Stanley-Lockman, 2022 (Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” , Retrieved 6/11/2022)

Even without being attacked, governability of AI in a NATO context also means understanding how AI-enabled and autonomous systems developed by the 30 Allies—and other partners—will interact with one another. NATO has expressed interest in governability as a principle of AI “to disengage or deactivate in case of unintended behavior,”85 which echoes the U.S. Department of Defense definition of governable AI.86 Disengaging adversaries is important to maintain de-escalation measures in conflict. For NATO, interoperability between systems also relates to governable AI because allies must also consider how the interactions between the 30 Allies’ own AI-enabled and autonomous systems may result in unintended or emergent behavior.87 This means that NATO has a responsibility to coordinate activities—be they technical exchanges, standardization efforts, or training and exercises—to build confidence that the systems perform as humans intend.88 Without this coordination, the lack of interoperability of allied systems could lead to accidents, and separately, the potential loss of operational effectiveness also presents vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit.

2022 SDI Affirmative
*****AI Interoperability Affirmative***** › AI Interoperability 1AC › 1AC – AI Leadership

Common standards in NATO are essential to maintaining an AI edge over China—both the domestic counterplan and the EU counterplan will fail to solve the AFF.

MELISSA HEIKKILÄ, 3/29/2021 (Senior reporter for AI @techreview, “NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics,” , Retrieved 6/15/2022)

The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use. “We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO. The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight. David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus. "I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said. Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground. For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications. The pitch NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said. The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said. The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems. “If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said. “We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued.