2022
UTNIF
Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › NATO Advantage › Heg Bad – 1NC
Mearsheimer and Walt ‘16 (John J, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, and Stephen M, Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, July/August, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing)//cmr
Proponents of liberal hegemony also claim that the United States must remain committed all over the world to prevent nuclear proliferation. If it reduces its role in key regions or withdraws entirely, the argument runs, countries accustomed to U.S. protection will have no choice but to protect themselves by obtaining nuclear weapons. No grand strategy is likely to prove wholly successful at preventing proliferation, but offshore balancing would do a better job than liberal hegemony. After all, that strategy failed to stop India and Pakistan from ramping up their nuclear capabilities, North Korea from becoming the newest member of the nuclear club, and Iran from making major progress with its nuclear program. Countries usually seek the bomb because they fear being attacked, and U.S. efforts at regime change only heighten such concerns. By eschewing regime change and reducing the United States' military footprint, offshore balancing would give potential proliferators less reason to go nuclear. Moreover, military action cannot prevent a determined country from eventually obtaining nuclear weapons; it can only buy time. The recent deal with Iran serves as a reminder that coordinated multilateral pressure and tough economic sanctions are a better way to discourage proliferation than preventive war or regime change.
2022
UTNIF
Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › NATO Advantage › Heg Bad – 1NC
Marchetti ‘17 (Raffaele Marchetti, *senior assistant professor in International Relations at the Department of Political Science and the School of Government of LUISS, external expert for the European Commission, “End of the American hegemonic cycle,” Feb 14, https://www.opendemocracy.net/raffaele-marchetti/end-of-american-hegemonic-cycle)//cmr
Trump’s election marks the end of the long phase of American world hegemony. Despite the electoral slogan “Make America Great Again” and the great expectations this may have generated, his presidency will presumably be characterized by an overall retrenchment. Many different interpretations have been provided on the reasons of Trump’s success ranging from populist framing to FBI support. Contrary to the mainstream debate, I see a more fundamental reason underpinning his victory: the changed costs/benefits balance in the US role in the world. The theory of hegemonic stability holds that at some point the hegemon will start to decline due to the increased costs of the management of the system which outbalance the benefits the hegemon gains out of it. The costs of the management of the system have in fact been accumulating in the last 4 presidencies. During the Bush administrations, security costs due to the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have, among other damage, impacted negatively on the US government. Equally, during the Obama presidencies costs due to economic stimuli have increased the overall debt of the country. As predicted by hegemonic theory, we finally come to a point in which the costs became too heavy for the citizens, or rather their perception of this becomes more evident, so that they start to protest and demand a change. This was intercepted by Trump much more than by Clinton, with Trump stepping back to decrease the costs of international projection. So-called “imperial overstretch”, formed much earlier, led Trump’s electorate to seek less international costs (and possibly, but less likely, more domestic benefits). Hence, the promised withdrawal from a number of Free Trade Agreements, the discussion of the terms of NATO participation, cancellation of the environmental deals etc. From this perspective Trump’s election has to do with a much longer trend of international order rather than the specific time-lapse of the electoral campaign, a trend of dis-engagement that had already begun during the Obama administration and will now be more clearly visible with Trump. The system in which we have been living in the last 70 years was created in large part by the US leadership. The UN system, Bretton Woods Institutions, NATO, and WTO are all institutional arrangements that have been strongly promoted by the post WWII hegemon and that have been preserved in life thanks to continuous support by the USA. Now all of this is put into question by the resistance of the newly elected president to engage in and with these multilateral organizations. Trump will most likely have a more unpredictable, possibly turbulent behaviour vis a vis all of these institutions and this will lead to their transformation and perhaps for some, to their marginalization. Other significant elements in this jigsaw puzzle have to do with the phenomenon of globalization. It is because of global transformation in production chains, the relocation of multinational corporation abroad coupled with the possibility of (re-)importing goods, and the subsequent loss of jobs that a component of the middle class has been badly affected by unemployment. But it is also thanks to globalization that China is rising fast and challenging the US leadership in economic, but also increasingly in political and military terms. It is clear by now that the policy choice for globalization taken by the US leadership in the ‘80s (republican) and ‘90s (democratic) was beneficial only at the beginning, but later turned out to be detrimental to the power position of the USA in the world economy. It is widely recognised that India and especially China are the real winners in the game of globalization, hence closing the gap with the west. Russia is an additional element in this calculation. This new would-be multipolar system, deprived of the overall western master plan, is left to pure bargaining, pure transactionalism played with ad hoc games, which is very much in line with Trump’s overall attitude to socio-economic engagement. And yet, this might have a de-polarizing effect, a de-escalating consequence in terms of the current world tensions that have grown in the last few years. Here I am thinking especially of the west-Russia split. Without a hegemonic power pushing for a specific world order, a more balanced system might emerge. We might end up with a Trump presidency that has polarizing effects domestically and depolarizing effects internationally. The line of march is clear: either new competition based on multipolar rivalry which might possibly escalate into conflicts, or the opening of new channels for dialogue, might lead to a foundational phase in which innovative rules of the international games are written by western and non-western powers together. It will be up to Trump and the other leaders to steer the way and to take a decision on which way to go.
2022
UTNIF
Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › NATO Advantage › Conventional Deterrence Turn – 1NC
Michael J. Mazarr et al 22, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. "Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition" Research Report. //pipk
Security Cooperation Efforts in Europe Emphasize Reassuring U.S. Allies European partners have consistently received approximately 26 percent of all U.S. security aid, but there has been a shift since 2014 in the type of aid these partners have received. Specifically, more attention has been devoted to developing conventional capabilities to deter Russian aggression. Eastern European states that border Russia, particularly Ukraine, received $1.1 billion from 2014 to 2019.18 Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia also received some funding through the European Deterrence Initiative. However, of the billions of dollars designated for the initiative, only a small portion supports building partner capacity. The initiative was designed primarily to support U.S. force presence, infrastructure, and exercises; as a result, DoD does not formally categorize European Deterrence Initiative funding as security aid.19
Over our period of study, U.S. military sales have increased for both highly capable allies and newer North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners in Europe. Among the top weapon purchasers, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany are purchasing advanced aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and missiles through the FMS and DCS programs. Poland and Romania are acquiring Patriot air-defense systems, and Slovakia is purchasing F-16 aircraft through FMS.20
2022
UTNIF
Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › 1NC Frontlines › Solvency
Konaev and Chahal 2021 – research fellow and research analys with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology
Margarita Konaev Husanjot Chahal April 2021 “The Path of Least Resistance: Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment” CSET Issue Brief
This is not to say that adopting and developing, let alone collaborating on AI-enabled logistics will be an easy task for the U.S. military and allied defense organizations. The ML and deep learning algorithms behind commercial AI-enabled logistics are generally not optimized for military needs.39 And if the experience of the Department of Defense is any indication, there are multiple challenges with regards to the data needed to power AI applications—from lack of data to problems with traceability, access, and interoperability of data collected by different systems.40 Moreover, data security and privacy concerns as well as different legal frameworks for how personal data is collected, handled, processed, and stored remain a critical barrier to international collaboration. Lack of clarity surrounding how to implement the exemptions for research incorporated into the General Data Protection Regulation, for example, has stalled collaboration between the U.S. National Institutes of Health and some European counterparts.41
2022
UTNIF
Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › 1NC Frontlines › Solvency
Broadbent 2021 - senior adviser (non-resident) with the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Meredith Broadbent August 10, 2020 “Internet or Splinternet? The Consequences of European Tech Sovereignty” Center for Strategic and International Studies https://www.csis.org/analysis/internet-or-splinternet-consequences-european-tech-sovereignty
Sitting atop resounding commercial success in the domestic as well as the global marketplace, the CEOs of four U.S. digital behemoths appeared last week before the House of Representatives to respond to public and congressional concerns about market domination.¶ The size and success of these champions, under fire for lack of transparency and anticompetitive practices, have triggered similar, more exaggerated concerns in Europe, which are playing out in a frenzy of proposed rulemaking at both the Commission and member-state level. As Congress probes the market behavior of U.S. digital companies, it is important for U.S. legislators to consider parallel rising pressure for digital and industrial protectionism in Europe, particularly in Germany and France. This flurry of regulatory activity endangers transatlantic data transfers—the lifeblood of many innovative U.S. firms—and will hurt U.S. business success globally while simultaneously distracting both Europe and the United States from the broader threat posed by China’s authoritarian state capitalist system.¶ Many Europeans are deeply worried about the continent’s ability to compete long term in the global digital economy, given its challenges in developing competitors to the U.S. and Chinese tech giants. Yet European economies have tremendous strengths—highly educated workforces, depth in engineering, advanced technologies, and a leadership role in a host of industries that are rapidly digitizing, such as agriculture, infrastructure, transportation, logistics, manufacturing, and knowledge-intensive services, for example, financial, business, environmental, and engineering services. Constructing new European regulations for the digital era should be guided first by the do no harm warning.¶ The United States and Europe share an interest in piloting, investing in, and leveraging disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, and the Internet of Things in these key industries, and liberalizing market access for services in emerging markets. The United States and Europe can also work together to ensure firms and workers in more underserved and remote regions are able to apply technologies, access educational and training opportunities, and increase productivity. But improved transatlantic cooperation in supporting innovation, productivity, consumer welfare, and sustainable job creation in a flourishing transatlantic digital economy, under an open and free internet architecture, seems all the more remote in light of where European regulators say they are headed.¶ The Commission released a series of documents earlier this year outlining Europe’s regulatory future, including a White Paper on Artificial Intelligence, a Communication on European Strategy for Data, and a framing paper related to Shaping Europe’s Digital Future. These documents and many more speak to the European desire to achieve “digital autonomy” and “tech sovereignty” through an array of regulatory and tax changes aimed at nurturing indigenous tech firms, developing independent European data pools, and tamping down on large, innovative foreign firms offering attractive digital services to European consumers.¶ Artificial Intelligence¶ Following the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) model of being the first mover with comprehensive regulation, the Commission is taking aggressive aim at being the preeminent “global standards setter” in AI. The European Union’s heavy-handed preliminary proposal for AI regulation diverges sharply from the U.S. approach. In its white paper on AI, the Commission has proposed ex ante conformity assessments to control access to the EU market for AI applications originating outside of the EU. That would likely require a new framework with criteria, benchmarks, and standards that European authorities will use to determine if an AI product is “trustworthy, secure and in respect of European values and rules” before it is allowed entry into the European market. This approach could include a pre-market review by EU authorities of algorithms, training data, documentation on programming, and how the system was built, as well as accuracy tests and other requirements. ¶ Also under consideration are data quality and traceability requirements that would require non-EU firms to train AI applications on GDPR compliant data, an extraterritorial regulation that seemingly would burden U.S. firms with requirements to completely retrain many proprietary algorithms developed in the United States with new data sets as a condition of market access in the European Union.¶ Unlike its inaction in the area of federal privacy regulation, which has allowed Europe to set a de facto global standard, the United States has led an international, cooperative effort through the G7 to reach common standards in the challenging area of AI research and development. A coordinated interagency team in the United States focused on AI regulation and emerging issues makes transatlantic collaboration is this new regulatory space a possibility.¶ New Activist Competition Measures¶ In a February 4, 2020, letter to Commission Executive Vice-President Vestager calling for more activist competition policy, France, Germany, Poland, and Italy describe their two overarching goals: (1) moderating competition emanating from “state-backed and subsidized” foreign competitors (e.g., China); and (2) controlling “emergence of large players in the digital economy relying on the accumulation of data and unparalleled network effects resulting in . . . excessive market power.” (e.g., large U.S. and Chinese tech companies.) The four European governments advocate for policies to tackle the “digital platforms with paramount importance for competition,” saying that these firms should be subject to “specific scrutiny” in Europe and an enhanced regulatory framework.¶ In different EU jurisdictions, competition authorities are increasingly weaving the precautionary principle into regulation of technology markets with the idea that new ex ante rules should be imposed ahead of any actual anticompetitive behavioral violation. Legislation pending in the German Bundestag is in this vein. For its part, the French government has put forward a legislative proposal to regulate “systemic platforms.” Under the French plan, competition regulators would be authorized to surveil and block planned acquisitions of European tech startups of almost any size.
2022
UTNIF
Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › 1NC Frontlines › Solvency
Franke 2021 – policy fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations
Ulrike Esther Franke January 2021 “Artificial Divide: How Europe And America Could Clash Over Ai” European Council on Foreign Relations
Obstacles to cooperation
2022
UTNIF
Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › 1NC Frontlines › Democracy Advantage
Dr. Daina Chiba 21, Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Government and Public Administration at the University of Macau, Ph.D. in Political Science from Rice University, LL.M in Jurisprudence and International Relations from Hitotsubashi University, and Dr. Erik Gartzke, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, PhD in Political Science from the University of Iowa, “Make Two Democracies and Call Me in the Morning: Endogenous Regime Type and the Democratic Peace”, 2/19/2021, https://dainachiba.github.io/research/make2dem/Make2Dem.pdf
The democratic peace—the observation that democracies are less likely to fight each other than are other pairings of states—is one of the most widely acknowledged empirical regularities in international relations. Prominent scholars have even characterized the relationship as an empirical law (Levy 1988; Gleditsch 1992). The discovery of a special peace in liberal dyads stimulated enormous scholarly debate and led to, or reinforced, a number of policy initiatives by various governments and international organizations. Although a broad consensus has emerged among researchers regarding the empirical correlation between joint democracy and peace, disagreement remains as to its logical foundations. Numerous theories have been proposed to account for how democracy produces peace, if only dyadically (e.g., Russett 1993; Rummel 1996; Doyle 1997; Schultz 2001).
At the same time, peace appears likely to foster or maintain democracy (Thompson 1996; James, Solberg, andWolfson 1999). A vast swath of research in political science and economics proposes explanations for the origins of liberal government involving variables such as economic development (Lipset 1959; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Przeworski et al. 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Epstein et al. 2006) and inequality (Boix 2003), political interests (Downs 1957; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), power hierarchies (Moore 1966; Lake 2009), third party inducements (Pevehouse 2005) or impositions (Peceny 1995; Meernik 1996), geography (Gleditsch 2002b), and natural resource endowments (Ross 2001), to list just a few examples. Each of these putative causes of democracy is also associated with various explanations for international conflict. Indeed, some as yet poorly defined set of canonical factors may contribute both to democracy and to peace, making it look as if the two variables are directly related, even if possibly they are not.
2022
UTNIF
Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › 1NC Frontlines › Democracy Advantage
Robert A. Freitas 22 Jr., JD from the University of Santa Clara (Santa Clara, CA), School of Law, Research Fellow at the Institute for Molecular Manufacturing, Won the 2009 Feynman Prize in Nanotechnology for Theory, BS in Physics and Psychology from Harvey Mudd College, “Molecular Manufacturing: Too Dangerous to Allow?”, Nanotechnology Perceptions, Volume 2, Number 1, Republished at The Lifeboat Foundation, https://lifeboat.com/ex/molecular.manufacturing
Attempts to block or “relinquish” [3, 12] molecular manufacturing research will make the world a more, not less, dangerous place [13]. This paradoxical conclusion is founded on two premises. First, attempts to block the research will fail. Second, such attempts will preferentially block or slow the development of defensive measures by responsible groups. One of the clear conclusions reached by Freitas [4] was that effective countermeasures against self-replicating systems should be feasible, but will require significant effort to develop and deploy. (Nanotechnology critic Bill Joy, responding to this author, complained in late 2000 that any nanoshield defense to protect against global ecophagy “appears to be so outlandishly dangerous that I can’t imagine we would attempt to deploy it.” [12]) But blocking the development of defensive systems would simply insure that offensive systems, once deployed, would achieve their intended objective in the absence of effective countermeasures. James Hughes [13] concurs: “The only safe and feasible approach to the dangers of emerging technology is to build the social and scientific infrastructure to monitor, regulate and respond to their threats.”
We can reasonably conclude that blocking the development of defensive systems would be an extraordinarily bad idea. Actively encouraging rapid development of defensive systems by responsible groups while simultaneously slowing or hindering development and deployment by less responsible groups (“nations of concern”) would seem to be a more attractive strategy, and is supported by the Foresight Guidelines [10]. As even nanotechnology critic Bill Joy [14] finally admitted in late 2003: “These technologies won’t stop themselves, so we need to do whatever we can to give the good guys a head start.”
2022
UTNIF
Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › 1NC Frontlines › NATO Advantage
Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke 14, Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, AND Erik Gartzke is Professor and Director of cPASS at the Department of Political Science @ UCSD, Lindsay, Jon R., and Erik Gartzke. “Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited.” The Power to Hurt: Coercion in the Modern World, Oct. 2014.
The combination of cross domain deterrence and voluntary connection to the internet gives rise to a variant of the classic stability-instability paradox. In Glenn Snyder’s original articulation of the paradox, mutually assured destruction could deter nuclear war. However, MAD was not credible for, and might even encourage, limited conventional war.56 Or as Robert Jervis puts it, “To the extent that the military balance is stable at the level of all-out nuclear war, it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.”57 Cyber capacity is a poor substitute for nuclear weapons, myths of paralysis notwithstanding, yet there is a similar logic constraining the distributions of harms which are possible via information technology. To extend this logic to the cyber domain, there are a variety of deterrent mechanisms contain the most disruptive types of cyber attacks yet fail to contain, and even enable, a wide variety of online espionage, subversion, symbolic protest, and criminal predation. In cyberspace we observe a rather stable damage contest (i.e., no “paralysis” and limited “disruption”) but a very unstable intelligence-counterintelligence contest (lots of “espionage” and “fraud” vying with efforts at “control” and “mobilization”). Thus the actors that have the ability to carry out highly destructive cyber attacks (mainly state actors for now) lack the motivation to attack; by contrast, these same actors as well as many different actors have both the ability and motivation to inflict irritant aggression with little fear of suffering consequences By and large, cyber options fill out the lower end of the conflict spectrum where deterrence is not as credible or reliable. The very few cases of physically disruptive cyber attack we do observe—mainly powerful states conducting covert action or battlefield support operations against militarily weaker opponents—have notably involved stronger actors who not only have the capacity to plan and conduct a sophisticated attack but also have the ability to deter retaliation against their use of cyber attack. This cyber variant of the stability-instability paradox has a slightly different logic, however. In the nuclear realm, actors cannot disconnect from the threatened harm, and this is what makes the threatened destruction both mutual and assured. When there are many missiles with many warheads, the chance of intercepting them on the ground through a disarming counterforce strike or in the air through ballistic missile defense with any confidence becomes vanishingly small. Not so in cyberspace, where connection to the internet or acceptance of connections through it is voluntary. There is “no forced entry in cyberspace” in Libicki’s phrase, and so the hundredth cyber attack against a closed vulnerability is as ineffective as the first. Attackers thus rely on deception to exploit vulnerabilities and ensure that they stay open. However, offensive deception can fail in the “fog of cyberwar” and defenders can be deceptive as well, both of which are more likely against high-reward targets (where cross domain deterrence also more credible). The need to preserve internet connections to facilitate ongoing and future deception as well as the need to preserve stealth to avoid the consequences of getting caught imposes discipline on attackers. Actors cannot enjoy the substantial benefits of interconnection without accepting some risk of exploitation (hacking to spy) and attack (hacking to disrupt). Thus the successful “lockout” of the internet, with advantage accruing exclusively to one political group or another, is not realistic. Moreover, because these harms share similar techniques, the observed abundance 39 of the former represents a latent potential for the later. The latent escalatory potential of even minor irritants leads to rampant fears of unrestrained catastrophe, to be sure. Yet this latent potential is difficult to harness for targeted coercion because the threat is self-effacing. Declared cyber threats that highlight the vulnerability to be exploited are readily mitigated. Instead, the ineradicable threat of cyber catastrophe (ineradicable as long as the internet continues to be useful) creates a general if diffuse deterrent effect among all parties who value their connection to the internet. No one who wants to make money on the internet really wants to have a cyberwar, and this includes states as well as criminals. Which types of actors are most able to benefit through internet coercion and which are most vulnerable to coercion? Large powers like the U.S. are highly dependent on the internet but also highly skilled at inflicting harm, both through cyber and traditional military force. Poor powers across the digital divide may have little vulnerability at all, while medium powers may have vulnerability but lack a range of forces to deter attacks. This might imply a “curvature” to the utility of cyber coercion. Big-capable countries are vulnerable to cyber harm but can deter through other military instruments. Poor states are not vulnerable. It may be the prosperous small or digitally developing who are in trouble, since they cannot credibly deter and have high dependence on the internet. The information revolution is often thought to be a boon to non-state actors, and indeed it is, but mainly in the irritant class of cyber operations. Moreover, the increasing ubiquity and sophistication of information technologies can be expected to have something of a democratizing effect on intelligence and counterintelligence techniques whereby firms and citizens will have access to and be concerned about the types of things that were historically the purview of obscure state intelligence agencies. However, it would be a mistake to use the increasing ferment of low-intensity information contests to infer the shape of higher 40 intensity activity. On the contrary, the traditional logic of war will continue to dominate the expression of cyber aggression. Because threatened internet harms depend on voluntary connections in the first place, and as many actors have alternative means to inflict (cross domain) harm in retaliation, the coercive utility of cyberspace is actually somewhat limited. At the same time an ever increasing variety irritants and more temperamental adjuncts becomes available for global political interaction. The “net” result is that opponents have strong incentives to impose costs via the internet but also to keep those costs low enough to preserve interconnection and avoid retaliation. Therefore, contests in damage will remain relatively stable while contests in intelligence will be increasingly unstable. The human-built world is becoming more complex, to be sure, but it is not necessarily more dangerous. As long as it is desirable to connect to the internet tomorrow, there will be only limited harm via the internet today.
2022
UTNIF
Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › 1NC Frontlines › NATO Advantage
Jon Lindsay and Erik Gartzke 14, Jon R. Lindsay is an assistant research scientist at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and an assistant adjunct professor at the University of California, San Diego School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, AND Erik Gartzke is Professor and Director of cPASS at the Department of Political Science @ UCSD, Lindsay, Jon R., and Erik Gartzke. “Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-Instability Paradox Revisited.” The Power to Hurt: Coercion in the Modern World, Oct. 2014.
Perhaps the simplest form of cross domain response to cyber threats is to forgo the use of the cyber domain altogether. While it is hard if not impossible to limit exposure to nuclear weapons and even a determined conventional assault, the risk of cyber attack can be completely eliminated by disconnection from digital networks. The internet is an artificial environment and connection to it is voluntary. Individuals, organizations, and states retain the ability to unplug completely, limit their online transactions, or erect various barriers to connection. Obviously disconnection is not very feasible commercially, socially, and militarily today, but this is more of an indicator of how positive the benefits of interconnection are compared to the perceived risks. If the risks were perceived as extreme, then firms and states could go back to making a living as they did before 1991 (when WWW went public). This is a cross-domain threat because it entails exiting the cyber domain altogether to leverage more traditional economic and military transactions. The threat of disconnection follows from the more general logic of international organizations, where contracts must be self-enforcing.44 On the internet as in institutions, ties among egoistic actors under anarchy must be mutually beneficial. If the internet is a bad deal for actors, they can throw up boundaries or exit cyberspace altogether. If repeated exposure to adversarial exploitation causes states to lose more than they gain from being online, then they can undermine the attacker’s very means for accessing the victim. The threat of voluntary disconnection is especially relevant for repeated interactions, or repeated exploitation, rather than a one-shot “bolt from the blue” cyber attack (which is better countered with cross-domain retaliation). The threat of disconnection is implicit in the voluntary nature of connection to the internet, and the potential loss of the ability to make future attacks exercises a deterrent effect on attacks in the present. An aggressor who does not want to lose the cyber adjuncts for espionage and disruption it has invested so much in developing will show restraint in their employment. This does not mean that coercion cannot take place online, but it is bounded by excess value. One implication is that the countries that can be most coerced on the internet will be those that have the most to lose by leaving it.
2022
UTNIF
Negative
NEG – AI – Neg vs. AI Aff – Case Debate › 1NC Frontlines › NATO Advantage
Valeriano and Maness 15 – co-authors of Cyber War versus Cyber Realities, AND *Senior Lecturer in Social and Political Sciences at the University of Glasgow, AND **Visiting Fellow of Security and Resilience Studies at Northeastern University (Brandon and Ryan C., The Coming Cyberpeace: The Normative Argument Against Cyberwarfare, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-05-13/coming-cyberpeace)
The era of cyberconflict is upon us; at least, experts seem to accept that cyberattacks are the new normal. In fact, however, evidence suggests that cyberconflict is not as prevalent as many believe. Likewise, the severity of individual cyber events is not increasing, even if the frequency of overall attacks has risen. And an emerging norm against the use of severe state-based cybertactics contradicts fear-mongering news reports about a coming cyberapocalypse. The few isolated incidents of successful state-based cyberattacks do not a trend make. Rather, what we are seeing is cyberespionage and probes, not cyberwarfare. Meanwhile, the international consensus has stabilized around a number of limited acceptable uses of cybertechnology—one that prohibits any dangerous use of force. Despite fears of a boom in cyberwarfare, there have been no major or dangerous hacks between countries. The closest any states have come to such events occurred when Russia attacked Georgian news outlets and websites in 2008; when Russian forces shut down banking, government, and news websites in Estonia in 2007; when Iran attacked the Saudi Arabian oil firm Saudi Aramco with the Shamoon virus in 2012; and when the United States attempted to sabotage Iran’s nuclear power systems from 2007 to 2011 through the Stuxnet worm. The attack on Sony from North Korea is just the latest overhyped cyberattack to date, as the corporate giant has recovered its lost revenues from the attack and its networks are arguably more resilient as a result. Even these are more probes into vulnerabilities than full attacks. Russia’s aggressions show that Moscow is willing to use cyberwarfare for disruption and propaganda, but not to inflict injuries or lasting infrastructural damage. The Shamoon incident allowed Iran to punish Saudi Arabia for its alliance with the United States as Tehran faced increased sanctions; the attack destroyed files on Saudi Aramco’s computer network but failed to do any lasting damage. The Stuxnet incident also failed to create any lasting damage, as Tehran put more centrifuges online to compensate for virus-based losses and strengthened holes in their system. Further, these supposedly successful cases of cyberattacks are balanced by many more examples of unsuccessful ones. If the future of cyberconflict looks like today, the international community must reassess the severity of the threat. Cyberattacks have demonstrated themselves to be more smoke than fire. This is not to suggest that incidents are on the decline, however. Distributed denial-of-service attacks and infiltrations increase by the minute—every major organization is probed constantly, but only for weaknesses or new infiltration methods for potential use in the future. Probes and pokes do not destabilize states or change trends within international politics. Even common cyber actions have little effect on levels of cooperation and conflict between states.
2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff answers › War Turns DA
Magsamen 19 (Kelly Magsamen, vice president for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress and Michael Fuchs, senior fellow, “The Case for a New U.S. Relationship with Afghanistan,” Center for American Progress,
• Opportunity cost #5: Two decades of military conflict have eroded U.S. military readiness. While the U.S. military has global responsibilities, it has finite resources, and nothing drains U.S. military readiness like an active war, as made clear by the 2017 report of a Task Force on Defense Personnel co-chaired by former U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and former National Security Adviser James Jones.39 For the Pentagon, prosecuting the war in Afghanistan is a top-level priority that requires significant time from its top officials as well as tremendous resources—from regular rotations of thousands of personnel to equipment to budget expenditures. With pressing needs to bolster U.S. force posture in Asia and Europe to deter threats from Russia and China and adapt the military to emerging threats such as cybersecurity, the U.S. military will have a difficult time dedicating the necessary attention and resources to these threats while fighting an indefinite war with roughly 14,000 troops in Afghanistan.
2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff answers › War Turns DA
Magsamen 19 (Kelly Magsamen, vice president for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress and Michael Fuchs, senior fellow, “The Case for a New U.S. Relationship with Afghanistan,” Center for American Progress,
Opportunity cost #4: Managing a war saps U.S. focus and diplomatic energy. While the United States is a global power, it does not have endless capacity. Inevitably, the attention of high-level policymakers is focused on the highest-priority concerns— and as long as the war in Afghanistan continues, it will rightly garner significant attention and resources from all sectors of the U.S. government. When it comes foreign policy priorities, urgency outweighs importance, so regular decisions about the war require the highest-level attention at the White House, the State Department, and the DOD. For the senior-most national security officials, time is precious, and dedicating enough time to issues such as climate change or China can be crowded out by the need for regular, high-level engagement on life-or-death decisions in Afghanistan.
2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff answers › China Not Revisionist
McKinney and Butts 19 (Jared Morgan McKinney, PhD candidate at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University (Singapore). Nicholas Butts, Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum Young Leader, “Bringing Balance to the Strategic Discourse on China’s Rise”, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, pg. 75-76, 2019, )
In the abstract, such claims are alarming—in context, and in balance, rather humdrum. In fact, the evidence of any Chinese intention to destroy, or even merely undermine and exploit, the current order is slight. China is certainly using its growing military power to defend its claims in the SCS and even—on occasion— to coerce its neighbors. It uses protectionist economic policies to boost the prospects of Chinese companies and reduce competition. It employs economic statecraft to serve its interests abroad. And it certainly is opposed to America’s policy of global democracy promotion. However, none of these positions fundamentally challenge the existing order, none of them radically depart from America’s own actions when it was a rising power in the nineteenth century, and none of them obviously surpass America’s own contemporary record of order subversion.
When the United States was a rising power, it took half of Mexico and considered taking the rest, it colonized the Philippines and Hawaii, and it unilaterally seized the maritime choke points of the Caribbean (Puerto Rico and Cuba).21 The United States used tariffs—which by 1857 averaged 20 percent22 and by the end of the nineteenth century were “the highest import duties in the industrial world”23—to protect its industries. It stole intellectual property,24 and it ideologically challenged the governments of the “Old World.” Today, despite no longer being a rising power, the United States has launched two disastrous invasions, tortured prisoners, and dispatches drone strikes at a whim with little international legal authority.25 The point is not that two wrongs make a right; it is that international order is much more resilient than critics seem to realize,26 and it is utopian to expect any rising Great Power to act in a way that uniformly satisfies one’s moral scruples, evolving, in Friedberg’s words, “into a mellow, satisfied, ‘responsible’ status quo power.”27
2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff answers › No China War
Nielsen 19 (Nicolai Fogth Gjøde Nielsen, holds a master’s degree in International Relations - European Studies and a bachelor’s degree in Language and International Studies, both of which were obtained from Aalborg University in Denmark. “How China Avoids War in the South China Sea.” The National Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 15 Jan. 2019, nationalinterest.org/feature/how-china-avoids-war-south-china-sea-41677, WC)
China has been able to avoid an all-out conflict in the region by taking only small bursts of actions that are unlikely to cause any detrimental fallout from neighboring countries. This strategy of below-the-threshold expansion allows China to acquire strategic territories, since Chinese actions are calibrated to avoid full-on war, despite very negative responses from its neighbors. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, as an exception, has expressed his support for China’s territorial claims, stating that Russia does not recognize the fact that the Court of Arbitration ruled against the Chinese claim of the Spratly Islands, nor that China has violated the sovereign rights of the Philippines by intervention.
Despite the ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, the outcome ultimately is in China’s favor, as a bilateral agreement between China and the Philippines enables China to retain the artificially built islands. This is just one example of a case that highlights China’s growing confidence and influence in the region. This is arguably a long-term gain for Beijing since China has built artificial islands in the disputed areas and restricted access for Filipino fishermen and oil exploration vessels even inside the Philippines’ own exclusive economic zone.
2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff answers › No China War
Lei 20 (Cui Lei, PhD and MA in International Politics, associate research fellow with the China Institute of International Studies, 7-24-2020, "Despite heated talk, risk of a US-China hot war is small", South China Morning Post, )
Many observers are pessimistic about deteriorating US-China relations and believe the two countries are heading towards a cold war. Even worse, some argue that the situation might be more dangerous than the US-Soviet Union Cold War, and that a hot war might break out between the two. This argument is unconvincing. First of all, deterrents to a flare-up are much stronger in US-China relations than in US-Soviet relations. Although economic and people-to-people ties between China and the US are declining, they are still close compared to US-Soviet ties. It is hard to decouple two closely intertwined economies and societies. Take two examples. China is expected to become the world's largest consumer market, a temptation hard to resist for exporters, including those from the US. And in education, more than 300,000 Chinese students study in the US, bringing in huge revenues for the US education industry. Many universities go to great lengths to woo international students. Recently Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology even sued the government over its new visa restrictions, now aborted, on international students. Second, even if there is decoupling, the pain would not be too great and can be kept out of the national security sphere if properly handled. In fact, for national security reasons, a modest degree of isolation will make both sides more secure and comfortable. For instance, if China’s information technology equipment cannot capture Western markets, the US will be more relaxed. If China cannot get advanced technologies from the US and its technological progress slows down, the US will be less anxious. In the same vein, China feels assured knowing that if the Trump administration does impose a travel ban on Communist Party members, it would be abandoning one of the tools available to the US to promote “peaceful evolution” in China. Economic decoupling is undeniably more painful for China than for the US. But unlike Japan during WWII, which was hit hard by the US oil embargo because of its lack of natural resources, China has no such problems. Given its large domestic market, losing the US as a major customer is not a disaster for China, and can be compensated through more dynamic economic activities at home. China can also make up for being freezed out of technological exchanges by turning to indigenous innovation. As for the US, it can import goods from other developing countries, albeit less cheaply. The relative loss is acceptable when weighed against the heightened perception of economic independence and security. Third, the ideological confrontation between China and the US is less intense than that during the Cold War. Unlike the obsession with ideology in those days, the line between capitalism and socialism is blurred today. The market economy has become universally recognised as the best way to promote economic growth and, politically, many countries have embraced democracy. Even North Korea calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Although ideological hawks in the US still long for the day when the beacon of freedom will light up the world, after many years of fighting bloody wars overseas, most American people are not interested in promoting democracy abroad. Meanwhile, China just wants to preserve its political system and has no interest in exporting it to other countries, as the Soviet Union did. Thus, ideological antagonism in China-US relations can easily be eased by calculations of realistic interests, which create conditions for compromise and cooperation. Fourth, both China and the US have many options other than war to achieve their policy goals. While they have no allies to serve as a buffer, given the nature of the potential conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan Strait, both countries are adept at operating in grey zones and fighting psychological, public opinion or diplomatic warfare below the threshold of war. The forced closure of the Chinese consulate in Houston by the US government is just the latest act of brinkmanship. In addition, given China’s huge economic and financial interests in the US, the latter can wield the stick of sanctions when use of force is highly risky or not worth it. When both sides have many tools and options, why would they rush to war to achieve their goals? Last but not least, the imbalance of power will act as a deterrent. Some say the US and Soviet Union did not fight a hot war because they were evenly matched. It was not the case, actually. At the beginning of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was at a relative military disadvantage. Moreover, a country needs the will to fight before going to war, even if it is stronger militarily than its adversary. Having fought years of meaningless wars, the US is weary of war. China, too, abhors war. Having a clear understanding of US strength, especially when its own economy is slowing down and it is facing various domestic challenges, China would not wish to recklessly start a war with the US. In summary, the possibility of a hot war between China and the US is very small. The greatest danger for China is not a cold or hot confrontation with the US, but policymakers’ interpretation of the momentary hostility towards Beijing of a portion of the American population and the larger world. An erroneous interpretation could end China’s march to further opening up, and see it turn instead towards self-isolation.
2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff answers › China Not a Threat
Sawant 21 (Mangesh Sawant, a master’s in international affairs from Columbia University, where he concentrated in international security policy, “Why China Cannot Challenge the US Military Primacy,” Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 2021,
The US military dominates the strategic, tactical, and operational levels of warfare across the spectrum. The Pentagon is implementing sophisticated network warfare programs such as the Advanced Battle Management System, Project Convergence, and Joint All Domain Command and Control. China is concerned about the lethal and distributed US military, equipped with a potent combination of quantity and quality of weapon systems. The USN surpasses the PLAN in rapid deployment, maneuverability, and expeditionary warfare capabilities. The overwhelming display of US military power since 1945 is a credible deterrent for Beijing. Since the First Gulf War, the United States has demonstrated its capability of destroying the adversary through preemptive strikes consisting of long-range weapon systems such as cruise missiles in the first few days of the war, giving no time for the adversary to retaliate.75 According to Taylor Fravel, China is not a military superpower.76 There is not much evidence about China’s plans for global military capabilities on par with the United States. China’s military power is miniscule as compared to United States’ former adversary the Soviet Union. China’s military will be thinly stretched defending the third-largest country in the world. The top echelons of the CCP and PLA acknowledge US military advantages. Chinese scholars like Xu Ruike and Sun Degang admit that China is an economic heavyweight but is a military featherweight and will remain so for the coming decades.77 US primacy in the post–Cold War world has prevented World War III. The two most likely contenders for expansion, North Korea and China, have restricted their militaries within their borders. The United States retains unrivaled military power, and China is not in a position to challenge it.
2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff answers › US-Europe Relations Solve China War
Khatiri 21 (Shay Khatiri, studied Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, “Why Has America Forsaken Europe?,” The Bulwark,
The United States needs Europe to be peaceful because it needs NATO and the EU to be productive. The size of Europe’s economy makes it an important counterbalance to China’s growth. British, French, and Spanish ties with Africa are important in pushing back against China’s growing influence in the continent. European universities still produce stellar research which is crucial in the technological competition with China. Each of Europe’s strengths in a competition with China also makes it an important region in its own right. With three-quarters of a billion people, it is an important trade partner and plays a key role in the American economy. It is home to many U.S. military bases used for important missions, most recently during the evacuation from Afghanistan. Its scientific and technological achievements contribute to American prosperity—the Pfizer-BioNTech vaccine that the president of the United States and millions of others recieved would not have been made without German partnership. America can’t afford to take Europe for granted anymore. They need us and we need them. The hard part of alliance management is supposed to be responding to the needs, wants, and objectives, and insecurities of the other side. But lately, the United States has had more trouble figuring out what its own needs, wants, and objectives in Europe are—or if it has any at all.
2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff answers › US-Europe Relations Solve China War
Sukin 21 (Lauren Sukin, MacArthur Nuclear Security Postdoctoral Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, “How Biden can improve European relations while pivoting to Asia,” The Bulletin,
France’s fretting should serve as a warning to the Biden administration. The US focus on East Asia continues to rock relations between Washington and its European allies. In transitioning its strategic priorities towards the Pacific, the United States cannot succeed alone. Incorporating allies and partners—including those in Europe—in the planning, negotiating, and implementation stages of its efforts to manage threats from China will be critical. The effort should also pay dividends. By restoring and reinvigorating damaged European alliances, the United States will be better positioned to manage threats in East Asia and elsewhere.
2022
UTNIF
Disadvantage
Aff answers › Asia Pivot Bad
Gerecht and Takeyh 22 (Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former Middle Eastern targets officer in the Central Intelligence Agency, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, “The Folly of the ‘Pivot to Asia’: China is a rising challenge, but neglecting Europe and the Middle East won’t help America confront it.,” Wall Street Journal,
Seldom has a diplomatic phrase been more reckless than the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia.” The U.S. has never been able to disentangle itself from key regions of the world, as the war in Ukraine demonstrates. But the notion that a new “Pacific century” should become the nation’s defining priority surely has emboldened adversaries elsewhere and called into question other alliances, including the most indispensable, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The question that ought to haunt the White House today is whether its ignominious retreat from Afghanistan in the name of ending so-called forever wars, and its stream of press releases insisting that China is the only rival worthy of attention, prompted an impetuous Vladimir Putin to undertake the largest land invasion in Europe since World War II. In January 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson gave a speech placing Korea outside America’s defense perimeter, thus inviting aggression from North Korea. Often overlooked in that speech is Mr. Acheson’s insistence that “it is a mistake . . . to become obsessed with military invasions” when thinking strategically about Asia and the Pacific. Acheson seemed to assume that the dilemmas of newly independent Asian states came from internal subversion stemming from economic stagnation. To be fair, the Truman administration didn’t shrink from its responsibilities in Europe when war broke out in the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. has been a global power for a century and has always given some regions and countries priority over others. Early in the Cold War, Europe’s economic rehabilitation and its military defense preoccupied America’s politicians and strategists. In the 1960s, as the Cold War stabilized in Europe, the U.S. turned its gaze toward Asia, where a truculent China and an eastward-looking Soviet Union were both bent on exporting revolution. With 500,000 U.S. troops in Vietnam, the Far East became a priority. And in the aftermath of 9/11, the Middle East took on importance as Washington hunted down terrorists and sought, however haphazardly, to refashion a political culture that had generated so much hate. Before Barack Obama, no president had insisted that the exigencies of one region mandated ignoring others. The U.S. fought prolonged wars in East Asia, yet Washington didn’t claim that these conflicts meant that it had to pivot from Europe or Latin America. Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were beset by Vietnam; they didn’t complain about “forever wars” and the need to leave the Far East. When George W. Bush found himself mired in Iraq, he didn’t proclaim that Europe and Asia no longer mattered. Burden sharing has been an objective of all U.S. presidents. The strategic neglect of Asia-firsters is new. Joe Biden must be considered the least authentic of China hawks. Much more than Mr. Obama, he has brandished the China threat as cover for isolationism. Even the hasty departure from Afghanistan was in part justified as a means of focusing on China. Leaving Afghanistan would somehow, Secretary of State Antony Blinken told us, make the U.S. stronger vis-à-vis Xi Jinping. At home Democrats partly justified exorbitant domestic spending as a means of rebuilding an America better able to resist China. Yet Mr. Biden hasn’t taken any serious military measures, or reinitiated a free-trading alliance, to confront Beijing. This disconnect between words and deeds might have been starkest when, soon after his inauguration, Mr. Biden held a summit meeting with Mr. Putin—whom Democrats had denounced throughout Donald Trump’s presidency as a threat to democracy—where he pressed for a “stable and predictable” relationship with Moscow. Much of the cheap talk about pivoting stems from U.S. frustrations in the Middle East. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan caused the political class to question its assumptions about American power. Yet the Middle East remains. Energy markets are still global. Fracking hasn’t made Persian Gulf oil less important to America’s national security. The perverse interplay between Arab authoritarian states and Islamic radicalism (the former feeds the latter) continues. Iran’s nuclear ambitions, unimpeded by arms-control diplomacy, will soon confront the international community. As Mr. Putin has shown, a revisionist leader, armed with nuclear weapons and nursing grievances, can easily rattle, if not upend, financial markets and cherished assumptions. For the foreseeable future, the Far East will have a prominent place in America’s strategic imagination. China’s conversion from a communist laggard to a rich and militarily powerful fascist state has Western leaders in a bind, given that they literally bet the bank on the hope that investment and trade would somehow pacify Beijing’s ambitions. But China’s rise doesn’t mean that Europe matters little or that the Middle East can be ignored. The U.S. isn’t Sweden. When America retreats, everyone suffers.