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2022 UTNIF Evidence

2AC – Debating Nuclear Risk Good

Debating nuclear risk is good.

Bernstein ’18 [Aron; September 21st; Emeritus Professor of Physics at MIT; The Bulletin, “Reducing the risk of nuclear war begins in the classroom,” https://thebulletin.org/2018/09/reducing-the-risk-of-nuclear-war-begins-in-the-classroom/]

The need for education on nuclear weapons. When it comes to nuclear weapons, the students of today have less lived experience to draw on than older generations. Today’s typical college student was born after the end of the Cold War and has no memory of a time when most Americans were deeply afraid of nuclear war (excluding, to an extent, the fiery exchange of threats between President Trump and Kim Jong-un last year). Perhaps as a result, these students also have very limited knowledge about nuclear weapons. The majority do not have a strong understanding of what nuclear weapons are, their destructive power, or their role in the international order, and even fewer have a sense of how many nuclear weapons exist. They are not aware of the $1.2 trillion nuclear modernization program, in which the majority of costs come from modernizing and improving delivery systems rather than performing the technically necessary maintenance of the nuclear warheads. History education on the Cold War often addresses the US-Soviet arms race of that time, but nuclear weapons issues in other regions—such as the tense situation between India and Pakistan—are rarely ever mentioned. The distant, but persistent, possibility of an unintentional nuclear launch due to unauthorized access, technical failure, or a cyberattack on warning systems, is also overlooked, as is general information about which states possess nuclear weapons today.

2022 UTNIF Evidence

2AC – Fiat Good

Fiat is good -- foreign policy simulations teach students how allies and adversaries respond to U.S. policy -- fosters ideological reflexivity, accurate policy prediction, and argumentative agency.

Esberg and Sagan ’12 [Jane and Scott; 2012; Special assistant to the Director at New York University’s Center on International Cooperation; Professor of Political Science and Director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation; The Nonproliferation Review, “NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,” p. 95-96]

These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome ‘‘bureaucratic myopia,’’ moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict. The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis*held in 2009 and 2010 at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center and at Harvard University’s Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional experts*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments’ preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.

2022 UTNIF Evidence

2AC – Scenario Planning Good

Scenario planning is good – our scholarship is not white silencing---IR can change from its racist origins---if predictions are false, there can be more studies that prove it wrong---their paradigm is worse because there is no falsification mechanism.

Monika Sus & Marcel Hadeed 20. *Postdoctoral Fellow at the Hertie School of Governance and works in the Dahrendorf Forum, which is a joint initiative by the Hertie School, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Stiftung Mercator. **Dahrendorf Research Associate at the Hertie School of Governance. February 2020. “Theory-infused and policy-relevant: On the usefulness of scenario analysis for international relations”. Contemporary Security Policy.

Added-value of scenario analysis for IR scholarship

2022 UTNIF Evidence

2AC – Extinction Reps Good

Preventing existential risk and framing it as a “we” claim is good.

Coles and Susen 18—Research Professor at the Institute for Social Justice at Australian Catholic University AND Reader in Sociology at the School of Arts and Social Sciences of City, University of London (Romand and Simon, “The Pragmatic Vision of Visionary Pragmatism: The Challenge of Radical Democracy in a Neoliberal World Order,” Contemporary Political Theory May 2018, Volume 17, Issue 2, pp 250–262)

Visionary pragmatism is driven by a political ethos that accents radical receptivity and a sense that a greater degree of wildness in our efforts is indispensable for transformative democratic movements. While some of my earlier works accented the ethical character of receptive generosity in political life, Visionary Pragmatism argues that receptivity is indispensable for generating democratic power – precisely because receptivity involves vulnerability, relationship formation, capacities to modulate, and learning in unexpected ways amidst difficult differences. Drawing on my engagements with the movement for democratic action research in Northern Arizona, I argue that receptive practices engender remarkable capacities for fostering grassroots critique and alternatives, powerful political assemblages across differences, and transformative dynamics in the face of what otherwise appear to be intractable problems. Our best and most powerful possibilities for co-creating urgent democratic change almost always advance along pathways engendered partly through relationships of careful attentiveness to what we initially took to be oblique, unintelligible – or, perhaps, even odious.

2022 UTNIF Evidence

2AC – Extinction First

Extinction outweighs.

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
*** Extra Neg Cards *** › Solvency › 1NC – Espionage Turn

increased integration makes cyber espionage more likely

Konaev and Chahal 2021 – research fellow and research analys with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Margarita Konaev Husanjot Chahal April 2021 “The Path of Least Resistance: Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment” CSET Issue Brief

Finally, on the technical front, there are numerous challenges to ensuring that hardware and digital systems are interoperable and secure. Creating and maintaining common or interoperable information systems and databases is a massive undertaking considering that in each country, the data resides in repositories lacking standardized formatting or maintained by contractors that keep such information proprietary, especially for data on sensors and weapon systems. Shared information systems and databases are also particularly vulnerable to disruption, manipulation, and data theft in part because of discrepancies in countries’ network security protocols and capabilities.26 These problems are hard to resolve in their own right. But the aforementioned political factors, especially the push toward greater data sovereignty by some of the European allies, only exacerbate these technical challenges for collaborations on AI.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
*** Extra Neg Cards *** › Solvency › 1NC – No Solvency – Data

No solvency – lack of optimization makes AI military application ineffective

Konaev and Chahal 2021 – research fellow and research analys with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Margarita Konaev Husanjot Chahal April 2021 “The Path of Least Resistance: Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment” CSET Issue Brief

This is not to say that adopting and developing, let alone collaborating on AI-enabled logistics will be an easy task for the U.S. military and allied defense organizations. The ML and deep learning algorithms behind commercial AI-enabled logistics are generally not optimized for military needs.39 And if the experience of the Department of Defense is any indication, there are multiple challenges with regards to the data needed to power AI applications—from lack of data to problems with traceability, access, and interoperability of data collected by different systems.40 Moreover, data security and privacy concerns as well as different legal frameworks for how personal data is collected, handled, processed, and stored remain a critical barrier to international collaboration. Lack of clarity surrounding how to implement the exemptions for research incorporated into the General Data Protection Regulation, for example, has stalled collaboration between the U.S. National Institutes of Health and some European counterparts.41

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
*** Extra Neg Cards *** › Solvency › No Solvency – EU Say No – Chilling Effect

EU tech protectionism creates a chilling effect on the industry – prevents research and development by dissuading start-up participation

Broadbent 2021 - senior adviser (non-resident) with the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Meredith Broadbent August 10, 2020 “Internet or Splinternet? The Consequences of European Tech Sovereignty” Center for Strategic and International Studies https://www.csis.org/analysis/internet-or-splinternet-consequences-european-tech-sovereignty

Sitting atop resounding commercial success in the domestic as well as the global marketplace, the CEOs of four U.S. digital behemoths appeared last week before the House of Representatives to respond to public and congressional concerns about market domination.The size and success of these champions, under fire for lack of transparency and anticompetitive practices, have triggered similar, more exaggerated concerns in Europe, which are playing out in a frenzy of proposed rulemaking at both the Commission and member-state level. As Congress probes the market behavior of U.S. digital companies, it is important for U.S. legislators to consider parallel rising pressure for digital and industrial protectionism in Europe, particularly in Germany and France. This flurry of regulatory activity endangers transatlantic data transfers—the lifeblood of many innovative U.S. firms—and will hurt U.S. business success globally while simultaneously distracting both Europe and the United States from the broader threat posed by China’s authoritarian state capitalist system.Many Europeans are deeply worried about the continent’s ability to compete long term in the global digital economy, given its challenges in developing competitors to the U.S. and Chinese tech giants. Yet European economies have tremendous strengths—highly educated workforces, depth in engineering, advanced technologies, and a leadership role in a host of industries that are rapidly digitizing, such as agriculture, infrastructure, transportation, logistics, manufacturing, and knowledge-intensive services, for example, financial, business, environmental, and engineering services. Constructing new European regulations for the digital era should be guided first by the do no harm warning.The United States and Europe share an interest in piloting, investing in, and leveraging disruptive technologies like artificial intelligence (AI), blockchain, and the Internet of Things in these key industries, and liberalizing market access for services in emerging markets. The United States and Europe can also work together to ensure firms and workers in more underserved and remote regions are able to apply technologies, access educational and training opportunities, and increase productivity. But improved transatlantic cooperation in supporting innovation, productivity, consumer welfare, and sustainable job creation in a flourishing transatlantic digital economy, under an open and free internet architecture, seems all the more remote in light of where European regulators say they are headed. The Commission released a series of documents earlier this year outlining Europe’s regulatory future, including a White Paper on Artificial Intelligence, a Communication on European Strategy for Data, and a framing paper related to Shaping Europe’s Digital Future. These documents and many more speak to the European desire to achieve “digital autonomy” and “tech sovereignty” through an array of regulatory and tax changes aimed at nurturing indigenous tech firms, developing independent European data pools, and tamping down on large, innovative foreign firms offering attractive digital services to European consumers.Artificial IntelligenceFollowing the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) model of being the first mover with comprehensive regulation, the Commission is taking aggressive aim at being the preeminent “global standards setter” in AI. The European Union’s heavy-handed preliminary proposal for AI regulation diverges sharply from the U.S. approach. In its white paper on AI, the Commission has proposed ex ante conformity assessments to control access to the EU market for AI applications originating outside of the EU. That would likely require a new framework with criteria, benchmarks, and standards that European authorities will use to determine if an AI product is “trustworthy, secure and in respect of European values and rules” before it is allowed entry into the European market. This approach could include a pre-market review by EU authorities of algorithms, training data, documentation on programming, and how the system was built, as well as accuracy tests and other requirements. Also under consideration are data quality and traceability requirements that would require non-EU firms to train AI applications on GDPR compliant data, an extraterritorial regulation that seemingly would burden U.S. firms with requirements to completely retrain many proprietary algorithms developed in the United States with new data sets as a condition of market access in the European Union.Unlike its inaction in the area of federal privacy regulation, which has allowed Europe to set a de facto global standard, the United States has led an international, cooperative effort through the G7 to reach common standards in the challenging area of AI research and development. A coordinated interagency team in the United States focused on AI regulation and emerging issues makes transatlantic collaboration is this new regulatory space a possibility.New Activist Competition MeasuresIn a February 4, 2020, letter to Commission Executive Vice-President Vestager calling for more activist competition policy, France, Germany, Poland, and Italy describe their two overarching goals: (1) moderating competition emanating from “state-backed and subsidized” foreign competitors (e.g., China); and (2) controlling “emergence of large players in the digital economy relying on the accumulation of data and unparalleled network effects resulting in . . . excessive market power.” (e.g., large U.S. and Chinese tech companies.) The four European governments advocate for policies to tackle the “digital platforms with paramount importance for competition,” saying that these firms should be subject to “specific scrutiny” in Europe and an enhanced regulatory framework.In different EU jurisdictions, competition authorities are increasingly weaving the precautionary principle into regulation of technology markets with the idea that new ex ante rules should be imposed ahead of any actual anticompetitive behavioral violation. Legislation pending in the German Bundestag is in this vein. For its part, the French government has put forward a legislative proposal to regulate “systemic platforms.” Under the French plan, competition regulators would be authorized to surveil and block planned acquisitions of European tech startups of almost any size.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
*** Extra Neg Cards *** › Solvency › No Solvency – EU Says No – “Tech Sovereignty”

Tech sovereignty prevents cooperation

Konaev and Chahal 2021 – research fellow and research analys with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Margarita Konaev Husanjot Chahal April 2021 “The Path of Least Resistance: Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment” CSET Issue Brief

Another potential barrier to collaboration, particularly with European allies, is the growing momentum around the idea of European digital sovereignty and increasing concerns about continued dependence on U.S. technology companies.17 Part of the push for greater European technology independence stems from Europe being “caught in the crossfire” on a variety of technology issues, including 5G and internet regulation amid the intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China. European nations like France and Germany, among others, are becoming more assertive when it comes to control over their data.18 The experts behind France’s AI strategy, for instance, have advocated for a data policy that is “structured around the goals of sovereignty and strategic autonomy” as a prerequisite for the development of AI in France and in Europe, in an effort to “avoid becoming just ‘digital colonies’ of the Chinese and American giants.”19 Moreover, as Ulrike Franke explains, the EU has taken a stronger stance on protecting individuals’ digital rights through regulations such as the 2014 “right to be forgotten” and the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation.20 Differing views on China, a push toward additional regulations of U.S. technology companies, different approaches toward data privacy, and commercial competition can all hinder transatlantic cooperation on AI.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
*** Extra Neg Cards *** › Solvency › No Solvency – EU Says No – “Tech Sovereignty”

EU Says No – Wants to establish digital autonomy separate from the US

Franke 2021 – policy fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations

Ulrike Esther Franke January 2021 “Artificial Divide: How Europe And America Could Clash Over Ai” European Council on Foreign Relations

European policymakers have been less vocal about the geopolitical consequences of AI. So far, the debate in Europe has primarily revolved around AI’s economic and social effects. Of the 21 strategies on AI either published or drafted by EU member states, very few touch on the geopolitical implications of AI. The notable exception to this is France, whose national AI strategy was clearly drafted with a geopolitical mindset. It warns that France and Europe need to “avoid becoming just ‘digital colonies’ of the Chinese and American giants”. The strategy’s inclusion of “American giants” is telling and important. It shows that, from a European point of view, the US is the primary ‘other’ that Europe measures itself against on technology – at least for now. This is despite the fact that, in recent years, Chinese acquisitions of European high-tech firms have caused significant concern.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
*** Extra Neg Cards *** › Solvency › 1NC – No Solvency – EU Say No

EU says no – 4 reasons – distrust of the US, desires for digital autonomy, lack of threat perception, and Brexit all short-circuit transatlantic cooperation

Franke 2021 – policy fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations

Ulrike Esther Franke January 2021 “Artificial Divide: How Europe And America Could Clash Over Ai” European Council on Foreign Relations

Obstacles to cooperation

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › Ext – Solvency › 2AC – AT Unethical AI – EU Involvement Checks

Collaboration with the EU ensures ethical use and application

Franke 2021 – policy fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations

Ulrike Esther Franke January 2021 “Artificial Divide: How Europe And America Could Clash Over Ai” European Council on Foreign Relations

Finally, there may be cases in which an AI-enabled system may be ethically unobjectionable and trustworthy, and the context of its use generally acceptable, but the specific goals for which the system is used are problematic. For example, AI-enabled surveillance might not be problematic per se; and it should be possible to design the underlying technology in a way that does not discriminate. But the specific use of an AI-enabled surveillance system to systematically oppress and exclude members of a minority group would be unethical. Equally, it is ethically problematic to take advantage of AI- enabled capabilities to analyse human behaviour, moods, and beliefs with the aim of influencing people’s behaviour and thoughts – such as during an election, for example. This is true even though the technology itself may have beneficial uses in other settings. In such contexts, many experts have raised concerns over increasingly powerful “deep fake” technologies – AI-enabled ways to create what look like genuine videos of people. A growing number of AI developers are realising that their work could potentially be misused. In early 2019, California-based research lab OpenAI made the news when it announced it had developed a text-generating model able to write whole essays by itself – but that it would not share the dataset it used for training the algorithm or all of the code it runs on. This was unusual, as most AI research – even that by commercial actors – tends to be carried out openly. The organisation argued that it was worried about the misuse of the tool for disinformation. That said, OpenAI later released the full model, stating that it had seen “no strong evidence of misuse”. Throughout the Western world and beyond, concerns have been raised about these dangers. Various firms and organisations, such as Google, have published charters and principles for ethical AI. The ethics of AI has become an area of intense academic research, with new institutions founded to study the topic, and calls for AI ethics to be recognised as an academic field comparable to medical ethics. No actor, however, has so publicly put itself at the forefront of this issue as the EU has. The EU defined the ethical implications of AI as a primary area of interest and work comparatively early on. The European Commission created a “High-Level Expert Group on AI”, which in April 2019 released its Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence, followed by its Policy and Investment Recommendations for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence. Ethical AI is not just a concern for EU institutions: every national AI strategy published by member states touches on the topic, and several countries, such as Denmark and Lithuania, identify ethical rules as their first priority.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › Ext – Solvency › 2AC – AT Unethical AI – Plan Cooperative Framework

Cooperating on logistics is key to establish a framework for future implementation

Engels 2022 - Vice President and CTO in Global Business Line Insights & Data, Capgemini Scandinavia

Robert H Engels January 6, 2022 “NATO’s outlook on a responsible military adoption of AI” https://www.capgemini.com/no-no/2022/01/natos-outlook-on-a-responsible-military-adoption-of-ai/

Or as Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, stated: “It’s better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics. (..) If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents.”[2] Training, at all levels of command, is certainly a key factor to cooperatively synchronize the development of maturity in both AI algorithms and operators, thus gradually building increased capacity and professionalism. NATO stresses the importance of an ethical approach and points out that “Allies and NATO must strive to protect the use of AI from such interference, manipulation, or sabotage, in line with the Reliability Principle of Responsible Use, also leveraging AI-enabled Cyber Defence applications.”. Furthermore, they point out the need to develop adequate security certification requirements for AI due to the fact that AI can impact critical infrastructure, capabilities and civil preparedness creating potential vulnerabilities, such as cyberspace, that could be exploited by certain state and non-state actors. The principles mentioned in the NATO strategy allow for modernization and use of AI without stifling innovation, on the contrary even: they might significantly boost the development of areas in artificial intelligence that have not been in focus until now. The AI strategy can point the direction how AI play a decisive role in how NATO’s partners cooperate, analyze and provide vital decision-making information faster and more comprehendible relevant to a wide range of potential challenges and threat situations.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › Ext – Solvency › 2AC – AT Unethical AI – “Killer Robots”

applications of AI in logistics and sustainability is distinct from militarized autonomous weapons

Konaev and Chahal 2021 – research fellow and research analys with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Margarita Konaev Husanjot Chahal April 2021 “The Path of Least Resistance: Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment” CSET Issue Brief

While we discuss how the United States and its allies can work together on AI for military logistics and sustainment in both combat and noncombat settings, there is no doubt that the environment in question matters a great deal. From data to computational power to available talent, as well as considerations like privacy, safety, and security, implementing AI for military logistics and sustainment functions performed in controlled environments similar to commercial settings is a different endeavor from deploying AI- enabled logistics and sustainment functions in contested and hostile environments. We take these differences into account where relevant, and acknowledge that even under the best of circumstances, there are still significant challenges for both the adoption of AI applications and multinational collaboration in this area.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › Ext – Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – AT EU Say No

Even if the EU member states are skeptical, using NATO as a channel for coordination ensures cooperation

Franke 2021 – policy fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations

Ulrike Esther Franke January 2021 “Artificial Divide: How Europe And America Could Clash Over Ai” European Council on Foreign Relations

Europe and the US will need to choose the appropriate forum for AI cooperation based on its area of focus. Transatlantic cooperation on military AI might be best located within NATO. Members of the alliance have a long history of working together, and NATO already has dedicated units whose task is to ensure that all allies can cooperate and transform together. Given that military interoperability is vital to its functioning, NATO has no alternative but to address this issue, independent of other forums’ work. It would be advisable for NATO, and possibly the EU and its member states, to join the newly established, US-led AI partnership for defence. The current situation – in which the partnership includes only a few European countries and some of the United States’ other like-minded partners – is not constructive from a European viewpoint: Europeans should strive for Europe-wide harmonisation, not the creation of further differences. For cooperation on other areas of AI, such as sharing data or supporting research, other forums, including ad hoc alliances aimed at specific outcomes, may be the way forward. From a European standpoint, however, it would be advisable to try to include the EU as much as possible, so that European positions are not watered down or member states divided among themselves.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › Ext – Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – AT EU Say No

European allies would say yes – see collaboration on AI as an essential component of future development

Franke 2021 – policy fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations

Ulrike Esther Franke January 2021 “Artificial Divide: How Europe And America Could Clash Over Ai” European Council on Foreign Relations https://ecfr.eu/publication/artificial-divide-how-europe-and-america-could-clash-over-ai/

The next phase could be a period of international, and specifically transatlantic, cooperation on AI. After several years of European states working at full capacity to understand how to support domestic AI research, including by assembling expert teams to deliberate new laws and regulations, there is growing interest among policymakers and experts in looking beyond Europe. On the EU level, AI policy and governance have already received significant attention, with the European Commission playing an important role in incentivising member states to develop AI strategies, such as by starting to tackle issues around how to make sure AI is “ethical” and “trustworthy”. But recent months have seen a rise in the number of calls for international cooperation on AI driven by liberal democracies across the world. Western countries and their allies have set up new forums for cooperation on how to take AI forward, and are activating existing forums. More such organisations and platforms for cooperation are planned.Calls for cooperation between the United States and Europe have become particularly regular and resonant: following last year’s US presidential election, it was reported that the European Commission planned to propose a “Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council”, which would set joint standards on new technologies. And, in September 2020, the US set up a group of like-minded countries “to provide values-based global leadership in defense for policies and approaches in adopting AI”, which included seven European states, in addition to countries such as Australia, Canada, and South Korea. In June 2020, the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence was founded to consider the responsible development of AI; it counts among its members the US, four European states, and the European Union.This paper examines the reasons European states may want to work with the US on AI, and why the US may want to reach out to Europe on the issue. It also identifies the points of disagreement that may stop the allies from fully fleshing out transatlantic AI cooperation. The paper shows that, while both sides are interested in working together, their rationales for doing so differ. Furthermore, economic and political factors may stand in the way of cooperation, even though such cooperation could have a positive impact on the way AI develops. The paper also argues that transatlantic cooperation in the area of military AI could be a good first step – here, Europe and the US should build on existing collaboration within NATO. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the different forums that have been created or proposed for transatlantic and broader Western cooperation on AI.Experts initially thought of AI as a ‘dual-use technology’, meaning that it can be used in both civilian and military contexts. As AI has advanced, with new uses for it emerging all the time, it has now become more common to speak of AI as an “enabler” or a “general-purpose technology” – aselectricity is, for example. AI can improve or enable various capabilities in almost all realms imaginable, from medicine and healthcare to basic research; from logistics and transport to journalism . With this change in understanding has come a realisation on both sides of the Atlantic that AI is likely to have immeasurable consequences for economic development, and will have an impact on social and democratic life, labour markets, industrial development, and more. This also means thatpolicymakers and analysts are increasingly asking questions about how AI could affect the global balance of power.There are two main rationales for current efforts at transatlantic cooperation on AI. Firstly, among experts and policymakers, there are concerns that AI may be developed and used in ways that are contrary to liberal democratic values and ethics. Secondly, some policymakers fear that AI may give their geopolitical competitors a significant advantage. While the former is the primary reason why many European states want to work with other democratic countries, the latter has played an important role in motivating the US to seek cooperation with Europe and other allies. This was the case even under Donald Trump, who was not known for his appreciation of alliances in general, and Europeans in particular.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › Ext – Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – NATO Key

NATO is key – it has a framework in place for accelerating development and integration into real-time military applications

Parrikar 2022 - Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

By Manohar Parrikar May 30, 2022 “China and Russia are pursuing military usage of AI now” https://www.eurasiareview.com/30052022-natos-ai-push-and-military-implications-analysis/

In future, AI will act as an enabler to out-adapt competitors and adversaries. The current AI strategy of NATO needs to address the vulnerabilities in AI systems and related measures for effectively using autonomous weapon systems and military governance of AI. The NATO accelerator has been devised to address, prioritise, and promote interoperability in transatlantic cooperation to drive the strategic innovation process. The key drivers for Innovation in AI and other EDTs will be the establishment of the NATO-Civil-Military Technology capability that will include various actors from the military, civil, state and private sectors as a part of the EDT innovation ecosystem. Another critical factor is the broadening of the NATO–EU cooperation through a joint taskforce on defence innovation and EDTs to regularise and provide strategic capabilities on ethical and adoption challenges of EDTs like AI and ML. Furthermore, NATO needs to protect the use of AI from manipulation and disruption and align it with its stated principle of “Responsible use of AI”. NATO needs to work on AI adoption challenges centred on innovation and arms control. It can look towards bringing in guiding principles on use of AI-driven lethal autonomous weapon systems. It is expected that in the next 2–3 years, AI’s use will be confined to the field of military logistics, reconnaissance, mission planning and support, predictive maintenance of a military facility, data fusion and analysis, cyber defence and optimisation of processes. In the long run, NATO could employ AI for more complex military applications as it generates greater political support for offensive AI military projects.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › Ext – Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – NATO Key

Alliances key to AI versus Russia and China---the US can’t do it alone

Imbrie et al 2020 - Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Andrew Imbrie Ryan Fedasiuk Catherine Aiken Tarun Chhabra Husanjot Chahal "Agile Alliances: How the United States and its Allies Can Deliver a Democratic Way of AI" Center for Security and Emerging Technology https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/agile-alliances/

America’s broad network of allies and partners is a source of enduring strength. In an era of economic and technological competition with China and Russia, the United States benefits from allies that share its values and produce troves of strategic resources, including computer and data science experts; private sectors that are innovative, dominant and trend-setting; data on which to train AI algorithms; advanced microprocessors and data storage units; governmental research and development (R&D) investments; diplomatic support for initiatives in AI safety and governance; and the clout needed to export norms and best practices to the rest of the world.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › Ext – Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – US Key

US involvement is key – it's the only way to leverage the integration of tech companies and encourage the development of tech start-ups

Vergun 2022 – staff writer @ DoD News

David Vergun June 9 2022 “Digital Transformation, AI Important in Keeping Battlefield Edge, Leaders Say” https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3058028/digital-transformation-ai-important-in-keeping-battlefield-edge-leaders-say/

John B. Sherman, DOD's chief information officer, held a fireside chat June 8 with Craig Martell, DOD's chief digital and artificial intelligence officer, at the DOD Digital and AI Symposium.   Sherman congratulated Martell on his appointment to this new leadership position. He brings a valuable industry perspective to the team, Sherman said, noting that Martell has only been on the job for three days and is hitting the ground running.  The chief of digital and artificial intelligence, which uses the acronym CDAO, reached Full Operating Capability June 1 and is charged with leading and overseeing DOD's strategy development and policy formulation for data, analytics and AI; breaking down barriers to data and AI adoption within appropriate DOD institutional processes; and creating enabling digital infrastructure and services that support Components' development and deployment of data, analytics, AI and digital-enabled solutions. Sherman noted that the CDAO has his hands full of real-world operational requirements, including such diverse things as the war in Ukraine, business analytics, counter unmanned aerial systems and data governance.  Martell said he will focus not only on the fight today but also future fights five or 10 years later.  "We need to find the gaps, the right places where we can leverage value, and then that value is going to drive a virtuous cycle of change," Martell said. "A lot of folks think that DOD should be more like industry. Some of that is true. But [there are] a lot of things about the DOD that can't be more like industry. … We need to find out how to keep the DOD but also make it more efficient and work better." Sherman mentioned that his and Martell's work involves a lot of coordination and communications with the military services, the Defense Information Systems Agency and combatant commanders regarding everything they do, such as the Artificial Intelligence and Data Accelerator and digital services. They are the ultimate customers.  The team, Sherman continued, constantly thinks about what sort of AI and machine learning capabilities would help them get ahead of specific problem sets, which will vary from combatant command to combatant command.  For instance, U.S. Southern Command might be focused on transnational criminal organizations, while U.S. European Command might be focusing on threats from Russia and U.S. Indo-Pacific Command on threats from China, he said.  Sherman also mentioned cybersecurity as it relates to securing data and algorithms.  "We talk a lot about zero trust," he said. "That assumes an adversary is already on our network. How do we micro-segment our network so as to prevent that adversary from moving laterally? And, we're going to leverage AI to help us get even better as we employ zero trust."  Sherman also said that AI will be important in satellite communications as well as command and control.  Spotlight: Engineering in the DOD Martell said leveraging the relationship with industry is important. "It doesn't make any sense for us to build things that we shouldn't be building here if industry already has a solution."  Also, Martell mentioned that startups and innovative small industries should be sought out by DOD for their creative solutions.  Sherman said he agreed and added that DOD needs to work with small and medium industries to help them bolster their cybersecurity needs.   Both men said that acquiring and retaining talent in the workforce must be a priority and that the hiring practice needs to be tweaked so that people in industry can do a stint in DOD, go back to industry with more tools in their toolkit and maybe eventually return to DOD in a revolving door sort of scenario.  Also, they both mentioned upskilling in DOD, which means getting meaningful work in the department so that when these professionals return to industry, they will have new and marketable skills that are desirable and cutting edge.  Martell noted that he took a pay cut coming into his current position. While the government usually cannot pay as much as the private sector, he said the intangible benefit that attracts him and others, is DOD's mission and service to country. 

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – Democracy Advantage › 2AC---Democratic Peace Theory True

Democratic peace is true

Hegre et al 2019 - Professor Department of Peace and Conflict Research Uppsala University

Havard Hegre Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol 64, Issue 1, 2020. "Civil Society and the Democratic Peace" https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0022002719850620

We theorize that three distinct structures of democratic constraint explain why more democratic dyads do not engage in military conflict with each other. We build on earlier theories that focused on electoral and horizontal accountability. We add a new dimension—the social accountability provided by an active civil society. Using several new measures from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data set, we stringently test these explanations. We find social accountability to be the strongest and most consistent predictor of nonbelligerence in dyads, that horizontal accountability is still important, but that the independent role of electoral accountability has been somewhat overstated. However, we do find that social and electoral accountability work strongly together, to make for an even greater effect. The finding is robust to a range of specifications and in the face of controls for contending theories that challenge the democratic peace (e.g., the capitalist and territorial peace theories).