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2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – Democracy Advantage › 2AC---Democratic Peace Theory True

The most exhaustive quantitative study finds DPT to be true.

Imai '21 - Professor of Government and of Statistics at Harvard University [Kosuke and James Lo, "Robustness of Empirical Evidence for the Democratic Peace: A Nonparametric Sensitivity Analysis," International Organization, Vol 75, Issue 3]

How should we resolve this empirical debate regarding the democratic peace?Footnote9 Unfortunately, in the absence of randomized experiments, we can never completely rule out the possible existence of confounding biases that arise from omitted variables. While scholars in this literature have exclusively relied on parametric regression models, this approach requires strong assumptions, namely that the model accurately characterizes the true data-generating process (correct set of variables, right functional form, valid distributional assumption, etc.). Given that these assumptions may not be verifiable from observed data, it is no surprise that various scholars advocate different regression models with diverging sets of variables, resulting in contradictory findings. The difficulty of adjudicating between these alternative modeling approaches has led to the ongoing controversy in the empirical democratic peace literature.

We propose an alternative approach based on nonparametric sensitivity analysis to formally assess the robustness of the empirical evidence.Footnote10 Specifically, we quantify the strength of confounding relationships that could explain away the observed association between democracy and peace. That is, we compute the precise level of unobserved confounding needed to render the observed association between democracy and conflict spurious. The idea is that although not all correlations imply causation, a very strong correlation suggests it. Unlike the parametric regression modeling approach prevalent in the literature, the proposed nonparametric sensitivity approach directly addresses the existence of unobserved confounders without assuming a particular regression model.Footnote11 Although one can never know with certainty from observational data whether democracy causes peace, this nonparametric sensitivity analysis can formally assess the robustness of empirical evidence for the democratic peace.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – Democracy Advantage › Impact – Democracy

Democracy solves a laundry list of impacts---economic growth, public goods, alliances, and war---the US is key.

Lee 2018 - an assistant professor at the U.S. Air War College and a Security Fellow with Truman National Security Project

Carrie Lee September 10th; “Why Democracy Promotion is in the Strategic Interest of the United States”; https://medium.com/truman-doctrine-blog/why-democracy-promotion-is-in-the-strategic-interest-of-the-united-states-ae959c111b2f;

However, reducing the United States’ emphasis on a values-driven foreign policy is wrong, and contrary to the strategic interests of the United States. Democracy promotion in particular serves a key role in safeguarding U.S. interests and promoting global, long-term growth in ways fundamentally compatible with U.S. strategic interests. After all, democracies protect private property in important ways, invest in public goods, are more politically stable, make for more dependable allies, and empirically do not go to war with one another. Ultimately, a world full of democratic governments is safer, more prosperous, and more stable — all states of being that the United States has an interest in promoting.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – Democracy Advantage › 2AC---US Key to Global Democracy

US key to global democracy

Diamond 2021 - Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University

Larry Diamond "A World Without American Democracy?". Foreign Affairs. July 2. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/americas/2021-07-02/world-without-american-democracy

A prolonged global democratic recession has, in recent years, morphed into something even more troubling: the “third reverse wave” of democratic breakdowns that the political scientist Samuel Huntington warned could follow the remarkable burst of “third wave” democratic progress in the 1980s and the 1990s. Every year for the past 15 years, according to Freedom House, significantly more countries have seen declines in political rights and civil liberties than have seen gains. But since 2015, that already ominous trend has turned sharply worse: 2015–19 was the first five-year period since the beginning of the third wave in 1974 when more countries abandoned democracy—twelve—than transitioned to it—seven.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – Democracy Advantage › NATO Key to Democratic Development

The aff spills over to broader international democratic cooperation on AI

Franke 2021 – policy fellow at European Council on Foreign Relations

Ulrike Esther Franke January 2021 “Artificial Divide: How Europe And America Could Clash Over Ai” European Council on Foreign Relations https://ecfr.eu/publication/artificial-divide-how-europe-and-america-could-clash-over-ai/

A glance at the history of artificial intelligence (AI) shows that the field periodically goes through phases of development racing ahead and slowing down – often dubbed “AI springs” and “AI winters”. The world is currently several years into an AI spring, dominated by important advances in machinelearning technologies. In Europe, policymakers’ efforts to grapple with the rapid pace of technological development have gone through several phases over the last five to ten years. The first phase was marked by uncertainty among policymakers over what to make of the rapid and seemingly groundbreaking developments in AI. This phase lasted until around 2018 – though, in some European states, and on some issues, uncertainty remains. The second phase consisted of efforts to frame and AI challenges politically, and to address them, on a domestic level: between 2018 and 2020, no fewer than 21 EU member states published national AI strategies designed to delineate their views and aims, and, in some cases, to outline investment plans.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – Democracy Advantage › NATO Key to Democratic Development

Plan builds a coalition that spills over to broader international collaboration---solves democratic alternatives to Chinese AI---countries will follow the model

Imbrie et al 2020 - Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Andrew Imbrie Ryan Fedasiuk Catherine Aiken Tarun Chhabra Husanjot Chahal "Agile Alliances: How the United States and its Allies Can Deliver a Democratic Way of AI" Center for Security and Emerging Technology https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/agile-alliances/

The United States has a vested interest in setting the rules of the road for artificial intelligence. Western countries have already taken the lead in developing principles governing the application of artificial intelligence. China has produced its own set of principles and engages actively in international bodies, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), to establish standards for mobile network technologies and the future governance of AI.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – Democracy Advantage › NATO Key to Democratic Development

US EU cooperation on AI key to global US leadership and democratic AI

Voo and Zabierek 2020 - Global Cybersecurity and Tech Policy Manager in HP Inc's Strategy and Policy team and Executive Director of the Cyber Project at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center

Julia Voo and Lauren Zabierek August "The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence" https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf

The next decade will be a decisive time for the US to shape its future role in the world. Democracies are being tested and toyed with by malign powers, as seen in the form of Russian interference in the 2016 US Presidential elections and subsequent disinformation campaigns by other nations. Great power politics and the national security implications of emerging technologies, such as AI, are breaking up supply chains and further fragmenting the internet. We’re witnessing shocks to the liberal economic order and global governance as a result of several economic crises and the aftermath of the biggest public health crisis in a century. Societies across the world will be looking to develop and implement new technology to deal with crises and recover from economic losses faster. The rise of revisionist powers and the transformative potential of emerging technologies means that the US and its European allies need to prioritize investing in capabilities and its relationships to ensure that emerging technologies align with liberal, democratic values. While the US currently maintains a slight edge in research and development of AI capabilities, that advantage is eroding as a result of a shortage of AI talent, lack of engagement between the federal government, academia, and the private sector, and overall gaps in federal government funding. US innovation has its roots in an open and multicultural society. American leadership in innovation is the result of decades of attracting, training, and recruiting the brightest minds in the world. While recognizing that there are some national security risks, efforts to cut off the flow of students will be detrimental to long-term US innovative capabilities. The European Union while maintaining its role as a leader in AI ethical guidelines, also faces challenges stemming from a lack of talent as well as insufficient funding and uncoordinated AI expertise and application across the Member States. Moreover, the EU suffers from other institutional challenges that are most glaringly demonstrated by the UK’s vote to leave the EU in 2016—which unbeknownst at the time dealt a major blow to the EU’s AI ecosystem. The US and EU need to enhance cooperation in the development and application of AI in healthcare, environmental science, and defense. When the US and EU work together on global challenges such as healthcare and environment science, the rest of the world benefits. And there are other key geopolitical challenges that the US and EU face that can only be balanced together. We are delighted to share with you this analysis of the AI landscape between the US and EU, written and researched by our students working with the Cyber Project and China Cyber Policy Initiative, Christie Lawrence and Sean Cordey. We feel this report provides a strong evidence base for further collaboration, and puts forth thoughtful recommendations. The importance of the transatlantic relationship cannot be understated. The world needs strong leadership in these uncertain times and the US and EU bring unique strengths to the table that collaboratively can strengthen the other’s advantage in the face of unprecedented technological and geopolitical challenges. The US and the EU need to work together.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – Democracy Advantage › NATO Key to Democratic Development

US cooperation with allies on AI key to democracy

Imbrie et al 2020 - Senior Fellow at Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Andrew Imbrie Ryan Fedasiuk Catherine Aiken Tarun Chhabra Husanjot Chahal "Agile Alliances: How the United States and its Allies Can Deliver a Democratic Way of AI" Center for Security and Emerging Technology https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/agile-alliances/

The United States has long benefited from its network of allies and partners that contribute forces, specialized capabilities, and legitimacy to U.S. leadership in the world. In recent years, however, this network has come under strain. Disputes over burden sharing and mutual recriminations have raised questions about the cohesion and durability of existing alliance structures. Recent U.S. policy shifts and withdrawal from certain international agreements have deepened fears that the United States no longer sees its allies and partners as central to U.S. strategic objectives and national security.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – Democracy Advantage › NATO Key to Democratic Development

NATO is key to establishing ethical foundations for AI

Merwe 2021 - Fellow at the Defense Tech Initiativ

Joanna van der Merwe February 17, 2021 “NATO Leadership on Ethical AI is Key to Future Interoperability” https://cepa.org/nato-leadership-on-ethical-ai-is-key-to-future-interoperability/

Establishing NATO ethical AI principles is the first step toward both technical and political alignment.In October 2020, Deputy Secretary General of NATO Mircea Geoană highlighted the benefits of establishing a “transatlantic community cooperating on Artificial Intelligence (AI).” The Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit followed with a commitment to its responsible use. The US Department of Defense (DoD) adopted Ethical Principles for AI in 2020 and has committed to bringing together NATO member and partners to operationalize these principles. Despite these statements and developments, more work is required to tackle the very real challenge that ethical AI will pose to future interoperability within NATO. Without a NATO-led initiative focused on aligning these ethical principles across the Alliance, the interoperability risk of nations fielding AI-based systems that hinder joint operations is high. As the foremost security framework for Europe and North America, as well as the leading defense alliance for promoting and protecting democratic values, NATO is able to facilitate alignment on this issue. As part of a broader strategy on emerging and disruptive technologies, NATO must prioritize ethical AI if it wishes to promote the shared values upon which it was founded, play a key role in facilitating innovation across the Atlantic, and ultimately retain the ability of its members to undertake joint operations.Establishing NATO ethical AI principles is the first step toward both technical and political alignment, in turn enhancing and fostering interoperability, which is the foundation for NATO to respond to emerging threats as an Alliance, in a flexible and timely manner.A key challenge for NATO is raising awareness that the answers to ethical questions can no longer be left to later stages of the development and procurement cycle. Decisions made at the political and legal level will have a significant impact on the engineering practices used to develop AI, as well as the technical characteristics of the AI-based systems. The answers to questions such as respecting human dignity, human control, and accountability will be the foundation upon which many technical elements are programed. Systems developers need to make a number of calls throughout the development cycle informed by the answers to key questions, including:how to label datawhat data to use, andwhat is an acceptable outcome?These answers will also impact how AI systems are evaluated and ultimately deployed.If individual nations or groups are left to develop their own ethical principles without wider alignment to NATO, the result will be a number of AI-based systems with varying technical specifications based on the legal and policy decisions made by individual governments when answering the key questions. As has been demonstrated in areas such as facial recognition and policing algorithms, the assumptions made by those developing the tools and answering the key questions have a significant impact on the real-world functioning of the tool and societal acceptance of its ethics. The risk of tools failing to gain acceptance depends on the legal and ethical decisions made by governments. For the military, this may mean one state using an AI-based system that is seen as unacceptable by another, and in a joint operation one state fielding a system that cannot be used by another. Or worse yet, this could render a joint operation impossible. Without the ability to interoperate across NATO, the inability to effectively and efficiently respond to future threats would undermine the Alliance.The role of the private sector is another aspect of ethical AI development that has proved a challenge to governments and the transatlantic relationship. Within states, governments have struggled to adequately regulate Big Tech firms, which has led to these companies encroaching on government responsibilities to protect and uphold the public interest. This encroachment permeates all aspects of government, including defense and security. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks discussed during her confirmation hearings, the lack of competition is also a challenge to innovation in the private defense industry. This, along with a lack of regulation, feeds into the power imbalance between the sectors. Consequently, private sector companies building the AI and AI systems that are or will be deployed on the battlefield are deciding the ethics policies for themselves. The transatlantic partnership must focus on coordinating these core principles and systematic governance to ensure AI systems development aligns with the rule of law and democracy. In particular, this must ensure answering questions about human dignity, human control, and accountability. NATO is the ideal defense and security forum for this alignment. Given the US lead on adopting ethical principles for the entire DoD and the EU’s drive to assert checks and balances for private-sector tech companies, NATO remains the organization that can bring these two together and establishes the ethical bottom line. These will then ensure the diverging legal and ethical stances towards Big Tech do not lead to an interoperability barrier in the future. If developments surrounding the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the challenges it brought for U.S.-based, data-driven companies are any indication, a strong transatlantic led initiative is needed in order to ensure the same challenges do not hinder NATO.The solution to the challenge that ethical AI poses for the future of interoperability within NATO is for the Alliance to establish shared transatlantic ethical principles, informed by the US DoD, the EU, and others. Establishing these principles will not only strengthen transatlantic political relations; more technically, it will allow for the establishment of standardization agreements and inform training and education initiatives of the Alliance in the future.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – Democracy Advantage › NATO Key

The aff spills over by standardizing best practices for incorporating AI into military practices

Lockman and Trabucco 2022 - Associate Research Fellow in the Military Transformations Programme at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and dual degree candidate pursuing a PhD in political science at Northwestern University and a PhD in Law at iCourts Center of Excellence in International Courts at the University of Copenhagen

Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Lena Trabucco March 2022 “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.013.69

NATO’s increasing interest in EDTs introduces the need to consider how governance priorities can help reinforce the Alliance’s influence. The STS and military innovation literature provide the theoretical foundations for NATO’s stewardship of AI as they place attention on “the role that institutions play in shaping technological trajectories.”45 As AI development continues, the actions that NATO and its members take will have important implications for their capacity to adopt, respond to, and shape their future operating environment. Particularly for democracies, this confers to military stakeholders a dual responsibility to prevent and manage risks, as well as to proactively shape their approach to technological development anchored in democratic values and security. As a multinational alliance with an incentive to drive cooperation and alignment, NATO is situated to define and operationalize norms, as well as promote standards that help shape the contours of future military effectiveness and technological competition. In a RRI framework, not only is this an institutional role, but it also becomes an institutional responsibility. To apply this responsibility to NATO’s stewardship of AI, the institutional interplay between technology, structure, and concepts is a form of socio-technical system with important implications for AI governance because they link the ways that an institution uses its power to adopt and shape AI trajectory to its respective ends.Already, several mechanisms are built into military bureaucracies to ensure that technology is adopted in alignment with responsible engineering practices and responsible state behavior.46 The Alliance is organized to harmonize between Allies so that their contributions enhance military effectiveness and political cohesion between like-minded democracies. We argue that these effectiveness-centric mechanisms likewise empower NATO to exert its influence in technology governance. More specifically, this entails the Alliance helping steward technological development for a more predictable strategic environment and enhanced democratic clout around the exploitation of technology reinforcing rule of law. For NATO, we focus on strategic and policy planning, as well as standards and certification because they reflect the Alliance’s particular strengths and interests in S&T. These practices are relevant to governance insofar as they exemplify an institution’s power to shape the trajectory of technological development—but this selection is by no means exhaustive.47Instead, our aim is to explore how these mechanisms are operationalized at the Alliance level. In this vein, Table 69.1 dissects the role that its various bodies play in managing technology, promulgating and operationalizing standards, and leading change through policy. The role of NATO in this equation is largely shaped by its members’ own approaches to technology, and member-state-driven processes are complemented by “policy entrepreneurs” and technical experts in the International Staff and related bodies.48 Table 69.1 does not list the ways that AI affects the various functions of NATO, but rather spotlights the entities that together operationalize AI governance through cumulative processes on policy and standardization.Strategic and policy planningNATO structures around strategic and policy planning both set Allied ambitions and priorities and have the competency to implement them through its many consultative bodies, coordination formats, and albeit to a lesser extent, technology foresight capacities. NATO has facilitative power among Allies, both for defense planning and for the conduct of operations. A cornerstone in modern architecture of international security is coalition warfare—or, more broadly, joint operations. Working with military partners has become a critical feature of modern security policy, where there is more power in enhancing numbers, but also in having allies that lend political and practical legitimacy to deterrence and operations.49 NATO is vital to that effort for many reasons, but also because NATO’s facilitative power is significant to promote coordination and cooperation. Simply put, partners and allies are a necessary feature of modern military behavior, and strategic and policy planning are necessary functions to encourage and underpin cohesion in alliance settings. This is important for AI governance because the nature of AI poses new strategic challenges and will require multilateral approaches and some degree of cohesion to effectively incorporate RRI frameworks in policy planning. As such, the necessity of working with security partners extends to the AI-policy frontier.A number of NATO entities carry out strategic and policy planning, recognizing the importance of policy alignment to sustain political strength and military effectiveness. As relates to S&T, allies’ representations to NATO, defense ministries, and policy entrepreneurs from the relevant entities summarized in Table 69.1 support and negotiate how the Alliance approaches EDTs. NATO’s strategic documentation and forward-looking policy analysis incorporates hints of technological determinism, including noting how technological change inevitably shapes the future strategic and operating environment. Further, the connections between technology and competitive advantage over adversaries and competitors are embodied in the Alliance’s desire to maintain its “technological edge” as the “foundation upon which NATO’s ability to deter and defend against potential threats ultimately rests.”50 This places technology squarely within NATO’s core purpose of deterrence and defense—and while this signals NATO’s express commitment to technology through these channels, this reliance on technology also obscures whether NATO’s governance capacity will be adaptive, anticipatory, or participatory. This position of technological determinism may result in more limitations for AI governance.Standards and certificationTo maintain its relevance in a security architecture increasingly concerned with the way that technology shifts power dynamics and scales threats to international security, NATO has an incentive to foster cooperation, promote standards of practice, and incentivize Allied AI harmonization. It is strategically salient to facilitate a dialogue and engagement among Allies on AI, but it is practically important to use NATO’s position to facilitate Allied cooperation regarding standards to project the Alliance’s ability to interoperate in future operations. NATO standards aim to enhance interoperability among partners and successful implementation of strategy.More specifically, standards and certification are used to establish and implement requirements aligned with safe development and responsible use of technology. In addition to purely technical standards, NATO has operational standards that specify “conceptual, organizational or methodological requirements to enable materiel, installations, organizations or forces to fulfil their functions or missions.”51 In line with the definitions from STS and military innovation scholarship, standards can thus be seen as a mechanism to translate responsibility-derived state and organizational AI policy into actionable functions. In fact, NATO has set certain standards for the Allies and these standards subsequently become the norm.Within NATO, it is the NATO Standardization Office (NSO) that coordinates thousands of experts to align technological development with military requirements that can help enhance effectiveness, interoperability, and cohesion.52 While the NSO is primarily responsible for setting standards, other NATO entities—including in the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO)—play important roles in implementing them and coordinating between national approaches.53 Certification frameworks and the promulgation of best practices can similarly help incentivize the transposition of RRI into military organizations, even if standardization is by no means a purely military governance tool.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – Democracy Advantage › 2AC NATO Leadership Democracy

incorporation in multinational frameworks like NATO are key to ensure democratic values

Cook 2022 – Director, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group and Senior Fellow, International Security Program

Cynthia Cook March 3 2022 “Solidifying Partnership Gains through Enhanced Defense Industrial Cooperation” Center for Strategic and International Studies https://www.csis.org/analysis/solidifying-partnership-gains-through-enhanced-defense-industrial-cooperation

Along with being an unnecessary tragedy in every conceivable dimension, the war in Ukraine is a historic critical juncture. Countries aligned against Russia and other actors seeking to degrade international norms, should work together immediately to plan for three things. The first step is to commit to understanding the new threat and its boundaries. The European Union, NATO, United States, and other nations have the opportunity to provide global leadership in this space as democracies across the world seek to understand the threats they face. A second step is to develop the framework for a new generation of strategic cooperation, perhaps in an expanded European Union or NATO. This could be as simple as discussing defense budgets or as robust as having a planning session for joint exercises. A third, longer-term step to solidify these gains and to strengthen enduring ties is to develop enhanced industrial cooperation with partners and allies, especially in Europe. Sweden and Finland are reportedly considering whether to join NATO. Germany reacted to the invasion with a quick and decisive rethink about its defense spending, rearmament, and contributions to NATO. These represent significant opportunities to strengthen cooperative industrial ties. Lessons from examples of other successful multinational cooperation frameworks can be used to consider what mix of approaches would best consolidate this momentous shift. Options include identifying a suite of multinational projects to counter urgent threats, expanding the role of existing multilateral industrial cooperation institutions, or expanding the National Technology Industrial Base (an arrangement in which United States works with some of its closest industrial partners, namely Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia). A review of what commercial technologies Germany excels at that could be added to U.S. and allied weapon systems could offer quick hits both in terms of excellent capabilities and a clear focus for German defense investment. Defense industrial and technological cooperation grounded in common values is not just an alternative model to coercive spheres of influence but is also critical to translating solidarity in sentiment to capabilities and the potential for action. These actions would signal to Russia (and by inference to other potential adversaries) that the West can stand up to its threats, and that it should think twice, or three times, before pressing its territorial claims. It could also signal to other potential adversaries that allied nations will work together to protect themselves and hopefully to ensure peace and prosperity. They are watching.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – Democracy Advantage › Lack of Regulation Now

Lack of a regulatory framework makes the development of military AI uncertain

Shafeeq 2022 - researcher at Centre for Aerospace & Security Studies

MAHEEN SHAFEEQ 06.15.2022 “Little Self-Regulation for Militaries Developing Artificial Intelligence” https://intpolicydigest.org/the-platform/little-self-regulation-for-militaries-developing-artificial-intelligence/

Over the years, there have been significant advancements in the militarization of artificial intelligence. To a limited extent we are already witnessing these innovations on the battlefield in Ukraine and elsewhere.Several types of AI applications such as autonomous drones, electronic warfare systems, target recognition, and the use of AI for logistics and transport have already made their way into modern militaries. However, unregulated research AI applications could jeopardize meaningful human control and oversight of the battlefield. AI applications have not yet fully matured and could have a number of ethical, moral, and legal consequences that necessitate greater oversight. To address these issues, measures have been taken by the United States, NATO, and China to implement ethical processes and guidelines in the conduct and deployment of AI technologies.In 2020, the Pentagon adopted five ethical principles for AI that cover responsibility, equitability, traceability, reliability, and governability. These series of ethical principles are for the deployment of AI for both combat and non-combat functions. Additionally, these principles assist and guide the U.S. military in upholding ethical, legal, and policy commitments in the domain of AI. These AI principles aim to ensure U.S. leadership in AI for years to come.In 2021, NATO released six principles for the use of AI in defense and security that are based on lawfulness, accountability, traceability, reliability, governability, and bias mitigation. These principles are aimed at aligning common values and an international commitment of allied nations to abide by international law and ensure interoperability. The formal adoption of an AI strategy will ensure the necessary collaboration between transatlantic allies to meet defense and security challenges. As NATO has been at an early stage of the research and development of AI, the focus appears to be on the desire to nurture an innovative AI ecosystem and reduce reliance on traditional capacity development mechanisms.While China has not formally published ethics for artificial intelligence, it has published its first position paper on regulating military applications of artificial intelligence. It calls for the establishment of an “effective control regime” for “military applications of AI,” and that countries should follow the principle of “AI for good.” It asserts that AI applications should be under “relevant human control.” However, the definition of “relevant human control” remains vague. For the governance of artificial intelligence, it stresses international cooperation and the development of a broader consensus on the formulation of a “universal international regime.”The above governance principles of the U.S., NATO, and China address different priorities. U.S. and NATO principles have been developed for cooperation among allies while strengthening international competitiveness. Whereas China primarily focuses on the development of artificial intelligence for assisting developing countries in strengthening their governance.It has been acknowledged that China has bypassed the U.S. in AI development. This could inform why the focus of the U.S. and NATO has been on enhancing their competitive capabilities. In theory, all three have emphasized adopting governance principles for the development and use of artificial intelligence, however, the practical manifestation of these principles has yet to be seen. The practical implementation of global regulation of AI military applications has been lagging. Even states with advanced research and development in AI defense applications are in the early phase of regulation and have not reached their full maturity. Therefore, the present is an ideal time to develop mutually agreed principles to facilitate programmers, developers, coders as well as manufacturers, and so on in their adoption. The move towards practical adoption could start with multistakeholder discussions, workshops, conferences, and research between technologically advanced countries and technologically progressing countries with the aim to develop an agreeable framework on principles of AI governance.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › Impact – US-Sino AI Tech Race

China is scaling up tech and military innovation— US scientific advancement is critical

Ni 2018 - Researcher, Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Australian National University

Adam Ni March 5, 2018 "China’s quest for techno-military supremacy” theconversation.com/chinas-quest-for-techno-military-supremacy-91840

Chinese President Xi Jinping wants to transform China’s military into the world’s most powerful force by 2050. And he could be on track to do it. On the opening day of its National People’s Congress in Beijing yesterday, China reported a defence budget of ¥1.11 trillion ($A225 billion) for 2018. That represents an 8.1% increase in its defence budget, compared to a 7% increase last year. China’s military has modernised rapidly in recent years. Since January alone it has demonstrated new capabilities in stealth fighter jets, drones, naval ships and advanced missiles. Chinese scientists are also working to develop revolutionary technologies that would change the way wars are fought – and the way we live. Read more: Asia is set for a difficult year in 2018 – much of it centred around China Challenging US military might While China still lags the US in overall technological capability, it has narrowed the gap substantially. In the coming decades, it is poised to challenge US technological supremacy in key fields such as artificial intelligence, supercomputing and quantum information science. What explains China’s rise as a technological power? First, it has leveraged the innovation of other countries via technology transfers, and the acquisition of foreign companies and talent. It has also been reverse-engineering Western technology, and conducting state-sponsored industrial espionage. According to one security analysis, between 2006 and 2013 the Chinese military stole confidential data from more than 140 organisations around the world. The problem was so serious that in May 2014, the US Department of Justice indicted five Chinese military hackers for cyber-espionage activities against US companies. Read more: For Beijing, the greatest threat to China's national security is not the Kim regime: it is the US Second, China has been able to mobilise resources for priority technology sectors and research and development (R&D) projects in a way that many democracies are simply unable to do because of the limits of government power or popular mandate. Large state subsidies, government R&D funding, tailored regulations, market barriers and lax individual rights (such as privacy) protection have given Chinese domestic companies an edge over their foreign competitors. A good example of this is the rise of China’s internet sector to global prominence, as represented by giants such as Tencent and Alibaba. Finally, China has substantially increased its R&D expenditure in recent years. From 2012 to 2017, China’s annual R&D spending rose 70.9% to ¥1.76 trillion ($A356 billion). The US National Science Board expects China to surpass the US in R&D investment, in purchasing power terms, by the end of this year. China’s new superweapons Here are a few examples of how China is making rapid progress in high-tech fields with military applications. Hypersonic technology A Chinese hypersonic gliding vehicle. Wikimedia, CC BY-SA Hypersonic technology could one day allow us to travel from Beijing to New York in about two hours, rather than the 13 hours it currently takes. China is developing a hypersonic glide vehicle known as DF-ZF to make its nuclear and non-nuclear missiles extremely fast, manoeuvrable and capable of defeating existing missile defence systems. To support this effort, China is building the world’s most advanced hypersonic wind tunnel for testing the extreme conditions of supersonic flight. While an operational hypersonic missile is still years away, once developed it would be a formidable weapon. It could also have a destabilising effect on strategic relations between China and other powers by compressing the time window for decision-making in a conflict or crisis situation. Quantum technology A quantum computer. Flickr/Lars Plougmann, CC BY-SA Another area of China’s focus is quantum technology, which uses subatomic mechanics to process and transmit information in a fraction of the time required by existing technology. China is making rapid headway in quantum communication, computing and cryptography. In August 2016, China launched the world’s first quantum satellite. This enabled Chinese researchers to conduct cutting-edge experiments in quantum entanglement and teleportation. To win the quantum race, China announced last year that it will build the world’s largest quantum research facility at a cost of ¥76 billion ($A15.4 billion). Quantum technology would enable the Chinese military to set up virtually unbreakable communication networks. It would also provide it with overwhelming computing power for information operations, such as the decryption of secret communications by adversaries. Read more: China's quantum satellite could make data breaches a thing of the past Electromagnetic technology China is also in the advanced stages of developing an electromagnetic railgun. This supergun uses electromagnetic energy to shoot powerful projectiles over vast distances at incredible speed. These projectiles are aerodynamic and their power comes from the kinetic damage generated by the intense speed at which they travel. Recent photos circulated on Chinese social media show what is suspected to be an experimental electromagnetic railgun mounted on the bow of the Chinese navy ship. This indicates that China may soon be the first in world to test such a weapon at sea, where it could revolutionise naval combat. In contrast, the US Navy is winding down its railgun research program because of resource constraints and shifting priorities. The above examples are only a few among dozens of high-tech fields in which China is making rapid progress. Others include biotechnology, robotics, supercomputing, nanotechnology, advanced materials, space technology, and artificial intelligence. In fact, the Chinese government has identified 17 engineering and science megaprojects that are key to China’s economic and military strength. These include advanced satellites, large nuclear reactors, large aircraft and high-end electronic chips. China’s continued rise as a technological giant will have profound implications for its military power as Beijing leverages civilian technology for its military. This effort is so important that President Xi considers it a top priority. To underscore this, Xi created a powerful commission under his direct leadership to provide high-level guidance and oversight. Much hinges on how Beijing chooses to use its new-found military and technological might. Indeed, China’s extensive geopolitical ambitions and increasingly assertive foreign policy are ominous signs that foreshadow the challenges ahead.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › Impact – US-Sino AI Tech Race

Chinese expansionism makes war likely in the event of tech supremacy despite international checks and M.A.D.

Colby and Ratner 2014 - Robert M. Gates Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and the Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security

Elbridge Colby and Ely Ratner “Roiling the Waters: Why the United States needs to stop playing peacemaker and start making China feel uncomfortable” Foreign Policy Journal Online http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/21/roiling_the_waters

Though officials on both sides of the Pacific are publicly loath to add fuel to the fire, it is increasingly clear that China's recent regional provocations are the result of more than just knee-jerk reactions or bureaucratic malfunctions over long-forgotten borders or arcane historical ownership. Beijing's far-reaching claims in the East and South China seas -- and coercive efforts to intimidate neighbors -- have unsettled countries from Vietnam to the Philippines to Japan because they amount to an expansionist strategy, with profound implications for U.S. power and regional security. China's latest act of revisionism, in late November, was to declare an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) across large swaths of the East China Sea, including over the disputed Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyu by the Chinese). America's response was twofold: The White House indicated that it would not officially honor the ADIZ designation (a message delivered by sending unarmed B-52 bombers through the zone on what the Pentagon called a routine and long-planned training mission), but it initially encouraged commercial airliners to comply with Beijing's request to identify themselves to Chinese air traffic control. Meanwhile, it dispatched high-level officials to calm the waters: When Vice President Joe Biden met with Chinese leaders in early December, his mission, according to one senior administration official, was to push for "crisis management mechanisms and confidence-building measures to lower tensions and reduce risk of escalation or miscalculation." This effort to play the role of regional peacemaker echoes the Obama administration's approach in 2012 during the Scarborough Shoal standoff between China and the Philippines, as well as during the row between Tokyo and Beijing after Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands. But if China's ends haven't changed, its means have -- in the past years, Beijing has stepped up efforts to achieve its long-held territorial aims. As a former Chinese ambassador told us in December, her country's position in the world is like that of "a new student that jumped many grades." Maybe so, but Beijing's behavior since 2009 is more akin to that of a brash adolescent both unaware and blithe to the potential consequences of adventurous behavior. U.S. officials have been careful to avoid provoking a China that appears increasingly willing to flex its newfound military muscle. U.S. officials have been careful to avoid provoking a China that appears increasingly willing to flex its newfound military muscle. Perhaps that's why Biden invoked his father's advice in warning on the eve of his Beijing visit that "the only conflict that is worse than one that is intended is one that is unintended." But an overemphasis on stability can be dangerous. While preventing inadvertent war in Asia is obviously a worthy goal, it is just as important to discourage China from believing that it can employ economic, military, and diplomatic coercion to settle international disagreements without triggering a serious response. Making the risk of escalation too low will at some point start running counter to U.S. interests. Why? Because China is taking advantage of Washington's risk aversion by rocking the boat, seeing what it can extract in the process, and letting the United States worry about righting it. Beijing's playbook of tailored coercion relies in part on China's confidence that it can weather ephemeral international outrage while Washington takes responsibility for ensuring the situation doesn't get out of control. This means that reducing the likelihood of escalation through high-level strategic dialogues and military-to-military hotlines, however important, is in and of itself insufficient to curb Chinese assertiveness. History has demonstrated the perils of focusing too much on stability at the expense of deterrence. The Cuban missile crisis, the modern world's closest brush with the apocalypse, was precipitated by Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's perception that the United States, especially President John F. Kennedy, was overly concerned about stability and cooling tensions between the superpowers. Khrushchev's sense that America could be pushed was formed by Kennedy's cautious reactions to assertive Soviet moves toward Berlin, as well as Khrushchev's measure of Kennedy at the 1961 Vienna superpower summit as "weak" and accommodating. Over the following year and a half, Khrushchev and the Soviet Union sought to exploit what they perceived to be shaky American resolve, pressing in Berlin, where East Germany built a wall closing off the free part of the city, and secretly deploying nuclear-armed missiles to Cuba. Only through a demonstrated willingness on the part of Kennedy to go to the nuclear brink -- with U.S. nuclear forces on high alert and U.S. naval forces prepared to forcibly halt Soviet ships attempting to run the blockade (accompanied by a U.S. concession on missile deployments in Turkey) -- was the United States able to get Moscow to back down. Needless to say, restraint and a willingness to negotiate were elemental to a peaceful resolution of the crisis, but only in the context of a major mobilization of U.S. forces against Cuba, the elevation of the U.S. alert level to Defcon 2 (one step short of nuclear war), and chilling threats designed to convince the Soviets that conciliation was the only viable move. OF COURSE, CHINA IS NOT THE SOVIET UNION. And 2014 is not 1962. The point is simply that a country with the power of the USSR or China, unsatisfied with features of the existing order, motivated to do something to change it, and skeptical of the resolve of the United States, could well pursue a policy of coercion and brinkmanship, even under the shadow of nuclear weapons. As historian Francis Gavin has argued, the whole history of the Cold War shows that countries like China -- and, at times, the United States -- can bluff, coerce, and threaten their way to geopolitical gain. The worst way to deal with such a power is to leave it with the impression that these approaches work. Just as the United States would have been far better off if Kennedy, at the Vienna summit, had squelched Khrushchev's doubts about his resolve to defend Berlin, it will be far better if the leadership in Beijing has the clear sense that the United States will meet each challenge to its and its allies' interests resolutely. Taking a cue from history, the United States needs to inject a healthy degree of risk into Beijing's calculus Taking a cue from history, the United States needs to inject a healthy degree of risk into Beijing's calculus, even as it searches for ways to cooperate with China. This does not mean abandoning engagement or trying to contain China, let alone fomenting conflict. But it does mean communicating that Beijing has less ability to control escalation than it seems to think. China must understand that attempts to roil the waters could result in precisely the kinds of costs and conflicts it seeks to avoid. To make this work, the United States should pursue policies that actually elevate the risks -- political, economic, or otherwise -- to Beijing of acting assertively. On the high seas, the focal point for the region's territorial disputes, China has bullied its neighbors by relying on non-military vessels. China is using its rapidly expanding coast guard to assert its expansive sovereignty claims by harassing non-Chinese fishermen, oil companies, and military vessels that pass through contested waters in the East and South China seas. This has the benefit of exploiting China's dominant numerical advantage while keeping the U.S. Navy on the sidelines. Washington should blur the false distinction between non-military and military ships by stating that it will respond to physical coercion and the use of force as deemed appropriate -- regardless of whether the perpetrator is a white- or gray-hulled ship. Exercises that practice U.S. naval operations against aggressive non-military vessels would be a good place to start. So would calling upon China to end its illegal occupation of the disputed Scarborough Shoal off the Philippine coast, while contesting Chinese administration there by sending the U.S. Navy through the area to assert its right to freedom of navigation. The Chinese PLA Navy, for its part, hasn't been shy to test the waters. In early December, the U.S. Pacific Fleet revealed that the guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens, while shadowing China's new aircraft carrier on a routine mission in international seas, was forced to take evasive action when a PLA Navy warship attached to the carrier group approached on a collision course, literally forcing the cruiser into a game of chicken. "The Chinese knew what they were doing," a military official told CNN. Beyond the sea, the United States must demonstrate a willingness to push back militarily when China attempts to coerce America's allies and partners. To do this, the U.S. military needs capabilities and plans that not only prepare it for major war, but that also offer plausible, concrete options for responding to Chinese attempts to exploit America's perceived aversion to instability. Leaders throughout Asia will be watching. Too much caution, especially if China is clearly the initiator, may be read as U.S. weakness, thereby perpetuating rather than diminishing China's incentives toward adventurism. The United States can further raise the stakes by deepening its military ties with Japan. This year, the two countries will rewrite the guidelines that govern the roles and responsibilities of their partnership. The result could be major steps forward in joint military planning and interoperability. Washington can also play a key role in mending fences between Tokyo and Seoul, renewing trilateral cooperation to address the many interests -- and common threats -- that the three countries share. Beyond America's traditional alliances in Northeast Asia, the Obama administration must demonstrate a concrete, long-lasting commitment to Australia, the Philippines, and Singapore in order to provide the United States with a more diversified set of partners and forward-operating locations in Asia, as well as broader political legitimacy. Beijing's planners worry about America's burgeoning military alliances and partnerships in Asia. Good. That means they'll be more reluctant to start a fight if doing so means China could end up facing a multitude of the region's powerhouses. The point, of course, is not to increase the likelihood of conflict between the United States and China. Rather, the goal is to cultivate real, long-term stability in Asia that doesn't give China a license to push, prod, and bully. Critics might assert that taking these steps will invite precisely the kind of Cold War-like competition that will make conflict, if not outright war, most likely. This is a real possibility, and U.S. policymakers will have to carefully balance deterrence with engagement. But those who are reluctant to push back need to ask themselves whether China's top leaders currently see a sufficient downside in acting assertively. Clearly, they do not.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › Impact – US-Sino AI Tech Race

The US-Sino AI arms race is escalating --- the aff positions dominance that spills over to modernizing military tech --- it’s a national security question

Lucas and Waters 2018 - Asian Technology Correspondent for the Financial Times and technology analyst for Silicon Valley

Louise Lucas and Richard Waters 4-30-18 “The AI arms race: China and US compete to dominate big data” Financial Times https://www.ft.com/content/e33a6994-447e-11e8-93cf-67ac3a6482fd

Algorithms trained on mountains of Chinese data may soon be making decisions that deeply affect the lives of people in the US. Take Yitu Technology, a Shanghai-based artificial intelligence start-up that won top honours in two AI competitions in the US last year for its facial recognition technology. The system was built for Chinese law enforcement using data collected by the authorities. Or as the company boasts, it was honed on the “world’s largest portrait system, covering more than 1.5bn people.” Yitu is now looking for customers in the US to put its software to work. “There are a lot of applications for this technology,” says Wu Shuang, who heads its Silicon Valley research group. This story is the first in a series on the growing competition between the US and China over AI, which will have an impact on the contest for military superiority, the international trading system and the future of the Chinese Communist party. It is not alone. Shenzhen-based Malong Technologies has also trained its image recognition algorithms on masses of Chinese data — in its case, by analysing hundreds of thousands of photos from fashion shows to identify trends for clients in the garment industry. It says it is now trialing the technology with ecommerce companies in the US. A “key difference in China is there are just more people, more data, more businesses — it’s just bigger,” says chief technology officer Matt Scott, a former Microsoft researcher who moved to China to co-found the company. “Having access to that data in China, we can export [the technology] around the world.” Algorithms like these are the advanced guard in a battle that will go a long way to determining economic leadership in the era of Big Data — a contest where China is catching up quickly and now vying with the US to be the dominant force. The AI revolution is often thought of in terms of robots or drones that can do tasks once performed by humans. But its impact will also be felt from a less visible source — the ability to sweat the data the hardest. Machine learning systems that can find patterns by analysing large data sets are at the cutting edge of today’s artificial intelligence. For some industries, deep learning — the most advanced form of the technology — has the potential to create value equivalent to as much as 9 per cent of a company’s revenues, according to a report in April from McKinsey Global Institute. That translates into trillions of dollars of potential economic value — and the US and China are the clear leaders. “If you look globally, it’s a two-horse race in AI,” says Michael Chui, a McKinsey partner who led the study. Visitors to the China Public Security Expo in Shenzhen in October are scanned by facial recognition software © Reuters In China, the AI boom has fed the country’s swelling sense of self-confidence in its expanding technology base. President Xi Jinping has made AI one of the central pillars of the Made in China 2025 plan to transform the country’s economy and has set a goal of being the world leader in the technology by 2030. At the same time, China’s advances are also contributing to an opposite paranoia in the US that its technology exceptionalism can no longer be taken for granted. The Trump administration’s plans for a trade war with Beijing are motivated — at least in part — by fear of China’s advances in new technology. “It’s clear that the US government sees itself in a tech arms race with the Chinese government,” says Robert Silvers, a partner at legal firm Paul Hastings and former assistant secretary for cyber policy at the department of homeland security. “The US is taking the view that these kinds of technologies are so transformative that the country that gets the lead is going to have not just economic or tech advantage but also national security advantage.” One reason the contest over AI is so charged is that it is connected with a race to find a new military edge. As well as answering mundane customer queries and piloting driverless cars, the same technology can also be deployed to synchronise drone swarms, analyse pictures taken by spy drones and control autonomous boats. Dominance in AI could bring a step change in warfare, says Sean Gourley, founder of Primer, a Silicon Valley AI start-up whose backers include the CIA’s venture capital arm. Technology shifts like this can undermine the military advantage of great powers. “It’s likely to be coupled with the reordering of global power. Whoever is best at this will be in a strong position in 10 years’ time,” he says.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › 2AC---Yes Hybrid Threats---Russia

Russia is weaponizing AI through hybrid warfare---that undermines NATO decision-making

Gady 2021 - Research Fellow for Cyber, Space and Future Conflict, International Institute for Strategic Studies

Franz-Stefan Gady “Hybrid Threats to Allied Decision-Making: Merging Whack-A-Troll Tactics with Whole-Of-Society Defense Concept” NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/978195445000.pdf

This chapter seeks to offer preliminary answers to two questions. First, to what degree will Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled information warfare exacerbate hybrid threats to NATO decision-making? Second, what can NATO countries do to alleviate the threat? To narrow the research scope, this chapter will principally look at threats posed by Russian AI-enabled information warfare operations under the concept of gibridnaya voyna. The study argues that given that AI-enabled information warfare has the potential to amplify societal polarization, elite disagreement within domestic politics, and reshape the perception of the “Russian threat” in NATO member countries, it can have a direct negative impact on national and NATO decision-making. Such operations, however, only amplify existing symptoms of polarization and disagreement found within NATO member states and are not their root causes. The chapter concludes that NATO must better integrate tech-centric so-called “whack-a-troll” tactics with a whole-of-nation strategy to better safe-guard NATO decision-making and alliance cohesion. Renewed discussion of whole-of-society defense concepts to inform national security strategies may be useful in this regard.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › 2AC---Yes Hybrid Threats---China

Chinese hybrid threats risks mischaracteriziation---being able to successfully characterize attacks is key

Smith 2021 - Director of Research and Analysis at the Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats and visiting professor for the academic year 2020–2021 at the College of Europe, Bruges

Hanna Smith “Hybrid Threats to Allied Decision-Making” NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/978195445000.pdf

Recent digital and technological developments have enabled many completely new tools, which have given rise to new virtual platforms that fall outside current norms and rules. These new tools have also brought unprecedented speed to all kinds of action. Interconnectivity and globalization have created new possibilities for network-based action, lowered borders, changed geopolitics and made sure that there is more data around us than ever before. New actors have emerged in international politics, who are looking to enhance their status. Authoritarian and democratic states appear to be entering into a new form of ideological battle. In this situation one can ask: what are the rules of the game? An important weapon in this new battle is hybrid threats. Hybrid threats constitute a shadow policy for authoritarian states that supports their strategic aims and is based on their strategic culture traditions. The clear dividing lines, unwritten rules, players and goals of the Cold War are history. This situation is challenging for planners, decision-makers and foresight building.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › 2AC---NATO AI key to Deterrence

Solves multipolarity and deterrence

Soare 2021 - Research fellow for defence and military analysis at International Institute for Strategic Studies, DMAP programme. Transatlantic and European defence innovation and EDTs.

Simona R. Soare June 11"Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies" https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies

Long-term great-power competition has returned and it has a strong technological dimension. The time when NATO had the luxury to adapt at its own pace to a changing strategic environment is over. To survive and remain relevant in a multipolar world of rapidly evolving security risks and threats, and to compete successfully against Russia and China, NATO needs a new framework centered on innovation as adaptation. The alliance’s ongoing efforts in EDTs and the new NATO Strategic Concept are timely opportunities to start on this new path. A focus on inclusive innovation in NATO could increase adaptability and competitiveness in the long-term, help to disrupt, deter or defeat adversarial subversive actions, mitigate transnational threats and, more importantly, maintain solidarity and the principle of indivisible security among the allies.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › 2AC---NATO AI key to Deterrence

AI key to effective NATO deterrence versus Russia and China

Soare 2021 - Research fellow for defence and military analysis at International Institute for Strategic Studies, DMAP programme. Transatlantic and European defence innovation and EDTs.

Simona R. Soare June 11"Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies" https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies

Throughout NATO’s history, defense innovation has been critical to its technological edge and its deterrence and defense posture against multiple threats. The unprecedented progress in emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) offers the prospect and challenge of transformative defense innovation for allied armed forces and societies at large. Technological progress in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning, advanced robotics, biotechnologies and human enhancement, quantum technologies, big-data analytics, and fifth-generation telecommunication systems, as well as growing autonomy in the critical functions of military systems, promise to change how wars are fought, how fast, where, and by whom. These technologies enable new forms of military presence, coercive action, and power projection in and across old and new domains (for example, cyberspace and outer space) and below and above the conventional threshold of armed conflict.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › 2AC – AI Key to NATO – Interoperability

Integration of AI systems into logistics and sustainability is key to interoperability

Konaev and Chahal 2021 – research fellow and research analys with the Center for Security and Emerging Technology

Margarita Konaev Husanjot Chahal April 2021 “The Path of Least Resistance: Multinational Collaboration on AI for Military Logistics and Sustainment” CSET Issue Brief

Considering both the potential for leveraging developments from the private sector and lower barriers to in-house innovation, collaboration on AI for logistics and sustainment could also involve allies with more limited military-industrial capacities. Based on its fact-finding mission to Singapore, NATO’s Science and Technology Committee observed that “small and medium-sized Allies with smart scientists and engineers can play an outsized role in AI development and adoption.”38 This is a significant advantage, arguably unique to AI technologies, and especially timely considering that even the relatively wealthy U.S. allies are facing cuts to their defense budgets due to the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, collaboration that includes input from small and medium-sized allies can strengthen interoperability, contribute to allied burden sharing, and buttress the long-term viability of U.S.-led defense partnerships.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
UTNIF – AI Aff › EXT – NATO Advantage › 2AC – AI key to NATO – Burden Sharing

AI gaps in NATO create burden-sharing conflicts

Lin-Greenberg 2020 – postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House

Erik Lin-Greenberg, National Security Review, Vol 3, Iss 2. Spring. "Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making" https://tnsr.org/2020/03/allies-and-artificial-intelligence-obstacles-to-operations-and-decision-making/

The existence of “AI haves” and “have-nots” within an alliance can complicate burden-sharing — a central tenet of military alliances. On one hand, states with robust AI capabilities can specialize their contributions to alliance operations and focus on providing AI-related capabilities. If, however, AI applications become a necessity for warfighting in the future, states that lack AI capabilities may be less able to contribute to alliance operations. States better equipped with AI capabilities may subsequently be forced to take on a greater share of work, generating both political and operational challenges. Politically, “AI haves” may complain that “AI have-nots” are not adequately contributing to a mission, straining relations between allies. Operationally, capability gaps can hamper an alliance’s ability to deploy forces or achieve military objectives. During the NATO-led air war over Kosovo in 1999, for instance, many NATO members possessed limited numbers of precision-guided munitions in their arsenals and often lacked the training to employ them, curtailing their ability to contribute to operations.65 As a result, responsibility for carrying out the air campaign fell to a small number of allies. In a larger conflict, burden-sharing might be critical to sustaining operations or securing battlefield victories.