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2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Unilat CP › Restraint Fails

Restraint will fail – the US needs to wield its power for good.

Brands '22 - The Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies [Hal, Jun1, "The World Doesn’t Need a More Restrained America,"https://www.aei.org/op-eds/the-world-doesnt-need-a-more-restrained-america/]

It has been a bumpy year for the restraint coalition — that loose network of analysts, advocates and politicians calling for a sharply reduced US role in the world. Having reached peak influence with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, this group initially found itself marginalized by Russia’s war in Ukraine. Now, the restraint crowd is offering a renewed critique of US policy, one that will probably prove to be persistent, though not persuasive.

Restraint is a broad church. It features anti-interventionist academics, who often style themselves as non-ideological “realists,” alongside well-funded think tanks such as the Quincy Institute. It includes libertarians such as Senator Rand Paul who deplore the financial costs of US foreign policy and progressives who contend that American globalism is a cover for imperialism and neoliberalism. There are pacifists who believe that all wars are criminal, as well as nationalists such as Senator Josh Hawley who argue that being appropriately hawkish on China requires being more dovish on nearly everything else.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Unilat CP › Multilat Key – Diplomacy

Military diplomacy promotes soft power

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute,

Since military people know better than anyone the true cost of waging war, the U.S. military has a vested interest in working to build capabilities and partnerships to maintain worldwide peace and stability. Although the lines between what are doctrinally military or diplomatic missions may blur, it is to the advantage of both the State Department and the military to capitalize on any opportunity to advance the policy and security of the United States. The military, known as a hard-power tool, can also be used as a soft-power one. Military members serving overseas in any capacity are already often the forefront of American diplomacy, moving their mission set beyond traditional warfighting to an extended role in support of the National Security Strategy of the United States, with great success. The fact that China is increasingly involved in regions like Africa and Latin America—giving Beijing influence there—is further reason for the United States to take a more active approach and mitigate vulnerabilities. China has learned from our greatest strategic achievement, the Marshall Plan, and has formulated a long-term strategy to, among other things, undermine U.S. influence. We need a coordinated, long-term plan of military diplomacy and economic support in response.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Unilat CP › Multilat Key – Diplomacy

Military diplomacy builds trust and relations

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute, )//BB

Moreover, in places where the U.S. military has maintained a long-term presence (e.g. Japan, South Korea, Germany), we see that military interoperability enhances regions economically—directly through commercial contracting and the resulting employment, servicemember contributions through commerce, and in some cases, contributions of military gear and equipment through foreign military sales or otherwise. The resulting “military diplomacy,” also referred to as “defense diplomacy,” “soft power,” “military public diplomacy,” and “strategic communication,” allows the military to have a direct impact on foreign policy through other means. Although not diplomacy in the traditional sense of a State Department mission, military relationships between countries build a foundation on which further connections between nations are developed.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Unilat CP › Multilat Key – Diplomacy

Military-to-military contacts are necessary to build trust and avoid miscalculation

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute,

Within the main elements of national power (diplomacy, informational, military, and economic, or DIME), the military is often considered the last resort. However, the U.S. military has been a key player in, for instance, the spread of democracy, building partner countries’ strength through military-to-military relationships (including in the form of bi- and trilateral exercises to support standing Operation Plans, NATO, the United Nations, and Theater Security Cooperation), personnel exchange, and humanitarian assistance operations. Through these efforts, among others, the U.S. military helps to carry out the diplomatic mission of the United States (military diplomacy paved the way for NATO, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization, for instance). When military units participate in bilateral or multilateral exercises with other countries, for example, the purpose is several-fold: The interaction increases interoperability between the militaries, provides for cultural exchange and understanding, and offers an opportunity to expand each nation’s capabilities while exercising potential contingencies. The importance of military diplomacy in foreign engagement is to build dialogue that may facilitate further communication and, during a crisis, avoid confusion between cultures.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Coop Bad DA › Middle East Invasion Mod

That makes WWIII inevitable

Hanson 2016 - classicist and historian at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University Victor Davis, "The return of appeasement, collaboration and isolationism," Feb 18, tribunecontentagency.com/article/the-return-of-appeasement-collaboration-and-isolationism/

By the start of the Great Depression in 1929, America was mostly unarmed and determined never to get involved in European feuding again. Most Americans complained that the huge death toll of World War I had led to neither perpetual peace nor even a peaceful Germany. America’s isolationism and disarmament also helped prompt another global war. Had the U.S. kept its military strong after World War I, and had it entered into a formal alliance with its former World War I partners, Germany never would have risked a second war against the combined strength of a fully armed Britain, France and United States. Instead, Hitler assumed the U.S. either could not or would not offer much military help to his intended European targets. Why, then, did a relatively weak Nazi Germany between 1939 and 1941 believe that it could take on much of the world, and inspire Axis partners such as Italy and Japan to follow its suicidal lead? The answer is obvious. British and French appeasement, Soviet collaboration and American isolation had together convinced Hitler and his Axis allies that the victors of World War I were more eager to grant concessions at any cost than were the defeated. The world of 2016 is eerily beginning to resemble the powder keg of 1939 Europe. Iran, China and North Korea, along with radical Islamic terrorist groups, all have particular contempt for Western democracies. Almost daily, various aggressive nations or organizations seek provocation by shooting off intercontinental missiles, boarding American boats, sending millions of young male Middle Easterners into the West, and issuing unending threats. China is creating new artificial islands to control commercial routes to and from Asia. The European Union is largely unarmed. Yet it still trusts that it can use its vaunted "smart diplomacy" to reason with its enemies. Meanwhile, Vladimir Putin’s Russia cuts deals with Iran, Syria and most of the enemies of the West. Like Stalin before, Putin cynically assumes that his triangulations will turn aggressive powers exclusively against the West. Recently, he warned the West of a "new world war" starting in the Middle East. America is slowly withdrawing from involvement abroad, using the same isolationist arguments heard in the 1920s. Past interventions in the Middle East have worn on the nation. Ingrate nations did not appreciate American sacrifices. In tough economic times, some contend that defense spending should be diverted to more social programs. Appeasement, collaboration and isolationism always prove a lethal mix — past and present.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Coop Bad DA › Middle East Invasion Mod

US abdication of NATO responsibilities greenlights Russian invasion of the Middle East

Shapiro 2019 - Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv Daniel, "The Most Dangerous Thing Trump Could Do Yet, and Its Nightmare Fallout for Israel," Jan 17,

Remove the United States from NATO - and forward-deployed U.S. forces from Europe, which would certainly follow - and the United States’ ability to respond to a Middle East crisis would be diminished.

Could U.S. support for Israel be shifted and coordinated instead through U.S. Central Command, based in the Persian Gulf? It has been proposed before as an efficiency measure. But Israeli generals have always resisted the proposal. Their worry is that they would find it challenging to enjoy the same level of intimacy they currently have with Europe-based U.S. commanders, with commanders who maintain a similar closeness with Arab militaries.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Coop Bad DA › War Mod

Consensus goes aff---NATO eradicates war

Beauchamp 16 – senior reporter at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, citing multiple political science professors (Zach, “Donald Trump needs to clarify his position on NATO before something scary happens,” Vox, https://www.vox.com/2016/7/21/12247074/donald-trump-nato-war)

Trump’s comments about NATO are like an arrow pointed straight at the heart of the alliance -- and, if implemented, would directly threaten the foundations of global peace itself. Any president could simply choose not to abide by Article 5. But abrogating NATO agreements was always deemed unthinkable by both parties, which has played an important part in maintaining credible deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. Trump has put the idea of the US not defending NATO on the table, in a very real way. This threatens the very integrity of NATO itself. If NATO allies start to think that the United States can’t be trusted to defend them, that NATO is just on paper, then they’ll start to wonder why they bother to adhere to this alliance in the first place. If Trump wins the election, this could cause them to exit the security agreement altogether. According to the best available research, this would make war on the European continent far more likely. One study, from professors Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds, surveyed about 200 years of data on conflicts and concluded that "defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in the world." Another study looked specifically at the period from 1950 to 2000 and found that "formal alliances with nuclear states appear to carry significant deterrence benefits." The US's formal agreements, then, deter aggression against its non-nuclear partners (like Germany and the Baltics). In their new book on American grand strategy, Dartmouth scholars Steven Brooks and William Wohlforth also surveyed research from regional experts and found a similar consensus. In Europe, they write, "most assessments nonetheless sum up to the conclusion that NATO is a net security plus." Trump, then, could end up weakening one of America’s most important security agreements — and may already have done so.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Coop Bad DA › War Mod

The alternative is war

Berlinski 7-15-2018 – PhD in IR @ Oxford (Claire, “Europe’s Dependence on the U.S. Was All Part of the Plan: Postwar U.S. statesmen designed our world order as it is for a reason. They had lived through what happened without it.,” Politico, )

Trump’s NATO-bashing surprised no one. He has repeatedly suggested the United States’ postwar security architecture is a “bad deal,” one negotiated by weak and foolish “incompetents.” Foreign policy, in his view, is a zero-sum game; any benefit to another nation must of necessity be a loss for the United States. “NATO countries,” he declared on Twitter, “must pay MORE, the United States must pay LESS. Very Unfair!” Unfair? A world that revolves around American military, economic and cultural power, and uses the U.S. dollar as its reserve currency? What Trump fails to understand is that the disparity in spending, with the U.S. paying more than its allies, is not a bug of the system. It is a feature. This is how the great postwar statesmen designed it, and this immensely foresighted strategy has ensured the absence of great power conflict—and nuclear war—for three-quarters of a century. The open, liberal world order we know today was built in the wake of World War II and expanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By design, it is led by the United States; by design, it ensures permanent U.S. military hegemony over Eurasia while uniting Europe under the U.S.’ protection. The goal of this American grand strategy is to prevent any single power from dominating the region and turning on the United States and its allies. American hegemony serves, too, to quell previously intractable regional rivalries, preventing further world wars. Dean Acheson, George Marshall and the other great statesmen of their generation pursued this strategy because they had learned, at unimaginable cost, that the eternal American fantasy of forever being free of Europe—isolationism, or America Firstism, in other words—was just that: a fantasy. Four hundred thousand American men lost their lives in the European theaters of the First and Second World Wars. (American fatalities in all of the other 20th-century conflicts—including Vietnam, Korea and the Persian Gulf—do not total one-quarter of that number.) Our postwar statesmen were neither weak nor incompetent. They were the architects of the greatest foreign policy triumph in U.S. history. So successful was this policy that Americans now—most of whom weren’t alive to witness the enormity of these wars—see peace, unity, prosperity and stability as Europe’s natural state. This is an illusion. For centuries, Europe was the fulcrum of global violence. With the age of global exploration, it became the globe’s primary exporter of violence, the tempo and horror of the carnage rising every century with improvements in technology for violence. The Scramble for Africa, the division and colonization of that continent by Europe, is a case in point. The 1884-85 Berlin West Africa Conference, which assembled the representatives of 13 European powers to settle their colonial claims to Africa by diplomacy in place of arms, did lead to peace in Europe for several years. Africans, however, would not recall these years for their exceptional comity. For example, the conference indulged King Léopold II’s claim that the Congo Free State was his private property. Ten million Congolese souls perished under his ministrations. In recognizing this history of blood, however, we must recognize something equally true: In the wake of World War II, liberal democracy saw its fullest realization in the West. This flourishing of peace and human rights cannot be explained by a sudden outbreak of European pacifism. (Consider the 1956 Suez expedition, crushed by an infuriated President Dwight Eisenhower; or the 1954-62 Franco-Algerian War.) It happened because during World War II, Europe destroyed itself, leaving the United States overwhelmingly powerful by comparison, its only rival the Soviet Union. Through the application of economic, diplomatic and military force majeure, the United States suppressed Europe’s internal security competition. This is why postwar Europe ceased to be the world’s leading exporter of violence and became, instead, the world’s leading exporter of luxury sedans. Only America, and massive power as the U.S. exercised it, could have pacified and unified Europe under its aegis. No other continental country possessed half the world’s GDP. No other country had enough distance from Europe to be trusted, to a large extent, by all parties and indifferent to its regional jealousies. No other country had a strategic, moral and economic vision for Europe that its inhabitants could be persuaded gladly to share. Indeed, Europeans cooperated with the U.S. program because it created conditions under which both the United States and Europe flourished. The United States assisted Europe’s postwar economic recovery with $13 billion of aid in the form of the Marshall Plan. (In today’s dollars, roughly $113 billion.) It midwifed the groupings and treaties that would become the European Union. It brought Europe under the U.S. security umbrella with the NATO treaty. Article V of the treaty, its most important element, declares that an attack on one member of NATO is an attack on all members. These policies were intended not only to counter the Soviet Union, but to condition Europe’s prosperity upon its integration into a single market, with free movement of goods, capital and labor. The founders of these institutions fully intended them to be the foundations of a United States of Europe, much like the United States of America. Profound economic interdependence, they believed, would make further European wars impossible. At the same time, the United States built an open, global order upon an architecture of specific institutions: the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the International Court of Justice. This order is in many respects an empire—a Pax Americana—but it is more humane than any empire that preceded it, with institutions that are intended to benefit all parties. Postwar U.S. statesmen believed that prosperous, liberal democracies that traded freely with each other would neither go to war with each other nor the United States. They ascribed, in other words, to the so-called Democratic Peace theory—a theory with overwhelming empirical support. The U.S. military was always an integral part of the plan to unite and rebuild Europe from the rubble. Since World War II, U.S. troops have been deployed in Eurasia to ensure the continent cannot be dominated by a single power capable of monopolizing its resources and turning them against the U.S. The United States has built overwhelmingly massive military assets there to deter local arms races before they begin, and it has simultaneously assured those under U.S. protection that there is no need to begin local arms races, for their safety is guaranteed. American grand strategy rests upon the credibility of its promise to protect American allies; this credibility rests, in turn, upon U.S. willingness to display its commitment. (The Berlin Airlift, when U.S. troops airlifted supplies to Berlin during a Soviet blockade, was precisely such a display.) In return for the United States’ commitment, U.S. allies have accepted America’s dominant role in the international system. In the postwar era, just as now, the enemies of liberal democracy sought to undermine the order the U.S. was building. Precisely because the Marshall Plan would strengthen and unite the West under the United States’ protection, the Soviet Union’s propaganda organs cranked into overdrive to denounce it. A cartoon, for example, published in Isvestia in 1949, depicted the Marshall Plan’s administrator, Paul Hoffman, as a fat capitalist bent on destroying the sovereignty of European nations. The French paper L'Humanité, which reliably parroted Moscow’s line, wrote, “After disorganizing the national economies of the countries which are under the American yoke, American leaders now intend conclusively to subjugate the economy of these countries to their own interests.” The Soviet Union’s criticism of the Marshall Plan and other American involvement in Europe was eerily similar to the language Russia’s now uses in its campaign to undermine NATO and the EU. The vocabulary and tropes of Russian propaganda are widely echoed, wittingly or unwittingly, by far-right, far-left and other antiliberal politicians, parties and movements throughout the West. With the men who built the postwar world order now in their graves, and the memory of carnage and horror buried with them, a very sizable constituency of Americans has forgotten that their country built this system for a reason—that the United States does not maintain its alliances as an act of foolish largesse. The loudest exponent of the idea that the U.S. is getting rolled, that the European Union was “created to destroy us,” and that multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization assault the “sovereignty” of the nations concerned is, unfortunately, the president of the United States. It’s hard to understate how foolish and reckless these notions are. History can be shoved down the memory hole, for a time, but reality is never so cooperative. Global free trade sustains modern economic life. An interruption to this trade—carried out chiefly on global shipping lanes safeguarded by the U.S. military—would bring modern life to an end. The Second World War proved not only that isolationism and American-Firstism were fantasies, but exceptionally childish and dangerous ones, at that. In the age of hyperglobalized trade, international air travel, the internet, nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles, these fantasies are even more childish and dangerous. The U.S. may be on another continent, but it is not on another planet. It is true that the U.S. spends more on its military, in absolute dollars and as a percentage of GDP, than any European country. That was always part of the deal. The U.S. is a global superpower. It can fight a war anywhere in the world, invade any country at will, and (at least in theory) fight multiple simultaneous major wars—even in space. Of course this costs more. It is in America’s advantage to be the only power on the planet that can do this. Conversely, it is not remotely in America’s advantage for other countries to spend as much money on their militaries as we do. Europe is America’s biggest export market, as designed. We want Europeans to spend their money enjoying U.S. goods and services, not razing Flanders to the ground yet again. Yet Trump’s refusal to deter our shared enemies and protect our allies risks provoking a regional European arms race—exactly what the U.S. has sought to avoid for 74 years. It is an invitation to adventurism from Putin. Trump’s refusal to adopt the encouraging language of past presidents toward European integration, language that until now has been transformed into policy by professional and experienced State Department employees, puts further strain on an already-weakened Europe. Above all, Trump’s overt support for sordid, Kremlin-backed actors who seek to undermine Europe’s unity is unfathomable: How could it be in Europe’s interest, or in ours, for the American president to lend the United States’ prestige and support to Europe’s Nazis, neo-Nazis, doctrinal Marxists, populists, authoritarians, and ethnic supremacists, particularly since all of them are ideologically hostile to the United States? The damage Trump has deliberately inflicted on Europe’s stability comes at a uniquely dangerous time. Democracy’s so-called third wave—the global blossoming of open political systems after the Cold War—has long since receded. A threat to liberal democracy, in the form of a distinct, rival ideology—illiberal democracy—is ascendant. We see it today in Russia and Turkey—a corrupt, oligarchic, kleptocratic and hollow form of democracy that spreads and consolidates itself through the new technologies of the 21st century. The global order the U.S. built was based on the principle that only a world of liberal democracies can be peaceful and prosperous. That principle is correct. Should the unraveling of the order the U.S. built proceed at this pace, the world will soon be neither peaceful nor prosperous. Nor will the effects be confined to regions distant from the United States. America will feel them gradually, and then, probably, overnight—in the form of a devastating, sudden shock. Charles de Gaulle believed the Anglophone world could not, in the long term, be trusted with French security. It led him to withdraw France from NATO’s military integrated command and launch an independent nuclear development program. The independent nuclear program was real, but the withdrawal from NATO wasn’t—a secret agreement kept France in NATO anyway. But, today, with other NATO members obliged to consider the costs and benefits of an independent accommodation with Russia and the risks and rewards of acquiring an independent nuclear deterrent, de Gaulle is saying from the grave, I told you so. The American-led world order, undergirded by the ideal of liberal democracy, has been highly imperfect. But it has been the closest thing to Utopia our fallen and benighted species has ever seen. Its benefits are not just economic, although those benefits are immense. Its benefits must be measured in wars not fought, lives not squandered. Yet many Americans have turned their backs on history and reality alike. Let us hope pride does not prevent them from realizing this mistake before it’s far too late.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Coop Bad DA › Top Level

American leadership in NATO solves their impacts

Burns 2018 - former under secretary of state and ambassador to NATO, teaches diplomacy and international relations at Harvard Nicholas, "What America Gets out of NATO," Jul 11, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/11/opinion/what-america-gets-out-of-nato.html

Third, future American leaders will find Europe is our most capable and willing partner in tackling the biggest threats to global security: climate change; drugand cybercrime cartels; terrorism; pandemics and mass migration from Africa and the Middle East. And America’s NATO allies will continue to be indispensable in safeguarding democracy and freedom, under assault by Russia and China.

Mr. Trump’s campaign to undermine the European Union and diminish America’s leadership in NATO serves none of these interests. He seems driven by resentment about European trade surpluses and low defense budgets, issues that blind him to all the other benefits Americans derive from our alliance with Europe and Canada.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Coop Bad DA › Top Level

NATO is key---it’s a full-spectrum force multiplier and guarantees multilateral logistics

Weinrod 16 - Former Secretary of Defense Representative Europe and Defense Advisor to the U.S. Mission NATO (W Bruce, “We Still Need NATO,” The American Interest, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/01/15/we-still-need-nato/)

Not only does NATO remain relevant, but more importantly it continues to support and advance U.S. security interests—though again, often in ways that do not make headlines and that casual observers rarely appreciate in full. Most fundamentally, NATO provides a standing multilateral military capability that can deter or be deployed should a significant security threat arise. Because NATO has a military capability in place, the core elements for mobilization, deployment, and sustainment of substantial multilateral military forces already exist. The ongoing training, exercises, and regular communication among the national militaries of NATO members allows them to jump-start preparations and actions when needed without very lengthy preparatory work. This can allow the U.S. government to proceed in shaping and leading military coalitions more quickly, at less cost and with greater effectiveness, than if NATO did not exist and its functional equivalent had to be invented from scratch at a moment’s notice. While the U.S. government retains the capacity and the right to act unilaterally if and when necessary, it makes sense for it to act with others whenever possible, whether through NATO or ad hoc coalitions of the willing. A multilateral framework can provide both political cover and military resources, and the United States very much can benefit from both. The United States also benefits significantly from NATO’s logistics capabilities. Pontificating about grand strategies sounds impressive, but for military effectiveness and success, logistics capabilities are what really count. For example, while NATO did not formally participate in the 1991 Gulf War, NATO resources, supplies, bases, and other infrastructure provided crucial support prior to and during the U.S.-led coalition military action to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. The coalition in effect borrowed NATO capacities already in existence, and benefitted greatly from equipment compatibility and common training and resources. Other coalitions of the willing assembled under U.S auspices and utilizing NATO resources can follow the same approach. In addition, the U.S. government has access to the numerous military facilities and resources that member nations make available to NATO. A good example is Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, now being used against ISIS in what is not a formal NATO operation. As importantly, working through NATO usually makes it relatively routine for host governments to agree to U.S. requests to use facilities within their territory for military-related purposes. Without NATO, in order to fulfill its security responsibilities, the U.S. government would need to develop and maintain a complex network of bilateral and multilateral security agreements and arrangements that would seek to maintain the kind of connectivity and flexibility that NATO already provides. Further, the U.S. government would need not only agreements to access such military facilities but also would likely need to obtain specific approval from the host nation for each use and perhaps even in some cases legislative approval. In general, it is much simpler, faster, and easier politically and otherwise for nations to grant the United States the use of their facilities within a NATO framework than it would be to have to grant permission to the United States on their own. Over recent decades NATO has, as noted above, developed a global security network that reflects formalized relationships with non-NATO nations. For the United States, this brings the advantage that it can work through NATO to develop or enhance security relationships with states that belong to the PFP, the MD, the ICI, and NATO bilateral security relationships. Working through NATO provides an extra dimension to U.S. efforts to enhance the military capacities of friends and allies in various regions who, with training and assistance, can provide supplementary support to NATO or U.S.-led operations. NATO also supports U.S. interests by providing a multilateral framework for a U.S. presence in nations where the U.S. government wishes to help train and also enhance its military contacts, but where unilateral U.S. military involvement might be politically contentious.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Solvency › US Key

US leadership is key to NATO effectiveness

NYT 2018 - Editorial Board "Why NATO Matters," Jul 8, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/opinion/editorials/why-nato-matters.html

Across seven decades NATO has invoked its Article 5 mutual defense commitment only once: to rally to the defense of the United States after the attacks of 9/11. Even today, the armed forces of 39 countries are serving, and sometimes dying, with American troops in Afghanistan.

More than 70 (NATO and non-NATO) countries are part of the U.S.-led fight against the Islamic State; two dozen countries have joined a global counterterrorism initiative.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Solvency › SPS

SPS can specifically focus on CBRN threats like disease – that enables effective mitigation efforts

NATO ESCG 2019. The Emerging Security Challenges Division. “THE NATO SCIENCE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY SPS PROGRAMME.” NATO OTAN. 2019. IZP)

In line with NATO’s political agenda to improve the ability of the Alliance and its partners to protect their populations and forces from CBRN threats, the SPS Programme supports activities under the key priority of Defence against CBRN agents. This ambition to continuously improve NATO’s capabilities and technologies to counter CBRN threats was reiterated at the 2018 Brussels Summit by the Alliance’s Heads of State and Government. The objectives of SPS activities under this key priority are to deliver high-quality scientific research, develop technologies and capacity building, and train young researchers and experts, strengthening the overall resilience and capabilities of participating countries. In this way, SPS supports situational awareness on safety and security developments, and enhances CRBN response capabilities, technical competences and skills in NATO and partner nations. Under this key priority, a total of 18 SPS activities were completed in 2019, involving co-directors from 21 countries. 11 MYPs developed technologies to rapidly and efficiently detect and identify CBRN agents, increase the efficiency of decontamination, detect biological agents, and manage radioactive dust disturbances and leaks. 512 specialists were trained in a single ATC on medical counter-measures and emerging technologies against CBRN agents. Moreover, three ASIs and three ARWs brought together 72 scientists and 227 participants respectively to share their skills and knowledge, and discuss topics such as diagnosis and exposure assessment, detection, and nanotechnology. DIMLAB-Deployable Chemical and Biological Analytical Laboratory [new] November 21-22, 2019 marked the official launch of the MYP, “Deployable Biological and Chemical Analytical Laboratory (DIMLAB)” in Madrid, Spain. This 30-month project, will be run by an international consortium including Spanish non- profit association, Adelfas, as project coordinator; the 1st Regiment of NBC Defense “Valencia” of the Spanish Army; the Mohammed V University Science Faculty; the General Directorate of Civil Protection, Morocco; the Institute of Applied Sciences and Technology (INSAT); and both the Tunisian General Directorate of Environment and Quality of Life and National Office of Civil Protection. Two dual-use (civil and military) deployable laboratories, one chemical and one biological, will be built for Tunisia and Morocco respectively. In attendance at the project launch were representatives from the SPS Programme, Adelfas members, scientific delegations from Morocco and Tunisia, and Ministry of Defence representatives from the three participating countries. NATO has been working with its partners towards strengthening its capacity to defend against CBRN agents. Scientific research with direct applications in defence and security, such as the DIMLAB project, is necessary to ensure that the Alliance meets its strategic partnership objective, which calls for mutually beneficial cooperation on issues of common interest including CBRN defence. This project is a key component of the SPS contribution to the DCB package for Tunisia, which also listed CBRN defence as a priority area of cooperation with NATO in its most recent IPCP. Similarly, the latest draft of the IPCP between NATO and Morocco highlighted “exchange of information and expertise, and capacity building in defence against CBRN agents” as a main practical area of cooperation through the SPS Programme. CBRN Exposure Assessment and Medical Countermeasures [completed] This ARW was initiated and supported by different organizations pertaining to the French Ministry of Armed Forces, the Commissariat à l’Energie Atomique et aux énergies alternatives (CEA) and the National Federation of Firefighters. It was embedded in the 3rd International Conference CBRNE on Research and Innovation held in Nantes, which welcomed internationally recognized scientists from different NATO and partner nations. 109 participants and speakers attended three interactive days of activities, discussing in depth all pillars of the new paradigm of medical countermeasures, including pre-deployment aspects to supportive care and new antidotes/ vaccine research activities or lessons learned from recent events. Presentations and posters addressed various threats (chemical, biological, viral diseases), as well as skin decontamination, and detection (alert and identification). This event directly addressed the strategic objective to “further develop NATO’s capacity to defend against the threat of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction”. Furthermore, it contributed to strengthening ties with an important partner in a critical area of defence and security research.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Solvency › Solvency Mechanism

Aff solvency mechanism

Giovanna De Maio 2020. Was a nonresident fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings. She is currently a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies. “NATO’S RESPONSE TO COVID-19: LESSONS FOR RESILIENCE AND READINESS.” Brookings. October 2020. . IZP)

A military alliance such as NATO is not a first responder in a health crisis, as most tasks must be implemented at the domestic level. However, given the impact and the spillover effects of COVID-19 on the very day-to-day operations of the alliance — military personnel are not immune from viruses — as well as on supply chains, and economies and societies around the world, it was paramount for NATO to take initiative both to protect its member states against malign actors and to offer crucial support in the spirit of solidarity. In spite of these successful initiatives, the Operations Division of NATO headquarters in Brussels has admitted64 that the alliance was ill-prepared to handle such a crisis. As Rittimann noted, the alliance lacked its own means and political bandwidth to do more.65 For this reason, NATO and its member states should not miss the opportunity that the COVID-19 crisis offers to set up more structured plans to ensure readiness in crisis management. In particular, they should expand the concept of security to include the most pressing non-military global security threats: climate change, health risks, and social resilience against disinformation. So far, NATO has set up a Lessons Learned Steering Group (LLSG)66 on COVID-19, which collects inputs by agencies, divisions, and delegations to help the alliance design a strategy for both future waves of this coronavirus and for future pandemics. Stemming from the inputs of the LLSG and from the reflections of officials interviewed for this paper, the following recommendations to the alliance focus on resilience and readiness in crisis management. ● Resilience: NATO must remain vigilant against malign exploitation of crises. Under whatever circumstances may arise, the Atlantic alliance should not shift its focus away from its main objectives of pushing back against adversaries through deterrence and response-readiness.67 ○ NATO should have a protocol to follow in case of crises like pandemics to ensure continuity of operations. So far, the alliance has shown impressive adaptability and was able to keep its missions running and continue with training and exercises, even if at a reduced level. However, military activities have been reduced by 33% with 80% fewer personnel participating,68 and the climate of uncertainty surrounding the impact of COVID-19 on NATO missions, training, and exercises could have left gaps for malign actors to exploit, especially in more fragile settings like in Iraq. To prevent future pandemics or similar events from eroding NATO’s readiness capabilities, it is paramount to develop structured plans and protocols that would allow timely adaptation, personnel protection, and resilience against external threats. To further protect core combat capabilities, it would be necessary for NATO personnel employed in quick-response units to receive early access to vaccines; the alliance should also be prepared with contact-tracing capabilities to identify outbreaks quickly.69 ○ NATO should increase its counter- disinformation efforts and protect its member states against malign actors exploiting crises to promote their geopolitical and economic interests. Although disinformation has been included among the list of threats to NATO since the 2014 summit in Wales, the alliance has not established a special agency or team to focus on countering disinformation. During COVID-19, when NATO member states were targeted by Chinese “mask diplomacy” and Russia’s claims about the inability of Western countries to deal with COVID-19, the organization resorted to its Public Diplomacy Division — in cooperation with the European Union’s East Stratcom Task Force70 — to increase its public profile and debunk Chinese and Russian fake news. However, this is not yet enough to counter the volume and reach of such propaganda, which requires real-time investigation and fact-checking and outreach to the audience that has been targeted by disinformation, with the possibility of providing training for soldiers and commanders to react to information warfare.71 For this reason, the alliance should consider setting up a dedicated team and establish a framework of coordination with the East Stratcom Task Force to broaden the scope of counter- disinformation efforts and take more targeted actions to strengthen societal resilience across member states. Readiness: NATO must further enhance its crisis management toolkit. The core lesson COVID-19 taught NATO concerned crisis management capabilities and culture. The alliance adjusted fairly quickly and made an incredibly efficient use of its logistical apparatus; yet, more can be done to enhance NATO readiness to face challenges of this nature. ○ Strengthen the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief Coordination Center. As mentioned, over the past few years, the EADRCC staff had been reduced to three people; as COVID-19 hit Europe, NATO was forced to rapidly reallocate military personnel from other departments to support the work of NATO’s clearinghouse for aid requests and delivery. At a time when the impact of global challenges can no longer be ignored, NATO should invest in and expand the EADRCC’s capacity and scope to increase preparedness in preparation for subsequent COVID-19 waves and other future catastrophic events. Along with the EADRCC, the alliance should enhance the flexibility in the NSPA procurement process in order to speed up access to cost-effective airlifting as well as to the procurement of medical equipment. Beyond overseeing the transportation supplies and medical assistance, the EADRCC could also play a role in coordinating NATO’s support to national armed forces in member states, in the event that such forces experience significant losses. ○ Increase knowledge, prediction capabilities, and awareness. Building on existing analytical platforms and programs72 and intelligence sharing between allied nations, NATO should increase its understanding and awareness of how global challenges and threats such as pandemics can affect NATO operations and personnel and increase preparation of tailored contingency plans for suitable responses. Some of these actions may include several aspects of the alliance’s activities, from decisionmaking to technological potential and research through its own laboratory (the Center for Maritime Research and Experimentation located in La Spezia, Italy) and its Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Program.73 Given NATO’s renewed sensitivity to biological risks, intelligence sharing could be crucial to elaborate plans for countering new threats such as bioterrorism.74 ○ Coordination with the European Union. NATO’s logistical apparatus was crucial in delivering aid when the EU’s Civil Protection Mechanism was under stress, and after initial hesitation, in coordination with the EU mechanism. Moving forward, in the words of Malcom Chalmers, deputy director-general of Britain’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the EU-NATO relationship will be crucial “if the West is to survive as a coherent entity.”75 Given that many NATO countries are also EU member states, all that applies to logistics, transportations, and purchases falls under the regulatory umbrella of the European Union. For this reason, a more established framework of cooperation between NATO and the EU will be crucial to ensure a smoother application of crisis protocols and ease the transportation of essential items within alliance territory, similarly to what was envisaged to ensure military mobility for the DEFENDER-Europe 20 drilling. In particular, the EU and NATO should also collaborate to establish permanent stockpiles76 and reduce the alliance’s dependence from global supply chain for crucial medical material, but also to develop cost-effective strategies for the production and distribution of a COVID-19 vaccine. Such coordination should also remain wary of duplicating efforts — as in the case of the NATO pandemic relief trust fund,77 which risks creating overlapping with the Civil Protection Mechanism for the accumulation of medical supplies.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Disease › Zoonotic Diseases Mod

Zoonotic diseases cause extinction---genome sequencing and data sharing is key to solve

MacPhee and Greenwood 13 - 1Vertebrate Zoology, American Museum of Natural History, PhD from University of Alberta, Professor, Richard Gilder Graduate School; Ph.D. degree and works as the Head of the Department of Wildlife Diseases at the Leibniz Institute for Zoo and Wildlife Research in Berlin, Germany, and Professor of wildlife diseases in the Department of Veterinary Medicine of the Freie Universität Berlin

(Ross and Alex, “Infectious Disease, Endangerment, and Extinction”, 1/4/13, https://www.hindawi.com/journals/ijeb/2013/571939/)

Why should the possible role of infectious disease in endangerment and extinction be regarded as a critical issue in modern conservation? Whether or not disease was ever a major cause of extinction in the fossil record [19], in our times it plays an acknowledged but perhaps underestimated role. Pathogen-driven population declines have been identified in a wide array of invertebrate and vertebrate taxa (cf. [20]), suggesting that the phenomenon is probably universal. Yet without the kinds of monitoring methods now available, some and perhaps most of these declines would have gone undetected, or attributed to other causes. Further, the processes forcing such declines are as diverse as the pathogens themselves and are far from being clearly understood. The apparent increase in zoonotic diseases during the last few decades [21] may be objectively real or merely due to better monitoring, but it seems highly likely that loss or reduction of pristine habitats and the overall impact of invasive species should promote the introduction of opportunistic pathogens into wildlife with increasing frequency. Thus, understanding the dynamics of disease-mediated species declines may be critical to conservation missions concerned with a wide variety of species and habitats. Recent advances in molecular biology and microbiology have permitted the detection and identification of hosts of novel microorganisms, many of which are pathogenic, and the technology needed to assess threat levels is becoming increasingly available. Although the fossil record clearly establishes that the fate of all species is to eventually die out, it is obvious from the same record that the rate of disappearance of individual species varies significantly [22]. As already noted, inferences about how (as opposed to when) an individual species disappeared must be developed inductively and retrospectively. An important guideline is that apparent causes of extinction that are diachronic (repeatedly affect species across time) are inherently more plausible than ones that are claimed to have occurred only once, or apply to only one taxon. Although this means that explanations about individual extinctions are not strictly testable, they can nevertheless be evaluated in terms of likelihood, which is the approach currently taken by the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and several other conservation organizations interested in compiling extinction statistics [23, 24]. It is an accepted tenet in conservation biology that any severe, continuing threat to a species might eventually contribute to its extinction [25]. From this perspective, it is also accepted that diseases presenting with very high levels of mortality—as in the case of a highly transmissible infection that is newly emergent in a population—can cause outright endangerment. But are there conditions under which a disease, probably in combination with other threats, might so imperil a species to cause its complete disappearance? MacPhee and Marx [19] considered this issue from the standpoint of model pathogenic features that a disease-provoking organism might exhibit in forcing the extinction of a given species. These features include: (1) a reservoir species presenting a stable carrier state for the pathogen, (2) a high potential for causing infections in susceptible species, affecting critical age groups, (3) a capacity for hyperlethality, defined here as mortality rates in the range of 50–75%. Only under the most extreme conditions is it conceivable that a species would suffer extinction in a single epizootic event. Much more likely would be repeated outbreaks over a period of years gradually reducing the fitness level of the species, with final disappearance potentially caused by stochastic events (such as causally unassociated climate change). One way in which this condition might be achieved would be through a stable carrier (i.e., a species other than the target, living in similar circumstances in the same environment, and in which the infection is inapparent or at least sublethal). A well-studied example is the transfer of simian acquired immunodeficiency virus from one species of macaque to another [26]. Although this instance occurred under captive conditions, repeated outbreaks of distemper in lions and African wild dogs have long been thought to be due to transfer from domestic dogs (although the mechanism is debated; see [27]). Obviously, for a disease to have a very severe impact, it would be necessary for the pathogen to occur in highly lethal, aggressive strains that strongly impact the target species before attenuated strains arise and become common. High potential for causing infections in a susceptible species is usually associated with the ability to successfully enter the organism through a major portal, such as the respiratory tract, where it can be lodged and transmitted easily (e.g., via aerosol). To achieve hyperlethality and produce serious mortality, all age groups within a species would probably have to be susceptible, not just the very young or very old (or the immunocompromised), with death the usual outcome. In large-bodied mammals, a fundamental consideration is that any process that deleteriously affects young individuals will have a pronounced effect on survivorship because of the lengthy intervals in birth spacing [19]. Lethality in the range of 50–75% is obviously extremely high and thus extremely unusual, although historically seen in Ebola infections in humans and in experimental transmission studies from pigs to macaques [28]. High percentages may have also been achieved in rinderpest outbreaks among East African bovids in the early 20th century [29], although quantitative data on this are largely lacking. An important issue here, however, is whether pathogens causing this level of lethality could maintain themselves in nature long enough to seriously imperil a species. Speculatively, a possible outcome with hyperlethal infections producing a rapid, fatal outcome is that affected populations would be reduced to small numbers of widely dispersed and/or relatively or completely immune individuals. Under these circumstances, the epizootic would necessarily abate as it ran out of new hosts, leading to the conclusion that exceptionally lethal diseases cannot be indefinitely maintained in a population or species under normal circumstances. However, if reservoirs exist from which the pathogen could repeatedly emerge, in principle epizootics might resurge year after year until population sizes were reduced below viable levels (~50–500 individuals). At this point stochastic effects might intervene and lead to complete loss of the species. Among possible examples of this “perfect storm” of circumstances and consequences is the loss of Christmas Island rats, detailed elsewhere in this paper. Among birds, the severe impact of avian malaria on Hawaiian honeycreepers is also pertinent and discussed later in this paper. Although a number of honeycreeper species survive at high elevations, above the limit at which introduced Culex mosquitos can survive, there are multiple adventitious threats, such as deforestation and competition from invasive species, which add to their endangerment picture [30]. Demonstrating that disease can produce endangerment and even extinction in species of invertebrates is not inherently more difficult than demonstrating the same thing for vertebrates. However, because there tend to be far fewer specialists for individual invertebrate groups, save for those having some degree of economic significance, the chances are high that disease impacts will frequently be missed. One case that was not missed was the loss of the last members of Partula turgida, a snail from French Polynesia that succumbed to an infection of the microsporidian Steinhausia sp. [31]. Steinhausia is a known parasite of various taxa of bivalve molluscans, infecting oocytes and thereby reducing fecundity (e.g., “mussel egg disease”; [32]). The decline of P. turgida received an unusual level of attention (for an invertebrate) because of this species’ importance for studying evolutionary variation and niche occupation [33]. This snail and several of its close relatives were already considered extinct in the wild due to predation by the introduced wolfsnail Euglandina when the last few known individuals were collected and kept as a captive colony. As is frequently the case with unmanaged natural populations, there were no relevant baseline data for this species, and it cannot be excluded that Steinhausia was already present in the colony. Admittedly, so small a coterie of individuals hardly constituted a viable species and could have been driven to extinction by other mechanisms as well. It should also be noted that Steinhausia infections are not known to present a severe threat to any natural populations of bivalves, or at least any that have maintained normal populations. Other possible instances of extinction by disease in invertebrates are few and inconclusive [1], although the loss of the eelgrass limpet (Lottia alveus) may be mentioned in this context as it demonstrates that “pathogen pollution” can have severe indirect effects on species other than the one affected by disease [34]. In this case, eelgrass wasting disease killed off seagrasses on both sides of the Atlantic on such a massive scale that all known populations of this limpet terminally crashed [35]. 4. Extinction and Infectious Disease in Amphibians In their survey Smith et al. [4] noted that amphibians account for 30% of critically endangered animals and that they also comprise approximately 75% of critically endangered species threatened by disease. Although ranavirus infections, trematode infestations, and several other pathogen threats have been proposed as driving particular cases of decline, the agent thought to contribute most widely to amphibian endangerment is Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis, first identified in the 1990s as the cause of a fatal chytridiomycosis [36, 37]. A concern that has emerged in the last few years is the effect of the global trade in amphibians on the health of natural populations. There are several instances of ranavirus and chytrid infections having been detected in pet store populations [38]; if infected individuals were to escape, transmission to wildlife is an obvious possibility. Release of captive-bred animals in reintroduction experiments represent another potential danger if captives were exposed to virulent pathogens. Amphibians are under global assault from a large variety of impactors additional to infectious diseases, including habitat loss, pollution, pesticides, and harmful UV radiation. Perhaps as many as 120 amphibian species have already been driven to extinction in recent decades; however, because of the complexity of the factors affecting their endangerment, the number actually lost to the effects of infectious disease remains uncertain [4, 39]. 5. Extinction and Infectious Disease in Birds Smith et al. [4] identified 18 examples of bird extinctions and extirpations that have been attributed at least partly to infectious diseases. Of these, 16 cases concern endemics that lived in the Hawaiian Islands; most were from one tribe of finches, the Hawaiian honeycreepers (Drepanidini, Fringillidae). Warner [40] proposed that these losses were due to panzootics caused by the inadvertent introduction of Culex quinquefasciatus, a vector of avian malaria (Plasmodium relictum). Another lethal agent, presumably introduced as well, was avian pox (Poxvirus avium). Although there are no empirical observations relating to the hypothesized panzootics (which presumably occurred in the early 19th century, when the mosquito arrived), one obvious effect of massive population depletions was that surviving species of honeycreepers—formerly common in the lowlands—became restricted to higher elevations where the mosquitoes do not occur. Additional research in more recent years indicates that such diseases limit the distribution and abundance of susceptible species, and that it is these factors (grouped as habitat loss) that primarily govern local or complete extinction [41, 42]. 6. Extinction and Infectious Disease in Mammals Although there are several current examples of mammalian species already under threat for various reasons being severely impacted by infectious diseases—including canine distemper in black-footed ferrets and lions [43, 44], Ebola and Marburg hemorrhagic diseases in anthropoids [45], and transmissible facial tumour disease in Tasmanian devils [46]—none of these has (yet) resulted in extinction. Possible examples in the mammalian fossil record (cf. [19]), although compelling in some instances, lack adequate corroboration for reasons already discussed. Indeed, to date there is only one study [10] that may be said to meet appropriate retrospective criteria for identifying disease as the primary cause of extinction at the species level in any mammal. This study involved an investigation of the disappearance of two endemic murid species on Christmas Island (Indian Ocean) at the beginning of the 20th century. That the Christmas Island extinctions could be usefully studied at all is due in large measure to the work of the biologist Andrews [47] and, later, the parasitologist Durham [48], both of whom spent considerable time on the island and recorded many valuable observations on the rats before and during their disappearance. Christmas Island was evidently uninhabited by humans until the last quarter of the 19th century. With the discovery of phosphate deposits on the island, its exploitation became inevitable, and Christmas Island was formally annexed by the United Kingdom in 1888. An immediate result was increased ship traffic, with the result that in 1899 black rats (Rattus rattus) were inadvertently introduced. Within 5 years, the two endemic murids, the Christmas Island rat (Rattus macleari) and the bulldog rat (Rattus nativitatis), were seriously affected; populations declined precipitously, and individuals were described as behaving abnormally (e.g., nocturnally active rodents appearing during the daytime) and displaying evidence of infection with parasitic trypanosomiasis [48]. By 1908 it was believed that the native rats had become extinct, but that some of the endemic diversity should have survived in the form of R. rattus × R. macleari and R. rattus × R. macleari hybrids (as deduced from pelt characteristics). Samples of hybrids, together with earlier collections of the Christmas Island rat and the less abundant bulldog rat, have been stored in museum collections in the UK since then. Wyatt et al. [10] extracted DNA from all available remaining Christmas Island and bulldog rats along with putative hybrid animals and black rats collected at the same time. Mitochondrial, nuclear, and trypanosome DNAs were amplified from the samples. Mitochondrial and nuclear DNA analysis clearly indicated Rattus rattus and Rattus macleari were biologically distinct, but that the alleged hybrids were in fact exclusively black rat morphotypes. Thus, the Christmas Island rat is completely extinct and its genetic endowment has not persisted in any form. Genetic evidence of the murid-specific trypanosome Trypanosoma lewisi was found in the true black rat and the Christmas Island rat samples. In samples of the bulldog rat, all collected earlier than 1899, no evidence of trypanosome infection could be found. Thus, detection of trypanosomes correlates with the arrival of invasive black rats and the subsequent extinction of the native rat species on Christmas Island (only inferential in the case of the bulldog rat). Like many other islands, Christmas Island is notable for having suffered mammal extinctions that cannot be explained by hunting pressure or sudden changes in climate [49]. The only other native ground-dwelling mammal on the island, the Christmas Island shrew (Crocidura trichura), survived many decades after the disappearance of the endemic rodents, but it has not been seen since 1985 despite considerable surveying effort [50]. More recently, the Christmas Island pipistrelle (Pipistrellus murrayi) appears to have become extinct in 2010, following an unexplained precipitous decline starting in the 1980s [50, 51]. The last remaining native mammal is the Christmas Island flying fox (Pteopus melanotus natalis), also declining rapidly. Whether these extinctions and declines subsequent to the loss of the endemic rats are disease-related might be resolved if appropriate samples were collected historically, although this possibility has not yet been investigated. In summary, and regardless of final cause, the rodent extinctions on Christmas Island display two interesting features. First, the extinctions were extremely rapid: the interval from first notice of decline to declared extinction was 10 years, with the actual event probably occurring within an even shorter period [52]. Second, the species affected would not normally be regarded as being particularly susceptible to extinction; murid rodents tend to be extremely adaptable, with high reproductive rates, and thus would normally be well buffered against population collapses sufficient to cause complete loss. The susceptibility factor at work in these cases was almost certainly long isolation on, and restriction to, a single small island. Among mammals the “island extinction effect” is particularly well investigated; more than 80% of the ~80–90 species of mammals that became extinct in the past 500 years were island dwelling [53]. Such losses are usually attributed to habitat destruction and the deleterious effects of invasive species, but under some circumstances introduced infectious diseases might be plausible as drivers. There are a number of other, largely anecdotal, instances of mammalian species succumbing to unknown infectious diseases (see [19]). One example of considerable interest is the Tasmanian tiger or thylacine (Thylacinus cynocephalus). Although extensively hunted because of its supposed taste for sheep, until the turn of the 20th century thylacines were not uncommon. Thereafter they became exceedingly rare, with no confirmed kills logged after about 1910. Distemperlike outbreaks observed in captive thylacines, as well as widespread outbreaks in other Australian marsupials at the same time, have been taken as anecdotal evidence that disease played a role in the final disappearance of thylacines [1]. Validation of a role for disease in this extinction would be particularly difficult, as distemper viruses are single-stranded RNA paramyxoviruses that are unlikely to be preserved in museum skins or bone. 7. Recent Cases of Infectious Disease Causing Serious Endangerment in Mammals Several excellent review articles have analyzed the impacts of infectious disease on extant natural populations [1, 3, 4]. To these may be added several more examples of verified associations of disease and severe population decline in mammal species living in diverse environments. Whether any of these taxa will actually disappear is unknown at present, but the very fact that new examples are being discovered at a much higher rate than in past decades presumably indicates that infectious diseases have been undervalued as a significant cause of species endangerment. 7.1. Koalas Koalas are under siege by two major pathogens. Kola retrovirus (KoRV), frequently observed in captive koalas, is oncogenic and causes substantial mortality [54]. The virus is not distributed evenly across Australia, as its frequency within populations decreases from north to south. Given the history of overhunting of koalas in the last 120 years, especially in southern Australia, it was originally concluded that KoRV must have entered Australia within the last 200 years, travelling from north to south [55]. However, a recent study [14] utilizing historical samples demonstrated that KoRV was already widespread by the late 1800s in northern Australia. Furthermore, its evolution is very slow, which is consistent with the retrovirus having entered koala populations long before this and likely having caused disease throughout this time. The second pathogen decimating koala populations at present is a specific strain of infectious Chlamydia pecorum. Infection can result in subsequent sterility or blindness [56]. There is some evidence that KoRV infection correlates with chlamydial infection [57]. This is plausible, as KoRV belongs to the gammaretrovirus family, many members of which are immunosuppressive. Infection with KoRV would thus provide opportunities for secondary infectious agents such as Chlamydia in less-resistant hosts. Koala populations exhibit low diversity in their mitochondrial DNA [58]; this lack of genetic diversity, if it affects overall resistance, may be emblematic of their inability to fend off infectious agents. According to the World Wildlife Foundation [59], serious overlapping infections of this kind could lead to the local extirpation, if not the outright extinction, of koalas within the next 50 years. 7.2. Myotis Bats A cryophilous fungus (Geomyces destructans), introduced to the northeastern USA from Europe within the last decade, has been conclusively shown to cause massive mortality (“white nose syndrome”) in the little brown bat (Myotis lucifugus) [60]. Fungal infections do not normally induce severe disease in mammals, except in cases of immunosuppression (often itself caused by another pathogen). Interestingly, Myotis myotis, a closely related species endemic to Europe, is also infected with this fungus, but other than the characteristic “white nose” produced by fungal growth, animals suffer no negative symptoms and there is no increased mortality associated with infection [61–63]. Geomyces destructans, which only grows at cold temperatures, interrupts bat hibernation; this causes wintering animals to awaken more frequently than normal, seriously impairing their energy and water balances and ultimately leading to death. Although why these two species differ so dramatically in their response to infection is obscure, the consequences are clear; millions of little brown bats, including entire populations of some hibernacula, have died as a result of their incapacity to resist infection [61]. Indeed, current mortality rates suggest that the little brown bat may eventually suffer complete regional extinction [64]. 7.3. Tasmanian Devils Devil facial tumor disease (DFTD), a severe threat to the Tasmanian devil (Sarcophilus harrisii), is currently receiving a great deal of attention because of its highly unusual nature [65]. Unlike most infectious diseases, the agent in this case is not viral, bacterial, parasitic, or prion-derived (infectious protein). Rather, the agent is a tumor that is spread from individual to individual by mechanical transmission of tumor cells during agonistic encounters, which often involve aggressive behavior. The only similarly infectious cancer identified to date is canine transmissible venereal tumor (CTVT), which affects dogs. The DFTD source tumor evidently derived from multiple individual clones developed in a single female; male and female devils are equally susceptible, and the disease has now spread throughout Tasmania. Museum samples predating 1996 display no evidence of the disease, making it likely that DFTD is newly emergent. At the same time, there are clearly complex evolutionary dynamics at play; for example, different clonal lineages derived from the original source tumor vary in frequency, geographical distribution, and diversity [65]. How such tumors manage to escape the devil’s immune system is unknown, but the ongoing threat is very real. Unless tumor-free populations can be established and protected, further population collapse, if not complete extinction, will be the probable outcome [66, 67]. Although host-pathogen interactions have been a subject of interest in conservation biology for some time, the possibility that disease might actually drive extinctions in certain contexts has rarely been considered. This is partly due to a general lack of knowledge concerning wildlife pathogens and their microbiology, but it also stems from a lack of well-researched and unequivocal examples of disease-induced loss of naturally occurring populations or species. We anticipate that, with the advent of endeavors such as the Human Microbiome Project [68] and the further development of next-generation sequencing, we will have an increasingly better understanding of microbiological processes in wildlife. Because of their relevance to human health, bat and rodent viromes are being explored with special intensity using high-throughput approaches, with the result that many novel—and potentially significantly pathogenic—viral strains have been identified in recent years [8, 69–72]. As such surveys increase, and sequencing costs decrease, we can expect to see a wealth of new data concerning microbiological diversity in wildlife, as well as new understandings of the natural history of host-pathogen relationships. New insights will also come from archives that we have never heretofore been able to tap. It is already the case that entire genomes from historical samples (aboriginal human genome) or now-extinct species (woolly mammoths, neandertals) have proven amenable to reconstruction using modern methodologies; it may be confidently predicted that our ability to undertake such investigations will only improve in future [73]. With regard to ancient pathogens, investigators have already made exciting discoveries, such as the recent identification of previously undocumented strains of Yersinia pestis retrieved from 13th century plague pits [16]. At present, the most promising methods are based on either microarray or solution-based hybrid capture methods, in which a sequence of interest is either synthesized directly or produced by PCR, biotinylated, and then used to “capture” target sequences in samples from which sequencing libraries have been generated [74]. With DNA microarrays, multiple targets can be collected in a single experiment; when coupled with next-generation sequencing, extraordinary amounts of sequence information can be recovered at minimal cost. Although such methods have been primarily applied to modern DNA, there have been some notable successes with ancient DNA applications [75, 76]. Again, it is surely reasonable to assume that, as methodologies improve and are applied to fresh questions, we will be able to recover sequence data on ancient DNA-based pathogens at levels that would have been unimaginable only a decade or so ago. To be sure, RNA-based pathogens may remain resistant to study due to the poor preservation of RNA genomes after mortem, but even here there is reason to be optimistic. For example, improvements in protein sequencing may provide information on the identity of RNA-based viruses (either as such, or in the form of presence/absence information), even though the level of analytical detail will likely be persistently poorer than we can now achieve with DNA-genome-based pathogens [77]. Whether epizootics in wildlife occupying pristine environments are in fact increasing is a question that can only be settled by much larger pools of data than we have at present. Nevertheless, we believe that understanding the role of disease in provoking endangerment and extinction is critically important to the education of conservation professionals, if only because the contribution of disease to declines and outright extinction has likely been underestimated. What we do not understand, or ignore, may be what hurts us most.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Disease › Zoonotic Diseases Mod

Data sharing is key to quickly identify and respond to zoonotic diseases

Luheshi et al 15 - Junior Associate Fellow at Centre for Science and Policy, University of Cambridge; Dr Sobia Raza is a Data Science Policy Analyst at the PHG Foundation; Sharon J. Peacock is at the Department of Medicine, University of Cambridge, Genome Medicine

(Leila, “Moving pathogen genomics out of the lab and into the clinic: what will it take?”, 12/30/15, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4697326/)

Pathogen genomics is a team game The most successful demonstrations of the capabilities of pathogen genomics were the deciphering of the origins of the Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus and the management of the Europe-wide 2011 STEC outbreak. These have also been excellent examples of the effectiveness of collaborations, which were supported by openness and data sharing, that span multiple geographies, fields of expertise and professional groups. As we move towards implementing these advances across entire health systems, this collaborative spirit needs to be harnessed and scaled up to deliver more formalised networks for sharing knowledge and best practice. These networks will expedite national service deployment, accelerate future service development and provide expert forums in which the arduous but essential task of establishing the standards and benchmarks of service quality can be undertaken. High-level strategic coordination and knowledge-sharing across health delivery organisations are equally essential. For example, synergy in the development of pathogen genomics programmes across animal and human health sectors will be needed to deliver a ‘one-health’ approach to tackling many of the most pressing zoonotic disease threats, such as avian influenza and the spread of antimicrobial resistance from livestock to humans, as well as the more commonplace but persistent issue of foodborne illnesses. Data — it’s time to go big No large-scale genomics enterprise can hope to succeed without effective data integration and sharing. In the case of pathogen genomics for clinical or public health, data integration will require the construction of dedicated infrastructure (real or virtual) to collate, store, analyse and share genomic, epidemiological and clinical data across complex national and international health systems. This integration will be particularly crucial to enable the delivery of genomic epidemiology services, in which the requirement for data sharing across locations is fundamental and time (as in the 2015 Ebola outbreak) is very much of the essence. Data integration and access will become equally central in diagnostic microbiology, where having an accurate and readily accessible summary of genotype, phenotype and clinical information for different pathogens is essential to deliver care to patients. Notably, the Global Microbial Identifier (http://www.globalmicrobialidentifier.org/Workgroups#work-group-1) and the Global Alliance for Genomic Health (https://genomicsandhealth.org/node/12703) projects are already demonstrating that huge technical, regulatory and political efforts will be required to overcome barriers imposed by the varying capabilities, legal systems and cultural frameworks of different nations if transnational genomic and clinical data integration is to be achieved. As an example, such barriers led the Indonesian government to temporarily withdraw from the Global Influenza Surveillance Network in 2007, owing to concerns that, if data were shared, proprietary interests would be exerted over the H5N1 strains [9]. The same issues can also impose barriers to sharing and data integration within individual health systems. Staying ahead of the game The application of genomics to infectious disease management is still in its infancy, and we currently lack the background knowledge, as well as the technological capability, to deliver rapid, clinically actionable information based on genomic analysis that can improve outcomes for patients. This situation is fluid, as sequencing technology (in the form of devices that are increasingly more portable, cost less and have a longer read capability) and analysis (in the form of cloud computing, more efficient metagenomic analysis and implementation of automated analytic pipelines) continue to develop apace. However, capitalising on the current rapid pace of innovation will demand novel approaches to public–private cooperation and co-development of the type seen with the Oxford Nanopore Minion Access Programme, which puts new genomic technology in the hands of its users (including those in the health system) at the earliest possible opportunity [10]. These efforts will also benefit from building on the commendably open and collaborative approaches for the development of knowledge and analytical methods that are already being taken by many pathogen genomics researchers. These collaborations will ensure that the knowledge and expertise of these researchers are shared rapidly with the clinical and public-health communities in which their influence is most needed.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Disease › Food Wars Mod

Which prevents nuclear escalation in multiple hotspots.

Castellaw, 17—Lieutenant General, former President of the non-profit Crockett Policy Institute (John, “Opinion: Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security,” , dml)

The United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional nuclear power Iran. The heated economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy.

An American Food Security Strategy is an imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing. Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Disease › Food Wars Mod

Rural healthcare is key to US food production.

Alemian, 16—Vice President, Capital Crest Financial Group (David, “Rural Healthcare Is a Matter of National Security,” , dml)

Rural health organizations are already struggling with enormous turnover rates and costs that run up into the millions of dollars each year. The additional financial burden of penalties from Medicare and Medicaid will put many rural health organizations at risk of going out of business. If too many rural health organizations go out of business, it then becomes a matter of national security and here’s why:

In most rural communities, the healthcare organization is the largest employer. When the largest employer goes out of business, the community collapses and people move away. What was once a thriving community then becomes a ghost town. Rural America produces the food that feeds the rest of the country.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Disease › Food Wars Mod

Science diplomacy ensures equitable healthcare

Lisette Pérez Ojeda 2019. Head, International Affair Office at the Center for State Control of Drugs and Medical Devices (CECMED), Cuba. She has a Masters in Clinical Pharmacy. “Science Diplomacy for Strengthening Medicine Regulatory Systems in The Americas: Emerging Regional Experience” In SCIENCE DIPLOMACY REVIEW, Vol. 1 | No. 3 | July 2019, IZP)

Introduction Science diplomacy is the use of scientific collaborations among nations to address common problems facing 21st century humanity and in building constructive international partnerships (Fedoroff, 2009). This applies also in the field of health regulations and regulatory science. Good Health and Well Being is Goal 3 of the Sustainable Development Goals. Its aim is to achieve universal health coverage and provide access to safe and affordable medicines and vaccines to all (United Nations, 2015a). Supporting research and development for vaccines is an essential part of this process as well (United Nations, 2015b). Regulatory systems play a key role in assuring quality, safety and efficacy of medical products. An effective regulatory system is an essential component of the health system, and it contributes to desired public health outcomes and innovation. National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) are government entities responsible for ensuring safety, efficacy and quality of medicines; and they play a vital role in the health- care system by providing regulatory oversight of all medical products. Since many decades, a growing number of networks and initiatives have been developed to strengthen medicines regulatory systems. The region of the Americas has developed an initiative to strengthen health regulatory systems through an evaluation- and- certification process that allows appointment of Regional Reference Regulatory Authorities of medicines and biological products (NRArs). NRArs work jointly through cooperation mechanism on capacity- building in other countries of the region; allowing them to strengthen their regulatory systems and act as a group with consensual positions in different international forums (Ojeda, 2016). Strengthening Regulatory Systems in the Americas National Regulatory Authorities play a vital role in the health- care system by providing regulatory oversight of all medical products such as medicines, vaccines, blood products, traditional or herbal medicines and medical devices. They perform their mandate based on a legal framework along with a set of recommended regulatory functions that span the medical product life- cycle, including clinical trial oversight, marketing authorization and registration, licensing and inspection of premises, market surveillance and enforcement activities when required. The Americas is a region of deep asymmetries where inequalities to access have persisted in poor and vulnerable populations, and there still exists fragmentation and segmentation in the system, which should guarantee access to health technologies. In the case of national regulatory authorities, large difference in structure and autonomy of the regulatory bodies, financing systems and their regulatory capacity are abridged to ensure effective compliance with their functions (Ojeda, 2016). In the last two decades, a group of global and regional initiatives have been developed for strengthening NRAs’ capacities, based on the population’s right to access to quality medicines commensurate with science and technology advances. One of the initiatives is the evaluation and certification of the Regional Reference Regulatory Authorities’ process in the Americas. In 2006, a group of five regulatory authorities from Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Mexico) had met in Oaxaca, Mexico, with a proposal to build a common agenda to consolidate mutual trust in regulatory matters for the economic well-being and public health of inhabitants of the region.1 That led to the proposal of an NRA evaluation process as the regional mechanism of certification of drugs regulatory authorities, focusing on evaluation of their performance in fulfillment of their functions, and also for serving as the capacity- building mechanism in the regulation of medicinal products’ field. The evaluation process concludes with the rating of the authority assessed, according to its results in one of the four levels. A Regional Reference Authority reaches level IV—this describes an authority that is competent and efficient in fulfilling functions recommended by PAHO/WHO to ensure efficacy, safety and quality of medicines. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) acts as the facilitator of the process leading to evaluation and giving certification to the Regional Reference Regulatory Authority for medicinal products and biologists to those very NRAs which reach level IV. To- date, 8 National Regulatory Authorities have been recognized by PAHO/WHO as National Regulatory Authorities of Regional Reference— Argentina’s National Administration of Drugs, Food and Medical Technology (ANMAT);Brazil’s National Health Surveillance Agency (ANVISA);the Center for State Control of Drug and Medical Devices of Cuba (CECMED);the National Institute of Food and Drug Monitory of Colombia (INVIMA);the Federal Commission for Protection against Sanitary Risks of the United Mexican States (COFEPRlS);Canada’s Health Canada, US Food and Drug Administration and Chile’s Institute of Public Health (P AHOc, 2018) A significant milestone was the discussion of this initiative at the 50th P AHO Directing Council meeting, in September 2010, and the approval of Resolution CD50. R9: “Strengthening National Regulatory Authorities for Medicines and Biologicals”. In this resolution, P AHO Member States were urged to strengthen and evaluate their regulatory capabilities with respect to the functions characteristic of the regulatory and oversight agency for medicines and biologicals through examination of the performance of their essential functions; to use the results of the qualification activity and the designation of the regulatory authorities of regional reference to strengthen their performance in terms of steering role of the health authority; and to support national regulatory authorities so that they can benefit from the processes and information from the national regulatory authorities of reference (PAHO, 2010) The regional reference authorities work as a network; which together with PAHO are committed to support efforts to strengthen other regulatory agencies, based on their own experience by promoting exchange and cooperation among countries and by actively participating in regulatory harmonization efforts within the framework of the Pan American Network for Drug Regulatory Harmonization (P ANDRH). Considering this, they develop a wide range of cooperation activities for capacity -building in other NRAs. From 2010 till- date, more than 30 courses have been carried out in different countries of the region along with bilateral consultancies and internships in the ARNr2. They also lead different regional projects on pharmaceutical regulation approved by PANDRH (PAHO, 2016). These reference authorities are also working in building trust among themselves while sharing information on their best practices and in exchanging technical information to achieve mutual recognition of their regulatory decisions to speed-up drugs’ approval processes allowing their better access. Regulatory collaboration through inter-agency work and data-sharing help to strengthen the regulatory capacity of all partners by promoting sustainable exchange of technical knowledge. Some bilateral agreements have been established to highlight inspection of final report exchange, considering large number of pharmaceutical companies, and the cost of in situ inspections, to establish mutual recognition of Good Manufacturing Practices Compliance. Regional Reference Authorities in Multilateral Forums In 2011, a group of ARNr was created—this group carries out two annual meetings; in the first semester it reviews the results of the work of the previous year and defines strategies and working plan for the new year3 and in the second semester, a meeting with PAHO is held to evaluate progress of their joint work to strengthen regulatory systems in the region. The following section highlights the regional level initiatives: The Regional Working Group on Medical Device Regulation: Established during the “1st Regional Meeting of the Regulatory Authorities for the Strengthening of Regulatory Capacity on Medical Devices in the Americas Region” held in La Habana, Cuba. It currently comprises16 NRAs; countries joined the Working Group voluntarily with the commitment to advance towards strengthening the Regulatory Capacity on Medical Devices through Regional exchange of information, joint projects, and training strategies towards the harmonization of regulatory requirements. This group is led by CECMED, the Cuban NRA (PAHO, 2018b): Specialist from regional reference authorities are a collection of experts in NRA acting as PAHO advisory experts of the system for evaluation of national reference regulatory authorities; 26 ARNs have so far been evaluated. Center for the State Control of Drugs and Medical Devices (CECMED) is working with PAHO and the Ministry of Health to strengthen the Nicaraguan National Regulatory Authority of Drugs as part of the technology transfer project for production of biologicals and immuno- biologicals between the governments of Russia and Nicaragua (PAHO,2018a) The regional reference NRA group is coordinated by one of its members for a period of two years. In the meetings different international forums and meetings that take place during the year, most current topics and initiatives, criteria, concerns and position are discussed. After the discussion process they try to adopt joint position responding to regional concerns. These actions are of particular importance during the international consultation process on the strengthening of the regulatory systems developed by WHO since October 2014 aimed at reaching a Global Benchmarking Tool (GBT) for evaluation of national regulatory system of medical products. The World Health Organization began assessing regulatory systems in 1997 using a set of indicators, designed to evaluate regulatory programmes for vaccines. Since that time, a number of tools and revisions were introduced. In 2014, work started on the development of a unified tool for evaluation of medicines and vaccines regulatory programmes following a mapping of existing tools in use within and external to WHO (WHO, 2018). For this, tools already applied by the organization, the tool used by the Pan American Health Organization for the evaluation and designation of Regional Reference Authorities, the standards established by the ISO standards, among others, were taken into account. The final objective was to have only one tool that replaces all tools previously used by WHO, representing the first truly ‘global’ tool for benchmarking regulatory systems. Recently, WHO has published a new document (Revision VI) that has taken into consideration inputs received from two international consultations with Member States in 2015, a public consultation in early 2018 and a series of meetings involving experts from regulatory authorities from different parts of the world. The work of the Americas region, (represented by P AHO), was significant, particularly as the region that already had a tool and an evaluation process with 8 years of experience. This last document contains a large part of recommendations and criteria, made by the NRAs and has incorporated indicators and measures criteria of the evaluation tool used in the process developed in the Americas. The document would be used to evaluate and publicly designate WHO-listed authorities (WLAs), which have objectively been documented to perform at high maturity levels in 2019. Conclusion The process of evaluation and certification of Regional Reference National Regulatory Authorities in the Americas completes 9 years of establishment in 2019. During these years, the initiative has succeeded in building capacities in the drug regulatory agency in the region strengthening their medicines regulatory systems,. An example is the process of strengthening the Nicaraguan National Drug Regulatory Authority as part of the technology transfer project for the production of biological and inmuno-biologicals, implemented by the governments of Russia and Nicaragua and the process of development of regional ecosystems, to evaluate the regulatory capacity on medical devices. The joint work of the regional reference authorities can be an example of the real implementation of science diplomacy based on the international collaboration of the authorities involved; showing their engagement in value- based international partnerships. This alliance adds values to national medicines programmes and other Ministries of Health missions. The development of joint capacity-building programmes enables taking advantage of the strengths of each member of the group of authorities for the benefit of their regional counterparts while sharing responsibilities and expenditures with maximized results to assure safety, efficacy and quality of medicines. Effective regulatory systems are an essential component of health systems and contribute to desired public health outcomes.

2022 UTNIF Affirmative
2AC › Disease › Pandemics Impact

Pandemics cause extinction

Bar-Yam, 16 – physicist and complex systems scientist, Founding President of the New England Complex Systems Institute, Ph.D., S.B., physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Yaneer Bar-Yam, “Transition to extinction: Pandemics in a connected world,” NECSI, 7-3-2016, )//RCU

[ FIGURE 1 OMITTED ] The video (Figure 1) shows a simple model of hosts and pathogens we have used to study evolutionary dynamics. In the animation, the green are hosts and red are pathogens. As pathogens infect hosts, they spread across the system. If you look closely, you will see that the red changes tint from time to time — that is the natural mutation of pathogens to become more or less aggressive. Watch as one of the more aggressive—brighter red — strains rapidly expands. After a time it goes extinct leaving a black region. Why does it go extinct? The answer is that it spreads so rapidly that it kills the hosts around it. Without new hosts to infect it then dies out itself. That the rapidly spreading pathogens die out has important implications for evolutionary research which we have talked about elsewhere [1–7]. In the research I want to discuss here, what we were interested in is the effect of adding long range transportation [8]. This includes natural means of dispersal as well as unintentional dispersal by humans, like adding airplane routes, which is being done by real world airlines (Figure 2). [ FIGURE 2 OMITTED ] When we introduce long range transportation into the model, the success of more aggressive strains changes. They can use the long range transportation to find new hosts and escape local extinction. Figure 3 shows that the more transportation routes introduced into the model, the more higher aggressive pathogens are able to survive and spread. [ FIGURE 3 OMITTED ] As we add more long range transportation, there is a critical point at which pathogens become so aggressive that the entire host population dies. The pathogens die at the same time, but that is not exactly a consolation to the hosts. We call this the phase transition to extinction (Figure 4). With increasing levels of global transportation, human civilization may be approaching such a critical threshold. Figure 4: The probability of survival makes a sharp transition (red line) from one to zero as we add more long range transportaion (horizontal axis). The right line (black) holds for different model parameters, so we need to study at what point the transition will take place for our world. In the paper we wrote in 2006 about the dangers of global transportation for pathogen evolution and pandemics [8], we mentioned the risk from Ebola. Ebola is a horrendous disease that was present only in isolated villages in Africa. It was far away from the rest of the world only because of that isolation. Since Africa was developing, it was only a matter of time before it reached population centers and airports. While the model is about evolution, it is really about which pathogens will be found in a system that is highly connected, and Ebola can spread in a highly connected world. The traditional approach to public health uses historical evidence analyzed statistically to assess the potential impacts of a disease. As a result, many were surprised by the spread of Ebola through West Africa in 2014. As the connectivity of the world increases, past experience is not a good guide to future events. A key point about the phase transition to extinction is its suddenness. Even a system that seems stable, can be destabilized by a few more long-range connections, and connectivity is continuing to increase. So how close are we to the tipping point? We don’t know but it would be good to find out before it happens. While Ebola ravaged three countries in West Africa, it only resulted in a handful of cases outside that region. One possible reason is that many of the airlines that fly to west Africa stopped or reduced flights during the epidemic [9]. In the absence of a clear connection, public health authorities who downplayed the dangers of the epidemic spreading to the West might seem to be vindicated. As with the choice of airlines to stop flying to west Africa, our analysis didn’t take into consideration how people respond to epidemics. It does tell us what the outcome will be unless we respond fast enough and well enough to stop the spread of future diseases, which may not be the same as the ones we saw in the past. As the world becomes more connected, the dangers increase. Are people in western countries safe because of higher quality health systems? Countries like the U.S. have highly skewed networks of social interactions with some very highly connected individuals that can be “superspreaders.” The chances of such an individual becoming infected may be low but events like a mass outbreak pose a much greater risk if they do happen. If a sick food service worker in an airport infects 100 passengers, or a contagion event happens in mass transportation, an outbreak could very well prove unstoppable. Watch this mock video of a pathogen spreading globally through land and air transportation. Long range transportation will continue to pose a threat of pandemic if its impacts cannot be contained.