Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 MGC Counterplan
Department of State cp › Perm › Do the cp – cooperation -> DoD

Security Cooperation requires the DoD to be the source of funding

Fenell 11, Captain, US Marine Corps, In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree MASTER OF ARTS in INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, at the UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO (Nathan, “Security Cooperation Poorly Defined” December, )

Security cooperation is a compilation of financial, educational, and material resources, that at their foundation are supported by the United States, in particular the Department of Defense, and are used to support the peaceful development of democracies in foreign countries. The resources provided by the Department of Defense are available to foreign countries after the host nation requests the peaceful assistance of the U.S. military in response to systemic deficiencies in the bureaucratic management of a nation state or when a nation state recognizes that its military limitations prevent it from properly defending its geographic borders. The host nation’s request for support from the U.S. is typically an effort by the foreign country to develop its internal capacity to protect its people and limit internal or external threats. The security cooperation exercise Baltic Operation, held in Estonia, is an example of a foreign country using the resources 9 provided by the United States to improve its national defense capabilities in direct response to a perceived threat to its sovereign borders. In this scenario Estonia is attempting to develop its military capabilities and project an image of strength in an effort to maintain the freedom it earned, from Russia, at the conclusion of the Singing Revolution in 1992 and prevent a future Russian incursion across its borders. In contrast to this appropriate use and definition of security cooperation as a strategy to prevent conflict, the Obama Administration is using the term security cooperation as a way to define a national exit strategy from a two front war, a strategy that at its heart is based on the reconstruction of a damaged infrastructure. The false labeling of reconstruction operations as security cooperation is the foci of this thesis project.

2022 MGC Counterplan
Department of State cp › Perm › Do the cp – prefer our interp

Given that basically any activity is included, the only functional limit on the topic has to come at the agent-level

Mazarr 22, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. Previously he worked at the U.S. National War College, where he was professor and associate dean of academics; as president of the Henry L. Stimson Center; senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; senior defense aide on Capitol Hill; and as a special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Michael, “Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition,” RAND, )

To pursue this analysis, we first had to define the bounds of what we would assess. Official U.S. government definitions of security cooperation are very broad. One definition from the Defense Security Cooperation Agency states that security cooperation

comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DoD) to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments, including all DoD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that build defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.3

2022 MGC Counterplan
Department of State cp › Perm › Do the cp – assistance vs cooperation

Any other interpretation is derived from, and causes, confusion

Tecott 21, PhD in Political Science @ MIT (Rachel, “The Cult of the Persuasive: The U.S. Military’s Aversion to Coercion in Security Assistance,” Proquest Dissertations)

There is confusion in the lexicon around Security Force Assistance (SFA). SFA, security assistance, security cooperation (SC), building partner capacity (BPC), foreign internal defense (FID), defense institution building (DIB), train-and-equip, advise-and-assist, and by-with-andthrough all refer to efforts by one nation to improve the capacity of another nation’s security sector. Within the United States government, these terms are attached to different legal authorities, different funding sources, and different strictures with respect to the agencies— civilian or military—responsible for implementation. The terms refer to an eclectic set of activities, ranging from educational programs like the International Military Education and Training Program (IMET), to personnel exchanges, to unit-level training, to unit-level advising, to wholesale efforts to build militaries from scratch. The byzantine nature of security assistance and security cooperation terminology, authorities, agencies, and activities has caused confusion and sparked criticism among the growing community of policymakers and scholars trying to better track it, understand it, and improve it.17 This study uses interchangeably the terms security assistance and Security Force Assistance (SFA), defined by U.S. Army Field Manual 3-07.1 as “the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host-nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority.”18 SFA technically refers to efforts to build the entire security sector of a partner— including their police, National Guard, and gendarme. This study focuses, however, exclusively on efforts by the United States to build the partner’s military (the largest subset of SFA activities), and excludes analysis of efforts to build non-military security forces.19 SFA, in turn, is the largest subset of SC, which refers to “all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote U.S. security interests.”20

2022 MGC Counterplan
Department of State cp › Perm › Do the cp – assistance vs cooperation

The State Department implements Assistance, the Department of Defense implements Security Cooperation

Tankel 20, associate professor at American University, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Tommy Ross, non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020, (“RETOOLING U.S. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE,” War on the Rocks, , (accessed 5-21-2022)

The United States provides security sector assistance to foreign civilian and military forces, agencies, and institutions ranging from local law enforcement and judicial systems to standing militaries. This assistance is intended to strengthen U.S. access to key territories and facilities, shape partners’ national security decision-making and governance, and build their capacity and capabilities for use against shared threats and adversaries. It also promotes the U.S. defense industry via arms transfers, supports the infrastructure and operations of multilateral organizations such as NATO, and increases military interoperability. The State Department implements assistance across the entire security sector, including organizations responsible for defense, law enforcement, and security of key assets like ports and borders. The Department of Defense has a narrower mandate, and provides assistance to partner militaries under the umbrella of security cooperation. The Pentagon also engages in a range of other activities — combined exercises, staff talks, port visits, and officer exchanges — that fall under security cooperation as well. We use the term security sector assistance for simplicity, and distinguish where these additional security cooperation activities are relevant. The U.S. government does not typically define Foreign Military Sales as assistance, but we believe it should, and that it ought to factor Direct Commercial Sales into its assistance planning as well. Both types of sales can lead to sustained U.S. engagement with a partner in the form of training, maintenance, and sustainment for the purchased items.

2022 MGC Counterplan
Department of State cp › Perm › Do the cp – assistance vs cooperation

Security Cooperation is administered by the DoD, Security Assistance is DoS

McLaren 14, US Air Force Captain (McKay, “Enhancing the Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of International Pilot Training (IPT) Within the U.S. Air Force: Is It Worth It?,” RAND Dissertations)

U.S. Code Title 22 provides congressional authority to conduct DoS Security Assistance programs. The programs are carried out through two basic laws, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA).24 AECA enacted congressional legislative controls over export of defense articles and services. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee are responsible for foreign assistance and Security Assistance program authorization legislation. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees are responsible for defense programs authorization legislation. The term security cooperation is used within DoD, whereas the term security assistance is used within the DoS. It is important to note that these congressional committees play a role only in FMS authorization. Although Congress maintains legislative control over exports, FMS is a nonappropriated program, external to the U.S. budget, and the president is charged with signing off on spending for the program. Through Executive Order 11958, as amended, the President delegates selected functions in the AECA to the secretaries of State and Defense. They are required to provide reports to Congress and obtain specific congressional approval on certain exports or transfers. The DoS has responsibilities relating to security assistance, which include managing the export of defense articles, services, training, and military technology.25 DoD has responsibilities relating to security cooperation, which include activities to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.26 The military departments and other DoD agencies involved in managing FMS programs are collectively called implementing agencies (IAs). The Army, Navy, and Air Force usually have the responsibility of being the IA in the process of FMS.27 The Air Force agency for all security cooperation programs is the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA). The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition has oversight in the execution by virtue of having responsibility for Air Force acquisition. SAF/IA is supported by the Air Force Security Assistance Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, for most FMS and other logistics functions. The Air Force Security Assistance Training (AFSAT) squadron at Randolph Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, is in charge of planning and, with AETC, managing the Air Force international military training. It is organized under the authority of AETC.

2022 MGC Counterplan
Department of State cp › Perm › Do the cp – assistance vs cooperation

“Security cooperation” requires the Department of Defense. The counterplan’s “security assistance” is administered by the Department of State.

Kerr 18, Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University (NDU) in the Center for Complex Operations (Alexandra, “Defense Institution Building in the U.S. Context,” Connections, 17.3)

Finally, in the U.S. government, “security cooperation” and “security assistance”—which are the chief lines of effort in the U.S. toolkit to help partners bolster their security and work with the United States to support common security objectives—are overlapping but not necessarily interchangeable. The distinction between “security cooperation” and “security assistance” activities has to do with the agency administering the program: in simplest terms, it is either an activity of the Department of Defense (security cooperation) or the Department of State (security assistance). DOD and the Department of State (DOS) have shared responsibility for engaging with foreign partner militaries since the mid-twentieth century, with the bulk of congressional security assistance funding allocated to DOS. Any security assistance administered by DOD—whether funded under Title 10 (Armed Services) or Title 22 (Foreign Affairs) of the U.S. Code—is a “security cooperation” activity.[21] After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the legal framework for the funding and administration of such activities evolved in response to emerging threats. Congress increasingly granted funding and authorities directly to DOD under Title 10 for security cooperation.[22] Therefore, while DOS security assistance programs can include DIB components, the majority of DIB-specific programming is currently funded under and implemented by the Department of Defense and is thus considered security cooperation.

2022 MGC Counterplan
Department of State cp › 1nc

Using the Department of State instead of the Department of Defense solves best

Bergmann and Schmitt 21,

*senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, )

U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system. Under the current security assistance system, the returns on America’s security investments are limited, inconsistent, and not strategic. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; and an ineffective and unwieldy bureaucracy. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. A new administration can change this by embracing wholesale reform of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill. There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD. Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department: The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy. Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency. The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the system is not working. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, it has been DOD officials who publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department.2 Ultimately, the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the military considerations of the DOD. Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department would centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control, while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance. Some of these ideas will likely be met with innate skepticism from a generation of security professionals whose experience in Washington has been characterized by an ever-withering State Department and an ever-strengthening Pentagon. This report anticipates and rebuts likely arguments against reform, including the capacity of the State Department to take on this responsibility, the benefits of the Pentagon’s current management, or the unnecessary disruption that would result from significant bureaucratic change laid out in this proposal. Failing to reform security assistance not only leaves the United States with a wasteful and inefficient status quo, it also perpetuates the marginalization of diplomacy and locks in the military’s newly found dominance in driving U.S. foreign policy. The current security assistance system evolved to address the threats posed by the post-9/11 era and is now outdated and ill-suited for a new geopolitical environment characterized by competition. If the next administration is to revive U.S. diplomacy and rebuild the State Department, it must empower the agency to oversee and direct foreign assistance. The Biden-Harris administration should seize the opportunity to work with a new Congress to reform the system from its first days in office and restore an effective tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. A new security assistance system, centralized and coordinated within the State Department, would allow the United States to wield its security assistance more effectively and responsibly in today’s competitive geopolitical environment. Arms transfers, training, and support could also better support U.S. foreign policy goals, in particular bolstering democratic partners and emerging democracies, making them stronger U.S. partners to counter threats from authoritarian actors. Empowering the State Department to oversee and manage security assistance would also ensure that aid is used to advance a values-based foreign policy that respects and supports human rights.3 It would also give U.S. diplomats greater clout and leverage and potentially create greater coherence to the provision of foreign assistance overall. The result would be to strengthen a key tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox and increase the clout and authority of America’s diplomats, which is badly needed in this new era of geopolitical competition.

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Aff › No impact

AI won’t undermine nuclear stability

Sankaran 19

(Jaganath, assistant professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, “A DIFFERENT USE FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMMAND AND CONTROL”, War on the Rocks, 4/25, ) DB

Decision-makers who stand guard at the various levels of the nuclear weapons chain of command face two different forms of stress. The first form of stress is information overload, shortage of time, and chaos in the moment of a crisis. The second is more general, emerging from moral tradeoffs and the fear of causing loss of life on an immense scale. AI and big data analysis techniques have already been applied to address the first kind of stress. The current U.S. nuclear early warning system employs a “dual phenomenology” mechanism designed to ensure speed in detecting a threat and in streamlining information involved in the decision-making process. The early warning system employs advanced satellites and radars to confirm and track an enemy missile almost immediately after launch. In an actual nuclear attack, the various military and political personnel in the chain of command would be informed progressively as the threat is analyzed, until finally the president is notified. This structure substantially reduces information overload and chaos for decision-makers in a crisis. However, as Richard Garwin writes, the system also reduces the role of the decision-maker “simply to endorse the claim of the sensors and the communication systems that a massive raid is indeed in progress.” While the advanced technologies and data processing techniques used in the early warning system reduces the occurrence of false alerts, it does not completely eliminate the chances of one occurring. In order to address decision-makers’ fear of inadvertently starting a nuclear war, future applications of AI to nuclear command and control should aspire to create an algorithm that could argue in the face of overwhelming fear of an impending attack that a nuclear launch isn’t happening. Such an algorithm could verify the authenticity of an alert from other diverse perspectives, in addition to a purely technological analysis. Incorporating this element into the nuclear warning process could help to address the second form of stress, reassuring decision-makers that they are sanctioning a valid and justified course of action. Command and Control During the Cold War: The Importance of Big Data In the world of nuclear command and control, the pursuit of speed and analysis of big data is old news. In the early 1950s, before the advent of nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the United States began developing the SAGE supercomputer. SAGE, which was built at approximately three times the cost of the Manhattan Project, was the quintessential big data processing machine. It used the fastest and most expensive computers at the time – the Whirlwind II (AN/FSQ-7) IBM mainframe computers – at each of 24 command centers to receive, sort, and process data from the many radars and sensors dedicated to identifying incoming Soviet bombers. The SAGE supercomputer then coordinated U.S. and Canadian aircraft and missiles to intercept those bombers. Its goal was to supplement “the fallible, comparatively slow-reacting mind and hand of man” in anticipating and defending against a nuclear bomber campaign. The proliferation of ICBMs in the 1960s, however, made the SAGE command centers “extraordinarily vulnerable.” The U.S. Air Force concluded that Soviet ICBMs could destroy “the SAGE system long before the first of their bombers crossed the Arctic Circle.” In 1966, speaking at a congressional hearing, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara argued that “the elaborate defenses which we erected during the 1960s no longer retain their original importance. Today with no defense against the major threat, Soviet ICBMs, our anti-bomber defense alone would contribute very little…” The SAGE command centers were shut down. McNamara formed a National Command and Control Task Force, informally referred to as the Partridge Commission, to study the problem of nuclear command and control in the early days of the ICBM era. The commission concluded “that the capabilities of US [nuclear] weapon systems had outstripped the ability to command and control them” using a decentralized military command and control structure. The commission recommended streamlining and centralizing command and control with much stronger civilian oversight. The commission also advocated the formation of the modern-day North American Aerospace Defense Command, better known as NORAD, with its advanced computer and communication systems, early warning satellites, and forward-placed radars designed to track any missile launch on the planet before it could reach the continental United States. NORAD and its computer and communication systems were designed to resolve the stress from information overload by compartmentalizing and automating the process of evaluating a threat. Depending on its particular trajectory, an enemy nuclear missile may take anywhere between 35 minutes to just eight minutes to reach its target. When the launch of an enemy missile occurs, it is first picked up by early warning satellite sensors within seconds. The satellites track these missiles while the engines are still ignited. Once the missile comes over the horizon, forward-deployed radars independently track them. The data from the two systems is then assessed in the context of the prevailing geostrategic intelligence by NORAD. NORAD would then pass the assessment up the military and political chain of command. This sequence of steps ensures that senior decision-makers are not overwhelmed with information. By the time decision-makers are notified, the decision to retaliate to an apparent attack “must be made in minutes.” Future advances in AI might only add incremental improvements to the speed and quality of information processing to this already advanced nuclear early warning system. Using AI to Prevent Inadvertent Nuclear War These advances in nuclear command and control still do not directly address the second form of stress, one that emerges from the fear of a nuclear war and the accompanying moral tradeoffs. How can AI mitigate this problem? History reminds us that technological sophistication cannot be relied upon to avert accidental nuclear confrontations. Rather, these confrontations have been prevented by individuals who, despite having state-of-the-art technology at their disposal, proffered alternate explanations for a nuclear warning alert. Operating under the most demanding conditions, they insisted on a “gut feeling” that evidence of an impending nuclear war alert was misleading. They chose to disregard established protocol, fearing that a wrong choice would lead to accidental nuclear war. Consider for example a declassified President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board report investigating the decision by Leonard Perroots, a U.S. Air Force lieutenant general, not to respond to incoming nuclear alerts. The incident occurred in 1983 when NATO was conducting a large simulated nuclear war exercise code-named Able Archer. The report notes that Perroots’ “recommendation, made in ignorance, not to raise US readiness in response” was “a fortuitous, if ill-informed, decision given the changed political environment at the time.” The report also states: the military officers in charge of the Able Archer exercise minimized this risk by doing nothing in the face of evidence that parts of the Soviet armed forces were moving to an unusual level of [nuclear] alert. But these officers acted correctly out of instinct, not informed guidance. Perroots later complained in 1989, just before retiring as head of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “that the U.S. intelligence community did not give adequate credence to the possibility that the United States and Soviet Union came unacceptably close to [accidental] nuclear war.” In the same year, Stanislav Petrov, a commanding officer involved in Soviet nuclear operations, also dismissed a nuclear alert from his country’s early warning system. In the face of data and analysis that confirmed an incoming American missile salvo, Petrov decided the system was wrong. Petrov later said, “that day the satellites told us with the highest degree of certainty these rockets were on the way.” Still, he decided to report the warning as a false alert. His decision was informed by fears that he “didn’t want to be the one responsible for starting a third world war.” Later recalling the incident, he said: “I had a funny feeling in my gut. I didn’t want to make a mistake. I made a decision, and that was it. When people start a war, they don’t start it with only five missiles.” Both, Perroots and Petrov feared the moral consequences of a nuclear war, particularly one initiated accidentally. They distrusted the data and challenged protocol. Conclusion Fred Iklé once remarked, “if any witness should come here and tell you that a totally reliable and safe launch on warning posture can be designed and implemented that man is a fool.” If that is true, how close can AI get us to reliable and safe nuclear command and control? AI-enabled systems may aspire to reduce some of the mechanical and human errors that have occurred in nuclear command and control. Prior instances of false alerts and failures in early warning systems should be used as a training dataset for an AI algorithm to develop benchmarks to quickly test the accuracy of an early warning alert. The goal of integrating AI into military systems should not be speed and accuracy alone. It should also be to help decision-makers exercise judgment and prudence to prevent inadvertent catastrophes.

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Aff › No impact

No emerging tech impact.

Sechser et al. 19, *Todd S., Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds, Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Virginia and Senior Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, **Neil Narang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, ***Caitlin Talmadge, Associate Professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign at Georgetown University. ( “Emerging technologies and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42:6, pg. 728-729)

Yet the history of technological revolutions counsels against alarmism. Extrapolating from current technological trends is problematic, both because technologies often do not live up to their promise, and because technologies often have countervailing or conditional effects that can temper their negative consequences. Thus, the fear that emerging technologies will necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to international politics should be treated with caution. There are at least two reasons to be circumspect. First, very few technologies fundamentally reshape the dynamics of international conflict. Historically, most technological innovations have amounted to incremental advancements, and some have disappeared into irrelevance despite widespread hype about their promise. For example, the introduction of chemical weapons was widely expected to immediately change the nature of warfare and deterrence after the British army first used poison gas on the battlefield during World War I. Yet chemical weapons quickly turned out to be less practical, easier to counter, and less effective than conventional high-explosives in inflicting damage and disrupting enemy operations.6 Other technologies have become important only after advancements in other areas allowed them to reach their full potential: until armies developed tactics for effectively employing firearms, for instance, these weapons had little effect on the balance of power. And even when technologies do have significant strategic consequences, they often take decades to emerge, as the invention of airplanes and tanks illustrates. In short, it is easy to exaggerate the strategic effects of nascent technologies.7 Second, even if today’s emerging technologies are poised to drive important changes in the international system, they are likely to have variegated and even contradictory effects. Technologies may be destabilising under some conditions, but stabilising in others. Furthermore, other factors are likely to mediate the effects of new technologies on the international system, including geography, the distribution of material power, military strategy, domestic and organisational politics, and social and cultural variables, to name only a few.8 Consequently, the strategic effects of new technologies often defy simple classification. Indeed, more than 70 years after nuclear weapons emerged as a new technology, their consequences for stability continue to be debated.9

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Aff › turn

AI cooperation is key to Nato’s threat response – turns the da

van der Merwe 21

(Joanna, “NATO Leadership on Ethical AI is Key to Future Interoperability”, ) DB

In October 2020, Deputy Secretary General of NATO Mircea Geoană highlighted the benefits of establishing a “transatlantic community cooperating on Artificial Intelligence (AI).” The Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit followed with a commitment to its responsible use. The US Department of Defense (DoD) adopted Ethical Principles for AI in 2020 and has committed to bringing together NATO member and partners to operationalize these principles. Despite these statements and developments, more work is required to tackle the very real challenge that ethical AI will pose to future interoperability within NATO.

2022 MGC Disadvantage
Aff › +Uniqueness

We’re losing the ai race now – cooperation is key

Wodecki 22

(Ben, “NATO at risk of losing AI innovation race to Russia, China”, ) DB

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) should standardize and regulate AI to keep up with rivals, according to findings published by the U.S. think tank, Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).

2022 MGC Negative

Miller 17

Ron, “Artificial intelligence is not as smart as you (or Elon Musk) think”, TechCrunch, 7/25, DB

In March 2016, DeepMind’s AlphaGo beat Lee Sedol, who at the time was the best human Go player in the world. It represented one of those defining technological moments like IBM’s Deep Blue beating chess champion Garry Kasparov, or even IBM Watson beating the world’s greatest Jeopardy! champions in 2011. Yet these victories, as mind-blowing as they seemed to be, were more about training algorithms and using brute-force computational strength than any real intelligence. Former MIT robotics professor Rodney Brooks, who was one of the founders of iRobot and later Rethink Robotics, reminded us at the TechCrunch Robotics Session at MIT last week that training an algorithm to play a difficult strategy game isn’t intelligence, at least as we think about it with humans. He explained that as strong as AlphaGo was at its given task, it actually couldn’t do anything else but play Go on a standard 19 x 19 board. He relayed a story that while speaking to the DeepMind team in London recently, he asked them what would have happened if they had changed the size of the board to 29 x 29, and the AlphaGo team admitted to him that had there been even a slight change to the size of the board, “we would have been dead.” “I think people see how well [an algorithm] performs at one task and they think it can do all the things around that, and it can’t,” Brooks explained. Brute-force intelligence As Kasparov pointed out in an interview with Devin Coldewey at TechCrunch Disrupt in May, it’s one thing to design a computer to play chess at Grand Master level, but it’s another to call it intelligence in the pure sense. It’s simply throwing computer power at a problem and letting a machine do what it does best. “In chess, machines dominate the game because of the brute force of calculation and they [could] crunch chess once the databases got big enough and hardware got fast enough and algorithms got smart enough, but there are still many things that humans understand. Machines don’t have understanding. They don’t recognize strategical patterns. Machines don’t have purpose,” Kasparov explained. Gil Pratt, CEO at the Toyota Institute, a group inside Toyota working on artificial intelligence projects including household robots and autonomous cars, was interviewed at the TechCrunch Robotics Session, said that the fear we are hearing about from a wide range of people, including Elon Musk, who most recently called AI “an existential threat to humanity,” could stem from science-fiction dystopian descriptions of artificial intelligence run amok. “The deep learning systems we have, which is what sort of spurred all this stuff, are remarkable in how well we do given the particular tasks that we give them, but they are actually quite narrow and brittle in their scope. So I think it’s important to keep in context how good these systems are, and actually how bad they are too, and how long we have to go until these systems actually pose that kind of a threat [that Elon Musk and others talk about].” Brooks said in his TechCrunch Sessions: Robotics talk that there is a tendency for us to assume that if the algorithm can do x, it must be as smart as humans. “Here’s the reason that people — including Elon — make this mistake. When we see a person performing a task very well, we understand the competence [involved]. And I think they apply the same model to machine learning,” he said. Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg also criticized Musk’s comments, calling them “pretty irresponsible,” in a Facebook Live broadcast on Sunday. Zuckerberg believes AI will ultimately improve our lives. Musk shot back later that Zuckerberg had a “limited understanding” of AI. (And on and on it goes.) It’s worth noting, however, that Musk isn’t alone in this thinking. Physicist Stephen Hawking and philosopher Nick Bostrom also have expressed reservations about the potential impact of AI on humankind — but chances are they are talking about a more generalized artificial intelligence being studied in labs at the likes of Facebook AI Research, DeepMind and Maluuba, rather than the more narrow AI we are seeing today. Brooks pointed out that many of these detractors don’t actually work in AI, and suggested they don’t understand just how difficult it is to solve each problem. “There are quite a few people out there who say that AI is an existential threat — Stephen Hawking, [Martin Rees], the Astronomer Royal of Great Britain…a few other people — and they share a common thread in that they don’t work in AI themselves.” Brooks went onto say, “For those of us who do work in AI, we understand how hard it is to get anything to actually work through product level.” AI could be a misnomer Part of the problem stems from the fact that we are calling it “artificial intelligence.” It is not really like human intelligence at all, which Merriam Webster defines as “the ability to learn or understand or to deal with new or trying situations.” Pascal Kaufmann, founder at Starmind, a startup that wants to help companies use collective human intelligence to find solutions to business problems, has been studying neuroscience for the past 15 years. He says the human brain and the computer operate differently and it’s a mistake to compare the two. “The analogy that the brain is like a computer is a dangerous one, and blocks the progress of AI,” he says. Further, Kaufmann believes we won’t advance our understanding of human intelligence if we think of it in technological terms. “It is a misconception that [algorithms] works like a human brain. People fall in love with algorithms and think that you can describe the brain with algorithms and I think that’s wrong,” he said. When things go wrong There are in fact many cases of AI algorithms not being quite as smart as we might think. One infamous example of AI out of control was the Microsoft Tay chatbot, created by the Microsoft AI team last year. It took less than a day for the bot to learn to be racist. Experts say that it could happen to any AI system when bad examples are presented to it. In the case of Tay, it was manipulated by racist and other offensive language, and since it had been taught to “learn” and mirror that behavior, it soon ran out of the researchers’ control. A widely reported study conducted by researchers at Cornell University and the University of Wyoming found that it was fairly easy to fool algorithms that had been trained to identify pictures. The researchers found that when presented with what looked like “scrambled nonsense” to humans, algorithms would identify it as an everyday object like “a school bus.” What’s not well understood, according to an MIT Tech Review article on the same research project, is why the algorithm can be fooled in the way the researchers found. What we know is that humans have learned to recognize whether something is a picture or nonsense, and algorithms analyzing pixels can apparently be subject to some manipulation. Self-driving cars are even more complicated because there are things that humans understand when approaching certain situations that would be difficult to teach to a machine. In a long blog post on autonomous cars that Rodney Brooks wrote in January, he brings up a number of such situations, including how an autonomous car might approach a stop sign at a cross walk in a city neighborhood with an adult and child standing at the corner chatting. The algorithm would probably be tuned to wait for the pedestrians to cross, but what if they had no intention of crossing because they were waiting for a school bus? A human driver could signal to the pedestrians to go, and they in turn could wave the car on, but a driverless car could potentially be stuck there endlessly waiting for the pair to cross because they have no understanding of these uniquely human signals, he wrote. Each of these examples show just how far we have to go with artificial intelligence algorithms. Should researchers ever become more successful at developing generalized AI, this could change, but for now there are things that humans can do easily that are much more difficult to teach an algorithm, precisely because we are not limited in our learning to a set of defined tasks.

2022 MGC Negative

East-West Center.Org

“US-CHINA RELATIONS: IS THERE A WAY OUT OF THE ABYSS?”, --ECM

Mingjiang Li, an associate professor and provost’s chair in international relations at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said that US-China relations are at a “very crucial moment,” and many analysts worry that the relationship could “slip into a new Cold War.”

Li suggested, however, that the US could smooth tensions by focusing less attention on human rights issues that China says are internal matters. “Too much US intervention in China's domestic politics may actually not be helpful in changing China politically,” he said.

2022 MGC Negative

Andrews 3/16/2022

Edmund L. Andrews is a economics reporter for The New York Times, “China and the United States: Unlikely Partners in AI”, -- ECM

The startling trend highlights a paradox. Even as China and the U.S. race for leadership in what they view as a strategically important technology, researchers on both sides appear to see benefits in sharing expertise and working together.

“What’s clear is that the amount of collaboration between the United States and China has gone up dramatically, and it has gone up much more than collaborations between any two other countries,” says Raymond Perrault, Distinguished Computer Scientist at SRI International in Menlo Park and co-chair of the AI Index Steering Committee.

2022 MGC Negative

No emerging tech impact.

Sechser et al. 19,

Todd S., Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds, Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Virginia and Senior Fellow at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, **Neil Narang, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, ***Caitlin Talmadge, Associate Professor of Security Studies in the School of Foreign at Georgetown University. ( “Emerging technologies and strategic stability in peacetime, crisis, and war”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 42:6, pg. 728-729

Yet the history of technological revolutions counsels against alarmism. Extrapolating from current technological trends is problematic, both because technologies often do not live up to their promise, and because technologies often have countervailing or conditional effects that can temper their negative consequences. Thus, the fear that emerging technologies will necessarily cause sudden and spectacular changes to international politics should be treated with caution. There are at least two reasons to be circumspect. First, very few technologies fundamentally reshape the dynamics of international conflict. Historically, most technological innovations have amounted to incremental advancements, and some have disappeared into irrelevance despite widespread hype about their promise. For example, the introduction of chemical weapons was widely expected to immediately change the nature of warfare and deterrence after the British army first used poison gas on the battlefield during World War I. Yet chemical weapons quickly turned out to be less practical, easier to counter, and less effective than conventional high-explosives in inflicting damage and disrupting enemy operations.6 Other technologies have become important only after advancements in other areas allowed them to reach their full potential: until armies developed tactics for effectively employing firearms, for instance, these weapons had little effect on the balance of power. And even when technologies do have significant strategic consequences, they often take decades to emerge, as the invention of airplanes and tanks illustrates. In short, it is easy to exaggerate the strategic effects of nascent technologies.7 Second, even if today’s emerging technologies are poised to drive important changes in the international system, they are likely to have variegated and even contradictory effects. Technologies may be destabilising under some conditions, but stabilising in others. Furthermore, other factors are likely to mediate the effects of new technologies on the international system, including geography, the distribution of material power, military strategy, domestic and organisational politics, and social and cultural variables, to name only a few.8 Consequently, the strategic effects of new technologies often defy simple classification. Indeed, more than 70 years after nuclear weapons emerged as a new technology, their consequences for stability continue to be debated.9

2022 MGC Negative

Andrews 3/16/2022

Edmund L. Andrews is a economics reporter for The New York Times, “China and the United States: Unlikely Partners in AI”, -- ECM

Despite both rivalry and rising tensions between the United States and China, the two nations have become the world’s leading collaborators in research on Artificial Intelligence.

The newly released AI Index Report, which tracks AI trends on a host of fronts and is published by the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, finds that U.S. and Chinese AI researchers teamed up on far more published articles than collaborators between any other two nations.

2022 MGC Negative

Haenle & Bresnick 2/21/2022

Paul Haenle holds the Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is a visiting senior research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. Sam Bresnick is assistant editor and research assistant., “Why U.S.-China Relations Are Locked in a Stalemate”, -- ECM

Fifty years ago this week, former U.S. President Richard Nixon flew to China, setting the stage for a dramatic shift in relations between the two countries. Much has changed since that visit, not always for the better. Despite a flurry of diplomatic activity over the past year, U.S.-China ties remain tense. Discussions in Alaska and Tianjin yielded few, if any, breakthroughs. While friendlier in tone, the recent summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden led only to agreements to hold yet more talks, albeit on important issues such as strategic stability. The lone bilateral bright spot has been some cooperation on climate.

Since the summit, the Biden administration announced its diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Olympics and added more Chinese companies to its trade restriction list while Congress passed a bill aimed at countering China’s forced labor abuses in Xinjiang. The two sides’ antagonistic stances on issues related to security, economics, technology, and ideology have largely crystalized, leaving little space for the adjustments that could relieve simmering tensions. Below, Paul Haenle and Sam Bresnick analyze how the two countries got here and how they can move forward.

2022 MGC Negative

Allison 20

Graham, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School, “The New Spheres of Influence: Sharing the Globe With Other Great Powers.”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 99, Iss. 2 DB

COME HOME, AMERICA? In the heady aftermath of the Cold War, American policymakers pronounced one of the fundamental concepts of geopolitics obsolete. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described a new world "in which great power is defined not by spheres of influence … or the strong imposing their will on the weak." Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that "the United States does not recognize spheres of influence." Secretary of State John Kerry proclaimed that "the era of the Monroe Doctrine is over," ending almost two centuries of the United States staking claim to its own sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere. Such pronouncements were right in that something about geopolitics had changed. But they were wrong about what exactly it was. U.S. policymakers had ceased to recognize spheres of influence--the ability of other powers to demand deference from other states in their own regions or exert predominant control there--not because the concept had become obsolete. Rather, the entire world had become a de facto American sphere. Spheres of influence had given way to a sphere of influence. The strong still imposed their will on the weak; the rest of the world was compelled to play largely by American rules, or else face a steep price, from crippling sanctions to outright regime change. Spheres of influence hadn't gone away; they had been collapsed into one, by the overwhelming fact of U.S. hegemony. Now, however, that hegemony is fading, and Washington has awakened to what it calls "a new era of great-power competition," with China and Russia increasingly using their power to assert interests and values that often conflict with those of the United States. But American policymakers and analysts are still struggling to come to grips with what this new era means for the U.S. role in the world. Going forward, that role will not only be different; it will also be significantly diminished. While leaders will continue announcing grand ambitions, diminished means will mean diminished results. Unipolarity is over, and with it the illusion that other nations would simply take their assigned place in a U.S.-led international order. For the United States, that will require accepting the reality that there are spheres of influence in the world today--and that not all of them are American spheres. THE WORLD AS IT WAS Before making pronouncements about the new rules of geopolitics, post-Cold War U.S. secretaries of state should have looked back to the final months of World War II, when U.S. policymakers were similarly resistant to accepting a world in which spheres of influence remained a central feature of geopolitics. Competing views on the issue lay at the core of a debate between two top Soviet experts in the U.S. government. On February 4, 1945, President Franklin Roosevelt met with Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Yalta. At Roosevelt's side was his translator and principal adviser on the Soviet Union, Charles Bohlen. Just that morning, Bohlen had opened an urgent private missive from his close colleague George Kennan in Moscow. Kennan correctly forecast that the Soviet Union would attempt to maintain control of as much of Europe as it could. The question was what the United States should do about that. Kennan asked, "Why could we not make a decent and definitive compromise with it--divide Europe frankly into spheres of influence--keep ourselves out of the Russian sphere and keep the Russians out of ours?" Bohlen was appalled. "Utterly impossible," he erupted in response. "Foreign policy of that kind cannot be made in a democracy." Reflecting on this moment later, Bohlen explained: "The American people, who had fought a long, hard war, deserved at least an attempt to work out a better world." Between 1945 and 1947, Bohlen worked alongside other leading figures in the Roosevelt and then the Truman administration to realize their "one world" vision, in which the allies who had fought together to defeat the Nazis would remain allied in creating a new global order. But he ultimately resigned himself to the world as it was--in short, Kennan had been right. "Instead of unity among the great powers on the major issues of world reconstruction--both political and economic--after the war, there is complete disunity between the Soviet Union and the satellites on one side and the rest of the world on the other," Bohlen acknowledged in the summer of 1947 in a memo to Secretary of State George Marshall. "There are, in short, two worlds instead of one." When he finally came to share Kennan's diagnosis, Bohlen did not shrink from the implications. His memo to Marshall concluded: Faced with this disagreeable fact, however much we may deplore it, the United States in the interest of its own well-being and security and those of the free non-Soviet world must … draw [the non-Soviet world] closer together politically, economically, financially, and, in the last analysis, militarily in order to be in a position to deal effectively with the consolidated Soviet area. This conviction became a pillar of the United States' strategy for the coming decades, and it rested on the acceptance of spheres of influence. There would be areas that would be subjected to Soviet domination, with often terrible consequences, but the best course for the United States was to bolster those powers on the periphery of this Soviet sphere while reinforcing the strength and unity of its own sphere. For the four decades that followed, the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in the great-power competition that we know as the Cold War. In the Soviet sphere, the captive nations of Eastern Europe remained under the boot of an "evil empire." American presidents faced repeated crises in which they had to choose between sending troops into Soviet-dominated nations to support freedom fighters seeking to exercise rights that the American creed declares universal and standing by as those freedom fighters were slaughtered or suppressed. Without exception, U.S. presidents chose to watch instead of intervene: consider Dwight Eisenhower when Hungarians rose up in 1956 and Lyndon Johnson during the Prague Spring of 1968 (or, after the Cold War, George W. Bush when Russian troops attacked Georgia in 2008 and Barack Obama when Russian special forces seized Crimea). Why? Each had internalized an unacceptable yet undeniable truth: that, as U.S. President Ronald Reagan once explained in a joint statement with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." This bit of Cold War history should serve as a reminder: a nation that is simultaneously idealistic and realistic will always struggle to reconcile rationales and rationalizations of purpose, on the one hand, with realities of power, on the other. The result, in the foreign policy analyst Fareed Zakaria's apt summary, has been "the rhetoric of transformation but the reality of accommodation." Even at the height of U.S. power, accommodation meant accepting the ugly fact of a Soviet sphere of influence. TECTONIC SHIFTS After nearly half a century of competition, when the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union disappeared, in 1991, the United States was left economically, militarily, and geopolitically dominant. In the first two decades of the post-Cold War era, U.S. defense spending exceeded the defense budgets of the next ten nations combined (five of them U.S. treaty allies). Operationally, that meant that, as Secretary of Defense James Mattis's 2018 National Defense Strategy put it, the United States "enjoyed uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain. We could generally deploy our forces when we wanted, assemble them where we wanted, and operate how we wanted." The United States and its allies could welcome new members into NATO, applying to them its Article 5 security guarantee, without thinking about the risks, since the alliance faced no real threat. In that world, strategy in essence consisted of overwhelming challenges with resources. But that was then. The tectonic shift in the balance of power that occurred in the first two decades of the twenty-first century was as dramatic as any shift the United States has witnessed over an equivalent period in its 244 years. To paraphrase Vaclav Havel, then the president of Czechoslovakia, it has happened so fast, we have not yet had time to be astonished. The U.S. share of global GDP--nearly one-half in 1950--has gone from one-quarter in 1991 to one-seventh today. (Although GDP is not everything, it does form the substructure of power in relations among nations.) And as the United States' relative power has declined, the menu of feasible options for policymakers has shrunk. Consider, for example, the U.S. response to China's Belt and Road Initiative. With currency reserves of almost $3 trillion, China can invest $1.3 trillion in infrastructure linking most of Eurasia to a China-centered order. When Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would increase its own investments in the Indo-Pacific in response, he was able to come up with just $113 million in new investments. China has, of course, been the chief beneficiary of this transformation. In the past generation, its GDP has soared: from 20 percent of the U.S. level in 1991 to 120 percent today (measured by purchasing power parity, the metric that both the CIA and the International Monetary Fund use to compare national economies). Although China faces many internal challenges, there are more reasons to expect this basic economic trend to continue than to bet that it will stop soon. With four times as many citizens as the United States, and if Chinese workers become as productive as Portuguese workers are today (that is, around half as productive as Americans), China will see its GDP rise to double that of the United States. In Asia, the economic balance of power has tilted especially dramatically in China's favor. As the world's largest exporter and second-largest importer, China is the top trading partner of every other major East Asian country, including U.S. allies. (And as an aggressive practitioner of economic statecraft, Beijing does not hesitate to use the leverage this provides, squeezing countries such as the Philippines and South Korea when they resist Chinese demands.) Globally, China is also rapidly becoming a peer competitor of the United States in advanced technologies. Today, of the 20 largest information technology companies, nine are Chinese. Four years ago, when Google, the global leader in artificial intelligence (AI), the most significant advanced technology, assessed its competition, Chinese companies ranked alongside European companies. Now, that state of affairs is barely visible in the rearview mirror: Chinese companies lead in many areas of applied AI, including surveillance, facial and voice recognition, and financial technology. China's military spending and capabilities have surged, as well. A quarter century ago, its defense budget was one-25th that of the United States; now, it is one-third and on a path to parity. And whereas the U.S. defense budget is spread across global commitments, many of them in Europe and the Middle East, China's budget is focused on East Asia. Accordingly, in specific military scenarios involving a conflict over Taiwan or in the South China Sea, China may have already taken the lead. Short of actual war, the best tests of relative military capabilities are war games. In 2019, Robert Work, a former U.S. deputy secretary of defense, and David Ochmanek, one of the Defense Department's key defense planners, offered a public summary of the results from a series of classified recent war games. Their bottom line, in Ochmanek's words: "When we fight Russia and China, 'blue' [the United States] gets its ass handed to it." As The New York Times summarized, "In 18 of the last 18 Pentagon war games involving China in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. lost." Russia is a different matter. Whatever President Vladimir Putin might want, Russia will never again be his father's Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union dissolved, the resulting Russian state was left with less than half the GDP and half the population and saw its borders rolled back to the days before Catherine the Great. Yet Russia remains a nuclear superpower with an arsenal that is functionally equivalent to that of the United States; it has a defense industry that produces weapons the world is eager to buy (as India and Turkey have demonstrated in the past year); and it boasts military forces that can fight and win--as they have demonstrated repeatedly in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria. On a continent where most of the other nations imagine that war has become obsolete, and maintain military forces more for ceremonial than combat operations, military prowess may now be Russia's major comparative advantage. BACK TO BASICS The claim that spheres of influence had been consigned to the dustbin of history assumed that other nations would simply take their assigned places in a U.S.-led order. In retrospect, that assumption seems worse than naive. Yet because many U.S. analysts and policymakers still cling to images of China and Russia formed during this bygone era, their views about what the United States should and should not do continues to reflect a world that has vanished. Over the course of centuries of geopolitical competition, policymakers and theorists developed a set of core concepts to help clarify the complexities of relations among states, including spheres of influence, balances of power, and alliances. These concepts must be adapted to take account of specific conditions in the twenty-first century. Yet they remain the sturdiest building blocks available for understanding and constructing international order. Where the equilibrium of forces between one state and another shifts to the point where the first becomes predominant, the resulting new balance of power casts a shadow that becomes, in effect, a "sphere of influence." That specific term entered the vocabulary of diplomacy in the early nineteenth century, but the concept is as old as international relations itself. (As Thucydides noted, after the defeat of the Persians in the fifth century BC, Sparta demanded that Athens not rebuild the walls around its city-state to leave itself vulnerable.) Traditionally, great powers have demanded a degree of deference from lesser powers on their borders and in adjacent seas, and they have expected other great powers to respect that fact. Recent actions by China and Russia in their respective neighborhoods are just the most recent examples of that tradition. Spheres of influence also extend beyond geography. When the United States led the world in the creation of the Internet, and the hardware and software that empowered it, the United States enjoyed what Michael Hayden, a former director of the National Security Agency, later called a "golden age of electronic surveillance." Since most countries were unaware of the surveillance capabilities revealed by the former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, the United States had an unparalleled ability to exploit technology to listen to, track, and even influence them. But post-Snowden, many states are resisting the current U.S. campaign to prevent them from buying their 5G wireless infrastructure from the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei. As the leader of a country currently considering the choice recently put it, Washington is trying to persuade other countries not to buy Chinese hardware because it will make it easier for China to spy and instead to buy American hardware, which would make it easier for the United States to spy. A REALISTIC RECKONING From the perspective of American interests and values, the consequences of increases in China's and Russia's power relative to that of the United States are not good. As great powers, China and Russia can use their power to suppress protesters' freedom in Hong Kong or block Ukrainian membership in NATO. The South China Sea is likely to become more like the Caribbean than the Mediterranean--that is, China's neighbors in Southeast Asia will be as beholden to China as Latin Americans have been to their hemispheric hegemon. Ukraine will have to get over the loss of Crimea as countries in Russia's "near abroad" learn to be both more fearful of and more deferential to the Kremlin. For many other nations and individuals around the world who have found shelter under the American security umbrella and found inspiration in a vision of an American-led international order that safeguards core liberties, the consequences will be tragic. Recent events in Syria offer a preview of what's to come. As the Arab Spring erupted in late 2010 and 2011, Obama famously declared that Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad "must go." But Putin had other ideas, and he was willing to act on them. He demonstrated that a nation Obama had dismissed as a "regional power" could use its military forces to defy the United States and help the Syrian leader consolidate his control. This has been a horror for Syrians, and the millions of displaced people have had a major impact on neighboring countries and Europe. But did Obama, or, later, President Donald Trump, conclude that this outcome was so costly that it would be better to send large numbers of U.S. troops to fight and perhaps die in Syria? Can Americans sleep soundly in a world in which Putin and Assad now smile when they ask visitors who is gone and who is still standing? U.S. inaction speaks for itself. Sadly, Americans will come to accept such outcomes as good enough--at least for the foreseeable future. Like Assad's atrocities, Russia's absorption of Crimea and China's militarization of the South China Sea are now facts on the ground that no one will contest militarily. Acknowledging that other powers have spheres of influence does not, of course, mean that the United States can do nothing. It is a reflection of the recent overmilitarization of U.S. foreign policy that restraint in the use of military force is often equated with acquiescence. Washington has other ways in which it can shape other countries' calculations of costs and benefits: through the condemnation of unacceptable actions; the denial of legal status; the imposition of economic sanctions on countries, companies, and individuals; and support for local resisters. But such tools can rarely decisively alter a decision another power has made when interests it sees as vital are at stake. And it is worth remembering how often a refusal to recognize and accept realities on the ground in the shadow of other powers has led to major U.S. policy failures. From General Douglas MacArthur's rush to the Chinese border during the Korean War (which triggered Chinese intervention and a bloody, inconclusive war) to George W. Bush's insistence that NATO offer membership to Georgia and Ukraine (which led to Georgian overconfidence, ending in the country's partial dismemberment by Russia), a stubborn disregard of brute facts has been counterproductive. THE MUSEUM OF RETIRED INTERESTS When it comes to doing what it can, Washington should focus above all on its alliances and partnerships. If China is destined to be "the biggest player in the history of the world," as the longtime Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew once claimed, the United States must work to assemble allied powers who together will constitute a correlation of forces to which China will have to adjust. This logic is most evident in the economic arena. Before the Trump administration ended U.S. participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, that trade agreement promised to bring together countries accounting for 40 percent of global GDP under a common set of rules on everything from tariffs to state-owned enterprises to labor and environmental standards--providing a counterweight to Chinese economic might that could have made Beijing a rule-taker rather than a rule-maker. Thanks to the efforts of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the TPP is now a reality--but without the United States. If American policymakers could find a way to allow strategic interests to trump politics, the United States could rejoin the TPP. If that new TPP were combined with the parallel trade agreement between the United States and the European Union that was being negotiated at the end of the Obama administration, nearly 70 percent of the world's GDP could be on one side of the balance, versus China's approximately 20 percent on the other. In the military arena, the same logic applies, but with more complexity. Washington will need partners--but partners that bring more in assets than they introduce in risks. Unfortunately, few of the United States' current allies meet this standard. The U.S. alliance system should be subjected to a zero-based analysis: every current ally and partner, from Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand to Latvia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, should be considered in terms of what it is doing to enhance U.S. security and well-being, and with what risks and costs. Alliances are not forever. Historically, when conditions have changed, particularly when a focal enemy has disappeared or balances of power have shifted dramatically, so, too, have other relationships among nations. Most Americans today have forgotten an era in which NATO had a counterpart in Asia, SEATO (the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization), and even an analogue in the Middle East, CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization); both of those are now artifacts in the museum of retired national interests. As Kennan noted, "There is more respect to be won … by a resolute and courageous liquidation of unsound positions than by the most stubborn pursuit of extravagant or unpromising objectives." To understand the risks entailed in the inheritance of current U.S. alliances, consider two scenarios U.S. defense planners worry about today. If, watching China's suppression of protests in Hong Kong, Taiwan should make a dramatic move toward independence that leads China to react violently, would the United States go to war with China to preserve Taiwan's status? Should it? On the European front, if in response to an uprising of ethnic Russian workers in Riga's shipyards, the Latvian government cracked down on ethnic Russians and sparked Russia's annexation of a swath of Latvia--Crimea 2.0--would NATO launch an immediate military response, in accordance with its Article 5 guarantee? Should it? If the answer to any of those questions is not a straightforward yes--and it is not--then the time has come for an alliance-focused version of the stress tests for banks used after the 2008 financial crisis. Such an approach is all the more important given the realities of nuclear weapons in this new world. Both China and Russia have reliable second-strike nuclear capabilities--that is, the ability to withstand an initial nuclear attack and conduct a retaliatory strike that could destroy the United States. Accordingly, not only is nuclear war not a viable option; even a conventional war that could escalate to nuclear war risks catastrophe. Competition must thus be tempered by caution, constraints, and careful calculations in risk taking. For a nation that has accumulated a long list of entanglements with nations that may have, or may imagine they have, a blank check from Washington, this creates a big problem. The line between reassuring an ally and emboldening its leadership to act recklessly is a fine one. If the balance of military power in a conventional war over Taiwan or the Baltics has shifted decisively in China's and Russia's favor, current U.S. commitments are not sustainable. The gap between those commitments and the United States' actual military capabilities is a classic case of overstretch. What a zero-based assessment would mean for the current alliance system, and for U.S. relations with each of more than 50 treaty allies and partners, should emerge as a result of an analysis of the evidence. But it would likely lead the United States to shed some allies, double down on others whose assets are as important for U.S. security as U.S. assets are for them, and radically revise the terms of each commitment to make obligations and restraints as prominent as reassurances and guarantees. This process would also enhance the credibility of the commitments that the United States chose to renew. While the veterans of the Cold War rightly claim that NATO has been the greatest alliance in the history of the world, neither Trump nor Obama before him was convinced. Tellingly, American military commanders doubted that the North Atlantic Council would authorize a military response to the Russian annexation of Crimea or that the U.S. government would be able to make a decision about how to respond before the event was over. Rethinking the United States' commitments to its allies would enhance American security and make these same pacts stronger. PRESENT AT THE (RE-)CREATION Strategy is the purposeful alignment of means and ends. Among the many ways in which a strategy fails, the two most common are mismatch--when the means an actor can organize and sustain are insufficient to achieve the stated ends--and vision blindness, when an actor is mesmerized by an ideal but unachievable end. The United States' twenty-first-century wars in the Middle East offer vivid examples of both. Going forward, U.S. policymakers will have to abandon unattainable aspirations for the worlds they dreamed of and accept the fact that spheres of influence will remain a central feature of geopolitics. That acceptance will inevitably be a protracted, confusing, and wrenching process. Yet it could also bring a wave of strategic creativity--an opportunity for nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the conceptual arsenal of U.S. national security. The basic view of the United States' role in the world held by most of today's foreign-policy makers was imprinted in the quarter century that followed the U.S. victory in the Cold War. That world is now gone. The consequences are as profound as those that Americans confronted in the late 1940s. Accordingly, it is worth remembering how long it took individuals now revered as "wise men" to understand the world they faced. Nearly five years passed between Kennan's "Long Telegram," an early warning of Cold War competition, and the policy paper NSC-68, which finally laid out a comprehensive strategy. The confusion that reigns in the U.S. foreign policy community today should thus not be a cause for alarm. If it took the great strategists of the Cold War nearly five years to forge a basic approach, it would be beyond hubris to expect this generation to do better.

2022 MGC Negative

Mearsheimer 18

John J, smartest man alive, “The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities”, National Interest, 10/5, DB

Liberal hegemony is an ambitious strategy in which a state aims to turn as many countries as possible into liberal democracies like itself while also promoting an open international economy and building international institutions. In essence, the liberal state seeks to spread its own values far and wide. My goal in this book is to describe what happens when a powerful state pursues this strategy at the expense of balance-of-power politics. Many in the West, especially among foreign policy elites, consider liberal hegemony a wise policy that states should axiomatically adopt. Spreading liberal democracy around the world is said to make eminently good sense from both a moral and a strategic perspective. For starters, it is thought to be an excellent way to protect human rights, which are sometimes seriously violated by authoritarian states. And because the policy holds that liberal democracies do not want to go to war with each other, it ultimately provides a formula for transcending realism and fostering international peace. Finally, proponents claim it helps protect liberalism at home by eliminating authoritarian states that otherwise might aid the illiberal forces that are constantly present inside the liberal state. This conventional wisdom is wrong. Great powers are rarely in a position to pursue a full-scale liberal foreign policy. As long as two or more of them exist on the planet, they have little choice but to pay close attention to their position in the global balance of power and act according to the dictates of realism. Great powers of all persuasions care deeply about their survival, and there is always the danger in a bipolar or multipolar system that they will be attacked by another great power. In these circumstances, liberal great powers regularly dress up their hard-nosed behavior with liberal rhetoric. They talk like liberals and act like realists. Should they adopt liberal policies that are at odds with realist logic, they invariably come to regret it. But occasionally a liberal democracy encounters such a favorable balance of power that it is able to embrace liberal hegemony. That situation is most likely to arise in a unipolar world, where the single great power does not have to worry about being attacked by another great power since there is none. Then the liberal sole pole will almost always abandon realism and adopt a liberal foreign policy. Liberal states have a crusader mentality hard-wired into them that is hard to restrain. Because liberalism prizes the concept of inalienable or natural rights, committed liberals are deeply concerned about the rights of virtually every individual on the planet. This universalist logic creates a powerful incentive for liberal states to get involved in the affairs of countries that seriously violate their citizens’ rights. To take this a step further, the best way to ensure that the rights of foreigners are not trampled is for them to live in a liberal democracy. This logic leads straight to an active policy of regime change, where the goal is to topple autocrats and put liberal democracies in their place. Liberals do not shy from this task, mainly because they often have great faith in their state’s ability to do social engineering both at home and abroad. Creating a world populated by liberal democracies is also thought to be a formula for international peace, which would not just eliminate war but greatly reduce, if not eliminate, the twin scourges of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. And lastly, it is an ideal way of protecting liberalism at home. This enthusiasm notwithstanding, liberal hegemony will not achieve its goals, and its failure will inevitably come with huge costs. The liberal state is likely to end up fighting endless wars, which will increase rather than reduce the level of conflict in international politics and thus aggravate the problems of proliferation and terrorism. Moreover, the state’s militaristic behavior is almost certain to end up threatening its own liberal values. Liberalism abroad leads to illiberalism at home. Finally, even if the liberal state were to achieve its aims—spreading democracy near and far, fostering economic intercourse, and creating international institutions—they would not produce peace. The key to understanding liberalism’s limits is to recognize its relationship with nationalism and realism. This book is ultimately all about these three isms and how they interact to affect international politics. Nationalism is an enormously powerful political ideology. It revolves around the division of the world into a wide variety of nations, which are formidable social units, each with a distinct culture. Virtually every nation would prefer to have its own state, although not all can. Still, we live in a world populated almost exclusively by nation-states, which means that liberalism must coexist with nationalism. Liberal states are also nationstates. There is no question that liberalism and nationalism can coexist, but when they clash, nationalism almost always wins. The influence of nationalism often undercuts a liberal foreign policy. For example, nationalism places great emphasis on self-determination, which means that most countries will resist a liberal great power’s efforts to interfere in their domestic politics—which, of course, is what liberal hegemony is all about. These two isms also clash over individual rights. Liberals believe everyone has the same rights, regardless of which country they call home. Nationalism is a particularist ideology from top to bottom, which means it does not treat rights as inalienable. In practice, the vast majority of people around the globe do not care greatly about the rights of individuals in other countries. They are much more concerned about their fellow citizens’ rights, and even that commitment has limits. Liberalism oversells the importance of individual rights. Liberalism is also no match for realism. At its core, liberalism assumes that the individuals who make up any society sometimes have profound differences about what constitutes the good life, and these differences might lead them to try to kill each other. Thus a state is needed to keep the peace. But there is no world state to keep countries at bay when they have profound disagreements. The structure of the international system is anarchic, not hierarchic, which means that liberalism applied to international politics cannot work. Countries thus have little choice but to act according to balance-of-power logic if they hope to survive. There are special cases, however, where a country is so secure that it can take a break from realpolitik and pursue truly liberal policies. The results are almost always bad, largely because nationalism thwarts the liberal crusader. My argument, stated briefly, is that nationalism and realism almost always trump liberalism. Our world has been shaped in good part by those two powerful isms, not by liberalism. Consider that five hundred years ago the political universe was remarkably heterogeneous; it included city-states, duchies, empires, principalities, and assorted other political forms. That world has given way to a globe populated almost exclusively by nation states. Although many factors caused this great transformation, two of the main driving forces behind the modern state system were nationalism and balance-of-power politics. The American Embrace of Liberal Hegemony This book is also motivated by a desire to understand recent American foreign policy. The United States is a deeply liberal country that emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful state in the international system. 1 The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 left it in an ideal position to pursue liberal hegemony. 2 The American foreign policy establishment em braced that ambitious policy with little hesitation, and with abundant optimism about the future of the United States and the world. At least at first, the broader public shared this enthusiasm. The zeitgeist was captured in Francis Fukuyama’s famous article, “The End of History?,” published just as the Cold War was coming to a close. 3 Liberalism, he argued, defeated fascism in the first half of the twentieth century and communism in the second half, and now there was no viable alternative left standing. The world would eventually be entirely populated by liberal democracies. According to Fukuyama, these nations would have virtually no meaningful disputes, and wars between great powers would cease. The biggest problem confronting people in this new world, he suggested, might be boredom. It was also widely believed at the time that the spread of liberalism would ultimately bring an end to balance-of-power politics. The harsh security competition that has long characterized great-power relations would disappear, and realism, long the dominant intellectual paradigm in international relations, would land on the scrap heap of history. “In a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march,” Bill Clinton proclaimed while campaigning for the White House in 1992, “the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to a new era in which ideas and information are broadcast around the globe before ambassadors can read their cables.” Probably no recent president embraced the mission of spreading liberalism more enthusiastically than George W. Bush, who said in a speech in March 2003, two weeks before the invasion of Iraq: “The current Iraqi regime has shown the power of tyranny to spread discord and violence in the Middle East. A liberated Iraq can show the power of freedom to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions. America’s interests in security, and America’s belief in liberty, both lead in the same direction: to a free and peaceful Iraq.” Later that year, on September 6, he proclaimed: “The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country. From the Fourteen Points to the Four Freedoms, to the Speech at Westminster, America has put our power at the service of principle. We believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that liberty is the direction of history. We believe that human fulfillment and excellence come in the responsible exercise of liberty. And we believe that freedom—the freedom we prize—is not for us alone, it is the right and the capacity of all mankind.” Something went badly wrong. Most people’s view of U.S. foreign policy today, in 2018, is starkly different from what it was in 2003, much less the early 1990s. Pessimism, not optimism, dominates most assessments of America’s accomplishments during its holiday from realism. Under Presidents Bush and Barack Obama, Washington has played a key role in sowing death and destruction across the greater Middle East, and there is little evidence the mayhem will end anytime soon. American policy toward Ukraine, motivated by liberal logic, is principally responsible for the ongoing crisis between Russia and the West. The United States has been at war for two out of every three years since 1989, fighting seven different wars. We should not be surprised by this. Contrary to the prevailing wisdom in the West, a liberal foreign policy is not a formula for cooperation and peace but for instability and conflict. In this book I focus on the period between 1993 and 2017, when the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, each in control of American foreign policy for eight years, were fully committed to pursuing liberal hegemony. Although President Obama had some reservations about that policy, they mattered little for how his administration actually acted abroad. I do not consider the Trump administration for two reasons. First, as I was finishing this book it was difficult to determine what President Trump’s foreign policy would look like, although it is clear from his rhetoric during the 2016 campaign that he recognizes that liberal hegemony has been an abject failure and would like to abandon key elements of that strategy. Second, there is good reason to think that with the rise of China and the resurrection of Russian power having put great power politics back on the table, Trump eventually will have no choice but to move toward a grand strategy based on realism, even if doing so meets with considerable resistance at home.