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2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Solvency › 1NC—SQUO SOLVES AI

Squo solves: NATO has invested $1 billion into an AI strategy

Wiggers ’21 (Kyle, writer about artificial intelligence for VentureBeat, “NATO launches AI strategy and $1B fund as defense race heats up”, Published October 21, 2021, Accessed 7/15/2022, https://venturebeat.com/2021/10/21/nato-launches-ai-strategy-and-1b-fund-as-defense-race-heats-up/)

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the military alliance of 30 countries that border the North Atlantic Ocean, this week announced that it would adopt an 18-point AI strategy and launch a “future-proofing” fund with the goal of investing around $1 billion. Military.com  that U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will join other NATO members in Brussels, Belgium, the alliance’s headquarters, to formally approve the plans over two days of talks. Speaking at a news conference, Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that the effort was in response to “authoritarian regimes racing to develop new technologies.” NATO’s AI strategy will cover areas including data analysis, imagery, cyberdefense, he added. NATO said in a July press release that it was “currently finalizing” its strategy on AI” and that principles of responsible use of AI in defense will be “at the core” of the strategy. Speaking to Politico in March, NATO assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges David van Weel  that the strategy would identify ways to operate AI systems ethically, pinpoint military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it’s up to NATO standards.” van Weel said. “Future conflicts will be fought not just with bullets and bombs, but also with bytes and big data,” Stoltenberg said. “We must keep our technological edge.”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Solvency › 1NC—SQUO SOLVES COOP

Squo CBMs over AI solve coop

Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22 EZG]

One confidence-building measure is already underway: Track II dialogues between academic experts from different countries with expertise surrounding military uses of AI.54 Because these dialogues occur among experts who are not government officials, they are low risk because they do not commit countries to actually doing anything. This also places a cap on their potential benefits. Track II dialogues can nevertheless be useful building blocks for more substantive cooperation among countries and an avenue to explore various potential modes of cooperation without fear of commitment by states. Track II dialogues can help facilitate mutual understanding among expert communities in different states and build shared trust between experts.55 Additionally, if some of those experts transition into government positions in the future, the lessons from these dialogues can improve the prospects for cooperation in more formal venues. While there are risks to misleading statements in the context of formal government dialogues, as discussed below, the consequences of such activities in a Track II context are minimal. The nature of the dialogue is that participants are not government officials and it is to be expected that some of their statements may not be entirely in line with their government’s policies. Thus, Track II dialogues can build trust and be an end in themselves, even as they serve as the means to broader cooperation and understanding.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Solvency › 1NC—NO NATO CONSENSUS

NATO will not agree on universal regulations

Heikkila 21 (Melissa, Journalist for Politico newspaper, “NATO wants to set AI standards.  If only its members agreed on the basics.”, Politico.eu, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/)

The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.” These issues threaten to hamper NATO's standard-setting drive. "I think there’s a certain danger that if NATO doesn’t take this on as a real challenge, that it may be marginalized by other such efforts,” Franke said. She pointed to the U.S.-led, which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body. That could have consequences for human rights, too. “NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the campaign. “Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “ethical vacuum,” Coyle said. Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics. “If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents. And I think we should then move on to the more controversial things such as autonomous weapons systems,” she said.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Solvency › 1NC—NATO CAN’T SOLVE

NATO efforts fail to solve for the Global South AND their motives are unethical

Burt ’21 (Peter, researcher at Drone Wars UK working on issues relating to artificial intelligence and autonomy and their role in the future development of drones, “NATO’s new AI strategy: lacking in substance and lacking in leadership”, Published 11/8/2021, Accessed 7/17/2022, )

Whilst publication of the AI strategy is a step in the right direction for NATO, although perhaps not a particularly ambitious one, a number of questions about NATO's position on the use of AI remain unanswered. So far NATO has only published a 'summary' of its AI strategy, raising an obvious question: what does the rest of the document say? Does it expand upon resolving ethical and human rights concerns in more detail and include clear monitoring processes to do this, or does it set out a manifesto for tackling the realities of how NATO expects to take forward the use of AI for military purposes? Running through the strategy is the mantra of interoperability – the desire for different systems to be able to work with each other across NATO's different forces and nations without any restrictions. An article in the NATO Review journal by two of the authors of the strategy, Zoe Stanley-Lockman and Edward Hunter Christie, makes it clear that “the aim of NATO’s AI Strategy is to accelerate AI adoption”, and NATO evidently intends AI to be adopted at all levels within the organisation and across all its roles. Despite the good intentions behind the ethical principles, a key thrust of the new strategy is to enable the uptake of AI for military purposes. In the same article Stanley-Lockman and Christie also talk of AI as an enabler to “out-adapt competitors and adversaries”, and the strategy itself states that collaboration and cooperation on AI among NATO allies is necessary “in order to maintain NATO’s technological edge”. NATO clearly sees the adoption of AI in terms of a zerosum arms race against rivals such as China and Russia, which are also investing heavily in AI, and presumably believes it can win the race. This is problematic, as arms races have the potential to escalate, as has been the case with other weapons. Competition has no absolute end goal—merely the relative goal of staying ahead of the other competitors. Should one player cross an ethical line, such as developing and deploying autonomous weapon systems, others may be expected to follow suit with destabilising consequences. NATO's ethical principles for the responsible use of AI, though welcome, raise several issues. Such statements of principle are now commonplace in the corporate sector and are increasingly being adopted by governments on both a unilateral and multilateral basis. NATO's principles are similar to principles adopted by the US Department of Defense for the ethical use of AI: indeed, in some places the wording is the same as that in the Department of Defense principles. As with many such statements of principle, the NATO principles have no coherent means of implementation or enforcement. Their successful adoption will in many ways depend upon leadership and political and military culture, which is different in each of NATO's 30 member states. Will Turkey, for example, which has been a keen proponent of automated warfare and by some accounts has already developed AI-based loitering munitions with an autonomous capability to identify targets, be willing to follow the same rules as the USA? And would the USA under a second Trump administration follow the same rules as a Biden administration? In the absence of any binding enforcement mechanism NATO's principles may provide useful for public relations purposes but are likely to be less useful in preventing harm to humans, particularly those in the Global South who are already in situations of conflict, and historically marginalised groups. Despite the plethora of corporate statements on ethical principles, those working in the tech sector are skeptical about the prospect that ethical AI design will be adopted as a norm over the next decade. A non-random poll conducted by the Pew Research Centre in early 2021 found that 68% of experts in the field thought that ethical principles focused primarily on the public good will not be employed in most AI systems by 2030. Their concerns recognised that the main developers and deployers of AI are focused on profit-seeking and social control, and that global competition will matter more to the development of AI than any ethical issues. This latter factor will very much influence NATO's future adoption of AI. Although NATO's ethical AI principles are stated to have been developed on the basis of “Allied approaches and relevant work in applicable international fora”, it is not clear whether they draw on views from the wide range of professional disciplines necessary to develop a representative and rounded view of the ethical pitfalls and risks associated for AI, or from a diversity of perspectives. There has certainly been no open consultation on their formulation, and it is possible that the principles may only represent the perceptions of a relatively narrow range of predominantly white male technocrats and military planners drawn from within NATO, member governments (notably the USA), and the arms industry. Ordinary people, particularly marginalised groups and those in the Global South, will ultimately face the consequences and impacts of NATO's decisions on AI systems, yet the public have certainly not been involved in making decisions on this strategy, which will set the framework for NATO's future AI choices. NATO's AI strategy does not discuss the development of AI-driven autonomous weapon systems – a significant omission, given the ethical issues that this application of AI would raise and the challenges to human rights that such weapons would pose. As a bare minimum, the strategy could—and should—have endorsed the 'Guiding Principles' on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons which have recently been adopted by consensus by High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Despite increasing pressure for a ban on the development and use of lethal autonomous weapons, key NATO states including the USA and UK have been lukewarm about the need for a ban, arguing that current laws of war are adequate to regulate any such weapons. This seems optimistic, given the rapid development of AI technology and the push by some states over recent years to redefine the rules that govern use of armed force to suit their own purposes. To date no NATO member states have supported the call for a ban on lethal autonomous weapons. If NATO members were serious about ensuring that the military use of AI adheres to international humanitarian law and human rights law, they would call for and engage in negotiations on a legally binding instrument on autonomous weapons systems at the CCW; which is expected to take a historic decision on this issue at its Review Conference in December 2021. Investment and innovation in artificial intelligence is being led by the private sector, and not by the world’s militaries. Recognising this, NATO's AI strategy places a premium on engaging with “start-ups, innovative small and medium enterprises, and academic researchers that either have not considered working on defence and security solutions, or simply find the adoption pathways too slow or restrictive for their business models”. NATO wants to “make defence and security a more attractive sector for civilian innovators to partner with”. Aiming to capture the civilian tech sector in this way risks increasing the influence of the military-industrialpolitical complex to an even greater extent than is already the case. Will this really help advance NATO's liberal and democratic values? Conclusion Although NATO's AI strategy contains a few worthwhile nuggets, on balance it is tame and unambitious. It is depressingly clear that NATO sees AI as basically another way of using technology to wage war more effectively, and is not willing to show any real leadership to mitigate the risks that AI poses to human rights and dignity. War is, after all, the highest area of risk when it comes to the potential for human rights abuses, yet NATO's strategy says nothing about measures to effectively govern military AI and autonomous weapon systems. AI has the potential to help humanity tackle intractable 'wicked problems' such as climate change and unsustainable development, and tackle the course of dangerous behaviour which is threatening the survival of our species. But this will only happen if it is employed under wise and decisive human leadership, otherwise it may dramatically compound the problems we face, threatening international security and human rights even more. NATO, unfortunately, seems unwilling to provide that leadership.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 2NC—NATO BAD

Concessions would detract from their pursuit.

Artyom 20, Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok, Russia). He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. (Lukin, 6-13-20; “The Russia-China entente and its future”, International Politics; Accessible at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7)

Scenario 2. Russia-US rapprochement Even though Russian-American relations are presently at a very low point and unlikely to substantially recover any time soon, in the long term their normalization is not impossible. In fact, the USA will be under increasing structural pressure to make peace with Russia as China looms as by far the biggest threat to America’s positions in the international system. At some point, Washington might be forced to seek Moscow’s collaboration in managing the massive challenge from Beijing. Although Russia is unlikely to participate in any overt containment of China, it might, at least, agree to become a neutral player. However, Washington will have to make some significant concessions to Moscow, such as recognizing Russia’s special interests in Eastern Europe and lifting sanctions. The hypothetical normalization of US-Russia relations would likely have a dual effect on Russia’s policy toward China. First, Russia would relax its systemic balancing of the USA and thus have much less incentive to strategically collaborate with China, especially in the political-military domain. Second, if Russia feels secure on its western borders, it will have more freedom to play its own game in East Asia, rather than siding with Beijing, which would, to a degree, help balance China’s ambitions.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 2NC—NATO BAD

Mutual containment causes a formal alliance.

Artyom 20, Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University (Vladivostok, Russia). He is also Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations. (Lukin, 6-13-20; “The Russia-China entente and its future”, International Politics; Accessible at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41311-020-00251-7)

Scenario 1. The continuation of the Sino-Russian entente It is quite likely that, even seven or 10 years into the future, the forces that currently sustain the Moscow–Beijing axis will remain in place or could even intensify. Russia and China’s rivalry with the USA could grow more acute, while their illiberal autocracies would become even more entrenched. This will result in the continuation of the Sino-Russian entente, with ever tighter political, ideological, military and economic ties between Moscow and Beijing, and could even see the elevation of their ‘strategic partnership’ to the level of a full alliance based on a formal treaty.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 2NC—NATO BAD

NATO forces Russia’s hand to cementing the axis.

Bradley Devlin 22, MA Political Economy from UC Berkeley, 2-11-22, “Thank NATO For The New Russia-China Pact,” , jy

The new partnership between Russia and China is America's chickens coming home to roost.

Russia and China announced the formation of a “no-limits” partnership last week, the predictable consequence of America’s misguided policy towards post-Soviet Russia and ill-advised embrace of a rising China.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—NATO BAD

BUT, stabilization of relations solves a litany of existential threats.

Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky 19, Rumer, former national intelligence officer for Russia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Sokolsky, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program, 6-20-19, “Thirty Years of U.S. Policy Toward Russia: Can the Vicious Circle Be Broken?” , jy

A military confrontation between the two countries could have profoundly destabilizing and even catastrophic effects on global order and security. In contrast, a more cooperative U.S.-Russian relationship could yield progress on threats to U.S. national security and prosperity—challenges that the United States cannot tackle effectively alone. Preventing further nuclear proliferation, including the complex problem of securing nuclear materials and other components of weapons of mass destruction, will require not only greater U.S.-Russia collaboration but also preserving at least some elements of the remaining arms control framework and inspection regimes. Efforts to combat transnational threats, from terrorist movements to criminal organizations and illicit trafficking, would also benefit from U.S.-Russian cooperation. Likewise, it will not be possible to resolve long-standing regional conflicts, for example on the Korean Peninsula and in Afghanistan, Syria, and Ukraine, without U.S. and Russian cooperation and willingness to negotiate. Finally, the United States and Russia will need to find practical ways to avoid escalation of tensions in cyberspace and outer space, and restrain the growth of Chinese influence.

POST–COLD WAR U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS—WHAT WENT WRONG?

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—NATO BAD

Overstretch cedes competition with China, making hotspots escalate.

Nishtha Kaushiki 21, Assistant Prof of International Studies at the Central University of Punjab, 12-10-21, "China: A nemesis that NATO wouldn’t want," https://www.dailypioneer.com/2021/columnists/china--a-nemesis-that-nato-wouldn---t-want.html, jy

The mention of China as a potential challenger to NATO first emerged in one of its documents in 2019, and by 2020-21, it has become its "systemic rival". From a Euro-Atlantic perspective, Russia is a direct military threat that does not shy away from a head-on clash. Its primary focus is on its immediate strategic backyard- Eastern Europe and Central Asia. On the other hand, China has violent tendencies towards its neighbours and politically intimidates the countries of other regions by actively using its economic and political clout. Further, it has forged strategic partnerships with authoritarian countries, attempts to change the existing security architectures by challenging the freedom of navigation of commercial ships by buying or financing strategic assets worldwide. Thus, it has a global strategic agenda and is far more dangerous than Russia for the EU and NATO.

There has been an upward trend of trade between the EU and China. During the first nine months of 2020, the bilateral trade between the two was Euro 425.5 billion. Simultaneously, the EU-US trade saw a downward trend of -11.4 percent for imports and -10 percent for exports. With regard to the Chinese BRI, in 2018, China marked its strategic presence in North-Western Europe with the takeover of Zeebrugge terminal in Belgium and Greece's Piraeus seaport,followed by crucial infrastructural development projects in Spain, Italy and Greece. Germany's Duisburg inland port should not be missed either. The EU and NATO essentially see the 17+1 format as a leapfrog approach by Beijing that threatens the region's security.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—NATO BAD

That causes Russia and China to create an Axis of Evil against the US.

Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky 22, Rumer, former national intelligence officer for Russia at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, a senior fellow and the director of Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; Sokolsky, senior fellow in Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program; 3-23-22, “Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front,” , jy

Putin’s war against Ukraine, preceded by his demands for the United States and its NATO allies to fundamentally alter post–Cold War European security arrangements, has dispelled all doubts—to the extent that any remained—about the primacy of Europe as the principal theater where Russia’s strategic interests reside, from where the principal threats to the country’s security emanate, and where the principal efforts to defend it from those threats are concentrated. As a critical strategic theater, Asia pales in comparison with Europe. The attack on Ukraine demonstrates the dominance of Europe and the unimportance of Asia—beyond China—in Russian strategic thinking.

Prior to the war in Ukraine, the view that Russian strategic thinking was myopic and misguided was widespread in the U.S. national security community. According to this view, the real threat to Russia in the medium and long term would emerge from China rather than the West. Sooner or later, the Russian strategic community would realize that. And the sooner it could be disabused of its mistaken approach to China, the better for the United States, whose interests would be best served by preventing Russia from becoming an ally and force multiplier of China. U.S. policy, therefore, should de-emphasize rivalry with Russia and instead seek to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. In other words, it was a policy prescription for a partnership with Russia on the basis of perceiving a shared threat from China.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—MILITARY AI TURN

Military AI lack of human cognition psychology card- not great but could be useful- doesn’t necessarily bad just says scary which is fair tbh

Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22 EZG]

The widespread adoption of AI could have a net effect on international stability in other ways. AI systems could change strategy in war, including by substituting machines for human decision-making in some mission areas, and therefore removing certain aspects of human psychology from parts of war.11 Warfare today is waged by humans through physical machinery (rockets, missiles, machine guns, etc.), but decision-making is almost universally human. As algorithms creep closer to the battlefield, some decisions will be made by machines even if warfare remains a human-directed activity that is fought for human political purposes. The widespread integration of machine decision-making across tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare could have far-reaching implications. Already, AI agents playing real-time computer strategy games such as StarCraft and Dota 2 have demonstrated superhuman aggressiveness, precision, and coordination. In other strategy games such as poker and go, AI agents have demonstrated an ability to radically adjust playing styles and risk-taking in ways that would be, at best, challenging for humans to mimic for psychological reasons. AI dogfighting agents have similarly demonstrated superhuman precision and employed different tactics because of the ability to take greater risk to themselves.12 In many ways, AI systems have the ability to be the perfect strategic agents, unencumbered by fear, loss aversion, commitment bias, or other human emotional or cognitive biases and limitations.13 While the specific algorithms and models used for computer games are unlikely to transfer well to combat applications, the general characteristics and advantages of AI agents relative to humans could have applications in the military domain. As in the case of speed, the net consequence of machine decision-making on the psychology of combat could change the character of warfare in profound ways.14

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—MILITARY AI TURN

Further adoption of AI into military means hyperwar- even if not LAWS- causes escalation

Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22 EZG]

It is reasonable and, in fact, vital to examine whether the integration of AI into warfare might also pose risks that policymakers should attend. Some AI researchers themselves have raised alarm at militaries’ adoption of AI and the way it could increase the risk of war and international instability.5 Understanding risks stemming from military use of AI is complicated, however, by the fact that AI is not a discrete technology like missiles or submarines. As a general-purpose technology, AI has many applications, any of which could, individually, improve or undermine stability in various ways. Militaries are only beginning the process of adopting AI, and in the near term, military AI use is likely to be limited and incremental. Over time, the cognization of warfare through the introduction of artificial intelligence could change warfare in profound ways, just as industrial revolutions in the past shaped warfare.6 Even if militaries successfully manage safety and security concerns and field AI systems that are robust and secure, properly functioning AI systems could create challenges for international stability. For example, both Chinese and American scholars have hypothesized that the introduction of AI and autonomous systems in combat operations could accelerate the tempo of warfare beyond the pace of human control. Chinese scholars have referred to this concept as a battlefield “singularity,”7 while some Americans have coined the term “hyperwar” to refer to a similar idea.8 If warfare evolves to a point where the pace of combat outpaces humans’ ability to keep up, and therefore control over military operations must be handed to machines, it would pose significant risks for international stability, even if the delegation decision seems necessary due to competitive pressure. Humans might lose control over managing escalation, and war termination could be significantly complicated if machines fight at a pace that is faster than humans can respond. In addition, delegation of escalation control to machines could mean that minor tactical missteps or accidents that are part and parcel of military operations in the chaos and fog of war, including fratricide, civilian casualties, and poor military judgment, could spiral out of control and reach catastrophic proportions before humans have time to intervene. Even if militaries successfully manage safety and security concerns and field AI systems that are robust and secure, properly functioning AI systems could create challenges for international stability. The logic of a battlefield singularity, or hyperwar, is troubling precisely because competitive pressures could drive militaries to accelerate the tempo of operations and remove humans “from the loop,” even if they would rather not, in order to keep pace with adversaries. Then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work succinctly captured this dilemma when he posed the question, “If our competitors go to Terminators ... and it turns out the Terminators are able to make decisions faster, even if they’re bad, how would we respond?”9 While this “arms race in speed” is often characterized tactically in the context of lethal autonomous weapon systems, the same dynamic could emerge operationally involving algorithms designed as decision aids. The perception by policymakers that war is evolving to an era of machine-dominated conflict in which humans must cede control to machines to remain competitive could also hasten such a development, particularly if decision makers lack appropriate education about the limits of AI. In extremis, the shift toward the use of algorithms for military decision-making, combined with a more roboticized battlefield, could potentially change the nature of war. War would still be the continuation of politics by other means in the broadest sense, but in the most extreme case it might feature so little human engagement that it is no longer a fundamentally human endeavor.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—MILITARY AI TURN

Military a goes bad- can escalate scenarios & other warrants

Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22 EZG]

Even if military AI systems are adequately tested, the use of AI to enable more autonomous machine behavior in military systems raises an additional set of risks. In delegating decision-making from humans to machines, policymakers may de facto be fielding forces with less flexibility and ability to understand context, which would then have deleterious effects on crisis stability and managing escalation. While machines have many advantages in speed, precision, and repeatable actions, machines today cannot come close to human intelligence in understanding context and flexibly adapting to novel situations. This brittleness of machine decision-making may particularly be a challenge in pre-conflict crisis situations, where tensions among nations run high. Military forces from competing nations regularly interact in militarized disputes below the threshold of war in a variety of contested regions (e.g., the India-Pakistan border, China-India border, South China Sea, Black Sea, Syria, etc.). These interactions among deployed forces sometimes run the risk of escalation due to incidents or skirmishes that can inflame tensions on all sides. This poses a challenge for national leaders, who have imperfect command-and-control over their own military forces. Today, however, deployed military forces rely on human decision-making. Humans can understand broad guidance from their national leadership and commander’s intent, such as “defend our territorial claims, but don’t start a war.” Relative to humans, even the most advanced AI systems today have no ability to understand broad guidance, nor do they exhibit the kinds of contextual understanding that humans frequently label “common sense.”27 Militaries already employ uninhabited vehicles (drones) in contested areas, which have been involved in a number of escalatory incidents in the East China Sea, South China Sea, Syria, and Strait of Hormuz.28 Over time, as militaries incorporate more autonomous functionality into uninhabited vehicles, that functionality could complicate interactions in these and other contested areas. Autonomous systems may take actions based on programming that, while not a malfunction, are other than what a commander would have wanted a similarly situated human to do in the same situation. While the degree of flexibility afforded subordinates varies considerably by military culture and doctrine, humans have a greater ability to flexibly respond to complex and potentially ambiguous escalatory incidents in ways that may balance competing demands of ensuring national resolve while managing escalation.29 Autonomous systems will simply follow their programming, whatever that may be, even if those rules no longer make sense or are inconsistent with a commander’s intent in the given situation. This challenge is compounded by the fact that human commanders cannot anticipate all of the possible situations that forward-deployed military forces in contested regions may face. Employing autonomous systems in a crisis effectively forces human decision makers to tie their own hands with certain pre-specified actions, even if they would rather not. Unintended actions by autonomous systems in militarized disputes or contested areas are a challenge for militaries as they adopt more autonomous systems into their forces. The complexity of many autonomous systems used today, even ones that rely on rule-based decision-making, may mean that the humans employing autonomous systems lack sufficient understanding of what actions the system may take in certain situations.30 Humans’ ability to flexibly interpret guidance from higher commanders, even to the point of disregarding guidance if it no longer seems applicable, is by contrast a boon to managing escalation risks by retaining human decision-making at the point of interaction among military forces in contested regions.31 Unintended escalation is not merely confined to lethal actions, such as firing on enemy forces. Nonlethal actions, such as crossing into another state’s territory, can be perceived as escalatory. Even if such actions do not lead directly to war, they could heighten tensions, increase suspicion about an adversary’s intentions, or inflame public sentiment. While in most cases, humans would still retain agency over how to respond to an incident, competing autonomous systems could create unexpected interactions or escalatory spirals. Complex, interactive dynamics between algorithms have been seen in other settings, including financial markets,32 and even in situations where the algorithms are relatively simple.33 Another problem stems from the potential inability of humans to call off autonomous systems once deployed. One reason for employing autonomous functionality is so that uninhabited vehicles can continue their missions even if they are operating without reliable communication links to human controllers. When there is no communication link between human operators and an autonomous system, human operators would have no ability to recall the autonomous system if political circumstances changed such that the system’s behavior was no longer appropriate. This could be a challenge in de-escalating a conflict, if political leaders decide to terminate hostilities but have no ability to recall autonomous systems, at least for some period of time. The result could be a continuation of hostilities even after political leaders desire a cease-fire. Alternatively, the inability to fully cease hostilities could undermine truce negotiations, leading to the continuation of conflict. These problems are not unique to autonomous systems. Political leaders have imperfect command-and-control over human military forces, which has, at times, led to similar incidents with human-commanded deployed forces. For example, the Battle of New Orleans in the War of 1812 was fought after a peace treaty ended the war because of the slowness of communications to deployed forces.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—REGS BAD

AI regulations hurt US-European geopolitical standing—current regulation views are divergent

Samuel Stolton, 1/15/2020 (Euractiv; “Avoid heavy AI regulation, White House tells EU”; )

The US administration has urged European lawmakers to avoid heavy regulation frameworks in the future rollout of Artificial Intelligence technologies on the continent. The call comes ahead of the European Commission’s planned presentation of its AI strategy, set to be announced early this year. On Tuesday (7 January), the White House put forward a set of regulatory principles aimed at avoiding the overregulation of Artificial Intelligence technologies in the private sector. In a statement, the US said AI regulation should not be pursued until risk assessment exercises and cost-benefit analyses have been carried out, adding that the government hopes its European counterparts would adopt a similar approach. “Europe and our allies should avoid heavy-handed innovation-killing models, and instead consider a similar regulatory approach,” a statement from the White House read. “The best way to counter authoritarian uses of AI is to make sure America and our international partners remain the global hubs of innovation, shaping the evolution of technology in a manner consistent with our common values.” In a call with reporters ahead of the news, the US’s Chief Technology Officer Michael Kratsios said America is leading the way in shaping the AI revolution “in a way that reflects our values of freedom, human rights, and civil liberties.” “We encourage Europe to use the U.S. AI principles as a framework,” Kratsios said, referring to the Commission’s forthcoming AI strategy. “The best way to counter authoritarian uses of AI is to make America and our national partners remain the global hub of innovation, advancing our common values,” he added, revealing that he brought up the issue with the EU’s digital tsar Margrethe Vestager during their meeting at Lisbon’s Web Summit in November. Kratsios is set to formally announce America’s AI principles on Wednesday at the CES convention in Las Vegas. European landscape Meanwhile, European countries continue to pursue a divergent approach to AI technologies. Over the weekend, a report from the German weekly news magazine Der Spiegel revealed that a draft law by the interior ministry is set to expand the competencies of the federal police force, in rolling out facial recognition technologies at 135 train station and 14 airports across the country. This introduction of the draft law follows a series of testing periods in the country over the past few years that have seen a number of tech firms taking part in the process, including German outfits IBM Deutschland, Funkwerk, and the G2K Group, in addition to Japan’s Hitachi consortium – featuring several multinational tech companies. Elsewhere in Europe, concerns have been raised about facial recognition technologies by data protection authorities in Sweden and France, as well as the EU’s European Data Protection Supervisor. There has also been a sense of disquietude in France surrounding the country’s new ID programme, ‘Alicem’, which will employ facial recognition technologies for identity verification purposes. However, France’s Secretary of State for Digital Cédric O has recently adopted a more cautious approach to the project’s take-off in France, in an interview with . In Brussels, a report published  by the Commission’s High-Level Group on AI suggested that the EU  should consider the need for new regulation to “ensure adequate protection from adverse impacts.” This could include issues arising from biometric recognition, the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), AI systems built on children’s profiles, and the impact AI may have on fundamental rights. In terms of how AI technologies could impact consumer rights, Justice Commissioner Didier Reynders told his parliamentary hearing in October he would advocate for an ‘ethics-by-design’ approach, whereby products and services using AI take into account ethical guidelines at the earliest possible stage in their development. For her part, the EU’s digital chief, Margrethe Vestager, told  in November that “great opportunities come with great risks,” but that she has “strong reservations” with the ‘blanket’ application of some technologies in Artificial Intelligence technologies in particular, such as facial recognition software. The US statement on Tuesday follows the recent passing of new rules to restrict the exports of American Artificial Intelligence technologies, which the administration hopes will keep rival governments from taking advantage of US innovation. The new measures, which came into force on Monday (6 January), mean that firms exporting types of geospatial imagery software from the US have to apply for a license to send it abroad.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—REGS BAD

Overregulation kills new AI innovations—existing ones move to less regulated countries

Mark Minevich, 5/15/2021 (‘Going Global Ventures’ president, Boston Consulting Group adviser, IPsoft digital fellow and AI expert, digital cognitive strategist, venture capitalist; Tech Crunch; “European AI Needs Strategic Leadership, Not Overregulation”; )

The EU Commission recently proposed a , citing an urgent need. With the global race to regulate AI officially on, the EU published a detailed proposal on how AI should be regulated, explicitly banning some uses and defining those it considers “high-risk,” planning to ban the use of AI that threatens people’s rights and safety. We can all agree with the , the European Commission executive vice president, when she said that when it comes to “artificial intelligence, trust is a must, not a nice to have,” but is regulation the most effective and efficient way to secure this reality? The  are incredibly in-depth, but the ones that make the most sense to me are those that stress regulated AI should aim to increase human well-being. However, regulation should not overly constrain experimentation and development of AI systems. High-risk AI systems should always have unalterable built-in human oversight and control mechanisms. AI systems intended to interact with people or to generate content, whether high-risk or not, should be subject to specific transparency obligations. In addition, AI-based remote biometric systems in publicly accessible places shall be only authorized by EU or member state law and serve the objective of preventing, detecting or investigating serious crime and terrorism. Partnership between AI and humanity The set of laws and legal framework enacted in Europe will have a profound impact on AI regulation around the world, similar to the effects the GDPR regulations created over the past decade. But will these laws assist us in moving away from the EU-wide haphazard regulatory approach toward a singularity of common classification? In my opinion, this will cripple AI development in the EU while China and the United States leap forward. It would limit the use cases and innovation of artificial intelligence and put the EU in a technologically inferior position globally. In the U.S, AI is being optimized to maximize corporate profitability and efficiency. In China, AI is being optimized to maximize the government’s grip on the population with the preservation of power. The overly regulated environment in the EU will lead to complete chaos when regulations in various EU bodies start contradicting. Negative effects on EU entrepreneurship A lack of investment in AI in the EU is a major factor why the EU is . There are currently about 446 million people living in the EU and 331 million people living in the U.S. But in the EU, $2 billion was  in AI in 2020, while in the U.S., $23.6 billion was invested. If the EU continues pushing with aggressive regulations and lack of funding, it will enjoy global leadership in AI regulations, but I won’t be surprised if many European entrepreneurs decide to launch their startups in more AI-friendly countries. To create an EU that is friendly to innovation and entrepreneurs, we must create a collaborative network of AI pioneers to lead the way. In turn, other nations will take advantage of the EU’s push toward strict regulations by fostering innovation and generating a stronger hold on the future of global technology. A recent World Bank report showed the  With policies this stringent and burdensome to companies, it should be no surprise if innovators and entrepreneurs begin to move to more business-friendly parts of the globe. Regulation leads to relegation The regulation proposal suggests fines of up to of the AI provider for noncompliance. If we consider prior EU legislation and subsequent lack of digital innovation, these proposed regulations will cause chronic stagnation of digital innovation and adoption in the EU bloc. In short, if these regulations become law, the EU will not become a pioneer but a laggard. The “real” use cases of AI are yet to emerge, uncovering the true potential of AI. The massive bureaucracy for high-risk use cases will undercut any entrepreneurship or bottom-up innovation efforts. With historical markers trending to the , now is not the time to stifle innovation. If AI is to be broadly accepted, we need a human face showing AI helping people solve their problems and challenges. We must highlight engaging stories that are true and showcase the real people behind them. For the population at large to accept the potential of AI, they must see people like themselves benefiting from the goodness of AI. AI funding means, above all, startup funding. Startups form the bridge between the discovery and development of disruptive technologies to their everyday use by the general public. Europe is already doing a significant amount of planning, but must accelerate. . Fast-growing startups are mostly dependent on American and Asian investors. This requires a rethinking of the investment culture and sensible promotion of a dynamic investment environment; for example, through the targeted relaxation of investment restrictions on the part of institutional investors. We’re living during the age of “moonshots,” a time when entrepreneurs and scientists are able to go further than ever before. Competing in the next economy requires playing a new innovation game, one whose goal is to boost innovation tenfold. In order to reach this level, incremental optimizations do not help. The focus needs to pivot to big innovations — moonshots. Taking risk is acceptable and implementation of a large and risky idea should become normal. To create an EU that is friendly to innovation and entrepreneurs, we must create a collaborative network of AI pioneers to lead the way. Entrepreneurs and data science leaders must use their energies to focus on AI for good to improve the world in the longer term and advocate for deregulation. To accomplish this, we need to set up a global AI pioneers council on AI for good, consisting of participants from leading research institutions, businesses, the public sector and civil society to develop a shared understanding of best practices. AI is no longer just a tool for optimizing corporate systems and societal infrastructures; its potential reaches much further into solving the various crises facing mankind, from climate change to uncontrolled pandemics. Responsible AI and AI for good application across all the world’s superpowers can address these crises. The EU cannot afford to be the region of the globe disincentivizing innovation and discouraging entrepreneurship. The EU must move not toward super regulation, but toward strategic leadership of AI based on AI for good. The path of overregulation leads to the depths of stagnation. It is up to the EU to decide what it wants its future to look like.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 2NC—NO RUSSIA IMPACT

Ukraine means Russia won’t be able to develop AI.

Bendett 4/15 (Samuel Bendett, 4-15-2022, Defense One, Samuel Bendett is an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an Adviser at the CNA Corporation; "Russia’s Artificial Intelligence Boom May Not Survive the War", https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/04/russias-artificial-intelligence-boom-may-not-survive-war/365743/ AY)

Ever since Putin the development of robotic combat systems in the new State Armaments Program in 2020, the Russian Ministry of Defense has been hyper-focused on AI. We have learned more about the Russian military’s in the past year thanks to several public revelations. But talk of AI has been muted since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Apart from the widespread for and target acquisition and a single of a mine-clearing robot—all of which are remote-controlled—there is no overt evidence of Russian AI in C4ISR or decision-making among the Russian military forces, other than a single public attempt to discredit the Ukrainian government. That does not mean AI isn’t used, considering how Ukrainians are now artificial intelligence in data analysis—but there is a notable absence of larger discussion about this technology in open-source Russian media. The gap between Russian military aspirations for high-tech warfare of the future and the of war today is becoming clear. In January 2021, Colonel-General Vladimir Zarudnitsky, the head of the Military Academy of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, wrote that the development and use of unmanned and autonomous military systems, the “robotization” of all spheres of armed conflict, and the development of AI for robotics will have the greatest medium-term effect on the Russian armed forces’ ability to meet their future challenges. Other MOD military experts also the impact of these emerging technologies on the Russian military and future balance of forces. Russia continued to upgrade and replace Soviet-made systems, part of the MOD’s from “digitization” (weapons with modern information technologies for C4ISR) to “intellectualization” (widespread implementation of AI capable of performing human-like creative thinking functions). These and other developments were covered in detail during Russia’s “, with AI as a key element in C4ISR at the tactical and strategic levels. Meanwhile, Russian military developers and researchers worked on AI-enabled robotics projects, including the “” concept unmanned ground vehicle and its autonomous operation in groups and with UAVs. Toward the end of 2021, the state agency responsible for exporting Russian military technology even to offer unmanned aviation, robotics, and high-tech products with artificial intelligence elements to potential customers this year. The agency emphasized the equipment is geared toward defensive, border protection, and counter-terrorism capabilities. Since the invasion, things have changed. Russia’s defense-industrial complex—especially military high-tech and AI research and development—may be affected by the international and cascading effects of Russia being cut off from semi-conductor and microprocessor imports. Throughout 2021, the Russian government was pushing for the adoption of its AI civilian initiatives across the country, such as nationwide aimed at different age groups with the aim of making artificial intelligence familiar at home, work, and school. The government also pushed for the digital transformation of science and higher education, emphasizing the development of AI, big data, and the internet of things. Russian academic AI R&D efforts drove predictive analytics; development of chat bots that process text and voice messages and resolve user issues without human intervention; and technologies for working with biometric data. Russia’s development of technology continued apace, with key efforts implemented across Moscow and other large cities. AI as a key image recognition and data analytical tool was used in many dealing with large data sets. Russian government officials their country’s efforts in promoting the ethics of artificial intelligence, and expressed confidence in Russia’s continued participation in this UN-sponsored work. The Russian Council for the Development of the Digital Economy has for a ban on artificial intelligence algorithms that discriminate against people. Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development was asked to “create a mechanism for assessing the humanitarian impact of the consequences of the introduction of such [AI] technologies, including in the provision of state and municipal services to citizens,” and to prepare a “road map” for effective regulation, use, and implementation. the council, citizens should be able to appeal AI decisions digitally, and such a complaint should only be considered by a human. The council also proposed developing legal mechanisms to compensate for damage caused as a result of AI use. In October, Russia’s leading information and communications companies the National Code of Ethics in the Field of AI; the code was recommended for all participants in the AI market, including government, business, Russian and foreign developers. Among the basic principles in the code are a to the development of this technology and the safety of working with data. AI workforce development was spelled out as a key requirement when the government officially unveiled the national AI roadmap in 2019. A 2021 government that tried to gauge the level of confidence in the government’s AI efforts showed that only about 64 percent of domestic AI specialists were satisfied with the working conditions in Russia. The survey reflected the microcosm of AI research, development, testing, and evaluation in Russia—lots of government activity and different efforts that did not automatically translate into a productive ecosystem conducive for developing AI, some major efforts notwithstanding. Among some of the in 2021 that Russia was lagging behind in the development of artificial intelligence technologies were the personnel shortage and the weakness of the venture capital market. The civilian developer community also noted the low penetration of Russian products into foreign markets, dependence on imports, slow introduction of products into business and government bodies, and a weak connection between AI theory and practice. Russia’s likely plans to concentrate on these areas in 2022 were revised or put on hold once Russia invaded Ukraine. The sudden of major IT and high-tech companies from Russia, coupled with a of Russia’s IT workers, and the high-tech sanctions against the Russian state may hobble domestic AI research and development for years to come. While the Russian government is trying to its AI and high-tech industry with subsidies, funding, and legislative support, the impact of the above-mentioned consequences may be too much for the still-growing and evolving Russian AI ecosystem. That does not mean AI research and development will stop—on the contrary, many 2021 trends, efforts, and inventions into the Russian economy and society in 2022, and there are domestic high-tech companies and public-private partnerships which are to fill the left by the departed global IT majors. But the effects of the invasion will be felt in the AI ecosystem for a long time, especially with so many IT workers the country, either because of the massive impact on the high-tech economy, or because they disagree with the war, or both. One of the most-felt sanctions aftereffects has been the severing of international cooperation on AI among Russian universities and research instructions, which earlier was enshrined as one of the most important drivers for domestic AI R&D, and reinforced by support from the Kremlin. For most high-tech institutions around the world, the impact of across Ukraine by the Russian military greatly outweighs the need to engage Russia on AI. At the same time, much of the Russian military AI R&D took place in a siloed environment—in many cases behind a classified firewall and without significant public-private cooperation—so it’s hard to estimate just how sanctions will affect Russian military AI efforts. While many in Russia now as a substitute for departed global commercial relationships and products, it’s not clear if Beijing could fully replace the software and hardware products and services that left Russian markets at this point. Recent events may not stop Russian civilians and military experts from discussing how AI influences the conduct of war and peace—but the implementation of these deliberations may become increasingly more difficult for a country under global high-tech isolation.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—NO RUSSIA CONFLICT

No US-Russia war– 7 reasons

Peck 14 [ (Contributor on defense and national security for Forbes); “7 Reasons Why America Will Never Go To War Over Ukraine”; 3/05/2014; http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/03/05/7-reasons-why-america-will-never-go-to-war-over-ukraine/]

America is the mightiest military power in the world. And that fact means absolutely nothing for the Ukraine crisis. Regardless of whether Russia continues to occupy the Crimea region of Ukraine, or decides to occupy all of Ukraine, the U.S. is not going to get into a shooting war with Russia. This has nothing to do with whether Obama is strong or weak. Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan would face the same constraints. The U.S. may threaten to impose economic sanctions, but here is why America will never smack Russia with a big stick: Russia is a nuclear superpower. Russia has an estimated 4,500 active nuclear warheads, according to the . Unlike North Korea or perhaps Iran, whose nuclear arsenals couldn’t inflict substantial damage, Russia could totally devastate the U.S. as well as the rest of the planet. U.S. missile defenses, assuming they even work, are not designed to stop a massive Russian strike. For the 46 years of the Cold War, America and Russia were deadly rivals. But they never fought. Their proxies fought: Koreans, Vietnamese, Central Americans, Israelis and Arabs. The one time that U.S. and Soviet forces almost went to war was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither Obama nor Putin is crazy enough to want to repeat that. Russia has a powerful army. While the Russian military is a shadow of its Soviet glory days, it is still a formidable force. The Russian army has about 300,000 men and 2,500 tanks (with another 18,000 tanks in storage), according to the “ from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its air force has almost 1,400 aircraft, and its navy 171 ships, including 25 in the Black Sea Fleet off Ukraine’s coast. U.S. forces are more capable than Russian forces, which did not perform impressively during the . American troops would enjoy better training, communications, drones, sensors and possibly better weapons (though the latest Russian fighter jets, such as the T-50, could be trouble for U.S. pilots). However, better is not good enough. The Russian military is not composed of lightly armed insurgents like the Taliban, or a hapless army like the Iraqis in 2003. With advanced weapons like T-80 tanks, supersonic AT-15 Springer anti-tank missiles, BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers and S-400 Growler anti-aircraft missiles, Russian forces pack enough firepower to inflict significant American losses. Ukraine is closer to Russia. The distance between Kiev and Moscow is 500 miles. The distance between Kiev and New York is 5,000 miles. It’s much easier for Russia to send troops and supplies by land than for the U.S. to send them by sea or air. The U.S. military is tired. After nearly 13 years of war, America’s armed forces need a breather. Equipment is worn out from long service in Iraq and Afghanistan, personnel are worn out from repeated deployments overseas, and there are still about 40,000 troops still fighting in Afghanistan. The U.S. doesn’t have many troops to send. The U.S. could easily dispatch air power to Ukraine if its NATO allies allow use of their airbases, and the aircraft carrier George H. W. Bush and its hundred aircraft are patrolling the Mediterranean. But for a ground war to liberate Crimea or defend Ukraine, there is just the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit sailing off Spain, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in Germany and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. While the paratroopers could drop into the combat zone, the Marines would have sail past Russian defenses in the Black Sea, and the Stryker brigade would probably have to travel overland through Poland into Ukraine. Otherwise, bringing in mechanized combat brigades from the U.S. would be logistically difficult, and more important, could take months to organize. The American people are tired. Pity the poor politician who tries to sell the American public on yet another war, especially some complex conflict in a distant Eastern Europe nation. Neville Chamberlain’s words during the 1938 Czechoslovakia crisis come to mind: “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.” America‘s allies are tired. NATO sent troops to support the American campaign in Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. Britain sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. It is almost inconceivable to imagine the Western European public marching in the streets to demand the liberation of Crimea, especially considering the region’s sputtering economy, which might be snuffed out should Russia stop exporting natural gas. As for military capabilities, the Europeans couldn’t evict Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi without American help. And Germans fighting Russians again? Let’s not even go there.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—NO RUSSIA CONFLICT

No Russia war

Bandow ‘16 (Doug, Senior Fellow, the Cato Institute, “Western Paranoia Aside, Russia Unlikely to Attack the Baltics,” 2/16, , CMR)

Yet the surging fear over Russian adventurism distorts Moscow's interests and ambitions. Vladimir Putin is a nasty fellow, brutal at home and abroad. However, he seems to well represent much of his country's power elite and public. There is little apparent support for Western-style liberalism. Oust Putin and "le deluge" to follow would not likely be pretty. Putin's behavior is bad, but poses little threat to America, "old" Europe, or even most of Russia's neighbors. He is behaving like a traditional Tsar, not a reincarnated Joseph Stalin or Adolf Hitler. He has taken Moscow back to the Russian Empire, not the Soviet Union. His government is not interested in an ideological crusade and sees no inherent conflict with the West. Rather, Moscow demands respect for its status], protection of Russia's borders, and consideration of its interests. In pursuing these ends Putin is practical and measured, if perhaps imprudent and myopic--and, of course, dismissive of the cost to others. Mikhail Saakashvili's Georgia was actively anti-Russian, pursued close ties with America, and sought membership in NATO--all certain to antagonize Moscow. Abkhazia and South Ossetia had resisted Georgian control in the past, giving Russia an easy means to weaken Tbilisi and pay back NATO over the latter's dismemberment of Serbia, with historic ties to Moscow. (Russia's defense of Belgrade helped turn an assassination into World War I.) Ukraine always mattered more to Moscow than Georgia or the Baltics for historical and cultural reasons, as well as the naval base of Sebastopol. Nevertheless, Russia accepted an independent Ukraine, even when ruled by the hostile, incompetent Viktor Yushchenko, who also pushed for his nation's membership in the alliance--then opposed by the majority of Ukrainians. Yushchenko's failure opened the way for the election of Viktor Yanukovich, nominally pro-Russian, though he resisted Moscow's control. Putin acted only after Europe pushed a trade agreement to reorient Ukraine away from Russia and both Brussels and Washington backed a street revolution against Yanukovich. Even then, Putin sought to weaken, not conquer, Ukraine. He seized Crimea, historically part of Russia, and backed ethnic Russian separatists in the east. Despite numerous predictions, Moscow did not absorb the Donbass, create a land bridge to Crimea, stage a coup de' main against Kiev, or launch a general assault on Ukraine. His brutal response was murderous and unjustified, but militarily on par with U.S. interventions. Putin continues to demonstrate no interest in ruling those likely to resist Russia's tender mercies. Ukrainians and Georgians would not likely act like docile Russian citizens today. Indeed, the former resisted the restoration of Soviet control after German forces were expelled in World War II. Nor was occupation necessary to bar those nations' way to NATO. Seizing the Baltic states likely would generate similar resistance. They developed separate identities under the Russian Empire and enjoyed brief independence between World Wars I and II. They also have the advantage of having joined NATO before Moscow could cause much trouble. Moreover, as weak nations currently containing no foreign troops, the Baltics pose no potential threat to Russia. Ukraine in NATO would look very different. Finally, the Baltic ethnic Russian populations, though significant, demonstrate little sentiment for joining Mother Russia. They prefer cultural connection to political affiliation, creating a poor target for the sort of destabilizing tactics deployed against Ukraine. Wrote Robert Person, a professor at West Point: "the Baltic Russians are not particularly amenable to Russian hybrid warfare. Though they have many lingering grievances over language, cultural and citizenship policies, these grievances have not translated into separatism." So what would Russia gain from attacking the Baltics? A recalcitrant, majority non-ethnic Russian population. A possible temporary nationalist surge at home. A likely short-lived victory over the West. The costs would be far greater. Grabbing the Baltics likely would spur population exodus and trigger economic collapse. Launching a war without the convincing pretext present in the cases of Georgia and Ukraine might leave the Russian public angry over the retaliation certain to come. Worse, Moscow certainly would rupture economic and political relations with the U.S. and Europe and probably start a losing conventional war with NATO. Even more frightening would be the prospect of a nuclear conflict, whether intentional or inadvertent. Russia has destroyed Europe's peaceful equilibrium, but everything about Putin's presidency so far argues against reckless war for no rational purpose against the Baltics. Of course, they should act to reduce even minimal chances of such a war. However, the U.S. should not launch a multi-billion dollar allied build-up, one which, ironically, would create a perceived threat to Russia where none currently exists. Could NATO lose a war over the Baltics? As Rand warned, yes, at least in the short-term. But the allies could defeat Russia if they were prepared for World War III. That would be beyond foolish for Washington--another reason why the U.S. should stop making defense promises which serve the interests of other nations rather than America. If the Europeans, in contrast, are ready to make that commitment, they should be preparing their own defense.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC—NO RUSSIA CONFLICT

Russia can’t escalate crisis --- low military spending

Stratfor ‘19- American geopolitical intelligence platform and publisher founded in 1996 in Austin, Texas, by George Friedman, who was the company's chairman. Chip Harmon was appointed president in February 2018. Fred Burton is Stratfor's chief security officer (“Russia's Defense Industry Finds Itself in a Tailspin,” Strafor Worldview,

Russia's defense industry is face to face with a major foe, but it's not a foreign military power. The Kremlin has been striving to modernize all branches of the Russian military, but the country's defense industry is struggling thanks to decreasing volumes of orders, difficulties in attracting high-skilled talent and limits to its technological capabilities. According to recent figures, the performance of Russia's aerospace sector is declining precipitously. In 2018, for instance, Russian aircraft and spacecraft makers produced 13.5 percent less than in 2017. And there's been no letup in 2019 either: In the first two months of the year, aerospace output plummeted 48 percent year on year. The decline in Russia's defense output raises concerns about the competitive strength of Russia's defense industry in general, whose health is critical if the country is to project itself as a military power in the longer term. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov attributed the reduction in output to a slowdown of orders for military systems, but projections suggest the slowdown is not just a short-term fluctuation; in fact, it's expected to become even worse in the future. The downturn in oil prices has taken a bite out of Russia's bottom line, squeezing spending for the military — all at a time when the country's arms manufacturers have lost their competitive edge in the global arms market. Together, these factors ensure that Russia's defense industry will struggle to get out of its funk. Suffering From a Dearth of Funds This dire picture stands in stark contrast to Russia's frequent presentation of sensational new platforms. In reality, however, just a few of the big-ticket weapon systems — such as the T-14 main battle tank or the Su-57 fighter aircraft — find buyers, as the rest remain mere prototypes. Russia has prioritized some hardware, such as the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, due to their strategic relevance to the country's overall military posture, but Moscow has failed to fully develop other programs or only introduced them on a limited scale. Under pressure from a limited government budget, the Kremlin even started reducing its military spending in 2017 — a strong indicator that, despite the modernization push, Russia's financial challenges are taking a toll on the country ambitions. Economically, the plunge in oil prices at the end of 2014 hurt Russia's bottom line, depriving the country of essential revenue and forcing it to dip into its reserves to bridge the gap. Today, more than four years on, Russian oil revenues are rising, yet the country is continuing to deal with the consequences of the lean years. Beyond that, low revenues from taxes, which have forced Russia to raise taxes and the retirement age, and Western sanctions over Moscow's activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, have shrunk the financial pool available to military planners. Low oil prices, declining revenues from taxes and Western sanctions have taken a chunk out of the financial pool available to Russia's military and the broader defense industry. But the Kremlin's problems don't end there. In the past, Russia has benefited from its position as a major global arms exporter to fuel further military development. During the 1990s, for example, such sales were critical to the country as it faced severe economic hardship. While Russia remains the world's second-largest arms exporter (only the United States sells more), the actual value of those exports has been decreasing significantly. Between 2014 and 2018, their total value dropped by as much as 17 percent. Again, budgetary limits are somewhat to blame: In the past, Russia frequently used arms exports as a political tool, offering weapons at a heavy discount, if not entirely free. But with Russia no longer able to offer customers a good deal on its fighter jets and other defense products, the country is losing business.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Public Trust › 1NC –NO POPULISM

EU populism makes it inevitable

Maher 17 (Richard Maher, Research Fellow, Global Governance Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. “Why populism is still a threat in Europe.” World Economic Forum. 12 Jun 2017 https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/populism-is-still-a-threat-in-europe-heres-why)

Has the populist tide sweeping Europe crested? Six months ago, many European leaders worried that the wave of popular discontent that led to the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and propelled Donald Trump into the White House could empower nationalist, anti-immigrant and anti-EU parties across Europe, shaking the very foundations of the bloc. Since then, however, populist movements have been turned back in Austria, the Netherlands and France. German Chancellor Angela Merkel looks likely to win her fourth term as chancellor in national elections this September. And with a young, energetic, pro-EU French president now in the Élysée Palace, some are predicting that the bloc is actually poised for a comeback. But it would be a mistake to think that populism no longer represents a serious threat to Europe and the EU. Populist authoritarians are in power in Hungary and Poland. Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Front captured a third of the vote in the run-off of France’s election last month, and Geert Wilders’s anti-Islam Freedom Party is the second most powerful seat-holder in Holland’s parliament. Even in Germany, long thought to be resistant to right-wing populist currents, the anti-immigrant party Alternative for Germany (AfD) seems poised to gain parliamentary representation for the first time following national elections this year. And with early parliamentary elections scheduled for October 15 in Austria, it appears likely that the far-right Freedom Party, which was formed in the 1950s by former Nazis, will enter into a government coalition with the centre-right Austrian People’s Party. A rise in populism since the 1960s Post-war Europe has seen populist movements of both the left and the right, but they have mainly operated on the margins of national politics. While no populist party or politician has been able to actually win a national election in Western Europe over the past seven decades, research shows that populism has been advancing slowly yet steadily in Europe since the 1960s. Today, virtually every European country has a populist party represented in national or regional parliaments. Most are right-wing, like Vlaams Belang in Belgium, the National Front in France, Golden Dawn in Greece, Lega Nord in Italy, the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats and the Swiss People’s Party. These parties’ aims and agendas are driven by different national histories, traditions and circumstances, but all are anti-immigrant and anti-EU. Populism’s appeal remains too small to actually win elections in most of Europe, but it is shaping national and European politics in various ways, reframing debates on immigration, the Eurozone and national security, among other examples. Political views once considered extreme or taboo are now firmly present in mainstream political discourse. In response, some mainstream politicians have co-opted parts of the populists’ message or have felt pressure to move to the right on some issues to blunt the populist advance. To counter Wilders’s anti-immigrant message, for example, Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte took a more hardline stance on immigration and refugees in the weeks leading up to parliamentary elections in March. Even Angela Merkel has placed limits on Germany’s absorption of new refugees in light of criticism from both the AfD and the Christian Social Union, the Bavarian sister party of her Christian Democratic Union. The period from the second world war to the present has been a remarkably stable one for Western Europe. Governments have largely alternated between the centre-right and the centre-left. With the rise of populist movements and candidates, we are, in a way, restoring the historical norm: for much of Europe’s modern history, liberals and social democrats have competed with populists of various stripes in national elections. What’s the plan? To effectively contain populism, Europe must accurately diagnose how and why it emerged in the first place. This means they cannot just ignore populists and their supporters, or ascribe their grievances as the product of envy, resentment or blind rage. Those in power must acknowledge constituents’ genuine worries and anxieties about immigration, national identity and terrorism, for example. Globalisation has produced rapid economic and social disruptions. It has contributed to economic displacement, rising income and wealth inequality, and what seems to some people to be the homogenisation of national cultures. Many people today face a level of economic insecurity that their parents or grandparents did not experience. And with large-scale immigration, they have legitimate concerns about the cultural and demographic future of their countries. The sources for such concerns are not likely to disappear, so populism is more of a long-term challenge than a temporary crisis. As Harvard’s Yascha Mounk has said, “the past two decades have represented not a populist moment but rather a populist turn — one that will exert significant influence on policy and public opinion for decades to come.”