Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC -- HEG RESILIENCE

Renewed US leadership counters Russia and reinvigorates US hegemony

Brands and Beckley, 22 (made the, 3-14-2022, accessed on 6-18-2022, American Enterprise Institute - AEI, "The Return of Pax Americana? | AEI", https://www.aei.org/articles/the-return-of-pax-americana/)

The United States and its allies have failed to prevent Russia from brutalizing Ukraine, but they can still win the larger struggle to save the international order. Russia’s savage invasion has exposed the gap between Western countries’ soaring liberal aspirations and the paltry resources they have devoted to defend them. The United States has declared great-power competition on Moscow and Beijing but has so far failed to summon the money, the creativity, or the urgency necessary to prevail in those rivalries. Yet Russian President Vladimir Putin has now inadvertently done the United States and its allies a tremendous favor. In shocking them out of their complacency, he has given them a historic opportunity to regroup and reload for an era of intense competition—not just with Russia but also with China—and, ultimately, to rebuild an international order that just recently looked to be headed for collapse.

This isn’t fantasy: it has happened before. In the late 1940s, the West was entering a previous period of great-power competition but had not made the investments or initiatives needed to win it. U.S. defense spending was pathetically inadequate, NATO existed only on paper, and neither Japan nor West Germany had been reintegrated into the free world. The Communist bloc seemed to have the momentum. Then, in June 1950, an instance of unprovoked authoritarian aggression—the Korean War—revolutionized Western politics and laid the foundation for a successful containment strategy. The policies that won the Cold War and thereby made the modern liberal international order were products of an unexpected hot war. The catastrophe in Ukraine could play a similar role today.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC -- HEG RESILIENCE

U.S. unipolarity is inevitable---no rivals are strong enough to challenge it

Beckley 18 [Michael Beckley, Michael Beckley is a leading expert on the balance of power between the United States and China. The author of two books and multiple award-winning articles, Michael is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously, Michael was an International Security Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense. Unrivaled : Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower., pg. 135-154, Cornell University Press, 2018. EBSCOhost]//AA

CHAPTER 6 The Unipolar Era “If Sparta and Rome perished,” the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau asked, “what State can hope to endure forever?”1 The resounding answer given by history is “no state.” In time, perhaps in another century or so, the American empire will crumble and new powers will rise. But we are not there yet, nor will we be for many decades. We are living in the unipolar era, and it will probably outlive us. So what? The United States might be the most powerful country in his- tory, but it has a limited presence in many corners of the globe, and weaker nations routinely trample on U.S. interests.2 The United States failed to pre- vent the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the rise of the Islamic State, the Russian inva- sion of Crimea, Russian meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, North Korean nuclear proliferation, and Chinese island-building in the South China Sea. Unipolarity, bipolarity, multipolarity: What difference does it make? In this final chapter, I explain why this view is wrong by highlighting several ways that unipolarity transforms world politics. The good news is that unipolarity dramatically reduces the likelihood of great power war. The bad news is that it may increase the likelihood of asymmetric conflict and undermine American national unity and the liberal world order. No Hegemonic Rivalry The story of world politics is often told as a game of thrones in which a rotating cast of great powers battles for top-dog status. According to researchers led by Graham Allison at Harvard, there have been sixteen cases in the past five hundred years when a rising power challenged a rul- ing power.3 Twelve of these cases ended in carnage. One can quibble with Allison’s case selection, but the basic pattern is clear: hegemonic rivalry has sparked a catastrophic war every forty years on average for the past half millennium. The emergence of unipolarity in 1991 has put this cycle of hegemonic competition on hold. Obviously wars and security competition still occur in today’s unipolar world—in fact, as I explain later, unipolarity has made certain types of asymmetric conflict more likely—but none of these con- flicts have the global scope or generational length of a hegemonic rivalry. To appreciate this point, just consider the Cold War—one of the four “peaceful” cases of hegemonic rivalry identified by Allison’s study. Although the two superpowers never went to war, they divided the world into rival camps, waged proxy wars that killed millions of people, and pushed each other to the brink of nuclear Armageddon. For forty-five years, World War III and human extinction were nontrivial possibilities. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, by contrast, the United States has not faced a hegemonic rival, and the world, though far from perfect, has been more peaceful and prosperous than ever before. Just look at the numbers. From 1400 to 1991, the rate of war deaths world- wide hovered between 5 and 10 deaths per 100,000 people and spiked to 200 deaths per 100,000 during major wars.4 After 1991, however, war death rates dropped to 0.5 deaths per 100,000 people and have stayed there ever since. Interstate wars have disappeared almost entirely, and the number of civil wars has declined by more than 30 percent.5 Meanwhile, the global economy has quadrupled in size, creating more wealth between 1991 and 2018 than in all prior human history combined.6 What explains this unprecedented outbreak of peace and prosperity? Some scholars attribute it to advances in communications technology, from the printing press to the telegraph to the Internet, which supposedly spread empathy around the globe and caused entire nations to place a higher value on human life.7 Such explanations are appealing, because they play on our natural desire to believe in human progress, but are they convincing? Did humans sud- denly become 10 to 20 times less violent and cruel in 1991? Are we orders of magnitude more noble and kind than our grandparents? Has social media made us more empathetic? Of course not, which is why the dra- matic decline in warfare after 1991 is better explained by geopolitics than sociology.8 The collapse of the Soviet Union not only ended the Cold War and related proxy fighting, it also opened up large swathes of the world to democracy, international commerce, and peacekeeping forces—all of which surged after 1991 and further dampened conflict.9 Faced with overwhelming U.S. economic and military might, most countries have decided to work within the American-led liberal order rather than fight to overturn it.10 As of 2018, nearly seventy countries have joined the U.S. alliance network—a Kantian community in which war is unthinkable—and even the two main challeng- ers to this community, China and Russia, begrudgingly participate in the institutions of the liberal order (e.g., the UN, the WTO, the IMF, World Bank, and the G-20), engage in commerce with the United States and its allies, and contribute to international peacekeeping missions.11 History may not have ended in 1991, but it clearly changed in profound ways—and mostly for the better.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC -- HEG GOOD --- European Stability

Loss of US power now risks Russian conquest of Europe and global instability.

Brands 6/1 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 6-1-2022; "The World Doesn’t Need a More Restrained America”; ; Bloomberg; accessed 6-22-2022; AH]

It has been a bumpy year for the restraint coalition — that loose network of analysts, advocates and politicians calling for a sharply reduced US role in the world. Having reached peak influence with the withdrawal from Afghanistan, this group initially found itself marginalized by Russia’s war in Ukraine. Now, the restraint crowd is offering a renewed critique of US policy, one that will probably prove to be persistent, though not persuasive. Restraint is a broad church. It features anti-interventionist academics, who often style themselves as non-ideological “realists,” alongside well-funded think tanks such as the Quincy Institute. It includes libertarians such as Senator Rand Paul who deplore the financial costs of US foreign policy and progressives who contend that American globalism is a cover for imperialism and neoliberalism. There are pacifists who believe that all wars are criminal, as well as nationalists such as Senator Josh Hawley who argue that being appropriately hawkish on China requires being more dovish on nearly everything else. Some restrainers seek wholesale global retrenchment; others mainly decry ongoing US involvement in Europe and the Middle East. What unites them is a conviction that the overuse of US power has been catastrophic for America and the world. This coalition seemed ascendant a year ago, when President Joe Biden denounced the “forever wars” while pulling out of Afghanistan. That decision, two analysts argued, marked Biden as a hard-nosed realist — and perhaps an ally in the struggle to reshape American diplomacy. Yet the moment didn’t last. The collapse of the Afghan state even before the US finished withdrawing showed that, while waging wars is expensive, losing them can impose a serious cost. Then came Russia’s assault on Ukraine. As Vladimir Putin’s forces sought to restore the Soviet empire and murdered Ukrainian citizens, they revealed just how awful a world shaped by great powers other than Washington might be. Indeed, Biden isn’t getting much praise from self-proclaimed realists today. While refusing to intervene militarily, Biden has otherwise backed Ukraine with money, weapons and other support. NATO — whose peaceful expansion allegedly forced Putin to order a campaign of aggression and murder — now appears likely to add two new members, Finland and Sweden. Biden has even invoked the rhetorical legacy of his cold war predecessors, declaring that Ukraine is a vital front in the struggle to save the free world. In response, the restraint coalition has itself opened a new front, finding multiple reasons to attack Biden’s Ukraine policy. First is cost. Sustaining a medium-sized country under a ferocious military assault is fantastically expensive. The latest US support package for Ukraine totals some $40 billion — money, Hawley complained, that could be better spent on giving US military personnel a generous raise. Some Republicans in Congress seem to agree — 57 representatives and 11 senators voted, unsuccessfully, against the aid package. Second is risk. No one knows how the war in Ukraine will end. If the US helps Ukraine defend itself too successfully, the thinking goes, then perhaps a humiliated Russia will escalate wildly rather than accept defeat. Finally, there is politics. With Biden having gone all-in on Ukraine, there’s little space for the restraint contingent on the left. But Hawley and other Republicans seeking to inherit Donald Trump’s political base clearly believe that there is a constituency for claims that supporting a vulnerable democracy equates to putting “America last.” It is uncharitable to label such arguments “pro-Putin.” Forty billion dollars is real money, given that the Pentagon is struggling to find a 10th of that for urgent near-term improvements to America’s military posture in the Pacific. There is, undoubtedly, danger in a scenario where Putin worries that he is losing the war — and in consequence loses his head. But the perpetual problem with restraint is the corresponding unwillingness to consider what happens after America pulls back. Suppose Washington does slash support to Ukraine and leave European security to the Europeans. What does that bring? Judging by the past century — or even the past six months — the answer is not a stable Europe and a more solvent America. Rather, the result is likely to be a partially successful Russian war of conquest that creates pervasive insecurity in Europe; a continent that, lacking American leadership, is less united and confident in opposing Putin; and greater global instability that ultimately makes it harder to contain China, as well.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 1NC HEG GOOD

U.S. heg is a prerequisite to solve existential risks, including the rise of authoritarian regimes and climate change

Betz 21 [11/3/2021, Betz, Hans-Georg, Hans-Georg Betz is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Zurich. Before coming to Zurich, he taught at various universities in North America, including Johns Hopkins University's School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, DC, and York University in Toronto. He is the author of several books and numerous articles and book chapters on radical right-wing populism. He holds a PhD in Political Science from MIT., “Uncertain Times in a World Without American Hegemony”, Fair Observer, ]//AA

The international order is in deep trouble, and not only since the onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic. This is not how things were supposed to turn out. The collapse of the “evil empire,” the end of the Cold War and the integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the EU were supposed to bring about a new era of stability and prosperity, the latter epitomized most prominently by China’s embrace of the market. Liberalism was supposed to reign supreme. In the grand battle of ideas, Marx had lost out, Hegel had won — or so his American acolyte, Francis Fukuyama, claimed. Fukuyama proclaimed that the “end of history” was at hand, and the cognoscenti and would-be cognoscenti on both sides of the Atlantic enthusiastically applauded. Three decades later, the world is in disarray. The attacks of September 11 were a drastic reminder that not everybody was sold on Fukuyama’s utopia. The financial crisis that followed the collapse of Lehman Brothers and, with it, the house of cards built on a derivatives market that had spun out of control exposed the irrationality of rational behavior — taking more and more risks simply because everybody else did so. Finally, COVID-19 has demonstrated how quickly the beautiful world of ever-expanding consumer choices, sustained by cheap labor in remote parts of the world, can grind to a screeching halt. Benign Hegemon It is too early to tell whether or not global turbulences have reached a point of no return. The prospects are not great, and that has a lot to do with the United States. There is a strong sense that America’s hegemonic position, which it assumed after World War II, is on the wane and, with it, the country’s “commitment to promoting a liberal international order.” Or, perhaps, the United States suffers from a severe case of “leadership fatigue” and no longer wants to play the role of the “benign hegemon.” The notion of the benign hegemon is derived from hegemonic stability theory, popular among some experts in international relations. The theory posits that order and stability in world affairs crucially depend on a Great Power capable of sustaining them and willing to do so. As Stephen Kobrin, of the Wharton School, has recently put it, “A stable, open economy requires a hegemon, a dominant power who can provide some of the necessary public goods, absorb costs, and order the system.” Although this pertains particularly to international economic relations, it can be applied to other areas, such as international security. Order and stability require, among other things, that the hegemonic power formulate and underwrite the rules that define and govern the interactions between states in the international system. This was the case in the second half of the 19th century when Great Britain assumed this role, providing and guaranteeing global public goods such as free trade, capital mobility and the British pound, backed up by the gold standard, as the global reserve currency. The system came to an end with World War I. The conflict left Britain weakened and largely unable to reassume its prewar role. The interwar period was characterized by turmoil and crises, paving the way for the rise of autocratic regimes, committed to establishing a new order on the ruins of the old one. They accomplished the latter, but the new order was not theirs to create. The new hegemonic power that emerged from the war was not Hitler’s Germany but the United States, which filled the void left by an exhausted Great Britain. This was anything but a natural transition. In fact, for most of the interwar period, the United States had refused to get entangled in international affairs. America’s retreat from internationalism after World War I was epitomized by Congress’s refusal to join the League of Nations — and that despite the fact that the league had been the brainchild of US President Woodrow Wilson. Isolationism went hand in hand with protectionism. Throughout the 19th century and way into the beginning of the 20th, the United States boasted some of the highest tariffs in the world. The culmination was the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which had a devastating impact on international trade and contributed to the Great Depression. It was not until the United States entered the war against Nazi Germany that it assumed the role commensurate to its position as the economically and militarily by far strongest power in the world. Alternative Options The failure of the most recent G20 meeting in Rome to arrive at a meaningful common position on global warming and climate change ahead of the COP26 in Glasgow is further proof that the United States is no longer in a position to fill this role. Instead of leading, President Joe Biden blamed China and Russia “for any disappointment over the level of commitment by G20 leaders to fight climate change.” This is not to deny that Biden has a point. But given the enormity of the impact climate change is bound to have on the natural environment and life on this planet, it is little more than an exercise in passing responsibility. Biden’s remark, however, does address a serious issue, namely the role of China in a rapidly changing world. A few weeks ago, Chinese coal production reached new historic highs, amounting to an estimated 4 billion tons for this year. Accelerated coal production is supposed to alleviate energy shortages that have threatened to slow down the country’s growth. Unfortunately, emissions-wise, coal happens to be one of the worst sources of energy. A new study on the impact of carbon dioxide emissions on coastal areas predicts catastrophic devastation as a result of rising sea levels for some of the world’s megacities, particularly in India, Indonesia, Vietnam and China — all major coal consumers. Given the concentration of China’s population in a string of coastal cities, one might assume that it has a particular interest in combating climate change. In theory, this would entail an active involvement in global governance, a proposition that China has been more than reluctant to embrace, presumably because it would entail directly challenging the United States. At the same time, however, China has launched major initiatives, such as the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and particularly the One Belt, One Road initiative. Together with China’s massive engagement in Africa, these projects leave the impression that they are part of a comprehensive drive designed to establish China as an alternative to the United States. This might herald the emergence of a new system, no longer dominated by one power but multipolar, and certainly very different from the one established after World War II. For, as Princeton’s John Ikenberry has noted a few years ago, “there is no liberal internationalism without American and western hegemony — and that age is ending.” With the decline of the United States and the parallel rise of China, countries have the option to “seek alternative patrons rather than remain dependent on Western largess and support.” The end result might very well be a bifurcated world order, on the heels of a period of instability and turmoil, or what Ian Bremmer and Nouriel Roubini have called a “G-Zero” world, one without clear leadership and global cooperation. Bifurcation means the coexistence of competing systems that follow fundamentally different rules. This can already be observed in the realm of economic governance. Olga Petricevic and David Teece have recently warned of a “noticeable defiance of the principles of classical economic liberalism and the rule-of-law” by Russia and China. The Chinese “alternative model of governance,” they note, “is deploying coordinated protectionist trade and investment policies and government intervention aimed at accessing and acquiring foreign intellectual property, thereby influencing the global economic and innovation system.” Its success is likely to inspire imitation and attempts to jump on the bandwagon, resulting not only in bifurcation but in polarization reminiscent of the Cold War period.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 1NC HEG GOOD

U.S. hegemony resists collapse

Kovac 2/19 (Igor Kovac, PhD in political science from the University of Cincinnati and Foreign Policy Advisor for the Slovenian Prime Minister, 2/12/22, “Persistent Imbalance of Power – A Pervasive Hegemony Theory”, pg ii-iii, accessed 6/18/22)//sfs

Most International Relations literature suggests that when power becomes imbalanced, such a situation will be corrected – hegemony cannot persist over time. However, history offers us several examples of hegemonies lasting over a century, e.g., Ancient Rome, Ming China. So far scholars have offered four explanations for such enduring hegemony (Coercive Hegemony, Cooperative Hegemony, Cultural Hegemony, and Opportunist Hegemony), with a common mechanism: ineffective balancing. Namely, the hegemon has the capacity to put balancing at bay using different strategies flowing from the nature and fundamental principles of its hegemony. Hence, the hegemon uses coercion, institutional leverage, ideological indoctrination, or buyout, in order to assure its hegemony can endure. Yet, through time and through crisis the capacities of the hegemon to make the balancing ineffective diminishes. As such, these theories all share a similar assumption – imbalance is transitory and thus hegemony will breakdown. But what if that common assumption is incorrect. What if under certain conditions, imbalance is not resisted, but rather serves interests of non-hegemonic states as well as the hegemon? Twentieth and twenty-first century US hegemony suggests such conditions may exist. This American imbalance displays a different nature and fundamental mechanism behind its functioning. Although US relative power is declining, its global monetary network centrality is not. Moreover, even in times of severe crisis, such as the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, or the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, we have not witnessed US monetary centrality decline. In fact, quite the opposite is true. The dynamics associated with an imbalance of power in favor of the United States runs against the expectations of existing theories. Therefore, we need a different theory to make sense of these particularities and make better policy recommendations. Thus, I have developed a Pervasive Hegemony Theory, which is based on a ‘buy-in’ behavior, that better explains US hegemony compared to existing alternatives. The ‘buy-in’ behavior relates to non-hegemonic states as well as the hegemon, in which all countries continue to use hegemon’s monetary unit in their monetary relations, even in times of severe economic crisis. This reinforces the hegemony. Even though non-hegemonic states may not prefer the imbalance of power, they prefer conducting their economic relations within the hegemon’s monetary unit and thus perpetuate the imbalance. Subsequently, they can only maximize their selfish interests and autonomy by buying-in to the hegemony and reproducing the imbalance of power. Conversely, the hegemon may not like the current rules and norms of the international system, but it can change those and obtain the support of the non-hegemonic states if it accepts to provide its monetary unit as the central currency of the system. In pursuing this argument, I use both quantitative (Network Analysis and Time Series) and qualitative methods (Process Tracing). I use the former on available economic data to establish the claim of US economic centrality, and that it is something different than what we have seen in the past. Second, I process trace the mechanisms of hegemonic and non-hegemonic state behavior in two international monetary systems (Bretton Woods and post-Bretton Woods) in order to isolate and identify the buy-in mechanism and provide an explanation of enduring imbalance – ownership over the central monetary unit in global economy. The dissertation, thus, assesses existing theories and indicates their inadequacies in explaining an important international phenomenon and provides a more robust explanation of enduring hegemony with the economic centrality, namely the ownership of the central monetary unit.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 1NC HEG GOOD

US heg boosts transatlantic unity, keeps Russia and China in check, spreads democracy, and leads world peace

Ville Sinkkonen 22, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA), Center on US Politics and Power, 6/7/2022, "A Fleeting Glimpse of Hegemony? The War in Ukraine and The Future of The International Leadership of The United States ," Transatlantic Policy Quarterly,

The war in Ukraine is a world-historical moment – a pivotal event that comes around maybe once every decade. Already the Russian invasion has upended the post-Cold War European security order. However, beyond shattering established structures, crises tend to create opportunities. In this regard, the war in Ukraine is no different. From the standpoint of the United States, Moscow’s blatant aggression has creating an opening to reassert its leadership of the Western alliance and even recapture some of its post-Cold War hegemonic position, which has been challenged by revisionist powers China and Russia and domestic travails.[1] A little over six months after a chaotic exit from Afghanistan, President Biden and his administration are being hailed for the successful coordination of a joint transatlantic response in sanctions against Russia and military aid to Ukraine. Joe Biden’s triumphant inaugural declaration looks prescient: “America is back”.

However, in the midst of such triumphalism, it is vital to pause and consider pathways forward. As the old international order receded, the Biden administration is facing questions regarding the future direction of America’s international engagement in the “post-February 24, 2022” world.[2] After briefly outlining how the Biden administration arrived at its pivotal date with history, this article zooms in on five sets of challenges that the U.S. needs to deal with to sustain the current “hegemonic moment.” Without attention and resolve to mitigate these challenges, the re-emergence of U.S. leadership in the transatlantic domain, not to mention any visions of reasserting U.S. hegemony more broadly, may prove but a flash in the pan.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC – NO PROLIF

No prolif impact

Mueller 17 (John Mueller, Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University & Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute & Senior Research Scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at Ohio State University "76. Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Terrorism" https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2017/2/cato-handbook-for-policymakers-8th-edition-76_0.pdf)

Except for their effects on agonies, obsessions, rhetoric, posturing, and spending, the consequences of nuclear proliferation have been largely benign: those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to deter real or imagined threats. For the most part, nuclear powers have found the weapons to be a notable waste of time, money, effort, and scientific talent. They have quietly kept the weapons in storage and haven’t even found much benefit in rattling them from time to time. If the recent efforts to keep Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons have been successful, those efforts have done Iran a favor. There has never been a militarily compelling reason to use nuclear weapons, particularly because it has not been possible to identify suitable targets—or targets that couldn’t be attacked as effectively by conventional munitions. Conceivably, conditions exist under which nuclear weapons could serve a deterrent function, but there is little reason to suspect that they have been necessary to deter war thus far, even during the Cold War. The main Cold War contestants have never believed that a repetition of World War II, whether embellished by nuclear weapons or not, is remotely in their interests. Moreover, the weapons have not proved to be crucial status symbols. How much more status would Japan have if it possessed nuclear weapons? Would anybody pay a great deal more attention to Britain or France if their arsenals held 5,000 nuclear weapons, or much less if they had none? Did China need nuclear weapons to impress the world with its economic growth or its Olympics? Those considerations help explain why alarmists have been wrong for decades about the pace of nuclear proliferation. Most famously, in the 1960s, President John Kennedy anticipated that in another decade “fifteen or twenty or twenty-five nations may have these weapons.” Yet, of the dozens of technologically capable countries that have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, very few have done so. Insofar as most leaders of most countries (even rogue ones) have considered acquiring the weapons, they have come to appreciate several drawbacks of doing so: nuclear weapons are dangerous, costly, and likely to rile the neighbors. Moreover, as the University of Southern California’s Jacques Hymans has demonstrated, the weapons have also been exceedingly difficult for administratively dysfunctional countries to obtain—it took decades for North Korea and Pakistan to do so. In consequence, alarmist predictions about proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, epidemics, and points of no return have proved faulty. Although proliferation has so far had little consequence, that is not because the only countries to get nuclear weapons have had rational leaders. Large, important countries that acquired the bomb were run at the time by unchallenged—perhaps certifiably deranged—monsters. Consider Joseph Stalin, who, in 1949, was planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by planting a lot of trees, and Mao Zedong, who, in 1964, had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that resulted in an artificial famine in which tens of millions of Chinese perished. Some also fear that a country might use its nuclear weapons to “dominate” its area. That argument was used with dramatic urgency before 2003 when Saddam Hussein supposedly posed great danger, and it has been frequently applied to Iran. Exactly how that domination is to be carried out is never made clear. The notion, apparently, is this: should an atomic rogue state rattle the occasional rocket, other countries in the area, suitably intimidated, would bow to its demands. Far more likely, threatened states would make common cause with each other and with other concerned countries (including nuclear ones) against the threatening neighbor. That is how countries coalesced into an alliance of convenience to oppose Iraq’s region-threatening invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Yet another concern has been that the weapons will go off, by accident or miscalculation, devastating the planet in the process: the weapons exist in the thousands, sooner or later one or more of them will inevitably go off. But those prognostications have now failed to deliver for 70 years. That time period suggests something more than luck is operating. Moreover, the notion that if one nuclear weapon goes off in one place, the world will necessarily be plunged into thermonuclear cataclysm should remain in the domain of Hollywood scriptwriters.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 1NC – NO PROLIF IMPACT

No impact to nuclear proliferation—more nuclear states produce peace

Suzuki 15 – (June 2015, Akisato, Researcher, Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, MA in Violence, Terrorism and Security at Queen's University, “Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests,” Research and Politics, SagePub)

Random Forests has three attractive and distinctive characteristics for the purposes of this paper: first, the estimation of conditional variable importance and partial dependence plots enable conventional applied researchers to interpret non-parametric analysis in an intuitive way; second, Random Forests can examine non-linearity (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341), which is desirable because, as already noted, some theories expect non-linearity between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict; and finally, it can cope with potential interactions and multicollinearity between regressors (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341; Strobl et al., 2008). As noted before, most of the regressors here are highly correlated, and also it is plausible to anticipate some interaction effect between them (e.g. the number of democratic states and the gross world product). The specific capabilities of Random Forests are therefore essential. The estimation of conditional variable importance shows that the nuclear year counter has a negative importance score.7 Thus, the nuclear year counter is not important in explaining the dispute–state ratio. This suggests that the optimist theory is supported. The remaining regressors have an importance score higher than the absolute value of the importance score of the nuclear year counter, meaning that they are all important. Controlling for democratic peace, capitalist peace, and polarity, the number of nuclear states is still a significant predictor in explaining a systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Figure 1 presents the partial dependence plots of the model.8 First, on average, a larger number of nuclear states is associated with a lower dispute–state ratio, although the changes from two nuclear states to three and from six to seven increase the ratio instead. Thus, the relationship is empirically non-linear, as Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982) and Intriligator and Brito (1981) expected in part. Overall, however, the optimist theory is supported, and the change from two nuclear states to nine nuclear states decreases the dispute–state ratio approximately from 0.228 to 0.18. This means that, if there are 194 states in the system (as there were in 2009), the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year decreases approximately from 44 to 35. This is a substantively significant decline. Second, the nuclear year counter shows a concave relationship with the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that new nuclear states are less prone to conflict than middle-aged nuclear states. Thus, the pessimist theory finds no support from either the variable importance estimation or the partial dependence plot. Finally, as for the control variables, the number of democratic states and the gross world product have a complex non-linear relationship with the dispute–state ratio, but if the number of democratic states and the gross world product are sufficiently large, they tend to decrease the dispute–state ratio. Their substantive effects are also significant, though not as much as the number of nuclear states. When comparing the effect of their lowest and highest values (23 and 94 in the number of democratic states and 7 and 71.2 in the gross world product), the number of democratic states decreases the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year approximately from 40 to 37, and the gross world product from 44 to 37. Unipolarity is also associated with a decline in the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that unipolarity is better than bipolarity in terms of a systemic propensity for interstate conflict; however, its effect is negligible, as it reduces the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year from 39 to 38. One caveat is, as explained in the online appendix, that the results of the number of democratic states and unipolarity are significantly sensitive to a parameter setting. Thus, these predictors are less robust, and the aforementioned points about them should be treated with caution. Discussion and concluding remarks The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported:9 first, a larger number of nuclear states on average decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is no clear evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system. This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention, to the extent that these effects overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-level empirics deserve attention.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC—ALT CAUSES

Trump’s budget cuts are an alt cause to failed disease response

Baumgaertner 17 (Emily Baumgaertner, the former global health projects and partnerships coordiantor at the Pulitzer Center. Prior to joining the Pulitzer Center, Emily earned her Master of Public Health degree in global health metrics at The George Washington University.)(“Trump’s Proposed Budget Cuts Trouble Bioterrorism Experts”, May 28, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/us/politics/biosecurity-trump-budget-defense.html)//ASMITH

WASHINGTON — President Trump has promoted his first budget proposal as placing one mission above all else — keeping America safe. But the president has drawn a narrow definition of national security, and one aspect of defense would actually receive less money: protecting the nation from deadly pathogens, man-made or natural. To help offset a 10 percent increase in military spending, much of the government would take serious hits, including agencies tasked with biosecurity. The Office of Public Health Preparedness and Response, which tracks outbreaks of disease, would be cut by $136 million, or 9.7 percent. The National Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases — a branch of the that fights threats like and Ebola — would be cut by $65 million, or 11 percent. The C.D.C.’s Center for Global Health would lose $76 million, or 18 percent. Its Emergency Operations Center, which conducts real-time monitoring of outbreak responses, and its Select Agents Program, which sets regulations in lethal toxin labs and helps researchers stay ahead of bioterrorists, face unspecified cuts as well. Experts in biological threats are reacting with alarm. “It’s horrific — worse than I expected,” says J. Stephen Morrison, the director of the Global Health Policy Center at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “They’re just gutting things, overlaying salt upon key institutions, with devastating human impact.” “When you add those cuts up,” he added, they “will inevitably impact health security.” Republicans in Congress are no less critical. “Sometime in the president’s term, you will have a pandemic,” Representative Tom Cole, Republican of Oklahoma, told the president’s budget director, Mick Mulvaney, at a House budget hearing on Wednesday. “You will have a , you will have an Ebola,” Mr. Cole said. “Cutting the Centers for Disease Control, I think, leaves you very vulnerable and the American people very vulnerable,” he said. Over all, the C.D.C.’s budget would be cut 17 percent. Dr. Thomas R. Frieden, who recently retired as the director of the C.D.C. and led its 2014 Ebola response, sent more than a dozen bullet points cataloging how the proposed budget was “Unsafe at Any Level Of Enactment.” Trump administration officials say they are trying to refocus scientific research in an era of domestic austerity. Too much federal science is competing with work that could be done in the private sector, they say. Under the president’s budget, the at large would be cut 18 percent. Within that, the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, which handles Zika, Ebola and /AIDS vaccine research, would lose 18 percent of its budget. “The administration wholeheartedly believes in the commitment to research,” Mr. Mulvaney said Wednesday at the House budget hearing. “We’d like to see more focus on what they call basic research, which is research further away from the marketability of products because that is one of the gaps that the government can and should fill.” The targeting is remarkably specific. At the N.I.H., the Fogarty International Center, a small program that in part trains foreign leaders in pandemic response, would be eliminated. Thousands of scientists and global health professionals rallied on Capitol Hill in April to protest the plan after a list of programs targeted for eradication was released. “They’re making a very radical statement,” Dr. Morrison said. “The big picture is a movement toward suspicion of international programs. The administration is threatening to abandon multilateralism in a big way.” Global health programs at the State Department and the United States Agency for International Development would be cut by at least a quarter. ”Our operations must become more efficient, and our assistance must become more effective,” Hari Sastry, the director of the State Department’s Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, told reporters on Tuesday. “Our primary mission is going to remain advocating for the national interests of our country.” Military and border patrol spending will increase, if Mr. Trump’s request is funded. But scientists warn that a $1.6 billion project to begin constructing a southern border wall will not keep out the most lethal outbreak of in history, which recently killed 40 percent of patients in China, nor will it keep out Ebola, which has resurfaced in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with 37 suspected cases this month. “The next weapon of mass destruction may not be a bomb,” said , the director of the World Health Organization’s Collaborating Center on Public Health Law and Human Rights. “It may be a tiny pathogen that you can’t see, smell or taste, and by the time we discover it, it’ll be too late,” Mr. Gostin said. “The closed-border, highly nationalistic, America-first vision is not the world’s scientific view of how to keep a population safe and healthy,” he said. The president’s requests on biomedical research and defense are likely to be greeted skeptically by Congress, which ultimately controls spending levels. Lawmakers in both parties have greatly increased funding for the N.I.H. budget, and Georgia’s two senators, both Republicans, have protected the C.D.C. and its Atlanta headquarters. Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, called the Trump proposal “dead on arrival.” And in the House budget hearing on Wednesday, Mr. Cole pressed Mr. Mulvaney on proposed cuts to the disease surveillance program.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 1NC—ALT CAUSES

Many other characteristics of biodefense must be bolstered to solve the impact

Dhillon et al. 17 (Ranu S. Dhillon, MD, is an instructor at Harvard Medical School and a physician at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. is the founder of , which curates patient educational content on YouTube. is a managing director of Bay City Capital. He previously served in several leadership roles at the intersection of government, policy, and technology.)(“The World Is Completely Unprepared for a Global Pandemic”, March 15, 2017, Harvard Business Review, https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-world-is-completely-unprepared-for-a-global-pandemic)//ASMITH

In 2003 a doctor with SARS while staying at a Hong Kong hotel, and overnight the virus reached across the globe. China is currently battling a bird flu that . If Ebola, which transmits through fluids, were spread by air, or if Zika, which were as deadly as Ebola, we would be facing an unprecedented catastrophe. An uncontrolled outbreak or bioterror attack could result in a . We fear it is only a matter of time before we face a deadlier and more contagious pathogen, yet the threat of a deadly pandemic remains dangerously overlooked. Pandemics now occur with greater frequency, due to factors such as climate change, urbanization, and international travel. Other factors, such as a weak World Health Organization and potentially massive cuts to funding for U.S. scientific research and stand to deepen our vulnerability. We also face the specter of novel and mutated pathogens that could spread and kill faster than diseases we have seen before. With the advent of genome-editing technologies, bioterrorists could artificially engineer new plagues, a threat that Ashton Carter, the former U.S. secretary of defense, thinks could . The two of us have advised the president of Guinea on stopping Ebola. In addition, we have and have informally advised U.S. and international organizations on the matter. Our experiences tell us that the world is unprepared for these threats. We urgently need to change this trajectory. We can start by learning four lessons from the gaps exposed by the Ebola and Zika pandemics. Faster Vaccine Development The most effective way to stop pandemics is with vaccines. However, with Ebola there was no vaccine, and only now, years later, . This has been the case with Zika, too. Though there has been in developing and getting a vaccine to market, it is not fast enough, and Zika has already spread worldwide. Many other diseases do not have vaccines, and developing them takes too long when a pandemic is already under way. We need faster pipelines, such as the one that the is trying to create, to preemptively develop vaccines for diseases predicted to cause outbreaks in the near future. Point-of-Care Diagnostics Even with such efforts, vaccines will not be ready for many diseases and would not even be an option for novel or artificially engineered pathogens. With no vaccine for Ebola, our was to identify who was infected as quickly as possible and isolate them before they infected others. Because Ebola’s symptoms were identical to common illnesses like malaria, diagnosis required laboratory testing that could not be easily scaled. As a result, many patients were only tested . Some were never tested at all, and about 40% of patients in Ebola treatment centers . Many dangerous pathogens similarly require laboratory testing that is difficult to scale. Florida, for example, has not been able to expand testing for Zika, so . What’s needed are point-of-care diagnostics that, like pregnancy tests, can be used by frontline responders or patients themselves to detect infection right away, where they live. These tests already exist for many diseases, and the technology behind them is well-established. However, the process for their validation . Point-of-care diagnostics for Ebola, for example, were available but . Greater Global Coordination We need stronger global coordination. The responsibility for controlling pandemics is fragmented, spread across too many players with no unifying authority. In Guinea we forged a response out of an amalgam of over 30 organizations, each of which had its own priorities. In Ebola’s aftermath, there have been for responding to pandemics similar to the advance planning and training that NATO has in place for its numerous members to respond to military threats in a quick, coordinated fashion. This is the right thinking, but we are far from seeing it happen. The errors that allowed Ebola to become a crisis replayed with Zika, and the WHO, which should anchor global action, . Stronger Local Health Systems International actors are essential but cannot parachute into countries and navigate local dynamics quickly enough to contain outbreaks. In Guinea it took months to establish the ground game needed to stop the pandemic, with Ebola continuing to spread in the meantime. We need to help developing countries establish health systems that can provide routine care and, when needed, coordinate with international responders to contain new outbreaks. Local health systems could be established for ultimately spent on creating an Ebola response from scratch. Access to routine care is also essential for knowing when an outbreak is taking root and establishing trust. For months, Ebola spread before anyone knew it was happening, and then lingered because communities who had never had basic health care flooding into their villages. The in the pandemic came when they began to trust what they were hearing about Ebola and understood what they needed to do to halt its spread: identify those exposed and safely bury the dead. With Ebola and Zika, we lacked these four things — vaccines, diagnostics, global coordination, and local health systems — which are still urgently needed. However, prevailing political headwinds in the United States, which has played a key role in combatting pandemics around the world, threaten to make things worse. The Trump administration is seeking drastic budget cuts in funding for and . The U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development may lose over one-third of their budgets, including The National Institutes of Health, which has been on the vanguard of vaccines and diagnostics research, . The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which has been , remains , and, if the Affordable Care Act is repealed, would lose , provided to it for . Investing in our ability to prevent and contain pandemics through revitalized national and international institutions should be our shared goal. However, if U.S. agencies become less able to respond to pandemics, leading institutions from other nations, such as and the in France, the and in the UK, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs have done and in previous pandemics), would need to step in to fill the void. There is no border wall against disease. Pandemics are an existential threat on par with climate change and nuclear conflict. We are at a critical crossroads, where we must either take the steps needed to prepare for this threat or become even more vulnerable. It is only a matter of time before we are hit by a deadlier, more contagious pandemic. Will we be ready?

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC—NO DISEASE IMPACT

Absolutely no chance of extinction from disease

Adalja 16 [Amesh Adalja, infectious disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh] “Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race?” June 17, 2016 (http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/) - MZhu

But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not asking about the threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a headline-grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large proportion of humans succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be sustained.

I’m not afraid of this apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a quintessentially human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 1NC—NO DISEASE IMPACT

Diseases don’t cause extinction

Owen Cotton-Barratt 17, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic.

One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC—WARMING INEV

The director of the EPA agrees

Snyder 16 (2016, Carolyn, Director, Climate Protection Partnerships Division at US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), “Evolution of global temperature over the past two million years,” http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature19798.html)

Reconstructions of Earth’s past climate strongly influence our understanding of the dynamics and sensitivity of the climate system. Yet global temperature has been reconstructed for only a few isolated windows of time, , and continuous reconstructions across glacial cycles remain elusive. Here I present a spatially weighted proxy reconstruction of global temperature over the past 2 million years estimated from a multi-proxy database of over 20,000 sea surface temperature point reconstructions. Global temperature gradually cooled until roughly 1.2 million years ago and cooling then stalled until the present. The cooling trend probably stalled before the beginning of the mid-Pleistocene transition, and pre-dated the increase in the maximum size of ice sheets around 0.9 million years ago, , . Thus, global cooling may have been a pre-condition for, but probably is not the sole causal mechanism of, the shift to quasi-100,000-year glacial cycles at the mid-Pleistocene transition. Over the past 800,000 years, polar amplification (the amplification of temperature change at the poles relative to global temperature change) has been stable over time, and global temperature and atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations have been closely coupled across glacial cycles. A comparison of the new temperature reconstruction with radiative forcing from greenhouse gases estimates an Earth system sensitivity of 9 degrees Celsius (range 7 to 13 degrees Celsius, 95 per cent credible interval) change in global average surface temperature per doubling of atmospheric carbon dioxide over millennium timescales. This result suggests that stabilization at today’s greenhouse gas levels may already commit Earth to an eventual total warming of 5 degrees Celsius (range 3 to 7 degrees Celsius, 95 per cent credible interval) over the next few millennia as ice sheets, vegetation and atmospheric dust continue to respond to global warming.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC—WARMING INEV

Warming inevitable

Loris et al. ’16 [Nicolas D. Loris is Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow in the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies, of the Institute for Economic Freedom and Opportunity, at The Heritage Foundation. Brett D. Schaefer is Jay Kingham Senior Research Fellow Fellow in International Regulatory Affairs in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation. Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas Senior Research Fellow in the Thatcher Center, The U.S. Should Withdraw from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, June 9, 2016, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/06/the-us-should-withdraw-from-the-united-nations-framework-convention-on-climate-change]

U.N. climate conferences have become increasingly irrelevant, in large part because the approach taken is unworkable. International negotiations have centered on placing the economic burden of addressing climate change on a few dozen developed countries while asking little or nothing from more the 150 developing countries. But the primary source of GHG emissions is increasingly the developing world, most notably from large developing economies such as China and India. Even if the U.S. cut 100 percent of its CO2 emissions it would not make a significant difference in projected global warming. Using the same climate sensitivity (which is arguably higher than reality) as the IPCC assumes in its modeling, the world would only be 0.137 degrees Celsius cooler by 2100 if the U.S. cut its CO2 emissions by 100 percent. If the entire industrialized world cut its CO2 emissions by 100 percent it would avert warming by only 0.278 degrees Celsius by the turn of the century.[36] Using the IPCC’s own assumptions, to have a meaningful impact on global temperatures, any agreement would require significantly reduced emissions from both developed and developing countries. Such a course would be economically devastating, however, and was one reason why Canada pulled out of the Kyoto Protocol, and why Japan, Russia, and Canada have said they would not commit to a new treaty with binding commitments to reduce emissions.[37] Proponents of an international agreement and the UNFCCC point to China and India’s commitment to reduce CO2 emissions as evidence that the developing world is serious about such reductions. For example, China agreed to peak its GHG emissions by 2030. Non-binding promises to cut emissions 14 years from now are a small price to pay for continuing the status quo. In fact, China has been grossly underreporting its CO2 emissions and use of coal. According to a November 2015 article from The New York Times: China, the world’s leading emitter of greenhouse gases from coal, has been burning up to 17 percent more coal a year than the government previously disclosed, according to newly released data. The finding could complicate the already difficult efforts to limit global warming. Even for a country of China’s size, the scale of the correction is immense. The sharp upward revision in official figures means that China has released much more carbon dioxide—almost a billion more tons a year according to initial calculations—than previously estimated.[38] What are the odds that China will be more forthright and transparent in the future when accuracy could have an actual impact? Further, China’s refusal to address its current severe air and water quality problems, neither of which has anything to do with reducing GHG emissions, should raise serious concerns as to whether China will follow through with any commitment. China’s improved standards of living have been accomplished through the use of CO2-emitting conventional energy. China’s GDP per capita has increased from a little more than $300 in 1990 to nearly $7,000 today.[39] This growth is impressive, but China’s per capita GDP is still a fraction of the developed world's. Decarbonization would hinder China’s economic growth, which is why authorities have resisted calls to restrict GHG emissions in previous agreements. China is unlikely to honor its promises in 2030 if it would hamper continued economic growth. India’s pledged cuts are similarly dubious. India recently vowed to cut its carbon intensity by 33 percent to 35 percent by 2030.[40] However, roughly 22 percent of Indians still do not have access to electricity.[41] Domestic political pressures to increase access to electricity and living standards are going to be far more pressing than international promises to make GHG emissions cuts. Closer inspection, however, reveals that India has already incorporated this reality into its pledge. The promised reductions are not for CO2 emissions, but for cuts in the ratio of CO2 emissions to GDP, i.e., emissions intensity. This ratio will go down so long as CO2 emissions rise less rapidly than GDP. For example, the carbon intensity of the U.S. economy dropped by more than 45 percent between 1981 and 2011 even as CO2 emissions rose 18 percent.[42] India’s GDP is projected to rise from $1.15 trillion in 2005 (the base year for India’s promised cuts) to $6.9 trillion in 2030.[43] Over the same span CO2 emissions are projected to rise from 1.2 gigatons (Gt) to 3.8 Gt.[44] Simple division shows that the CO2 intensity in 2005 was 1.05 Gt per trillion dollars and that it is expected to drop to 0.577 Gt per trillion dollars in 2030. Therefore, projections for India’s GDP and CO2 emissions combine to predict that a business-as-usual scenario (one without any policies beyond those currently in place) will lead to a 45 percent reduction in India’s carbon intensity by 2030. The promised cuts are 33 percent to 35 percent. In other words, if India does nothing at all, it is likely to more than meet its “bold commitment.”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC—NO CLIMATE IMPACT

Adaptation and resilience solve warming

Hart 15 (Michael - Simon Reisman chair at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, former Fulbright-Woodrow Wilson Center Visiting Research, he was also a Scholar-in-Residence in the School of International Service and a Senior Fellow in the Center for North American Studies at American University in Washington, a former official in Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, where he specialized in trade policy and trade negotiations, MA from the University of Toronto and is the author, editor, or co-editor of more than a dozen books, “Hubris: The Troubling Science, Economics, and Politics of Climate Change”, google books)

As already noted, the IPCC scenarios themselves are wildly alarmist, not only on the basic science but also on the underlying economic assumptions, which in turn drive the alarmist impacts. The result cannot withstand critical analysis. Economists Ian Castles and David Henderson, for example, show the extent to which the analysis is driven by the desire to reach predetermined outcomes.50 Other economists have similarly wondered what purpose was served by pursuing such unrealistic scenarios. It is hard to credit the defense put forward by Mike Hulme, one of the creators of the scenarios, that the IPCC is not engaged in forecasting the future but in creating “plausible” story lines of what might happen under various scenarios.51 Each scare scenario is based on linear projections without any reference to technological developments or adaptation. If, on a similar linear basis, our Victorian ancestors in the UK, worried about rapid urbanization and population growth in London, had made similar projections, they would have pointed to the looming crisis arising from reliance on horse-drawn carriages and omnibuses; they would have concluded that by the middle of the 20th century, London would be knee-deep in horse manure, and all of the southern counties would be required to grow the oats and hay to feed and bed the required number of horses. Technology progressed and London adapted. Why should the rest of humanity not be able to do likewise in the face of a trivial rise in temperature over the course of more than a century? The work on physical impacts is equally over the top. All the scenarios assume only negative impacts, ignore the reality of adaptation, and attribute any and all things bad to global warming. Assuming the GHG theory to be correct means that its impact would be most evident at night and during the winter in reducing atmospheric heat loss to outer space.52 It would have greater impact in increasing minimum temperatures than in increasing maximum temperatures. Secondary studies, however, generally ignore this facet of the hypothesis. The IPCC believes that a warmer world will harm human health due, for example, to increased disease, malnutrition, heat-waves, floods, storms, and cardiovascular incidents. As already noted there is no basis for the claim about severe-weather-related threats or malnutrition. The claim about heat-related deaths gained a boost during the summer of 2003 because of the tragedy of some 15,000 alleged heat-related deaths in France as elderly people stayed behind in city apartments without air conditioning while their children enjoyed the heat at the sea shore during the August vacation. Epidemiological studies of so-called "excess" deaths resulting from heat waves are abused to get the desired results. Similar studies of the impact of cold spells show that they are far more lethal than heat waves and that it is much easier to adapt to heat than to cold.53 More fundamentally, this, like most of the alarmist literature, ignores the basics of the AGW hypothesis: the world will not see an exponential increase in summer, daytime heat (and thus more heat waves), but a decrease in night-time and winter cooling, particularly at higher latitudes and altitudes. Based on the AGW hypothesis, Canada, China, Korea, Northern Europe, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Chile, and Argentina will see warmer winters and warmer nights. There are clear benefits to such a development, even if there may also be problems, but the AGW industry tends to ignore the positive aspects of their alarmist scenarios. The feared spread of malaria, a much repeated claim, is largely unrelated to climate. Malaria’s worst recorded outbreak was in Siberia long before there was any discussion of AGW. Similarly, the building of the Rideau Canal in Ottawa in the 1820s was severely hampered by outbreaks of malaria due to the proximity of mosquito-infested wetlands in the area. Malaria remains widespread in tropical countries today in part because of the UN’s lengthy embargo on the use of DDT, the legacy of an earlier alarmist disaster. Temperature is but one factor, and a minor one at that, in the multiple factors that affect the rise or decline in the presence of disease-spreading mosquitoes. Wealthier western countries have pursued public health strategies that have reduced the incidence of the dis- ease in their countries. Entomologist Paul Reiter, widely recognized as the leading specialist on malaria vectors and a contributor to some of the early work of the IPCC, was aghast to learn how his careful and systematic analysis of the potential impacts had been twisted in ways that he could not endorse. In a recent paper, he concludes: “Simplistic reasoning on the future prevalence of malaria is ill-founded; malaria is not limited by climate in most temperate regions, nor in the tropics, and in nearly all cases, ’new' malaria at high altitudes is well below the maximum altitudinal limits for transmission. Future changes in climate may alter the prevalence and incidence of the disease, but obsessive emphasis on ’global warming' as a dominant parameter is indefensible; the principal determinants are linked to ecological and societal change, politics and economics.”54 Catastrophic species loss similarly has little foundation in past experience.55 Even if the GHG hypothesis were to be correct, its impact would be slow, providing significant scope and opportunity for adaptation, including by flora and fauna. One of the more irresponsible claims was made by a group of UK modelers who fed wildly improbable scenarios and data into their computers and produced the much-touted claim of massive species loss by the end of the century. There are literally thousands of websites devoted to spreading alarm about species loss and biodiversity. Global warming is but one of many claimed human threats to the planet’s biodiversity. The claims, fortunately, are largely hype, based on computer models and the estimate by Harvard naturalist Edward O. Wilson that 27,000 to 100,000 species are lost annually - a figure he advanced purely hypothetically but which has become one of the most persistent of environmental urban myths. The fact is that scientists have no idea of the extent of the world's flora and fauna, with estimates ranging from five million to 100 million species, and that there are no reliable data about the rate of loss. By some estimates, 95 per cent of the species that ever existed have been lost over the eons, most before humans became major players in altering their environment. A much more credible estimate of recent species loss comes from a surprising source, the UN Environmental Program. It reports that known species loss is slowing reaching its lowest level in 500 years in the last three decades of the 20th century, with some 20 reported extinctions despite increasing pressure on the biosphere from growing human population and industrialization.57 The alarmist community has also introduced the scientifically unknown concept of "locally extinct,” often meaning little more than that a species of plant or animal has responded to adverse conditions by moving to more hospitable circumstances, e.g., birds or butterflies becoming more numerous north of their range and disappearing at its extreme southern extent. Idso et al. conclude: “Many species have shown the ability to adapt rapidly to changes in climate. Claims that global warming threatens large numbers of species with extinction typically rest on a false definition of extinction (the loss of a particular population rather than en- tire species) and speculation rather than real-world evidence. The world’s species have proven very resilient, having survived past natural climate cycles that involved much greater warming and higher C02 concentrations than exist today or are likely to exist in the coming centuries?“

It’s not existential.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 1NC—NO DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

Global backsliding is an alt cause or SQ solves – democracy is inevitably resilient

Anna Lührmann et al, 6-26-2017, (Anna Lührmann is a postdoctoral research fellow at the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg. From 2002 to 2009, she was a member of the German National Parliament. Valeriya Mechkova is a PhD candidate at the V-Dem Institute/University of Gothenburg. Matthew Wilson is an assistant professor at West Virginia University and will be a visiting researcher at the V-Dem Institute in 2018."Analysis," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/26/is-democracy-on-the-decline-not-as-much-as-some-pundits-want-you-to-believe//)MBA HBJ

Clearly liberal democracy is facing challenges in some countries — in particular in the United States. Therefore, U.S. political scientists are right to be on alert and continuously monitor the weak points of their democracy. In some places, it is even worse: Countries such as Turkey or Venezuela have experienced serious breakdowns. But the V-Dem data suggests that alarmist reports about a global demise of democracy are not yet warranted. For one, the average level of democracy in the world is still close to the highest recorded level, even if a slight decline is detectable over the last few years. And there are real success stories, like in Tunisia, even if those do not make as many headlines. Although the declines in democracy in places such as Europe and the United States deserve our attention, the V-Dem data suggest that political institutions in these countries are relatively resilient. Recent examples include the electoral victory of Emmanuel Macron against Marine Le Pen in France and judicial challenges to the immigration ban proposed by President Trump.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC – DEMOCRACY IMPACT

4. More evidence – best case scenario for the aff is that democratic peace theory conflates a weak correlation with causation – it’s more likely to cause war – all the best models statistics and studies go neg

Rosato ‘11

[Asst Prof Poli Sci at Notre Dame and Univ of Chicago. The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, 2011]

Democratic wars There is considerable evidence that the absence of war claim is incorrect. As Christopher Laync(2001, p. 801) notes, 'The most damning indictment of democratic peace theory, is that it happens not to be true: democratic states have gone to war with one another." For example, categorizing a state as democratic if it achieves a democracy score of six or more in the Polity dataset on regime type - as several analysts do - yields three inter-dcmocratic wars: the American Civil War. the Spanish American War and the Boer War/' This is something defenders of the theory readily admit - adopting relatively inclusive definitions of democracy, they themselves generate anywhere between a dozen and three dozen cases of inter-democratic war. In order to exclude these anomalies and thereby preserve the absence of war claim, the theory's defenders restrict their definitions of democracy. In the most compelling analysis to date, Ray (1993, pp. 256-9, 269) argues that no two democracies have gone to war with one another as long as a democracy is defined as follows: the members of the executive and legislative branches arc determined in fair and competitive elections, which is to say that at least two independent parties contest the election, half of the adult population is eligible to vole and the possibility that the governing party can lose has been established by historical precedent. Similarly, Doyle (1983a, pp. 216-17) rescues the claim by arguing that states" domestic and foreign policies must both be subject to the control of the citizenry if they are to be considered liberal. Russett, meanwhile, argues that his no war claim rests on defining democracy as a stale wilh a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of the population, a government brought to power in elections involving two or more legally recognized parties, a popularly elected executive or one responsible to an elected legislature, requirements for civil liberties including free speech and demonstrated longevity of at least three years (Russett 1993, pp. 14-16). Despite imposing these definitional restrictions, proponents of the democratic peace cannot exclude up to five major wars, a figure which, if confirmed, would invalidate the democratic peace by their own admission (Ray 1995, p. 27). The first is the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States. Ray argues that it does not contradict the claim because Britain does not meet bis suffrage requirement. Yet this does not make Britain any less democratic than the United States at the time where less than half the adult population was eligible to vote. In fact, as Laync (2001, p. 801) notes, "the United States was not appreciably more democratic than un re formed Britain." This poses a problem for the democratic peace; if the United States was a democracy, and Ray believes it was, then Britain was also a democracy and the War of 1812 was an inter-democratic war. The second case is the American Civil War. Democratic peace theorists believe the United States was a democracy in 1861, but exclude the case on the grounds that it was a civil rather than interstate war (Russett 1993, pp. 16-17). However, a plausible argument can be made that the United Stales was not a stale but a union of stales, and thai this was therefore a war between states rather than within one. Note, for example, that the term "United States" was plural rather than singular at the time and the conflict was known as the "War Between the States."7 This being the case, the Civil War also contradicts the claim.8 The Spanish-American and Boer wars constitute two further exceptions to the rule. Ray excludes the former because half of the members of Spain's upper house held their positions through hereditary succession or royal appointment. Yet this made Spain little different to Britain, which he classifies as a democracy at the time, thereby leading to the conclusion that the Spanish-American War was a war between democracies. Similarly, it is hard to accept his claim that the Orange Free State was not a democracy during the Boer War because black Africans were not allowed to vote when he is content to classify the United States as a democracy in the second half of the nineteenth century (Ray 1993. pp. 265, 267; Layne 2001. p. 802). In short, defenders of (he democratic peace can only rescue their core claim through the selective application of highly restrictive criteria. Perhaps the most important exception is World War I, which, by virtue of the fact that Germany fought against Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and the United States, would count as five instances of war between liberal states in most analyses of the democratic peace.9 As Ido Oren (1995, pp. 178-9) has shown. Germany was widely considered lo be a liberal state prior to World War I: "Germany was a member of a select group of the most politically advanced countries, far more advanced than some of the nations that arc currently coded as having been "liberal' during that period." In fact, Germany was consistently placed toward the top of that group, "either as second only to the United States ... or as positioned below England and above France." Moreover, Doyle*s assertion that the case ought to be excluded because Germany was liberal domestically, but not in foreign affairs, does not stand up lo scrutiny. As Layne (1994, p. 42) points out. foreign policy was "insulated from parliamentary control" in both France and Britain, two purportedly liberal states (see also Mcarshcimcr 1990, p. 51, fn. 77; Layne 2001, pp. 803 807). Thus it is difficult to classify Germany as non-liberal and World War I constitutes an imporiant exception to Ihe finding. Small numbers Even if restrictive definitions of democracy enable democratic peace theorists to uphold their claim, they render it unsurprising by reducing the number of democracies in any analysis. As several scholars have noted, there were only a dozen or so democracies in the world prior to World War I, and even fewer in a position to fight one another. Therefore, since war is a rare event for any pair of states, the fact that democracies did not fight one another should occasion little surprise (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 50; Cohen 1994, pp. 214, 216; Layne 1994, p. 39; Henderson 1999, p. 212).10 It should be a source of even less surprise as the number of democracies and the potential for conflict among them falls, something that is bound to happen as the democratic bar rises. Ray*s suffrage criterion, for example, eliminates two great powers - Britain and the United States - from the democratic ranks before World War I. thereby making the absence of war between democracies eminently predictable." A simple numerical example should serve to illustrate the point. Using a Polity score of six or more to designate a state as a democracy yields 716 purely democratic dyads out of a total 23240 politically relevant dyads between 1816 and 1913. Assuming that wars arc distributed according to the proportion of democratic dyads in the population and knowing that there were 86 dyads at war during this period, we should expect to observe three democratic-democratic wars between the Congress of Vienna and World War I. If we actually observed no wars between democracies, the democratic peace phenomenon might be worth investigating further even though the difference between three and zero wars is barely statistically significant." Increasing the score required for a state to be coded as a democracy to eight - a score that would make Britain democratic from 1901 onwards only and eliminate states like Spain and the Orange Free State from the ranks of the democracies - makes a dramatic difference. The number of democratic dyads falls to 171. and the expected number of wars is now between zero and one. Now the absence of war finding is to be expected. In short, by adopting restrictive definitions of democracy, proponents of the democratic peace render their central claim wholly unexceptional. In sum, proponents of the democratic peace have unsuccessfully attempted to tread a fine line in order to substantiate their claim that democracies have rarely if ever waged war against one another. On the one hand, they admit that inter-democratic war is not an unusual phenomenon if they adopt relatively inclusive definitions of democracy. On the other hand, in their attempts to restrict the definition of democracy and thereby save the finding they inadvertently make the absence of war between democracies trivial.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC – DEMOCRACY IMPACT

3. Democracy doesn’t cause peace – statistical models are spurious and don’t assume economic growth

Mousseau, 12

(Michael – Professor IR Koç University, “The Democratic Peace Unraveled: It’s the Economy” International Studies Quarterly, p 1-12)

Model 2 presents new knowledge by adding the control for economic type. To capture the dyadic expectation of peace among contract-intensive nations, the variable Contract- intensive EconomyL (CIEL) indicates the value of impersonal contracts in force per capita of the state with the lower level of CIE in the dyad; a high value of this measure indicates both states have contract-intensive economies. As can be seen, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.80) is negative and highly significant. This corroborates that impersonal economy is a highly robust force for peace. The coefficient for DemocracyL is now at zero. There are no other differences between Models 1 and 2, whose samples are identical, and no prior study corroborating the democratic peace has considered contractintensive economy. Therefore, the standard econometric inference to be drawn from Model 2 is the nontrivial result that all prior reports of democracy as a force for peace are probably spurious, since this result is predicted and fully accounted for by economic norms theory. CIEL and DemocracyL correlate only in the moderate range of 0.47 (Pearson’s r), so the insignificance of democracy is not likely to be a statistical artifact of multicollinearity. This is corroborated by the variance inflation factor for DemocracyL in Model 2 of 1.85, which is well below the usual rule-of-thumb indicator of multicollinearity of 10 or more. Nor should readers assume most democratic dyads have both states with impersonal economies: While almost all nations with contract-intensive economies (as indicated with the binary measure for CIE) are democratic (Polity2 > 6) (Singapore is the only long-term exception), more than half—55%—of all democratic nation-years have contract-poor economies. At the dyadic level in this sample, this translates to 80% of democratic dyads (all dyads where DemocracyBinary6 = 1) that have at least one state with a contract-poor economy. In other words, not only does Model 2 show no evidence of causation from democracy to peace (as reported in Mousseau 2009), but it also illustrates that this absence of democratic peace includes the vast majority—80%—of democratic dyad-years over the sample period. Nor is it likely that the causal arrow is reversed—with democracy being the ultimate cause of contract-intensive economy and peace. This is because correlations among independent variables are not calculated in the results of multivariate regressions: Coefficients show only the effect of each variable after the potential effects of the others are kept constant at their mean levels. If it was democracy that caused both impersonal economy and peace, then there would be some variance in DemocracyL remaining, after its partial correlation with CIEL is excluded, that links it directly with peace. The positive direction of the coefficient for DemocracyL informs us that no such direct effect exists (Blalock 1979:473–474). Model 3 tests for the effect of DemocracyL if a control is added for mixed-polity dyads, as suggested by Russett (2010:201). As discussed above, to avoid problems of mathematical endogeneity, I adopt the solution used by Mousseau, Orsun and Ungerer (2013) and measure regime difference as proposed by Werner (2000), drawing on the subcomponents of the Polity2 regime measure. As can be seen, the coefficient for Political Distance (1.00) is positive and significant, corroborating that regime mixed dyads do indeed have more militarized conflict than others. Yet, the inclusion of this term has no effect on the results that concern us here: CIEL ()0.85) is now even more robust, and the coefficient for DemocracyL (0.03) is above zero.7 Model 4 replaces the continuous democracy measure with the standard binary one (Polity2 > 6), as suggested by Russett (2010:201), citing Bayer and Bernhard (2010). As can be observed, the coefficient for CIEL ()0.83) remains negative and highly significant, while DemocracyBinary6 (0.63) is in the positive (wrong) direction. As discussed above, analyses of fatal dispute onsets with the far stricter binary measure for democracy (Polity = 10), put forward by Dafoe (2011) in response to Mousseau (2009), yields perfect prediction (as does the prior binary measure Both States CIE), causing quasi-complete separation and inconclusive results. Therefore, Model 5 reports the results with DemocracyBinary10 in analyses of all militarized conflicts, not just fatal ones. As can be seen, the coefficient for DemocracyBinary10 ()0.41), while negative, is not significant. Model 6 reports the results in analyses of fatal disputes with DemocracyL squared (after adding 10), which implies that the likelihood of conflict decreases more quickly toward the high values of DemocracyL. As can be seen, the coefficient for DemocracyL 2 is at zero, further corroborating that even very high levels of democracy do not appear to cause peace in analyses of fatal disputes, once consideration is given to contractintensive economy. Models 3, 4, and 6, which include Political Distance, were repeated (but unreported to save space) with analyses of all militarized interstate disputes, with the democracy coefficients close to zero in every case. Therefore, the conclusions reached by Mousseau (2009) are corroborated even with the most stringent measures of democracy, consideration of institutional distance, and across all specifications: The democratic peace appears spurious, with contract-intensive economy being the more likely explanation for both democracy and the democratic peace.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC – DEMOCRACY IMPACT

2. leaders will just change the definition of democracy to justify war – Germany, Russia, and Japan prove

Antić, Associate professor at University of Zagreb, and Vlahovec, MA, University of Zagreb, 2013

(Miljenko and Jadranka, “’Democratic War’: Democratic Peace Theory and the War in Former Yugoslavia” International Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, 2013, p. 55-71, , accessed 5-16-18, JCP RH)

Ido Oren’s “The Subjectivity of the ‘Democratic’ Peace: Changing U.S. Perceptions of Imperial Germany” (1995) analyses how statesmen change their definitions of democracy. Oren holds that pairs of countries do not remain at peace because they regard one another as democracies. Instead, countries that have an interest in remaining at peace tend to define one another as democracies. Oren argues that American leaders have tried to interpret democracy to mean “countries like the U.S.”. Oren criticizes the literature on democratic peace for overlooking how the meaning of democracy changed over the course of U.S. history. To support this argument, Oren focuses on how some prominent American scholars classified Imperial Germany. Before World War I they regarded Germany as “the most genuinely democratic” state. However, after the War they changed their view and referred to the pre-war Germany as an autocratic state. Oren briefly mentions two additional cases: Russia and Japan. He points out that the United States regarded them as more similar to the United States whenever U.S. interests called for a closer relationship with them.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
NEG › Clarity › 2NC – DEMOCRACY IMPACT

1. Cherry Picked Data

Antić, Associate professor at University of Zagreb, and Vlahovec, MA, University of Zagreb, 2013

(Miljenko and Jadranka, “’Democratic War’: Democratic Peace Theory and the War in Former Yugoslavia” International Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, 2013, p. 55-71, , accessed 5-16-18, JCP RH)

David Spiro’s “The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace” (1996) argues against the democratic peace theory by stating that the apparent absence of war between democra- cies is statistically insignificant. For most of international history before 1945, there were few democracies and little chance for them to fight each other. Spiro also su- ggests that institutional explanations of democratic peace are weak, because institu- tional constrains on a government’s ability to wage war would make democracies less war-prone. The data, however, reveal that democracies frequently go to war against non-democracies. Spiro also criticizes studies of democratic peace for failing to define democracy clearly. Moreover, he states that shifting definitions of war have also made democratic peace appear more significant than it is. Many supporters of the democratic peace exclude the U.S. Civil War, Spanish-American War of 1898, and Finland’s World War II alliance with the Axis powers against the Western democracies. Therefore, Spiro suggests that the number of wars between democracies is higher than claimed by the proponents of democratic peace proposition.