2022
Michigan
Affirmative
T › T – Article V
Brady ’13 [Colonel Brian H. Brady; October; Judge Advocate, U.S. Army assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency Office of General Counsel Operations, former staff legal advisor (LEGAD) in the Office of the Legal Advisor, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Allied Command Transformation, Joint Warfare Centre; 2013 Army Law. 4, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization Legal Advisor: A Primer,” Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-485, lexis]
II. NATO Legal Authority The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a creation of international agreement. A mosaic of international agreements establishes the NATO Alliance, states its mission, and grants privileges and immunities to its subordinate elements. The next section provides an overview of some of these key agreements. A. North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 The North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Washington Treaty, establishes NATO legal authority, organization, and function. 11 NATO is both a political entity and a military entity. NATO's political leader is the Secretary General (currently Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a Danish citizen), while its military leader is the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) (currently U.S. Air Force General Philip M. Breedlove). The treaty establishes both a political and military role for the organization. 1. Core Mission and Article 5 Article 5 of the treaty states the core mission of NATO. 12 This mission is based upon article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides for collective self-defense. Article 5 states as follows: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. 13 NATO invoked the provisions of article 5 to the treaty for the first time in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States. 14 NATO Operation Active Endeavor (naval operations in support of 9/11 counterterrorism missions in the Mediterranean) was one of the first NATO operations authorized under article 5. 15 2. Non-Article 5 Activity Not all NATO military activity can be justified under article 5 to the treaty. NATO member states 16 have an obligation to train and prepare for their defense. This is articulated in article 3 to the treaty. 17 The political aspect of NATO is reflected in the article 4 requirement that parties consult one another to resolve disputes or identify potential threats to the alliance. 18 These authorities have been interpreted to give NATO its own engagement activity (mirroring the activity of a U.S. combatant command), such as the Partnership for Peace and the Mediterranean Dialogue. 19 While article 5 is a good start point in articulating the legal basis for traditional NATO operations, the LEGAL) may also refer to underlying United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) giving authority to engage in armed conflict under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 20 In this light, NATO doctrine provides for operational responses beyond article 5 self-defense. To address the multitude of security scenarios facing the alliance, NATO doctrine recognizes a category of activity known as Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations (NA5CRO). 21 Non-Article 5 operations cover contingencies that do not amount to a response to an armed attack on alliance territory. 22 The earliest example of this type of operation includes the NATO-lead of the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 23 The doctrine states as follows: NA5CRO range from support operations primarily associated with civil agencies through operations in support of peace, countering irregular threat activities, to combat . . . this could include, but is not limited to, extraction operations, tasks in support of disaster relief and humanitarian operations, search and rescue (SAR) or support to non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs), freedom of navigation and overflight enforcement, sanction and embargo enforcement, support to stabilization and reconstruction activities, peace enforcement (PE), and counterinsurgency (COIN). 24 3. Organizational Authority Under Article 9 The North Atlantic Treaty establishes the North Atlantic Council (NAC). 25 All NATO entities owe their base authority to some action taken by the NAC. As part of NATO's basic functions, the NAC establishes subsidiary bodies which include political, military, and other organizational entities within NATO. On the military side, the NAC established the Military Committee (MC), which provides direction and guidance on military policy and strategy. 26 The MC is supported by its International Military Staff (IMS). Among other things, the NAC approves rules of engagement (ROE) and target lists for specified NATO operations. 27 The NAC is chaired by the Secretary General of NATO (Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen), who builds consensus within this political and military body. The Secretary General is supported by the International Staff (IS) who works NATO's political agenda. The NAC is also empowered to establish a form of subsidiary body that is now known as a NATO Agency. 28 NATO Agencies are the executive body within a subsidiary body. 29 NATO agencies include such entities as the NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), NATO Mamtenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA), and the NATO Communications and Information System Services Agency (NCSA). 30 Soldiers who eat at a NATO dining facility on the NATO-operated part of Kabul International Airport (KAIA) eat meals that were contracted and paid for by a NAMSA.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AI Clarity › 1AC › AC—Public trust
Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/ai-and-international-stability-risks-and-confidence-building-measures Acc 6/6/22 EZG]
Direct military-to-military engagement on deconfliction measures for AI and autonomous systems could be valuable, both as a precursor to potentially more fulsome specific measures, but also a valuable communication mechanism in their own right. For example, if militaries deploy an autonomous vehicle into a contested area where other military forces will be operating, a direct military-to-military channel would give the other side an opportunity to ask questions about its behavior and the deploying side an opportunity to communicate expectations, to avoid unintended escalation or incidents. Similarly, such a venue would give militaries an opportunity to ask questions and communicate information about other capabilities or investments that may threaten mutual stability, such as investments in AI, autonomy, or automation in nuclear operations. There are many advantages of direct, private communication over more indirect, public communication. Nations can send targeted messages just to the intended audience, rather than dealing with multiple audiences, including domestic ones. There may be reduced political pressure to save face or show strength publicly, although of course some of these pressures may still exist in private channels. And direct discussions afford more high-bandwidth information exchange with greater back-and-forth between sides than may be possible via public messages broadcast to a wider audience. One challenge, of course, is that these dialogues are most challenging precisely when they are needed the most: when there is a lack of transparency and trust on both sides. However, history shows that such dialogues are possible and indeed can be valuable measures in increasing transparency and reducing mutual risks.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AI Clarity › 1AC › AC—Public trust
Gallagher ’19 [Mike and Colin Dueck; January 2019; Representative for Wisconsin’s Eighth District in the U.S. House of Representatives; Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University; National Review, “The Conservative Case for NATO,” ]
The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American national interests. In an age of great-power competition, as identified by the Trump administration, America’s Western alliance provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The United States, Canada, and their European allies have a number of common interests and common challenges with regard to Beijing, Moscow, terrorism, cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for cooperation on these matters. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, NATO helps keeps America’s strategic competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in Europe is a bit like oxygen. You may take it for granted, but you’ll miss it when it’s gone.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AI Clarity › 1AC › AC—Public trust
Soare 21 -- (Simona R. Soare is the author and editor of numerous books, articles and chapters on transatlantic and European security, defence innovation and technology transfers. She holds a PhD in Political Science/International Security from the National School of Political Studies and Public Administration and is a US Department of State fellow and a James S. Denton fellow, "Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies", 6-11-2021, GMFUS, https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies)//Alk
During the Cold War, the allies had dedicated instruments—for example, the Cooperation Committee—to monitor and control technological diffusion. Now, to facilitate innovation and improve its adaptability through innovation, NATO needs a strategic-level, civil-military capacity for horizon scanning, technology assessment, and monitoring. Such a capability would build on work currently undertaken by NATO ACT and the Science and Technology Organization, and it would be complementary to the Innovation Board and Defense Innovation Accelerator. However, it would broaden the scope to include a variety of military and civilian, state, and private-sector actors active in the EDTs innovation ecosystem. It would deliver constant understanding (including taxonomies) and intelligence on technological developments in academia, the private sector, and the military across the alliance, as well as the authority to link such developments to NATO innovation priorities. It would contribute to the resilience of allies by monitoring the transfer of jointly agreed critical EDTs (software and hardware) to non-NATO and non-partner countries. And it would provide intelligence and understanding among the allies on adversarial developments in defense innovation and EDTs uptake. Established as a distinct entity or within an existing NATO structure, this capability should regularly consult with competent EU bodies to exchange information, improve understanding, and facilitate coordination on output and commonality of purpose. Figuring out the added value of NATO-enabled innovation in EDTs and how to build a sustainable and mutually reinforcing relationship with prevalent national innovation efforts is another key element. Prioritization is essential in innovation efforts, particularly when there is little certainty about what technology areas or combinations yield sustainable strategic advantages. Without discussing the merits of every innovation effort, NATO should adopt a strategic “systems of systems” focus on innovation in EDTs. While there is merit in strategic planning for individual technology areas, the added value in alliance defense innovation efforts is a more applied focus on technology convergence—what mix of new technologies deliver the more sustainable strategic military advantage in the medium- and long-term in the context of great-power competition. For example, the integration of AI, autonomy, and digitally enabled human enhancement opens multiple possibilities of adversarial exploitation of the cognitive and physical domain.23 Some work in this field is ongoing, but it requires more investment, frequent iteration, and a larger scale. In February, the Science and Technology Organization organized a two-day tabletop exercise that explored combinations of new technologies and their efficiency in various scenarios.24 Similarly, in May the European Defense Agency organized a ten-day Technology Foresight Exercise to inform the revision of the European research and capability development priorities.25 Rob Murray, the head of NATO Innovation Unit has argued that “the nations that win [the technology adoption] race may be those with the most agile bureaucracy rather those with the best technology.”26 Organizational change is a prerequisite of success in defense innovation and the adoption of EDTs—and one aspect of NATO’s adaptation patterns. But it is only one measure of its success. Setting the right benchmarks for defense innovation and EDTs is also critical and it requires a link to clear and measurable improvements in military capabilities, posture and power projection, enhanced resilience, and deterrence and defense in a multi-domain framework, as well as the ability to compete below the threshold of armed conflict against hybrid threats. To this effect, NATO needs to be linked to more experimentation, wargaming, and red teaming to determine how deterrence, defense, and operational capacity will evolve, how resilience can be enhanced, and how to disrupt rival coercive operations, above and below the threshold of armed conflict, across all domains of warfare. Not all allies have the defense funding, technological capacity, skills, and military infrastructure to facilitate rapid defense innovation, including the adoption and scaling of emerging technologies. And not all that have such resources and knowledge are willing to share them in collaborative innovation processes. Leading allies—the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands—already have national-focused approaches to the adoption of EDTs. By contrast, for most Central and Eastern countries EDTs in defense are mainly a long-term prospect. Previous challenges in integrating cyber capabilities into NATO operations, persistent capability gaps among the allies, and slow standardization procedures are a good indication of the magnitude of the challenge, which is acknowledged at the highest levels of NATO decision-making. As Secretary-General Stoltenberg has stated, a technological gap between the allies would undermine interoperability and weaken alliance cohesion. In the context of the NATO AI and big data strategies and the Defense Innovation Accelerator, allies should reflect on how to improve and facilitate technological transfers among themselves. This could enable smaller allies to specialize in niche EDTs capabilities, as has been the case with cyber, for example, and could prevent the emergence of new technological and capability gaps between the allies. The Biden administration’s focus on shared democratic values and the digital agenda, and its willingness to strengthen NATO and technology partnerships, constitute a window of opportunity for the alliance. It should be fully capitalized on to accelerate transatlantic collaborative defense innovation.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AI Clarity › 1AC › AC—Public trust
Gillespie, Nicole, et. al (2021); (Professor of Management; KPMG Chair in Organizational Trust, The University of Queensland, research fellow; University of Queensland, KPMG; “Executive Summary--Trust in Artificial Intelligence: a five country study”; https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Caitlin-Curtis/publication/356842206_Trust_in_artificial_Intelligence_a_five_country_study/links/61b0342cc2e267424d0fd68f/Trust-in-artificial-Intelligence-a-five-country-study.pdf//EF & acd)
Realising the benefits AI offers requires building and maintaining the public’s trust: citizens need to be confident AI is being developed and used in an ethical and trustworthy manner2 . AI poses considerable risks and challenges to society which have raised concerns about whether AI systems are worthy of trust. These concerns have been fuelled by high profile cases of AI use that were biased, discriminatory, manipulative, unlawful, or violated human rights. This survey is the first to take a deep dive into understanding citizen trust and expectations of AI use across multiple countries. To do this, we surveyed a nationally representative sample of 1,200+ citizens from the United States, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom and Australia, respectively (total sample 6,054). We asked about AI systems in general, as well as AI systems in two domains – healthcare and human resources – where AI is rapidly being deployed and is likely to impact large numbers of citizens. Our findings provide important and timely research insights into citizens’ trust and attitudes towards AI. We draw on these insights to lay out an evidence-based pathway for strengthening trust and acceptance of AI systems, and discuss the implications for government, business and non-government organisations (NGOs). Below, we summarise the key findings. Most of these findings hold across all countries and therefore are reported in aggregate form. Significant country differences in the findings are highlighted.
Trust in artificial intelligence Trust is central to the acceptance of AI, and is influenced by four key drivers Our results confirm that trust strongly influences AI acceptance, and hence is important for the societal uptake of AI and realising its benefits. There are four key drivers that influence citizens’ trust in AI systems: 1) beliefs about the adequacy of current regulations and laws to make AI use safe, 2) the perceived impact of AI on jobs, 3) familiarity and understanding of AI, and 4) the perceived uncertain impact of AI on society. These drivers are important across all five countries. Of these drivers, the perceived adequacy of current regulations and laws is clearly the strongest. This highlights the importance of ensuring adequate regulatory and legal mechanisms are in place to protect people from the risks associated with AI use. Such regulation in turn supports citizen uptake and adoption. Citizens have low trust in AI systems but generally ‘accept’ or ‘tolerate’ AI Trust in AI is low across the five countries, with citizens generally wary or ambivalent about trusting AI systems. Only about a quarter (28%) of citizens are willing to trust AI systems in general. Two out of five citizens are unwilling to share their information or data with an AI system and a third are unwilling to trust the output of AI systems (e.g. a recommendation or decision). While many citizens are hesitant to trust AI systems, they generally accept (42%) or tolerate (28%) AI, but few approve (15%) or embrace (6%) it, and some outright reject AI (9%). Citizens’ trust and support of AI depends on the purpose of the AI system: the public is more trusting and supportive of AI use in healthcare (i.e. for aiding medical diagnosis and treatment), and less trusting and supportive of AI use in human resources (i.e. for aiding hiring and promotion decisions). Citizens also view the benefits of AI in healthcare as greater than the risks, whereas they view the risks of AI in human resources as greater than the benefits. However, regardless of the application, citizens are still wary with the majority unwilling or ambivalent about trusting AI in both healthcare (63%) and human resources (77%). Younger generations, notably Gen Z and Millennials, are generally more trusting and accepting of AI systems than older generations. In Germany and Australia, those with a university education are also more accepting of AI than those without a degree. Confidence in entities to develop, use and regulate AI varies across countries Citizens have the most confidence in their national universities and research institutions, as well as their defence organisations, to develop and use (71-77%) and regulate and govern AI (67-73%) in the best interest of the public. In contrast, citizens have less confidence in governments and commercial organisations to do this. 58% – 62% have confidence in commercial organisations and government to develop and use AI, and 54 – 58% have confidence in these entities to regulate and govern AI. This may be because most citizens believe commercial organisations (62%) and government (52%) innovate with AI for financial gain, rather than for societal benefit. Countries differ in their confidence of entities to use and govern AI. Americans are less confident in a broad range of entities to regulate and govern AI, compared to citizens in other countries. US and UK respondents are also less confident in their governments to develop and use AI in the public’s best interest compared to other countries, a finding that mirrors the lower trust these countries have in their governments more generally. In contrast, Australians are more confident in their research institutions and defence forces to develop, use and regulate AI. ©2021 The University of Queensland ©2021 KPMG, an Australian partnership and a member firm of the KPMG global organisation of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Limited, a private English company limited by guarantee. All rights reserved. The KPMG name and logo are trademarks used under license by the independent member firms of the KPMG global organisation. Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional Standards Legislation. Trust in artificial intelligence 3 Citizens expect AI to be regulated with external, independent oversight The large majority of citizens (81%) expect AI to be regulated. While there are small country differences, there is general agreement (61-62%) that there should be a new, dedicated independent AI regulator, and that government and existing regulators should play a role in the regulation of AI systems. Co-regulation and involvement of industry that develop or use AI is also seen as desirable by the majority (54-59%). US respondents are less likely than respondents in other countries to report that government and existing regulators should regulate AI, and more likely to believe AI regulation is not required. In contrast, UK respondents are more likely to expect a new, dedicated, independent AI regulator than other countries. Current safeguards are insufficient given the uncertainty around AI Despite the strong expectations of AI regulation, most citizens (67%) across the five countries either disagree or are ambivalent that current regulations and laws are sufficient to make the use of AI safe. This powerfully highlights the importance of strengthening and communicating the regulatory and legal framework governing AI (including data privacy laws) across all surveyed countries. Most citizens (66-79%) in each country believe the impact of AI on society is uncertain and unpredictable. It is therefore not surprising that the large majority (96%) expect AI governance challenges to be carefully managed. The public view data challenges such as surveillance (61%), fake online content (60%), cyber-attacks (60%), and data privacy (59%) to be the most likely to impact large numbers of citizens within their country in the next 10 years. Half also viewed disease misdiagnosis as likely to impact society. Citizens expect organisations to uphold the principles of trustworthy AI Citizens in each country have very clear expectations of the principles and related practices they expect organisations deploying AI systems to uphold in order to be trusted. These principles mirror those proposed by the European Commission’s High Level Expert Group on AI. Almost all citizens (95%) expect AI systems to meet high standards of: – performance and accuracy – data privacy – security and governance – transparency and explainability – accountability – risk and impact mitigation – fairness – human oversight Most citizens (more than 57%) would be more willing to use AI systems if assurance mechanisms were in place, such as independent AI ethics reviews, AI ethics certifications, national standards for transparency, and AI codes of conduct. Organisations can directly build trust and consumer willingness to use AI systems by supporting and implementing these mechanisms. ©2021 The University of Queensland ©2021 KPMG, an Australian partnership and a member firm of the KPMG global organisation of independent member firms affiliated with KPMG International Limited, a private English company limited by guarantee. All rights reserved. The KPMG name and logo are trademarks used under license by the independent member firms of the KPMG global organisation. Liability limited by a scheme approved under Professional Standards Legislation. 4 Trust in artificial intelligence Citizens feel comfortable with some but not all uses of AI at work Only about one in five citizens (22%) believe AI will create more jobs than it will eliminate. Despite this, 45% of employed citizens report using AI in their work, but most use AI rarely or occasionally. Most citizens (70-76%) are comfortable with the use of AI at work for the purposes of task automation and augmentation. However, they are less comfortable with the use of AI for employeefocused activities, such as monitoring and evaluating employees, or in recruitment and selection. Citizens want to know more about AI but currently have low awareness and understanding of AI and its uses Most citizens (62%) have heard about AI. However, three out of every five citizens report a low understanding of AI, including how and when it is used in everyday applications. For example, even though 76% of citizens use social media, only 41% are aware social media uses AI. Men and the university-educated are more likely to be aware of AI and understand when it is being used. The good news is that most citizens across all countries (83%) want to know more about AI. Considered together, the results suggest there is a strong need and appetite for a public AI literacy program. A pathway to strengthen public trust in AI Collectively these survey insights provide an evidence-based pathway for building and maintaining the trust and acceptance of AI systems by citizens of western nations. As we discuss in detail in the concluding section, this pathway requires government and business to take action by: 1) living up to citizens’ expectations of trustworthy AI, 2) strengthening the regulatory framework for governing AI, and 3) enhancing AI literacy of the public and employees. The survey insights are relevant for informing AI policy and practice within business, government, and NGOs at the national level, as well as multinational and pan-governmental AI policy and practice (e.g. the Global Partnership on AI). Resources are available to support organisations to embed the principles and practices of trustworthy AI into their everyday operations, and put in place mechanisms that support stakeholder trust in their use of AI3 . Given the rapid investment and deployment of AI, it will be important to regularly re-examine public trust and expectations of AI systems as they evolve over time, to ensure AI use is aligned with and meeting societal expectations.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AI Clarity › 1AC › AC—Public trust
hÉigeartaigh 17 – Professor @ Cambridge, PhD in Genomics from Trinity College Dublin (Sean, “Technological Wild Cards: Existential Risk and a Changing Humanity”, gcd
Confronting the Limits of Our Knowledge A common theme across these emerging technologies and emerging risks is that a tremendous level of scientific uncertainty and expert disagreement typically exists. This is particularly the case for future scientific progress and capabilities, the ways in which advances in one domain may influence progress in others, and the likely global impacts and risks of projected advances. Active topics of research at CSER include how to obtain useful information from a range of experts with differing views, and how to make meaningful scientific progress on challenges where we have discontinuous data, or few case studies to draw on, or even when we must characterize an entirely unprecedented event. This might be a hypothesized ecological tipping point, which when passed would result in an irreversible march toward the collapse of an entire critical ecosystem. Or it might be a transformative scientific breakthrough such as the development of artificial general intelligence, where we only have current trends in AI capability, hardware, and expert views on the key unsolved problems in the field to draw insight from. It is unrealistic to expect that we can always, or even for the most part, be right. We need to have humility, to expect false positives, and to be able to identify priority research targets from among many weak signals. Recognizing that there are limits to the level of detail and certainty that can be achieved, this work is often combined with work on general principles of scientific and technological governance. For example, work under the heading of “responsible innovation” focuses on the challenge of developing collective stewardship of progress in science and technology in the present, with a view to achieving good future outcomes.21 This combines scientific foresight with processes to involve the key stakeholders at the appropriate stages of a technology’s development. At different stages these stakeholders will include: scientists involved in fundamental research and applied research; industry leaders; researchers working on the risks, benefits, and other impacts of a technology; funders; policymakers; regulators; NGOs and focus groups; and laypeople who will use or be affected by the development of a technology. In the case of technologies with a potential role in global catastrophic risk, the entire global population holds a stake. Therefore decisions with long-term consequences must not rest solely with a small group of people, represent only the values of a small subset of people, or fail to account for the likely impacts on the global population. There have been a number of very encouraging specific examples of such foresight and collaboration, where scientific domain specialists, interdisciplinary experts, funders, and others have worked together to try to guide an emerging technology’s development, establish ethical norms and safety practices, and explore its potential uses and misuses in a scientifically rigorous way. In bioengineering, the famous 1975 Asilomar conference on recombinant DNA established important precedents, and more recently summits have been held on advances such as human gene editing. In artificial intelligence, a number of important conferences have been held recently, with enthusiastic participation from academic and industry research leaders in AI alongside interdisciplinary experts and policymakers. A number of the world’s leading AI research teams have established ethical advisory panels to inform and guide their scientific practices, and a cross-industry “partnership on AI to benefit people and society” involving five companies leading fundamental research has recently been announced.22 More broadly, it is crucial that we learn from the lessons of past technologies and, where possible, develop principles and methodologies that we can take forward. This may give us an advantage in preparing for developments that are currently beyond our horizon and that methodologies too deeply tied to specific technologies and risks may not allow. One of the key concerns associated with risks from emerging and future technologies is the rate at which progress occurs and at which the associated threats may arise. While every science will throw up specific challenges and require domain-specific techniques and expertise, any tools or methodologies that help us to intervene reliably earlier are to be welcomed. There may be a limited window of opportunity for averting such risks. Indeed, this window may occur in the early stages of developing a technology, well before the fully mature technology is out in the world, where it is difficult to control. Once Pandora’s box is open, it is very difficult to close. WORKING ON THE (DOOMSDAY) CLOCK Technological progress now offers us a vision of a remarkable future. The advances that have brought us onto an unsustainable pathway have also raised the quality of life dramatically for many, and have unlocked scientific directions that can lead us to a safer, cleaner, more sustainable world. With the right developments and applications of technology, in concert with advances in social, democratic, and distributional processes globally, progress can be made on all of the challenges discussed here. Advances in renewable energy and related technologies, and more efficient energy use—advances that are likely to be accelerated by progress in technologies such as artificial intelligence—can bring us to a point of zero-carbon emissions. New manufacturing capabilities provided by synthetic biology may provide cleaner ways of producing products and degrading waste. A greater scientific understanding of our natural world and the ecosystem services on which we rely will aid us in plotting a trajectory whereby critical environmental systems are maintained while allowing human flourishing. Even advances in education and women’s rights globally, which will play a role in achieving a stable global population, can be aided specifically by the information, coordination, and education tools that technology provides, and more generally by growing prosperity in the relevant parts of the world. There are catastrophic and existential risks that we will simply not be able to overcome without advances in science and technology. These include possible pandemic outbreaks, whether natural or engineered. The early identification of incoming asteroids, and approaches to shift their path, is a topic of active research at NASA and elsewhere. While currently there are no known techniques to prevent or mitigate a supervolcanic eruption, this may not be the case with the tools at our disposal a century from now. And in the longer run, a civilization that has spread permanently beyond the earth, enabled by advances in spaceflight, manufacturing, robotics, and terraforming, is one that is much more likely to endure. However, the breathtaking power of the tools we are developing is not to be taken lightly. We have been very lucky to muddle through the advent of nuclear weapons without a global catastrophe. And within this century, it is realistic to expect that we will be able to rewrite much of biology to our purposes, intervene deliberately and in a large-scale way in the workings of our global climate, and even develop agents with intelligence that is fundamentally alien to ours, and may vastly surpass our own in some or even most domains—a development that would have uniquely unpredictable consequences. It is reassuring to note that there are relatively few individual events that could cause an existential catastrophe—one resulting in extinction or a permanent civilizational collapse. Setting aside the very rare events (such as supervolcanoes and asteroids), the most plausible candidates include nuclear winter, extreme global warming or cooling scenarios, the accidental or deliberate release of an organism that radically altered the planet’s functioning, or the release of an engineered pathogen. They also include more speculative future advances: new types of weaponry, runaway artificial intelligence, or maybe physics experiments beyond what we can currently envisage. Many global risks are, in isolation, survivable—at least for some of us—and it is likely that human civilization could recover from them in the long run: less severe global warming, various environmental disasters and ecosystem collapses, widespread starvation, most pandemic outbreaks, conventional warfare (even global). However, this latter class of risks, and factors that might drive them (such as population, resource use, and climate change) should not be ignored in the broader study of existential risk. Nor does it make sense to consider these challenges in isolation: in our interconnected world they all affect each other. The threat of global nuclear war has not gone away, and many scholars believe that it may be rising again (at the time of writing, North Korea has just undergone its most ambitious nuclear test to date). If climate pressures, drought, famine, and other resource pressures serve to escalate geopolitical tensions, or if the potential use of a new technology, such as geoengineering, could lead to a nuclear standoff, then the result is an existential threat. For all these reasons and more, a growing community of scholars across the world believe that the twenty-first century will see greater change and greater challenges than any century in humanity’s past history. It will be a century of unprecedented global pressures, and a century in which extreme and unpredictable events are likely to happen more frequently than ever before in the past. It will also be a century in which the power of technologies unlike any we have had in our past history will hang over us like multiple Damocles’ swords. But it will also be a century in which the technologies we develop, and the institutional structures we develop, may aid us in solving many of the problems we currently face—if we guide their development, and their uses and applications, carefully.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
AI Clarity › 1AC › AC—Public trust
OECD, 13 (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development., 2013, accessed on 7-20-2022, OECD, "Trust in government, policy effectiveness and the governance agenda", https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/gov_glance-2013-6-en.pdf?expires=1658341530&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=1996A5CD57990A17A996CE82603295C8)
Trust in government has been identified as one of the most important foundations upon which the legitimacy and sustainability of political systems are built. Trust is essential for social cohesion and well-being as it affects governments’ ability to govern and enables them to act without having to resort to coercion. Consequently, it is an efficient means of lowering transaction costs in any social, economic and political relationship (Fukuyama, 1995). A high level of trust in government might increase the efficiency and effectiveness of government operations. 1. TRUST IN GOVERNMENT, POLICY EFFECTIVENESS AND THE GOVERNANCE AGENDA 22 GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2013 © OECD 2013 Core levels of trust in government are necessary for the fair and effective functioning of government institutions – such as adherence to the rule of law, or the delivery of basic public services and the provision of infrastructure. The rule of law and independent judiciary are particularly important as their proper functioning is a key driver of trust in government, as established in several studies (Knack and Zak, 2003; Johnston, Krahn and Harrison, 2006; Blind, 2007). As well-functioning government institutions matter for business investment decisions, trust in them is a necessary ingredient to spur economic growth (Dasgupta, 2009; Algan and Cuha, 2013). Trust in government institutions at the same time influences individual behaviour in ways that could support desired policy outcomes. This may range from rather narrowly defined policies and programmes (such as participation in vaccination campaigns) to broader policy reforms (e.g. environmental regulation or pension reform). Trust is important because many public programmes create the opportunity for free riding and opportunistic behaviour. Trust could reduce the risk of such behaviour to the extent that people are prepared to sacrifice some immediate benefits if they have positive expectations of the longer-term outcome of public policies, either at a personal level (pensions) or by contributing to the common good (redistribution of income through taxation). Trust in government may help governments to implement structural reforms with long term benefits. Many reforms involve sacrificing short-term satisfaction for longer-term gains and will require broader social and political consensus to be effective and sustainable. In a high-trust environment, such reforms may not only be properly enacted and implemented, but could be sustained long enough to bear their fruits. This extends the time frame for policy decisions. In a low-trust climate, citizen will prioritise immediate, appropriable and partial benefits, and will induce politicians to seek short-term and opportunistic gains through free-riding and populist attitudes (Gyorffy, 2013). Trust in government could improve compliance with rules and regulations and reduce the cost of enforcement. Rules and regulations are never perfect or complete enough to eliminate abuse. Their effectiveness depends on the extent to which people see them as fair and legitimate enough to outweigh the benefits of non-compliance. This is particularly important for regulations where the gap between the cost of compliance and personal benefits is large and where control is more difficult. Taxation is an example of the first, while traffic regulations are an example of the second. Trust in the regulator can lead to higher voluntary compliance (Murphy, 2004). Trust in government institutions could help to increase confidence in the economy by facilitating economic decisions, such as on investment and consumption that foster economic growth. Trust in institutions as well as interpersonal trust may reduce the perception of risks linked to decisions ranging from the consumption of durables to job mobility, worker hiring and investment. An increase in trust among people raises total factor productivity, therefore fosters economic progress (Dasgupta, 2009). This, in turn, supports economic growth and extends the planning horizon of economic agents, increasing economic dynamism. Trust in government seems to be especially critical in crisis situations, such as natural disasters, economic crisis or political unrest which focuses attention on the core functions of public governance. The capacity of governments to manage crises and to implement successful exit strategies is often a condition for their survival and for their re-election. In the aftermath of major disasters, lack of trust may hamper emergency and recovery GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2013 © OECD 2013 23 1. TRUST IN GOVERNMENT, POLICY EFFECTIVENESS AND THE GOVERNANCE AGENDA procedures causing great harm to society and damaging government’s capacity to act. Likewise, the current economic crisis may reveal dimensions of trust that were not evident in the gradual evolution of countries in the years that preceded it. Trust may run in different directions. It is not only trust of citizens and organisations in government that matters for policy effectiveness; trust of government in citizens and organisations and trust within government may shape policy design and its outcomes (Bouckaert, 2012). How much citizens and businesses are trusted by government is reflected in how government functions and how public services are organised as well as their efficiency and effectiveness – e.g. the tax system, the use of self-regulation and self-monitoring. In addition, citizens’ and businesses’ trust in government and governments’ trust in citizens and businesses feed off one another. An open and responsive government is an enabling environment to reinforce trust between government and citizens in both directions. Unfortunately, trust from and within government is considerably less documented in the literature than trust in government. While trust takes time to be established, it can be lost quickly. It is not sufficient to discuss the impact of trust in government on the performance of government, the economy and society, it is also necessary to describe what might happen if there is an increasing distrust in government. This might lead to less willingness on the part of citizens (and businesses) to obey the law, to make sacrifices during crises or to pay taxes. This could raise costs for government – resulting in declining efficiency – or erode revenues. Declining trust in government might also make it more difficult to attract and retain talent to work for government institutions.
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AI Clarity › 1AC › AC—Public trust
Bailey et al., 20 (Jane Bailey, Jacquelyn Burkell, and Valerie Steeves , 9-2-2020, accessed on 7-20-2022, RSC College of New Scholars, "AI Technologies - Like Police Facial Recognition - Discriminate Against People of Colour | The Royal Society of Canada", https://rsc-src.ca/en/voices/ai-technologies-like-police-facial-recognition-discriminate-against-people-colour)
Predictive policing uses algorithmic processing of historical data to predict when and where new crimes are likely to occur, assigns police resources accordingly and embeds enhanced police surveillance into communities, usually in lower-income and racialized neighbourhoods. This increases the chances that any criminal activity — including less serious criminal activity that might otherwise prompt no police response — will be detected and punished, ultimately limiting the life chances of the people who live within that environment. And the evidence of inequities in other sectors continues to mount. Hundreds of students in the United Kingdom protested on Aug. 16 against the disastrous results of Ofqual, a flawed algorithm the U.K. government used to determine which students would qualify for university. In 2019, Facebook’s microtargeting ad service helped dozens of public and private sector employers exclude people from receiving job ads on the basis of age and gender. Research conducted by ProPublica has documented race-based price discrimination for online products. And search engines regularly produce racist and sexist results. These outcomes matter because they perpetuate and deepen pre-existing inequalities based on characteristics like race, gender and age. They also matter because they deeply affect how we come to know ourselves and the world around us, sometimes by pre-selecting the information we receive in ways that reinforce stereotypical perceptions. Even technology companies themselves acknowledge the urgency of stopping algorithms from perpetuating discrimination. To date the success of ad hoc investigations, conducted by the tech companies themselves, has been inconsistent. Occasionally, corporations involved in producing discriminatory systems withdraw them from the market, such as when Clearview AI announced it would no longer offer facial recognition technology in Canada. But often such decisions result from regulatory scrutiny or public outcry only after members of equality-seeking communities have already been harmed. It’s time to give our regulatory institutions the tools they need to address the problem. Simple privacy protections that hinge on obtaining individual consent to enable data to be captured and repurposed by companies cannot be separated from the discriminatory outcomes of that use. This is especially true in an era when most of us (including technology companies themselves) cannot fully understand what algorithms do or why they produce specific results.
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Mills et al., 21 (Steven Mills, Elias Baltassis, Nadim Abillama, and Matthew Mendelsohn, Steven Mills is the Global GAMMA Chief AI Ethics Officer at Boston Consulting Group. , 1-18-2021, accessed on 7-17-2022, BCG Global, "Responsible AI Builds Trust in Government", https://www.bcg.com/publications/2021/responsible-ai-builds-trust-in-government)
When governments incorporate artificial intelligence into decision making, the results can be good. Governments have, for instance, deployed AI-based systems effectively to manage hospital capacity, regulate traffic, and determine the best way to distribute social benefits and deliver services. However, some government AI systems have unfairly or unwittingly targeted or disadvantaged specific portions of their constituencies—and worse. A major difference between systems that work and those that fail is the way in which they are created and overseen. An approach that leads to successful outcomes includes proper governance, thoughtfully conceived processes based on input from affected stakeholders, and transparency about AI’s role in decision making. We call such a comprehensive approach Responsible AI. To achieve it, governments must empower leadership and use AI to enhance human decision making—not replace it. A Responsible AI approach should include regular reviews, integration with standard tools and data models, and a plan for potential lapses. Governments have another powerful tool at their disposal. They can use procurement to promote widespread adoption of Responsible AI. By making adherence to Responsible AI principles a prerequisite for bidding on public-sector AI contracts, agencies can ensure that the systems they create are ethical and transparent, while gradually integrating AI into public-sector decision making. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF GOVERNMENT AI SYSTEMS In the recent past, several well-publicized lapses have illustrated the unintentional harm that can befall individuals or society when government AI systems aren’t designed, built, or implemented in a responsible manner. A major difference between AI systems that work and those that fail is the way in which they are created and overseen. After college entrance exams were canceled because of the pandemic, the UK government used an algorithm that determined grades based on students’ past performance. The system and led to accusations that it was biased against test takers from challenging socioeconomic backgrounds. A Dutch court ordered the government to —which was intended to predict whether people would commit benefits or tax fraud—after it was determined that the system breached human rights laws and the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation. Citizens groups initiated the legal action after discovering that the system had been used to target neighborhoods with mostly low-income and minority residents. A local NGO after the city adopted a facial-recognition system to find criminal suspects. The system relied on a database that contained information about children as young as four. A US border control agency deployed a biometric scanning application built on machine-learning systems from multiple vendors. When it was because of the proprietary nature of the technology, concerns arose about the agency’s accountability and procurement practices. These lapses and others like them have led to widespread criticism and legal action. In the US, concerns over algorithmic-based decision systems in health care, criminal justice, education, employment, and other areas have resulted in lawsuits. Lapses have also led to organized efforts to track “bad actor” vendors and enact policies or laws to limit the use of public-sector AI systems or, at a minimum, make them more transparent. A 2020 UK parliamentary committee report on AI and public standards found that government and public-sector agencies are failing to be as open as they should be about AI use. The report called on the government to uphold new transparency standards and create effective oversight processes to mitigate risks. When lapses occur in government AI systems, trust in public institutions is eroded. Over time, such a disconnect can damage government legitimacy and citizens’ belief in and support for governmental authority in general. According to BCG research, when people have a positive experience with online public-service delivery, it strengthens their trust in government. But when they have a negative experience, it has a disproportionately detrimental effect on trust. If governments’ deployment of AI is to earn citizens’ trust, they need to get it right. Responsible AI will foster both trust and the ongoing license that governments need in order to use machine learning to improve their own performance.
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Everstine 20 – Brian W. Everstine served as Air Force Magazine’s Pentagon editor, where he reported on US military operations, the Air Force’s presence abroad, among others. (Jan. 15, "DOD AI Leader Wants Closer Collaboration With NATO", 1-15-2020, Air Force Magazine,
NATO allies need to join the US in developing artificial intelligence capabilities to gain an upper hand over China and Russia, which are working together on AI in ways that threaten shared Western values, the military’s top AI expert said Jan. 15. Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, the director of the Pentagon’s Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, said that while the US is moving forward on AI as a military initiative, some NATO allies are progressing slower because ethical debates have “immobilized” some countries. “Success with AI adoption requires a multi-generational commitment with the right combination of tactical urgency and strategic patience,” Shanahan told reporters on a call from Brussels, where he is meeting with NATO officials. “The US, along with our NATO allies, will face difficult decisions regarding the future of legacy systems and platforms in an era where technological innovations are transforming every aspect of the human experience.” The threats are clear from China and Russia in the realm of AI, Shanahan said. For example, China is using it for censorship, stifling freedom of expression, facilitating the sale of AI-enabled weapons, “and lowering the barrier of entry of potential adversaries and potentially placing this technology in the hands of non-state actors.” Most concerning is China forcing its companies like Huawei to cooperate with Chinese Communist Party intelligence, “no matter where the company operates,” he said. Russia has shown a “greater willingness to disregard international ethical norms” and develop systems that could destabilize international security, he added. That includes using automation and machine learning to power global disinformation campaigns as well as lethal weapons systems, Shanahan said. Much of AI software comes from commercial industry and is easily exported, so “we have serious concerns about nonstate actors and their ability to grab these capabilities from the open-source market,” Shanahan said. While other technologies are developed by the military and then spun off in the commercial world, AI is moving in the opposite direction. “When you do that, those technologies will be available to almost anyone with not a lot of effort to go get them,” he said. “That risks a future which destabilizes the international order in the digital age, so I will tell you that we’re looking carefully about how we would prevent proliferation of those capabilities. But I will not pretend that we can do that easily or immediately.” One example Shanahan touched on is the expansion of “deepfake” technology, where AI and machine learning can produce video that looks and sounds realistic enough to convincingly portray a world leader. Deepfakes could worsen the “corrosive influence” of disinformation campaigns in political elections, such as Russia’s attempt to influence the 2016 US presidential race, Shanahan argued. “What if a senior leader were to come on and announce that the nation is at war, but it was a deepfake?” he said. “Those are areas that are of increasing concern across all of society, not just the United States military, but they could be used anywhere across the world. They’re not hard to get access to either.” Authoritarian regimes can also deploy AI for ubiquitous social surveillance and facial recognition, he added. Shanahan believes these issues should compel the US and NATO to “vigorously promote AI for our shared values.” “The deliberate actions we take in the coming years with responsible AI adoption will ensure our militaries keep pace with digital modernization and remain interoperable in the most complex and consequential missions, so that we can continue to rely on the security architecture that has preserved peace, prosperity, and stability in Europe and beyond for decades,” he said.
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Boulanin et al. 20 (vincent, PhD in Political Science from École des Hautes en Sciences Sociales, lora saalman, petr topychkanov, fei su, moa peldán carlsson, “ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, STRATEGIC STABILITY AND NUCLEAR RISK”) June 2020 https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/artificial_intelligence_strategic_stability_and_nuclear_risk.pdf
Existing nuclear risk-reduction measures The fact that many of the risks and strategic challenges posed by AI are not fundamentally new means that policy options to mitigate the impact of AI on nuclear risk already exist. In fact, a number of existing policy options for nuclear risk reduction could have a positive effect on the strategic relations of nuclear armed states and could help to reduce nuclear risk. These include no-first-use policies, commitments to lower the alert status of nuclear arsenals, transparency and information sharing, and cooperation. No-first-use policy One of the most effective means to prevent the nuclear escalation scenarios described in chapter 4 would be if all nuclear-armed states adopted a clear NFU policy. Currently, China and India are the only nuclear-armed states that have such a policy. Although universal adoption of NFU policies would not necessarily alleviate all the signalling problems generated by the introduction of AI in nuclear weapon systems, from the authors’ perspective it would be positive for strategic stability if all nuclear-armed states, particularly Russia and the USA, were to make such a commitment. Some participants in the SIPRI workshops—notably from Russia and the USA—did not share this view. Indeed, in the current geopolitical context, it is highly unlikely that these two states, as well as the USA’s NATO partners France and the UK, would seriously consider that possibility. The USA in particular is constrained from official adoption of NFU by its alliance structures and the views of its allies in both East Asia and Europe.491 The likelihood of Russia and the USA adopting NFU policies is further compromised by both official and non-official statements from China and India about the longer-term status and nature of their NFU commitments.492 A commitment to lower the alert status of nuclear arsenals Removing strategic weapons from a launch-on-warning or launch-ready alert status would allow more time for decision makers to make appropriate assessments. India, Pakistan and China have the lowest level of alert as their nuclear warhead and delivery vehicles are reportedly kept separate.493 It would take at least a few days for them to launch a nuclear strike (although this is changing as they develop the sea legs of their nuclear triads).494 In contrast, Russia and the USA have their systems on high alert, which means that they are much more likely to use nuclear weapons by accident or deliberately in a crisis or from the outset of a conflict. It would be highly positive for international security if Russia and the USA were to de-alert their nuclear weapons––although this would not be a panacea without proper training, data integrity and cybersecurity systems in place. In the current context, this also seems to be an unrealistic possibility. Nevertheless, there is reason to hope that this possibility could be part of future bilateral nuclear riskreduction measures between these two countries, as well as between them and other nuclear-armed states. Transparency and information sharing A traditional approach to transparency and information sharing could also help in risk reduction. AI is a kind of technology that is prone to misunderstanding for two principal reasons. First, there remains widespread misconceptions about what AI is and what it can or could do. Second, it is difficult for states to assess in a tangible way each other’s progress in this area. It is, for instance, impossible for a state to assess whether an opponent’s air defence systems rely on traditional hard-coded programming or an algorithm trained by machine learning if that information has not already been disclosed by the opponent itself. There are a number of transparency-centred CBMs that states could implement voluntarily and unilaterally or as a result of bilateral or multilateral dialogue. These can be grouped in three categories: (a) AI-specific measures, (b) measures related to the military use of AI, and (c) measures related to the use of AI in connection with nuclear weapons and deterrence. AI-specific measures. One AI-specific measure would be for a state to make publicly available official documents that outline its general strategy and policy on AI. If a state has not yet adopted a national policy or strategy on AI, then it could adopt one to clarify its intention and views. Another AI-specific measure would be to make publicly available governmental recommendations (e.g. guidelines, procedures and techniques) about testing and verification and about cybersecurity in the field of AI.
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Löfven & Wallström 22 (Stefan, Prime Minister of Sweden from October 2014 to November 2021 and leader of the Social Democratic Party from 2012 to 2021, Margot, Chair of the international expert panel guiding the Environment of Peace initiative, “We must strengthen multilateralism in a new era of risk”) 2 June 2022 https://www.sipri.org/commentary/essay/2022/we-must-strengthen-multilateralism-new-era-risk
Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, it was all too apparent that global governance was not dealing well with the most important contemporary challenges. The outcomes of COP 26—the Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, held in Glasgow in November 2021—, even if they exceeded many observers’ low expectations. The conference’s achievements included accelerating the process of making national commitments more ambitious. But the collective pledges would not keep the global average temperature rise below the ‘desirable’ 1.5°C limit set six years earlier in the Paris Agreement, and probably not below the 2°C limit viewed as essential. The response to the Covid-19 pandemic also highlighted key weaknesses—as well as the strengths—of global governance and cooperation. The rapid development of effective vaccines was an outstanding example of successful cooperation. But the distribution of vaccines was plagued with logistical problems and ‘vaccine nationalism’. Two thirds of the world’s ocean surface—the so-called areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ)—is being ravaged by unsustainable and illegal fishing and pollution from shipping and mineral extraction. But the institutions and agreements that focus on the ABNJ tend to have narrow mandates, making it hard to address threats to this important global commons. The legal framework governing the use of outer space is similarly unfit for purpose. Mostly dating from the 1960s and 1970s, it does not regulate the activities of private companies and includes no enforcement mechanisms. Nor does it provide any clarity about how to prevent or even manage the militarization of outer space, or instruments for handling disputes. And progress on nuclear disarmament has stalled during the last decade and much of the arms control architecture since the cold war has collapsed. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) from 2010 is now the only agreement left that sets any verifiable limits on the size and composition of the Russian and United States nuclear arsenals, while the Conference on Disarmament has long been stagnant as a negotiating body. The body entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security, the UN Security Council, was shown to be powerless in the face of the invasion of Ukraine, as a consequence of Russia’s veto power. Russia also blocked, last year, a resolution that would have recognized climate-related security risks as core Security Council business. In short, the instruments and institutions of international governance are badly in need of a makeover and a revivified spirit of cooperation. We have no choice but to address these deficiencies. As the Environment of Peace report emphasizes, the twin environmental and security crises have brought us into a new era of risk to human security. In this new era, many of the problems we face are non-linear: they are multi-dimensional; they have multiple stakeholders; they have multiple causes; they have multiple symptoms; they have multiple solutions; and they are constantly evolving. We need global governance fit to address these kinds of risk, and to deliver on three key tasks: The first is managing the consequences of climate change and environmental challenges, both those that are already here and those that are probably inevitable over the coming years because of the environmental damage we have already done. The second is tackling the root causes of those environmental problems to stop them getting worse. Because those root causes so often lie in human economic activities, we need to effect a far-reaching green transition—not just decarbonizing energy and transport systems, but also how we produce food, how we manage natural resources and how we manage waste. We must make sure we do not create new risks to peace and justice in the process. And third, we must ensure that the steps we take to build peace and security are sensitive to the risks from, and potential impacts on, the natural environment. All of these tasks require collective action both at and between different scales—local, national, regional, global—and within and between different spheres—communities, youth, civil society, public services, government, intergovernmental mechanisms, and the finance and business sectors. This collective action, in turn, requires the rebuilding of trust, a new social contract, and the means to negotiate a viable bargain between different participants to balance their interests in the most productive way. This is true for relations between states and for relations between community groups. But how do we go about creating this new contract and strengthening collaborative global governance? One of the headline recommendations of the Environment of Peace report is to be ‘deliberately inclusive’. Inclusivity broadens the base of knowledge available when creating or adapting policies. It can help in understanding the nature of the problems policies are meant to address, as well as the context. It can also help to identify possible solutions, who could implement them, and what unintended knock-on impacts—including on peace and security—the policy might have. And when these different groups know that their perspectives and their interests have been taken into account, it creates legitimacy for the policy, unity of purpose and political trust. These in turn improve the chances of a successful outcome and build political trust that makes even more ambitious policies possible in the future. Healthy democratic governance and a strong civil society are vital to this process. Inclusivity is as important between states as between communities, even if it inevitably takes different forms. Between states, it means that nations large and small have a seat at the table in discussions that affect them. Inclusivity also means actors from outside the worlds of government and diplomacy can participate meaningfully in multilateral exchanges. One of the questions that the High-level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism will explore is how to make sure that youth, women, Indigenous Peoples and other traditionally sidelined groups are included and can influence what is happening. Non-linear problems demand joined-up policymaking and implementation that is coordinated between the traditional policy areas and sectors. This requires breaking out of siloed thinking. It requires dialogue. And for that to happen, the different policy areas and sectors need to speak each other’s language. Specialization needs to be balanced with breadth of knowledge. This is an area where substantial progress has already been made. The UN Security Council has held several discussions on climate security. Several governments have, like Sweden’s, pushed for climate security to become more systematically included in the Security Council agenda. The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) includes environmental cooperation within its comprehensive approach to security. Its 2008 Madrid Declaration on Environment and Security explicitly recognized the OSCE’s role in addressing security risks related to climate change and other environmental challenges within its region, and in 2021 the OSCE passed a decision at the highest political level on ‘strengthening co-operation to address the challenges caused by climate change’. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP)—a key part of the legacy of the 1972 Stockholm Conference—has conducted various projects on the security implications of climate change for well over a decade. In 2018, the UN formally established the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM), which provides integrated climate risk assessments to the Security Council and other UN bodies. As we push further into this new era of risk, we need more initiatives like this, and stronger, broader mandates. Another area where multilateral cooperation must improve is finance. Huge sums are needed over the coming years to increase resilience to climate change and other environmental hazards, to reverse environmental decline and to build peace. The principle is firmly established that richer countries should provide climate finance and technical assistance to poorer countries for this purpose. This is not only about global solidarity but also a recognition that richer countries have, by and large, had the biggest historical carbon footprints and enjoyed the greatest benefits from fossil-fuelled industrialization. Yet there is a worrying tendency for big funding pledges to be broken, whether it is for disaster relief, post-conflict reconstruction or climate finance. At the Copenhagen climate summit in 2009, rich countries pledged to provide US$100 billion of climate finance annually to developing countries by 2020. By 2021, they were still an estimated $20 billion short of the target—arguably far more. It is also worth noting that when it comes to resilience building, the most fragile states have the clearest need; yet per person, they receive only around one eightieth of the climate financing that flows to non-fragile states. Trust is an essential foundation for cooperation. One key way to build trust at the multilateral level would be for rich countries to quickly and fully meet their international funding obligations on climate change, biodiversity and other environmental issues. Reliable data and improved transparency could play a big role in multilateral action to deal with the twin crises. It is hard to predict the scale and timing of today’s environmental and security risks, partly because they are often generated by combinations of factors originating in different parts of the world. Shared global or regional banks of accurate, up-to-date data could improve our ability to spot emergent risks and prepare for them, or even stop them materializing. Advances in monitoring, data processing and modelling could help communities, governments and businesses to plan and invest more confidently.
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Hill 20 (Steven Hill* Affiliation: The author served until February 2020 as Legal Adviser and Director of the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) at the NATO International Staff in Brussels and , 4-27-2020, accessed on 7-9-2022, Cambridge Core, "AI's Impact on Multilateral Military Cooperation: Experience from NATO | American Journal of International Law | Cambridge Core", https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/core/journals/american-journal-of-international-law/article/ais-impact-on-multilateral-military-cooperation-experience-from-nato/3AEF22AA22550A10B75DD74A806D4D18)
It is useful to complement this description of NATO's fairly nascent policy work on military applications of AI with a brief overview of the types of applications that one hears most discussed in NATO circles. Given the amount of academic, media, and political attention to the issue of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), it might come as a surprise that it is the far less high-profile or headline-grabbing applications of AI that receive attention within NATO. This may well be because LAWS are already being discussed by a Group of Governmental Experts within the Geneva-based framework of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, thus making Allies hesitant to duplicate discussions in Brussels. However, the reason that the issue of LAWS—however important the debates involved—is not on the forefront of the agenda at NATO is likely more straightforward: that current and foreseeable technology suggests different, perhaps more prosaic applications, for AI in the military sphere. This essay focuses on two: (1) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and (2) cyber defense. The development and use of AI-enabled applications in each of these areas clearly presents both opportunities and challenges. Enhancing the information available to support decision-making is one of NATO's priorities. ISR is based on information-gathering from a variety of assets deployed across domains. The information or data gathered from both NATO and national assets can then be fused together to help identify patterns and trends in support of situational awareness and operational decision-making. Since this data will likely be too voluminous for traditional human analysis, NATO can leverage AI-enabled systems to comb through these datasets. In this way, NATO can apply AI to enhance situational awareness and improve decision-making, a potentially considerable advantage given the challenges of getting all Allies up to speed on rapidly evolving situations. AI applications can also be used in the context of cyber defense, where NATO has a defensive mandate focused on defending NATO's networks and supporting Allies as they defend their own networks. AI-based applications cover areas such as preemptive patching and the taking of corrective action on the basis of a constant analysis of low-level and recurrent patterns of attacks and cyber threats across networks, all done more quickly and with greater precision. Moreover, the more information exchanged on the nature of attacks in a variety of networks, the easier it is to identify trends in multinational cyber threats. While the use of AI in both these contexts could potentially increase the speed and quality of multinational military cooperation, it clearly also can pose difficulties. For example, increasing speed could be perceived as fueling pressure for inappropriately accelerated action. This kind of acceleration of usual processes might be perceived as going against “normal” NATO decision-making in a number of ways: it might be seen as evading the political control exercised by the North Atlantic Council, overriding the consensus decision-making that applied within the Alliance, being susceptible to misinterpretation or being seen as escalatory in nature, or otherwise leading to unpredictable results. In an extreme case, Allies might see these situations as inconsistent with NATO's collective defense mandate. This might result in a backlash against the use of AI-enabled military applications, precisely at a time when the Alliance needs to maintain an edge with them. In other words, as with many issues involved in multinational military cooperation, the problem may ultimately boil down to one of trust. As noted above, the different national strategies refer to the need for legal and ethical frameworks. They also generally refer to the desirability of multilateral cooperation on AI. The limited work within NATO so far has also pointed to a willingness to take on these issues in a multinational setting. However, the reality is that these discussions have not yet taken off. There may be good reasons for this, including the ongoing nature of LAWS discussions in Geneva or the understandable reluctance—frequently encountered with respect to new technologies—to take positions that could constrain innovation or that could present a strategic disadvantage to those who abide by the rules. At the same time, the perception that there are unresolved legal or ethical issues hovering over military applications of AI clearly poses a risk to the use of this technology, including in a multilateral military setting. There is generally broad agreement among NATO allies that existing international law should apply to the military use of new technologies, including AI. However, a perception of lack of clarity on the rules of the game may lead to a lack of trust that might hamper multinational cooperation. In this regard, dialogue about legal and ethical frameworks can be an important means of building trust. Individual NATO Allies are in the midst of developing their own national strategies for military applications of AI. As noted above, while these strategies use some of the same vocabulary in calling for more clarity on the legal and ethical frameworks of military AI, there is a real risk of a lack of meeting of the minds about the substantive content of these frameworks.
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Kendall-Taylor 19, Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) (Andrea, February 26th, “Autocracy’s Advance and Democracy’s Decline: National Security Implications of the Rise of Authoritarianism Around the World”, , accessed 7/21/19)
The growing prevalence of personalized autocracies is cause for concern because they tend to produce the worst outcomes of any type of political regime: they tend to produce the most risky and aggressive foreign policies; the most likely to invest in nuclear weapons;7 the most likely to fight wars against democracies;8 and the most likely to initiate interstate conflicts.9 As the adventurism of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, Uganda’s Idi Amin, and North Korea’s Kim Jong-un suggests, a lack of accountability often translates into an ability to take risks that other dictatorial systems simply cannot afford.
Russia underscores the link between rising personalism and aggression. Although Putin’s actions in Crimea and Syria were designed to advance a number of key Russian goals, it is also likely that Putin’s lack of domestic constraints increased the level of risk he was willing to accept in pursuit of those goals. Putin’s tight control over the media ensures that the public receives only the official narrative of foreign events. Limited access to outside information makes it difficult for Russians to access unbiased accounts of the goings-on in the rest of the world and gauge Putin’s success in the foreign policy arena. Putin’s elimination of competing voices within his regime further ensures that he faces minimal accountability for his foreign policy actions.
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Twining 21, PhD, president of the International Republican Institute, former director of the Asia Program at the German Marshall Fund. (Daniel, 10-10-2021, "America must double down on democracy", The Hill, ) *language edited
The hard truth is that a world that is less free is one that is less secure, stable and prosperous. The greatest dangers to the American way of life emanate from hostile autocracies. There are no quick fixes, but the best antidotes to the challenges of great-power conflict, terrorism and mass migration of desperate refugees lie in the building of inclusive democratic institutions — and working with allied democracies to sustain the free and open order that China, in particular, wishes to replace with a world that’s safe for autocracy. The conventional wisdom that authoritarianism has popular momentum is wrong. No one anywhere is taking to the street to demand more corrupt governance, the adoption of one-man rule, a stronger surveillance state, or greater intervention by malign foreign powers. Democratic freedoms are unquestionably under assault in many nations. Autocrats are aggressive precisely because of the growing demands for change in their more modern, connected societies — and the rising risk that middle classes in nations such as China and Russia will not be willing forever to forfeit political rights for prosperity. American retrenchment and isolationism compound the danger. It would be nice to live in a world where failed states and dictatorships were a problem for someone else to worry about. But rather than producing stability, Western retreat only emboldens autocrats in ways that amplify dangers to American national security. We know that violent extremism flourishes under state failure and dictatorship. Broken states become breeding grounds for extremist groups because they leave vacuums that terrorists are only too happy to fill. In nations without democratic accountability, citizens become drawn to the only forms of expression available to them, which are often violent and extreme. The good news is that we have billions of allies around the world: citizens on every continent chafing for greater freedom and dignity. They do not want U.S. military-led nation-building. They want peaceful support for their independent efforts to create democratic space in systems distorted by overweening government control, dangerous governance gaps and foreign malign influence. The free world cannot be neutral in the face of autocracy’s resurgence. Rather, it should play to its strengths. The appeal of democratic opportunity is a strategic asset for the United States — despite our own shortcomings — because people around the world similarly aspire to live in societies that guarantee justice, rights and dignity. America’s closest allies are democracies. Democracies don’t fight each other, export violent extremism, or produce the conflicts that drive mass migration. Democracies are better partners in fighting terrorism, human trafficking and poverty, as well as establishing reliable trading relationships. Open societies incubate the technologies that will help solve the world’s most pressing problems, including climate change. Citizens can hold leaders accountable when they fall short, and democratic institutions are stronger than any [individual] man — as America itself witnessed after the assault on the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6.
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Di Minardi, October 15, 2020, a graduate of Boston College where she majored in Political Science and minored in International Studies now works in communications at Georgia Tech, “The grim fate that could be ‘worse than extinction’”,
When we think of existential risks, events like nuclear war or asteroid impacts often come to mind. Yet there’s one future threat that is less well known – and while it doesn’t involve the extinction of our species, it could be just as bad. It’s called the “world in chains” scenario, where, like the preceding thought experiment, a global totalitarian government uses a novel technology to lock a majority of the world into perpetual suffering. If it sounds grim, you’d be right. But is it likely? Researchers and philosophers are beginning to ponder how it might come about – and, more importantly, what we can do to avoid it. Existential risks (x-risks) are disastrous because they lock humanity into a single fate, like the permanent collapse of civilisation or the extinction of our species. These catastrophes can have natural causes, like an asteroid impact or a supervolcano, or be human-made from sources like nuclear war or climate change. Allowing one to happen would be “an abject end to the human story" and would let down the hundreds of generations that came before us, says Haydn Belfield, academic project manager at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk at the University of Cambridge. Toby Ord, a senior research fellow at the Future of Humanity Institute (FHI) at Oxford University, believes that the odds of an existential catastrophe happening this century from natural causes are less than one in 2,000, because humans have survived for 2,000 centuries without one. However, when he adds the probability of human-made disasters, Ord believes the chances increase to a startling one in six. He refers to this century as “the precipice” because the risk of losing our future has never been so high. Researchers at the Center on Long-Term Risk, a non-profit research institute in London, have expanded upon x-risks with the even-more-chilling prospect of suffering risks. These “s-risks” are defined as “suffering on an astronomical scale, vastly exceeding all suffering that has existed on Earth so far.” In these scenarios, life continues for billions of people, but the quality is so low and the outlook so bleak that dying out would be preferable. In short: a future with negative value is worse than one with no value at all. This is where the “world in chains” scenario comes in. If a malevolent group or government suddenly gained world-dominating power through technology, and there was nothing to stand in its way, it could lead to an extended period of abject suffering and subjugation. A 2017 report on existential risks from the Global Priorities Project, in conjunction with FHI and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, warned that “a long future under a particularly brutal global totalitarian state could arguably be worse than complete extinction”. Singleton hypothesis Though global totalitarianism is still a niche topic of study, researchers in the field of existential risk are increasingly turning their attention to its most likely cause: artificial intelligence. In his “singleton hypothesis”, Nick Bostrom, director at Oxford’s FHI, has explained how a global government could form with AI or other powerful technologies – and why it might be impossible to overthrow. He writes that a world with “a single decision-making agency at the highest level” could occur if that agency “obtains a decisive lead through a technological breakthrough in artificial intelligence or molecular nanotechnology”. Once in charge, it would control advances in technology that prevent internal challenges, like surveillance or autonomous weapons, and, with this monopoly, remain perpetually stable. If the singleton is totalitarian, life would be bleak. Even in the countries with the strictest regimes, news leaks in and out from other countries and people can escape. A global totalitarian rule would eliminate even these small seeds of hope. To be worse than extinction, “that would mean we feel absolutely no freedom, no privacy, no hope of escaping, no agency to control our lives at all", says Tucker Davey, a writer at the Future of Life Institute in Massachusetts, which focuses on existential risk research. “In totalitarian regimes of the past, [there was] so much paranoia and psychological suffering because you just have no idea if you're going to get killed for saying the wrong thing,” he continues. “And now imagine that there's not even a question, every single thing you say is being reported and being analysed.” “We may not yet have the technologies to do this,” Ord said in a recent interview, “but it looks like the kinds of technologies we’re developing make that easier and easier. And it seems plausible that this may become possible at some time in the next 100 years.” AI and authoritarianism Though life under a global totalitarian government is still an unlikely and far-future scenario, AI is already enabling authoritarianism in some countries and strengthening infrastructure that could be seized by an opportunistic despot in others. “We've seen sort of a reckoning with the shift from very utopian visions of what technology might bring to much more sobering realities that are, in some respects, already quite dystopian,” says Elsa Kania, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for New American Security, a bipartisan non-profit that develops national security and defence policies. In the past, surveillance required hundreds of thousands of people – one in every 100 citizens in East Germany was an informant – but now it can be done by technology. In the United States, the National Security Agency (NSA) collected hundreds of millions of American call and text records before they stopped domestic surveillance in 2019, and there are an estimated four to six million CCTV cameras across the United Kingdom. Eighteen of the 20 most surveilled cities in the world are in China, but London is the third. The difference between them lies less in the tech that the countries employ and more in how they use it. What if the definition of what is illegal in the US and the UK expanded to include criticising the government or practising certain religions? The infrastructure is already in place to enforce it, and AI – which the NSA has already begun experimenting with – would enable agencies to search through our data faster than ever before. In addition to enhancing surveillance, AI also underpins the growth of online misinformation, which is another tool of the authoritarian. AI-powered deep fakes, which can spread fabricated political messages, and algorithmic micro-targeting on social media are making propaganda more persuasive. This undermines our epistemic security – the ability to determine what is true and act on it – that democracies depend on. “Over the last few years, we've seen the rise of filter bubbles and people getting shunted by various algorithms into believing various conspiracy theories, or even if they’re not conspiracy theories, into believing only parts of the truth,” says Belfield. “You can imagine things getting much worse, especially with deep fakes and things like that, until it's increasingly harder for us to, as a society, decide these are the facts of the matter, this is what we have to do about it, and then take collective action.”
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Wright 18 -- (Nicholas Wright is a cybersecurity fellow in New America’s International Security Program. Wright’s work combines neuroscientific, behavioural, and technological insights to understand decision-making in politics and international confrontations, in ways practically applicable to policy. He leads international, interdisciplinary projects with collaborators in countries including China, the United States, Iran and the United Kingdom., "How Artificial Intelligence Will Reshape the Global Order", 7-10-2018, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-07-10/how-artificial-intelligence-will-reshape-global-order?check_logged_in=1)//Alk
There is also a third way in which AI promises to reshape the world. By allowing governments to monitor, understand, and control their citizens far more closely than ever before, AI will offer authoritarian countries a plausible alternative to liberal democracy, the first since the end of the Cold War. That will spark renewed international competition between social systems. For decades, most political theorists have believed that liberal democracy offers the only path to sustained economic success. Either governments could repress their people and remain poor or liberate them and reap the economic benefits. Some repressive countries managed to grow their economies for a time, but in the long run authoritarianism always meant stagnation. AI promises to upend that dichotomy. It offers a plausible way for big, economically advanced countries to make their citizens rich while maintaining control over them. Some countries are already moving in this direction. China has begun to construct a digital authoritarian state by using surveillance and machine learning tools to control restive populations, and by creating what it calls a “social credit system.” Several like-minded countries have begun to buy or emulate Chinese systems. Just as competition between liberal democratic, fascist, and communist social systems defined much of the twentieth century, so the struggle between liberal democracy and digital authoritarianism is set to define the twenty-first. New technologies will enable high levels of social control at a reasonable cost. Governments will be able selectively censor topics and behaviors to allow information for economically productive activities to flow freely, while curbing political discussions that might damage the regime. China’s so-called Great Firewall provides an early demonstration of this kind of selective censorship. As well as retroactively censoring speech, AI and big data will allow predictive control of potential dissenters. This will resemble Amazon or Google’s consumer targeting but will be much more effective, as authoritarian governments will be able to draw on data in ways that are not allowed in liberal democracies. Amazon and Google have access only to data from some accounts and devices; an AI designed for social control will draw data from the multiplicity of devices someone interacts with during their daily life. And even more important, authoritarian regimes will have no compunction about combining such data with information from tax returns, medical records, criminal records, sexual-health clinics, bank statements, genetic screenings, physical information (such as location, biometrics, and CCTV monitoring using facial recognition software), and information gleaned from family and friends. AI is as good as the data it has access to. Unfortunately, the quantity and quality of data available to governments on every citizen will prove excellent for training AI systems. Even the mere existence of this kind of predictive control will help authoritarians. Self-censorship was perhaps the East German Stasi’s most important disciplinary mechanism. AI will make the tactic dramatically more effective. People will know that the omnipresent monitoring of their physical and digital activities will be used to predict undesired behavior, even actions they are merely contemplating. From a technical perspective, such predictions are no different from using AI health-care systems to predict diseases in seemingly healthy people before their symptoms show. In order to prevent the system from making negative predictions, many people will begin to mimic the behaviors of a “responsible” member of society. These may be as subtle as how long one’s eyes look at different elements on a phone screen. This will improve social control not only by forcing people to act in certain ways, but also by changing the way they think. A central finding in the cognitive science of influence is that making people perform behaviors can change their attitudes and lead to self-reinforcing habits. Making people expound a position makes them more likely to support it, a technique used by the Chinese on U.S. prisoners of war during the Korean War. Salespeople know that getting a potential customer to perform small behaviors can change attitudes to later, bigger requests. More than 60 years of laboratory and fieldwork have shown humans’ remarkable capacity to rationalize their behaviors. As well as more effective control, AI also promises better central economic planning. As Jack Ma, the founder of the Chinese tech titan Alibaba, argues, with enough information, central authorities can direct the economy by planning and predicting market forces. Rather than slow, inflexible, one-size-fits-all plans, AI promises rapid and detailed responses to customers’ needs. There’s no guarantee that this kind of digital authoritarianism will work in the long run, but it may not need to, as long as it is a plausible model for which some countries can aim. That will be enough to spark a new ideological competition. If governments start to see digital authoritarianism as a viable alternative to liberal democracy, they will feel no pressure to liberalize. Even if the model fails in the end, attempts to implement it could last for a long time. Communist and fascist models collapsed only after thorough attempts to implement them failed in the real world. CREATING AND EXPORTING AN ALL-SEEING STATE No matter how useful a system of social control might prove to a regime, building one would not be easy. Big IT projects are notoriously hard to pull off. They require high levels of coordination, generous funding, and plenty of expertise. For a sense of whether such a system is feasible, it’s worth looking to China, the most important non-Western country that might build one. China has proved that it can deliver huge, society-spanning IT projects, such as the Great Firewall. It also has the funding to build major new systems. Last year, the country’s internal security budget was at least $196 billion, a 12 percent increase from 2016. Much of the jump was probably driven by the need for new big data platforms. China also has expertise in AI. Chinese companies are global leaders in AI research and Chinese software engineers often beat their American counterparts in international competitions. Finally, technologies, such as smartphones, that are already widespread can form the backbone of a personal monitoring system. Smartphone ownership rates in China are nearing those in the West and in some areas, such as mobile payments, China is the world leader. China is already building the core components of a digital authoritarian system. The Great Firewall is sophisticated and well established, and it has tightened over the past year. Freedom House, a think tank, rates China the world’s worst abuser of Internet freedom. China is implementing extensive surveillance in the physical world, as well. In 2014, it announced a social credit scheme, which will compute an integrated grade that reflects the quality of every citizen’s conduct, as understood by the government. The development of China’s surveillance state has gone furthest in Xinjiang Province, where it is being used to monitor and control the Muslim Uighur population. Those whom the system deems unsafe are shut out of everyday life; many are even sent to reeducation centers. If Beijing wants, it could roll out the system nationwide. To be sure, ability is not the same as intention. But China seems to be moving toward authoritarianism and away from any suggestion of liberalization. The government clearly believes that AI and big data will do much to enable this new direction. China’s 2017 AI Development Plan describes how the ability to predict and “grasp group cognition” means “AI brings new opportunities for social construction.” Digital authoritarianism is not confined to China. Beijing is exporting its model.The Great Firewall approach to the Internet has spread to Thailand and Vietnam. According to news reports, Chinese experts have provided support for government censors in Sri Lanka and supplied surveillance or censorship equipment to Ethiopia, Iran, Russia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Earlier this year, the Chinese AI firm Yitu sold “wearable cameras with artificial intelligence-powered facial-recognition technology” to Malaysian law enforcement. More broadly, China and Russia have pushed back against the U.S. conception of a free, borderless, and global Internet. China uses its diplomatic and market power to influence global technical standards and normalize the idea that domestic governments should control the Internet in ways that sharply limit individual freedom. After reportedly heated competition for influence over a new forum that will set international standards for AI, the United States secured the secretariat, which helps guide the group’s decisions, while Beijing hosted its first meeting, this April, and Wael Diab, a senior director at Huawei, secured the chairmanship of the committee. To the governments that employ them, these measures may seem defensive—necessary to ensure domestic control—but other governments may perceive them as tantamount to attacks on their way of life. THE DEMOCRATIC RESPONSE The rise of an authoritarian technological model of governance could, perhaps counterintuitively, rejuvenate liberal democracies. How liberal democracies respond to AI’s challenges and opportunities depends partly on how they deal with them internally and partly on how they deal with the authoritarian alternative externally. In both cases, grounds exist for guarded optimism. Internally, although established democracies will need to make concerted efforts to manage the rise of new technologies, the challenges aren’t obviously greater than those democracies have overcome before. One big reason for optimism is path dependence. Countries with strong traditions of individual liberty will likely go in one direction with new technology; those without them will likely go another. Strong forces within U.S. society have long pushed back against domestic government mass surveillance programs, albeit with variable success. In the early years of this century, for example, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency began to construct “Total Information Awareness” domestic surveillance systems to bring together medical, financial, physical and other data. Opposition from media and civil liberties groups led Congress to defund the program, although it left some workarounds hidden from the public at the time. Most citizens in liberal democracies acknowledge the need for espionage abroad and domestic counterterrorism surveillance, but powerful checks and balances constrain the state’s security apparatus. Those checks and balances are under attack today and need fortification, but this will be more a repeat of past efforts than a fundamentally new challenge. In the West, governments are not the only ones to pose a threat to individual freedoms. Oligopolistic technology companies are concentrating power by gobbling up competitors and lobbying governments to enact favorable regulations. Yet societies have overcome this challenge before, after past technological revolutions. Think of U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt’s trust-busting, AT&T’s breakup in the 1980s, and the limits that regulators put on Microsoft during the Internet’s rise in the 1990s. Digital giants are also hurting media diversity and support for public interest content as well as creating a Wild West in political advertising. But previously radical new technologies, such as radio and television, posed similar problems and societies rose to the challenge. In the end, regulation will likely catch up with the new definitions of “media” and “publisher” created by the Internet. Facebook Chief Executive Mark Zuckerberg resisted labeling political advertising in the same way as is required on television, until political pressure forced his hand last year. Liberal democracies are unlikely to be won over to digital authoritarianism. Recent polling suggests that a declining proportion in Western societies view democracy as “essential,” but this is a long way from a genuine weakening of Western democracy. The external challenge of a new authoritarian competitor may perhaps strengthen liberal democracies. The human tendency to frame competition in us versus them terms may lead Western countries to define their attitudes to censorship and surveillance at least partly in opposition to the new competition. Most people find the nitty-gritty of data policy boring and pay little attention to the risks of surveillance. But when these issues underpin a dystopian regime in the real world they will prove neither boring nor abstract. Governments and technology firms in liberal democracies will have to explain how they are different. LESSONS FOR THE WEST The West can do very little to change the trajectory of a country as capable and confident as China. Digital authoritarian states will likely be around for a while. To compete with them, liberal democracies will need clear strategies. First, governments and societies should rigorously limit domestic surveillance and manipulation. Technology giants should be broken up and regulated. Governments need to ensure a diverse, healthy media environment, for instance by ensuring that overmighty gatekeepers such as Facebook do not reduce media plurality; funding public service broadcasting; and updating the regulations covering political advertising to fit the online world. They should enact laws preventing technology firms from exploiting other sources of personal data, such as medical records, on their customers and should radically curtail data collection from across the multiplicity of platforms with which people come into contact. Even governments should be banned from using such data except in a few circumstances, such as counterterrorism operations. Second, Western countries should work to influence how states that are neither solidly democratic nor solidly authoritarian implement AI and big data systems. They should provide aid to develop states’ physical and regulatory infrastructure and use the access provided by that aid to prevent governments from using joined-up data. They should promote international norms that respect individual privacy as well as state sovereignty. And they should demarcate the use of AI and metadata for legitimate national security purposes from its use in suppressing human rights. Finally, Western countries must prepare to push back against the digital authoritarian heartland. Vast AI systems will prove vulnerable to disruption, although as regimes come to rely ever more on them for security, governments will have to take care that tit-for-tat cycles of retribution don’t spiral out of control. Systems that selectively censor communications will enable economic creativity but will also inevitably reveal the outside world. Winning the contest with digital authoritarian governments will not be impossible—as long as liberal democracies can summon the necessary political will to join the struggle
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Justin Sherman, 2019 (WIRED, Washington Post, The Atlantic, New America geopolitics contributor; New America; Chapter 3 “Why U.S.-China AI Competition Matters”,“Essay: Reframing the U.S.-China AI “Arms Race”; https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/reports/essay-reframing-the-us-china-ai-arms-race/why-us-china-ai-competition-matters//EF)
Competing AI development in the United States ande China needs to be reframed from the AI arms race rhetoric, but that doesn’t mean AI development itself doesn’t matter. In fact, the opposite is true. We are in an era of great power competition, and U.S. policymakers must pay greater attention to artificial intelligence development domestically and in China, primarily for two reasons. First, artificial intelligence will have a profound impact on state power, mainly through economic growth and enhanced military capability. Second, global leaders in AI will set norms around its use—and around the use of technology in society writ large—which will have important influence on other “undecided” states and the future international order. This is why American policymakers should focus on engaging with China on AI projects without giving up critical expertise or technologies that could potentially enhance harmful applications of artificial intelligence, whether they are in governance, business, or the military. An Era of Great Power Competition We are entering an era of great power competition, characterized by “struggle, change, competition, the use of force, and the organization of national resources to enhance state power.” Industrial productivity, science, and technology are critical in this struggle as well, notes international relations scholar Paul Kennedy.41 Indeed, that seems to be the case. Amidst a heap of articles on the death of the liberal world order,42 there is also much concern in the American national security arena around China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea—what political scientist Amy Zegart refers to as the “big four” due to their various elements of state power and the threat vectors they present (nuclear risks, cyber risks, territorial aggression against U.S. allies, and disruption of the international order).43 The great power competition that Paul Kennedy identified from the twentieth century is back in full force.44 Artificial Intelligence and State Power Artificial intelligence is poised to contribute greatly to bolstering a developed nation’s economy. Accenture Research and Frontier Economics predict, based on research in 12 developed countries, that AI could “double annual economic growth rates” in 2035 while also increasing labor productivity by up to 40 percent.49 McKinsey Global Institute predicts AI may deliver $13 trillion in global economic activity by 2030.50 PricewaterhouseCoopers puts that figure even higher at up to $15.7 trillion in global GDP growth by 2030, much of which will be due to productivity increases.51 These estimates are varied, but they all rightfully predict enormous economic growth due to an explosion in AI uses worldwide.52 However, these gains will not be evenly spread. As research from McKinsey Global Institute articulates, “leaders of AI adoption (mostly in developed countries) could increase their lead over developing countries,” and “leading AI countries could capture an additional 20 to 25 percent in net economic benefits, compared with today, while developing countries might capture only about 5 to 15 percent.”53 With the United States and China already representing the largest economies in the world, maximizing uses of AI within either nation could lead to massive gains in state power and influence on the global stage. “After all,” writes political scientist Michael Horowitz, “countries cannot maintain military superiority over the medium to long term without an underlying economic basis for that power.”54 Further, there is in part a question of pure economic power: If Chinese companies don’t just develop better but also use that AI more profitably than American firms, China benefits economically and by extension has more resources to build state power generally. That the United States currently has significant AI talent does not mean an American edge in AI development is decisive and everlasting. Militarily speaking, artificial intelligence is also revolutionary for state military power. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in China views AI as a revolutionary factor in military power and civil-military fusion,55 just as the U.S. Department of Defense has similarly recognized how advances in artificial intelligence “will change society and, ultimately, the character of war.”56 China is investing in this future. The PLA has already funded a number of AI military projects as part of its 13th Five-Year Plan, spanning command decision-making, equipment systems, robotics, autonomous operating guidance and control systems, advanced computing, and intelligent unmanned weapon systems.57 In 2017, President Xi Jinping called for the military to accelerate AI research in preparation for the future of war.58 There has even been a report of the Beijing Institute of Technology recruiting high-talent teenagers for a new AI weapons development program.59 The Chinese government is undoubtedly preparing to maximize its AI development in the service of maximizing its military power. That the United States currently has significant AI talent does not mean an American edge in AI development is decisive and everlasting. The United States has started to do the same, in some respects: It has established a Defense Innovation Board for ethics of AI in war,60 as well as a Joint Artificial Intelligence Center to develop “standards….tools, shared data, reusable technology, processes, and expertise” in coordination with industry, academia, and American allies.61 DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, currently has 25 programs in place focused on artificial intelligence research, and in September 2018, its director announced a plan to spend up to $2 billion over the next five years on more AI work.62 But there is still much to be done, as I’ll address in the last section. Even within the U.S. military’s approaches to artificial intelligence, as one West Point scholar notes, “the military is facing some hard questions about how it will adapt its culture and institutions to exploit new technologies—and civilians face a tough job ensuring they answer them effectively.”63 There are certainly military leaders aware of this fact—in announcing the $2 billion in AI funding, DARPA’s director depicted it “as a new effort to make such systems more trusted and accepted by military commanders”64—yet the road ahead will have its challenges. In general, the U.S. defense apparatus’ willingness to engage in cultural and operational shifts will greatly influence how successfully AI is integrated into the United States military. It’s also important to note that China’s government and its private companies will likely be less constrained by ethical and legal norms when developing AI than will their American counterparts.65 Faster deployment of and greater experimentation with AI may result, even though this may lead to perhaps chaotic or more unpredictable deployments of artificial intelligence—or, perhaps, plainly unethical uses of AI. This leads into the second main reason why U.S.-China AI competition still matters. Artificial Intelligence and Global Technology Norms Artificial intelligence is increasingly enabling authoritarian governance around the world. Many commentators have referred to this as “digital authoritarianism,”66 by which technologies like AI—deployed at scale to, say, bolster citywide facial recognition—enable or enhance authoritarian principles of state governance. Chinese companies have been complicit—and at times instrumental—in the diffusion of the technology and practices that enable this authoritarian governance. While Western companies sometimes export surveillance technology to dictators as well, most democratic governments take steps to prevent it through export controls, such as those established in the Wassenaar Arrangement.67
Artificial intelligence is increasingly enabling authoritarian governance around the world. Chinese firms have exported facial recognition systems to governments in Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, Zimbabwe, and Malaysia. Broader categories of surveillance technology—from national identity cards to biometric sensors, internet monitoring software, and more—are also exported by Chinese companies to governments in Ethiopia, Ecuador, South Africa, Bolivia, Egypt, Rwanda, and Saudi Arabia.68 In addition to enabling insidious social control and large-scale human rights abuses, such spread of surveillance technology—which includes AI—consolidates power in the hands of governments that are hostile, or typically align with powers hostile, to American interests.69 Democracy is under attack around the world,70 and authoritarian uses of AI further harm democratic norms and the state of democracy globally. This is especially true for the many countries who remain undecided in their use and regulation of technologies like artificial intelligence. This is an obvious strategic problem for U.S. policymakers, especially as Beijing has already sought to become a global leader in technology norms through an assortment of proposals at the likes of the United Nations71 and through channels such as IEEE.72 Unsurprisingly, this interest has already been reflected with respect to artificial intelligence. The China Electronics Standardization Institute, involved in standard-setting under China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, released a white paper in January 2018 on a framework for AI standardization.73 In April 2018, Chinese organizations hosted a major international AI standards meeting in Beijing.74 Similar to how China is proactive in trying to set global norms around the internet, it is also intent on setting global standards and norms around artificial intelligence and its use in society.75 As Jeffrey Ding, Paul Triolo, and Samm Sacks explain, “realizing that China’s many large companies are increasingly global players, and Chinese-developed AI algorithms will have effects on users outside of China, China’s government aims to advance global efforts to set standards around ethical and social issues related to AI algorithm deployment. Should Chinese officials and experts succeed in influencing such standards and related AI governance discussions, the policy landscape may skew toward the interests of government-driven technical organizations, attenuating the voices of independent civil society actors that inform the debate in North America and Europe.”76 This may very well become a greater trend—as China’s government and private industry develop increasingly sophisticated AI applications—that lends even further global influence to China alongside bigger economic advantage. It’s not just through diplomats, trade negotiators, and military officers that the Chinese or American government will exercise influence in areas of competition between the two countries (most obviously Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America). Without a clear, viable model of digital governance to oppose digital authoritarianism, the United States stands to lose political influence over a number of countries in these areas. This, too, will significantly impact great power competition, potentially in ways that diminish the relative importance of military power. The Chinese government, in this larger process of global norm-setting on uses of contemporary technologies, is attempting to remake the world in its image. This is why U.S. policymakers desperately need to reframe their thinking on AI competition.
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NSCAI 21 “final report” National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence: Eric Schmidt (Chair) Safra Catz, Steve Chien, Mignon Clyburn, Chris Darby, Kenneth Ford, José-Marie Griffiths, Robert Work (Vice Chair), Eric Horvitz, Andrew Jassy, Gilman Louie, William Mark, Jason Matheny, Katharina McFarland, Andrew Moore https://www.nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf acd
The impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on the world will extend far beyond narrow national security applications. The development of AI constitutes a new pillar of strategic competition, and it heightens the competition in existing pillars. The nation with the most resilient and productive economic base will be best positioned to seize the mantle of world leadership. That base increasingly depends on the strength of the innovation economy, which in turn will depend on AI. AI technologies will drive waves of advancement in critical infrastructure, commerce, transportation, health, education, financial markets, food production, and environmental sustainability. The race to research, develop, and deploy AI and associated technologies is already intensifying strategic competition. The U.S. government must embrace the AI competition and organize to win it. The American approach to innovation, which has served the country well for decades, must be recalibrated to account for the centrality of the competition involving AI and associated technologies to the emerging U.S.-China rivalry. To retain its innovation leadership and position in the world, the United States needs a stronger government-led technology strategy that integrates promotion and protection policies and links investments in AI to a larger constellation of related emerging technologies. This chapter articulates the nature of the AI competition and the two prerequisites for winning it: organizing for technology competition under White House leadership and establishing the principles for continued cooperation with competitors. The following chapters (10–16) enumerate the core elements of an integrated strategy and prescribe actions to ensure the United States wins the AI competition and sets the foundation to win the broader technology competition. It is foremost an affirmative agenda for growing and recruiting talent, promoting a diverse AI innovation ecosystem, and investing in the R&D to harness AI and associated technologies to build a healthier, more prosperous, and secure society. Protection of research, intellectual property (IP), and investments will be necessary to complement the effort to invigorate AI competitiveness at home and build a coalition of like-minded partners in the world. The U.S.-China AI Competition Is Serious and Complex. The leading indexes that measure progress in AI development generally place the United States ahead of China.2 However, the gap is closing quickly. China stands a reasonable chance of overtaking the United States as the leading center of AI innovation in the coming decade.3 In recent years, technology firms in China have produced pathfinding advances in natural language processing,4 facial recognition technology,5 and other AI-enabled domains. China’s businesses, investors, technologists, and academics are integral to global AI development. China’s social media and e-commerce companies compete for users around the world. Its telecoms build global 5G infrastructure. Its venture capitalists and large technology firms invest huge sums in new startups.6 Its leading AI companies have research labs in the United States7 and elsewhere.8 Its researchers produce a trove of respected AI papers that advance the field.9 None of this would concern us from a national security perspective, except for the fact that China is led by a single-party authoritarian regime that threatens American interests. China has moved more quickly and with more determination than the United States, guided by a constellation of AI plans for government ministries, universities, and companies.10 These strategic documents reflect Beijing’s view that advances in AI will fundamentally reshape military and economic competition in the coming decades.11 China has backed up its strategic plans with significant state subsidies to technology firms and academic institutions that engage in cutting-edge AI research.12 China preserves its capital by taking advantage of basic research done by the West so that it can focus more on applications. It pours significant sums of money into research and talent in relevant fields,13 and it promotes “national champion” companies to win markets abroad.14 Through its military-civil fusion programs, China has sought to integrate advances in AI from the commercial and academic worlds into military power.15 Using espionage, technology transfer programs, and targeted investment, Beijing seeks to acquire sensitive IP and data from the United States and other countries. The U.S.-China competition is complicated by the complex web of supply chains, research partnerships, and business relationships that link the world’s two AI leaders. Dramatic steps to sever these ties could be costly for Americans and reverberate across the world. The relationships between American and Chinese academics, innovators, and markets are deep, often mutually beneficial, and help advance the field of AI.17 Moreover, it remains in the U.S. national interest to leverage formal diplomatic dialogue about AI and other emerging technologies and to explore areas for cooperative AI projects that will benefit humanity. The United States can compete against China without ending collaborative AI research and severing all technology commerce. Broad-based technological decoupling with China could deprive U.S. universities and companies of scarce AI and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) talent,18 sever American companies’ efficient supply chains,19 and cut off access to markets and capital for innovative firms.20 Instead, the United States should conceive of targeted disentanglement as just one element of its overall approach, which, if applied judiciously to key sectors, can help build U.S. technological resilience, reduce threats from illicit technology transfer, and protect national security–critical sectors.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Midterms Ups › No Link - FoPo
Dr. James Hughes and Dr. Ross Baker, Dr. James Hughes, Dean Emeritus, School of Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers University, is a nationally recognized expert on economic, demographic, housing market, and real estate development issues. Baker is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University 22, 7-15-2022, "U.S. 2022 Midterm Elections: Role of the Economy in Elections," United States Department of State, //Finn p
QUESTION: Thank you so much and good morning. I’m Pearl Matibe with Power FM 98.7. Coverage is generally the continent of Africa. My question is for both professors. So, Professor Hughes, please, can you just help me understand – I understand that the employment numbers seem to be good, that the fact that all these jobs that had been lost with the closures due to COVID-19, that 97 percent number seems pretty good. So can you help me make the connection: What, then, explains the fact that we’re having issues with the economy? What is that stemming from? What is the root causes, I guess, is what I really want to understand? If people are back to work producing and doing what they were doing pre-COVID, why do we have this problem now? So please help me understand that, and it would be nice if you can explain what impact does that have for the rest of the world, bearing the fact that we are foreign journalists, so we want to understand the link of what impact this has on the rest of the world, particularly perhaps places like Africa. For Professor Baker, my question to you would be: Given what is – what we think might happen for these midterm elections, how different are these from the past midterm election? So I’d like to understand the comparison between the one during the Trump administration versus the Biden administration. And then, if you do have data or whatever on these battleground states, maybe if you could pass that on to the Foreign Press Center, they can maybe send that to us. I’d like to understand which states those are so that that can help me, for example, track that. What I’d like to understand as well is what then does this have an impact to other countries given the fact that United States has this narrative of being a global leadership? So what impact, if any, will the midterm elections have? What should the rest of the world be expecting as maybe a boomerang effect or something of that nature? So I’d like to understand those linkages, please. Thank you. MR HUGHES: Well, let me start on the economy. Basically, the labor markets are strong. Consumers currently are in good financial shape. One metric of that is they have $18.5 trillion – $18.5 trillion basically in savings – money market accounts, savings accounts, checking accounts, and the like. That is $5 trillion higher than it was before the pandemic began in February of 2020. And they also have low debt levels and the like. And so part of the reason for that was the federal relief checks that they received during the pandemic and the economic downturn. However, looking forward, even though they are in reasonably good shape right now, they see real problems ahead. When gasoline per gallon in the United States is over $5 a gallon, a dramatic increase from where it was a year ago, they are very unhappy, and that gives them a negative perception of the future. The same thing with food and groceries and the like where prices have been soaring. And some of this stems obviously from the supply chain issues that emerged during the pandemic, pushed up the prices of various commodities and the like, and that’s reflected in a number of other segments, certainly, of the economy. So there’s also concerns – I’m not sure exactly how to weigh these in – that we have sort of a challenge to globalization in that maybe the world economy is deglobalizing, and that does not bode well for prices of many goods and the like. There’s also unease in terms of the war in Ukraine. And there may well be a sense that things are out of control. So they’re okay today, but boy, we have – there are storm clouds on the horizon, there are issues on the horizon. Now, one of the things that’s going to – that is impacting many parts of the world are the actions of the Federal Reserve. In order to combat inflation, they have pushed up interest rates. In historical terms, they’re not that high yet, but compared to the ultra-low interest rates of 2018, 2019, and 2020, they are exploding upwards. Now, this is strengthening the dollar. Its – the strengthening dollar hurts many developing nations, the value of their currency. The value of the euro in Europe against the dollar has plummeted and the like. So high U.S. interest rates do not bode well for the global – for much of the global economy. And if demand diminishes in the United States, if there is a recession, that’s going to impact consumers purchasing foreign (inaudible) as the year proceeds. Again, the election technically is three and a half months away. We’ll be getting a series of economic metrics. We’ll have a series of federal month – actions taking place in each of the months to come. So again, there’s highly uncertain economic conditions around the election time. MODERATOR: Professor Baker, over to you. MR BAKER: Yes. I guess as a general rule, foreign policy issues don’t play a very large role in American midterm elections or even in presidential elections unless the United States happens to be at war. The most recent example, of course, is 2002, when President George W. Bush defied historical trends of midterm elections going against the president’s party in which the Republicans made modest gains in the House and Senate. The – clearly, in this – in the 2022 midterm elections, foreign policy issues are not very high on the agenda unless you define things like energy prices as foreign policy issues, and clearly, the price of energy in the United States has been profoundly affected by the war in Ukraine and the sanctions that have been taken against Russia. But really, energy prices are seen more or less as an economic issue rather than as a foreign policy issue. And interestingly enough, Ukraine, the war in Ukraine, the attack by Russia on Ukraine, has not figured very prominently in the run-up to the 2022 election, largely because American troops are not directly involved in the hostilities even though we are providing very, very significant military assistance to Ukraine. There are – clearly, there are other things going on in the world. For example, in terms of Africa and the advent of monkeypox as a health risk in the United States, which is being treated as a sexually transmitted disease in the United States. There’s a problem in terms of the availability of vaccine to inoculate people against monkeypox. We did have stocks of that in the United States, but there have again been problems with supplying it in the quantities that are needed. So barring some other event – I mean, there are kind of background factors certainly involving international relations and foreign policy. The evacuation, hasty evacuation of American forces from Afghanistan, which President Biden pledged that he would do based upon the belief that the Afghan Government could hold out for a period of time, the very quick collapse of the Ghani regime was very much a blot on President Biden’s foreign policy ledger. But that took place quite a while ago, and has been superseded by other concerns and other problems which the President may have to deal with, most conspicuously domestic inflation. MODERATOR: Thank you, professors, for that response. I’ll turn it over to Alex. Alex, please state your whole name and your media outlet and ask your question. Thank you.