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2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Econ Ups › No, Recession

No recession---survey data recovery now

Fisher Investments Editorial Staff 22 (Fisher Investments Editorial Staff, Fisher Investments is a fee-only investment adviser serving institutional and private clients globally, published 6/27/22, accessed 7/23/22, “June’s Global Flash PMIs Still Look Ok”, ) KCabrera

Another month, another round of flash purchasing managers’ indexes (PMIs) giving an early read into major economies’ business activity. Though they mostly ticked down in June, prompting more recessionary chatter, their levels still indicate overall expansion. It may not be gangbusters, but stocks don’t need perfection to mount a recovery from this year’s downturn—just for reality to beat dreary expectations. PMIs are surveys that aim to measure growth’s breadth. Readings above 50 indicate the majority of surveyed firms reported expanding business activity, with growth (and contraction) theoretically accelerating the further readings drift from that marker. PMIs don’t say anything about how much their businesses grew (or shrank), only that they did, so they are a timely but loose estimate of economic activity at best. Among the various readings, the composite PMI combines services and manufacturing, but it is a narrower measure of their “output” that focuses only on production. The services and manufacturing PMIs are broader, including new orders, backlogs, suppliers’ delivery times and employment. That is why, for example, the composites for June’s US, UK and eurozone PMIs can be below each of their services and manufacturing PMIs. Exhibit 1 shows major economies’ PMIs remain above 50—though they are down from the spring, implying deceleration (Japan excepted). The US and eurozone’s June flash composites, released with only 85% – 90% of responses in, fell to the low 50s, continuing a generally slower trend. This includes both services, which comprise the bulk of developed market economies, and manufacturing. But while low-50s PMIs aren’t historically robust, they generally coincide with pedestrian growth. Exhibit 1: Major Economy PMIs ***image omitted*** Source: FactSet and S&P Global, as of 6/23/2022. Flash PMIs are preliminary estimates based on 85% – 90% of responses. Also note, the downward trend isn’t global—Japan’s composite PMI rose and the UK’s was flat. Japan’s lift was services-based as COVID restrictions eased there. Reopening-related boosts helped buoy UK services, too, as more workers returned to the office and patronized surrounding businesses. However, Japanese and UK manufacturing weakened alongside the rest of the developed world as Chinese lockdowns hit global supply chains. As a whole, the picture here appears mixed. Business activity growth is less broad-based. But through mid-June at least, the pockets of strength seemingly outnumbered the pockets of weakness. Whether that translates to actual economic growth, we will see when output data roll in. For many, this isn’t exactly consoling. As we wrote in early June for the eurozone, there are some discrepancies between “soft” survey data and “hard” sales and volume data, with some signs of contraction in the latter. In the US and UK, May retail sales fell -0.3% m/m (nominal) and -0.5% (real), respectively.[i] But we don’t think this is conclusive, as it may reflect a continuing shift back to services spending from goods—a return to normal, not necessarily weakness. Hard services data tend to lag, which is why timelier PMIs are helpful and looking at both provides a fuller picture, if only in broad brushstrokes. Based on our read of all the data so far, it is premature to declare a recession is underway. Some quantitative efforts to derive GDP from monthly indicators—like the Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow—might seem to disagree, but these models aren’t air-tight. GDPNow currently predicts 0.3% annualized Q2 growth given available data.[ii] But the most telling component, personal consumption expenditures—71% of GDP—won’t be released until month end, and that is just May’s number.[iii] More broadly, these nowcast models are young, with a spotty record of accuracy. The New York Fed’s proved so inaccurate that they have temporarily ceased publication, pending methodological improvements. The St. Louis Fed’s attempt currently estimates 3.9% annualized growth in Q2, but neither it nor the Atlanta Fed’s model predicted Q1’s inventory-fueled GDP contraction.[iv] Absent a foolproof tool, investors must survey the entire landscape and make their best judgments. For now, we are inclined to interpret PMIs as more evidence economies aren’t uniformly weak despite well-documented struggles. Notably, though, even survey data have some weak points worth monitoring. Deteriorating new orders may suggest demand is faltering—but it is too early to tell. Relative services strength may be fading, but whether that is normalization following the initial reopening boom or something worse—e.g., cost of living pressures taking a more lasting toll—remains to be seen. Meanwhile, manufacturing’s downtrend, beset by component shortages, could reverse as supply chains recover. Some businesses, particularly in the consumer world, apparently overstocked trying to compensate amid surging goods demand. They may just have inventory overhangs they need to work through—a more temporary hiccup than needing to get lean to correct prior excess. We also see some other encouraging nuggets. The PMI surveys indicate falling backorders, which could be signaling easing supply chain and price pressures. This may be occurring as headwinds from China’s choppy reopening fade. One hint: The New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index, which aggregates transportation costs, input-output prices and other measures—like PMIs’ delivery times, backlogs and inventories—to gauge the overall intensity of bottlenecks’ disruption on world trade. (Exhibit 2) While still at lofty levels, it has started subsiding and may be past its peak. Exhibit 2: Global Supply Chain Pressures Elevated, but Easing ***image omitted*** Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York, as of 5/18/2022. Global Supply Chain Pressure Index, January 1998 – May 2022. For investors, the most salient aspect of the latest PMI releases may be their accompanying bearish sentiment. Given the market environment, it isn’t surprising. But we still think it is notable that PMI coverage widely extrapolates imminent recession—which the data don’t confirm, at least yet. The evidence, as we have explored, is more mixed. While recession is possible, we think the global economy’s resilience is just as remarkable given the challenges it has faced year to date. This is an underappreciated positive to us. Recession uncertainty has undoubtedly weighed on markets lately. But by the same token, it lowers the expectations bar reality needs to clear to surprise stocks positively. In our view, increasing economic clarity in the second half—even if it just muddles through—will likely provide relief.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Econ Ups › Yes, Recession

Recession now---inflation, debt, and unsustainable work-at-home practices prove.

Tate 6/30, Kristin Tate is a visiting fellow at the Independent Women’s Voice and a libertarian writer, “Young Americans are in for a rude awakening with the coming recession,” 6/30/2022, https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/3540529-young-americans-are-in-for-a-rude-awakening-with-the-coming-recession/, AJS

Societal legends are born out of challenging times. The Great Recession bore out not only the difficulties of American capitalism, but provided a myth among millennials of living through uniquely bad times. The current crop of young adults has known the comfort and ease their parents’ work afforded them. A serious recession is something for which most in that age cohort have done little planning. The unsustainability of work-from-home, low-output and overpaid jobs, massive student loan debts accumulated for prestige, and the effects of the pandemic will come to bear soon. For many young people who have known nothing but relative ease, the coming years will be a harsh reality check.

Many under-40s seemed to enjoy a “Goldilocks” view of the American economy. Any major pressure — from 9/11, to the 2008 financial crash, to massive money printing, to the pandemic — appeared to be solvable, for the most part, through a combination of economic stimulus spending and smoke and mirrors at the Federal Reserve. While each of the above came with its own economic pain, a low-inflation, moderate-growth future appeared inevitable for millennials and Generation Z — especially for those with a college education. However, this type of economic growth cannot remain forever. The current runaway inflation shows just the tip of the iceberg of federal irresponsibility, which we are already paying for as a massive unlevied tax.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Russia Ups › Russia Not Revisionist

Only reacting to Western expansion

Chotiner 22 (Isaac Chotiner; He is a staff writer at The New Yorker, where he is the principle contributor to Q.&A, a series of interviews and became a senior editor after graduating from the University of California, Davis; 3-1-22; “Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine”; “The New Yorker”; https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine)//SD

I think all the trouble in this case really started in April, 2008, at the nato Summit in Bucharest, where afterward nato issued a statement that said Ukraine and Georgia would become part of nato. The Russians made it unequivocally clear at the time that they viewed this as an existential threat, and they drew a line in the sand. Nevertheless, what has happened with the passage of time is that we have moved forward to include Ukraine in the West to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. Of course, this includes more than just nato expansion. nato expansion is the heart of the strategy, but it includes E.U. expansion as well, and it includes turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy, and, from a Russian perspective, this is an existential threat. You said that it’s about “turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy.” I don’t put much trust or much faith in America “turning” places into liberal democracies. What if Ukraine, the people of Ukraine, want to live in a pro-American liberal democracy? If Ukraine becomes a pro-American liberal democracy, and a member of nato, and a member of the E.U., the Russians will consider that categorically unacceptable. If there were no nato expansion and no E.U. expansion, and Ukraine just became a liberal democracy and was friendly with the United States and the West more generally, it could probably get away with that. You want to understand that there is a three-prong strategy at play here: E.U. expansion, nato expansion, and turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy. You keep saying “turning Ukraine into a liberal democracy,” and it seems like that’s an issue for the Ukrainians to decide. nato can decide whom it admits, but we saw in 2014 that it appeared as if many Ukrainians wanted to be considered part of Europe. It would seem like almost some sort of imperialism to tell them that they can’t be a liberal democracy. It’s not imperialism; this is great-power politics. When you’re a country like Ukraine and you live next door to a great power like Russia, you have to pay careful attention to what the Russians think, because if you take a stick and you poke them in the eye, they’re going to retaliate. States in the Western hemisphere understand this full well with regard to the United States. The Monroe Doctrine, essentially. Of course. There’s no country in the Western hemisphere that we will allow to invite a distant, great power to bring military forces into that country. Right, but saying that America will not allow countries in the Western hemisphere, most of them democracies, to decide what kind of foreign policy they have—you can say that’s good or bad, but that is imperialism, right? We’re essentially saying that we have some sort of say over how democratic countries run their business. We do have that say, and, in fact, we overthrew democratically elected leaders in the Western hemisphere during the Cold War because we were unhappy with their policies. This is the way great powers behave. Of course we did, but I’m wondering if we should be behaving that way. When we’re thinking about foreign policies, should we be thinking about trying to create a world where neither the U.S. nor Russia is behaving that way? That’s not the way the world works. When you try to create a world that looks like that, you end up with the disastrous policies that the United States pursued during the unipolar moment. We went around the world trying to create liberal democracies. Our main focus, of course, was in the greater Middle East, and you know how well that worked out. Not very well. I think it would be difficult to say that America’s policy in the Middle East in the past seventy-five years since the end of the Second World War, or in the past thirty years since the end of the Cold War, has been to create liberal democracies in the Middle East. I think that’s what the Bush Doctrine was about during the unipolar moment. In Iraq. But not in the Palestinian territories, or Saudi Arabia, or Egypt, or anywhere else, right? No—well, not in Saudi Arabia and not in Egypt. To start with, the Bush Doctrine basically said that if we could create a liberal democracy in Iraq, it would have a domino effect, and countries such as Syria, Iran, and eventually Saudi Arabia and Egypt would turn into democracies. That was the basic philosophy behind the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine was not just designed to turn Iraq into a democracy. We had a much grander scheme in mind. We can debate how much the people who were in charge in the Bush Administration really wanted to turn the Middle East into a bunch of democracies, and really thought that was going to happen. My sense was that there was not a lot of actual enthusiasm about turning Saudi Arabia into a democracy. Well, I think focussing on Saudi Arabia is taking the easy case from your perspective. That was the most difficult case from America’s perspective, because Saudi Arabia has so much leverage over us because of oil, and it’s certainly not a democracy. But the Bush Doctrine, if you go look at what we said at the time, was predicated on the belief that we could democratize the greater Middle East. It might not happen overnight, but it would eventually happen. I guess my point would be actions speak louder than words, and, whatever Bush’s flowery speeches said, I don’t feel like the policy of the United States at any point in its recent history has been to try and insure liberal democracies around the world. There’s a big difference between how the United States behaved during the unipolar moment and how it’s behaved in the course of its history. I agree with you when you talk about American foreign policy in the course of its broader history, but the unipolar moment was a very special time. I believe that during the unipolar moment, we were deeply committed to spreading democracy. With Ukraine, it’s very important to understand that, up until 2014, we did not envision nato expansion and E.U. expansion as a policy that was aimed at containing Russia. Nobody seriously thought that Russia was a threat before February 22, 2014. nato expansion, E.U. expansion, and turning Ukraine and Georgia and other countries into liberal democracies were all about creating a giant zone of peace that spread all over Europe and included Eastern Europe and Western Europe. It was not aimed at containing Russia. What happened is that this major crisis broke out, and we had to assign blame, and of course we were never going to blame ourselves. We were going to blame the Russians. So we invented this story that Russia was bent on aggression in Eastern Europe. Putin is interested in creating a greater Russia, or maybe even re-creating the Soviet Union. Let’s turn to that time and the annexation of Crimea. I was reading an old article where you wrote, “According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine Crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian president Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a longstanding desire to resuscitate the Soviet Empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine as well as other countries in Eastern Europe.” And then you say, “But this account is wrong.” Does anything that’s happened in the last couple weeks make you think that account was closer to the truth than you might have thought? Oh, I think I was right. I think the evidence is clear that we did not think he was an aggressor before February 22, 2014. This is a story that we invented so that we could blame him. My argument is that the West, especially the United States, is principally responsible for this disaster. But no American policymaker, and hardly anywhere in the American foreign-policy establishment, is going to want to acknowledge that line of argument, and they will say that the Russians are responsible.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Russia Ups › Russia Not Revisionist

no means nor will

Chotiner 22 [Isaac Chotiner ;Staff Writer at NYT ; 3-1-2022; Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine; New Yorker; https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine; Accessed 7-23-2022; DQ]

No, none of us know what’s going to happen. You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv? No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests. I thought you said that he was not interested in taking Kyiv. No, he’s interested in taking Kyiv for the purpose of regime change. O.K.? As opposed to what? As opposed to permanently conquering Kyiv. It would be a Russian-friendly government that he would presumably have some say over, right? Yes, exactly. But it’s important to understand that it is fundamentally different from conquering and holding onto Kyiv. Do you understand what I’m saying? We could all think of imperial possessions whereby a sort of figurehead was put on the throne, even if the homeland was actually controlling what was going on there, right? We’d still say that those places had been conquered, right? I have problems with your use of the word “imperial.” I don’t know anybody who talks about this whole problem in terms of imperialism. This is great-power politics, and what the Russians want is a regime in Kyiv that is attuned to Russian interests. It may be ultimately that the Russians would be willing to live with a neutral Ukraine, and that it won’t be necessary for Moscow to have any meaningful control over the government in Kyiv. It may be that they just want a regime that is neutral and not pro-American. When you said that no one’s talking about this as imperialism, in Putin’s speeches he specifically refers to the “territory of the former Russian Empire,” which he laments losing. So it seems like he’s talking about it. I think that’s wrong, because I think you’re quoting the first half of the sentence, as most people in the West do. He said, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart.” And then he said, “Whoever wants it back has no brain.” He’s also saying that Ukraine is essentially a made-up nation, while he seems to be invading it, no? O.K., but put those two things together and tell me what that means. I’m just not too sure. He does believe it’s a made-up nation. I would note to him, all nations are made up. Any student of nationalism can tell you that. We invent these concepts of national identity. They’re filled with all sorts of myths. So he’s correct about Ukraine, just like he’s correct about the United States or Germany. The much more important point is: he understands that he cannot conquer Ukraine and integrate it into a greater Russia or into a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union. He can’t do that. What he’s doing in Ukraine is fundamentally different. He is obviously lopping off some territory. He’s going to take some territory away from Ukraine, in addition to what happened with Crimea, in 2014. Furthermore, he is definitely interested in regime change. Beyond that, it’s hard to say exactly what this will all lead to, except for the fact that he is not going to conquer all of Ukraine. It would be a blunder of colossal proportions to try to do that. I assume that you think if he were to try to do that, that would change your analysis of what we’ve witnessed. Absolutely. My argument is that he’s not going to re-create the Soviet Union or try to build a greater Russia, that he’s not interested in conquering and integrating Ukraine into Russia. It’s very important to understand that we invented this story that Putin is highly aggressive and he’s principally responsible for this crisis in Ukraine. The argument that the foreign-policy establishment in the United States, and in the West more generally, has invented revolves around the claim that he is interested in creating a greater Russia or a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union. There are people who believe that when he is finished conquering Ukraine, he will turn to the Baltic states. He’s not going to turn to the Baltic states. First of all, the Baltic states are members of nato and— Is that a good thing? No. You’re saying that he’s not going to invade them in part because they’re part of nato, but they shouldn’t be part of nato. Yes, but those are two very different issues. I’m not sure why you’re connecting them. Whether I think they should be part of nato is independent of whether they are part of nato. They are part of nato. They have an Article 5 guarantee—that’s all that matters. Furthermore, he’s never shown any evidence that he’s interested in conquering the Baltic states. Indeed, he’s never shown any evidence that he’s interested in conquering Ukraine. It seems to me that if he wants to bring back anything, it’s the Russian Empire that predates the Soviet Union. He seems very critical of the Soviet Union, correct? Well, I don’t know if he’s critical. He said it in his big essay that he wrote last year, and he said in a recent speech that he essentially blames Soviet policies for allowing a degree of autonomy for Soviet Republics, such as Ukraine. But he also said, as I read to you before, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart.” That’s somewhat at odds with what you just said. I mean, he’s in effect saying that he misses the Soviet Union, right? That’s what he’s saying. What we’re talking about here is his foreign policy. The question you have to ask yourself is whether or not you think that this is a country that has the capability to do that. You realize that this is a country that has a G.N.P. that’s smaller than Texas. Countries try to do things that they don’t have the capabilities for all the time. You could have said to me, “Who thinks that America could get the Iraqi power system working quickly? We have all these problems in America.” And you would’ve been correct. But we still thought we could do it, and we still tried to do it, and we failed, right? America couldn’t do what it wanted during Vietnam, which I’m sure you would say is a reason not to fight these various wars—and I would agree—but that doesn’t mean that we were correct or rational about our capabilities. I’m talking about the raw-power potential of Russia—the amount of economic might it has. Military might is built on economic might. You need an economic foundation to build a really powerful military. To go out and conquer countries like Ukraine and the Baltic states and to re-create the former Soviet Union or re-create the former Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe would require a massive army, and that would require an economic foundation that contemporary Russia does not come close to having. There is no reason to fear that Russia is going to be a regional hegemony in Europe. Russia is not a serious threat to the United States.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Russia Ups › Russia Not Revisionist

peace talks prove

Lieven 22 (Anatol Lieven; Anatol Lieven is a British author, journalist, and policy analyst best known for his expertise on the Taliban of Afghanistan. He is currently a visiting professor at King's College London and senior fellow at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft; 3-4-22; “It’s time to ask: what would a Ukraine-Russia peace deal look like?”; Guardian News and Media Limited; https://proxy.lib.umich.edu/login?url=https://www-proquest-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/blogs-podcasts-websites/s-time-ask-what-would-ukraine-russia-peace-deal/docview/2635741560/se-2?accountid=14667)//SD

There is still the possibility of a diplomatic settlement that would bring an early end to this dreadful war and Russian military withdrawal while safeguarding the vital interests of Ukraine. Indeed, if the Russians are ever to withdraw, a diplomatic agreement on the terms of withdrawal will be necessary. The first round of Ukrainian-Russian talks has now taken place in Belarus, and a member of the Ukrainian delegation has stated that “The parties identified a number of priority topics in which certain solutions were outlined”. The West should back a peace agreement and Russian withdrawal by offering Russia the lifting of all new sanctions imposed on it. The offer to Ukraine should be a massive reconstruction package that will also help Ukraine to move towards the West economically and politically rather than militarily – just as Finland and Austria were able to do during the Cold War despite their neutral status. The demands by the Russian side are that Ukraine should sign a treaty of neutrality; engage in “demilitarisation” and “denazification”; and recognise Russian sovereignty over Crimea, which was seized back by Russia after the Ukrainian Revolution. These demands are a mixed bag of the acceptable, the unacceptable, and the undefined. The option of neutrality for Ukraine has often been called “Finlandisation”, and perhaps the determined and unified Ukrainian response to Russian aggression over the past week has given a new meaning to that term in the case of Ukraine. For like the Finns in the “winter war” of 1939-40, the Ukrainians have also been abandoned militarily by the West, which has declared publicly and repeatedly that it has no intention of fighting to defend them. On the other hand, it seems that the extraordinary courage and resolution with which the Finns fought convinced Stalin that to rule Finland would be too much of a challenge. Finland became the only part of the former Russian Empire not to be incorporated in the USSR, and during the cold war, though neutral by treaty, was able to develop as a successful social market democracy. Similarly, we must hope that the courage and determination of the Ukrainians has convinced Putin that it will be impossible to run Ukraine as a Russian client state, and neutrality is the best deal he is going to get. President Volodymyr Zelensky has publicly hinted that a treaty of neutrality may be on offer; and he is right to do so. For two things have been made absolutely clear by this war: that Russia will fight to prevent Ukraine becoming a military ally of the West, and the West will not fight to defend to defend Ukraine. In view of this, to keep open the possibility of an offer of Nato membership that Nato has no intention of ever honouring, and asking Ukrainians to die for this fiction, is worse than hypocritical. As to “demilitarisation” and “denazification”, the meaning and terms of these will have to be negotiated. Demilitarisation is obviously unacceptable if it means that Ukraine must unilaterally dissolve its armed forces; but the latest statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has suggested that Russia would accept a ban on missiles based in Ukraine. This could be modelled on a similar guarantee to the US that ended the Cuba Missile Crisis. As for “Denazification”, this presumably means that Ukraine should ban extreme right wing nationalist parties and militias at Russia’s behest. This is a completely unacceptable interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs; but perhaps Ukraine could make a counter-offer that would meet Moscow’s concerns about the rights and future of the Russian minority in Ukraine by guaranteeing these under the Ukrainian constitution – which, by the way, is something that the West should support anyway, in accordance with its own principles. There remains the demand for recognition of the Russian annexation of Crimea. Here, respect for international law (slightly ambiguous in the case of Crimea, which was only transferred from Russia to Ukraine by Soviet decree in 1954) must be tempered by considerations of reality, the prevention of future conflict, and the interests of ordinary people in the region – which is essentially what we have been asking Russia to do in the case of Kosovo. Ukraine has already lost Crimea, and cannot recover it, as Serbia cannot recover Kosovo, without a bloody and unending war that in this case Ukraine would almost certainly lose. Our principle in all such disputes must be that the fate of the territories concerned must be decided by local democratic referenda under international supervision. This should also apply to the Donbas separatist republics. These proposals will be denounced as “rewarding Russian aggression”; but if Putin’s original aim really was to subjugate the whole of Ukraine, then by such an agreement Moscow would fall far short of its maximal goals. Moreover, such an agreement would give Russia nothing that it had not in practice already achieved before launching the invasion. The West is morally right to oppose the monstrous and illegal Russian war and to have imposed exceptionally severe sanctions on Russia in response, but would be morally wrong to oppose a reasonable agreement to end the invasion and spare the people of Ukraine terrible suffering. America’s own record over the past generation gives no basis for such self-righteous hyper-legalism.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Camp Tournament Updates - Classic MMP › Russia Ups › Russia Revisionist

Ukraine

Serhan 22 [Yasmeen Serhan; Staff writer at the Atlantic; Who is Vladimir Putin’s Revisionist History For?; Atlantic; https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2022/02/putin-russia-ukraine-revisionist-history/622936/; Accessed 7-11-2022; DQ]

The evolution of Putin’s historical revisionism can be seen throughout his public statements over the years. In 2005, he famously described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century. Two years later, Putin bemoaned the aftermath of the Soviet era and the pernicious, unipolar world—one led not by Moscow, but by Washington—that it had created. Last year, in perhaps the clearest articulation of his worldview, Putin said that Ukrainians and Russians are “one people—a single whole.” On Monday, he took that sentiment even further, declaring Ukraine to be “an inalienable part of our own history, culture, and spiritual space” whose independence was a product not of self-determination (Ukrainians resoundingly voted in favor of independence from the Soviet Union in a 1991 referendum), but rather “a mistake.”Unlike his 2014 address announcing Moscow’s annexation of Crimea, which was largely framed as a moment of celebration, this was an angry speech—one ostensibly designed to make Russia’s people angry too, and to justify what was to come. “In territories adjacent to Russia, which I have to note is our historical land, a hostile ‘anti-Russia’ is taking shape,” Putin said in another address ahead of the invasion. “For our country, it is a matter of life and death, a matter of our historical future as a nation.” It’s hard to know what Putin means by historical future (which is, on its face, an oxymoron), though we can take an educated guess. When Putin speaks of Russia today, he speaks of a country whose greatness is defined by its past—namely, its imperial history and its victory during World War II—which he believes must guide its present. “Putin weaponized history by giving it a function,” Orysia Lutsevych, the head of the Ukraine Forum at the London-based Chatham House think tank, told me. As far as the Russian president is concerned, “history is the fortune teller of the future.”

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Cap › AFF AT – AI

AI will be the end of Capitalism

Feng Xiang 18, professor at Tsinghua University, one of China’s most prominent legal scholars, spoke at the Berggruen Institute’s China Center workshop on artificial intelligence in March in Beijing, 5/2/2018, “AI Will Spell the End of Capitalism,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/05/03/end-of-capitalism/, PB

It is the very pervasiveness of AI that will spell the end of market dominance. The market may reasonably if unequally function if industry creates employment opportunities for most people. But when industry only produces joblessness, as robots take over more and more, there is no good alternative but for the state to step in. As AI invades economic and social life, all private lawrelated issues will soon become public ones. More and more, regulation of private companies will become a necessity to maintain some semblance of stability in societies roiled by constant innovation.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Cap › AFF AT – AI

AI good for communism --- No Link

Feng Xiang 18, professor at Tsinghua University, one of China’s most prominent legal scholars, spoke at the Berggruen Institute’s China Center workshop on artificial intelligence in March in Beijing, 5/2/2018, “AI Will Spell the End of Capitalism,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/05/03/end-of-capitalism/, PB

The dream of communism is the elimination of wage labor. If AI is bound to serve society instead of private capitalists, it promises to do so by freeing an overwhelming majority from such drudgery while creating wealth to sustain all.

If the state controls the market, instead of digital capitalism controlling the state, true communist aspirations will be achievable. And because AI increasingly enables the management of complex systems by processing massive amounts of information through intensive feedback loops, it presents, for the first time, a real alternative to the market signals that have long justified laissez-faire ideology—and all the ills that go with it.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AT: Cap › NATO solves

Globalization of NATO to combat China will lead to downfall of capitalism

William Briggs ’22 [William Briggs; 5-6-22, "The globalisation of NATO and the madness of capitalism," Green Left, not-for-profit, activist media, carrying the news, analysis & debates of environmental and social justice campaigns and movements, https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/globalisation-nato-and-madness- //bxscijaclyn]

In an astonishing speech delivered in London on April 27, British foreign secretary  called for the “globalisation” of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to pre-empt “threats in the Indo-Pacific”, namely China. Truss’s speech, entitled “The return of geopolitics” promoted a stronger NATO in response to the war in Ukraine, but reserved much of its venom for China.

It is almost a year since Britain sent its new aircraft carrier, the  for military drills in the South China Sea — the first such mission since the beginning of the Korean War. Truss visited Australia in January to further sound the drums of war, with totally unfounded denunciations of China’s intentions in the region.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › No Impact – Its all staged

Yet at least for now, these standoffs almost appear staged. As each side, and each country’s opposition, takes political advantage of the moment, one can almost envision back-channel diplomats sending each other quiet thumbs up about the ramped-up rhetoric.

As with Ankara’s looming  to take on Kurdish militants, a bit of rhetorical sparring with Greece underscores Turkey’s military’s confidence while also sticking it to the “imperialist” West. Domestically, that’s a win-win.

Going to war with Greece, on the other hand, would be disastrous for Turkey, Greece, the US and Nato – not to mention the Nato-backed war effort in Ukraine. But as recent history has shown, that it is an exercise in futility doesn’t mean it won’t happen.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › No Impact – Its all staged

The conflict is all staged for domestic political purposes

David Lepeska, 6/15/22, veteran journalist who has reported widely across the region and contributed to top outlets including the New York Times, the Guardian, and the Atlantic, is the Turkish and Eastern Mediterranean affairs columnist for The National, “Turkey and Greece keep quarrelling, but don't expect conflict soon,” , BradAs

The most recent war of words may have domestic political purposes

One hundred summers ago, the forces of the Turkish National Movement, led by the charismatic and confident Mustafa Kemal, had turned the tide and begun pushing the invading Greeks further and further west, with nowhere to go but into the sea.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › No Impact - No Nukes

Greece doesn’t want to use nukes. Same author as their ev.

Efstathiou & Kappis ’21 (Yvonni & Bill, Political Officer at the EU Delegation to the United Arab Emirates & Deputy Director and Lecturer at the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies in the University of Buckingham (BUCSIS), as well as a visiting Professor at the War Studies University of Poland, “Weapons of Mass Debate - Greece: a Key Security Player for both Europe and NATO,” ) JHK

During the Cold War and until 2001, Greece hosted US nuclear weapons on its territory, as part of a NATO nuclear-sharing agreement. Yet, recent geopolitical developments - the US’s progressive military disengagement from the Middle East, its "pivot to Asia", debate around removing nuclear weapons from Turkey - highlight Greece’s potential to become a nuclear base again. Greece is sold to the idea of greater European strategic autonomy and is not suspicious of France, unlike other member states. However, Athen’s lack of reaction following French President Emmanuel Macron’s February 2020 speech is due to the country’s other internal priorities and its commitment to NATO as the only actor capable of offering nuclear deterrence at the moment. In this fifth episode of our series Weapons of Mass Debate, Yvonni Efstathiou, Programme Coordinator and Research Analyst for Defense and Military Analysis at IISS, and Bill Kappis, Lecturer at the Centre for Security and Intelligence Studies in the University of Buckingham, analyze Greece’s position on the future of European security.

There is hardly any evidence of a debate concerning nuclear weapons within the Greek military and political apparatus, mainly due to concerns regarding the sensitivity of the issue in international affairs, but also due to the political cost associated with the topic. Despite the fact that from 1978 to 2001, the Hellenic Airforce Araxos Air Base hosted the NATO 345 Air Munitions Company under the NATO nuclear sharing arrangements, the Greeks are sceptical about nuclear deployments, with most critics, unsurprisingly, hailing from the left of the political spectrum. 

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › No Impact – Diversionary Peace

Turkey prioritizes cooperation with great powers and defense, no risk of attack

Baba and Onsoy 16 – Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Social Science University of Ankara & King’s College London, Assist. Prof. Dr., Department of International Relations, Hacettepe University. (Baba, Gürol and Önsoy, Murat, “Between Capability and Foreign Policy: Comparing Turkey’s Small Power and Middle Power Status”, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Volume 13, No. 51, 2016, pp. 9-20.) //RSG🌳

In the same era, Turkey followed “a passive strategy of renunciation” and stayed in the nonrevisionist camp.59 Turkey increased its defense expenditures (see Table 2) but its defenses were still only effective for limited regional warfare. Turkey could not face a major threat, such as the Italian or German Air Force.60 Ankara remained passive in the hope that the threat would disappear. Turkey also used international regimes, particularly when the revision of the Lausanne Straits Convention started with Turkey’s application to the League of Nations in April 1936. During the process, Turkey had pro-status quo tendencies carried out via multilateral diplomacy and international law.61 It managed to win the support of greater powers, i.e. Britain, to reshape other parties’ demands. Turkey invoked the rebus sic stantibus principle to terminate the Straits Convention.62 With these maneuvers, Turkey, through the Montreux Convention (1936), managed to offset Russia, and to achieve control over the Bosporus and the Dardanelles as regulatory authority on the transit of naval warships. Turkey then started shifting between varying alliance structures against Italian expansionism in the Eastern Mediterranean, which increased its value as a counterweight between antagonistic alliances.63 Against Italian armaments in the Dodecanese islands and Mussolini’s Mare Nostrum rhetoric, Turkey successfully cooperated with the British within the League to impose sanctions on Italy after the invasion of Abyssinia and the signing of the Balkan Entente of 1934. Once the Abyssinia Crisis cooled down, Italy tried to reharmonize relations with Turkey by revoking its claims over Turkish lands.64 In its relations with the Soviets, Ankara glossed over its anticommunist tendencies65 to test the opportunities for economic and security partnerships. Moscow contributed 8 million USD towards Turkey’s first five-year economic development plan after the Great Depression of 1929.66 Turkey, with Russia, proclaimed its opposition to Western dominance in the international economy but at the same time became a League member, which it considered to be of Western design.67 Turkey also rejected Stalin’s quest for security against Hitler via the joint Turkish-Soviet defense system on the Straits.68 Turkey managed to accomplish these relations while maintaining the framework of neutrality. In the 1930s, Ankara made a special effort to not be on either side of the polarizing international system, but did not completely detach itself either. Turkey did not conclude agreements with any one side, which could potentially have restricted its revenues from the other. Two clear examples were Ankara’s rejection of Stalin’s offer for a joint defense system of the Turkish straits against Germany and its non-conclusion of an agreement with the Germans for chrome, which could cut down on sales to the Allies.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › No Impact – Diversionary Peace

Diversionary peace, not war

Holger Albrecht, 2020, Professor at the University of Alabama in Comparative Politics, Diversionary Peace: International Peacekeeping and Domestic Civil-Military Relations, , BradAs

This article introduced the theory of diversionary peace, which improves our understanding of the link between foreign policy making and contentious civil-military relations. Contributing to peace abroad can have coup proofing effects at home quite like the decision to go to war. A thick description of Tunisia served as an empirical plausibility probe of the mechanisms linking peacekeeping to coup-proofing. Participation in peacekeeping establishes feasibility obstacles for coup coordination, the allocation of economic resources to officers, the institutionalization of the military apparatus, and a professionalized ethos in the officer corps. In an emerging research programme on the interplay of peacekeeping and domestic politics, studying Tunisia reveals three novel findings. First, coup-proofing can be the unintended outcome of dynamics in civil-military relations where political incumbents did not design specific strategies to keep officers in the barracks. In Tunisia, it was the military leadership pushing for peacekeeping participation more so than the Ben Ali regime. Second, the Tunisian case reveals that coup-proofing through peacekeeping is particularly effective in countries with small armies, where battalion strength mission participation immediately introduces a high percentage of officers into a career trajectory contributing to individual and collective professionalization. It is in larger armies, with larger officer corps, where military 96Author interview with Tunisian journalist, Tunis, 17 May 2017. 608 H. ALBRECHT leaderships and political incumbents remain more selective on mission participants. Greater competition creates winners and losers for the perks of peacekeeping and hence individual grievances among those officers deprived of opportunities at professional advancement. Third, and relatedly, Tunisia shows which mechanisms prove particularly effective in advancing coup proofing. While peacekeeping contributes to institutional professionalization and the development of a professional ethos, these remain slow-moving facets of a military’s social fabric. Other dynamics and events, such as international support for military training, the effect of economic development on recruitment and procurement, and a military’s deployment in domestic or external conflicts certainly have an impact on military professionalism as well, perhaps at a higher degree than the provision or troops for international peacekeeping. Rather than such corporate factors, it is the individual-level mechanisms highlighted in this article – feasibility obstacles and the provision of material resources – where peacekeeping generates the most significant impact on coup-proofing. These findings have important empirical and theoretical implications for scholars in various thematic fields across Comparative Politics and International Relations. Experts of Middle East politics and civil-military relations will note the empirical blind spot in the works on coup-proofing in Tunisia and beyond. Peacekeeping participation has so far not been fully addressed as an important element of the Tunisian military’s engagement and helps us better understand why, for instance, the military returned to the barracks in 2011, that is, at a point in time where it could have assumed power through the post-Arab Spring transition period. Scholars interested in the theory and empirical practice of diversionary war may consider a limitation to the theory’s applicability for weak armies. While war may not always be an option, contributing to peace can be equally attractive for its positive effects on civil-military relations. In turn, the theory of diversionary peace offers a contribution to the research programme on international peacekeeping in that it proposes novel ideas about the rationale for troop commitments beyond geostrategic considerations. Further research will be necessary to explore the external validity of the findings from the Tunisian case. The broader applicability of the diversionary peace appears to be particularly promising for civil-military relations during democratic transitions, such as in Latin America, and the post-conflict environments of small states in sub-Sahara Africa. In fact, initial observations appear to reveal the explanatory power of the diversionary peace in multiple cases including Ghana, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, and Senegal. While the diversionary peace should be seen as an important component in the toolbox of foreign policy making, it remains a medium-range theory with its explanatory power subject to important context factors. For one, the theory works well for small armies in authoritarian regimes that, at the time of increased coup threat, would entertain opportunities for participation in peacekeeping missions. Perhaps more importantly, participation in peacekeeping missions is not a coup-proofing strategy equally available to authoritarian incumbents across time and space. The very existence of a peacekeeping mission along with the mission sponsor’s invitation to participate come as necessary conditions for incumbents to consider sending troops abroad. These constraints ultimately limit the applicability of diversionary peace to post-Cold War international politics for the dramatic increase in peacekeeping missions after 1990. Yet, since the number of interstate wars has declined quite considerably during that same period, diversionary war becomes less likely and diversionary peace merits greater attention in contemporary international politics

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › No Impact - NATO Checks

NATO and EU checks – empirics prove

Neophytos Loizides, 2011, Professor in International Conflict Analysis at University of Kent School of Politics and International Relations, , https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Result-of-the-diversionary-theory-of-war_tbl1_44792522, BradAs

Although Greece and Turkey escalated their crisis behaviour, crisis escalation was actu-

ally inhibited at lower levels by NATO and the EU. The empirical evidence from the

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › No Internal Link – Not About Politics

Greece concerns existed before Erdogan, and will persist past him

Jeffrey 6-15-2022 (James F., Former ambassador to Iraq and Turkey, and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition To Defeat ISIS, “The NATO Accession Crisis Risks Final Collapse of the Alliance-Turkey Relationship,” ) JHK

Turkey’s rejection of NATO accession for Sweden and Finland, beyond undercutting NATO’s response to Russia’s aggression, reflects a deeper rift between the West and Turkey. This is further manifest by Ankara’s recent threat to expand into northern Syria and its overflights of Greek territory. For the sake of the Alliance, immediate responses are vital, but the rift will worsen unless Washington and European capitals work with Ankara to fundamentally shift their relationship. While such a shift has long been advisable given Turkey’s importance, the existential threat of Russian aggression for both Turkey and the Alliance make it urgent.

Almost overnight Ankara lashed out against Finland and Sweden, threatening to block their NATO accession if they did not cut real and alleged ties to the PKK.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › No Internal Link – Not About Politics

Aff isn’t key - Its not just about politics – Erdogan’s concerns are real and will persist past him

Aaron Stein, 5/30/22, Director of Research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). Resident senior fellow of the Atlantic Council, where he managed their Turkey-related research program, oversaw work on nonproliferation in the Middle East with a focus on Iran, and researched non-state actors in the Middle East, with a particular focus on Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq, “YOU GO TO WAR WITH THE TURKEY YOU HAVE, NOT THE TURKEY YOU WANT,” , BradAs

The Turkish government is using the Russian invasion of Ukraine to settle  with much of NATO. Sweden and Finland were expected to , in time for the June summit in Madrid. Instead, Ankara has upended this coronation. Turkey, which joined NATO during the alliance’s  in 1952, seeks to  from Sweden and Finland on combatting terrorism, extraditing citizens of Kurdish origin to Turkey, and lifting the arms embargo that much of the West placed on Turkey following its October 2019 invasion of Syria. The Turkish protests have underscored how Ankara’s narrow security concerns differ considerably from those of the rest of the NATO alliance, particularly at a time when the alliance has sought to move beyond the war in Afghanistan and return to its core mission of deterring Russia.

The topic of Turkey has polarized debate in many Western capitals. The debate centers on Ankara’s value to the alliance, and whether Turkey’s domestic authoritarianism and functional relationship with Moscow matter for Western security. For Turkey skeptics,  is that Ankara has upended Western efforts in Syria, and that its tight trading relationship with Russia and refusal to join with Western sanctions to punish Moscow for its invasion of Ukraine suggest that Turkey undermines NATO security. For proponents, Turkey’s large, conscript-heavy military is seen as vital for tying up Russian forces in a theoretical conventional conflict, and its  to Ukraine is proof-positive of Ankara’s constructive role in NATO and contribution to . 

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › No Internal Link – Diversionary War False

Diversionary war is backwards---decline causes diversionary peace

Mattsson 16 (Linus Mattsson, Uppsala Universitet Department of Government, Fall 2016, “Unrest as Incentive for Cooperation? The Diversionary Peace Theory, Turkish-Syrian Relations and the Kurdish Conflict,” http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1067590/FULLTEXT01.pdf)

3. Theoretical framework 3.1 Diversionary War theory First, let us look at the founding theory again. The Diversionary war theory, as previously explained, is claimed to be an explanation of the outbreak of war. The theory assumes that in times of domestic turmoil or discontent, leaders initiate conflict in the international arena in order to divert the citizens' attention away from the politically unpopular domestic situation, thus making sure they stay in office. The breakout of a large number of conflicts in history, from the Middle Ages to modern times, has been explained in terms of diversionary use of force. The actions of Napoleon III have been interpreted as frequent uses of diversionary tactics: not only did the Emperor provoke the Crimean war (1852-1856) to “divert the eyes of Frenchmen from their own government's weaknesses” (Blainey, 1988:72), but also the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 has been interpreted in the same way. Perhaps the most well-known example is the RussoJapanese war of 1904. The Russian Interior Minister at that time, Plehve, is cited in the memoirs of Count Witte, Minister of Finance, as saying “you are not familiar with Russia's internal situation. We need a little victorious war to stem the tide of revolution” (Blainey, 1988:76). The theory has been widely supported and is a long-lived one, appearing long before the established scholarly field of International Relations. Historically, it has been a conventional wisdom on the outbreak of war, based upon a number of ad hoc observations rather than a well-established theoretical scientific hypothesis. As Morgan and Bickers put it: “virtually every war since 1800 has been attributed, at least in part, to efforts of state leaders to deal with domestic problems” (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:27). However, throughout the years, this enigma has become widely researched by political scientists, resulting in a more developed theory. What theoretical arguments do the advocates of the Diversionary War theory rely upon? In summary, the main mechanisms of the DWT have said to be three: The In-group/Out-grouphypothesis or Rally-Round-The-Flag-Effect, Scapegoating and Gambling for Resurrection (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). The first one, the In-group/Out-group theory, or conflict-cohesion theory, originates from the field of sociology and the two sociologists Simmel and Coser. It suggests that identities of a group, in this case national identities, become stronger in times of external threats – that the in-group identity becomes more united during conflicts with the out-group (Levy, 1989:261). The Rally-Round-The-FlagEffect is a consequence of this. Not only does external pressure strengthen the group identities – in addition, it also leads to the group's unification around leader. The tenure of the leader should therefore be extended in times of external crisis (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). However, for the theory to be effective, there are some conditions that should be met: the group has to be fairly salient to begin with, has to already perceive itself as a group and also view the survival of the group as something worthwhile (Levy 1989:261). In addition, Simmel recognized that the outcome of conflict might be of importance: “[War] might either cause domestic quarrels to be forgotten, or might on the contrary aggravate them beyond reconciliation” (Levy, 1989:261). The second mechanism, Scapegoating, means that leaders retort to war to shift the blame of failed policies onto the states enemies (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:445). This is a consequence of the first theory, implying that leaders are aware of the psychological effect external pressure has on national identity and, in turn, their own tenure. The third mechanism, Gambling for resurrection, stemming from rational choice literature, argues that state leaders who are confronted with a possible loss of power can afford starting a foreign conflict, since their risk of losing office is imminent. If creating a conflict increases their chance of staying in office even by a small percentage, it would be worth it (Chiozza and Goemans, 2003:446). Consequently, we should be able to observe the following patterns or mechanisms, according to the theory: When a domestic issue in a state threatens the legitimacy or political power of the ruling elite, said elite should a) be likely to use aggressive foreign policy behaviour as a tool to divert the attention of the public from the domestic issue, since a) the leaders are aware that the people will become more united or nationalistic under such external pressure, b) the people will give more support to the leader leading to c), a return of the popular support of the political elite. However, as already touched upon in the introduction, most of the research in support of the DWT have been either backed up by anecdotal evidence or lack quantitative evidence, which leads to both theoretical and empirical issues. 3.2 The Critiques of Diversionary War Theory The Diversionary War theory has been heavily criticized throughout the years. Only few modern scholars working on the subject ultimately support the initial theory. The main critique against the DWT is that there are insignificant links between the theory and the empirical findings (Levy, 1989:282). The historical and theoretical literature strongly suggests that political leaders should use diversionary force to strengthen their own positions, while the empirical studies, often quantitative, have found little or no support for the relationship between domestic strife and foreign conflict. The reasons for this are, in summary, two: 1. There might be something wrong with the theory itself. 2. The methodology used (mostly statistical analysis of a large number of states) might not be the right one (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:28). Regarding the theory, the idea that external enemies unite the group might not be as strong as initially thought. As Simmel himself explained, the in-group/out-group theory needs strict conditions to work – one of them is the in-group being fairly small. Thus, extrapolating the concept from small group psychological behaviour into a large, complex entity as modern day states might be difficult (Morgan and Bickers 1992:32). Although commonly treated almost as a general law, some scholars have paid attention to under what circumstances diversionary tactics would be used. The level of internal conflict should matter for the use of diversionary tactics. If the level of internal conflict is too low, aggressive foreign policy should be an exaggerated tool to use. If the level of internal conflict instead is too high, it would not be wise to turn to diversionary tactics. Blainey noted that during open civil war, diversionary use of force is rare since states turn to deal with their internal issue first as a part of its rational calculations (Blainey, 1988:86). In conclusion, we should only be able to observe diversionary actions at the moderate levels of internal strife. Another issue with the Diversionary War theory has to do with the assumptions that it makes regarding the management of conflict (or war). It presumes that war is something that can be easily managed. However, war requires a warring opponent who the state leaders cannot control. The situation is very likely to get out of hand and therefore open conflict should probably be an unlikely goal for leaders who seek to divert the attention of the public. Thus, actions short of war, like escalation of threat of force should be observable (Morgan and Bickers, 1992:29). However, this has also been challenged. Rummel, conducting a study on the link between internal and external conflict upon 77 states between 1955-57 found that “foreign conflict behavior is generally completely unrelated to domestic conflict behavior” (Levy 1989:262). These two facts about the variables give us some clue to why the quantitative studies that have been conducted might fail to produce any results in favor of the DWT. Large scale studies of the relationship between domestic strife and foreign conflict using correlation analysis and regressions all rely on the assumption that the relationship between the variables should be linear. The problem is that the theory does not imply that this is the case. Rather, the relationship should differ depending on the level of internal strife. There are more clues as to why the large, statistical analyses have failed to produce any results. One reason could be that scholars mainly have focused on correlations rather than offering any explanations through causality. One such scholar is Blainey. In his observations, he finds support for the linkage between civil strife and foreign conflict, but not due to diversionary actions. Instead, a state torn by civil strife often end up in conflict because it is perceived as weakened, and thus easily become a target for other states seeking to exploit the shift in power balance (Blainey 1988:82). It has also been argued that the direction of the relationship between internal and external conflict could be reversed. Foreign conflict could easily lead to internal turmoil and finally revolution at the home front, giving us internalization of external conflict rather than externalization of internal conflict (Levy, 1989:267). However, that this could happen would not per se be a problem for the theory – it is only problematic when the direction of the relationship is unaccounted for, given that there probably should be different casual mechanisms active during externalization and internalization of conflict, which would affect the results. In summary, the biggest obstacle to the research is a common, cumulative theoretical framework. As Levy puts it: “Little attention is given to questions of under what kinds of conditions what kind of states resort to what kinds of external conflict in response to what kinds of threats to the security of political elites” (Levy, 1989:283). 3.3 Diversionary Peace Theory The Diversionary Peace Theory, as put forward by Fravel is an alternative critical engagement with the Diversionary War Theory. In a case study on China and its territorial disputes, he finds that in times of internal turmoil or regime insecurity, China seeks compromises with foreign states, rather than confrontation (Fravel, 2005:47). Internal or domestic turmoil is referred to as regime insecurity. Fravel specifically dwells on social discontent, such as protests and legitimacy crises, and ethnic violence or uprisings. His observations are that when China is in a state of regime insecurity, the state chooses not to escalate any of the territorial conflicts with the neighbouring states. Instead, China seeks cooperation, contrary to what the DWT predicts. Instead of diversion, good relations with foreign state is one key way to solve internal problems, in addition to domestic tools. This is connected to the theoretical concept of Omnibalancing (David, 1991:235), which explains that leaders of third-world countries would be inclined to cooperate with an adversary, if there is an enemy deemed as more threatening. There are several ways leaders could benefit from cooperating with other states to deal with regime insecurity: they can gain direct assistance in dealing with the domestic threat, such as an external state denying rebel groups a harbor, as in Syria harboring Öcalan in our case, or they can improve border patrols. They can avoid a costly two-front war, and focus their resources on the domestic issues instead of the defense budget. Cooperation could also lead to an improvement of the regimes' international recognition, which would delegitimize any domestic contestors (Fravel, 2005:52). According to Fravel, leaders have three strategy options in ongoing disputes: they can delay, i.e. maintain claims to the issue, escalate via threat or use of force, and finally cooperate by dropping claims or offering concessions (Fravel, 2005:52). The least costly alternative is the delaying strategy, whereas escalation is costly due to risk of ending up in a military defeat, and cooperation is costly since it can be perceived as weakness by domestic audiences and lead to a removal from office. However, his argument is that when facing regime insecurity, the cost of the cooperation strategy is significantly lowered, since whatever one might lose on domestic discontent is won through the assistance in dealing with the original threat (Fravel, 2005:53). This is especially true if the threat to the regime emerges in the form of a threat to territorial integrity, which would drastically enhance the incentives to offer concessions to the neighbouring countries to prevent them from aiding events such as uprisings (Fravel 2005:53). This has clear implications for our case. When the armed Kurdish struggle for independence (i.e. a threat to territorial integrity) escalates, Turkey would have strong incentives to cooperate with or give concessions to Syria, an adjacent state that could serve as a base for the rebels. Fravel mainly studies behavior in territorial issues as the main independent variable. In this study, I will broaden this framework and include other contested foreign policy issues as well as long as there is a bargain situation for the two related states where concessions can be made. Although he backs his claims by an empirical study, only some attempt is made by Fravel to theoreticize his findings. He claims it is a “counterintuitive argument about the effects of domestic conflict on foreign policy” (Fravel, 2005:49). He does elaborate on why states would chose to cooperate, but does not offer any deeper explanation of the intervening variables in action. However, we can draw some theoretical conclusions from Fravel's observations and thoughts. First, we assume that leaders are rational. They would, in times of a crisis, assess the problem, identify possible courses of action and then choose the alternative that is most effective. By assuming this, we can draw the conclusion that leaders do not engage in a new conflict simply because the conflict is not manageable. The logic of the DWT is that leaders can control new conflicts – otherwise they would not be able to initiate them in order to divert attention. For Fravel, in contrast, leaders choose to focus on what they can control, which leads to cooperation rather than war. Secondly, we can assume that conflict is costly. The resources of the state might be too scarce to manage two crises. Therefore, it is not rational to engage in a new, foreign conflict before the domestic one is solved.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › No Internal Link – Diversionary War False

No diversionary war

Boehmer ‘7 – political science professor at the University of Texas [

Charles, Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”, WEA]

This article examines the contemporaneous effect of low economic growth and domestic instability on the threat of regime change and/ or involvement in external militarized conflicts. Many studies of diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic growth should heighten the risk of international conflict. Yet we know that militarized interstate conflicts, and especially wars, are generally rare events whereas lower rates of growth are not. Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that regime changes are also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or regime change, is the most likely to occur with domestic discord and lower rates of economic growth? Diversionary theory claims that leaders seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy or political scandals, or to garner increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto other nations, sometimes as scapegoats based on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955), where foreign countries are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where a leader can expect a short-term boost in popularity with the threat or use of force (Blechman, Kaplan, and Hall 1978; Mueller 1973). Scholarship on diversionary conflict has focused most often on the American case1 but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other countries.2 The Falklands War is often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was reeling from hyperinflation and rampant unemployment associated with the Latin American debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War may have helped to rally support for the governing Galtieri regime, although Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime lost power. How many other attempts to use diversionary tactics, if they indeed occur, can be seen to generate a similar outcome? The goal of this article is to provide an assessment of the extent to which diversionary strategy is a threat to peace. Is this a colorful theory kept alive by academics that has little bearing upon real events, or is this a real problem that policy makers should be concerned with? If it is a strategy readily available to leaders, then it is important to know what domestic factors trigger this gambit. Moreover, to know that requires an understanding of the context in external conflict, which occurs relative to regime changes. Theories of diversionary conflict usually emphasize the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal attention to the prospective costs associated with such behavior. It is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain in office. However, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic unpopularity through their states’ participation in foreign militarized conflicts—especially outside of the American case—is a question open for debate. Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic conflict and regime change. Lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as well as regime changes (Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if leaders do, in fact, undertake diversionary conflicts, many may still be thrown from the seat of power—especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign enemy. Diversionary conflict would thus seem to be a risky gambit (Smith 1996). Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988) have nevertheless questioned the validity of the diversionary thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a cohesive and comprehensive theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. “Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different states” (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these problems, we should add a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. Yet a few studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how diversionary tactics might be employed. Using a Bayesian updating game, Richards and others (1993) theorize that while the use of force would appear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity, a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a leader’s constituents about his or her competence. Hence, attempts to use diversion are likely to fail either because incompetent leaders will likewise fail in foreign policy or people will recognize the gambit for what it is. Instead, these two models conclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This stress on a heightened risk of removal from office is also apparent in the work of Bueno de Mesquita and others (1999), and Downs and Rocke (1994), where leaders may “gamble for resurrection,” although the diversionary scenario in the former study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader survival. Again, how often do leaders fail in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can even initiate diversionary tactics? A few studies focusing on leader tenure have examined the removal of leaders following war, although almost no study in the diversionary literature has looked at the effects of domestic problems on the relative risks of regime change, interstate conflict, or both events occurring in the same year.3

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Aff › Thumper – Covid

COVID thumps and disproves the theory

Stephen Walt 20. Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University and a columnist for Foreign Policy. Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War? Foreign Policy. 5-13-2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/

But war could still be much less likely. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Barry Posen has already considered the likely impact of the current pandemic on the probability of war, and he believes  COVID-19 is more likely to promote peace instead. He argues that the current pandemic is affecting all the major powers adversely, which means it isn’t creating tempting windows of opportunity for unaffected states while leaving others weaker and therefore vulnerable. Instead, it is making all governments more pessimistic about their short- to medium-term prospects. Because states often go to war out of sense of overconfidence (however misplaced it sometimes turns out to be), pandemic-induced pessimism should be conducive to peace.

Moreover, by its very nature war requires states to assemble lots of people in close proximity—at training camps, military bases, mobilization areas, ships at sea, etc.—and that’s not something you want to do in the middle of a pandemic. For the moment at least, beleaguered governments of all types are focusing on convincing their citizens they are doing everything in their power to protect the public from the disease. Taken together, these considerations might explain why even an impulsive and headstrong warmaker like Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman has gotten more interested in winding down his brutal and unsuccessful military campaign in Yemen.