2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
PGMs › Neg › Dems/Bipartisanship
Patricia Zengerle, 7-17-2019, Patricia Zengerle, Correspondent at Thomson Reuters. "House rejects Saudi weapons sales; Trump to veto," U.S., //brian
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. House of Representatives backed resolutions on Wednesday to block the sale of precision-guided munitions to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, sending them to the White House, where President Donald Trump has promised a veto. Nearly a month after the Senate supported 22 resolutions disapproving of Trump’s plan for billions of dollars in weapons sales despite Congress’ objections, the House passed three of the 22, two on a vote of 238-190 and the third by a 237-190 margin, largely along party lines. The three resolutions would block the sale of Raytheon Co precision-guided munitions and related equipment to the two countries. The House’s Democratic leaders opted to take up those three before the others because the PGMs could be delivered quickly, aides said. Some lawmakers also suspect that the PGMs have been used against civilians in Yemen’s civil war Many members of Congress, including some of Trump’s fellow Republicans as well as Democrats, have been frustrated by what they see as Trump’s embrace of Saudi Arabia. The Senate’s backing of the resolutions of disapproval was one of the few times the Republican-led chamber has opposed his foreign policy. Lawmakers want Washington to push the kingdom to improve its human rights record and do more to avoid civilian casualties in the four-year-long war in Yemen, where the Saudis and UAE are leading an air campaign against Iran-backed Houthi rebels. Frustration grew after the murder at a Saudi consulate in Turkey last year of Saudi journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi, a U.S. resident. “This is a strong message, I think, that our values must guide our foreign policy,” said Representative Eliot Engel, the Democratic chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, urging support for the resolutions before the vote. Trump wants to retain close ties to Riyadh, which he considers an important partner in the Middle East and counterweight to the influence of Iran. Trump also views foreign military sales as a way to generate U.S. jobs. Officials from his administration had been unhappy with Democrats in Congress who blocked the planned sales, in some cases for more than a year, over civilian casualties in Yemen. Trump announced in May that he would sidestep congressional review of the military deals, worth more than $8 billion, by declaring that the threat from Iran constituted an emergency. Tensions with Iran have decreased since then, and administration officials have acknowledged that the military equipment has not been delivered. Several Republicans joined Democrats in condemning that decision and voting for the resolutions. However, they would have to attract far more support in both the Republican-led Senate and House to garner the two-thirds majorities needed to override Trump’s vetoes. But lawmakers from both parties are not dropping the matter. Several pieces of legislation making their way through Congress include Saudi-related provisions. And the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is due to vote on two Saudi-related bills on Tuesday. One, sponsored by seven Republican and Democratic senators, includes sanctions to support a peaceful resolution of the Yemen war, address the humanitarian crisis and hold perpetrators responsible for murdering Khashoggi. The other would mandate an in-depth review of U.S.-Saudi policy and bar travel to the United States by many members of the Saudi royal family.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
PGMs › Neg › Dems/Bipartisanship
Oliver O'Connell, 5-18-2021, Oliver O'Connell. Experienced content creator, reporter, writer, editor, event producer and conference moderator. "Democrats criticise Biden for approving $735m sale of precision-guided missiles to Israel," Independent, //brian
The Biden administration has approved the sale of $735m of precision-guided weapons to Israel, raising the ire of some Democrats who question support for the government of Benjamin Netanyahu. The Washington Post reports that Congress was officially notified of the proposed sale on 5 May, citing three people familiar with the notification — a week before the current conflict with Hamas began. Rockets fired from Gaza into Israel have led to the deaths of 10 Israelis. Airstrikes on Gaza have left almost 200 Palestinians dead. The Biden administration has called for a ceasefire but also maintains that Israel has the right to defend itself. While a large majority of Congress backs this position, a growing minority of Democrats, particularly in the House of Representatives, have raised concerns about supporting Mr Netanyahu and question the timing of the sale. Some suggest using the sale as leverage to push for a ceasefire. “In the past week, the Israeli military's strikes have killed many civilians and destroyed the building that housed the Associated Press, an American company reporting on the facts in Gaza,” a Democratic lawmaker on the House Foreign Affairs Committee told the Post. “Allowing this proposed sale of smart bombs to go through without putting pressure on Israel to agree to a ceasefire will only enable further carnage.” After official notification of a weapons sale, Congress has 15 days to object by way of a non-binding resolution of disapproval. Israel maintains it uses precision-guided munitions to minimise civilian casualties, accusing Hamas of using its own people as human shields in the densely populated Gaza Strip. Given the majority support for Israel in Congress, it is unlikely that action will be taken to block the sale, but coming during the middle of the current conflict, it has highlighted a growing split in the Democrat ranks over the special treatment the ally receives. Younger lawmakers, in particular, are more open to criticising Israel’s actions, and this has opened the way for criticism from those that defend the country as the death toll in Gaza mounts. “I am deeply troubled by reports of Israeli military actions that resulted in the death of innocent civilians in Gaza as well as Israeli targeting of buildings housing international media outlets,” said Senator Robert Menendez, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a statement over the weekend. Congressman Mark Pocan of Wisconsin tweeted: “We cannot just condemn rockets fired by Hamas and ignore Israel’s state-sanctioned police violence against Palestinians — including unlawful evictions, violent attacks on protestors & the murder of Palestinian children. US aid should not be funding this violence.” New York representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez labelled Israel an “apartheid state” on Twitter saying that it could not be considered a democracy. She also tweeted: “This is happening with the support of the United States. I don’t care how any spokesperson tries to spin this. The US vetoed the UN call for ceasefire. If the Biden admin can’t stand up to an ally, who can it stand up to? How can they credibly claim to stand for human rights?”
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
NATO General › Aff › 2AC – No PC – Dem Base
Bolton 7/18 – senior staff writer for The Hill. (Alexander, “Cracks form in Biden’s Senate Democratic base,” The Hill, 7-18-2022, https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/3561683-cracks-form-in-bidens-senate-democratic-base/)// STC
Cracks are beginning to form in President Biden’s support among Senate Democrats, who are becoming less bullish about him running for reelection in 2024 after recent polling shows that most Democratic voters want a different nominee in two years.
Senate Democrats say Biden’s unpopularity is one of their biggest challenges heading into the midterm elections and are worried about data showing that young Democratic voters, whom they need to turn out in large numbers to win, are especially unenthusiastic about the 79-year-old president.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
NATO General › Aff › 2AC – Thumper – Abortion
Choi 7/17 – staff writer for The Hill. (Joseph, “Abortion fight comes to Senate, House floors,” The Hill, 7-17-2022, https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/3562671-abortion-fight-comes-to-senate-house-floors/)// STC
Legislative battles over abortion access are heating up in the House and Senate as Democrats look to raise pressure on Republicans.
A round of bills aimed at protecting abortion access that were introduced by Democrats were considered on Capitol Hill last week, leading to the first instances of lawmakers butting heads over such legislation since the Supreme Court overturned Roe v. Wade last month.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
NATO General › Neg › 2NC – L – DOD
Williams 7/20 – staff writer for The Hill. (Jordan, “Senate defense bill signals opposition to Pentagon’s extremism efforts,” The Hill, 7-20-2022, https://thehill.com/policy/defense/3567244-senate-defense-bill-signals-opposition-to-pentagons-extremism-efforts/)// STC
The Senate Armed Services Committee signaled opposition to the Department of Defense’s efforts to counter extremism in the military in a report on its version of the fiscal 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
The committee released the text of the bill this week, after voting 23-3 to advance the measure last month.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
NATO General › Neg › 2NC – L – NATO
Politico ’19 (Mark Hannah, Politico Magazine, “Opinion | It’s Not Just Trump. The American People Are Skeptical of NATO, Too,” 12/05/19, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2019/12/03/not-just-trump-american-people-skeptical-nato-074813 )
But as the heads of NATO member countries gather this week in London, some of that popular support is in jeopardy. This is one of the conclusions of a national that my colleagues and I at the Eurasia Group Foundation recently conducted. For a second year in a row, when faced with a hypothetical scenario in which Russia invaded Estonia, a NATO ally, Americans were roughly split on whether they wanted the United States to respond militarily. And that was after respondents were reminded of Article 5, the part of the NATO treaty that obligates the United States to respond to such aggression, and after they were told that U.S. action could be the only way to expel Russia. It’s not just President Donald Trump who is skeptical of the North Atlantic alliance, in other words. It’s the American people. To the extent that U.S. citizens think about NATO at all, they disagree about whether honoring its commitments would be worth the sacrifice. This wavering commitment likely signals a belief that American protection is no longer necessary for European security or that the United States has different priorities from when NATO was created 70 years ago. If NATO wants to earn the confidence of American citizens—who, after all, elect the American president whom NATO allies deal with—the alliance must rethink its mission for the 21st century. To be sure, most Americans still have a general sense that NATO is important to our country’s security, according to another recent by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. But even that survey found the same divide on whether Americans would opt to retaliate against a Russian attack on a NATO ally. As recently as the late 1990s, nearly of surveyed Americans supported sending U.S. troops to defend a new NATO member from a military attack.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
NATO General › Neg › 2NC – L – NATO
Ashlet Parker et al. ’22 -- White House Bureau Chief. Marianna Sotomayor is a congressional reporter covering the House of Representatives. Isaac Stanley-Becker is a national political reporter. (“Inside the Republican drift away from supporting the NATO alliance,” The Washington Post, 4-29-2022, STC
In early 2019, several months after President Donald Trump threatened to upend the North Atlantic Treaty Organization during a trip to Brussels for the alliance’s annual summit, House lawmakers passed the NATO Support Act amid overwhelming bipartisan support, with only 22 Republicans voting against the measure.
But this month, when a similar bill in support of NATO during the Russian invasion of Ukraine again faced a vote in the House, the support was far more polarized, with 63 Republicans — 30 percent of the party’s conference — voting against it.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
NATO General › Neg › 2NC – L – NATO
Bernstein ’22 – Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering politics and policy. He taught political science at the University of Texas at San Antonio and DePauw University. (Jonathan, “Are Republicans Turning Against NATO?,“ Bloomberg, 4-7-2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-04-07/are-republicans-turning-against-nato#xj4y7vzkg)// STC
Earlier this week, an astonishing 63 House Republicans opposed a resolution supporting NATO. That’s still not a full third of the Republican conference, but it’s not exactly a tiny fringe, either. To be fair, some of those objecting claimed to oppose the non-binding, symbolic resolution because of some of its specific wording rather than because they opposed the alliance — but quite a few seem to be wary of the whole concept of an alliance of democracies against authoritarianism.
These lawmakers are only reflecting where their party appears to be heading. In two recent polls, strong minorities of Republicans — 40% of respondents in one survey — supported leaving the alliance altogether.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
NATO General › Neg › 2NC – L – NATO
Saletan ’22 – writer at The Bulwark. (William, “Putin Wants to Break NATO. Republicans Want to Help Him.,“ The Bulwark, 4-12-2022, https://www.thebulwark.com/putin-wants-to-break-nato-republicans-want-to-help-him/)// STC
Vladimir Putin’s central objective in Europe isn’t to capture Kyiv, the Donbas, or any other part of Ukraine. It’s to weaken the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which protects most of the continent against him. And in that longstanding campaign, Putin scored two significant victories this week.
One was in France, where Marine Le Pen, a Putin sympathizer, finished a close second to Emmanuel Macron in Sunday’s French presidential election. Le Pen is running almost even with Macron in polls for the April 24 runoff. She has said that if she wins, she’ll withdraw France from NATO’s command structure.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
NATO General › Neg › 2NC – L – NATO
Singer 7/21 -- political reporter based in New York. (Emily, “63 House Republicans vote against resolution affirming support for NATO,“ American Independent, 7-21-2022, https://americanindependent.com/house-republicans-nato-resolution-russia-ukraine/)// STC
Nearly one-third of the House Republican Caucus on Tuesday night voted against a resolution that vowed support for both democratic values and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization — the alliance of countries that seeks to keep peace and prevent threats from illiberal countries.
The resolution passed by a vote of 362 - 63, with all 63 "no" votes coming from Republican members — many of whom are allies of former President Donald Trump.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
NATO General › Neg › 2NC – L – NATO
Schnell 7/18 – staff writer for The Hill. (Mychael, “House approves resolution supporting Finland, Sweden joining NATO; 18 Republicans vote ‘no’,” The Hill, 7-18-2022, https://thehill.com/homenews/house/3564989-house-approves-resolution-supporting-finland-sweden-joining-nato-18-republicans-vote-no/)// STC
The House approved a resolution on Monday that expressed support for Finland and Sweden joining NATO, exactly two months after the Nordic countries submitted applications to become part of the military alliance amid Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The resolution cleared the House in a 394-18 vote, with only Republicans voting in opposition. Two Democrats and 17 Republicans did not vote.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Cyber Security › Aff › Plan Popular
Politico ’22 (Maggie Miller, Politico Magazine, “Cyber Bills Gain Ground on Capital Hill,” 05/23/22, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/weekly-cybersecurity/2022/05/23/cyber-bills-gain-ground-on-capitol-hill-00034321)
CYBER BILLS ON CAPITOL HILL: The passage of a flurry of standalone cybersecurity bills in the House in recent weeks is highlighting how interest in cybersecurity has sharpened on Capitol Hill after a difficult year of attacks. — Action on cyber: President Joe Biden the Better Cybercrime Metrics Act and the National Cybersecurity Preparedness Consortium Act , and the House passed around half a dozen cyber-related bills in the last two weeks including measures to providing cyber funding to state and local governments and to strengthen the federal cyber workforce. The pace is no accident, following a series of incidents including the ransomware attack on Colonial Pipeline and the fallout from the SolarWinds hack. Prior to these attacks, the vast majority of cybersecurity bills were included in larger pieces of legislation, such as defense and appropriations packages. But after the chaos in 2021, cyber bills have been pushed into the spotlight for independent votes. “We are having a bit of a spurt of independent bills independently passed in the House and Senate,” said Mark Montgomery, the director of CSC 2.0 and a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “This is fantastic, this is the congressional process maturing to handle cybersecurity provisions alone, and I think overall it’s a very good thing.” Montgomery noted that “good governance” bills are more likely to get standalone votes, particularly if there is not an obvious larger legislative effort to attach them to. “I think there will be some cybersecurity in the fiscal year NDAA, and then there will be a handful more independent cybersecurity bills…any bills that are broader sweeping will probably be in the NDAA,” he predicted. — Coming soon: Several of the bills approved by the House were previously passed by the Senate, and await Biden’s signature, including the State and Local Government Cybersecurity Act, which would help increase cybersecurity coordination between all levels of government.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Cyber Security › Neg › L —Turf War (NSA)
Chalfant 18 – White House reporter for The Hill (Morgan, “Federal ‘turf war’ complicates cybersecurity efforts,” The Hill, 4-29-18, ) //sg
Lawmakers are concerned that bureaucratic turf wars are complicating the federal response to cyber threats. The issue took center stage this week, as senators on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee fretted that they had been unable to pass key cyber legislation requested by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) because of a disagreement with the Senate Intelligence Committee. {mosads}“The reality of the situation is there is conflict here,” said Chairman Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) at a hearing Wednesday. “This threat is too significant to allow turf wars to get in the way of as efficient an operation as possible in terms of dealing with a very complex and serious problem.” The dust-up illuminates the broader issue of turf wars over cybersecurity in the federal government. The executive branch has no one single agency assigned to handle cyber. Instead, authorities are spread out over various agencies, including the Justice Department, which investigates and prosecutes cyber crime, and the Pentagon and broader intelligence community, both of which handle what is considered “offensive” cyber activity. While Homeland Security is broadly recognized as the main agency defending federal networks and critical national assets from cyberattacks, individual agencies also play a major role in guarding their own networks and personnel from malicious cyber actors. The set-up means that virtually every congressional committee has a say in the federal government’s cybersecurity efforts.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Cyber Security › Neg › L – Secrecy Concerns Backlash
Porter ’19 [Christopher and Klara Tothova Jordan; Feb 14; nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council; assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative; Lawfare, “Don’t Let Cyber Attribution Debates Tear Apart the NATO Alliance,” https://www.lawfareblog.com/dont-let-cyber-attribution-debates-tear-apart-nato-alliance]
The United States still struggles to find effective policies for deterring cyberattacks. Suggestions run the gamut from more widespread use of indictments and economic sanctions, despite their lackluster record of success, to less traditional but more risky policies that emphasize the asymmetric advantage America has in conventional military power. Most of the discussion of cyber deterrence focuses on preventing a single catastrophic or cascading cyberattack that would threaten lives (like disruptions to electricity transmission or clean water)—or our way of life—altering election outcomes or grinding global finance to a halt. Yet the reality is that in the event of such an attack, the response would likely not come from the U.S. alone but from the NATO alliance in concert. NATO’s cyber-defense mandate has evolved over time to update its collective defense commitment under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty for the era of cyberattacks. In the latest effort to collectively impose costs on adversaries, the 2018 NATO Summit saw a commitment from heads of state and government “to integrate sovereign cyber effects, provided voluntarily by Allies, into Alliance operations and missions, in the framework of strong political oversight.” The newly updated White House National Cyber Strategy likewise envisions working together with a “coalition of like-minded states” to “ensure adversaries understand the consequences of their malicious cyber behavior.” Therein lies the rub. Both formal alliances, such as NATO, and more ad hoc arrangements, such as what the Cyber Deterrence Initiative imagines, will require members to share intelligence and eventually, to the best of their ability and perhaps in different domains, contribute to joint action against a presumably well-armed foreign aggressor. States including the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Estonia, and Denmark have publicly declared their willingness to lend sovereign offensive cyber effects to deter, defend against and counter the full spectrum of threats. Sharing intelligence and information is a key element of NATO’s core decision-making process enshrined in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. Political consultations are part of the preventive diplomacy between member states, but they are also an avenue to discuss concerns related to the security threats member states face. These consultations can be a catalyst for reaching a consensus on policies to be adopted or actions to be taken—including those on the use of sovereign cyber effects to support a NATO operation. The alliance has a track record of collective action and cooperative security measures. For example, Operation Active Endeavour helped to deter, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity in the Mediterranean in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, in solidarity with the United States. For the seventh time, the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative will be among the organizations privileged to organize an event on the sidelines of the Feb. 15–17 Munich Security Conference. This year in particular, the Atlantic Council’s event, “Defending Human Dignity: Limiting Malicious Cyber Activity Through Diplomacy,” will complement the topics high on the agenda of the main conference, such as transatlantic collaboration, the consequences of a resurgence of great power competition and the future of arms control. In the United States, the greatest failures of response and deterrence to foreign aggression in cyberspace have not been caused by a lack of intelligence, capability or imagination. Rather, U.S. policy has been serviceable in theory but impotent in practice because of an inability to translate technical findings and intelligence into public support for sufficiently tough responses ordered by elected political leaders. North Korea’s repeated operations targeting U.S. companies and critical infrastructure have been met with public skepticism over their culpability, limiting the strength of retaliatory options needed to deter further events. Chinese cyber economic espionage continued for years despite widespread knowledge of China’s activities because political leaders found it difficult to confront Beijing without undermining U.S. companies in return. Russian information operations did not sow enough doubt to mislead experts, but they succeeded in exacerbating the partisan polarization of an already-divided electorate and its leaders. That inability to translate the findings of cyber experts into public sentiment and therefore political action has sidelined America’s cyberwarriors, by far the most technologically advanced and well-resourced in the world. Imagine the political response of an ally that is asked to burden-share in response to cyber aggression but is probably much closer to any resulting kinetic fight than the United States. Now imagine the response of that ally when it’s being asked to take causus belli on faith: The United States is presenting attribution for a cyberattack elsewhere in the world, but perhaps is depending on the ally lacking critical details due to classification, and is presenting that information alongside a request for help that might well put the ally in the crosshairs of its own cyberattack or lethal action. How can allies with different capabilities to collect, analyze and understand intelligence be part of a consensus on using sovereign cyber effects to support a NATO operation? How can a commander achieve a common operational picture to authorize the use of sovereign effects in a NATO operation if all the allies are not on the same page with respect to critical attribution and other technical information needed for a use of effect in an operation? We all know what a tank looks like on a shared satellite image, but if you ask three cyber experts to interpret the attribution for a set of indicators, you are likely to get at least four answers. For most U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere, there is simply a dearth of technical know-how within the government when it comes to cyber attribution and operations. This is already a challenge for the United States, with a massive defense budget, Silicon Valley innovation and an educated workforce to pull into government service. But for many U.S. allies, tech-savvy public servants will have long fled for the private sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academia before reaching ministerial positions. To its credit, the U.S. National Cyber Strategy does propose capacity-building measures to support allies. This means building up law enforcement, intelligence, and military operational and investigative capability. But even with successful capacity-building programs, many nations could, in a crisis, end up in the same place the United States is—with good options stuck on the shelf while political leaders and their electorates lack a critical mass of informed voters to trust, understand and act on expert findings. For countries weighing whether to risk their own blood and treasure in support of an ally’s cyber attribution findings, this hurdle could well prove insurmountable if not addressed well before a crisis emerges. Many such countries will no doubt recall being burned when placing too much confidence in U.S. technical and human sources without an ability to evaluate the evidence for themselves, as with the Iraq weapons of mass destruction findings. The private sector will probably play a crucial role in providing intelligence to support alliance responses to cyberattacks, especially as a stopgap over the next few years. FireEye and its peer competitors and partners regularly produce analyses of major world cyber events—many that fly below the radar of Western leadership, in fact—sometimes at a near-government quality and often covering much of the same “classified” evidence. More important, private-sector analysts are accustomed to writing for impact with both their technical counterparts, like chief information security officers (CISOs) and threat hunters, and nontechnical stakeholders such as boards of directors, CEOs and other persons controlling the purse strings. In this sense, unclassified, private-sector and NGO-driven cyber threat intelligence can become the lingua franca of discussions. Relying on commercial reporting generated by international teams, rather than declassified government-generated reports, both broadens the audience enough to make alliance discussions feasible and mitigates against disparities in terminology across national lines—the tendency of even closely integrated allies to describe cyber “attack,” “information operations,” and attribution findings with different implicit assumptions or implications. Long-Term Thinking In the long run, though, the U.S. and its more technologically advanced allies—such as its fellow Five Eyes (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the U.K.), France and Japan—will have to make important policy changes in the interests of furthering alliance cooperation in cyberspace: a willingness to sometimes risk sensitive sources and methods in order to get cyber threat intelligence into the hands of other countries better positioned to take policy action, an end to classifying public information like IP addresses solely because of their acquisition via classified means, and greater transparency on their own decision-making. Government cyber leaders within the alliance should consider taking another page out of the private-sector playbook as well: running cyber-crisis exercises that involve more than the IT department. In the commercial world, the more successful practice runs involve leaders at both the CISO level and some presence from nontechnical teams that would weigh in during a crisis, such as communications and legal. The best exercises involve executives, too, who despite their busy schedules must see for themselves how their companies would survive and respond during a potentially ruinous cyberattack, and work through the minutiae of leading a response themselves. The experience and confidence is invaluable if ever called on during a real-life crisis, and the organizational introspection by involving decision-makers at all levels is irreplaceable. Military-to-military cyber training as part of cross-country force standardization and joint operational planning could pull in more senior national leadership, beyond battlefield commanders, and be coupled with increased funding for foreign affairs-led training for nontechnical leaders. The private sector could also meaningfully contribute during NATO consultations when developing Allied Joint Publications to make sure that definitions and requirements for threat intelligence incorporate the best practices of NATO member countries’ private sectors. If a U.S. diplomat reaches out to his or her counterpart in an allied country to ask for assistance responding to malware that’s damaging critical infrastructure, and that counterpart has to ask what malware is, the response isn’t going to happen. *** NATO’s essential and enduring purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Tolerating cyberattacks, especially those deliberately targeting civilians and the political legitimacy of governments—without the alliance having the capability to jointly discuss attribution and have the confidence to act and assist one another—undermines this core purpose of the alliance. Likewise, pursuing only deterrence and response without an active role for the alliance in reaching peaceful diplomatic agreements with potential adversaries abrogates member responsibilities to their citizens but is impossible without a common language and operational picture to discuss enforcement of such agreements. The U.S. is stronger with allies, and with attention to these issues its cybersecurity can be too.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Cyber Security › Neg › L – Secrecy Concerns Backlash
Vinik 15 – former assistant editor of The Agenda (Danny, “America’s secret arsenal, The Agenda, 12-9-15, “https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/12/defense-department-cyber-offense-strategy-000331/) //sg
That’s not what happened. In fact, cyber weapons exist in a realm not unlike the early days of the nuclear program, shrouded in secrecy, with plenty of curiosity but very little public information. In part this secrecy is integral to the whole concept: a cyberattack is useful insofar as the enemy is unaware of it. The more the government reveals about what’s in its arsenal, the more our adversaries can do to protect themselves.
"If you know much about it, [cyber is] very easy to defend against," said Michael Daniel, a special assistant to the president and cybersecurity coordinator at the National Security Council. "Therefore, that’s why we keep a lot of those capabilities very closely guarded."
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Cyber Security › Neg › L – OCOs 2nc/1nr
Blessing 2021
Jason Blessing is a Jeane Kirkpatrick Visiting Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. During the 2020-2021 academic year, he served as a DAAD Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Program on “The United States, Europe, and World Order” at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Blessing has previously worked as a Consulting Fellow for the Cyber, Space and Future Conflict Programme at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) and was a USIP-Minerva Peace and Security Scholar with the United States Institute of Peace. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs at Syracuse University, an MA in Political Science from Virginia Tech, and a BA in Government from The College of William & Mary. “Fail-Deadly, Fail-Safe, and Safe-to-Fail: The Strategic Necessity of Resilience in the Cyber Domain,” NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond, (172-191) 2021. dmr
Attribution difficulties present further challenges to the ‘who’ of deterrence. Adversaries with rapidly changing tactics, techniques, and procedures—along with the ability to easily conceal an operation’s origin and perpetrator—can pose hurdles to technical attribution.41 Technical difficulties can weaken deterrent postures by delaying the timeliness of retaliatory punishment. Moreover, the effects of an operation that a defender notices may actually be second- or third-order effects. This can add additional time between attribution and punishment.42 The larger attribution issues, however, are political. NATO lacks common standards or guidance for attributing cyber operations in either a technical or political sense. Indeed, attribution remains a member state prerogative. Not only are the targeted member states responsible for attribution, but those members looking to contribute to collective defense must perform independent attribution assessments, and the political decision for a collective defense response must come from the NAC.43 Reaching a consensus decision to trigger collective defense in response to cyberspace operations is likely to be politically contentious, and member states will have few incentives to risk revealing the intelligence sources and methods that underlie attribution decisions. These dynamics are likely to intensify when additional links in the attribution chain are required, such as when a perpetrator is encouraged or sponsored by an adversarial state but lacks direct ties. Attribution is less likely to be politically controversial across the Alliance once a conventional conflict is underway as contextual clues from kinetic attacks can reduce uncertainty. This discussion points to a greater role for deterrence-by-denial. Deterring an adversary by taking measures to deny potential gains does not hinge on attribution and thus possesses a potentially wider scope of application.44 A second and related hurdle for cyber deterrence is determining which actions the Alliance seeks to deter. Much of the activity in cyberspace falls below the physical effects thresholds associated with the disruption, degradation, or destruction of computers and networks. Such considerations complicate decisions to invoke Article 5—specifically, the types of cyberattacks to which Article 5 should apply. Indeed, cyber operations targeting military assets or critical civilian infrastructure can be incredibly costly but may not reach damage levels associated with conventional attacks.45 Moreover, espionage via network exploitation is widespread, varied, and falls well below the threshold of armed conflict.46 Problematically, such exploitation can be nearly indistinguishable from operations that eventually seek to attack computers or networks and produce effects. Network exploitation can even be precursor to conventional military operations.47 Determining how to deter presents a third obstacle to NATO’s cyber deterrence efforts. Threatening conventional military means in response to cyber operations poses dilemmas of proportionality and can risk unintended escalation.48 Retaliation with cyber tools carry their own problems. First, the Alliance faces issues of political reliability, particularly in the context of the SCEPVA framework. Legally, Allies retain different constitutional restraints on offensive cyber operations that can hamper the ability to volunteer sovereign effects. Strategically, states may be hesitant to volunteer their ‘best’ cyber effects for fear of burning an exploit that could have had a greater payoff when used in a national context. Volunteering sovereign effects can also inadvertently give unwanted insight to an adversary regarding an Ally’s techniques, tactics, and procedures. Second, the temporary and transient nature of cyber capabilities makes it incredibly difficult to establish repeatable and predictable effects required of deterrent threats.49 Finally, signaling in cyberspace is generally ambiguous and rarely straightforward.50 For instance, an adversary may not even recognize a signal, believing it instead to be a technical glitch. Even if a costly signal is received, there is no way to ensure that it has interpreted as intended. In addition to deterrence, NATO’s fail-safe cyber defense efforts face political and technical challenges. Because NATO will not undertake any active defense measures, actions to mitigate the effects of a cyberattack are limited to NATO networks or to individual member state networks when requested. This forecloses the possibility of developing an institutional strategy to mitigate the costs of a cyberattack upstream by disrupting the source of an attack, much like US Cyber Command does with its “defend forward” posture.51 More problematically, Allies have and will continue to have different legal, strategic, doctrinal, and threat frameworks for cyberspace that complicate defensive measures for the Alliance. Most immediately this means that Allies will locate resources to different aspects of cyber defense based on individual country circumstances. Different strategic focuses have the potential to intensify disparate threat perceptions, capabilities, and skillsets. This can also exacerbate interoperability problems; for example, during an operation or crisis, some systems will be controlled by NATO while others will be controlled by an ally or a group of allies with different skill and knowledge levels. In the longer term, disparate legal understandings, particularly regarding sovereignty in cyberspace, will become more impactful as a greater number of allied nations develop forward defense strategies and the requisite capabilities for out-of-network operations. An out-of-network operation can in and of itself cause operational friction. However, differing definitions of sovereignty in cyberspace—and what violates it—inevitably create political friction between Allies as some look to operate and produce effects on other Allies’ networks.52 This political friction will contribute to even greater hesitancy over cyber-intelligence sharing and complicate the coordination of defensive mitigation measures across the Alliance.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Cyber Security › Neg › Reducing Reliance on OCOs
Suzanne Smalley, 4-5-2022, "Legislators rail against potential rollback of flexible DOD cyber powers," CyberScoop, https://www.cyberscoop.com/nspm-13-senate-armed-services-nakasone-king-gallagher-rounds/
Plans to review and potentially scale back a Trump-era rule providing broad authorities to the Department of Defense to launch offensive and defensive cyber operations without White House permission sparked concern from legislators at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing Tuesday. National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command leader Gen. Paul Nakasone testified at the hearing, responding to concerns from senators troubled by with an eye on taking back some of the broad authorities Cyber Command has held since the Trump administration issued National Security Policy Memorandum-13 (NSPM-13) in September 2018. Sen. Angus King, I-Maine told Naksone at the open session hearing that he was very concerned about a potential scaling back of NSPM-13, which he called “a grave mistake [that] would undermine deterrence at the worst possible moment.” Other senators also expressed worry about a possible weakening of NSPM-13, with Sen. Mike Rounds, R-S.D., pointedly asking Nakasone if losing the authority to use “persistent engagement” to defeat adversaries in cyberspace would harm national security. Nakasone said that prior to Cyber Command receiving NSPM-13 cyberspace authorities, his agency was forced to do less to defend American interests in cyberspace. Specifically, Nakasone said he is unaware of any examples of so-called cyber effects operations — which DOD defines as operations “where the primary purpose is to externally defend or conduct force projection in or through cyberspace” — prior to Cyber Command gaining authorities in 2018. Nakasone also told Rounds that NSPM-13 authorities helped protect the 2018 and 2020 U.S. elections from cyber interference by hostile foreign governments. While careful to say he’ll review the proposed changes from the White House before making a final judgment, Nakasone allowed that, “significant changes to that NSPM, it could affect what we need to do.” King’s remarks opposing revisions to NSPM-13 followed a letter to President Joseph Biden that he and Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., sent Monday in their capacity as chairs of The executive director of the commission, Mark Montgomery, “One of the most important improvements in our national cyber capability over the past four years has been the development of effective, timely planning processes for the execution of offensive cyber operations,” “As the co-chairmen of the National Cyberspace Solarium Commission we are very concerned by press reporting that your administration may be considering changes to the governing policy document, National Security Policy Memorandum-13, with an intent to limit the Secretary of Defense’s freedom of action to plan and conduct offensive cyber operations.” In their letter, King and Gallagher hailed NSPM-13 for allowing more “agile” cyber operations. They said the policy enabled the Department of Defense to better thwart Russian information operations in the 2018 and 2020 elections and asserted that it plays an important role in “signaling our willingness to use cyber capabilities, a key aspect to an effective national cyber strategy.” “Any effort to weak and possibly alter NSPM-13 signals to our adversaries a lack of credible willingness to use offensive cyber capabilities which undermines the credibility of our deterrent,” the letter concluded.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Cyber Security › Neg › General
Mariam Baksh, 4-6-2022, Cybersecurity Policy reporter for nextgov "Partisan Rift Stalls Efforts to Secure Critical Infrastructure from Cyberattack," Nextgov, https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2022/04/partisan-rift-stalls-efforts-secure-critical-infrastructure-cyberattack/364120//DG
Senior House Democrats and Republicans disagree on legislation Rep. John Katko, R-N.Y., has proposed that calls on the Department of Homeland Security to identify “systemically important critical infrastructure”—SICI—for prioritizing the government’s efforts to improve the nation’s cybersecurity. “It is not enough to simply identify these most critical entities, nor is it consistent with what the solarium Commission proposed,” Rep. Yvette Clarke, D-N.Y., chair of the House Homeland Security Committee’s panel on cybersecurity, infrastructure protection and innovation, said during a hearing Wednesday. “We need to be able to answer the question, ‘what do these companies need to do as a result of their designation?’ And ‘what does the federal government need to do for them?’” The , and identical legislation proposed by Sen. Angus King, I-Maine, in the upper chamber, draws from a recommendation of the congressionally mandated Cyberspace Solarium Commission. The commission, which was composed of members of Congress from across the political spectrum, executive-branch officials and major private-sector representatives, proposed that entities designated systemically important critical infrastructure be allowed some protection from liability and access to information in exchange for implementing appropriate cybersecurity controls. Katko is ranking member of the House Homeland Security Committee. His legislation, which has –Rep. Abigail Spanberger, D-Va.—who has not been active on cybersecurity policy, covers the first part of the Solarium Commission’s bargain by calling on DHS to identify the entities and outlining benefits they would receive. But it does not approach a discussion of appropriate security controls companies should be required to implement. CISA, meanwhile, has made a point of noting the agency is taking on the work of identifying the entities in question, regardless of whether there is legislation instructing them to do so. “It's clear that CISA's Systemically Important Entities effort is engaged in a rigorous identification process, but the next steps of what to do with the list appear less clear to me than the Solarium Commission's vision of SICI, which calls for specific benefits and obligations to SICI entities,” Rep. Jim Langevin, D-R.I., said. Langevin chairs a key cybersecurity panel on the House Armed Services Committee and is co-chair of the House Cybersecurity Caucus. He and King were both members of the Solarium Commission. Agreement also broke down along partisan lines regarding the use of regulatory enforcement versus the voluntary approach that has been at the center of cybersecurity policy over the last decade.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Cyber Security › Neg › General
, 11-2-2021, "Analysis," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/11/02/cybersecurity-funding-is-stake-democrats-spending-battles/
The bipartisan infrastructure bill and the Democrats’ $1.75 trillion social spending deal together would commit about $2.5 billion to cybersecurity. Provisions would boost federal government cyber operations and raise protections against ransomware and other cyberattacks for state and local governments and critical infrastructure, such as the energy grid. The spending would effectively reverse course on a decade of inadequate cyber spending that’s been out of step with the surging threats to government and industry. But that investment is in limbo as moderate and progressive Democrats tangle over the size of the spending package. “We have significantly underinvested in cybersecurity for decades at this point, and this would be the first time in a long time that we’re really upping our investment and perhaps meeting the need in some areas,” Ari Schwartz, a former top White House cyber official during the Obama administration, told me. The largest-ever investment in the nation's cybersecurity is hanging in the balance as Democrats continue to spar over two mammoth spending bills.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
Cyber Security › Neg › General
Jon Harper, 4-26-2022, Jon Harper is the Managing Editor of DefenseScoop, he covers the Pentagon and military technology. "Industry still faces ‘a lot of ambiguity' around CMMC implementation," FedScoop, https://www.fedscoop.com/industry-still-faces-a-lot-of-ambiguity-around-cmmc-implementation//brian
Federal contractors still face a lot of unknowns about how the Pentagon’s controversial Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification program will be implemented, the head of a leading trade association told lawmakers Tuesday. The CMMC program is an effort to prod the defense industrial base to improve their cybersecurity with new certification-based standards and better protect controlled unclassified information from adversaries. After receiving major pushback from contractors about the burdens and cost of implementation and conducting an internal review, the Department of Defense in November announced that it was revamping its plans and would eventually implement what it called CMMC 2.0. Additionally, earlier this year Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks moved responsibility for the program from the Pentagon’s acquisition and sustainment office to the Office of the CIO. “The requirements are in the early stages of the rulemaking process. And so we anticipate a revised Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement to … come out. We’ve heard various estimates that it could be as early as late this spring or as late as a year from now,” David Berteau, president and CEO of the Professional Services Council, said during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the health of the defense industrial base. He continued: “What we don’t know is, what’s the next standard we’re gonna have to comply with? What’s the timeline in which the flag will go down and you’ve got to be in compliance? And what can you do now to be ready for that when you don’t know … what standards you’re gonna have to meet? So, there’s still a lot of ambiguity there.” Delays in the program have implications for cybersecurity, he noted. “One of the problems or concerns that we’ve raised from the beginning is the threat is not waiting for this implementation, if you will, and every day that threat grows,” he said. “The real question is, do those standards go far enough in order to protect us against the evolving threat? And nobody really knows the answer to that.” CMMC 2.0 is intended to simplify the standards, minimize barriers to compliance, provide additional clarity on regulatory, policy and contracting requirements, increase department oversight of “professional and ethical standards in the assessment ecosystem,” and improve the overall ease of execution, according to a DOD press release issued in November. Key changes include a reduction in the number of security compliance levels from five to three, and a reduction in the number of contractors that will be required to get third-party verification of their compliance. The DOD plans to specify a baseline number of requirements that must be achieved by contractors prior to contract award. CMMC won’t be implemented until after the completion of the rulemaking process for the Code of Federal Regulations and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement. However, the Pentagon has encouraged contractors to beef up their cybersecurity while the rulemaking is underway. Berteau noted that many contractors are already moving to come into compliance with the cybersecurity standards laid out in National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-171 (NIST SP 800-171), which are expected to inform CMMC. “Almost every company I know and that participates in the defense business today at the prime contractor level, whether large, medium or small, is already investing and has a plan on record for compliance with and meeting those standards,” Berteau said. “It’s not being incorporated into contracts [now as part of CMMC] … but a lot of people are moving forward anyway.”