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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Russia Won’t Retaliate
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Prepare for the most likely area of escalation: cyberspace. As events progressively turn against Putin, the prospect of cyber war will loom ever larger, as it represents one of Russia’s most powerful remaining weapons. Few Western nations possess true offensive cyber capabilities, and the United States alone possesses the ability to deter major cyberattacks by delivering effective and large-scale reprisals. President Joe Biden has issued clear warnings to the private sector to harden its cyber defenses, which remain patchy and incomplete, and put Putin on notice that cyber assaults on critical infrastructure, the financial sector, and other key targets will be met with severe retaliation. A complicating factor is that cyber warfare on a strategic scale has never occurred, and much remains unknown about it. For example, attacks on critical Russian infrastructure, such as power grids and transportation networks, could unintentionally cause civilian deaths, while intrusion into military command-and-control nodes could alarm the commanders of Russia’s nuclear forces. In many respects, the cyber domain remains the realm of the unknown. Like aerial warfare in the early twentieth century, both sides must grope forward and learn as they go. A strong and clearly articulated cyber-deterrence regime, punctuated by sharp demonstrations if necessary, is the best defense here.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Climate Turn
Lisa Aronsson 6-16-2022 nonresident senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and a research fellow at National Defense University. Brett Swaney is an associate research fellow at National Defense University focused on NATO, Europe, and the Baltic Sea region. The views expressed are the authors own and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. Atlantic Council, , https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/trackers-and-data-visualizations/visualizing-the-nato-strategic-concept/, "Visualizing the NATO Strategic Concept: Five ways to look at the Alliance's future," (ermo/sms, Acc:7-2-2022)
As NATO reconceptualizes its role to focus on defense and deterrence while also addressing non-traditional challenges such as emerging technologies and climate change, the Alliance should look for opportunities to strengthen climate and technology cooperation with partners, especially with its closest partner states and like-minded international organizations.
NATO’s network of partners extends to forty states around the world, and it includes some of the most innovative economies and global leaders in addressing climate change. According to the United Nations World Intellectual Property Organization Global Innovation Index, eight of the top twenty most innovative global economies are NATO partners. And according to the MIT Green Future Index, which evaluates countries’ ability to transition to a low-carbon future, six of the top twenty states are also NATO partners.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Prolif Turn
Natasha Lander Finch 6-16-2022, nonresident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center’s Transatlantic Security Initiative and former advisor on countering weapons of mass destruction to the US Department of Defense. Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/trackers-and-data-visualizations/visualizing-the-nato-strategic-concept/, "Visualizing the NATO Strategic Concept: Five ways to look at the Alliance's future," (ermo/sms, Acc:7-2-2022)
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE/MACHINE LEARNING QUANTUM TECHNOLOGIES NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL SPACE
The opportunities and challenges of dual-use technologies
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Hardline Good Turn
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
In short, while these more extreme escalatory options deserve consideration, most would leave Russia in even worse shape and at greater risk. Russian elites almost certainly see this. The more moderate and sensible approach—to withdraw to pre-war boundaries, offer concessions to Ukraine and the West, and open Russia to economic integration and improved relations with the international community—is highly improbable as long as Putin remains in power. The most probable outcome is that Putin will continue to escalate until he is defeated outright, removed from power, or offered concessions he can accept as victory.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › No Ukraine Escalation
Marc De Vore, 6-15-2022, School of International Relations - Senior Lecturer https://ucigcc.org/news/what-ukraine-is-teaching-us-about-geoeconomics/, "What Ukraine Is Teaching Us About Geoeconomics," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)
There’s a third question: what does this mean for nuclear proliferation? There’s been an implicit bargain since the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that a lot of states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for nuclear states agreeing not to use them against non-nuclear states. And this was a very specific part of the Budapest Memorandum with Ukraine. Russia has breached that agreement by repeatedly threatening to use nuclear weapons, which could be an argument for other states to want to acquire nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Russia has not used these nuclear weapons likely because it can’t figure out an advantageous way to do so. So I can see the war either incentivizing proliferation because states look at this and say, “The only way not to be threatened by nuclear weapons is to have them ourselves,” or I could see states saying, “Here we have a country that has repeatedly made nuclear weapons central to its National Security Strategy, has the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, and what do they get from for it? Almost nothing.”
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › No Ukraine Escalation
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
In this regard, continuous references to the danger of escalation to “World War III” and a steady drumbeat of measures not to be taken can only serve to reassure Putin that he has a free hand in Ukraine. A degree of strategic ambiguity and the possibility of US and NATO intervention should he go too far can be helpful in moderating Russian excesses and controlling escalation. An “all measures on the table” approach will force Russian planners to consider, and prepare for, multiple response scenarios, complicating resource allocation and inducing uncertainty. While deterrence is more art than science, signaling to one’s opponent that one is too frightened to engage is more likely to encourage than to deter.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Resolve Turn
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Bolster forward presence. As a hedge against further Russian aggression and to reassure allies, the US deployed two additional heavy brigades to Poland in February and early March, along with an airborne brigade, bringing the US rotational “heel-to-toe” brigade there to divisional strength. US divisional and corps-level headquarters were also sent. The US 2nd Cavalry Regiment based in Germany (actually a Stryker brigade) was relocated to Romania at the same time. Additional air units and ground troops from a number of allies have also been deployed to NATO’s eastern flank, while the forty-thousand-soldier NATO Response Force (NRF) has been alerted for the first time in its history.
Putin’s rhetoric and aggressive disinformation and subversion efforts have, for years, targeted the Baltic States, which stand between Kaliningrad and contiguous Russia and extend almost to the suburbs of St. Petersburg. To forestall future aggression and cement firm deterrence, these forces should remain in eastern Europe at least for the near term (i.e., 3–5 years). As the campaign in Ukraine unfolds, Putin should understand clearly that NATO is postured to respond strongly to further escalation. For many years, policymakers have argued strenuously against providing the Baltic States, and NATO’s eastern flank in general, with an adequate defense for fear of “provoking” Russia and to “maintain Alliance unity.” Measures to build up Ukraine’s defensive capacity were resisted for the same reasons; the Barack Obama administration opposed lethal aid, even after the invasions of Crimea and the Donbas, while the Donald Trump administration provided only a trickle. The invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated the pitfalls of this thinking. Putin’s threats were intended to keep his neighbors weak, but recent events have proven that it is the perception of weakness, not strength, that provokes him most. Accordingly, a firm defense from the borders of Finnmark to the Black Sea can prevent spillover or regional escalation, communicate resolve, and reassure host-nation publics that the conflict in Ukraine will not land on their doorstep. This is under way with the recent announcement that NATO battlegroups will be posted in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slovakia. Meanwhile, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), Denmark, and others have also pledged to increase their forces in the Baltic States.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Nuclear Deterrence Turn
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Take an unambiguous stance on nuclear policy. To relieve the threat of a Russian first-use nuclear strike and regain freedom of action, the United States and NATO must return to core deterrence principles. As it has for many decades, nuclear deterrence rests on both capability and credibility. NATO nuclear forces, though much reduced since the Cold War (especially with respect to theater nuclear systems) are redundant, survivable, and absolutely capable of destroying Russia from end to end. NATO’s credibility, on the other hand, is constantly undermined when leaders publicly express palpable fears that Putin will employ his nuclear arsenal, for unclear reasons and in unclear ways, and that they must at all costs avoid pushing him into a corner. A resolve not to be bullied is essential. Deterrence works best when leaders are direct, unambiguous, resolute, and calm, as John Kennedy was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. As President Emmanuel Macron reminded his public recently, the West has nuclear weapons, too.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Ukraine Impact - Democracy
Philip Wasielewski, 6-9-2022, Templeton Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is a former Paramilitary Case Officer who had a 31-year career in the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/06/the-evolving-political-military-aims-in-the-war-in-ukraine-after-100-days/, "The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Both nations have suffered severe losses and need to regenerate military strength. The winner will be the one who is quickest to reconstitute its combat forces at the tactical level and whose leader best motivates his country to fight and manages to enlarge and equip his armed forces, and the logistics to sustain those forces, at the strategic level.
Twenty-first century Russia is using twentieth-century weapons to fight a nineteenth-century war of attrition, combined with eighteenth-century pillaging. Currently, Russia’s numerical advantage in Donbas allows it to grind out a slow advance toward a pointless objective. Even if Russian forces advance to the administrative borders of both oblasts, it will not end the war as long as Ukraine still has the will to fight and the means to do so. If Putin plans to declare victory once his army has cleared Ukraine out of Donbas, he is building on sand. Unlike Georgia or Moldova, Ukraine has the resources and international support to refuse to accept a “frozen conflict.” Instead, the incoming tide of a rebuilt and expanded Ukrainian army will eventually wash those gains away—be it months or years from now.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Ukraine Impact - Democracy
Eli Berman 6-15-2022, IGCC Research Director for International Security Studies and professor of economics at UC San Diego. https://ucigcc.org/news/what-ukraine-is-teaching-us-about-geoeconomics/, "What Ukraine Is Teaching Us About Geoeconomics," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)
I want to add just one thing, which is that, if this war goes on, as it looks like it will, Russia’s economy could start to collapse for lack of spare parts. The demonstration value of that collapse might be that, in two or three years, people will look back and say: this was a war that was won by the sanctions –an unprecedented event.
Granted, there was a period in between the World Wars where trade embargoes were strong, but trade in intermediate goods, and financial markets make economies more interlinked now, and more vulnerable. We’re in a world where the hundred designers of chip manufacturing facilities in Taiwan are critical to global supply chains. Russia is no longer the simple command economy that the neo-Stalinists want to make great again. Its consumers use imported smartphones and cars, full of chips. Its military is also dependent on imported parts and components.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Ukraine Impact - Economy
Maavak 21 – Dr. Mathew, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, External Researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Expert and Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council. “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal, The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Vol. 9, No. 1, pg. 2-8, , 04-14-2021
Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit.
According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019):
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Ukraine Impact - Economy
Vera Michlin-Shapir June 2022, visiting research fellow at King College’s Center for Strategic Communications. & Dr. Ofer Fridman is a lecturer in war studies at King’s College London and the director of operations at the King’s Center for Strategic Communications. https://jstribune.com/michlin-shapir-fridman-the-seismic-effects-of-the-war-in-ukraine/, "The Seismic Effects of the War in Ukraine," Jerusalem Strategic Tribune (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)
Western societies and economies will have to address these urgent sociopolitical challenges, which may arrive in tandem with other threats to the global order. The disruption caused by the war to the global economic model led Larry Fink, the chief executive of BlackRock and one of the world’s leading hedge fund investors, to write that “the Russian invasion of Ukraine has put an end to the globalization we have experienced over the last three decades.” Fink is worried about two further expected shockwaves. First, the globalized economy is amidst a supply chain crisis, which the war in Ukraine is aggravating further. Since the start of the coronavirus pandemic, shippers have tried to bypass the uncertainty of fraught container shipping by turning to rail transport as an alternative route for the Asia–Europe trade. Rail operators ran more than 1,200 freight trains per month between China and Europe, transiting through Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, and transporting almost 1.5 million containers. The disruption caused by the blocking of land routes may result in more permanent and painful retreat by manufacturers from reliance on global supply chains. Second, the war in Ukraine may also disrupt technological innovation. For example, much of the world’s neon, which is crucial for the production of computer chips, originates in Russia, and 50% of this is purified in Ukraine. The interruption to supply chains and possible deficit of microchips are daunting scenarios for global economic development. But they may also come as a natural and much needed trend to cool down a radically decentralized, overcomplicated, and hence venerable global system of trade.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Ukraine Impact - Food
Vera Michlin-Shapir June 2022, visiting research fellow at King College’s Center for Strategic Communications. & Dr. Ofer Fridman is a lecturer in war studies at King’s College London and the director of operations at the King’s Center for Strategic Communications. https://jstribune.com/michlin-shapir-fridman-the-seismic-effects-of-the-war-in-ukraine/, "The Seismic Effects of the War in Ukraine," Jerusalem Strategic Tribune (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)
Poorer countries are currently facing the prospect of a major food crisis. While much attention has been paid to the Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports, which disrupts supplies, even if the ports become operational again the problem will remain. First, rising energy prices are already translating to higher transportation costs of basic goods, driving up the prices of basic foodstuffs. Second, Ukraine and Russia are major exporters of basic foodstuffs—together they supply almost 29% of the world’s exports of wheat brands, 20% of corn, and 80% of sunflower oil. While the Western economies have enough margins to address these rising prices, the situation in the poorer corners of the world is different—as indicated by the Economist front page showing human skulls in a sheaf of grain. According to David Beasley, the executive director of the UN World Food Programme, 50% of the wheat supplied by the organization was coming from Ukraine. Russia is also a prime exporter of indispensable ingredients in fertilizers—potash and phosphate. When Ukrainian farmers are preoccupied with defending their land in the beginning of the seeding season, and when Russian farmers cannot be paid due to the exclusion of Russia from the SWIFT system, rising food prices threaten to bring more instability into already unstable countries. Just a few weeks into the conflict and the spiraling prices of food and other basic commodities ignited protests and rallies in Iraq and Morocco. According to the Financial Times, “a jump in grain prices in 2009-10 is regarded as one of the triggers of the Arab Spring in the Middle East.” The looming global food crisis threatens to have yet more destructive consequences, including more conflicts and more refugees.
Many in the West have praised the decisiveness of the EU’s effort to protect Ukrainian refugees escaping the war. While the unprecedented deal—that grants Ukrainians instant rights to live and work within the EU—is more than welcome in itself, many human rights groups and organizations have been clamoring that it demonstrates the EU’s “double standards” in comparison to the 2015 refugee crisis. “The Ukraine refugee crisis,” argues the Global Detention Project (GDP), a Geneva-based nonprofit organization, “presents Europe with . . . a critical moment of reflection: Can the peoples of Europe overcome their widespread racism and animosity and embrace the universalist spirit of the 1951 Refugee Conventions?” This question might become pivotal once food shortages start to affect societies in the Middle East and North Africa. This may expose not only the West’s moral bias but also systemic weaknesses of contemporary institutions that have shaped globalization processes during the last decades, such as migration regimes.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Ukraine Impact – Asia Pivot
Marc De Vore, 6-15-2022, School of International Relations - Senior Lecturer https://ucigcc.org/news/what-ukraine-is-teaching-us-about-geoeconomics/, "What Ukraine Is Teaching Us About Geoeconomics," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)
Another difference is that this is the first conflict involving quasi-alliances. NATO and the EU are not participants in the war, but they’re clearly involved and not neutral. Russia has a series of partnerships— the cooperative treaty organization and its strategic partnership with China—which are also in play.
One of the questions this war raises is: what does the war’s outcome mean for the U.S. pivot toward Asia? And I think that raises two other questions. One is: how diminished will Russia be at the end? Since Barack Obama, the U.S. has been trying to pivot towards Asia because China is clearly the larger and more significant long-term competitor. But Vladimir Putin is sticking around Eastern Europe and kicking the Western order in the shins. That has made it very difficult to pivot towards Asia. On the other hand, if this war ends with Russia being a crippled power, then, in that sense, pivoting towards Asia is going to be much were easier if what one is dealing with in Europe is a very weakened Vladimir Putin with a decrepit military that can’t reconstitute itself.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Ukraine Impact - Genocide
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
If NATO intervenes, do it decisively. Several European nations, including Poland, Denmark, and Belgium, are considering some form of “peacekeeping” intervention in Ukraine, while calls for a no-fly zone are mounting as the civilian death toll rises. This suggests a critical mass of support may be forming for outside intervention under certain circumstances. Strong material and financial aid may enable Ukraine to hold on, and even advance to retake occupied territory, but Russia remains a far larger and stronger opponent. If the logic that it is better to defeat Putin in Ukraine than on NATO territory is sound, intervention to prevent the fall of Ukraine or its dismemberment must be considered. The prospect of actual genocide of Ukrainian civilians, or use of weapons of mass destruction, might also trigger NATO intervention.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Ukraine Impact - LIO
Min-hyung Kim 20. Department of Political Science and International Relations, Kyung Hee University, Seoul, South Korea. “A real driver of US–China trade conflict: The Sino–US competition for global hegemony and its implications for the future” Emerald Insight. 02-04-2019.
Underlying these arguments for an inevitable war between the two superpowers is PTT. PTT originally formulated by Organski (1958) posits that war is likely when the power of the dominant state in the international system (i.e. hegemon) is declining and that a dissatisfied rising challenger substantially reduces the power gap between the hegemon and itself. Unlike balance of power theory, PTT argues that the war is most likely when there is near power parity between a dominant state and a rising and dissatisfied challenger (Organski and Kugler, 1980, pp. 19-20)[5]. A rising power here is generally dissatisfied with the existing international order and initiates war against a declining hegemon in order to impose orders that are more favorable to itself (Organski 1958, pp. 364-367). Layne (2018, p. 110) put these power transition dynamics quite succinctly as follows: “Over time, however, the relative power of states changes, and eventually the international order no longer reflects the actual distribution of power between or among the leading Great Powers. When that happens, the legitimacy of the prevailing order is called into question, and it will be challenged by the rising power(s).” And when the balance of power between a dominant state and a rising challenger changes sufficiently, a new order replaces an old one typically by a hegemonic war (2018, p. 104). Paying close attention to the growing Sino–US competition over hegemony in the twenty-first century, therefore, Shirk (2007, p. 4), China specialist, argues that “History teaches us that rising powers are likely to provoke war.” On the other hand, scholars like Gilpin (1981) contend that the power transition war between great powers is likely to occur when a hegemonic state whose power is declining due to imperial overstretch[6] views “preventive war as the most attractive means of eliminating the threat posed by challengers” (Ned Lebow and Valentino, 2009, p. 391), although they do acknowledge that there might be some “ways to prolong the period of its power preponderance vis-à-vis the rising challenger, so that the rapidly rising power will not dare to challenge the hegemonic leadership” (Kim and Gates, 2015, p. 221). In this case, the initiator of war is a declining hegemon, rather than a rising challenger. The declining hegemon who fears a rising challenger’s overtaking its power in the near future sees war as a better option than other options of maintaining its hegemony such as reducing its commitments abroad and appeasing a rising challenger.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Turn – Plan Helps Ukraine
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
The most effective way to prevent spillover onto NATO territory and other forms of future Russian aggression is to help defeat Russian forces in the field inside Ukraine. Supplying Ukraine with food, fuel, spare parts, and modern equipment is the best way to do that, while still avoiding direct intervention by NATO. This means combat aircraft, main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled and rocket artillery, mobile air defense, secure radios, unmanned aerial vehicles, target-acquisition radars, spare parts, and ammunition, including precision-guided munitions. Many of these combat systems exist in storage in great numbers in the United States and in Europe. The Ukrainian military has shown remarkable versatility in adapting to unfamiliar systems such as the Javelin and Stinger, but exportable training packages, and even training sites in Europe for selected specialists, also warrant consideration.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Turn – Plan Helps Ukraine
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Maintain unity on the diplomatic front. In the midst of aggressive warfare, diplomacy may not capture the headlines. But, it must remain in play, above all because political objectives in the end must govern what happens on the battlefield. Here there are minefields. NATO and the EU may be tempted to intervene in negotiations and offer solutions—“off ramps” is au courant—to more quickly achieve a cessation of hostilities. These could take the form of sanctions relief and acknowledgement of Russian sovereignty over parts of Ukraine in exchange for “peace.” This would be a fatal error.
Practitioners of realpolitik may minimize Zelenskyy’s emphasis on shared values and the ongoing contest between democracy and autocracy, but his citizenry and millions in Europe and the United States won’t. Despite the leverage the West has over Ukraine as its storehouse and quartermaster, the Ukrainian people will decide “how this ends.” The political endgame—the definition of “victory”—must reflect outcomes they deem worthy of the enormous sacrifices they have made. The trap here is that Putin will not give up his aspirations if allowed to keep some of his gains, restore his finances, rebuild his forces, and try again.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Turn – Plan Helps Ukraine
Richard D. Hooker, Jr. 4-21-2022, Fellow Nonresident Senior Fellow Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security Transatlantic Security Initiative https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/managing-escalation-in-ukraine/, "Climbing the ladder: How the West can manage escalation in Ukraine and beyond," Atlantic Council (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)
Use economic tools as a primary “offensive” weapon. As the military campaign progresses, sanctions will continue to strangle the Russian economy. This pressure must continue—and, if possible, intensify—in order to force Russia, not just to the negotiating table, but to withdraw altogether from Ukrainian territory. To date, not all Russian banks have been banned from SWIFT, and many oligarchs remain unsanctioned. Though painful and difficult, weaning Europe from Russian energy, divesting from Russian businesses, and closing European markets are powerful weapons the EU can wield in its own right. (While 37 percent of Russian trade is with Europe, only 4 percent of the EU’s goods exports go to Russia.) Today, Russian energy remains exempt from EU sanctions. Developing alternate sources of energy, in particular, will take time and investment, but continued reliance on Russian oil and natural gas can only enable Putin to continue to finance the war in Ukraine.
In March 2022, the EU imposed its fourth tranche of trade sanctions on Russia, tightening export restrictions on dual-use technologies, expanding the list of sanctioned persons related to defense industries; imposing further trade restrictions for steel, iron, and luxury goods; and prohibiting transactions with specific state-owned enterprises. The challenge now will be to maintain the full range of sanctions until they bear fruit. Global food shortages, rising energy prices, and scarcities among certain commodities will challenge the sanctions regime. Much depends on the persistence and resolve of Western leaders.
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MSDI Russia DA › Aff Answers › Thumpers
George Allison, 6-27-2022, https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/nato-increases-high-alert-force-from-40000-to-300000-troops/, "NATO increases high alert force from 40,000 to 300,000 troops," UK Defence Journal (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)
The almost eight times increase in NATO Response Force troops is due to the threat posed by Russia, say the Alliance.
For clarity, the NATO Response Force is a highly ready and technologically advanced multinational combat force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces components that the Alliance can deploy quickly, wherever needed.