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2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Affirmative Answers › Thumpers

Congress just passed and continues to work on gun control measures

Clare Foran, Kristin Wilson and Annie Grayer, CNN House passes first major federal gun safety legislation in decades, bill will next go to Biden for signature Updated 3:07 PM ET, Fri June 24, 2022 https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/24/politics/house-vote-bipartisan-safer-communities-act/index.html

The House passed a bipartisan bill on Friday to address gun violence that amounts to the first major federal gun safety legislation in decades. The final tally was 234 to 193 voting with Democrats to approve the measure. Now that the House has passed the bill, it will go to President Joe Biden to be signed into law, marking a significant bipartisan breakthrough on one of the most contentious policy issues in Washington. The Senate in a late-night vote Thursday. millions of dollars for mental health, school safety, crisis intervention programs and incentives for states to include juvenile records in the National Instant Criminal Background Check System.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Affirmative Answers › Won’t pass

Not unique - China bills can’t be reconciled and won’t pass

and May 4 2022 U.S. Senate moves to launch formal talks on massive China competition bill https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-congress-edges-toward-massive-china-competition-bill-with-votes-iran-energy-2022-05-04/

The Senate also voted 86-12 on a motion arguing terrorism-related sanctions on Iran are necessary to limit cooperation between China and Iran. Such provisions could complicate delicate negotiations on the nuclear deal, although western officials have largely lost hope that the pact can be resurrected after then-Republican President Donald Trump abandoned it in 2018. They also could make it more difficult to pass the chips and China competition bill, which has been working its way through Congress for nearly a year. Another Republican-sponsored motion was approved on a 49-47 vote that would seek language to bar President Joe Biden from using climate change to declare an emergency to expand executive branch powers. The Senate first passed a version of the semiconductor chips and China competition bill in June, with strong bipartisan support. That $250 billion bill was hailed as potentially the most significant government intervention in manufacturing in decades, but stalled in the House. The House passed a version in February 2022 that had $52 billion in chips funding but significant differences on other provisions.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Affirmative Answers › Won’t pass

China bill won’t pass – no agreement on loophole language and tech giants.

Cristiano Lima June 10 2022 Pelosi fears tech giants will exploit wrinkle in China competition bill, sources say https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/06/10/pelosi-fears-tech-giants-will-exploit-wrinkle-china-competition-bill-sources-say/

For weeks, consumer advocates have sounded the alarm that trade language in the massive China competition bill under negotiation on Capitol Hill could be exploited by the tech giants to target regulations overseas, including Europe’s sweeping new digital rules. It’s a concern that’s shared by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), people familiar with the matter told The Technology 202. At odds is a portion of the legislation that’s ostensibly aimed at “addressing censorship and barriers to digital trade” in countries like China, but one that groups fear contains loopholes that could be co-opted by major corporations. Under the Senate version of the bill, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) would be required to identify and report on countries “that engage in acts, policies, or practices that disrupt digital trade activities,” including censorship. It’s a process that can lead to tariffs, and that advocates say could be weaponized to exert pressure on tech regulations overseas. On Friday, a transatlantic coalition of consumer groups wrote a letter to congressional leadership warning that the language has been crafted too broadly and could be used by tech companies to claim that rules overseas seeking to promote online safety or crack down on competitive abuses qualify as “censorship” or as “barriers to digital trade.” The groups said in the letter shared exclusively with The Technology 202 that it may “undermine the European Union’s superior regulatory framework to protect consumers online.” The Coalition for App Fairness, a group of smaller app developers including Match Group and Basecamp that is pushing for new tech regulations, also voiced concern last month in a separate letter obtained by The Technology 202 that the language “could be interpreted to undermine critical efforts to restore fairness and competition to the digital app economy.” Another coalition of consumer and anti-monopoly groups took aim at the language last month. The provision is a key point of contention for consumer advocates as talks enter a pivotal stretch on Capitol Hill, where the House and Senate will need to hammer out differences between their versions of the bill, aimed at boosting competitiveness with China. The concerns are shared by key House lawmakers, including Pelosi, said the people familiar with the matter, who spoke anonymously to discuss private talks. It could emerge as a flash point in negotiations as the two chambers look to finalize the highly watched package. During a hearing last June, Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-Ill.) urged colleagues to reject what she called the “effort to entrench Big Tech’s … failed [business] models” in the bill by Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Mike Crapo (R-Idaho), who authored part of the Senate trade title. Schakowsky confirmed the remarks were in reference to the section on censorship and barriers to digital trade, among other provisions. “This is exactly the wrong approach, and as a conferee I will fight to make sure this bad approach stays out,” Schakowsky, who is in the group negotiating the bill, said in a statement. Pelosi's staff has told House members she shares the concerns, according to two people familiar with the matter. A senior congressional aide added “there’s no daylight” between Schakowsky and Pelosi. Another senior congressional aide, who was not authorized to speak on the record, said the “House position is reflected in what is and what isn’t included in the trade-related measures which were carefully crafted to have the votes to be able to pass the House.”

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Affirmative Answers › Won’t pass

Won’t pass – Dems will insist on including immigration provisions in the final reconciliation which Republicans won’t accept.

JEFFREY MERVIS JUN 22 2022 https://www.science.org/content/article/democrats-lobby-high-tech-immigration-reforms-innovation-bill-congress

The COMPETES Act passed the House with the support of only one Republican lawmaker. And there are no such immigration provisions in the Senate version, which won significant Republican support. That means Lofgren and her Democratic colleagues must convince enough Senate Republicans that these narrowly focused changes to current immigration policy belong in the final bill because they are essential to sustaining U.S. innovation. A hearing last week by a Senate judiciary subcommittee on immigration made public those deep partisan divisions. The 14 June hearing focused on the plight of so-called Dreamers—undocumented immigrants living in the United States since they were children who have been given a temporary reprieve from deportation through the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. But that program, created in 2012, faces legal challenges that could soon lead to its termination. Some DACA recipients are early-career scientists, like Dalia Larios, a resident in radiation oncology at Harvard Medical School who came to the United States from Mexico at the age of 10. Larios was the first DACA recipient to enter Harvard Medical School, and she testified about how students like her are eager to remain and apply their talents to bolster U.S. economic growth. The panel’s Republicans readily acknowledged the contributions of immigrant scientists and engineers to U.S. innovation. But some suggested it was premature to make new rules for foreign-born researchers before deciding how to deal with other groups, such as the Dreamers. “Between DACA and STEM entrepreneurs, what should be Congress’s priority?” Senator John Cornyn (R–TX), a key backer of the Senate innovation bill, asked Larios, who declined to choose. Speaking to ScienceInsider after the hearing, Cornyn said he’s worried that adding the House immigration provisions to the final product would put the entire bill in jeopardy. “Immigration is not the primary purpose of [the Senate innovation bill],” Cornyn said. “And based on my experience here, I think that the more it deals with immigration, the harder it will be to get it passed.” Other Republican senators believe border security must come first, and they don’t trust U.S. universities hosting foreign-born scientists to safeguard national security. If anything, said Senator Marsha Blackburn (R–TN), the new visa category and other provisions will make it easier for enemies of the United States to pilfer emerging technologies. Bernard Burrola, a senior officer at the 230-member Association of Public and Land-grant Universities, which backs a pathway to citizenship for DACA recipients and Lofgren’s provisions, rejected Blackburn’s premise. “We take this topic incredibly seriously,” he told Blackburn when she asked whether international academic collaborations pose a threat to national security. “And we work closely with the FBI to identify, understand, and ameliorate any risks.” Senator Alex Padilla (D–CA), who chaired last week’s hearing, urged his Republican colleagues to embrace the immigration provisions in the House bill. “I hope we made it abundantly clear today that they are in the national interest, not just from an economic standpoint but also from the standpoint of national security,” Padilla said after the hearing. “Tapping the best talent from around the world has given us our competitive edge, and that needs to continue.” But Padilla also acknowledged that Democrats are a long way from closing a deal. “I do think immigration reform is central to the [final innovation] bill,” he told ScienceInsider. “But I guess we have more work to do to convince [Republicans] of that.”

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › A2 Theory › 2NC – A2 intrinsic

Our politics DA is intrinsic

1. We read links that prove the plan will have political consequences that affect agenda items. Congress isn’t a single actor.

2. Their interpretation kills negative ground-they can cross apply the same argument to trade-off and spending arguments.

3. Empirical intrinsicness checks-running arguments that a congressperson would pass both is fine-but you can’t advocate that it should or could happen.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Climate Turns X Impact › Structural Violence

Climate turns structural violence.

Eric Bonds, Department of Sociology and Anthropology University of Mary Washington, Virginia, United States, 2015, Upending Climate Violence Research: Fossil Fuel Corporations and the Structural Violence of Climate Change, , Xoxo 6/5/2020

There is a high-profile body of work asserting a link between anthropogenic climate change and increased rates of violence. There is also an expanding literature that is highly skeptical of this research. Critics point out that (1) this research has so far produced widely divergent findings, and that there is no consensus on a causal link between climate and the incidence of conflict. Critics also argue that much climate violence research (2) draws upon a longdiscredited environmental determinism, (3) rehashes colonial stereotypes of the global South, (4) naturalizes and depoliticizes inequalities within and between nations, and (5) potentially creates new rationales for militarism and intervention from more powerful states. In the following essay, I build on these critiques, arguing that orthodox climate conflict research also focuses unduly on the potential climate-related violence of the poor, overlooking the violence of the powerful. Drawing from a climate justice perspective, I advocate for more study on the structural violence of climate change. To make this case, I focus on the world’s largest publicly traded fossil fuel companies. Keywords: climate conflict, climate justice, fossil fuel corporations, fossil fuel divestment, structural violence Introduction Will climate change make the world a more violent place? This is one of the more important questions of our time. There are a growing number of warnings coming from influential places about the relationship between climate change and violence. The United States government, for instance, has increasingly labeled global warming a “threat multiplier” (Banusiewicz, 2014; CNA, 2007). 1 Author contact: ebonds@umw.edu. Human Ecology Review, Volume 22, Number 2, 2016 4 Additionally, prominent journalists and policy analysts at important think tanks and advocacy groups have worked to highlight potential connections between global warming and conflict (see for instance EJF, 2014; Friedman, 2013; Werrell & Fernia, 2013). And headlines at major newspapers, for example in the Washington Post, report “there’s a surprisingly strong link between climate change and violence” (Mooney, 2014). But how we answer the question—“will climate change create a more violent future?”—has much to do with the definitions we use. On one hand, the jury is very much out in terms of proving a causal relationship between climate change and increasing conflict. While some research, published in some of the world’s most prestigious journals, has found what the authors describe as a strong link between climatic changes and rates of violence (see Burke et al., 2009; Hsiang et al., 2013), other research, sometimes published in the same journals, has found no such correlation (Buhaug, 2010a, 2010b; Wischnath & Buhaug, 2014). There is, in fact, no consensus among quantitative researchers about the existence of a causal link between changes in temperature and rainfall and increasing violence (Buhaug, 2015; Selby, 2014). As the body of research on a potential climate violence relationship has grown, so too has the number of its critics. An increasing number of authors worry that quantitative climate conflict research, as the next reincarnation of a long-discredited environmental determinism, is simply old wine in a new bottle (Hartmann, 2014; Raleigh et al., 2014). Moreover, according to critics, this research draws upon colonial stereotypes of the global South, implying that its peoples are somehow more predisposed to violence than those of European ancestry (Livingstone, 2015; Raleigh et al., 2014; Selby, 2014; Verhoeven, 2014). Finally, this research implies that the violence of poor people in the most peripheral areas of the global economy is “natural,” hiding from view the ways that histories of colonialism and the contemporary global political economy have conditioned and produced violent conflict (Hartmann, 2010, 2014; Verhoeven, 2011, 2014). Why, given all these problems, has orthodox climate conflict research continued to flourish, and to enjoy such a high public profile? Critics warn that this is because the perspective so closely matches, and is so useful to, governments that are securitizing the issue of climate change and using it as a means to legitimate militarism and ongoing interventions in the global South (Hartmann, 2010, 2014; Selby, 2014; Verhoeven, 2014). Given all the problems with orthodox climate violence research, does this mean that it is safe to say that climate change will not make the world a more violent place? Hardly. I advance instead that anthropogenic climate change is itself a kind of violence (Solnit, 2014). After all, it will certainly cause early deaths and it will drive people from their homes and homelands, all of which will cause untold suffering. Drawing upon a climate justice perspective, I provide here a brief overview of orthodox climate conflict research and further describe its Upending Climate Violence Research 5 critics’ concerns. I add to their critique by arguing that this body of research, as a whole, focuses almost exclusively on the potential violence of the poor, overlooking the violence of the wealthy and powerful groups who benefit most from, and actively work to sustain, a fossil fuel–dependent neoliberal capitalism. To begin amending this bias in the climate violence literature, I draw upon work in sociology, green criminology, and geography to argue that major fossil fuel companies are disproportionately responsible for, and have disproportionately benefited from, the structural violence of climate change.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Climate Turns X Impact › Democracy

Warming turns democracy

Samuel Miller, 7-30-2018, [Samuel Miller McDonald studies climate and energy politics at Oxford University.], "This May Be the Most Overlooked Threat of Climate Change," New Republic, , Xoxo 7/14/2020

National crises make governments vulnerable to autocracy—a rather obvious assessment, perhaps, but one rarely seen in debates about climate change. Take the Maldives, an atoll nation in the Indian Ocean. Rising seawater is projected to consume most, if not all, of the country this century. In 2008, the Maldives chose its first democratically elected president, Mohamed Nasheed. Almost immediately, he made climate change preparations central to his administration. He announced plans to move 360,000 Maldivian citizens to new homelands in Sri Lanka, India, or Australia, and he promised to make the Maldives the world’s first carbon-neutral country. Nasheed also demonstrated a flair for the dramatic, staging an underwater Cabinet meeting that turned him into a viral climate celebrity. “What we need to do is nothing short of decarbonizing the entire global economy,” he said. “If man can walk on the moon, we can unite to defeat our common carbon enemy.” In 2012, the military deposed Nasheed, forcing him to flee the country at gunpoint after mass protests over economic stagnation and spikes in commodity prices. His eventual successor, Abdulla Yameen, has since suspended parts of the constitution, giving himself sweeping powers to arrest and detain opponents, including two of the country’s five Supreme Court justices and even his own half-brother. Meanwhile, Yameen has tossed out Nasheed’s climate adaptation plans and rejected renewable energy programs, proposing instead to build new islands and economic free zones attractive to a global elite. “We do not need cabinet meetings underwater,” his environment minister told The Guardian. “We do not need to go anywhere. We need development.” If any lesson can be drawn from the power struggle in the Maldives, it is that people who feel threatened by an outside force, be it foreign invaders or rising tides, often seek reassurance. That reassurance may come in the form of a strongman leader, someone who tells them all will be well, the economy will soar, the sea walls hold. People must only surrender their elections, or their due process, until the crisis is resolved. This is perhaps the most overlooked threat of climate change: Major shifts in the global climate could give rise to a new generation of authoritarian rulers, not just in poorer countries or those with weak democratic institutions, but in wealthy industrialized nations, too. Number of the Maldives’ inhabited islands that flood annually: 37 of 185 Number that will eventually need to be abandoned: 61 The Maldives’ Freedom House Rating: Dropped 20 percentage points since Nasheed was deposed Sources: The United Nations; The Guardian; Freedom House Refugee crises, famine, drought—these are materials strongmen can use to build power. Already, strife and civil instability are spreading throughout the global South, with droughts and floods stoking conflict and refugee crises in parts of Africa and the Middle East. According to a 2016 paper in Science, climate change will increase the risk of armed conflict across Africa by 50 percent by 2030. Eastern Africa is particularly vulnerable. The genocidal strife in Darfur is one of the bloodiest examples, but even countries with robust economies and democracies are susceptible. In Kenya, for example, a crippling drought has led to rapid inflation of food prices, doubling the number of food-insecure people since 2014. That, and disputes over who owns land in the Laikipia region, north of Nairobi, has contributed to violent clashes there, threatening the political stability of the country. This has enabled Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta to tighten his grip on power. In October, amid reports that he’d rigged a recent presidential election, Kenyatta declared the drought a national disaster—this, just weeks before the next round of voting. He was reelected and, amid continued chaos, has cracked down on his opponents in the media. It’s not just developing nations that are at risk of opportunistic climate-fueled authoritarianism. Wealthy countries may possess the resources to insulate themselves from the near-term physical impacts of climate change—they can afford sea walls, emergency services, and air conditioning. But when conflicts over resources break out in the developing world, they are bound to generate crises that spill into wealthier countries. Refugee crises, famine, drought—these are materials strongmen can use to build power. Civil instability is already spreading in the global South. A study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences in 2015 drew a direct link between the 2007–2010 drought in the greater Fertile Crescent, which “exacerbated existing water and agricultural insecurity and caused massive agricultural failures and livestock mortality,” and Syria’s 2011 civil war, which has forced millions of people to seek refuge in Europe. Their arrival has helped fuel antidemocratic movements throughout the continent. “Even the specter of refugee crises and population movements can impact attitudes toward authoritarianism,” said Jonathan Weiler, co-author of Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics. These fears aren’t going away: According to a 2017 study published in The Lancet, extreme weather could displace up to a billion people around the world by the middle of the twenty-first century—an unprecedented human migration will undoubtedly influence the politics of wealthy countries, pushing them to the right. The best way to counteract this phenomenon is naturally to halt, or at least slow, the effects of climate change. So far, the Paris agreement is the only tangible result of those efforts, and its fate is far from certain, with the United States threatening to withdraw. But this might change, if the problems caused by climate change—not just stronger hurricanes, droughts, and rising seas, but political rupture—keep washing up on the disappearing shorelines of wealthy governments.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Climate Turns X Impact › Failed States

Sea level rise and resource depletion foster failed states.

Sipho Kings, 4-1-2017, [Sipho Kings is the acting editor-in-chief of the Mail & Guardian], "​Climate change brings failed states and violent conflict," Mail & Guardian, , Xoxo 8/10/2020

With states struggling to respond to rapid changes in climate, capturing ever more scarce resources such as Tabqa is becoming a powerful weapon for their enemies. This is according to a new report, Insurgency, Terrorism and Organised Crime in a Warming Climate, by the German think-tank, Adelphi. The report looks at how “non-state armed groups” are capitalising on the rapidly shifting climate to exercise more control over parts of the world. The report comes as Islamic State and Kurdish forces fight over control of the dam, which has been central to the Islamic State’s control of northern Syria for much of this decade. It goes back to the outbreak of civil war in the country in 2011. In part, the civil war itself has been attributed to changes in Syria’s climate. Ten of the 12 driest years in the area have been in the past 20 years. By 2007, water use in Syria exceeded supply by 20%. Then came a five-year drought, the worst in recorded history. Crops failed. Herders lost 85% of their livestock. More than a million people moved to cities. The combination of social pressure and political repression led to civil war. The Adelphi report says this can be attributed to “climatic changes and the way they contributed to eroding the social contract in Syria”. Since then, water has played a key role in the way the different sides have fought the war. In 2014, many reports said both the regime and opposition forces were cutting water to Aleppo to weaken each other. Adelphi says: “In other cases, rebel groups diverted water to supply only those neighbourhoods that they controlled, causing severe harm [to] civilians and farmers dependent on irrigation.” The Islamic State, which controlled territory along Syria’s major rivers, used water to both harm and control communities. In 2015, the group closed the gates of the Ramadi Dam to dry up land for an offensive. In other cases, it has flooded areas to force people to move out. In 2014, when it was pushed out of Iraqi towns, it poisoned drinking water with crude oil. When the group does control areas, it uses water to raise income. Adelphi’s research says: “Control over and effective distribution of water can also help Islamic State gain legitimacy and work towards its goal of establishing a caliphate.” Syria and its Tabqa Dam is just one example of how armed groups are using the control of water — a resource becoming ever more scarce because of climate change — to gain power. These groups have also grown in number since the end of the Cold War. The United Nations says, since 2004, the number of non-state armed groups involved in civil conflicts has increased fourfold. Several different groups have linked this rise to the inability of states to respond to changing climate and the collapse of ecosystems that people rely on. The United States department of defence, in its 2014 climate change adaptation road map, referred to climate change as a “threat multiplier”. The department says this is because climate change “has the potential to exacerbate many of the challenges we are dealing with today — from infectious disease to terrorism. We are already beginning to see some of these impacts.” The G7 group of countries has made similar statements, as has the UN. Its Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has said climate change will add pressure to existing problems, with dire consequences for communities who are close to breaking point. States that are already weak are most at risk but nowhere is safe. “Seemingly stable states can be overburdened by the combined pressures of climate change, population growth, urbanisation, environmental degradation and rising socioeconomic inequalities”, the Adelphi report says. And when states are overburdened, it is non-state armed groups such as the Islamic State and Boko Haram that have tended to benefit. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the five African countries, containing about 38-million people, that rely on the clean waters of Lake Chad, around which Boko Haram is active. Nigeria’s environment ministry says its northeastern provinces, which experience frequent drought and rely on the lake to act as a buffer, used to get rain for 150 days a year in the 1970s. They only now get 120 days of rain. The average temperature in those provinces has increased by 0.8˚C, and the Sahara is moving south at between one kilometre and 10km a year. The annual fish catch from the lake has also dropped from 140 000 tonnes a year in 1970 to just 80 000 tonnes. Lake Chad is now 10% of the size that it was five decades ago, which, Adelphi’s research says, has resulted in fewer resources and has made livelihoods less secure. It has “exacerbated tensions between pastoralists, farmers and fishers”. These groups have all crowded in on each other in an attempt to get to the lake’s dwindling water. Traditional authorities, which used to resolve disputes over access to land and water, have fallen apart with the creation of local government in countries such as Nigeria. But, Adelphi says, these new authorities have not stepped in to resolve the crisis. Instead, Boko Haram has moved into the vacuum, creating local governance structures to replace the failing state. When this doesn’t work, it has — like the Islamic State in Syria — resorted to a stranglehold on natural resources “as a weapon”. In Niger, this has been catastrophic. Fishing communities are going hungry because they cannot get food from Lake Chad, because Boko Haram uses the lake as a base from which to launch attacks. Farmers have also been affected, with the group cutting off their access to water and fertiliser. When the government sends forces to an area, Boko Haram has poisoned wells and streams, according to reports. Acts such as this are projected to become the new normal. Adelphi says climate change is creating “vicious cycles of increasing climate impacts, vulnerability, violence, conflict and fragility”.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Climate Turns X Impact › Terror

Climate change causes ISIS rise and further conflict

Think Progress 15---(“The link between climate change and ISIS is real,” July 23, 2015, https://thinkprogress.org/the-link-between-climate-change-and-isis-is-real-399789412b41#.5gsutmwvp) Democratic presidential candidate Martin O’Malley linked climate change to the rise of ISIS earlier this week. . Score this round for O’Malley.

For three years now, leading security and climate experts — and Syrians themselves — have made the connection between climate change and the Syrian civil war. Indeed, when a came out on in March making this very case, Retired Navy Rear Admiral David Titley it identifies “a pretty convincing climate fingerprint” for the Syrian drought. Titley, a meteorologist who led the U.S. Navy’s Task Force on Climate Change when he was at the Pentagon, also said, “you can draw a very credible climate connection to this disaster we call ISIS right now.” Compare the words of Admiral Titley — former Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance (!) and currently Director of Penn State’s . — with O’Malley’s (): “One of the things that preceded the failure of the nation-state of Syria and the rise of ISIS was the effect of climate change and the mega-drought that affected that region, wiped out farmers, drove people to cities, created a humanitarian crisis that created the symptoms — or rather, the conditions — of extreme poverty that has led now to the rise of ISIL and this extreme violence.” Let’s run through the science underpinning what O’Malley, Admiral Titley, and others have said. We know that the Syrian civil war that helped drive the rise of the terrorist Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria (ISIS) was itself spawned in large part by what called perhaps “the worst long-term drought and most severe set of crop failures since agricultural civilizations began in the Fertile Crescent,” from 2006 to 2010. That drought destroyed the livelihood of 800,000 people according to the U.N. and sent vastly more into poverty. The poor and displaced fled to cities, “where poverty, government mismanagement and other factors created unrest that exploded in spring 2011,” as the study’s explains. The , “Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought,” found that global warming made Syria’s 2006 to 2010 drought two to three times more likely. “While we’re not saying the drought caused the war,” lead author Dr. Colin Kelley explained. “We are saying that it certainly contributed to other factors — agricultural collapse and mass migration among them — that caused the uprising.” The study identifies “a pretty convincing climate fingerprint” for the Syrian drought, Admiral Titley told at the time. Titley is the former COO of NOAA. In particular, the study finds that climate change is already drying the region out in two ways: “First, weakening wind patterns that bring rain-laden air from the Mediterranean reduced precipitation during the usual November-to-April wet season. In addition, higher temperatures increased moisture evaporation from soils during the usually hot summers.” This study and others make clear that for large parts of the not-terribly-stable region around Syria — including Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, and parts of Turkey and Iraq — brutal multi-year droughts are poised to become the norm in the coming decades if we don’t reverse carbon pollution trends ASAP. Climate models had long predicted that the countries surrounding the Mediterranean would start drying out. In general, climate science says dry areas will get dryer and wet areas wetter. In 2011, a major NOAA study that “human-caused climate change [is now] a major factor in more frequent Mediterranean droughts.” Reds and oranges highlight lands around the Mediterranean that experienced significantly drier winters during 1971–2010 than the comparison period of 1902–2010. Via NOAA [Click to enlarge]. “The magnitude and frequency of the drying that has occurred is too great to be explained by natural variability alone,” explained Dr. Martin Hoerling of NOAA’s Earth System Research Laboratory, the lead author of the 2011 study. The connection between the conflict in Syria and climate change is not new. In March 2012, Climate Progress a piece by Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell, co-founders and directors of the Center for Climate and Security, which made the case for the link between climate change and events in Syria. In 2013, Tom Friedman went to Syria to learn firsthand about the connection between the drought and the civil war. His New York Times column, “,” explains what he discovered. Friedman also filmed his visit, where he talked to actual Syrians about the causes of the civil war. It was for the premiere episode in April 2014 of the Emmy-winning Showtime series, “,” which can be viewed on Netflix . Many other recent studies have been done on this subject, such as “” by climate and water expert Peter Gleick. Perhaps the central takeaway from this area of research is that the greatest danger to humanity this century from human-caused climate change is and the threat to our food supplies and hence global security. That’s because large parts of the most inhabited and arable parts of the planet — including the U.S. breadbasket — face the exact same heating and drying that have already affected the Mediterranean. The 2014 study, “,” projected this bleak future: The bottom line: Homo sapiens is currently on track to make drought and extreme drying the normal condition for the Southwest, Central Plains, the Amazon, southern Europe, the entire region around the Mediterranean, and many other key areas post-2050. As Femia bluntly told an interviewer in 2013, the time to act is now: “if you let this problem get out of hand you’re going to have a number of situations in the future, whether they’re major disasters or conflicts, that our security forces may have to respond to. It will cost us a lot more in the long term if we do nothing now.” Returning to O’Malley’s comments, it’s pretty clear that they are quite reasonable and defensible. Personally, because the causes of war and terrorism are so complicated and interconnected, I prefer to say things like “climate change HELPED create conditions for rise of ISIS.” Not that nuanced phrasing will not spare anyone the attacks from the anti-science crowd.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Climate Turns X Impact › Russia

Climate change is the biggest internal link to Russia strategic decisions.

Cyrus Newlin and Heather A. Conley, 1-13-2021, [Cyrus Newlin Associate Fellow, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program; Heather A. Conley Senior Vice President for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic; and Director, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program], "Climate Change Will Reshape Russia," No Publication, , Xoxo 3.25.2021

When U.S. policymakers ponder Russia’s trajectory, they tend to focus on the leadership and longevity of President Vladimir Putin and the nature of his regime, on the Kremlin’s growing authoritarian tendencies at home and the poisoning of opposition figures, on Russia’s nuclear arsenal and cyber capabilities, or on Russia’s projection of power abroad, from election interference to military interventions in Ukraine and Syria. Rarely does climate change make the shortlist. Yet it is climate change, as much as any one politician or set of policies, that will exert the strongest force on Russia’s strategic future, reshaping its politics, economy, and society for decades to come. Russia is warming 2.5 times faster than the rest of the world. In 2020, regions across Russia have experienced the hottest temperatures on record, contributing to forest fires that burned through acreage the size of Greece and emitted one-third more carbon dioxide into the atmosphere than in 2019 (Russian forests account for one-fifth of the world’s total). Flash floods in Siberia destroyed entire villages and displaced thousands of residents. Snow coverage was at a record low in 2020, and Arctic sea ice coverage shrank to its second-lowest extent in over 40 years. Permafrost, which covers nearly two-thirds of Russian territory, is rapidly thawing. More dramatic freeze-thaw cycles in the subsoil are eroding urban infrastructure in Russia’s Arctic cities, home to over 2 million people, and pose a mounting risk to Russia’s 200,000 kilometers of oil and gas pipelines, not to mention thousands of miles of roads and rail lines bridging some of Russia’s widest rivers. Permafrost thaw recently toppled a diesel storage tank near the Arctic city of Norilsk, spilling 21,000 tons of diesel into the Ambarnaya river and surrounding subsoil. It has been linked to outbreaks of anthrax and the discovery of vast methane craters. At its current rate of thaw—about 1 degree Celsius per decade—Russia’s permafrost layer will stop freezing completely in three decades. This could result in a potentially catastrophic, one-off release of carbon into the atmosphere which will no longer be Russia’s problem alone. According to one study, a 30 to 99 percent reduction in near-surface permafrost would release an additional 10 to 240 billion tons of carbon and methane into the atmosphere and potentially put the globe “over the brink” by 2100. Russia is already the fourth-largest emitter of greenhouse gases, accounting for 4.6 percent of all global emissions. Its per capita emissions are among the highest in the world—53 percent higher than China, and 79 percent higher than the European Union. Dramatic shifts in global weather patterns, accelerated by warming Arctic waters and a diminishing ice cap, are expected to increase droughts in Russia’s rich southern agricultural “bread basket” regions encompassing Stavropol and Rostov. This could pose food security risks and threaten a primary Russian export: wheat. Though climate change will expand arable land in Russia in its northern latitudes, the northern topsoil tends to be thinner and more acidic than in Russia’s most productive southern regions and would not make up for its losses. In fact, arable land shrank by more than half to just 120,000 acres in 2017. In June of this year, regional officials in Stravopol, one of Russia’s major wheat regions, projected a remarkable 40 percent decline in wheat crop in 2020 as a result of droughts. This too has global implications: Russia is a core part of global food chains, accounting for 20 percent of global wheat exports, so climate disruption to Russian agricultural output will have strong effects well beyond Russia’s borders and budget coffers. As agriculture shifts north, scientists are concerned that the cultivation of carbon-rich soils will create a separate carbon feedback loop and expedite global warming. The Economics of Climate Change in Russia The threat to the Russian economy from climate change is twofold. An increase in droughts, floods, wildfires, permafrost damage, and disease could lower GDP by 3 percent annually in the next decade, according to Russia’s Audit Chamber. Climate damage to buildings and infrastructure alone could cost Russia up to 9 trillion rubles ($99 billion) by 2050, according to Deputy Minister for the Development of the Russian Far East and Arctic Alexander Krutikov. Meanwhile, Russia’s overreliance on hydrocarbon production is a conspicuous vulnerability as the world shifts toward low-carbon sources of energy and carbon neutrality. Natural gas and Arctic liquified natural gas may serve as bridge for Russia into a lower-carbon future, but global demand for gas is expected to be in sharp decline by mid-century. Russia’s top-down federal policy strongly favors state-led and managed industrial oil and gas giants. Though Russia has immense potential as a source of renewable energy, the share of renewables in Russia’s energy mix is negligible—under 0.1 percent for wind, solar, and geothermal—and there are no clear plans to invest significantly in their growth. Nor do current strategy documents foresee a major growth in nuclear and hydropower, which currently account for 36 percent of Russia’s electricity mix but under current plans will only climb to 43 percent by 2050. (To limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, renewables must account for 70-85 percent of global electricity by 2050.) How Is the Russian Government Responding? Russian climate policy at the federal and regional level is nascent and is handicapped by thinly stretched budgets. The need to respond to more environmental disasters with less money is becoming a growing friction point between regional governments and Moscow. An expected increase in extreme weather events and infrastructure degradation requires proactive planning and significant long-term investments into infrastructure modernization and resilience, forest management, and other adaptive measures, but regional governments are chronically under resourced and heavily in debt (some regions have begun to fall into bankruptcy). A reduction in international hydrocarbon demand will further constrict the federal budget just as the material costs of climate change will begin a parabolic ascent. This shrinking budget is abetted by chronic corruption and public service mismanagement—issues which, unlike climate change, are politically front and center in the minds of Russians. All of these dynamics fuel a very public blame game between regional political elite, business, and federal authorities over who bears the financial and moral responsibility for managing the consequences of climate change. Putin himself has offered mixed messaging on global warming, acknowledging for the first time only in October 2019 that global warming was a result of human activities, but just a month later he cast doubt on the prospects of a global shift to renewable energy, stating, “When these ideas of reducing energy production to zero or relying only on solar or wind power are promoted, I think humanity could once again end up in caves, simply because it won’t consume anything.” Though a growing chorus of officials are voicing concern about the economic consequences of a changing climate for Russia, the prevailing view remains one of passive resignation or misguided optimism. Some officials recognize the reality of climate change but contend that it is beyond Russia’s means to resolve and that Russia should therefore extract revenue from its abundant hydrocarbon resources while there is still global demand. Others believe Russia will benefit economically from warmer temperatures by way of an increase in arable land and greater use the Northern Sea Route for commercial shipping—a bet that makes dangerous assumptions about the ability of Russia to replace energy exports with agriculture and presumes as-yet-unproven sustained commercial interest in an Arctic shipping route. This policy ambivalence is encapsulated in Russia’s approach to the Paris climate accord. Russia signed on to the agreement in 2019 in an apparent recognition of the threat, but because it used 1990 as its benchmark, a year when the country was still part of the Soviet Union and emitted nearly 2.4 billion tons of carbon, Russia can effectively increase its emissions over the next decade and still meet its 30 percent reduction target. Russia’s emissions are set to rise through the next decade, according to a Ministry of Economic Development strategy document published in March 2020. Legislation introduced in 2019 as part of Russia’s ratification of the Paris Agreement would have instituted emissions quotas and carbon pricing, but lobbying efforts by the influential Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs significantly diluted the bill, resulting in weaker provisions on emissions reporting and the elimination of a national carbon trading system and penalties for polluters. How Is Russian Society Responding? The environment is front of mind for Russians. According to a January 2020 survey by the independent Levada Center, environmental degradation was named the biggest threat to humanity in the twenty-first century (48 percent), followed by international terrorism (42 percent) and wars (37 percent). Of Russia’s environmental challenges, respondents viewed air pollution as the most important in a year that set new records for instances of hazardous air quality in Russia, due in part to wildfires and industrial pollution. Yet the immediacy of local environmental challenges in Russia—from air pollution to waste management practice to wildfires—has not translated into broader apprehension about global warming or activism to change public policy. An April 2020 Ipsos survey found that only 13 percent of Russians ranked climate as the most important environmental issue facing their country—well below the world average of 37 percent. Russians were also comparatively less concerned about future energy sources and choices and held the lowest overall levels of support for government action to combat climate change. One contributing factor to this seeming contradiction is likely the tightening of Russia’s civic space. The imposition of “foreign agent” laws has hollowed out environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Russia and muffled voices sounding the alarm on global warming. Public support for environmental NGOs has declined in recent years even as a growing number of Russians are ready to protest over local environmental issues. Economic realities also contribute. Years of anemic economic growth, the dual shocks of Covid-19 and low oil prices, and a tight-fisted approach to fiscal stimulus has reduced the average Russian’s household wealth. The Kremlin is prioritizing jumpstarting the economy by supercharging its hydrocarbon and industrial model. For many Russians who are just getting by financially, issues such as price hikes, unemployment, and inequality supplant concern over climate change. Despite a more repressive political climate, there has been an uptick in environment-related protests in recent years. In April 2019, thousands turned out in the Arctic region of Arkhangelsk to protest the construction of a new landfill for Moscow’s ballooning waste. That summer, over 2,000 people turned out in the Ural city of Yekaterinburg to protest the construction of a church in one of the city’s few remaining green spaces. More recently, in Bashktorstan, in Russia’s southern Urals region, protests erupted over a local company’s plans to mine a rare limestone hill regarded as sacred by local residents. In general, the landscape for environmental activism in Russia is more fluid and decentralized than in the West, with informal protest groups springing up around specific, local issues and then dissipating. But though protests have been local, it is not coincidental that Russia’s Arctic, Siberian, and Far East regions—where the impacts of climate change will be concentrated—are also bearing the brunt of chronic economic underdevelopment. Importantly, these same regions are traditionally more independently political minded and less supportive of Kremlin-backed initiatives. Change Is Coming to Russia Externally Although many Russian officials will continue to emphasize the economic opportunities of climate change and downplay its consequences for Russia, they are growing concerned about the sweeping changes being made to the climate policies of major export markets, particularly the European Union, with its ambitious plans for a New Green Deal and target for carbon neutrality by 2050. An EU plan to introduce a carbon border adjustment tax, which in a baseline scenario would cost Russian exporters 33 billion euros by 2030, has forced Russian firms to confront the reality of a global shift toward low-carbon development and the rising the cost of their emissions. China, meanwhile, has pledged to be carbon neutral by 2060. A new economic reality is gaining a toehold: in December 2020, Deputy Finance Minister Vladimir Kolychev acknowledged that global peak oil demand may have passed and indicated his ministry was preparing for extended lower budget revenues (oil and gas sales account for roughly one-third of federal budget revenue). The Russian energy and industrial lobby remain influential voices against carbon emission quotas and are a primary cause of domestic climate policy stasis, but a growing number of Russian companies, including some hydrocarbon producers such as Novatek and more internationally exposed firms such as Lukoil, are moving ahead of the government to cut emissions and address sustainability issues. They have been given a push by international financial institutions and growing investor requirements for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) metrics. Some of Russia’s largest companies are making expensive investments into improving their sustainability ranking as low scores hit others in the pocket. Polyus, Russia’s largest gold producer, and Novatek were upgraded to an ESG ranking of “A” in 2020—ahead of many industry peers. Change Has Already Arrived Climate change will continue to compel change within Russia whether its leaders acknowledge the issue or not. The most immediate and significant thrust for change within Russia will come from the outside, as major energy export markets accelerate their environmental policies. This poses an existential threat to Russia’s economic model of hydrocarbon and mineral export, a threat heightened by years of weak domestic growth and a global economy suppressed by the pandemic. But change is also occurring from within, as climate-linked environmental disasters take their toil and as scarce state resources fail to address the growing frequency and magnitude of infrastructure decay, wildfires, local pollution, and other climate-related challenges, fueling protests and increasing tensions between regional governors and Moscow. The Russian Arctic, in particular, will be a case study in how climate change, regional political dynamics, and Russia’s economic ambitions interact, as businessmen, regional officials, and federal ministers, including key members of the Kremlin’s inner circle, jockey for state development resources but defer responsibility for funding disaster recovery and climate resilience. Our research and analysis must determine how climate change and climate policies—both internally and externally—will shape Russia’s future, and, in the near term, how the Kremlin and its fossil fuel export-based economy will—or will not—respond.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Climate Turns X Impact › Resource Wars

Climate change causes huge resource wars [and nuclear prolif]

Klare 2006 (Michael Klare, professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, March 10, 2006, “The Coming Resource Wars,” http://goo.gl/sPH9D)

It's official: the era of resource wars is upon us. In a major London address, British Defense Secretary John Reid warned that global climate change and dwindling natural resources are combining to increase the likelihood of violent conflict over land, water and energy. Climate change, he indicated, "will make scarce resources, clean water, viable agricultural land even scarcer" -- and this will "make the emergence of violent conflict more rather than less likely." Although not unprecedented, Reid's prediction of an upsurge in resource conflict is significant both because of his senior rank and the vehemence of his remarks. "The blunt truth is that the lack of water and agricultural land is a significant contributory factor to the tragic conflict we see unfolding in Darfur," he declared. "We should see this as a warning sign." Resource conflicts of this type are most likely to arise in the developing world, Reid indicated, but the more advanced and affluent countries are not likely to be spared the damaging and destabilizing effects of global climate change. With sea levels rising, water and energy becoming increasingly scarce and prime agricultural lands turning into deserts, internecine warfare over access to vital resources will become a global phenomenon. Reid's speech, delivered at the prestigious Chatham House in London (Britain's equivalent of the Council on Foreign Relations), is but the most recent expression of a growing trend in strategic circles to view environmental and resource effects -- rather than political orientation and ideology -- as the most potent source of armed conflict in the decades to come. With the world population rising, global consumption rates soaring, energy supplies rapidly disappearing and climate change eradicating valuable farmland, the stage is being set for persistent and worldwide struggles over vital resources. Religious and political strife will not disappear in this scenario, but rather will be channeled into contests over valuable sources of water, food and energy. Prior to Reid's address, the most significant expression of this outlook was a report prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense by a California-based consulting firm in October 2003. Entitled "An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its Implications for United States National Security," the report warned that global climate change is more likely to result in sudden, cataclysmic environmental events than a gradual (and therefore manageable) rise in average temperatures. Such events could include a substantial increase in global sea levels, intense storms and hurricanes and continent-wide "dust bowl" effects. This would trigger pitched battles between the survivors of these effects for access to food, water, habitable land and energy supplies. "Violence and disruption stemming from the stresses created by abrupt changes in the climate pose a different type of threat to national security than we are accustomed to today," the 2003 report noted. "Military confrontation may be triggered by a desperate need for natural resources such as energy, food and water rather than by conflicts over ideology, religion or national honor." Until now, this mode of analysis has failed to command the attention of top American and British policymakers. For the most part, they insist that ideological and religious differences -- notably, the clash between values of tolerance and democracy on one hand and extremist forms of Islam on the other -- remain the main drivers of international conflict. But Reid's speech at Chatham House suggests that a major shift in strategic thinking may be under way. Environmental perils may soon dominate the world security agenda. This shift is due in part to the growing weight of evidence pointing to a significant human role in altering the planet's basic climate systems. Recent studies showing the rapid shrinkage of the polar ice caps, the accelerated melting of North American glaciers, the increased frequency of severe hurricanes and a number of other such effects all suggest that dramatic and potentially harmful changes to the global climate have begun to occur. More importantly, they conclude that human behavior -- most importantly, the burning of fossil fuels in factories, power plants, and motor vehicles -- is the most likely cause of these changes. This assessment may not have yet penetrated the White House and other bastions of head-in-the-sand thinking, but it is clearly gaining ground among scientists and thoughtful analysts around the world. For the most part, public discussion of global climate change has tended to describe its effects as an environmental problem -- as a threat to safe water, arable soil, temperate forests, certain species and so on. And, of course, climate change is a potent threat to the environment; in fact, the greatest threat imaginable. But viewing climate change as an environmental problem fails to do justice to the magnitude of the peril it poses. As Reid's speech and the 2003 Pentagon study make clear, the greatest danger posed by global climate change is not the degradation of ecosystems per se, but rather the disintegration of entire human societies, producing wholesale starvation, mass migrations and recurring conflict over resources. "As famine, disease, and weather-related disasters strike due to abrupt climate change," the Pentagon report notes, "many countries' needs will exceed their carrying capacity" -- that is, their ability to provide the minimum requirements for human survival. This "will create a sense of desperation, which is likely to lead to offensive aggression" against countries with a greater stock of vital resources. "Imagine eastern European countries, struggling to feed their populations with a falling supply of food, water, and energy, eyeing Russia, whose population is already in decline, for access to its grain, minerals, and energy supply." Similar scenarios will be replicated all across the planet, as those without the means to survival invade or migrate to those with greater abundance -- producing endless struggles between resource "haves" and "have-nots." It is this prospect, more than anything, that worries John Reid. In particular, he expressed concern over the inadequate capacity of poor and unstable countries to cope with the effects of climate change, and the resulting risk of state collapse, civil war and mass migration. "More than 300 million people in Africa currently lack access to safe water," he observed, and "climate change will worsen this dire situation" -- provoking more wars like Darfur. And even if these social disasters will occur primarily in the developing world, the wealthier countries will also be caught up in them, whether by participating in peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations, by fending off unwanted migrants or by fighting for access to overseas supplies of food, oil, and minerals. When reading of these nightmarish scenarios, it is easy to conjure up images of desperate, starving people killing one another with knives, staves and clubs -- as was certainly often the case in the past, and could easily prove to be so again. But these scenarios also envision the use of more deadly weapons. "In this world of warring states," the 2003 Pentagon report predicted, "nuclear arms proliferation is inevitable." As oil and natural gas disappears, more and more countries will rely on nuclear power to meet their energy needs -- and this "will accelerate nuclear proliferation as countries develop enrichment and reprocessing capabilities to ensure their national security." Although speculative, these reports make one thing clear: when thinking about the calamitous effects of global climate change, we must emphasize its social and political consequences as much as its purely environmental effects. Drought, flooding and storms can kill us, and surely will -- but so will wars among the survivors of these catastrophes over what remains of food, water and shelter. As Reid's comments indicate, no society, however affluent, will escape involvement in these forms of conflict.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Climate Turns X Impact › Prolif

Climate turns prolif---creates the motive---and turns the economy

Nader Elhefnawy 8, Professor of English at the University of Miami, writer on IR published in journals including International Security, Astropolitics, and Survival, Autumn 2008, “The Next Wave of Nuclear Proliferation,” Parameters: The US Army War College Quarterly

The rationale driving the shift to nuclear energy in the first place (energy and climate stress) will increasingly translate into greater motivation on the part of some actors to pursue a nuclear capability. Broad economic disruption is nearly certain as the result of the tightening of oil supplies and the climate changes this scenario anticipates. Politically, this may translate into changes in the distribution of international power depending on individual states’ ability to cope (as with wealthier nations, or ones with energy-efficient economies), or even profit from these conditions (for instance, oil exporters); while the most vulnerable states may collapse, creating even greater problems for the international community (havens for crime, terrorism, or refugee flows). 27 Intensified conflict over territory and waters rich in energy and other resources will become increasingly likely. Alliances, trading relationships, and other arrangements will be in flux, and when combined with the associated anxiety and vulnerability may exacerbate a desire on the part of certain states to minimize their vulnerability. A goal which nuclear weapons have long been viewed as a cheap way of achieving. The “nuclearization” of a single state can induce a chain reaction across a region. The nuclearization of China spurred India and in turn Pakistan to follow suit, and the Argentinean and Brazilian nuclear programs fed off one another. Today the possibility that a nuclear North Korea may lead South Korea or Japan to acquire nuclear weapons is often discussed. 28 In the Middle East there are signs that Saudi Arabia is reviewing its nuclear options, and a nuclear-armed Iran may encourage the Saudis and others in the region to continue down this path. 29 With nuclear technology more widely available these actions can be taken much more rapidly and at less cost. Those pursuing this course of action will find it a simple matter to amass large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It is also worth noting that even were the development of actual nuclear weapons to remain a rarity, “virtual arsenals” could be more common, leaving the nuclear weapons status of a longer list of countries uncertain, in many cases deliberately so, with a detrimental impact on the security environment.30

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Climate Turns X Impact › Heg Good

Warming turns hegemony—Climate change military overstretch

AP 2009—Fox News, August 9, 2009, “Report: Climate Change Could Warrant U.S. Military Action.,” http://www.foxnews.com/politics/elections/2009/08/09/report-climate-change-warrant-military-action

Climate change will pose profound challenges to the United States in the coming decades, raising the prospect of military intervention to deal with its effects, The New York Times reported, citing military and intelligence analysts. Crises such as drought, violent storms, mass migration and pandemics could topple governments, feed terrorist movements or destabilize entire regions. The Times reported that for the first time, intelligence agencies and the Pentagon are taking a hard look at the possible security implications resulting from climate change. In particular, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, will face the prospect of food shortages, water crises and catastrophic flooding driven by climate change that could call for U.S. military response. The U.S. military also faces a direct challenge with climate change, the Times reported, because many of its installations are vulnerable to storm surges and rising seas and plans to protect naval stations in Norfolk, Va., and San Diego, Calif., are already underway. "The sense that climate change poses security and geopolitical challenges is central to the thinking of the State Department and the climate office," said Peter Ogden, chief of staff to Todd Stern, the State Department's top climate negotiator. A U.S. government study of glaciers released Thursday said climate change is melting America's glaciers at the fastest rate in recorded history, exposing the country to higher risks of drought and rising sea levels. "The observations show that the melt rate has definitely increased over the past 10 or 15 years," Ed Josberger, a USGS scientist, said. "This certainly is a very strong indicator that climate change is occurring and its effects on glaciers are virtually worldwide."

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Climate Turns X Impact › US-China War

Warming Turns US-China War

Hal Brands, 08/19/2019, [Hal Brands is a Bloomberg columnist and a professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.], "To meet China challenge, the U.S. has to fight climate change," Japan Times, , Xoxo 8/10/2020

WASHINGTON – The two greatest challenges for American statecraft in the 21st century are becoming more severe — and seemingly pulling the United States in opposing directions. Relations with China are deteriorating by the day, presaging a prolonged competition over the shape of global order. Meanwhile, the worsening effects of climate change — demonstrated by the shocking melting of ice in Greenland this summer — are invoking the specter of ecological catastrophe. And while dealing with the changing climate will undoubtedly require cooperation between Beijing and Washington — the world’s two largest emitters of greenhouse gases — winning the geopolitical struggle with China will require the U.S. to take a harder-edged, more competitive approach. Statecraft is the art of reconciling the apparently irreconcilable, and the U.S. need not abandon either its environmental or its geopolitical objectives. But Washington must navigate between two bad strategies to execute the right one. The need to balance climate-change diplomacy with sharpening geopolitical rivalry is relatively new. After the end of the Cold War, climate-change diplomacy was conducted on the assumption that the geopolitical conflicts of previous eras had receded, easing the inevitable tradeoffs created by a process that required asymmetric economic sacrifices. “Most nations worry about the same global threats,” U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said a few months before the United Nations climate-change summit in Copenhagen in 2009; the U.S. could lead by “uniting diverse partners around common concerns.” Today, by contrast, the zero-sum aspects of the U.S.-China relationship are prominent, forcing thoughtful policymakers to consider how to approach climate-change diplomacy in a more competitive world. The Trump administration, of course, has largely dodged this challenge, by amping up confrontation with China while essentially abandoning the Paris accords and international climate-change diplomacy. But denying that a problem exists will not make it go away, and so Trump’s abdication is deferring the challenge to his successor. At a strategic level, there are three basic options for managing the simultaneous intensification of climate change and U.S.-China rivalry. The first (bad) idea, which flows naturally from the “America First” mentality that brought Trump to power, is that the U.S. should simply de-emphasize multilateral diplomacy on climate change. China, the thinking goes, is the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide. So it should not be allowed to transfer the global costs of adaptation to the U.S. by forcing Washington to make bigger, earlier cuts than China in its own greenhouse gas emissions, as stipulated in the U.S.-China bilateral agreement of 2014. More important, the long-term effects of climate change will supposedly hurt a badly polluted China more than a comparatively clean America. As climate change imposes mounting social and economic costs on China, the U.S. will reap a competitive advantage. This approach, however, is short-sighted and wrong-headed. According to one recent study, the U.S. will actually pay a significantly higher economic price than China as climate change progresses. In fact, Beijing’s authoritarian system might prove better than America’s messy democracy at undertaking the vast engineering projects — constructing seawalls, for instance — that are needed to mitigate the effects. This approach would also be diplomatically disastrous: Key allies, especially in Europe, will not sign up for a counter-China coalition if they perceive that Washington, rather than Beijing, is thwarting effective climate-change diplomacy. And even if the U.S. did out-compete China in a dramatically warming world, the victory would prove Pyrrhic indeed. A second bad strategy would move to the other extreme, making geopolitical concessions in hopes of getting Beijing to cooperate on a more aggressive global program to slow climate change. The Obama administration was sometimes accused of taking this approach in the run-up to Copenhagen in 2009 and Paris in 2015, although former officials have rejected this allegation. But the basic temptation will be there, particularly for progressives who are inclined to prioritize environment over geopolitics. In this scenario, a post-Trump president might mute U.S.-Chinese disputes over Taiwan or the South China Sea as a way of getting an agreement that would commit Beijing to more aggressively curb its emissions. Yet this strategy ignores that the Chinese government is a ruthlessly self-interested, Leninist party-state. It will address climate change — or not — based primarily on its assessment of whether doing so will bring benefits to China and the Chinese Communist Party. This calculus probably will lead — and already has led — to greater Chinese concern with climate issues, given China’s enormous environmental problems and the high economic and social costs that a warming globe will impose on Beijing. But if the U.S. makes unrelated concessions in hopes of moving Beijing farther and faster on climate, it will simply give China’s rulers incentive to pocket those concessions while never quite delivering on climate — so that they can keep extracting more concessions. A climate-first strategy may or may not benefit the environment, but it will cost the U.S. dearly in geopolitical terms. The question, then, is whether the U.S. can take a third route: Competing fiercely while preserving cooperation where interests align. This idea may seem counterintuitive. Yet history suggests that, while hard, is not impossible. During the Cold War, Washington and Moscow clashed far more dangerously than Washington and Beijing are jousting today. Yet they worked together on certain shared interests. They pursued smallpox eradication programs that saved millions of lives. They joined forces to build a remarkably effective nuclear nonproliferation regime. They concluded agreements, such as the Helsinki Accords, to reduce tensions in key regions, and inked arms control treaties to limit the danger of another sort of ecological catastrophe — nuclear war. Achieving something similar in the U.S.-China relationship would require careful balancing. U.S. officials would have to show that they will not allow China to establish linkage between climate and other issues — and to demonstrate that they will not go easy on key geopolitical disputes as the price of “improving the atmosphere” for future negotiations. Yet they would also need to keep open lines of communication on climate change even in periods of high tension, and reinforce the point — publicly and privately — that competition is some areas does not preclude collaboration in others. This sounds obvious, but is critically important; the momentum toward rivalry can otherwise color all aspects of the relationship. It may also be helpful to preserve scientific exchanges and international forums where technical experts can meet in relatively politics-free zones, just as exchanges of arms control and disarmament experts helped lay the intellectual groundwork for certain U.S.-Soviet agreements. Most basically, this approach requires reviving climate diplomacy as an American priority. There are legitimate critiques of the Paris agreement and other Obama-era climate initiatives. There are legitimate disagreements about how to proceed. But simply absenting the U.S. from international efforts to address climate change, as Trump has done, leaves Washington diplomatically isolated and dangerously behind the curve in dealing with a worsening problem. To its credit, the Trump administration has shown that it is possible to reorient the American geopolitical debate on China. It will be up to Trump’s successors to show that doing so doesn’t require ignoring the other profound global threat to American well-being in the 21st century and beyond.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Climate Turns X Impact › Econ

But Warming wrecks the economy

Kimberly Amadeo, 6-30-2020, [Kimberly Amadeo has 20 years of experience in economic analysis and business strategy. She writes about the U.S. Economy for The Balance.], "What Has Climate Change Cost Us? What's Being Done?," Balance, , Xoxo 7/13/2020

The U.S. is one of the world’s richest countries. A recent study found that the planet's wealthiest 1 billion people emit 60% of greenhouse gases. The poorest 3 billion produce only 5%.25 That’s why you may hear people say income inequality can cause climate change. What's the Economic Impact of Climate Change? Insurance From 1980 to 2019, extreme weather cost $1.775 trillion.26 Munich Re, one of the world's largest reinsurance firms, blamed climate change for $24 billion of losses in the California wildfires.27 It warned that insurance firms would have to raise premiums to cover rising costs from extreme weather. That could make insurance too expensive for most people. GDP Scientists estimated that, if temperatures only rose 2 degrees Celsius, the global gross domestic product would fall 15%. If temperatures rose to 3 degrees Celsius, the global GDP would fall 25%. If nothing is done, temperatures will rise by 4 degrees Celsius by 2100.28 29 Global GDP would decline by more than 30% from 2010 levels.30 That's comparable to the Great Depression, where GDP fell to -26.7%.31 The only difference is that it would be permanent. Employment The World Employment and Social Outlook 2018 estimated that climate change threatens 1.2 billion jobs.32 The industries most at risk are agriculture, fisheries, and forestry. Maine has already seen a decline in its lobster catches.33 Natural disasters caused or compounded by humans cost 23 million working-life years annually from 2000 to 2015.34 On the other hand, efforts to stop climate change would create 24 million new jobs by 2030.3536 Immigration Climate change creates mass migration around the world. People are leaving flooded coastlines, drought-stricken farmlands, and areas of extreme natural disasters. Since 2008, events related to climate or weather have displaced 22.5 million people annually, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.3738 Some forecasts predict that by 2050, climate change could cause as many as 1 billion people to emigrate.3940 Immigration at the U.S. border can be expected to increase as climate change worsens conditions in Latin America. The World Bank estimates that as many as 3.9 million people in Mexico and Central America will migrate internally by 2050 due to climate impact, and that subsequent deterioration will further exacerbate the movements of these migrants.41 Drought, shifting rain patterns, and extreme weather destroys crops and leads to food insecurity. The World Food Program found that almost half of Central Americans left because there wasn't enough food.42 National Security In 2017, Congress proclaimed that “climate change is a direct threat to the national security of the United States.” Climate change endangers 128 military bases.43 A 2018 Pentagon survey revealed that U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland has experienced storm surge flooding and hurricane damage. The Cape Lisburne Long Range Radar Station in Alaska has lost a seawall from extreme weather.44 In response, Congress asked the Department of Defense to identify the 10 most vulnerable sites and recommend solution strategies.45 Food Prices As America experiences more extremely hot days, food prices are rising. Corn and soybean yields in the U.S. precipitously plummet when temperatures rise above 84 degrees Fahrenheit.46 Those crops feed cattle and other meat sources and create spikes in beef, milk, and poultry prices. Worker productivity declines sharply, particularly for outdoor jobs.47 That further increases the cost of food. A 2019 study found that a warming ocean has pushed global sustainable fish yields down 4% since 1930. That's 1.4 million metric tons. In the North Sea and Sea of Japan, that decline is 35%. That affects Atlantic cod, haddock, and herring.48 Many species are threatened with extinction. That affects the 3 billion people who rely on fish for their primary source of protein.49 It also affects the $150 billion fishing industry and the 59 million people employed.50 It especially affects the U.S., which imports more than 80% of its seafood

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Climate Turns X Impact › Disease

Global warming turns disease—Increases range and transmission rates

Boyles and Chang 2009— (Salynn. Louise. MD. “Report: Climate Change Threatens Health: Scientists Say Global Warming Will Increase Malaria and Other Diseases.” May 13, 2009. WebMD Health News. <http://www.webmd.com/news/20090513/report-climate-change-threatens-health> Accessed: 6/3/09)

According to the report: Rising temperatures will affect the spread and transmission rates of vector-borne and rodent-borne diseases like malaria, dengue fever, Lyme disease, hantavirus, tick-borne encephalitis, and a host of other diseases. According to one model, there will be as many as 320 million additional cases of malaria in 2080. And 6 billion people will be at risk for dengue fever, compared to 3.5 billion today. As ocean temperatures rise and more intense seasonal weather events occur as a result, cholera outbreaks may increase.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Climate Turns X Impact › Conflict

Climate Turns it- newest studies prove.

Stanford University, 6-12-2019, "Does climate change cause armed conflict?," Stanford News, , Xoxo 7/14/2020

Intensifying climate change will increase the future risk of violent armed conflict within countries, according to a study published today in the journal Nature. Synthesizing views across experts, the study estimates climate has influenced between 3% and 20% of armed conflict risk over the last century and that the influence will likely increase dramatically. A new study synthesizing views from experts across several fields indicates climate change will have an increasing impact on the risk of armed conflict. In a scenario with 4 degrees Celsius of warming (approximately the path we’re on if societies do not substantially reduce emissions of heat-trapping gases), the influence of climate on conflicts would increase more than five times, leaping to a 26% chance of a substantial increase in conflict risk, according to the study. Even in a scenario of 2 degrees Celsius of warming beyond preindustrial levels – the stated goal of the Paris Climate Agreement­ – the influence of climate on conflicts would more than double, rising to a 13% chance. “Appreciating the role of climate change and its security impacts is important not only for understanding the social costs of our continuing heat-trapping emissions, but for prioritizing responses, which could include aid and cooperation,” said Katharine Mach, director of the Stanford Environment Assessment Facility and the study’s lead author. Climate change-driven extreme weather and related disasters can damage economies, lower farming and livestock production and intensify inequality among social groups. These factors, when combined with other drivers of conflict, may increase risks of violence. “Knowing whether environmental or climatic changes are important for explaining conflict has implications for what we can do to reduce the likelihood of future conflict, as well as for how to make well-informed decisions about how aggressively we should mitigate future climate change,” said Marshall Burke, assistant professor of Earth system science and a co-author on the study.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Impact Extension › Link Alone Turns Case

Domestic pushback to plan guts US leadership – turns case

T.J. Pempel 6-15-2022, Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at UC Berkeley https://ucigcc.org/news/what-ukraine-is-teaching-us-about-geoeconomics/, "What Ukraine Is Teaching Us About Geoeconomics," No Publication (ermo/sms, Acc:7-1-2022)

I want to turn back to the question of how this Ukraine-Russia interaction plays out in terms of state strategies vis-a-vis economics. We’ve seen a lot of economic cooperation, but at the heart of some of the questions you’ve been asking is this notion that nation-states are going to be predisposed to look for national economic security, which will mean developing a capacity for relative strength—independent strength—vis a vis global changes. The difficulty is that most states can’t do this, and there’s a strong impulse toward economic cooperation along the technological gradient that will allow states to make up for their potential deficiencies. We’ve talked at this conference about semiconductors and it seems pretty clear that no state, even if it does make major moves in that direction, is going to be capable of complete autarky in a whole host of these high-tech areas.

The second piece of this relates to domestic politics in the U.S. What we’re seeing in the United States is a growing resistance on the part of segments of the Republican Party to the development of international support for Ukraine. We’re seeing resistance to U.S. aid for the military, and we’re seeing much broader isolationism that goes back to the MAGA mentality. This has a ripple effect in terms of how other states will perceive their capacity to rely on the United States economically. The idea of the U.S. as a reliable economic and security partner is very much at risk.

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Impact Extension › Turns Cyber

Causes tit-for-tat escalation to nuke war.

Klare 19 [Michael T. Klare, professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College, “Cyber Battles, Nuclear Outcomes? Dangerous New Pathways to Escalation,” Arms Control Association, November 2019, armscontrol.org/act/2019-11/features/cyber-battles-nuclear-outcomes-dangerous-new-pathways-escalation]

Yet another pathway to escalation could arise from a cascading series of cyberstrikes and counterstrikes against vital national infrastructure rather than on military targets. All major powers, along with Iran and North Korea, have developed and deployed cyberweapons designed to disrupt and destroy major elements of an adversary’s key economic systems, such as power grids, financial systems, and transportation networks. As noted, Russia has infiltrated the U.S. electrical grid, and it is widely believed that the United States has done the same in Russia.12 The Pentagon has also devised a plan known as “Nitro Zeus,” intended to immobilize the entire Iranian economy and so force it to capitulate to U.S. demands or, if that approach failed, to pave the way for a crippling air and missile attack.13

The danger here is that economic attacks of this sort, if undertaken during a period of tension and crisis, could lead to an escalating series of tit-for-tat attacks against ever more vital elements of an adversary’s critical infrastructure, producing widespread chaos and harm and eventually leading one side to initiate kinetic attacks on critical military targets, risking the slippery slope to nuclear conflict. For example, a Russian cyberattack on the U.S. power grid could trigger U.S. attacks on Russian energy and financial systems, causing widespread disorder in both countries and generating an impulse for even more devastating attacks. At some point, such attacks “could lead to major conflict and possibly nuclear war.”14

2022 SDI Disadvantage
MSDI Politics – China › Impact Extension › Turns Cyber

Bill solves cybersecurity deficiencies.

Johnson 3-25 (Lamar Johnson, 3-25-2022, “Congress Nearing Finish Line on USICA/COMPETES Chips, Cyber, Innovation Bill“, No Publication, https://www.meritalk.com/articles/congress-nearing-finish-line-on-usica-competes-chips-cyber-innovation-bill/\

Lawmakers Call for Cyber Provisions to Make the Cut As Congress moves closer to beginning the conferencing process, Sen. Angus King, I-Maine, and Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wis., called for the final bill to include cybersecurity measures that both USICA and America COMPETES share, as well as others contained in one bill or the other. Sen. King and Rep. Gallagher, who co-chaired the Cyberspace Solarium Commission, sent a letter to Sen. Schumer and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., voicing their support for the $52 billion in CHIPS funding included in the bills, but said that the final bill should reflect the need for enhanced investment in the cyber workforce and the nation’s cyber posture as a whole. “Congress has a critical opportunity to advance and secure U.S. global technological leadership for the 21st century,” King and Gallagher wrote. “In doing so, it must also invest in America’s cybersecurity and critical infrastructure resilience.” Among that highlighted legislation is the Cybersecurity Opportunity Act, which would create a grant program to increase investment in cyber education at HBCUs and minority-serving institutions, as well as language that would create rotational learning opportunities for Federal cyber employees. Additionally, the lawmakers called for the final inclusion of a measure to expand the ROTC-like CyberCorps program that is included in the America COMPETES bill. Other COMPETES provisions the pair argued for include designating Critical Technology Security Centers, and creating programs designed to build international cyber capacity for the U.S. and its allies. As far as USICA cyber components the pair called to make the cut, they pointed to investments in regional technology hubs, as well as the creation of a National Risk Management Cycle. The latter represents a solution to a problem the Cyberspace Solarium Commission identified in its March 2020 report. The commission was then government-chartered but has since transitioned to a non-profit organization. “In our March 2020 report, the Cyberspace Solarium Commission noted that the U.S. government ‘lacks a rigorous, codified, and routinely exercised process’ for identifying risk. By creating a National Risk Management Cycle, Congress would codify an essential capability for properly resourcing U.S. government efforts to deter threats and mitigate risks to critical infrastructure,” the letter says. “The cyber threats facing our country have never been greater, and American technological leadership will depend significantly on our ability to defend against those threats and recover quickly from disruptions to critical infrastructure,” they wrote. “As such, we strongly urge that the provisions we have highlighted here be included in the final conferenced legislation that crosses President Biden’s desk later this year.”