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2022 MNDI Kritik
--Extend No Arms Race

“Arms Race” claims are exaggerated – the AI adoption process is routine continuation of modernization

Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and  Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Michael, Paul, January 12 2021, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence- Building Measures”, , Acc 6/18/22. M.A.]

AI is a general-purpose technology akin to computers or the internal combustion engine, not a discrete technology like missiles or aircraft. Thus, while concerns of an “AI arms race” are overblown, real risks exist. Additionally, despite the rhetoric of many national leaders, military spending on AI is relatively modest to date. Rather than a fervent arms race, militaries’ pursuit of AI looks more like routine adoption of new technologies and a continuation of the multi-decade trend of adoption of computers, networking, and other information technologies. Nevertheless, the incorporation of AI into national security applications and warfare poses genuine risks. Recognizing the risks is not enough, however. Addressing them requires laying out suggestions for practical steps states can take to minimize risks stemming from military AI competition. One approach states could take is adopting confidence-building measures (CBMs): unilateral, bilateral, and/or multilateral actions that states can take to build trust and prevent inadvertent military conflict. CBMs generally involve using transparency, notification, and monitoring to attempt to mitigate the risk of conflict. There are challenges involved in CBM adoption due to differences in the character of international competition today versus during the Cold War, when CBMs became prominent as a concept. However, considering possibilities for CBMs and exploring ways to shape the dialogue about AI could make the adoption of stability-promoting CBMs more likely.

There is no global sprint or arms race – “Arms Race” claims overexaggerate normal military behavior and ignore actual spending.

2022 MNDI Kritik
1NC – AI “Arms Race” Kritik

Our alternative turns their impacts – only rejecting the “Arms Race” discourse allows global AI collaboration, which is essential its development.

Huang and Scott, 2018 - Chief Executive Officer and Chief Technology Officer at Malong Technologies [Dinglong and Matt July 21 World Economic Forum “Who will win the AI race? If countries work together, then the answer could be all of us” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/ai-arms-race-global-collaboration/, BK]

As an artificial intelligence company with co-founders from China and the United States, we get this question a lot. The premise behind it is straightforward: many believe that China will soon challenge the current leader in AI, the United States. An arms race is imminent, or so the thinking goes, and the smart move is for each national government to fund its own AI programme to make sure its citizens don’t miss out. We recognize we might be shouting into the wind a little bit, but we want to challenge part of that thinking and suggest a way to look beyond competition among nation-states. The AI community is global. We do our best work when we work together across boundaries. It has been like that for a long time. Here are some quick examples: 1. The seminal paper on deep neural nets was published in 2009 by Geoff Hinton, a Brit working at the University of Toronto. One of his co-authors was Li Deng, who is Chinese and was working at Microsoft Research in Redmond. 2. Andrew Ng, who trained computers to recognize cats in videos for a research project at Google, was born in the United Kingdom to parents who were from Hong Kong. He spent much of his childhood in Singapore before studying in the US. 3. Another leading light in AI is Yann LeCun, from France, now working for Facebook and New York University. 4. And Microsoft Research’s Rick Rashid, from Iowa, brought us the first Chinese-English real-time translation demonstration in Tianjin in 2012 thanks to a team of experts from China, the US, the UK and Germany. At Malong Technologies, we’ve tried to reflect and extend that heritage of global collaboration. We’re co-founded by a Chinese national from Shenzhen and an American from New York City. We have offices and teams in China, the US, and Japan, and we have expansion plans that include South America and Europe in the near term. We are active in the Association of Asia-Pacific Universities, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the G20 Young Entrepreneurs Alliance and other multinational groups along with our new membership in the World Economic Forum’s 2018 Technology Pioneers. Being global gives the AI community dynamism, creativity and accountability. It imposes broad obligations to present, share and defend our ideas and techniques against the best in the world. Irrespective of where we’re located, we have to be aware of one another’s work. If anyone tried to wall themselves off from the rest of the global AI community, keeping their work to themselves, their own work would slow down, wither and die. There’s a mutual interdependence based on transparency in pursuit of the best ideas for the field and ultimately, for humanity. That is what drives progress more than any competition among nation-states.

2022 MNDI Kritik
1NC – AI “Arms Race” Kritik

Reject their Rhetoric of an “Arms Race” – changing our discourse is necessary to head off constructed insecurity and escalation

Roff 2019 – Fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Program [Heather, 4/26/19, , “The Frame problem: The Ai ‘Arms Race’ isn’t one’, 6/18/22, LND]

Diffusion, however, is a different animal. Widely available commercial off the shelf components, a widely available and open source knowledge base, and wide access to large amounts of data make limiting the diffusion of AI knowledge almost impossible. There are necessary ingredients for AI, including access to computing power and sufficient amounts of data. Some actors possess more of these ingredients than others, but that advantage does not preclude individuals, groups, companies, or states from obtaining access to and knowledge about AI. As greater emphasis is placed on the economic and security benefits of using AI systems, AI will become more diffused because the incentive structure rewards diffusion. Managing the risks of proliferation and diffusion of a knowledge base is an entirely different enterprise than restraining an arms race. In the case of artificial intelligence, rather than looking at what sorts of actions are required for deterrence, what balances may affect conflict onset or escalation, world leaders should turn their focus to how to foster responsible competition. Mitigating the risks associated with AI is not a single-shot activity. Certainly there are technological solutions, such as researching new ways of testing, verifying, and validating systems that include the technologies that fall under the AI umbrella. There even may be novel ways of constraining unwanted system behaviors by generating new architectures or safety controls. Ultimately, however, reducing the risks that AI will be abused requires a reframing of the way in which we think, talk, write about, and deploy AI. The problems of AI misuse are human problems; they are problems exhibited by all dual-use technologies, not just AI. Control of artificial intelligence lies with humans, because they are the moral agents responsible for the design, development, and deployment of AI.

2022 MNDI Kritik
1NC – AI “Arms Race” Kritik

This turns the case – the security dilemma pressures states to push out AI before it is safe, which causes it to fail, risking unintentional escalation of conflicts

Horowitz and Kahn, 2021 – Senior and Research Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations [Michael and Lauren, The Washington Quarterly 3-19-2021 “Leading in Artificial Intelligence through Confidence Building Measures” TM]

Risks exist for AI uses across society, in civilian and military sectors alike.7 Survey research shows that many in AI and machine learning (ML) communities worry about whether militaries can be trusted to develop safe and reliable AI.8 Given the current geopolitical context, there is fear that competitive pressures to be first in deploying AI systems could overshadow safety and ethics efforts, incentivizing militaries to take “short cuts” that could increase the risk of lethal accidents, unintentional conflict (conflict between states that results from miscommunication or accidents), and inadvertent escalation (when states commit intentional actions that unintentionally cause escalation by an adversary). The Risk of Accidents First, military applications of AI may not work as intended due to flaws in the algorithms themselves. Inadequate training data, the algorithm’s complexity, biased data, biased coding, or intentional data sabotage or poisoning by adversaries can make accidents more likely when systems are deployed. For example, a malfunctioning AI-enabled targeting system in a conflict could attack friends instead of foes, or friends and foes alike. Or an algorithmic decision aid could derive a flawed estimate of the risk of a particular operational plan, leading to a use of force that either unnecessarily fails or succeeds at a greater cost than required. These risks are amplified when systems are employed outside their design context, which may be more likely due to competitive dynamics.9 The Risk of Unintentional Conflict Second, even if algorithms work as designed, they could unintentionally make conflict more likely. Uncertainty about how algorithms will work on the battlefield could create challenges for signaling adversaries through posture and deployments in a crisis or within a conflict. Actors might be uncertain about how A Ienabled systems deployed by an adversary will behave. They might not believe that AI-enabled autonomous systems are programmed as described because the black-box nature of algorithms could lead to increased skepticism of claims made about the systems. Even if a state is telling the “truth” about a specific system and how it was used, there might not be a way for a third party or another state to validate those claims. Mistrust due to great power competition could exacerbate the situation. There is still substantial uncertainty about the reliability of many AI methods, especially deep learning and related techniques when they generate opaque outputs, meaning there is not an available chain of logic which explains why the algorithm recommended or engaged in a particular action.10 Even with sufficient training data, hedges against biases, and protections from data poisoning and hacking, current DoD systems may not be prepared for testing, evaluation, validation, and verification (TEVV) of algorithmic systems, particularly AI-enabled autonomous systems that will continually learn while operating.11 Furthermore, in operating at machine speed, AI-enabled autonomous systems could cause adversaries in a conflict to fear losing a war so quickly that they feel compelled to escalate.12 For an adversary with nuclear weapons, this could create pressure for launch postures such as pre-delegation and launch on warning that increase the chance of nuclear use.

2022 MNDI Kritik
1NC – AI “Arms Race” Kritik

The Affirmative reinforces the Security Dilemma they described in the 1AC – their discourse labelling AI as an “arms race” reinforces the perception of insecurity that they are “losing” a race that doesn’t exist. This increases the risk of conflict – hyperbolic rhetoric escalates rivalries.

Roff 2019 – Fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Program [Heather, 4/26/19, , “The Frame problem: The Ai ‘Arms Race’ isn’t one’, 6/18/22, LND]

Often, one hears the phrase “AI arms race,” especially in regard to competition between major powers. Yet an AI arms race seems a particularly unfortunate and misleading phrase. Since 1957, myriad scholars have attempted to understand arms races, including how one can identify and measure them and what the potential effects of one are. While there have certainly been academic and policy disputes over the last 62 years, there is one important consensus to note about arms races: looking at one particular dimension of a state’s behavior is not sufficient. Arms races deal with military build ups, arms expenditures, rivalry, alliances, territorial disputes, economic policies, and more. As yet, however, there has been no coherent or comprehensive discussion about the so-called AI arms race. For example: How is AI by itself a weapon? Or is the “race” merely military modernization efforts that include automation, autonomy, or AI enabled military systems? How would we even begin to find, label and disaggregate the numbers to claim that there is an arms race between rivals regarding only AI? Indeed, the discussion of an AI arms race is reminiscent of the hyperbolic and mislabeled rhetoric surrounding “cyber bombs” in the battle again ISIS. Of course, there are quite spectacular claims about AI’s potential benefits and risks. Russian President Vladimir Putin fanned that fire when he claimed that “whoever becomes the leader in this space [AI] will become the ruler of the world.” But talking about technological competition – in research, adoption, and deployment – in all sectors of multiple economies and in warfare is not really an arms race. Indeed, to frame this competition in military terms risks the adoption of policies or regulations that could escalate rivalry between states and increase the likelihood of actual conflict. More accurately stated, the current situation is one of AI competition, with variations of technological proliferation and diffusion. In some cases, countries may want to limit the amount and kinds of specific AI systems that proliferate to other countries or non-state actors. In these instances, it will more than likely be particular kinds of components or platforms that are at issue. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Australia Group, or the Missile Technology Control Regime are but a few regimes that are meant to deal with such proliferation issues.

2022 MNDI Kritik
1NC – AI “Arms Race” Kritik

There is no AI “Arms Race” – global spending is not enough to warrant the Arms Race title – it is just military modernization

Scharre 2021 – Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Paul, 6/28/21,https://tnsr.org/2021/06/debunking-the-ai-arms-race-theory/, “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory”, 6/18/22, LND]

The scale of military AI spending, at least at present, is nowhere near large enough to warrant the title of “arms race.” Of course, AI can also be used for weapons. Militaries around the world are actively working to adopt AI to improve their military capabilities. Yet the militarization of AI does not, at present, meet the traditional definition of an arms race, despite the rhetorical urgency of many national leaders. Michael D. Wallace, in his 1979 article “Arms Races and Escalation,” defined an arms race as “involving simultaneous abnormal rates of growth in the military outlays of two or more nations” resulting from “the competitive pressure of the military itself, and not from domestic forces exogenous to this rivalry.” Wallace further stated that the concept of an arms race only applied “between nations whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent” and who have “roughly comparable” capabilities. AI is being adopted by many countries around the globe. Arguably at least some of the dyads, such as the United States and China, meet Wallace’s definition in terms of being nations with “roughly comparable” capabilities, locked in competition, “whose foreign and defense policies are heavily interdependent.” However, AI fails the arms race test in the critical area of spending. Wallace distinguished arms races from the normal behavior of states to improve their military forces. A state that adopts a new technology and modernizes its military forces is not automatically in an arms race, under Wallace’s definition, even if the modernization is aimed at competition with another country. The decisive factor in qualifying as an arms race, according to Wallace, is the rate of growth in defense spending. Wallace characterized arms races as resulting in abnormally large growth rates in defense spending, beyond the historical average of 4 to 5 percent annual growth (in real dollars). In an arms race, annual growth rates are above 10 percent or even as high as 20 to 25 percent. Other scholars define arms races using different quantitative thresholds — and some definitions lack clear quantitative thresholds at all — but the existence of rapid increases in defense spending or military forces above normal levels is a common criterion in the scholarly literature on arms races. Arms races result in situations in which two or more countries are locked in spiraling defense spending, grabbing ever-greater shares of national treasure often with little to no net gain in relative advantage over the other. Classic historical examples include the Anglo-German naval arms race prior to World War I and the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race during the Cold War. Military AI spending today clearly does not meet these criteria of abnormally large growth rates in defense spending. AI defense spending is difficult to calculate due to the general-purpose nature of AI technology. Unlike ships or ballistic missiles, AI systems cannot be easily counted. Nevertheless, even crude estimates of defense spending show that military AI investments are nowhere near large enough to constitute an arms race. An independent estimate by Bloomberg Government of U.S. defense spending on AI identified $5 billion in AI-related research and development in fiscal year 2020, or roughly 0.7 percent of the Department of Defense’s over $700 billion budget. The scale of military AI spending, at least at present, is nowhere near large enough to warrant the title of “arms race.” (Adding in private sector spending, which constitutes the bulk of AI investment, would lead to larger figures but would further belie the claim of an “arms” race since most private sector AI investment is not in weapons.)

2022 MNDI Counterplan
AFF › Space › 2AC --- China

China and US won’t cooperate now – further tensions provide an opportunity for escalation

Bin Li, 5-9-2022, "Space Won’t Be Safe until the U.S. and China Can Cooperate," Scientific American, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/space-wont-be-safe-until-the-u-s-and-china-can-cooperate1/

China is undeniably one of the world’s top players in space these days, with successful missions to the moon and Mars and a solar probe due to be launched soon. Its rise has spurred competition with the U.S.; “Watch the Chinese,” NASA Administrator Bill Nelson recently warned. Given the strategic value the two nations have placed on their space programs, and the political tension that already exists between the countries, the contest over achievements in space is likely to intensify.

Despite the tension, the U.S. and China must figure out a way to cooperate on some, if not all, issues in the use of space. The most critical area is the safety of space infrastructure, where a lack of communication could be damaging and possibly even deadly. This need was highlighted by the recent saga of a near miss between two of Elon Musk’s Starlink satellites and China’s in-progress crewed space station. Although the Starlink spacecraft are privately owned, the U.S. government is internationally responsible for their space activities under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
AFF › Space › 2AC --- China

US SpaceX operations would anger China

Jim Pollard, 5-10-2022, "China Fears US Will Use SpaceX to Bring Calamity to World," Asia Financial,

The Starlink internet service run by Elon Musk’s SpaceX may be used by the “hegemony-obsessed US” to dominate space and bring “chaos or calamity” to the world.

That’s according to a recent commentary published by China Military Online, an official website linked to China’s Central Military Commission, which is headed by President Xi Jinping.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
AFF › Norms › 2AC --- CP fails

Norms-based approach leaves no one accountable – it is ambiguous and lacks enforcement.

MaČÁK 17 [Kubo MaČÁK, Dr Kubo Mačák is a legal adviser at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Prior to joining the ICRC in 2019, he worked as an Associate Professor of Public International Law at the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom. "From Cyber Norms to Cyber Rules: Re-engaging States as Law-makers," Cambridge University press, https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/from-cyber-norms-to-cyber-rules-reengaging-states-as-lawmakers/63A45029B685C11BBD9512AC0459FAE5] Blitz

While the first two indicators relate to states’ reluctance to act in ways meaningful for the generation of new rules, the third concerns their actual conduct in relation to cyber governance. It would be inaccurate to claim that states have entirely given up on standard-setting. However, instead of interpreting or developing rules of international law, state representatives have generally sought refuge in the more ambiguous term ‘norms’. It is true that law and norms are ‘intimately intertwined’ concepts and that inter-state agreement on ‘norms’ may gradually influence the development of the law.Yet, a fundamental difference between the two is that a violation of a binding rule of international law gives rise to international legal responsibility. while the same cannot be said of non-legal norms regulating cyber conduct.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
AFF › Hybrid War › 2AC --- Perm do both

Perm do both- Cooperating with EU and NATO against Russian Hybrid War tactics solves best.

Clark 20 [Mason Clark, the Russia Team Lead and Research Analyst on the Russia and Ukraine portfolio at the Institute for the Study of War. His work focuses on Russian military adaptation and learning in Syria. His work has been cited by Task & Purpose, Defense One, the Kyiv Post, the New York Times, BBC, and others. He has briefed multiple senior military and civilian decision makers on Russian military development and the Kremlin’s global campaigns, September 2020, Institute For The Study of War, “Russian Hybrid Warfare Military Learning And The Future of War Series”, , Pgs 9-10, JMH]

The United States should take several actions to support this revision of its strategy and approach to Russia.

• Analyze the Kremlin’s decisions within the Russian framework of hybrid war to understand and mitigate Russian lines of effort. Obfuscating the nature and purpose of Kremlin activities is a key objective of hybrid war, and US confusion about the term and the Russian approach to such conflicts hinders the development of effective counterstrategies.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
AFF › 5-G › 2AC --- CP fails

5G infighting causes economic nosedive – governmental disputes wreck solvency – only the plan solves

Grossmann 22 [J. DAVID GROSSMAN, VP OF REGULATORY AFFAIRS, CONSUMER TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION (CTA)"US 5G leadership depends on ending government infighting," Light Reading, https://www.lightreading.com/regulatorypolitics/us-5g-leadership-depends-on-ending-government-infighting/a/d-id/776413] Blitz

From Wi-Fi and smartphones to telehealth, fitness wearables and more – wireless connectivity is a critical part of our daily lives. However, recent government infighting over spectrum use threatens the technology that so many Americans depend on. As the demand for faster and more reliable wireless connectivity continues to grow, it is time to reform our nation's spectrum policy to make sure that spectrum continues to benefit Americans. (See ). Spectrum drives a large portion of consumer connectivity and technology and influences America's economy. A recent found that unlicensed spectrum generates $95.8 billion per year in incremental sales value, and there are billions more in economic benefits from licensed spectrum used by our nation's wireless providers. DOT and FCC debris Good spectrum policy can create jobs, spur innovation and grow GDP. Bad spectrum policy places US companies, federal agencies and American consumers at a disadvantage in a world where every country is competing to offer better technology and services. The US is risking the latter due to a lack of coordination between government agencies. For example, the recent auction of the C-band for 5G, which raised nearly $81 billion in revenue, was followed by objections from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). This is not the first time in recent memory that spectrum battles have erupted. There is an ongoing dispute over the repurposing of spectrum in the 5.9 GHz band between the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Many more examples of bureaucratic infighting and dysfunction have littered the spectrum landscape. Sadly, these disputes are not just Beltway parlor games; they have real consequences for America's economy. American technology companies face an uncertain environment due to whether the federal government's decisions will be implemented. How can we ask companies to invest billions of dollars in a technology direction when the regulatory rug may be pulled out from under them at the last moment?

2022 MNDI Counterplan
AFF › Biotech › 2AC --- Rogue States

Rogue states will use biotech to create super-soldiers.

Malet ’11/15 [David; 11/13/15; Qualifications; "Captain America in International Relations: the Biotech Revolution in Military Affairs," , IC]

Biological weapons are typically associated with rogue states and terrorist groups; germ weapons used by weak actors against the strong. This article makes a contrary argument, that the emerging use of biotechnology by the United States, China, and other hegemonic powers is likely to afford them a new Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), one at least as significant as the introduction of the information technology RMA that gave the United States a dominant edge over potential adversaries at the end of the Cold War. It examines recent developments and current R&D programs that call into question the rights of enemy combatants, civilian populations in target areas, and soldiers who will be physically augmented to pursue battlefield objectives. Examples include the Quikclot used to reduce fatalities in the Iraq War, which arguably prolonged public support for the war, and the Pentagon’s publicly detailed research across various programs to create super-soldiers akin to super-heroes. The real advances in biotech will likely only further retrench the major powers of the international system by conferring an asymmetric advantage far beyond the capacity of weaker actors to match.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
AFF › Biotech › 2AC --- Too Expensive

Funding extremely high totaling over 40 billion

BioSpace 22 [BioSpace Editorial Staff 9/21/2020 ; The Home of the Life Sciences Industry. Find biotech, clinical research and pharmaceutical jobs from thousands of employers; “Investment in Biopharma is Reaching an Inflection Point,” https://www.biospace.com/article/investment-in-biopharma-is-reaching-an-inflection-point-/]

Emerging biopharma companies are vital to the creation of many novel therapies and health technologies, and play an important role in the future of early-stage drug development. Little wonder U.S.-based biotech companies are the darling of private equity, venture capital companies and institutional money managers.

During the past two years, fundraising and investment in biotechnology have reached record levels. These factors have translated into elevated IPO activity and an overarching positive outlook.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
AFF › Biotech › 2AC --- Impact

Any solvency deficit risks a global arms race.

Almosara 10 [Joel O.; 6/?/2010 ; The senior consultant to the Pacific Air Forces Surgeon General and commanders on occupational and environmental health programs and Deputy Director of the USAF Counterproliferation Center ; “BIOTECHNOLOGY: GENETICALLY ENGINEERED PATHOGENS,” ]

The developmental trends in biological sciences indicate there is a plethora of possibilities concerning the study of microorganisms and its applicability in creating the next biological warfare agent. Both historical and recent events show the potentially devastating effect of using biological warfare agents and the terror they cause among the populace. Even more alarming is that technological advancements in the field of biological sciences will transform biological warfare agents into a new classification of genetically engineered pathogens eliciting catastrophic consequences. 2 Just as the twentieth century was the “century of chemistry and physics,” the twenty-first century will emerge as the “century of biology.” Nations, groups, and individuals that have the resources, capabilities, and knowledge to develop this technology in the year 2035 will have the global arms race advantage.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
AFF › Biotech › 2AC --- Bans Fail

Biotech in the military is inevitable.

Malet ’11/15 [David; 11/13/15; Qualifications; "Captain America in International Relations: the Biotech Revolution in Military Affairs," , IC]

The Biotech Revolution in Military Affairs There have been numerous studies of the impacts of a wide array of emergent technologies by hegemonic actors or aspirants (For a preliminary list, see Jervis 1978, Levy 1984, Posen 1984, Shimshoni 1990, Arquilla and Ronfeldt 1997, Adams 1998, Murray and Millett 1998, Tannenwald 2008, Clarke and Knake 2010, Vogel 2012, Waltz and Sagan 2012, Carpenter 2013). However, there has been little examination of what the adoption of biotechnology by the leading military powers has meant or is likely to mean. The United States Office of Technology Assessment defines biotechnology as “any technique that uses a living organism, or parts of organisms, to make or modify products, to improve plants or animals, or to develop microorganisms for specific uses.” 320 D. Malet Other definitions include material patterned after living organisms but not necessarily using them as components (biomimetics). The conventional wisdom on biotechnology has held that coming decades will see Western nations increasingly vulnerable to ever-more sophisticated biological weapons attacks by non-state actors and rogue states. As recombinant genetic technology proliferates, a greater number of actors will possess genetic engineering capabilities that will enhance the lethality and durability of their biological weapons. Proponents of this perspective note that the overwhelming technological advantage in conventional forces enjoyed by the United States creates the incentive for competitors to develop effective asymmetric responses, and that the affordability, accessibility, and relatively easy preparation of biological weapons make them a likely means of doing so. In this view, the superior conventional capabilities of the US military not only fail to deter the proliferation of biological weapons, but encourage their development. Western states will face an increasing number of biologically armed opponents, and will remain on the defensive. The priority for military biotech research is therefore the development of protective equipment and vaccines, antibiotics and antivirals (Department of Defense 1998). However, this scenario requires the presumption that military applications of biotechnology will simply be a secular progression from the bacteriological warfare that has existed throughout history. Even when analysts have factored in the vast possibilities of genetic engineering, it has usually only been to the extent that they can breed deadlier pathogens, and that the growing availability of technology means that it may be used by a broader spectrum of actors. Conventional wisdom therefore predicts an unstable future for the international system, a Hobbesian world in which the weakest have power to kill the strongest. Rather than rogue states and non-state terrorists, it is the most powerful and resource-laden actors in the international system that will enjoy the advantages of “biological warfare” in the twenty-first century as they continuously integrate emergent biotechnologies into their military and national defense infrastructures and extend their dominance. This process will closely resemble the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that occurred during the last 30 years of the twentieth century as the United States adapted its forces to exploit advances in new information technologies. The RMA, first described by the Soviet military intelligence in the 1970s and then witnessed by the world during the unexpectedly uneven 1991 Gulf War, occurred because the United States employed its competitive advantage in integrated computer systems. Rather than a single transformative device, like the atomic bomb, the steady accretion of advanced technologies augmenting existing equipment came to inform doctrine and strategies. The term asymmetric warfare is meant to describe efforts by weaker participants in military confrontations to frustrate the advantages of the stronger power by guerilla tactics or other unconventional methods not envisioned in force planning (Mack 1975). However, high technology also offers asymmetric advantages to the best-equipped actors, and American military planners sought to use the advances of the RMA to field forces that no state competitor could match. Their goals included “dominant maneuver” capability on the battlefield in bringing dispersed resources to bear against targets, “precision engagement” capability delivered by smart weapons, and “full dimension force protection” against all anticipated threats (Rizwan 2000). The ultimate expression of this vision would be a fighter comparable to a “Jedi knight” from the Star Wars films: a super-empowered solider, dressed in a protective stealth cloak and commanding an Defence Studies 321 armed companion drone, able to perform solo missions and to transmit data back to headquarters (Hundley and Gritton 1994). Coincidentally or not, this is precisely how Darth Maul was depicted in 1999’s The Phantom Menace. Military planners likewise foresee similar advantages conferred by developments across the various biotech fields. In coming decades, biotechnology is forecast to bring advances such as “rugged computers” made from biological components that will provide situational awareness to individual soldiers on the battlefield, camouflaged materials and lightweight armor incorporating the properties of living organisms, and ingested biological markers to distinguish friendlies, which would be of particular use in counterinsurgency (Purdue University 2001). From the perspective of those involved in force planning, the anticipated future is not one of vulnerability but unassailability.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › Misc › 2NC --- Squo solves gene editing

China has already implemented gene editing regulations

Civil Code of The People’s Republic of China 20 [Civil Code of The People’s Republic of China; 5/28/20; Civil Code is expected to comprehensively strengthen the protection of people's various rights and improve the Chinese socialist system of laws adopted at the Third Session of the Thirteenth National People’s Congress; “Civil Code Of the People’s Republic of China,” http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/c23934/202012/f627aa3a4651475db936899d69419d1e/files/47c16489e186437eab3244495cb47d66.pdf]

Article 1009 A medical and scientific research activity related to human genes, embryos, or the like, shall be done in accordance with the relevant provisions of laws, administrative regulations, and the regulations of the State, and shall not endanger human health, offend ethics and morals, or harm public interests.

Others have banned human gene editing

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › Misc › 2NC --- Squo solves gene editing

We’ve already banned gene editing.

Kaiser 19 [Jocelyn; 6/4/19; Princeton University degrees in chemical engineering; “Update: House spending panel restoes U.S. ban on gene-edited babies,” https://www.science.org/content/article/update-house-spending-panel-restores-us-ban-gene-edited-babies]

*Update, 4 June, 1:25 p.m.: By voice vote, the full Appropriations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives today restored language to a 2020 spending bill that bars the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) from considering requests to approve any clinical trial "in which a human embryo is intentionally created or modified to include a heritable genetic modification." Late last month, an appropriations subcommittee had removed the rider, which has been part of the spending bill that funds FDA for the past 4 years. Today, Democrats who lead the spending panel said they had removed the rider because they wanted to spur a fuller debate on how the U.S. government should regulate the genetic modification of human sperm, eggs, or embryos. In particular, they said that although they support a ban on using gene-editing tools such as CRISPR to modify babies, they were concerned that the FDA rider might also hinder the development of potentially helpful therapies, such as modifying a cell's mitochondria to prevent heritable diseases. Several Democrats said they were reluctantly supporting the request from Republicans to restore the rider, and lawmakers from both parties suggested congressional health committees that shape agency policies need to address the issue comprehensively, rather than have it debated annually during the appropriations process.

Here is our previous story from 24 May:

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › Misc › 2NC --- Super Soldiers

The future of military enhancement with biotech is here to stay

Malet 15 [David; 11/13/15; Qualifications; "Captain America in International Relations: the Biotech Revolution in Military Affairs," , IC]

On 27 August 2014, President Barack Obama unveiled the new ElectRx system, created by the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Intended to preserve the health of United States military personnel and veterans, these “new computer chips [are] designed to modulate the nervous system to help with everything from arthritis to post-traumatic stress” (Lamothe 2014). While the exploits of superhero-like “metabolically dominant warfighters” may be more of a concern for moviegoers than military strategists today, biotechnologies are already being deployed to give the United States unprecedented strategic military advantage, and the effort and the billions of dollars of public funds invested in the furtherance of their creation merit examination. There has as of yet been little consideration in the international relations discipline of what the advent of augmented forces with unprecedented offensive and defensive capabilities mean for concepts of just war, or for the legitimacy that underpins the authority of successful international hegemonic actors. Yet, if past and recent developments in revolutionary new military technologies are any indication, debates about their deployment will inevitably arise. This article is not concerned primarily with the ethics of human enhancement, a literature which details the potential for social and economic improvement or inequality but neglects considerations of international security almost completely. Instead, it considers the import of biotechnologies that are currently at least being discussed as the basis of an effective combat capability of the future. These include physical and mechanical enhancements of troops that may be intended as purely defensive, but which also offer augmented offensive capability, and related ethical considerations, because they enable troops to securely project power in a way that no adversary would be able to match, belying any notion of a “fair fight.” Robbed of any hope of winning symmetrically, opponents would necessarily fall to strategies that would produce arms races or alternative disruptive technologies to compete. The character of Captain America, first introduced in comic books in March 1941, offers an easy shorthand for some of the technological innovations on the drawing board for twenty-first-century theaters of conflict. The early super-hero was physically enhanced by a combination of a “super-soldier serum” and “vita-rays,” but also provided with a unique indestructible shield that could also be used as an offensive weapon. He was therefore singularly both invulnerable and capable of projecting force in a way that no adversary could match, although the adversaries of the day soon developed their own special counter-forces in response. Potentially, some variation of this tale can be expected in coming decades, and indeed already began unmarked a decade ago in Iraq.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › Pharma › 2NC --- Vaccines

260 vaccines currently being developed now

PHRMA 22 [National Institute Health 4/?/2020 ; trade group representing companies in the pharmaceutical industry in the United States.; “New Era of Medicine: Vaccines,” https://www.phrma.org/science/new-era-of-medicine-vaccines]

As of April 2020, there are nearly 260 vaccines in development by America’s biopharmaceutical companies to both prevent and treat diseases including cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, allergies and autoimmune disorders. These vaccines offer significant hope for the future, with many vaccines in the pipeline using new technologies that have the potential to prevent the transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), protect against malaria and even therapeutic vaccines to treat several types of cancer.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › Pharma › 2NC --- Follow on

US Is a hotspot for Biopharmaceuticals leaders

BioSpace 22 [BioSpace Editorial Staff 9/21/2020 ; The Home of the Life Sciences Industry. Find biotech, clinical research and pharmaceutical jobs from thousands of employers; “Investment in Biopharma is Reaching an Inflection Point,” https://www.biospace.com/article/investment-in-biopharma-is-reaching-an-inflection-point-/]

In particular, America’s east coast hubs excel due to an enviable university system, innovative biotech companies and the presence of large pharma companies like Pfizer, Johnson & Johnson and Merck & Co. Adding to the allure are plentiful enterprise partnerships, a robust entrepreneur ecosystem and a well-functioning incubator system.

New Jersey leads the nation in big names. There are 139 U.S. Food and Drug Administration-registered biopharmaceutical manufacturing facilities in the state, and 25% of all cell and gene therapies are being developed there. Among the largest biopharma companies in the country, 13 are in New Jersey, along with 3,280 life science establishments. More than 50% of all new FDA novel medicines approved in 2019 were from companies with a footprint in New Jersey.