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2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › Pharma › 1NC --- Vaccines

Vaccine development solves emerging diseases

PHRMA 22 [National Institute Health 4/?/2020 ; trade group representing companies in the pharmaceutical industry in the United States.; “New Era of Medicine: Vaccines,” https://www.phrma.org/science/new-era-of-medicine-vaccines]

Vaccines represent some of the most impactful public health advances seen to date, playing a critical role in reducing the spread of, and, in some cases, eliminating the threat of the world’s many devastating infectious diseases.

The human immune system is incredibly powerful and versatile, working continuously to keep a variety of invaders from causing infection and disease. From bacteria, to viruses, to parasites, the immune system recognizes invading threats and triggers a response in the body to contain and combat invaders. And although the immune system is incredibly robust, it is not invincible which is why vaccines are needed to help support the body’s defenses.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › Funding › 2NC --- Bioprinting

Bioprinting is costly but funding allows development to proceed.

Hanaphy 20 [Paul ; 5/28/20; Kingston University Masters degree ; “BRINTER RAISES €1.2M TO FUND LAUNCH OF SCALABLE BIOPRINTER IN NEW MARKETS,” https://3dprintingindustry.com/news/author/paul-hanaphy/]

Finland-based 3D bioprinting start-up Brinter has revealed that it has received €1.2 million worth of investment. Raised via a seed funding round led by early-stage VC firm Innovestor, the capital is set to be used as a means of expanding the company’s operations, allowing it to more easily address the U.S. and European medical markets with its modular 3D bioprinter, which it says could have future organ fabrication applications. “Bioprinting can rapidly unlock the opportunities behind long-running but unrealised science and research, and plays a key role in pushing the frontier of medical science,” said Tomi Kalpio, CEO of Brinter. “This will result in an improved quality of life for patients through the expansion of more personalised treatment and the ongoing development of bioprinted ‘spare parts’ that can save lives.” “WE ARE EXCITED TO HAVE THE BACKING OF INNOVESTOR, WHO CAN HELP US ACCELERATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES AND SCALE IN NEW GEOGRAPHIES.” Brinter’s bioprinting technology Based in the Finnish city of Turku, and spun-off from the 3D printing bureau 3DTech Ltd, Brinter develops bioprinting systems, modules and inks for medical, research and cosmetics clients. The firm’s offering revolves around its aptly-named ‘Brinter 1,’ which is capable of depositing layers of cell-laden hydrogels into oncological models as well as cancerous and cartilage microtissues. In practise, Brinter clients are able to use the company’s software to turn MRI, X-ray or CT scanning data into CAD models, before printing them into viable soft tissues for use within drug evaluations, in a way that could help accelerate the translation of new medicines into clinics and bring an end to the use of animal testing. Priced at €24,900, Brinter’s machines are far from cheap, but they are also uniquely modular in that users can acquire and add different printheads to access a variety of modalities on a single platform. The company’s Pneuma Tool, for instance, enables the dispensing of low-to-medium viscosity bio-inks, while its premium Visco Heated Tool comes with material temperature-regulating functionality.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › Funding › 2NC --- Funding Solves

Venture Capital funding allows R&D and creates jobs helping economy

PHRMA No Date [National Institute Health; trade group representing companies in the pharmaceutical industry in the United States.; “RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

Venture Capital ,” https://phrma.org/policy-issues/Research-and-Development/Corporate-Venture-Capital]

The U.S. biopharmaceutical ecosystem has propelled the U.S. to global leadership in medical development. Here we look at the impact of venture capital and small startup companies in this process from 2000-2017.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › Funding › 1NC --- Private Sector

Even if years away, funding allows for fast development on Biotech.

Hanaphy 20 [Paul ; 5/28/20; Kingston University Masters degree ; “BRINTER RAISES €1.2M TO FUND LAUNCH OF SCALABLE BIOPRINTER IN NEW MARKETS,” https://3dprintingindustry.com/news/author/paul-hanaphy/]

Funding international growth According to Brinter, many researchers still use traditional drug discovery and disease modelling methods, when its proprietary 3D bioprinter could help scale the entire process. As a result, using its newly-raised funding, the company aims to make its technology as accessible as possible, and bring bioprinting within reach for all U.S. or European clinical firms, hospitals and universities. At present, Brinter’s clientele includes companies like Nanoform, as well as researchers at VTT, the University of Glasgow, Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, University of Oulu and University of Helsinki. In one particularly promising project at the University of Eastern Finland, the firm’s technology is currently being used to 3D print neural matter for future brain disease modelling applications. “I am extremely excited to continue our 3D brain printing project with Brinter,” explained Jari Koistinaho, Professor of Regenerative Medicine at the University of Eastern Finland. “3D bioprinting will soon provide us with fine-tuned human mini-brains and brain prosthetics, thereby deepening our understanding of the human mind and our ability to combat serious brain disorders.” For its part, Innovestor has also identified “accelerated technological, material and methodological” advances within the bioprinting industry, and it now anticipates that Brinter’s technology will supplement this trend, making scientific R&D up to ten times faster and helping to usher in the age of bioprinted heart/kidney transplants. “We are very excited to be a part of Brinter’s journey,” concluded Wilhelm Lindholm, CEO of Innovestor. “Brinter is an exciting addition to our portfolio as the company’s competitive advantages of multi-material printing capabilities, modularity, and scalability combined with their own easy-to-use software application were very convincing.” “COMPANIES LIKE BRINTER ARE PAVING THE WAY FOR 3D BIOPRINTING, REVOLUTIONIZING THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE TO THE POINT WHERE A CUSTOMIZED HEART OR KIDNEY CAN BE MADE FOR A TRANSPLANT PATIENT.” Advances in bioprinted organs While transplantable bioprinted organs remain years away from reality, recent advances in the technology may have shortened this wait considerably. 3D Systems’ continued interest in bioprinting will no doubt hasten its development, and the firm reported “tremendous progress” within its dedicated Print to Perfusion program earlier this year. As part of a strategic refocus announced by the company in 2020, it has also sought to build on its core healthcare and industrial segments, and acquired Additive Works and bioprinting firm Allevi during May 2021, with this in mind. Similarly, manufacturers such as UpNano are increasingly entering the bioprinting sector, and the company has now launched its own NanoOne Bio system. Released in May 2021, the firm’s machine is reportedly capable of constructing 3D tissues out of living cells, resulting in viable meso-to-nanoscale sized structures. In more experimental developments, the National Science Foundation (NSF) has awarded Allegro 3D nearly $1 million to fund the R&D of its novel high-throughput bioprinting platform. Using the capital, the firm aims to create a machine that’s capable of rapidly producing in-vitro therapeutic and biomedical testing models.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › CBD › 2NC --- Solves

CBD solves by using the treaty as a tool in legislative committees.

Chandra 11 (Alvin Chandra and Anastasiya Idrisova, School of Earth, Atmospheric and Environmental Sciences, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester and Department of Environmental Sciences and Policy, Central European University, Nador Utca, Springer Science+Business Media, “Convention on Biological Diversity: a review of national challenges and opportunities for implementation”, September 23, 2011, , Accessed June 18, 2022)//AS

“The ultimate conservation challenge for all the countries remains halting biodiversity loss. This review however reveals that developing and developed countries and transition economies are at different stages of implementing the different requirements of the CBD. The countries that have progressed most on the programmes of work of the CBD also have developed economies and strong capacity to share information, coordinate stakeholder actions, and apply economic incentive measures. Developing countries and transition economies however are in the process of implementing measures on capacity development, awareness-raising, engaging key sectors and stakeholders, and mainstreaming of biodiversity targets. Additional efforts are required by developing countries and transition economies on knowledge and information-sharing mechanisms, engaging indigenous communities and developing sustainable financing mechanisms for conservation. The key challenges to the national implementation of the CBD identified in this research can be major explanations of failure to achieve the 2010 Biodiversity Targets. National challenges are complexed by multiple interactions with political, societal, legal, economic policy, and financial factors. The underlying, persisting problem is that limited capacity in developing countries and transition economies undermines conservation initiatives. This study is also of the view that the CBD objectives and targets cover an enormous range of tasks and agendas for the Parties, which can create confusion and divert attention from issues most pertinent to biodiversity conservation at the national level. This is particularly relevant for issues on access and benefit sharing, indigenous rights, traditional knowledge, and technology transfer, where gaps still remain within national legislations and the CBD. Despite many challenges, institutions, stakeholders, and the Parties have demonstrated certain best practices and developed networks of inquiry for CBD implementation. This study proposes the following recommendations for inclusion in national strategies to address the challenges and achieve the Convention’s objectives: • Institutional and capacity: Implementing the NCSA priorities and reviewing existing regulatory processes, including creating incentive schemes for skilled practitioners to engage in the biodiversity conservation field. • Knowledge and accessible information: National agencies should develop communication strategies and make information available online through user-friendly and contemporary websites that provide key audiences the ability to take relevant action. • Economic policy and financial resources: Developing and marketing quality biodiversity projects through a resource mobilisation strategy. Market-based instruments such as payments for ecosystem services and fair trading schemes should be designed, piloted and where possible, replicated to stimulate sustainable financing schemes. • Cooperation and stakeholder involvement: Consulting key stakeholders and the community to better understand their problems and opportunities, and support mutual actions on conservation. Developing and formalising partnership initiatives with the scientific community will also actively promote joint actions. • Mainstreaming and integration of biodiversity: Engaging national planners, statisticians and finance staff for setting national targets and allocating direct budgetary support for CBD implementation. Lessons learnt from mainstreaming initiatives in successful countries are useful, which can be documented and disseminated to other Parties. It is also important to point out that national conservation measures should be supported by multiple sectors and secure high level political support. Political, economical, and legislative sectors are more likely to show interest in CBD implementation and use it as a tool for managing biodiversity when they know the Convention processes and perceive it as a benefit. Modest investments in capacity building and training, and engaging different sectors in setting priorities would have a significant pay-off.”

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › CBD › 2NC --- Solves

Convention on Biosafety Protocol and Biosafety program allows for concrete biodiversity protection to take place

UNEP 10 (UNEP Convention on Biological Diversity, The conservation of biological diversity, The sustainable use of the components of biological diversity, The fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, “United Nations Decade on Biodiversity”, 2010, , Accessed June 18, 2022)//AS

“The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is an international legally-binding treaty with three main goals: conservation of biodiversity; sustainable use of biodiversity; and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources. Its overall objective is to encourage actions which will lead to a sustainable future. The conservation of biodiversity is a common concern of humankind. The CBD covers biodiversity at all levels: Ecosystems, species and genetic resources. It also covers biotechnology through the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. In fact, it covers all possible domains that are directly or indirectly related to biodiversity and its role in development, ranging from science, politics and education to agriculture, business, culture and much more. The governing body of the CBD is the Conference of the Parties (COP). This ultimate authority of all governments (or Parties) that have ratified the treaty meets every two years to review progress, set priorities and commit to work plans. In 2010, Parties to the CBD adopted the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011–2020, a ten-year framework for action by all countries and stakeholders to safeguard biodiversity and the benefits it provides to people. The Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (SCBD) is based in Montreal, Canada. Its main function is to assist governments in the implementation of the CBD and its programmes of work, to organize meetings, draft documents, and coordinate with other international organizations and collect and spread information. The Executive Secretary is the head of the Secretariat.”

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › CBD › 2NC --- Solves

Biosafety protocol solves regulations and safety without disrupting innovation.

IATP 00 (Institute of Agriculture and Trade Policies, advocate for policy in the public interest at the state, federal and international level striving for research, collaboration, and policy change, “Global Industry Coalition - Biotechnology - Industry Leaders Support Safety Protocol Workable Agreement Vital to Future of Biotechnology”, January 14, 2000, , Accessed June 19, 2022)//AS

“MONTREAL - The Global Industry Coalition continues to support a practical and workable Biosafety Protocol that would share the benefits of biotechnology, while protecting and sustaining biological diversity. The Global Industry Coalition pledges to support efforts to achieve a successful outcome to the Biosafety Protocol negotiations in Montreal, January 24-28. The Coalition represents more than 2,200 companies from more than 130 countries. "The nations participating in this international negotiation cannot settle for anything less than a Protocol that is practical and workable," said Joyce Groote of BIOTECanada, chair of the Global Industry Coalition. "We hope for success in Montreal but these matters are too important for us to do anything other than keep working until we achieve a practical and workable Protocol." Essentially, a Biosafety Protocol should create a scientifically-based framework that will facilitate international commerce as well as co-operative research and development in biotechnology among all countries. Biotechnology enables all countries to share the tools that can improve agricultural production, enhance the nutritional benefits of food, protect the environment and generate breakthroughs in health care and renewable fuels. In the past five years, considerable progress has been made through international negotiations for a Protocol. This follows through on the commitments made at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, where countries agreed to better stewardship of our planet. The Coalition has been fully supportive and involved in this process. Working under the auspices of the United Nations, delegates attending the Biosafety Protocol negotiations must endeavour to find a realistic balance that will protect biodiversity without disrupting research, innovation and trade. While the meeting is intended to produce an agreement that can be adopted in Montreal, the Coalition members, as responsible corporate citizens, expect the dialogue to continue until there is a satisfactory, workable Biosafety Protocol.”

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › CBD › 2NC --- Modelling

Protocol increases trade and international cooperation

BIO 22 (Biotechnology Innovation Organization, BIO is the world’s largest advocacy association representing member companies, state biotechnology groups, academic and research institutions, and related organizations across the United States and in 30+ countries, “The Biosafety Protocol-An Overview”, , Accessed June 19, 2022)//AS

“THE PROPOSED BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL: KEY ISSUES The Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity intended for the Biosafety Protocol to govern the transboundary movement of Living Modified Organisms (LMOs) that may have an adverse effect on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. Jakarta Decision II/5, which established the negotiating parameters, provides that the Protocol: Not exceed the scope of the Convention; Not override or duplicate any other international legal instrument; Not unduly hinder access to and transfer of technology, and Be efficient, effective and minimize unnecessary negative impacts on biotechnology research and development. To serve the goals of the Convention and meet the conditions specified by Decision II/5, the Protocol must provide for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, while at the same time allowing for the development and use of valuable new products. It must also be consistent with other international agreements and not cause unwarranted disruptions in the transboundary movement and trade of essential materials. To meet these objectives we recommend that the Biosafety Protocol be built on the following key positions: The scope of the Protocol must govern only those LMOs and intended uses that may have a significant adverse effect on biodiversity. Extending the scope of the Protocol cover LMOs and intended uses that, based on scientific principles, will not have significant adverse effects on biodiversity would impede access to agricultural, medical and other beneficial products without a compensatory increase in biodiversity protection. LMOs and intended uses that realistically will not have adverse effects on biodiversity should not be included in the scope of the Protocol. This will allow resources to be focused more effectively. Appropriate exclusions include, at a minimum, LMOs that have been reviewed and accepted for commercial or research use by the importing country; LMOs destined for contained use or transport; commodities approved for commercialization, and pharmaceuticals. The Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA) procedures should be applied only to those LMOs and intended uses that may realistically have a significant adverse effect on biodiversity. A "Notice of First Shipment" should be the primary mechanism to inform countries of the proposed shipment of an LMO. An AIA provision that requires written notification and consent for all LMOs will be extremely costly, demanding and burdensome for governments to administer, especially as the number of shipments covered by the Protocol increases. Moreover, if an intricate, lengthy and repetitive AIA process is applied to all LMOs, access to food, fiber and health care products will be impeded as will the development of new products. The Protocol must be consistent with international trade rules. If the scope of the Protocol is unnecessarily broad and the AIA procedure is excessively burdensome, the Protocol could have serious negative impacts on the trade. As such, the Protocol's scope and AIA provisions must be limited to those LMOs and intended uses that may realistically have a significant adverse effect on biodiversity. The decision to approve or deny shipment of an LMO covered by the Protocol must be based on sound science regarding real or reasonably anticipated effects on biodiversity. Speculative, non-significant adverse effects on biodiversity must not be used to reject products. Discrimination of products based on their production techniques must also be avoided. The Protocol must provide for the protection of confidential business information and other intellectual property. The Protocol must contain clear and appropriate procedures for designating and protecting confidential information and intellectual property shared in conjunction with the notification provisions of the Protocol. Procedures for resolving disputes over confidentiality claims regarding protected and privileged information must also be defined in the Protocol. In the absence of protection afforded by such procedures, companies and institutions will be reluctant to engage in commercial trade, international product development or exchange of research materials involving LMOs covered by the Protocol. The Protocol should not create an international system of liability. Existing national and regional legal systems should be relied upon to determine what triggers legal liability for harm to biodiversity, the nature and extent of harm that can be compensated, and the procedural system to obtain relief from liable parties.”

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › CBD › 2NC --- Modelling

CBD gives incentives for follow on that they can’t access.

UNEP 10 (UNEP Convention on Biological Diversity, The conservation of biological diversity, The sustainable use of the components of biological diversity, The fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, “United Nations Decade on Biodiversity”, 2010, , Accessed June 18, 2022)//AS

“Biodiversity is the basis for ecosystem services, which are essential for human well-being and economic development. In addition to its intrinsic value, biodiversity and ecosystem services are therefore also of tremendous economic value. However, many ecosystem services are not traded on markets and their value is not properly reflected in existing market prices for other goods and services. Markets, when left alone, do not tell the ‘ecological truth’ and will therefore provide insufficient, if any, incentives to individuals, companies and governments to use biodiversity, and related ecosystem services, in a sustainable manner. The reason for this market failure is simple: most biodiversity components are considered ‘public goods’, belonging to everyone and to no one. Consequently, there is little concern in economic decision-making for their conservation and sustainable use. The economic work under the Convention on Biological Diversity seeks to elucidate this ‘hidden’ economic value of ecosystem services and the underlying biodiversity and incorporate it into market prices through the use of incentive measures that favour the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.”

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › CBD › 2NC --- Modelling

CBD and BSP bolsters biotechnology trade and co-research and increases unity between countries

UNEP 10 (UNEP Convention on Biological Diversity, The conservation of biological diversity, The sustainable use of the components of biological diversity, The fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, “United Nations Decade on Biodiversity”, 2010, , Accessed June 18, 2022)//AS

The reason for this market failure is simple: most biodiversity components are considered ‘public goods’, belonging to everyone and to no one. Consequently, there is little concern in economic decision-making for their conservation and sustainable use. The economic work under the Convention on Biological Diversity seeks to elucidate this ‘hidden’ economic value of ecosystem services and the underlying biodiversity and incorporate it into market prices through the use of incentive measures that favour the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. “Work under the Convention, in partnership with the World Trade Organization, also looks at the relationship between its provisions and international trade rules. This is part of a broader effort by the international community to ensure harmony and mutual support between international trade rules and international environmental law, in order to both maintain biodiversity and promote international trade for the common goal of sustainable development. An important= goal of the Convention is that no species of wild flora and fauna should be endangered by international trade hence the CBD is closely cooperating with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.”

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › CBD › 1NC --- CBD

CBD solves biotech research, agriculture, burden sharing, and biodiversity

BIO 22(Biotechnology Innovation Organization, BIO is the world’s largest advocacy association representing member companies, state biotechnology groups, academic and research institutions, and related organizations across the United States and in 30+ countries, “The Biosafety Protocol-An Overview”, , Accessed June 19, 2022)//AS

“Desired Outcomes Biodiversity is a global resource of tremendous value to all of humankind. The CBD provides an important opportunity for nations to work together on an issue vitally important to us and future generations. To that end, we support a BSP that furthers the goals of the CBD: The conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity and equitable sharing of the benefits of biotechnology. To contribute to these goals, the BSP must: Be based on sound scientific principles. Take into account the actual environmental risks and the benefits of biotechnology, especially its role in facilitating biodiversity conservation. Focus on the transboundary movement of LMOs that may threaten biodiversity. Not unnecessarily restrict the transboundary movement of LMOs that pose no threat to biodiversity, thus increasing costs and delays without compensatory increases in environmental protection. Be consistent with existing international obligations to protect the environment. Encourage technology transfer and information sharing so all countries can benefit from advances in medical, agricultural and environmental biotechnology, while, at the same time, allowing for the protection of confidential information and intellectual property. Not divert resources from the protection of biodiversity to the development and administration of a regulatory system requiring case-by-case review of low-risk products. Be flexible so that any country can respond rapidly and appropriately to favorable developments in the new and evolving field of biotechnology.”

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Biotech › CBD › 1NC --- CBD

The CBD and BSP work to protect biodiversity and increase information sharing between countries for mutual benefit of the environment and the field of biotechnology

BIO (Biotechnology Innovation Organization, BIO is the world’s largest advocacy association representing member companies, state biotechnology groups, academic and research institutions, and related organizations across the United States and in 30+ countries, “The Biosafety Protocol-An Overview”, , Accessed June 19, 2022)//AS

“Representatives from 170 countries are currently negotiating international provisions governing the shipment and use of products from biotechnology. These provisions, officially known as the "Biosafety Protocol," are intended to provide uniform international requirements for ensuring the safe transport and use of these products. The Protocol could offer a framework to guide countries that currently lack national regulatory systems for products of biotechnology. If the Protocol is not carefully crafted, however, it could seriously impede international trade, product development, technology transfer, and scientific research. Potential benefits could also be significantly offset by huge costs, uncertainty, and delays. Protocol development is proceeding rapidly; negotiations will be completed in February 1999.

Background: The Biosafety Protocol (BSP) is an outgrowth of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), a multilateral treaty for protecting biodiversity. The CBD's sound and commendable goals are to: Conserve biodiversity and provide for its sustainable use, and promote the fair and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the genetic resources inherent in biodiversity.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Cyber › Ukraine › 1NC --- Ukraine

US unilateral action solves Ukraine escalation

Freeman 22 - [Robert Freeman, (Founder and Executive Director of  which builds small-scale infrastructure projects in the developing world to improve humanity’s capacity for self-development; author of "The Best One Hour History" series which includes "World War I" , "The InterWar Years", "The Vietnam War", and other titles.) 3-7-2022, "How the US Could Solve the Ukraine Crisis Tomorrow: If the U.S. wants peace, it can have it tomorrow." ] //MLee

No war is a one-sided affair. There is no sound to one hand clapping. Russia's assault on Ukraine is an unambiguously bad thing. But it didn't happen in a vacuum. In order to solve the problem, we have to first understand the context in which it occurred, and the part that the U.S. played in its happening. [The U.S.] can attain that end with two simple moves: declare that Ukraine will not be admitted into NATO; and remove its offensive nuclear missiles from Russia's borders. The Big Bang in U.S.-Russian relations was the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Then-U.S. president George H.W. Bush and his Secretary of State, James Baker, promised Mikhail Gorbachev that if he agreed to the unification of Germany, NATO would not expand eastward, toward Russia, "not one inch." That promise was broken almost immediately when, in 1999, Bill Clinton helped usher Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO. Russia considered this move not just a betrayal, but an act of aggression. First, Poland is an implacable enemy of Russia, and has been for centuries. And NATO had just finished bombing Russian ally Yugoslavia out of existence. The "slav" in Yugoslavia signifies the same ethnicity as the Slavs who are the Russian people. It is lost on the average American that Russians are spooked by Western aggression. Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812 and burned Moscow to the ground. That's what Tchaikovsky's 1812 Overture, with its church bells ringing and cannons booming, is about. The German invasion in the First World War caused the government of the Tsar to fall to the Bolsheviks. That gave birth to communism as a state-based system and the animus for the Cold War which dominated the second half of the Twentieth Century. Before World War I was even settled, the Western victors invaded Russia to try to snuff out its new government before it was stable. That was the infamous White Counter-Revolution, led by the U.S., the U.K., Japan, and Italy. The German invasion in World War II caused the death of 27,000,000 Russians, 90 times U.S. losses in the War. Over 70,000 villages, 1,500 towns, and 9,000 bridges were destroyed. The already primitive national transportation network was reduced to rubble and agricultural production was decimated. Russians remember these things, though they are barely known in the West. The perception of aggressiveness in NATO moving eastward was hardly the Russians' alone. Bill Bradley, Paul Nitze, Sam Nunn, Robert McNamara, and more than 30 other foreign policy heavyweights wrote to Clinton that such expansion was both provocative and unnecessary, given the absence of a military threat. George Kennan, the pre-eminent U.S. strategist of the post-World War II era, declared that, "NATO expansion will prove the greatest U.S. foreign policy blunder of the twentieth century." That is a pretty stern prediction, coming from the man who conceived of the Cold War policy of Containment and who, in 1980, wrote, "The Vietnam War was the most disastrous of all of America's undertakings over the whole two hundred years of its history." It didn't matter. The U.S. had just won the Cold War. It was on a roll, convinced of its imperial inevitability, strategic infallibility, and military invulnerability. Vapid phrases masqueraded as deep ideas, phrases like "a new world order," "the end of history" and "the indispensable nation." They were tossed around as rationalizations for the use of force against any nation that stood in the way of U.S. pursuit of global hegemony. Think, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The U.S. promise to not move NATO eastward was broken again, in 2004, when, during the George W. Bush administration, NATO admitted Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to membership. All three nations adjoin Russia, placing NATO forces on Russia's borders. NATO also admitted Romania and Bulgaria in the same induction batch. Poland, Hungary, and Romania participate in NATO's "nuclear preparedness posture" which means hosting offensive nuclear missiles aimed at Russia. These can hit major Russian cities in as little as 10 minutes. The best way to understand the provocativeness of this move to the Russians is the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1962, the Soviet Union began placing offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, 90 miles off the coast of Florida. It was in response to the U.S. having installed similar missiles in Turkey. The Cuban missiles would be able to hit Washington D.C. in 30 minutes. The U.S. became apoplectic, in fact, hysterical. There was no defense against the missiles. U.S. military forces were put on "DEFCON 2" alert, the highest state of preparedness short of actual war. It was the only time during the entire 45 years of the Cold War they were placed at such an elevated state of readiness. Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defense, later wrote of going out onto the balcony of the White House, looking up at the stars, and crying. It occurred to him that this would be the last Saturday he would ever see. That's how perilous the Crisis was. It was only John Kennedy's deft handling of the situation that defused the Crisis. Part of the resolution was that the U.S. agreed to remove its missiles from Turkey. It was an implicit acknowledgement on the part of the U.S. of just how provocative such forward-based offensive nuclear systems are. They are no less provocative today. In 2014, the U.S. helped carry out a coup d'état against the democratically-elected, Russian-leaning Ukrainian government of Viktor Yanukovych. It installed in its place a crypto-fascist, Western-leaning government headed by Arseniy Yatsenyuk. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland was recorded organizing the coup. The recordings were made public by Russian intelligence in February 2014. When told by her associate, Geoffrey Pyatt, that the EU would not support a coup, Nuland famously declared, "Fuck the EU." Since the 2014 coup, the U.S. has shipped more than $2.5 billion in weapons to the new Ukrainian government. It has seen to it that Ukraine has not honored the Minsk I and II treaties that it signed in 2014 and 2015. Those treaties were designed to protect the autonomy of Russian-speaking dissidents in eastern Ukraine. In early February, the government of Ukraine began shelling Donbass, that eastern region of the country with a majority Russian-ethnic population. This has been done with the implicit blessing of the U.S., Ukraine's strategic sponsor Between 2002 and 2020, the U.S. withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Open Skies Treaty. All were designed to reduce tensions with Russia by ensuring verifiable enforcement of strategic nuclear weapons systems. Without the Treaties, nuclear uncertainty, and, therefore, the risks of mis-step and war, are greatly heightened. So, where does this leave us? Harvard's Stephen Walt, hardly a lightweight or a leftist dove, wrote two weeks ago, "Whatever your views on NATO enlargement might be, there is overwhelming evidence that Russian leaders were alarmed by it from the start and expressed their concerns repeatedly. Moscow grew increasingly opposed …as NATO crept ever eastward." Nobody can pretend the West did not know what the stakes were or what was coming. No meaningful security guarantees were offered. Indeed, in December, 2021, Vladimir Putin stated publicly that there was no further back that Russia could go. If the west would not provide meaningful security guarantees, Russia would solve the problem itself through "military-technical measures." The current invasion is what he was referring to. Nobody can pretend the West did not know what the stakes were or what was coming. No meaningful security guarantees were offered. Again, Russia's invasion of Ukraine is unambiguously bad. But as we search for a solution to the crisis, the key consideration is that while Ukraine is existential for the Russians—a matter of life and death—it is not a vital national security interest to the U.S. This is revealed in President Biden's repeated assurances that no U.S. forces will be committed to Ukraine. That is the key to the solution. If the U.S. is sincerely interested in a peaceful resolution of the crisis—and for argument's sake, let's assume that it is—it can attain that end with two simple moves: declare that Ukraine will not be admitted into NATO; and remove its offensive nuclear missiles from Russia's borders. Since Ukraine is not a matter of strategic interest to the U.S., this would come at little cost to the U.S. but will yield vastly disproportional gains to the situation by facilitating immediate de-escalation. Both the U.S. and NATO have stated informally that Ukraine will not be admitted anyway, so nothing, save, perhaps a little face, is lost. It would allow Russia to withdraw with something to be said for its efforts. As for the second plank of the solution—withdrawal of U.S. nuclear missiles from countries adjoining Russia—the U.S. understands better than any nation on earth the value of having offensive nuclear missiles removed from its borders. It knows, from first-hand experience, better than any nation in the world, how to defuse this crisis. This is the concept of "strategic empathy:" understanding your adversary's interests and motivations, not to give in to them, but to better attain your own ends. As Walt, Kennan, and other analysts have said, Russia feels aggressed upon, threatened, and out of peaceful options. If the U.S.'s ends are peace, the means are at hand to achieve it, and with no loss of strategic position. If the U.S.'s interests are not peace, that will be revealed equally as clearly, equally as quickly. Yes, there will be necessary negotiations about withdrawal, reparations, and other such wind-downs, but those pale next to the threat of unintended escalation to what could very easily end up as nuclear war. The stakes are huge. Simple, workable solutions are at hand. The costs are small. The alternatives are unfathomable. If the U.S. wants peace, it can have it tomorrow.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Cyber › Space › 2NC --- Satellites

Updating satellites solves critical infrastructure.

Rebecca Heilweil, 7-29-2021, "For hackers, space is the final frontier," Vox,

Our increased reliance on this tech makes the threat of hacking especially worrisome. A hacker could try to access a satellite by targeting a company’s ground systems, and once inside, the attacker could manipulate the communications or controls, download unwanted software, or even tell the satellite to change its course, according to Iain Boyd, the director of the University of Colorado Boulder’s Center for National Security Initiatives.

“It’s the same kind of thing where people are getting into your computer system and behaving badly,” Boyd told Recode. He added that hackers might also attempt to overwhelm a satellite with false signals or impersonate a satellite’s communication — a process called spoofing — to confuse vehicles on Earth’s surface.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Cyber › Space › 1NC --- Space Force

The USSF solves satellite cyber security

Johnson 22 - [Kimberly Johnson, (Writer covering aviation and defense issues, including assignments in Iraq and Afghanistan with Marine Corps and Army infantry units) 5-26-2022, "To Infinity and Beyond," FLYING,

The U.S. Space Force (USSF)—the nation’s newest military service branch and the first created in a generation—stands ready to engage in a new era of national defense where commercial space and military interests collide.

Pushing military capabilities “to infinity and be-yond” isn’t exactly new. The U.S. military began space research following World War II and prior to the formation of the Department of the Air Force. Nearly four decades later, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) unified efforts by establishing the Air Force Space Command in 1982. That mission later expanded into cyberspace as well as providing space-based communication and navigational support for U.S. forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Cyber › Space › 1NC --- SpaceX

SpaceX bottom up approach solves – bringing the public and private sectors together solves without relying on international actors.

Brian Downey, 9-2-2020, "MSP Security Threats," Connect Wise,

If you’ve been following the news lately, you know that SpaceX—the space exploration company founded by Elon Musk nearly 20 years ago—is making a lot of headway in their mission to get to Mars. It’s not a matter of IF SpaceX will make human travel into space possible, but WHEN.

There’s a lot to be learned from the way SpaceX approaches their mission, specifically as it relates to cybersecurity.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Cyber › Open source › 2NC --- Solves Cybersecurity

Open-sourced software solves cybersecurity

Lin 22 - [Sz Lin, (works for Moxa in the Software Development Center) 2022, "Manage Vulnerabilities in ICS Open Source Software," Global Cybersecurity Alliance, ] //MLee

Open source software (OSS) is frequently integrated into industrial control systems (ICS) and critical infrastructure as business owners pursue greater interoperability, portability, and interchangeability. While tapping into the benefits of open source software, cybersecurity considerations are imperative, since availability and reliability is paramount for industrial control systems. Ensuring high-quality code in open source software to avoid an increased cyber risk to the ICS becomes a pivotal challenge. Vulnerability management of open source software should be considered and evaluated through the lifecycle of software development, starting as early as possible—to reduce cost and effort in the maintenance phase and to enhance the cybersecurity management that helps avoid system downtime.

Open Source Software in Industrial Control Systems

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Cyber › Open source › 1NC --- Open Source

Federal open-sourced policy gets modeled globally

Tucker 22 - [Margaret Tucker, (Platform Policy Analyst for GitHub), 6-14-2022, "How can the United States build its Open Source Software policy?," GitHub Blog, ]//MLee

The world runs on open source, which serves as the foundation for globally interconnected digital infrastructure. With an estimated , both the private and public sectors depend on the maintenance of open source software (OSS), but governments have untapped potential as leaders in the OSS community. Currently, most engagement has centered around security. Earlier this year, GitHub attended the  where participants discussed the unique value and security challenges of OSS. While securing OSS is an important concern, full stack federal OSS policy requires dialogue between policymakers, practitioners, and wonks. To this end, GitHub was proud to attend the June 8 roundtable discussion, , in Washington, D.C.

The event kicked off with a bold question posed by Harvard Business School professor, Frank Nagle: “What would a federal open source policy agenda look like?” Building off of his , Nagle proposed actionable steps the public sector could take to cultivate a thriving OSS ecosystem, from understanding and supporting the open source ecosystem to establishing a federal Open Source Program Office (OSPO). A federal OSPO could coordinate OSS efforts across agencies, including those among the thousands of government organizations around the world already using  As the meeting progressed, speakers addressed the political and organizational challenges to federal open source publishing and discussed how renewed commitment to  and the  could bolster US support for digital infrastructure.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Cyber › Norms › 2NC --- Coop Fails

International cyber agreements always fail – history proves

MaČÁK 17 [Kubo MaČÁK, Dr Kubo Mačák is a legal adviser at the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Prior to joining the ICRC in 2019, he worked as an Associate Professor of Public International Law at the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom. "From Cyber Norms to Cyber Rules: Re-engaging States as Law-makers," Cambridge University press, https://www-cambridge-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/from-cyber-norms-to-cyber-rules-reengaging-states-as-lawmakers/63A45029B685C11BBD9512AC0459FAE5] Blitz

2. Crisis indicators: International law and cyber security Three stand-out indicators suggest a crisis in this area of law. First, the domain of cyber security appears resistant to codification of the applicable rules in a comprehensive multilateral binding treaty.This is not for want of trying by the leading international stakeholders. In 1996, France put forward the earliest proposal with the lofty title Charter for International Cooperation on the Internet.Later, a Sino-Russian initiative resulted in two proposals for a Code of Conduct for Information Security, submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2011 and 2015, respectively.However, none of these proposals was met with much enthusiasm by other statesand scholars describe the prospects of an ‘omnibus’ treaty being adopted in the near future as slim to negligible.This is no doubt partly because, whatever the subject, the ‘very word “treaty” may conjure up the fearsome formalities of diplomacy’, with a chilling effect on states’ willingness to engage in this form of law-making.Yet, with respect to cyber security, this aversion appears to be particularly pronounced. Second, states have shown extreme reluctance to contribute to the development of cyber-specific customary international rules. In addition to state practice in this area being inevitably shrouded in secrecy,states have been reluctant to offer clear expressions of opinio juris on matters related to cyber security.At times, this approach may be understandable, as it is the consequence of domestic political gridlock or a deliberate waiting strategy.On other occasions, it may rather be due to the persistent ‘cybersecurity knowledge gap’; in other words, the striking lack of understanding of cybersecurity permeating governments around the world.On the whole, this reluctance adds to the pervasive ambiguity as far as the specific applicability of international law is concerned. This trend is visible even in the most recent developments. A representative example of another missed opportunity to steer the development of cyber custom is provided by the recent US Law of War Manual adopted in July 2015 and updated in December 2016.Although it does contain a chapter on cyber operations,the Manual skirts virtually all unsettled issues, including standards of attribution, rules of targeting or the requirement to review cyber weapons.

2022 MNDI Counterplan
Cyber › Norms › 2NC --- Solvency

Disambiguating norms solves – it allows for accountability while avoiding the pitfalls of international agreements

Lewis 22 [James Andrew Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic Technologies Program at CSIS, "Creating Accountability for Global Cyber Norms," Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://www.csis.org/analysis/creating-accountability-global-cyber-norms] Blitz

The year 2021 saw all UN member states agree in the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on a for responsible state behavior in cyberspace, based on norms developed in the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) in 2015.1 The OEWG formalized global agreement on the 2015 norms. This consensus agreement means that the framework for responsible state behavior is now politically binding for all member states. Global agreement on the obligations for responsible state behavior is a substantial step forward in building international cybersecurity in a rules-based environment. Unfortunately, international experience since 2015 has shown that agreement on norms, even when politically binding, is by itself not enough to ensure their observation or create stability in cyberspace. This has shifted discussion from what norms are needed to how to build accountability and what to do when norms are ignored. While the norms agreed to by all member states will ultimately reinforce international stability, to make progress, it will be necessary to develop a collective diplomatic strategy to improve the observation of norms and increase accountability when they are ignored. A strategy of sustained engagement and the imposition of consequences is necessary for norms to have effect. Our assumption is that accountability for malicious cyber actions can only be strengthened if there are consequences for a state’s decision not to observe norms. If nothing else, a failure to take action in response to transgressions seems to only encourage opponents. An immediate task is to define the conditions for collective action. There has been an initial and informal agreement among like-minded democratic nations that accountability requires the imposition of consequences for a failure to observe norms, but several issues must be addressed. These include agreement on standards for attribution of the source of a malicious action and agreement on a proportional, lawful, and effective response. A collective approach is essential if efforts to create accountability are to succeed, and any response to a cyber incident will require political heft and sustained engagement. Applicable Norms and “Agency” What norms are in fact ignored? Many of the OEWG norms focus on protecting critical infrastructure. However, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure are rare. In contrast, risks of international peace and stability from other kinds of cyber actions are already increasing. If the aim is to increase stability, the relevant norms are found in , where states agree to prevent actions that threaten or are harmful to international peace and security and to not knowingly allow their territory to be used for wrongful acts. This latter norm is vital, as it makes clear that responsibility derives from sovereign jurisdiction (or a failure to exercise it). This makes the assignment of political responsibility to a state easier and clearer. Equally important, the foundation for the OEWG norms is the binding agreement by all states to observe the UN Charter, where states have agreed to refrain from the use of force or threats to use force against the political independence of other states and have agreed to respect international law and fundamental human rights. These OEWG commitments and charter obligations are routinely ignored by some states that violate other nations’ sovereignty in ways that damage security, stability, and human rights. One shortcoming with the UN-agreed norms is their lack of “agency,” or the capacity to take action. In theory, agency falls to the international community acting through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but in fact, this means the ability to reach agreement in the United Nations on a response to malicious cyber action is very limited. The United Nations is a consensus-based organization, with many members who have different and sometimes competing interests. Creating accountability has always been difficult for the international community, not just in cyberspace. Actions must be exceptionally egregious, and powerful states will put their national interests first. Additionally, states are understandably reluctant to agree to coercive measures—particularly those involving force or the threat of force—for cyber incidents where culpability is deniable, rules are still unclear, and damage (from a strategic perspective) is usually minimal. The absence of consequences for individual cyber actions makes it easy to ignore efforts to impose accountability. One shortcoming with the UN-agreed norms is their lack of “agency,” or the capacity to take action. In theory, agency falls to the international community acting through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but in fact, this means the ability to reach agreement in the United Nations on a response to malicious cyber action is very limited. Creating accountability is complicated for cyber actions, since almost all such actions stay below the threshold of the use of force, on which many rules are predicated. The international community is more likely to respond to the use of force, but few cyber incidents have had effects that approximate the use of force. Despite hyperbole, no one has ever died in a cyberattack, there have been very few incidents of physical destruction, and until 2020, cybersecurity had never come before the UNSC, making it a lesser issue in the eyes of many member states not directly involved in cyber conflict. This is changing as the risks of malicious cyber action have increased, as dependence on networks has grown, and as a result of increased great power competition. Even so, there is still some reluctance to act in response to malicious cyber action. Diplomatic practice does offer an alternative approach that provides for agency. This alternative is more attainable in the near term. It requires a group of like-minded nations to first agree on their responsibility to observe cyber norms in their national practice. This requires a public commitment at senior political levels for these nations themselves to be guided by the OEWG framework for responsible state behavior. On the basis of this commitment, the second step is collectively responding to violations of norms. This collective response has rarely been undertaken for malicious cyber actions. Changing this is a crucial first step. Consistent action by a group of states to impose consequences for not observing agreed norms is essential to creating accountability. An example might be the Western effort in the 1990s to persuade China not to sell missiles.2 This effort took several years of high-level engagement and a constant reiteration of the need for responsible states to observe the norms developed for such transfers (in the Missile Technology Control Regime). The issue was raised with China at every level, on every occasion, and during every topic of engagement. A talking point on proliferation was appended to every senior officials’ statement. Most importantly, it was not just one nation appearing to complain and suggest; it was done repeatedly and collectively every time Western leaders engaged with their Chinese counterparts. One of the most important steps that can be taken to increase observation of the 2021 UN norms is to make this kind of sustained engagement a routine expectation for state behavior rather than a sporadic objection when unspoken expectations for respecting sovereignty and law are flouted. Raising specific instances of a failure to observe norms with the state responsible and asking for explanation and cessation is an essential first step. However, such efforts will be more effective when accompanied by persuasive evidence (and adequacy will be discussed later) and when carried out by many nations. This can be done in both private and public engagement. In the proliferation case, it was persuasive to share with China and others the most senior levels of intelligence (such as satellite imagery) that established responsibility. For cyber actions, there will be objections to such sharing on the grounds that this will inform opponents of U.S. capabilities, but the detailed indictments made by the Department of Justice—often accompanied by pictures of the individual government agent—show such sharing can be done. This is different from “name-and-shame,” a useless strategy involving a public statement made safely in capital and without any follow-up action. These statements have no political weight. What is needed is a direct engagement with the leaders of culpable states and the credible threat of a punitive response. The key to a new approach is a consistent, collective, and direct approach at senior levels to object to a state’s failure to observe norms accepted by all responsible states. Every time ministers meet with a counterpart, they must raise the issue of malicious cyber action, using points developed in common with their partners and providing specifics of the act. The actions that have come closest to this have only occurred with the joint condemnations of and and the statements and the EU high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, . But if such statements are to be more than one-offs, filed away and ignored, they must be repeated by all other G7 nations and by other EU member states. Consistent and direct iteration on the need to observe norms must become standard diplomatic practice for like-minded states. A comprehensive strategy to create accountability would define and articulate possible responses to reinforce an integrated diplomatic campaign. In developing a collective diplomatic strategy linked to potential consequences, the issues of political attribution, the development of a menu of response actions consistent with international law and agreed norms, and proportionality in any response come to the fore as determinative issues.