2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Brittle AI Advantage › Brittle - AI Accidents Inevitable
Scharre, 2016 -- Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Paul, Feb 2016, Center for New American Security, “Autonomous weapons and operational risk”, https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf?mtime=20160906080515&focal=none, Acc 6/21/22, M. A.]
The risk in employing an autonomous system is that the system might not perform the task in a manner that the human operator intended. There are a number of reasons why an autonomous system might begin performing inappropriately, from simple malfunctions and software bugs to more complex system failures, changing environmental conditions, hacking, and human error. When these failures can be anticipated in advance, human operators can account for these limitations. When failures are unanticipated, however, the result can be autonomous systems that slip out of control. Understanding the likelihood and consequences of a loss of control is essential to assessing the risk in employing autonomous systems.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Brittle AI Advantage › Brittle - AI Accidents Inevitable
Nurkin and Konaev, 2022 - senior fellows at the Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council [Tate and Margarita, 5-25-2022, “Eye to eye in AI: Developing artificial intelligence for national security and defense” Atlantic Council ARD]
Demonstrating that the age of deployed AI is indeed here, in September 2021 Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall announced that the Air Force had “deployed AI algorithms for the first time to a live operational kill chain.”52 According to Kendall, the objective of incorporating AI into the targeting process is to “significantly reduce the manpower intensive tasks of manually identifying targets— shortening the kill chain and accelerating the speed of decision-making.”53 The successful use of AI to support targeting constitutes a milestone for AI development, though there remain ethical, safety, and technical challenges to more complete adoption of AI in this role. For example, a 2021 DoD test highlighted the problem of brittle AI. According to reporting from Defense One, the AI-enabled targeting used in the test was accurate only about 25 percent of the time in environments in which the AI had to decipher data from different angles—though it believed it was accurate 90 percent of the time—revealing a lack of ability “to adapt to conditions outside of a narrow set of assumptions.”54 These results illustrate the limitations of today’s AI technology in security-critical settings, and reinforce the need for aggressive and extensive real-world and digital-world testing and evaluation of AI under a range of conditions. The ethics and safety of AI targeting could also constitute a challenge to further adoption, especially as confidence in AI algorithms grows. The Air Force operation involved automated target recognition in a supporting role, assisting “intelligence professionals”—i.e., human decision-makers.55 Of course, DoD has a rigorous targeting procedure in place, of which AI-enabled targeting algorithms would be a part, and that, thinking further ahead, autonomous systems would have to go through. Still, even as they are part of this process and designed to support human decisions, a high error rate combined with a high level of confidence in AI outputs could potentially lead to undesirable or grave outcomes.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Brittle AI Advantage › Brittle - AI Accidents Inevitable
Scharre, 2016 -- Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Paul, Feb 2016, Center for New American Security, “Autonomous weapons and operational risk”, https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf?mtime=20160906080515&focal=none, Acc 6/21/22, M. A.]
Autonomous systems lack the flexibility humans have to adapt to novel circumstances. This may mean that in unexpected situations, autonomous systems make mistakes that humans would not have. As militaries think through how they incorporate autonomy into future weapons, a clear-eyed assessment of the risks associated with autonomous weapons is required. Accidents with autonomous weapons could lead to civilian casualties, fratricide, or unintended escalation in a crisis. Understanding these risks is important for policymakers and acquisition professionals weighing whether to build autonomous weapons, as well as for military commanders who are responsible for the weapons they deploy on the battlefield. Of course, humans are far from perfect in war. They make mistakes that lead to fratricide and civilian casualties as well, and humans also commit deliberate acts of atrocity.5 There are important qualitative differences between the risks associated with semi-autonomous (human in the loop) weapons and autonomous weapons, however: • Without a human in the loop to act as a fail-safe, the consequences of failure with an autonomous weapon could be far more severe than an equivalent semi-autonomous weapon. • For extremely simple autonomous weapons, these risks may be manageable if human operators employ them only in limited, controlled contexts. As autonomous weapons increase in complexity, however, it may be more difficult for human operators to fully understand the boundaries of their behavior and accurately predict under what conditions failures might occur, even if they are unlikely. • While improved test and evaluation can mitigate these risks somewhat, they cannot be eliminated entirely. Failures in complex systems may not be likely, but over a long enough time horizon they are inevitable.
Military AI systems are prone to technical failures which cause unpredictable escalation risks.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Brittle AI Advantage › Brittle – Fast Deployment causes Brittle AI
Vestner, 2021 - Head of Security and Law Programme at Geneva Centre for Security Policy [Tobias, July 8 “Warfare and Artificial Intelligence” in Robin Geiß and Henning Lahmann (eds), Research Handbook on Warfare and Artificial Intelligence -forthcoming https://www.gcsp.ch/publications/military-operations-and-artificial-intelligenceGCSP Acc 5/27/22 TA]
Most importantly for military strategy, AI applications may assist decision-makers to monitor the battlefield and develop scenarios. Indeed, AI could be developed to predict the behaviour and reactions of foreign countries or generate simulations of the progression of ongoing conflicts.32 AI may also be useful to assess threats, provide risk analyses, and suggest courses of action, ultimately guiding decision-makers on the best response to take.33 In addition, AI may support the alignment of the armed forces’ ways and means with the given political and strategic objectives - a major function of military strategy. A consequence of such developments would be an increased speed and quality of military processes. While this would provide significant advantages to those states with the most performant AI,34 this may also pressure armed forces to increasingly delegate the orchestration of military operations to AI systems.35 Indeed, the use of AI for military strategy may also lead to challenges. Reliable AI systems would need to be trained with vast data sets.36 Furthermore, it has been warned that AI may exacerbate threats, transform their nature and characteristics, and introduce new security threats.37 A tabletop exercise on the integration of AI into nuclear C2 systems showed that such systems were ‘vulnerable to malicious manipulation that can severely degrade strategic stability’,38 for instance. Such vulnerabilities would derive mostly from the risk posed by third actors using techniques to deceive, disrupt or impair C2 systems,39 which indicates the importance of system safety for AI to be used for military strategy. Another significant challenge is that AI may accelerate the speed of warfare to the extent that humans cease to be able to follow the developments, ultimately leading humans to lose control. 40 This phenomenon has been termed battlefield ‘singularity’ or ‘hyperwar’.41 This may lead to strategic errors and accidents, including involuntary conflict escalation. Even if such risks can be alleviated, the increased reliance on AI would reduce the human element of military strategy, in particular psychology and human judgment. It has been argued that this could lead to a ‘gap between how the AI solves a problem framed by humans, and how those humans would solve it if they possessed the AI’s speed, precision, and brainpower’.42 Yet it has also been argued that strategy development would require the understanding of values, the balance of costs, and the understanding of the complex social system in which war operates, thereby significantly limiting AI’s use for military strategy.43 Yet it is also possible that when enemies possess high levels of rational prediction power provided by AI systems, the decisive factor in warfare will not be the AI systems’ capabilities but the human judgment, in particular concerning critical and difficult choices.44 This, however, presumes a certain level of meaningful human involvement. In sum, AI may enhance military strategy development and strategic decision-making, notably if able to process more data and make sense of complexity with more precision and at a higher speed than humans and simple computing. A likely result is an acceleration of military operations, which may increase pressure on armed forces to integrate AI and may marginalize human judgment. States’ recent adoption of defence strategies on and related to AI indicate that states increasingly intend to develop, acquire, and operationalize AI for military purposes. As such, the possession and use of AI is a strategic objective itself. In light of secrecy around the development of new technologies, states’ investment in military AI can become a strategic liability as it may increase the risk of destabilizing arms races, misperceptions, and miscalculations.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Brittle AI Advantage › Brittle – Fast Deployment causes Brittle AI
Atherton 2022 – Military Technology Journalist [Kelsey, 5/6/22, “Understanding the errors introduced by military AI applications”, , 6/18/22, LND]
On March 22, 2003, two days into the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, American troops fired a Patriot interceptor missile at what they assumed was an Iraqi anti-radiation missile designed to destroy air-defense systems. Acting on that recommendation of their computer-powered weapon, the Americans fired in self-defense, thinking they were shooting down a missile coming to destroy their outpost. What the Patriot missile system had identified as an incoming missile, was in fact a UK Tornado fighter jet, and when the Patriot struck the aircraft, it killed two crew on board instantly. The deaths were the first losses suffered by the Royal Air Force in the war and the tragic result of friendly fire. A subsequent RAF Board of Inquiry concluded that the shoot-down was the result of a combination of factors: how the Patriot missile classified targets, rules for firing the missiles, autonomous operation of Patriot missile batteries, and several other technical and procedural factors, like the Tornado not broadcasting its “friend or foe” identifier at the time of the friendly fire. The destruction of Tornado ZG710, the report concluded, represented a tragic error enabled by the missile’s computer routines. The shoot-down of the Tornado happened nearly 20 years ago, but it offers an insight into how AI-enabled systems or automated tools on the battlefield will affect the kinds of errors that happen in war. Today, human decisionmaking is shifting toward machines. With this shift comes the potential to reduce human error, but also to introduce new and novel types of mistakes. Where humans might have once misidentified a civilian as a combatant, computers are expected to step in and provide more accurate judgment. Across a range of military functions, from the movement of autonomous planes and cars to identifying tanks on a battlefield, computers are expected to provide quick, accurate decisions. But the embrace of AI in military applications also comes with immense risk. New systems introduce the possibility of , and understanding how autonomous machines is important when for this new generation of autonomous weapons.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Brittle AI Advantage › Brittle – Fast Deployment causes Brittle AI
Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Michael, Paul, January 12 2021, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence- Building Measures”, , Acc 6/18/22. M.A.]
Alternatively, militaries could adopt an immature technology too quickly, betting heavily and incorrectly on new and untested propositions about how a technology may change warfare. Given the natural incentive militaries have in ensuring their capabilities work on the battlefield, it may be reasonable to assume that militaries would manage these risks reasonably well, although not without some mishaps. But when balancing the risk of accidents versus falling behind adversaries in technological innovation, militaries arguably place safety as a secondary consideration. Militaries may be relatively accepting of the risk of accidents in the pursuit of technological advantage, since accidents are a routine element of military operations, even in training. Nevertheless, there are strong bureaucratic interests in ultimately ensuring that fielded capabilities are robust and secure, and existing institutional processes may be able to manage AI safety and security risks with some adaptation. For militaries, balancing between the risks of going too slow versus going too fast with AI adoption is complicated by the fact that AI, and deep learning in particular, is a relatively immature technology with significant vulnerabilities and reliability concerns. These concerns are heightened in situations where there may not be ample data on which to train machine learning systems. Machine learning systems generally rely on very large data sets, which may not exist in some military settings, particularly when it comes to early warning of rare events (such as a nuclear attack) or tracking adversary behavior in a multidimensional battlefield. When trained with inadequate data sets or employed outside the narrow context of their design, AI systems are often unreliable and brittle. AI systems can often seem deceptively capable, performing well (sometimes better than humans) in some laboratory settings, then failing dramatically under changing environmental conditions in the real world. Self-driving cars, for example, may be safer than human drivers in some settings, then inexplicably turn deadly in situations where a human operator would not have trouble. Additionally, deep learning methods may, at present, be insufficiently reliable for safety-critical applications even when operating within the bounds of their design specifications. For example, concerns about limits to the reliability of algorithms across demographic groups have hindered the deployment of facial recognition technology in the United States, particularly in high-consequence applications such as law enforcement. Militaries, too, should be concerned about technical limitations and vulnerabilities in their AI systems. Militaries want technologies that work, especially on the battlefield. Accordingly, the AI strategy of the Department of Defense (DoD) calls for AI systems that are “resilient, robust, reliable, and secure.” This is undoubtedly the correct approach but a challenge, at least in the near term, given the reliability issues facing many uses of algorithms today and the highly dynamic conditions of battlefield use.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › “Arms Race” Framing › Reject “Arms Race” Rhetoric
Roff 2019 – Fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Program [Heather, 4/26/19, , “The Frame problem: The Ai ‘Arms Race’ isn’t one’, 6/18/22, LND]
There needs to be a change in thinking about AI. Those dealing with AI must insist on greater clarity about its definition. If policy makers and other leaders are not clear about what the term means and entails, they cannot possibly formulate best practices and governance mechanisms. It would help matters if artificial intelligence discussions were framed in an “AI +” framework, because in many cases, AI is merely a tool included in a system involving other functions or capabilities. The news media should stop framing the global artificial intelligence competition as an “arms race.” This misrepresents the competition going on among countries. The policy community needs a clear-eyed appraisal of AI’s capabilities and limitations. Without that orientation, those who hope to steer research and development in positive directions will create more problems than they solve. Last year, colleagues and I in the “AI Safety” community published a paper on the potential misuses of artificial intelligence and potential interventions to lessen the likelihood and impact of misuse. Because of the dual-use nature of artificial intelligence, its almost ubiquitous nature, and its potential to create threats – either new or in combination with previously existing threats – we recommended that policy makers and others involved in AI efforts begin to respond immediately. In many cases, my coauthors have done just that. For example, OpenAI – an organization that hopes to ensure artificial general intelligence benefits humanity and that includes some of my co-authors – recently refused to publish the full model of its GPT-2 algorithm, which can generate synthetic natural language text – that is, articles, answers to reading comprehension questions, and other types of writing – of “unprecedented quality.” OpenAI realized that GPT-2 could help malicious actors generate disinformation and abusive content, increasing the likelihood of fraud based on impersonation. So they released only a smaller version of the GPT-2 code, dataset, and related information. That decision has been met with both derision and applause. Others have also begun serious and rigorous work at the policy and technology nexus, pushing for responsible and ethical design, development, and deployment of AI technologies. But there are other development and policy changes that could help head off potential abuses of AI. First, there needs to be a change in thinking about, and framing of, AI. In particular, those dealing with AI must insist on greater clarity about its definition. If policy makers and other leaders are not clear about what the term means and entails, they cannot possibly formulate best practices and governance mechanisms. Also, it would help matters if artificial intelligence discussions were framed in an “AI +” framework, because in many cases, AI is merely a tool included in a system involving other functions or capabilities – for example, artificial intelligence might be a part of a driverless vehicle that involves many technologies. Finally, I certainly hope that scholars, practitioners, policy makers, and especially the news media stop framing the global artificial intelligence competition as an “arms race.” This framing misrepresents the competition going on among countries. To address the risks of AI, the policy community needs a clear-eyed appraisal of its capabilities and limitations. Without that orientation, those who hope to steer AI research and development in positive directions will create more problems than they solve.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › “Arms Race” Framing › “Arms Race” Impacts
Garcia, 2021 - Vice-chair of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control [Denise, May 13, 2021, Nature.com, “Stop the emerging AI cold war,” ., 6/18/22 MD]
A race to militarize artificial intelligence is gearing up. Two years ago, the US Congress created the Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI). This March, it recommended that the must accelerate artificial-intelligence (AI) technologies to preserve national security and remain competitive with China and Russia. This will undermine the United States' ability to lead emerging global norms on AI. In April, the European Commission published the first international legal framework for making AI secure and ethical; in January, the European Parliament issued guidelines stating that military AI should not replace human decisions and oversight. By contrast, the NSCAI recommendations advocate "the integration of AI-enabled technologies into every facet of war-fighting". Enhancing AI war-fighting capacity will decrease security in a world where the biggest threats are instability -- political, social, economic and planetary. The NSCAI should heed the research community. Some 4,500 AI and researchers have declared that AI should not make the decision to take a human life -- aligning with the European Parliament guidelines and the European Union regulation. The NSCAI resurrected disastrous ideas from the cold war and framed its report in terms of winning a competition for AI-enabled warfare. During the cold war, the drive to stay ahead in the technological race led to the accumulation of 70,000 nuclear weapons and today's global arsenal of 13,100 warheads. This brought extortionate costs: US$70 billion is spent annually to maintain nuclear weapons globally. Other threats demand similar investments: in 2019, climate-induced natural disasters displaced 25 million people, and decentralized conflicts forced 8.6 million to move. Still more threats affect infrastructure, such as the ransomware attack on 8 May that shut down a 8,850-kilometre US fuel pipeline. The NSCAI does not prioritize international cooperation to create new regulations. Indeed, it speaks against a global ban on autonomous weapons, saying that other countries cannot be trusted to comply. But an AI-militarization race would be profoundly destabilizing. Unlike nuclear arms, AI is already ubiquitous in civilian spheres, so the dual-use risks of, say, flying drones or computer night are much higher. Since 2014, I have been an observer and adviser at United Nations meetings, and I testified in 2017 as part of the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons. In my view, rather than focusing on counting weapons or on particular weapons systems, policies should specify human intention and human-machine interaction, obligating countries to maintain human control over military force. Other agreements could mitigate malicious uses of AI, such as using facial recognition to oppress citizens or biased data to guide decisions about employment or incarceration. The world's people need protection from cyberattacks to infrastructure -- such as those on US hospitals in 2020 or those that hit national electrical grids. The NSCAI report calls for international standards for AI-enabled and autonomous weapons systems, arguing that if these systems are properly tested and designed, humans can use them to make the decision to kill, consistent with international humanitarian law. This is misleading: it's difficult to make machine learning's 'black box' nature fully interpretable, or to ensure that AI systems perform as expected after deployment. These systems learn from their environment, and the real world is never as simple as the laboratory. The NSCAI argues that the United States should seek commitments from Russia and China against autonomous nuclear weapons, even as it argues against treaties regulating other autonomous and AI weapons. Instead, the United States should negotiate decreases in nuclear arsenals and establish standards to keep humans in meaningful control. The NSCAI is too dismissive by discounting cooperation. The Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological Weapons Convention, the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the 1987 Montreal Protocol are examples of accountability on which all the major powers worked together. The United States and Russia established the International Space Station by cooperating closely. Most nations want governance that controls the use of AI in war. In June 2020, the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence was created by the Group of Seven industrialized countries (G7) and called for human-centric development and use of AI. The partnership brings scientific and research communities together with industry and government to facilitate international cooperation. This is the path that the United States should take -- with scientists, researchers and industry alike. The relentless pursuit of militarization does not protect us. It diverts resources and attention from nearer existential threats, such as extreme weather events. With the world reeling from COVID-19 -- the shock of the century -- now is not the moment to hasten towards worldwide confrontation. In 2019 alone, climate disasters displaced almost one million people in the United States. China, too, is extremely vulnerable to global warming. This common ground could pave the way to cooperation, including stopping the emerging AI cold war. This is no time to embark on an exorbitant and ineffective race.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › “Arms Race” Framing › “Arms Race” Impacts
Huang and Scott, 2018 - Chief Executive Officer and Chief Technology Officer at Malong Technologies [Dinglong and Matt July 21 World Economic Forum “Who will win the AI race? If countries work together, then the answer could be all of us” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/ai-arms-race-global-collaboration/, BK]
Why, then, the fixation? We suggest three reasons, starting with the most obvious: China’s 2017 declaration of support for AI as a national priority got the world’s attention, and other nations have followed suit. Second, the great places to work for the world’s best talent now include cities in China. We’re in Shenzhen, Beijing and Shanghai, and can observe our peer AI companies also thriving in these cities. Third, the amount of seed capital and venture capital investment available in China to support great companies is robust and according to some studies, exceeds that of the US for the first time. This need not be something to fear. The most promising near-term AI applications are those that are supported by globally relevant data, and will help people wherever they happen to live. Take medical technology. Everyone looks the same on the inside, and everyone can benefit from AI-enabled solutions that lead to faster, more accurate diagnoses and more effective treatment. Or take manufacturing and agriculture. AI-driven improvements and efficiencies will bring benefits where the factories and farms are. We aren’t arguing for nations to abandon homegrown efforts to support AI research, investment and entrepreneurship. In fact, we see them as something to celebrate and encourage. We expect great people, ideas and companies to continue to show up all over the world, with all the attendant benefits in terms of job creation and economic growth. There are indeed amazing things going on not only in the US and China, but also in Canada and Europe, Korea and Japan. It’s genuinely an international phenomenon. Problems come when we limit our thinking to nation-vs-nation competition. It bogs down our progress. There cannot be a Chinese AI vs an American AI vs a French AI, and so on. Instead, those national efforts must contribute to global cooperation and collaboration if AI is to advance and bring benefits to all communities worldwide. Let the companies do the competing.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › “Arms Race” Framing › “Arms Race” causes Premature Deployment
Sharre, 2018 - director of the technology and national security program at the Center for a New American Security [Paul, 12 September, “Ultrafast computing is critical to modern warfare. But it also ensures a lot could go very wrong, very quickly.” ST]
The problem is that automated systems—at least those using current technology—tend to be brittle. Machines are good at handling routine tasks under predictable circumstances, such as flying a commercial airliner. But automation can sometimes fail dramatically in new situations, which is a major reason why self-driving cars, which must contend with extremely dynamic and uncontrolled environments, have proved so much harder to develop than self-flying planes. Learning systems, which focus on a set of rules for processing and incorporating data into behavior instead of strict mandates, exhibit more flexibility but are still limited by the quality of information. Machine learning can fail if the real world proves different from training models—a major problem in the military context, where adversaries are unlikely to offer easy access to their tactics and hardware. Human intelligence is robust and adaptable in ways that machine intelligence is not—yet. The most effective militaries will thus be those that find ways to successfully marry human and machine intelligence into joint cognitive systems—an approach that defense analysts call centaur warfighting. Despite humans’ advantages in decision-making, an arms race in speed may slowly push humans out of the OODA loop. Militaries are unlikely to knowingly field weapons they cannot control, but war is a hazardous environment and requires balancing competing risks. Faced with the choice of falling behind an adversary or deploying a new and not yet fully tested weapon, militaries are likely to do what they must to keep pace with their enemies. As mentioned above, automated stock trading provides a useful window into the perils of this dynamic. In 2010, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost nearly 10 percent of its value in just minutes. The cause? A sudden shift in market prices driven in part by automated trading, or what’s come to be known as a flash crash. In the last decade, financial markets have started to suffer such crashes, or at least miniature versions of them, on a regular basis. The circuit breakers installed by regulators to pull a stock offline can’t prevent incidents from occurring, but they can stop flash crashes from spiraling out of control. Circuit breakers are still regularly tripped, though, and on Aug. 24, 2015, more than 1,200 of them went off across multiple exchanges after China suddenly devalued the yuan. In competitive environments such as stock markets and battlefields, unexpected interactions between algorithms are natural. The causes of the 2010 flash crash are still disputed. In all likelihood, there were a range of causes, including an automated sell algorithm interacting with extreme market volatility, exacerbated by high-frequency trading and deliberate spoofing of trading algorithms. To prevent the military equivalent of such crises, in which autonomous weapons become trapped in a cascade of escalating engagements, countries will have to balance advantages in speed with the risk of accidents. Yet growing competition will make that balancing act ever more difficult. In 2016, Robert Work, then-U.S. deputy defense secretary, colorfully summed up the problem this way: “If our competitors go to Terminators, and it turns out the Terminators are able to make decisions faster, even if they’re bad, how would we respond?”
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › “Arms Race” Framing › “Arms Race” causes Premature Deployment
Bob, 2019 - intelligence, terrorism and legal analyst at the Jerusalem Post [Yonah Jeremy, 13 February Jerusalem Post, “Top cybersecurity expert: Crisis worse than 9/11 could emerge from AI arms race.” , 6/18/22 MD]
Winning the artificial intelligence arms (AI) race between the US, Israel and their adversaries may need to take precedent over balancing the risks at this stage, a former government agency chief technology officer has told The Jerusalem Post. Those risks could include crises even worse than 9/11, said Amit Meltzer, now a top cybersecurity consultant. Discussing the issue on Tuesday, merely a day after US President Donald Trump issued the first-ever executive order to bolster US efforts in the artificial intelligence arms race, he said that winning such a competition would not go well with careful oversight of negative consequences and potential abuses. While US Senate Vice Intelligence Committee Chairman Mark Warner (D-VA) applauded aspects of the order, he criticized the lack of developing oversight for the misuse of AI. Warner supported the order’s provisions for opening US federal data sets to non-federal entities to enhance cooperation, but said that Trump’s order 'reflects a laissez-faire approach to AI development that... will have the US repeating the mistakes it has made in treating digital technologies as inherently positive forces, with insufficient consideration paid to their misapplication.' Meltzer called Trump’s declaration more symbolic rather than concretely operational, but said that it still was crucial 'to give strong backing to academic and government institutions… which suffer from a chronic lack of personnel' and resources. Furthermore, he said that concerns that certain companies would quickly gain domination of the AI sector and abuse their standing economically were possible. But, he said that it was nearly impossible to square 'the national necessity for the US' or Israel to 'strengthen and maintain leadership in the industry' with policies that encourage caution and that new technologies should only be rolled out after any danger was carefully examined. He compared the need to act with trying to keep up in the field of artificial intelligence with the US’s sale of weapons to any dictatorship that is not in a direct conflict with it, in order to make weapon development economically sustainable. However, Meltzer said that neither Trump nor Warner honed-in on the true potential dangers of AI. Once AI starts taking over a large number of societal functions, damage to a such a network could have far more disastrous and broader consequences and at a more rapid pace, he explained. By raising the specter of a disaster the size of the stock market crash of 1987, he said that economic or social-psychological warfare influence campaigns that dwarf current threats would become possible. Another nightmare scenario could be using an AI algorithm to make four million Toyota cars all crash at the same time worldwide, leaving countless dead and wounded in a tragedy 'that would be worse than 9/11.' The worst part of these dangers is that artificial intelligence could make such attacks infinitely easier than with advanced existing cyber hacking capabilities. Despite these threats, he predicted that the US needs to keep up with China, Russia and Israel’s need to stay ahead of its adversaries, meaning that rapidly developing new capabilities would continue to be put before protecting civil liberties. 'Afterwards, they will fix things and ask forgiveness from the victims,' he said of moving ahead too fast without proper oversight.
The Rhetoric of an AI Arms Race sparks a race to the bottom – states will deploy unsafe weapons to get them out before their competitors
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › “Arms Race” Framing › “Arms Race” causes Premature Deployment
Horowitz and Scharre 2021 - Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Michael, Paul, January 12 2021, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence- Building Measures”, , Acc 6/18/22. M.A.]
An additional challenge stems from security dilemma dynamics. Competitive pressures could lead nations to shortcut test and evaluation (T&E) in a desire to field new AI capabilities ahead of adversaries. Similar competitive pressures to beat others to market appear to have played an exacerbating role in accident risk relating to AI systems in self-driving cars and commercial airplane autopilots. Militaries evaluating an AI system of uncertain reliability could, not unjustifiably, feel pressure to hasten deployment if they believe others are taking similar measures. Historically, these pressures are highest immediately before and during wars, where the risk/reward equation surrounding new technologies can shift due to the very real lives on the line. For example, competitive pressures may have spurred the faster introduction of poison gas in World War I. Similarly, in World War II, Germany diverted funds from proven technologies into jet engines, ballistic missiles, and helicopters, even though none of the technologies proved mature until after the war. This dynamic risk might spark a self-fulfilling prophecy in which countries accelerate deployment of insufficiently tested AI systems out of the fear that others will deploy first. The net effect is not an arms race but a “race to the bottom” on safety, leading to the deployment of unsafe AI systems and heightening the risk of accidents and instability.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › “Arms Race” Framing › “Arms Race” causes Premature Deployment
Scharre 2021 – Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Paul, 6/28/21,https://tnsr.org/2021/06/debunking-the-ai-arms-race-theory/, “Debunking the AI Arms Race Theory”, 6/18/22, LND]
In 2015, a group of prominent AI and robotics researchers signed an open letter warning of the dangers of autonomous weapons. “The key question for humanity today,” they wrote, “is whether to start a global AI arms race or to prevent it from starting. If any major military power pushes ahead with AI weapon development, a global arms race is virtually inevitable.” Today, many nations are working to apply AI for military advantage, and the term “AI arms race” has become a catchphrase used by both critics and proponents of AI militarization. In 2018, then-Under Secretary of Defense Michael Griffin, calling for the United States to invest more in AI, stated, “There might be an artificial intelligence arms race, but we’re not yet in it.” In a 2020 Wired article, Will Roper, then chief acquisition officer for the U.S. Air Force, warned of the risks of falling behind in a “digital arms race with China.” The so-called AI arms race has become a common feature in news headlines, but the arms race framing fails to match reality. While nations are clearly competing to develop and adopt AI technology for military use, the character of that competition does not meet the traditional definition of an arms race. Military AI competition nevertheless does pose risks. The widespread adoption of military AI could cause warfare to evolve in a manner that leads to less human control and to warfare becoming faster, more violent, and more challenging in terms of being able to manage escalation and bring a war to an end. Additionally, perceptions of a “race” to field AI systems before competitors do could cause nations to cut corners on testing, leading to the deployment of unsafe AI systems that are at risk of accidents that could cause unintended escalation or destruction. Even if fears of an “AI arms race” are overblown, military AI competition brings real risks to which nations should attend. There are concrete steps nations can take to mitigate some of these dangers.
2022
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Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › “Arms Race” Framing › Security Dilemma Links
Sosanya, 2022 - AI researcher and a policy analyst at the Day One Project [Andrew, Jan 3, Peace Review A Journal of Social Justice “Autonomous Weapons Are Here to Stay” TM]
Great powers cannot afford to be idle in the face of technological innovation. Today, clear signs that leading militaries are preparing for the inevitable warfare of tomorrow exist: a future with autonomous weapons. With promising technology that is still in the research and development (R&D) phase, states act cautiously as the future has become doubly uncertain: they cannot predict their adversaries’ intentions, nor can they predict the usefulness of the weapon. In the United States, Department of Defense (DoD) leaders have indicated their willingness to deploy them. In 2017, Lieutenant General Jack Shanahan, the then-Director of DoD’s Joint AI Center, stated that he “does not want to see a future where our potential adversaries have a fully AI-enabled force and we do not.” The DoD has upstarted numerous programs in the last decade dedicated to autonomy, covering robotics, swarms, target recognition, machine learning, and more. Shanahan had cited China and Russia’s military AI R&D as a reason for the DoD’s increased focus on improving their own militarized artificial intelligence. Former Secretary of Defense Bob Work, who oversaw the 2017 revision of the DoD’s autonomous weapons policy, corroborated Shanahan’s thinking, that the United States would deploy autonomous weapons if their adversaries do first.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › “Arms Race” Framing › Security Dilemma Links
Scharre, 2019 - Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Paul, May-June, “Killer Apps: The Real Dangers of an AI Arms Race,” https://omnilogos.com/killer-apps-real-dangers-of-ai-arms-race/6/18/22 MD]
WHAT AI WILL DO Whichever country takes the lead on AI will use it to gain economic and military advantages over its competitors. By 2030, AI is projected to add between $13 trillion and $15 trillion to the global economy. AI could also accelerate the rate of scientific discovery. In 2019, an artificial neural network significantly outperformed existing approaches in synthetic protein folding, a key task in biological research. AI is also set to revolutionize warfare. It will likely prove most useful in improving soldiers' situational awareness on the battlefield and commanders' ability to make decisions and communicate orders. AI systems can process more information than humans, and they can do it more quickly, making them valuable tools for assessing chaotic battles in real time. On the battlefield itself, machines can move faster and with greater precision and coordination than people. In the recent AI-versus-human StarCraft match, the AI system, AlphaStar, displayed superhuman abilities in rapidly processing large amounts of information, coordinating its units, and moving them quickly and precisely. In the real world, these advantages will allow AI systems to manage swarms of robots far more effectively than humans could by controlling them manually. Humans will retain their advantages in higher-level strategy, but AI will dominate on the ground. Washington's rush to develop AI is driven by a fear of falling behind China, which is already a global powerhouse in AI. The Chinese technology giants Alibaba, Baidu, and Tencent rank right alongside Amazon, Google, and Microsoft as leading AI companies. Five of the ten AI startups with the most funding last year were Chinese. Ten years ago, China's goal of becoming the global leader in AI by 2030 would have seemed fanciful; today, it's a real possibility.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › “Arms Race” Framing › “Arms Race” Rhetoric Links
Scharre, 2019 - Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Paul, May-June, “Killer Apps: The Real Dangers of an AI Arms Race,” https://omnilogos.com/killer-apps-real-dangers-of-ai-arms-race/6/18/22 MD]
When it comes to applying AI to national security, government agencies will have to reconsider their traditional approaches to testing new systems. Verifying that a system meets its design specifications isn't enough. Testers also need to ensure that it will continue to function properly in the real world when an adversary is trying to defeat it. In some cases, they can use computer simulations to tease out bugs, as manufacturers now do for autonomous cars. On top of that, the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security and the intelligence community should create red teams--groups that act as attackers to test a system's defenses--to ferret out vulnerabilities in AI systems so that developers can fix them before the systems go live. Government officials should also tone down their rhetoric about an AI arms race, since such talk could easily become self-fulfilling. At a conference in 2018, Michael Griffin, the chief Pentagon official for research and engineering, said, "There might be an artificial intelligence arms race, but we're not yet in it." Militaries are certainly going to adopt AI, but Griffin's statement was missing any concern for--or even awareness of--the risks that come with it. Talk of an arms race encourages adversaries to cut corners on safety. Government officials should emphasize not only the value of AI but also the importance of guaranteeing reliability and security.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › “Arms Race” Framing › “Arms Race” Rhetoric Links
Scharre, 2019 - Vice President and Director of Studies at CNAS [Paul, May-June, “Killer Apps: The Real Dangers of an AI Arms Race,” https://omnilogos.com/killer-apps-real-dangers-of-ai-arms-race/6/18/22 MD]
The nation that leads in the development of artificial intelligence will, Russian President Vladimir Putin proclaimed in 2017, "become the ruler of the world." That view has become commonplace in global capitals. Already, more than a dozen governments have announced national AI initiatives. In 2017, set a goal of becoming the global leader in AI by 2030. Earlier this year, the White House released the American AI Initiative, and the U.S. Department of Defense rolled out an AI strategy. But the emerging narrative of an "AI " reflects a mistaken view of the risks from AI--and introduces significant new risks as a result. For each country, the real danger is not that it will fall behind its competitors in AI but that the perception of a race will prompt everyone to rush to deploy unsafe AI systems. In their desire to win, countries risk endangering themselves just as much as their opponents. AI promises to bring both enormous benefits, in everything from health care to transportation, and huge risks. But those risks aren't something out of science fiction; there's no need to fear a robot uprising. The real threat will come from humans. Right now, AI systems are powerful but unreliable. Many of them are vulnerable to sophisticated attacks or fail when used outside the environment in which they were trained. Governments want their systems to work properly, but competition brings pressure to cut corners. Even if other countries aren't on the brink of major AI breakthroughs, the perception that they're rushing ahead could push others to do the same. And if a government deployed an untested AI weapons system or relied on a faulty AI system to launch cyberattacks, the result could be disaster for everyone involved. Policymakers should learn from the history of computer networks and make security a leading factor in AI design from the beginning. They should also ratchet down the rhetoric about an AI arms race and look for opportunities to cooperate with other countries to reduce the risks from AI. A race to the bottom on AI safety is a race no one would win.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › “Arms Race” Framing › 2AC Kritik of Disads with Arms Race Impacts
Roff 2019 – Fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Program [Heather, 4/26/19, , “The Frame problem: The Ai ‘Arms Race’ isn’t one’, 6/18/22, LND]
Diffusion, however, is a different animal. Widely available commercial off the shelf components, a widely available and open source knowledge base, and wide access to large amounts of data make limiting the diffusion of AI knowledge almost impossible. There are necessary ingredients for AI, including access to computing power and sufficient amounts of data. Some actors possess more of these ingredients than others, but that advantage does not preclude individuals, groups, companies, or states from obtaining access to and knowledge about AI. As greater emphasis is placed on the economic and security benefits of using AI systems, AI will become more diffused because the incentive structure rewards diffusion. Managing the risks of proliferation and diffusion of a knowledge base is an entirely different enterprise than restraining an arms race. In the case of artificial intelligence, rather than looking at what sorts of actions are required for deterrence, what balances may affect conflict onset or escalation, world leaders should turn their focus to how to foster responsible competition. Mitigating the risks associated with AI is not a single-shot activity. Certainly there are technological solutions, such as researching new ways of testing, verifying, and validating systems that include the technologies that fall under the AI umbrella. There even may be novel ways of constraining unwanted system behaviors by generating new architectures or safety controls. Ultimately, however, reducing the risks that AI will be abused requires a reframing of the way in which we think, talk, write about, and deploy AI. The problems of AI misuse are human problems; they are problems exhibited by all dual-use technologies, not just AI. Control of artificial intelligence lies with humans, because they are the moral agents responsible for the design, development, and deployment of AI.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › “Arms Race” Framing › 2AC Kritik of Disads with Arms Race Impacts
Roff 2019 – Fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Program [Heather, 4/26/19, , “The Frame problem: The Ai ‘Arms Race’ isn’t one’, 6/18/22, LND]
Often, one hears the phrase “AI arms race,” especially in regard to competition between major powers. Yet an AI arms race seems a particularly unfortunate and misleading phrase. Since 1957, myriad scholars have attempted to understand arms races, including how one can identify and measure them and what the potential effects of one are. While there have certainly been academic and policy disputes over the last 62 years, there is one important consensus to note about arms races: looking at one particular dimension of a state’s behavior is not sufficient. Arms races deal with military build ups, arms expenditures, rivalry, alliances, territorial disputes, economic policies, and more. As yet, however, there has been no coherent or comprehensive discussion about the so-called AI arms race. For example: How is AI by itself a weapon? Or is the “race” merely military modernization efforts that include automation, autonomy, or AI enabled military systems? How would we even begin to find, label and disaggregate the numbers to claim that there is an arms race between rivals regarding only AI? Indeed, the discussion of an AI arms race is reminiscent of the hyperbolic and mislabeled rhetoric surrounding “cyber bombs” in the battle again ISIS. Of course, there are quite spectacular claims about AI’s potential benefits and risks. Russian President Vladimir Putin fanned that fire when he claimed that “whoever becomes the leader in this space [AI] will become the ruler of the world.” But talking about technological competition – in research, adoption, and deployment – in all sectors of multiple economies and in warfare is not really an arms race. Indeed, to frame this competition in military terms risks the adoption of policies or regulations that could escalate rivalry between states and increase the likelihood of actual conflict. More accurately stated, the current situation is one of AI competition, with variations of technological proliferation and diffusion. In some cases, countries may want to limit the amount and kinds of specific AI systems that proliferate to other countries or non-state actors. In these instances, it will more than likely be particular kinds of components or platforms that are at issue. The International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Australia Group, or the Missile Technology Control Regime are but a few regimes that are meant to deal with such proliferation issues.
2022
MNDI
Affirmative
TEVV AFF – MNDI HPA › Contention One Extensions › AT UN Solves Now
Farge 2021 - Senior Correspondant, Reuters Geneva [Emma, 12/17/21, Reuters, , , “U.N. talks adjourn without deal to regulate ‘killer robots’”, 6/18/22, LND]
GENEVA, Dec 17 (Reuters) - Countries taking part in U.N. talks on autonomous weapons stopped short of launching negotiations on an international treaty to govern their use, instead agreeing merely to continue discussions. The International Committee of the Red Cross and several NGOs had been pushing for negotiators to begin work on an international treaty that would establish legally-binding new rules on the machine-operated weapons. Unlike existing semi-autonomous weapons such as drones, fully-autonomous weapons have no human-operated "kill switch" and instead leave decisions over life and death to sensors, software and machine processes. Opponents say they raise the risks for civilians, pose problems for accountability and increase the chances of conflict escalation. The Geneva talks, ongoing for eight years, have taken on new urgency since a U.N. that said the first autonomous drone attack may have already occurred in Libya. "It's a real missed opportunity and not in our view what is needed to respond to the risks posed by autonomous weapons," Neil Davison, a policy adviser in the Legal Division at ICRC, said of the outcome of the week-long talks. Many countries also expressed disappointment in the outcome. "At the present rate of progress, the pace of technological development risks overtaking our deliberations," Switzerland's Disarmament Ambassador, Felix Baumann, said. The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons which has 125 parties has been discussing possible limits on the use of lethal autonomous weapons, or LAWS, which are fully machine-operated and use new technology such as artificial intelligence and facial recognition. U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres had called for countries to come up with an "ambitious plan" on new rules. Sources following the talks said that Russia, India and the United States were among the countries who expressed doubts about the need for a new LAWS treaty. Washington has previously pointed to their possible benefits, such as precision. Clare Conboy of campaign group Stop Killer Robots said the outcome was one that "keeps the minority of militarised states investing in developing these weapons very happy". She said she expected the many countries in favour of a new law such as New Zealand or Austria to begin negotiations outside of the United Nations.