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[John T. Woodlley Professor, Director of American Presidency Project UCSB. Gerhard Peters is a professor of Political Science at Citrus College where he has taught full-time since 2007; 02/20/20] American Presidency Project, Fact Sheet - The Historic Results Of President Donald J. Trump's Economic Agenda. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/fact-sheet-the-historic-results-president-donald-j-trumps-economic-agenda//WM

LEADING AN ECONOMIC RESURGENCE: President Trump has reversed the failed economic policies of old and ushered in a new era of economic prosperity for the United States.

In markets it is known as the “Trump trade”, a bet that Donald Trump’s return to the White House would herald more inflation and higher interest rates. Many of Mr Trump’s core policies push in this direction: tariffs would add to import costs, deportations of immigrants could push up wages and deficit-financed tax cuts would juice the economy. Amid mounting inflation, the Federal Reserve would have little choice but to opt for higher rates.

In the wake of Joe Biden’s calamitous debate on June 27th, a preview of the trade played out. As investors grappled with the likelihood that Mr Trump would romp to the presidency, they sold off Treasuries, which led to a brief surge in yields. The big fear is that much worse would come to pass. If Mr Trump fought the Fed on rates, he might sow doubts about the central bank’s independence, undermining confidence in America’s markets and the dollar. That is the economic nightmare scenario for a second Trump administration.

As Donald Trump’s election victory looks more probable with questions swirling about President Joe Biden’s health and fitness, many people left of center — and Trump critics on the right — are voicing urgent concerns about the survival of American democracy. Is this political hyperbole or a real danger? And what can we do to keep liberal democracy alive?

The argument that we already had a Trump presidency and democracy is doing fine isn’t as heartening as one might think. When Trump took office in 2017, he hadn’t really expected to win and didn’t have a structure in place to take over the government; the Trump administration was full of more traditional Republicans who were not Trump loyalists or Trumpist ideologues. What’s more, Trump’s presidency ended with a blatant attempt to overturn a legitimate election — and his 2024 campaign is filled with rhetoric about revenge against those who tried to hold him accountable.

One paradox of America’s debate over democracy is that many of its most ardent professed defenders also seem most convinced of its frailty — and perhaps, if Donald Trump wins a second term, its imminent demise. Can a governing system portrayed even by its champions as weak and decrepit maintain the public’s confidence?

Kurt Weyland, a political scientist at the University of Texas at Austin, rests his case for democracy not on the system’s vulnerability but on what he sees as its enduring strength. His book, “Democracy’s Resilience to Populism’s Threat,” published last month by Cambridge University Press, has gone virtually unnoticed in the popular media. Surveying 40 examples of populist leaders elected in Latin America and Europe since the late 20th century, Weyland argues that only seven overturned their country’s democratic system. And each of those instances occurred under conditions that are unlikely to occur in the United States any time soon.

Cities, Mayors, Governors another major hurdle that will slow down Trump’s path toward dictatorship is the emergence of cities as liberal strongholds, with younger Democratic governors and mayors as opposition leaders. Democracies that have experienced an illiberal transformation have all seen big cities emerge as strongholds for dissent and liberal values, with charismatic mayors often becoming the public face of opposition. Trump is America’s rural candidate. Both in 2016 and 2020, he did better in small towns than in metropolitan areas. That isn’t all that different from what happened in Hungary, Turkey and Poland. In 2019, Erdogan lost all major Turkish cities in local elections, with Istanbul’s opposition mayor, Ekrem Imamoglu, effectively turning into his political rival. In 2020, the charismatic mayor of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski, ran as a presidential candidate and while he lost by a thin margin, he played an important role in the opposition’s victory in 2023. In Hungary, despite his immense hold on political power, Orban lost the capital, Budapest, to the opposition candidate Gergely Szilveszter Karácsony in 2019 — making the mayor a prominent opposition voice. Trump should remember the massive anti-government protests in Hong Kong, Warsaw, Istanbul and Budapest and worry about the power of cities and the rise of younger and more energetic politicians, both mayors and governors, some of whom could galvanize the Democratic Party’s base and urban elites, turning New York, San Francisco, Chicago, or Washington, D.C., into strongholds of civil disobedience. Of course, no one should relax thinking “Dictatorship doesn’t work in America as long as we have New York!” Cities and urban centers — where professionals, young people and educated elites gravitate — will resist an illiberal takeover for as long as they can. This tension already played out during Trump’s first term on issues like pandemic response, immigration and abortion and will only grow in a second Trump administration. Bringing cities and blue states to heel takes a long time — and demands a real social and institutional consensus, which Trump, in a second term, will not have. Trump’s problem during the Jan. 6 insurrection was that while his MAGA base wanted him to retain power, he had not built an institutional consensus within the U.S. bureaucracy or the GOP that supported his allegations of election denial — and he was therefore unable to galvanize Republicans or bureaucrats. During the four years of a possible second term, Trump will work hard to build the type of social consensus that would allow him to remain in power for a third term, but the example of other countries, even those with less robust democracies, suggests that four more years is not enough time for him to do that. Don’t get me wrong — I’m not saying there’s nothing to worry about. No country should take democracy for granted and there is plenty to fear in a second Trump term. Even if Trump doesn’t turn himself into a full-on dictator, he can do a lot of damage to American society and democracy if he wants to. Still, four years pass quickly and even in another four years as president, Trump will not gain the organizational capacity, popular mandate, or institutional consensus to build a dictatorship or prolong his tenure past a second term. What I have seen in Turkey, Poland and Hungary suggests there is a turbulent time between the election of an illiberal leader and the establishment of a dictatorship when resistance will flourish. Any attempt at state capture by Trump will face a pushback from media, bureaucracy, major cities and the judiciary. That resistance is necessary and will emerge at every level of civic life. It will also damage and tear up America in ways that are unimaginable today. It is easier to stop Trump now than to wait until after he becomes president again, when polarization and the push-and-pull between Trump and his opposition will consume the nation’s energy and cripple state resources. It will drain every bit of energy this country has. So my message to America is, do not panic — but organize. The most successful method of fighting creeping authoritarianism is alliance building and effective opposition — preferably before the election. After the election, it will be more costly to stop it. Even in an imperfect democracy like Turkey, it took more than a decade to dismantle the rule of law. Donald Trump might try, but he will find that it takes a long time to become dictator.

Many Democrats are terrified that a second term for Donald Trump would turn America into a dictatorship. They aren’t wrong to worry. For one thing, Trump has talked about the idea without completely dismissing it. And the U.S. is neither immune to populism, which is a precursor of authoritarianism, nor unshakable in its institutional attachment to liberal democracy. Given enough time, America, too, can loosen its checks and balances and slide into some type of electoral tyranny of the majority. At the same time, panic is unnecessary. As someone who lived through the birth and growth of authoritarianism in Turkey, I’m something of an expert on the subject — and no, another four years of Trump is not enough time to turn America into a dictatorship. What I saw in Turkey over the course of two decades of Tayyip Erdogan’s rule — working as a journalist for much of that time — is that building a dictatorship takes a long time. Similarly in Poland and Hungary, illiberal governments have needed years to chip away at the rule of law. There is a particular rhythm and process to dismantling a democracy, a kind of incubation period for despotism: There are laws to change, institutions to dismantle, alliances to build. With a concerted effort by Trump, the incubation period could be squeezed into eight more consecutive years, but not four. To be fair, Trump had something of a head start during his first term, appointing an impressive number of federal judges, tipping the balance of power in the Supreme Court, promoting MAGA-aligned media as an alternative source of reality, denying election results, and lately, claiming immunity from laws even after leaving office. But he is still a long way off from achieving total control over U.S. institutions, media and the judiciary, or building the kind of social consensus he’d need to reign as an autocrat. Let me describe some of the obstacles Trump or any dictator wannabe would encounter during the autocratization of America, based on what has happened in other countries. A camera monitor shows Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump speaking to thousands of supporters at SNHU Arena during a campaign stop in Manchester, New Hampshire. An entire ecosystem of pro-Trump media, such as Fox News, amplifies his narratives, such as stolen elections. Most illiberal populists pretend to run against some type of elite conspiracy that denies voters a say in the destiny of the nation. Having an alternative media landscape is essential to push such narratives, such as stolen elections, and Trump will have no problem there, since the Fox News channel as well as an entire ecosystem of pro-Trump alternative media are already doing that job. But the problem for him will be the persistence of the old guard — the independent media outlets and mainstream news channels which do not sing from the MAGA hymn sheet and continue to provide good journalism to raise questions on his judgment. Getting rid of them is laborious. I used to work at one of Turkey’s top dailies, Sabah, when it was taken over by the government in 2007, marking the beginning of a decadelong struggle for Erdogan to take control of the media landscape in the country. But it wasn’t easy. To silence Sabah and other newspapers, Erdogan had to use the tax authority, the courts, call for public boycott of newspapers and threaten individual journalists publicly — eventually forcing media owners to sell off. After Sabah, the Turkish government focused on other distressed media holdings, provided the financial support for cronies to buy them, and over the years passed anti-terrorism legislation to stifle free speech. In 2017, Erdogan finally held a referendum on expanding his presidential powers and consolidated power. Even in an imperfect democracy like Turkey, it took a full decade from 2007 to 2017 for Erdogan to gain full compliance and transfer media ownership to his cronies. Similarly in Poland, the recently ousted Law and Justice Party tried to reshape the media landscape after they took power in 2015 by turning state broadcasters into partisan hacks — but made only incremental progress during their eight years in power. That kind of takeover is doable in the U.S. too, but it would take longer than four years. The Judiciary Courts are necessary to wage culture wars and create a climate of fear among dissidents — the sine quo non for a dictatorship. But to move from a proto-dictator to a real one, Trump would need full loyalty from the judiciary. That’s easier said than done in America, where the judicial system is designed to put limits on the executive and judges have long tenures. Trump may have shifted the balance of power on the Supreme Court and appointed more than 200 federal judges to reshape the federal judiciary, including an impressive number of appointments to the powerful appeals court and district courts. That means by the end of his term, over a quarter of active judges were Trump appointees. But that’s not so unusual. The courts have long been an ideological battleground in U.S. politics and the highest number of judicial appointments in modern times came during Ronald Reagan’s presidency — though it still wasn’t enough to create a permanent right-wing governance structure. Moreover, not all Trump appointees have ruled in ways Donald Trump wanted, even though many emerged from some type of a Republican vetting process through an alliance with Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell. Based on examples from Hungary, Poland and Turkey, we can safely say that Trump’s real problem will not be the loyalty or the conservative credentials of his judicial appointees but the presence of others — the non-Trumpians. Out of 800-something federal judges (numbers vary depending on vacancies), only a quarter have been appointed by Trump, leaving hundreds of others within the system. Meanwhile, the Biden administration has been in a race to shape the courts by filling vacancies and pushing ahead with confirmations of their own, non-Trumpy judges. In a country that prides itself on checks and balances, “cleaning up” the hundreds of active judges and prosecutors who are not loyal to him would present a challenge for any burgeoning autocrat, since judges have long tenures and plenty of independence. The U.S. Constitution says federal judges may hold their position “during good behavior” — meaning, lifelong. This makes it harder to push around or penalize unruly justices even when their verdicts go against the wishes of the White House. What Trump would really need to bring the judiciary to heel is a centralized administrative structure, as in Turkey, Hungary and elsewhere, where he could easily reassign uncooperative judges to different courts, take punitive action, or relocate them to different cities — all common practices in Turkey. Instead, the U.S. has overlapping judicial systems and once an appointment is made, it is harder to fully control a judge. U.S. judges also are well compensated, and, in some states, directly elected, further increasing their independence. All this makes the full control of the U.S. judiciary a long-term, even a multi-generational challenge for an aspiring autocrat. Trump could try to do what populists elsewhere have tried, namely, changing the rules of the game. Since 2010, Orban and his Fidesz Party have incrementally dismantled the independence of the judiciary by forcing judges into retirement, creating an alternative court system and expanding the powers of the Minister of Justice over the judges. Law and Justice in Poland tried to reshape the courts through similar methods after it regained power in 2015, including lowering the retirement age and expanding the powers of a national body that appoints judges. It used government-controlled media to target judges and made courts a core element of its culture wars. But at each step of the way, Law and Justice met significant pushback and eventually lost power last October. Biden raised his voice over House Dem commander-in-chief concerns: ‘I don’t want to hear that crap’ The judiciary was a big headache for Erdogan as well. In 2006, the Turkish government’s attempts to reshape the justice system and break the monopoly of secularists met with enormous social pushback, forcing the government to hold referendums on judiciary reforms in 2007 and 2010. But what finally gave Erdogan the control he wanted was his declaration of emergency presidential powers after a failed coup attempt in 2016 that allowed the president or Turkish Justice Department the right to dismiss or move judges at will. Can Trump claim similar emergency powers? Not without first gaining institutional and social consensus. Even in Turkey, it took a bloody military coup attempt for Erdogan to assume the type of powers he wanted. Trump would need a dramatic event of similar nature that would serve as a force-majeure and convince U.S. society that it would be OK for the president to take control of the judiciary. Of course, Trump has other options that are legally available but politically difficult. Surprisingly, the U.S. Constitution does not stipulate the number of judges at the Supreme and District courts. If he has the support of Congress, Trump could pack the courts by expanding the number of judges on federal benches and the Supreme Court. But such a move would be too alarming and unlikely to be fully backed by Congress or the Republican establishment. President Franklin D. Roosevelt tried to pack the courts but failed. It is hard to imagine Trump’s Justice Department being able to build in four more years the social and institutional consensus to achieve what FDR failed to do after the New Deal.

Liberals on social media seethed in reaction to Democratic lawmakers reportedly admitting behind the scenes that former President Trump isn't a "threat to democracy" as their party loudly claims. New York Times columnist Ezra Klein appeared on The Bulwark Podcast Tuesday and revealed what "top Democrats" have told him off the record as they panic over whether they should support or abandon President Biden on their ticket. "People are weighing this set of things. Like, ‘It would be quite unpleasant for me personally to come out against the president as an elected official in the Democratic Party,' and weighing what will happen if Donald Trump wins, and saying, in a revealed preference way, ‘I can live with Donald Trump winning,’" Klein said. "And I've heard people say that to me off the record, to be fair-" BIDEN INTERVIEWERS SHED LIGHT ON HIS FRAILTY BEHIND THE SCENES: ‘IT’S IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO NOTICE' Ezra Klein New York Times columnist Ezra Klein said "top Democrats" told him that they don't actually think former President Trump is an "existential threat to democracy." (Lloyd Bishop/NBCU Photo Bank/NBCUniversal via Getty Images) "Really?" podcast host Tim Miller reacted. "I've had top Democrats say to me, basically, say something like, ‘I don’t know why all these Democrats who think Donald Trump is an existential threat to democracy are acting the way they are. But the reason I'm acting the way I am is because I don't think that,'" Klein continued. "Who the f--- is this?" an angered Miller exclaimed. "Out your sources, Ezra!" "I find it maddening, but I do find it consistent," Klein responded. Klein later told Miller, "I think you have to at some point say, whatever these Democrats are saying in public, they're more resigned and more willing to just be the resistance to a Trump presidency than a lot of their public-facing rhetoric would suggest." "You have a calm voice, but you're skyrocketing my f---ing blood pressure right now," Miller said. "Ezra, I'm just, like, so f---ing mad." ABC'S GEORGE STEPHANOPOULOS AFTER BIDEN INTERVIEW: ‘I DON’T THINK HE CAN SERVE FOUR MORE YEARS' Donald Trump Former President Trump has seen a bump in the polls following last month's presidential debate. (Mario Tama/Getty Images) Miller shared the "GALLING exchange" on X, sparking anger among other anti-Trump voices. "Absolutely f---ing enraging," former Obama speechwriter and Pod Save America co-host Jon Favreau reacted. "Correction: I was not being much too easy on the Democrats. I was being much, much, much too easy on them," New York Magazine writer Jonathan Chait said. CRITICS PILE ON BIDEN FOLLOWING ABC INTERVIEW, BLAST HIS REFUSAL TO COMMIT TO COGNITIVE TEST: ‘DISQUALIFYING’ Progressive activist Aaron Regunberg posted, "This is a story with actual, legitimate villains. Here they are. May they rot in hell." "If a party is filled with this many useless people, there is no reason for it to exist," Vox writer Sean Illing said. Washington Post assignment editor Damir Marusic remarked, "It’s so quaint, the idealism. It’s as if people living in a city devoted to politics don’t understand politics at all." Joe Biden President Biden shocked the nation with his disastrous debate performance, sparking calls for him to step out of the 2024 race. (Getty Images) Rep. Jared Golden, D-Maine, offered a similar sentiment publicly in an op-ed published in the Bangor Daily News with the headline "Donald Trump is going to win the election and democracy will be just fine." Biden is facing mounting pressure to withdraw from the presidential race despite vowing to remain on the ballot til November following his disastrous debate performance. Democrats on Capitol Hill have been facing turmoil in recent weeks, with many publicly supporting Biden but reportedly expressing otherwise in private. Wednesday night Vermont Sen. Peter Welch joined eight House Democrats in calling for Biden to step aside. Several members of the media have also been vocal in calling for his removal from the ticket. Hollywood A-lister and Democratic megadonor George Clooney, who co-hosted Biden's star-studded fundraiser in Los Angeles just weeks before the debate, penned a scathing essay in The New York Times calling for a new nominee. "It’s devastating to say it, but the Joe Biden I was with three weeks ago at the fund-raiser was not the Joe "big F-ing deal" Biden of 2010. He wasn’t even the Joe Biden of 2020. He was the same man we all witnessed at the debate," Clooney wrote.

As former President Donald Trump edges closer to clinching the Republican presidential nomination in 2024, our political science research has shown that a second Trump presidency is likely to damage American democracy even more than his first term did. The reason has less to do with Trump and his ambitions than with how power dynamics have shifted within the Republican Party. In our forthcoming book, “The Origins of Elected Strongmen: How Personalist Parties Destroy Democracy from Within,” we explain the dangers that arise when leaders come to power backed by political parties that exist primarily to promote the leader’s personal agenda, as opposed to advancing particular policies. In general, typical political parties select new leaders at regular intervals, which gives elites in the party another chance to win a nomination in the future if the party is popular. And typical parties tend to select leaders who rise up the ranks of the party, having worked with other party elites along the way. But so-called personalist parties, as political scientists like us call them, are a threat to democracy because they lack the incentives and ability to resist their leader’s efforts to amass more power. The Conversation is a news organization dedicated to facts and evidence Learn more From 1990 to 2020, in countries all over the world, elected leaders backed by personalist parties have gone on to undermine democracy from within. There are three reasons personalist parties are harmful to democracy, all of which have clear parallels to experiences with Trump and the Republican Party. 1. Loyalty to the person, not the party Personalist party elites are loyal to the leader. A classic indicator of party personalization is the ouster of politically experienced people in the party elite, who are often highly qualified and more independent of the leader – and their replacement with less experienced people who are personally loyal to the leader. These people are more likely to view their political success as being intertwined with that of the leader rather than the party. They therefore are more likely to support the leader’s agenda, no matter how harmful it may be for democracy. In Turkey, for example, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party, known in Turkish as the AKP, initially included elites who were established politicians, such as Ali Babacan, Abdullah Gul and Bulent Arinc. As time passed, however, Erdogan weeded out these veterans and replaced them with more loyal supporters. This paved the way for Erdogan to consolidate control, including – among other things – shifting power in 2018 from the parliament to the presidency and expanding his powers considerably. 2. Official endorsement of leader’s actions In personalist parties, elites endorse the leader’s actions, cueing voters to do the same. Ordinary citizens who support personalist parties often go along with leaders’ efforts to dismantle democracy, even if they care about democracy, because they are highly receptive to signals provided by the party elite. When the party higher-ups endorse – rather than condemn – the leader’s undemocratic inclinations, supporters get the message that nothing is wrong, and they fall in line. In Brazil, for example, then-President Jair Bolsonaro generated doubts among supporters that the 2022 presidential elections would be fair, suggesting that electoral officials might manipulate the results in his opponent’s favor. The political elite, including members of Brazil’s Congress, amplified these claims. These elite cues signaled to Bolsonaro supporters that his actions were compatible with a healthy democracy, ultimately setting the stage for them to resort to violence when Bolsonaro lost the election in a contest that independent observers considered free and fair. 3. Polarizing society with controversy Leaders of personalist parties polarize the societies they govern. While many kinds of leaders demonize their political opponents, we have found that personalist party leaders’ anti-democratic behaviors – such as attempting to overturn an election they’ve lost – split society into polarized factions: those who support them and everyone else. When opponents of the leader raise concerns that the leader’s actions are harmful to democracy, as the Democrats regularly have since Trump won office in 2016, supporters dig in their heels in defiance, incredulous that there is cause for concern. Affective polarization, where citizens increasingly dislike their opponents, deepens. With the opponents vilified, the leader has the political support to take actions to keep the other side out of power, even if those actions undermine democracy in the process. Take Venezuela, historically one of the most stable democracies in Latin America. Former President Hugo Chavez’s power grabs splintered Venezuelan society, dividing citizens over what the rules of the game should be and who should have access to power. As the chasm between his backers and the opposition grew, so did the abuses of power his supporters were willing to accept to ensure his continued rule. Chavez’s actions, which faced no resistance from those in his party, polarized society, ultimately pushing the country toward dictatorship. A man stands waving to a crowd of people holding signs. Many Republican Party members back Trump, in part because other party leaders signal their own support. AP Photo/Sue Ogrocki The GOP is a personalist party The present Republican Party closely fits the personalist mold. Conventionally, a party leader rises through the party ranks. But Trump didn’t do that, and before seeking the presidency, he didn’t have strong, collegial relationships with key Republican figures in government. Rather, he switched party allegiance several times and before becoming president had never held any elected office. Since 2016, Trump has increasingly sidelined the traditional party establishment to remake the party into an instrument to further his own personal, political and financial interests. As an indicator of this, the party elite have grown fearful of diverging from his agenda, so much so that the 2020 GOP platform essentially amounted to “whatever Trump wants.” Today, the main qualification for a Republican candidate or appointee appears to be loyalty to Trump himself, not fealty to longstanding GOP principles. Traditional parties, including the pre-Trump Republican Party, offer voters a bundle of policy positions hashed out among multiple elite factions of the party. Trump’s supersized control over the Republican Party has transformed other leading party figures into sycophants, always seeking Trump’s favor. Even Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, after experiencing ridicule and abuse from Trump, endorsed the former president’s bid to return to the White House. No resistance to a Trump power grab The personalist nature of the Republican Party means that if Trump were to win office again, he is unlikely to face pushback from the party on any issue. All signs indicate that Trump, if reelected, is likely to pursue an authoritarian power grab by, for example, purging professional bureaucrats, expanding the Supreme Court or using the Insurrection Act to deploy the military against protesters. Party members may even support him in that power grab. Most elected leaders are ambitious and, like Trump, seek to gain and hold onto power for as long as they can. Indeed, very few elected leaders resign voluntarily. The octogenarians who fill Congress attest to many politicians’ unwillingness to relinquish the power they have. We have found that what matters for democracy is not so much the ambitions of power-hungry leaders, but rather whether those in their support group will tame them. As our research shows, the most danger comes when personalist ruling parties hold legislative majorities and the presidency, meaning opposition parties in the legislature can’t stop the ruling party from dominating. In those circumstances, there is little that stands in the way of a grab for power. For instance, if Republicans won a slim Senate majority, they might abolish the filibuster. That would limit Democrats’ ability to hold up legislation they opposed. Elected leaders backed by personalist parties are therefore often successful in dismantling institutional checks on their power, whether from the legislature or the courts. Leaders of personalist parties have attempted to curb judicial constraints in countries as different as El Salvador, Hungary and Israel, with the ruling parties doing little to stop their efforts. Long-standing and wealthy democracies, like the U.S., are remarkably resilient to the challenges that confront them. But ruling party personalism helps elected leaders undercut these protective guardrails. Because the Republican Party has taken a personalist turn under Trump’s spell, democracy in the U.S. would suffer should Trump win a second term.

[Aimee Picchi a renowned journalist and associate managing editor for CBS MoneyWatch ; 6/25/24] 16 Nobel Prize-winning economists warn that Trump's economic plans could reignite inflation https://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-economy-nobel-prize-winners-letter-inflation-warning//WM

Sixteen of the world's most notable economists — all Nobel Prize winners — are warning that former President Donald Trump could stoke inflation if he wins the presidency in November and moves forward with his economic plans. 

Regardless of whoever emerges as the winner of the Nov. 5 U.S. presidential election, technology policy – particularly towards China – will be a major focus of the incoming U.S. administration. While both President Joe Biden and former President Donald Trump will have similar national security concerns about China's access to foreign technology and exports of technology goods, Trump may entertain talks with China on a second trade deal or another agreement that could lead to a slowdown or a deal on some of the U.S. restrictions – an outcome that is highly unlikely to occur in a second Biden term. Domestically, a Trump presidency may dial back aggressive antitrust action by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission across all sectors. Still, Trump would instead likely focus his criticism and scrutiny on specific technology companies, including those he believes have squelched his speech or that of his conservative followers, or specific deals he does not like, similar to his focus on TikTok during tenure as president. To discuss the election's impact on technology policy, RANE spoke with Adam Golodner, CEO of Vortex Strategic Consulting, LLC. Both Trump and Biden Will Have Core National Security Concerns, and Neither Will Push Through AI, Data Privacy Legislation. No matter who wins on Nov. 5, Golodner says either administration will implement core national security and technology policies. He notes that both Biden and Trump would want to keep hostile actors — primarily China, but Golodner also mentions Iran and Russia — in mind when creating these policies, with Trump being less concerned about Russia and likely open to giving Putin a wide berth. Both presidential candidates are concerned about "China's developing military capacity and the challenge and threats that it poses to the US," says Golodner, and this continued idea will inspire policy. Specifically, U.S. policy will aim to "police China's civil-military fusion and the ability of U.S. technology or intellectual property to flow from the commercial side in China to the military side." Congress will also likely continue pushing for increased legislation targeting China, especially via the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party. A report released by the Committee in December 2023 outlined a number of policy recommendations designed to slow down China's military technology modernization program and support American leadership in critical technologies. In addition to matters relevant to trade and other policy domains, the Committee recommended Congress enact legislation requiring large public companies to disclose key supply chain risks associated with the potential loss of access to Chinese suppliers. Furthermore, it proposes giving the president the authority to ban Chinese technology products from the U.S. market and to enact legislation to allow the Treasury Department to place sanctions on Chinese companies directly tied to the Chinese military-industrial complex. Golodner also says both potential administrations would likely continue focusing on the artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, critical and advanced materials (materials for military application and rare earth metals), biotechnology, and semiconductor industries. Policies and restrictions on these key industries will likely increase as these technologies and their military applications advance. This may include tightening export controls on the most advanced semiconductors as both semiconductors and their application in AI and supercomputing also advance. China will continue to try to build up its own indigenous semiconductor industry to compensate for the loss of the most advanced Western chips and equipment. Restrictions like export controls, however, tend to be a "lagging indicator" catching up to the advances in technology, according to Golodner. Fundamentally, Golodner notes that future tech policy will likely be rooted in protecting U.S. national security, as opposed to denying purely commercial technology to others, as the sale of commercial technology to others helps fund U.S. company innovation. Irrespective of the incoming administration, Golodner anticipates little progress toward the enactment of comprehensive federal legislation pertaining to data privacy or a highly regulatory federal AI law akin to the European Union's AI Act that was approved in the European Union this year. He says one exception might be a privacy law focused on protecting children, an idea that seems to have broad bi-partisan support. Golodner expects the states to continue to take the lead with state-level data privacy acts in the absence of a federal data privacy law. In total, 13 U.S. states have enacted comprehensive data privacy laws as of Feb. 28, 2024, with New Hampshire also passing legislation that still needs to be signed into law. Another 18 states – primarily in the Midwest, Mid-Atlantic and Northeast – have bills that have been introduced. While some Democrat-led states have been aggressive in passing data privacy laws, like California, many Republican states have also sought to pass data privacy laws, including Texas and Montana. On AI in the United States, Golodner expects voluntary pledges, National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) AI best practices and guidelines, and OECD and G7 sets of good practices – as opposed to explicit requirements – for AI companies. One exception may be in U.S. government procurement, where agencies may try to impose specific requirements. Biden's October 2023 Executive Order largely focused on ordering various government agencies to develop voluntary standards and guidance for the use of AI, with only a small portion of AI models posing a risk to national security, economic security or public health and safety, requiring higher standards of operation and reporting. A Second Biden Term Would Focus on Pushing U.S. Allies to Place Restrictions on China In a second term, Golodner believes the Biden administration would likely continue its existing framework of implementing further national security-based export controls on technology exports to China, as well as U.S. investments in sensitive industries. As noted by Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo in October 2023, the Biden administration is looking at a "grand vision" of about five to six years to decouple semiconductor supply chains from China, with the current policies working toward that goal. Golodner forecasts a continuation of technology policy that is both national security-based and aware of the benefits to U.S. industry and innovation from the sale and export of commercial technologies globally. On the core military use side, the United States will continue global policies that "create a balance against China's continued expansion of its sphere of control and policies." The core principle of protecting U.S. national security will remain constant, but the targeted industries and specific policies will likely change in accordance with the evolving nature of technology. Additionally, a second-term Biden administration would likely increase pressure on its allies and partners to implement similar measures. Golodner emphasizes that Biden aims to cooperate with allies and align foreign policy measures with other democracies "to present a values-based proposition for people around the world" in the face of rising autocracies. This could result in an organized multilateral framework coordinated on technological restrictions on China or, as Golodner mentions, increased cooperation in existing partnerships like the Quad — a strategic security dialogue between Australia, India, Japan and the United States. The Biden Administration is currently pressing many of its allies to step up restrictions on China, and a second Biden term would see similar pressure. Specifically, the United States is pushing the Netherlands to stop semiconductor manufacturing equipment producer ASML from servicing advanced lithography machines that it sold in China before the Netherlands placed restrictions on the export of those machines last year. The United States is also pressuring Japan to restrict chemical exports to China for use in chipmaking. The United States is similarly pressuring South Korea and Germany. A Second Trump Presidency Would Bring Back An 'America First' Policy But Also a Potential Deal with China Golodner says that a second Trump administration would bring back an 'America First' approach to foreign and national security policy that would differ significantly from Biden's and would inform Trump's technology policy towards China and Russia, even if Trump continues to, largely speaking, implement more national security-focused restrictions on China. Golodner points out that Trump "does not view the role of the United States as having an obligation to provide for the stability of the world." He adds that as president, Trump's policies would push Europe away from the United States, as in his previous term. Trump's focus on 'America First' trade policies would likely mean a resumption of the U.S. trade war with the European Union – and likely continue to increase tariffs on China. This will make it more difficult for Trump to place any pressure on European countries to implement harsher technology restrictions on China, similar to those for which the Biden administration is currently pressing. Without European or Asian countries placing restrictions on technology exports to China, a second Trump administration would likely need to be even more expansive in unilateral restrictions by the United States – possibly even increased sanctions – in order to have the same impact on China's technology sector that a second Biden administration would be able to achieve through global cooperation. Golodner also warns that there could be policy whiplash, or 'zigzag,' on China in a second Trump term. While Golodner expects a second Trump Administration to place more restrictions on China due to national security concerns, he points out that a second Trump term is likely to have more political appointees that are aligned with his 'America First' approach to foreign policy than he did in his first term. As a result, while many U.S. government agencies will still be pushing for a hardline approach to China, the White House may quickly latch onto an issue and redirect the United States' focus to something else. Golodner points out that in his first term, Trump was "enamored of making deals with dictators, and [he thinks] that will continue." He points out that Trump is very "transactional" and that a second Trump term would have "fewer people who might put brakes on [his] policies appointed to positions of authority, and there will be much less of the structure to hold back or stymie some of his impulses." He adds that if there's a deal to be made, Trump might trade off "what one might consider a national security interest for an interest that he personally thinks is more important." Golodner notes that the first Trump Administration reportedly delayed placing some restrictions on Huawei over concerns that it would have disrupted China-U.S. negotiations on a trade deal. A Second Trump Administration Would Narrow Focus on Antitrust Concerns With Tech Companies Golodner does not expect a second Trump administration to focus on launching antitrust lawsuits against all technology companies for 'big is bad' philosophical reasons, but says the administration could instead focus its enforcement efforts on whether or not the administration believes a particular technology company has been curbing conservative or Trump's own speech. He adds that the concern over curbing conservative speech has gotten significant attention from Republican Congressional leaders. Overall, he says it will be important to watch who will get key antitrust positions in a second Trump administration at the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division. If the appointees are traditional Republican Chicago School, economic-based antitrust professionals, then Golodner says there will likely be a return to a more traditional view of antitrust enforcement across sectors. However, regarding technology companies, a Trump appointee may still be compelled to focus particularly on the speech issues Trump espouses. For non-technology enforcement, it would be hard to imagine a full-on 'big is bad' approach followed by the current FTC chair, Lina Khan. However, Golodner cautions that just as Trump was previously able to readily involve himself in a technology dispute with China, he maintains the capacity to push for antitrust and regulatory investigations across various sectors and "take enforcement actions against companies and owners of companies that he did not like." At the minimum, this could result in regulators taking a "hard, close look" at deals Trump is interested in. Under a Trump presidency, CFIUS reviews of foreign takeovers of domestic companies in strategic industries are likely to be heightened, even from allied countries. A Biden administration would be less concerned about such takeovers. Still, as the bipartisan push against Nippon Steel’s acquisition of U.S. Steel demonstrates, even a second Biden administration could still be skeptical of some takeovers by foreign firms from allied countries in politically sensitive industries where unions oppose the acquisitions. If Biden wins, Golodner says it will be crucial to see what happens to Khan and her position as chair of the FTC. Khan's term as chair expires Sept. 25, 2024, and Golodner points out that she is not required to leave until a replacement for her slot is confirmed; she could therefore, retain her position, at least for a while, even if she is not renominated. He notes that even if Biden is re-elected, the FTC nomination and confirmation process will receive a lot of attention because of how Lina Khan was appointed previously. President Biden nominated her as an FTC commissioner, later surprising many in the Senate by appointing her as Chair immediately upon confirmation, a move considered controversial given her views on antitrust and application to tech companies. Golodner says that if the Republicans regain control of the Senate and Biden is president, they will take a hard look at the FTC chair appointment, and it is unlikely the Senate would approve anyone with her expansive views on anti-trust issues. Khan has launched a number of high-profile antitrust investigations and lawsuits against technology companies, approaching antitrust in a different way from her predecessors by focusing less on consumer welfare and more on how monopolies harm competition in other ways, such as potential competitors, actual competitors, sellers and labor markets. Her mixed track record in cases that have gone to court – including a high-profile court defeat for the FTC trying to block Microsoft's $70 billion acquisition of Activision Blizzard – has led critics to question her approach. In a second Biden administration, Golodner adds that regardless of who the FTC chair is, "you will continue to see the FTC de facto making Privacy Law and [using] enforcement actions." On domestic technology subsidies, Golodner says that he would not expect the Trump administration to back another Chips Act, referring to the $280 billion 2022 law that set aside more than $52 billion in subsidies and tax benefits for semiconductor production in the United States. While Trump would certainly push for increased domestic semiconductor manufacturing — during his first term, he personally pushed for TSMC to build a plant in the United States — Trump, as well as most Republican fiscal hawks in Congress, have criticized the Biden administration's spending bills for the industrial sectors, including the 2021 Bipartisan Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act and the Chips Act. A return to a Trump presidency would likely lead to more emphasis on tax cuts rather than subsidies, while new subsidies for green technologies like those included in the Inflation Reduction Act will discontinue. A Biden administration would likely try to increase subsidies and other financial incentives for domestic manufacturing similar to the three major acts passed in its first term. What Companies Should Do to Prepare Companies should immediately start planning a strategy for the next U.S. administration, says Golodner. He explains that companies need to ensure they understand the technology restrictions, policies and related issues discussed above, elaborating that they need to also understand "the policies not just in the U.S. but in Europe, India, Australia, Korea and Japan." Golodner adds that companies should be looking at how these issues are relevant to their particular industries and products, as the impact on companies directly in the technology sector differs from those just using technology goods in their own services and products. Golodner adds that this strategy planning needs to be "cross-functional between business units, government affairs, the CFO's office and communications" to understand how the election may impact them and how they might adjust their course based on the election outcome. Golodner says that it is also "vitally important for corporate leaders to decide whether or not to engage with policymakers in the U.S. and globally in order to shape those changes and to push those changes." He points out that second-term administrations are "just different." Second-term presidents do not need to be as concerned with how their decisions affect their electability in the future, giving them more freedom to express their personal views on specific issues. Golodner says he thinks there will be "opportunities in [a] second Biden Administration to push for changes." He also says that companies will need to decide whether or not they will want to interact with a second Trump administration as well. He concludes that if corporate leaders do decide to act to shift corporate decisions based on what comes out of the election, they need to have a "very clear path forward both in the U.S. and globally," given the narrowing window for such actions. Golodner's view that Congress is unlikely to pass a broad-based federal data privacy law regardless of the outcome of the election also means that companies should continue to prepare for greater compliance burdens resulting from the patchwork of state laws. Under a Biden administration, the FTC will continue its efforts to alleviate this issue by effectively establishing federal regulations in in specific realms where its authority is clearly defined, such as matters concerning discrimination, protection of children and consumer consent. In a Trump administration, the FTC will not be nearly as active, magnifying the differences between state-level data privacy laws.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump's vice presidential pick J.D. Vance has openly praised the work of Federal Trade Commission Chair Lina Khan, a sign that the agency's broad approach to antitrust enforcement could enjoy some level of support from a second Trump administration. Vance, a Republican U.S. senator from Ohio, joined the presidential ticket on Monday at the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee, where Trump officially became the party's nominee. Vance is one of several Republican lawmakers, including U.S. Senator Josh Hawley of Missouri and Florida U.S. Representative Matt Gaetz, called "Khanservatives" for their agreement with the FTC chair that U.S. antitrust law has a broader purpose than keeping prices down for consumers. "She recognized there has to be a broader understanding of how we think about competition in the marketplace," Vance said at an event in Washington in February. The comments reflect a tension in the conservative movement, between an impulse to shrink regulatory agencies and a willingness to use antitrust laws to challenge powerful corporations — especially in Big Tech, where some hope to tackle perceived censorship of conservatives online. Joseph Coniglio, director of antitrust policy at the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, said Vance is among the latter. "I do think that picking Senator Vance as vice president certainly sends a signal in one direction," said Coniglio. His think tank receives funding from several major technology companies. Scrutiny of Big Tech would not be a departure for Trump. The FTC and Department of Justice under Trump initiated investigations into Meta (NASDAQ:META), Amazon (NASDAQ:AMZN), Apple (NASDAQ:AAPL) and Google (NASDAQ:GOOGL) over alleged antitrust violations. All four companies were eventually sued, and have denied wrongdoing. 3rd party Ad. Not an offer or recommendation by Investing.com. See disclosure here or remove ads. Vance is a Yale-educated lawyer and venture capitalist who worked at corporate law firm Sidley Austin and has helped Trump fundraise in Silicon Valley. He has also called for the breakup of one of its biggest companies. "Long overdue, but it's time to break Google up," Vance tweeted in February, lamenting that "monopolistic control of information in our society resides with an explicitly progressive technology company." It remains to be seen what a potential second Trump administration would focus on. The conservative Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 policy platform discusses ways conservative causes can be championed by antitrust enforcers, but also questions whether the FTC should continue to exist. Business groups have criticized President Joe Biden's antitrust enforcers for going beyond traditional considerations of how competition affects prices to focus on issues including labor. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has sued to block the FTC's recent ban on employers requiring workers to sign agreements not to join rivals or launch competing businesses. Vance said at the February event, hosted by Silicon Valley startup incubator Y Combinator, that his view of antitrust encompasses not only helping small firms compete, but also on workers and the quality of consumer goods. He disagreed with what he described as some conservatives' view that corporations' behavior cannot be "tyrannical." "I want people to live good lives in our country," he said. "I don't really care if the entity that is most threatening to that vision is a private entity or a public entity."

Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg released NATO's latest defence spending figures on Wednesday (14 February 2024), which show an unprecedented increase across European Allies and Canada.

[Omit Graphs]

NATO defence expenditure has surged in 2024, with 19 of the 32 Alliance members implementing double-digit growth in real terms to their military budgets. Increases by European members continue to be driven by the threat posed by Russia’s war in Ukraine, in addition to the ambition set in the Wales Summit Declaration in 2014 to spend at least 2% of gross domestic product on defence within a decade.

Progress towards the 2% benchmark has been notable, particularly since 2022. According to the latest military-expenditure data released by NATO, 23 members will reach or exceed the 2% of GDP target this year, compared to seven in 2022 and just three in 2014. The data also finds that aggregate spending for the Alliance now exceeds the target level as a proportion of total GDP.

Former President Donald Trump said in an interview slated to air Tuesday that the U.S. will remain in NATO if he’s reelected, Politico reported, amid mounting fears that the U.S. would quit the alliance during a second Trump term after his most recent series of controversial remarks.

In an interview with Nigel Farage, former UK Independence Party leader and Trump ally, Trump said NATO “has to treat the U.S. fairly,” adding that if it wasn’t for the U.S. “NATO literally doesn't even exist” while encouraging European nations to “play fair,” according to Politico.

Congress this week approved a measure aimed at preventing any U.S. president from unilaterally withdrawing the United States from NATO without congressional approval. Passage came amid long-standing concerns that Donald Trump may try to exit the alliance if he returns to office. The provision was included in the National Defense Authorization Act, an annual bill detailing defense policy, which was passed by the House on Thursday and is awaiting the signature of President Biden. Under the measure, advocated by Sens. Tim Kaine (D-Va.) and Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), the president would be prohibited from withdrawing from NATO without the approval of two-thirds of the Senate or separate legislation passed by Congress. Kaine and Rubio had tried to advance similar measures since 2021. Passage of the defense policy bill this week marked the first time the House had embraced the tactic. The Republican-led House Armed Services Committee did not respond to questions about why the chamber accepted the provision. The office of Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) declined to comment.

The bipartisan attempt to add checks and balances highlights the lengths Congress is willing to go to protect the U.S.-NATO relationship amid ongoing Russian aggression and after years of criticism of the military alliance during Trump’s presidential tenure.

As Joe Biden bowed out of the 2024 presidential race last weekend, he endorsed Vice President Kamala Harris to replace him.

We in Silicon Valley know Harris well, as she was a top prosecutor in San Francisco, California's attorney general, and U.S. Senator. In those roles, she often visited Silicon Valley to meet with its leaders and became a long-time friend of the tech industry.

President Joe Biden’s decision to withdraw from the 2024 presidential campaign and endorse Vice President Kamala Harris upends the contest and alters its policy and strategic dynamics. It pits a younger Democrat against an older Republican, a woman of color campaigning against a white man, and a former prosecutor from California versus a New York/Florida billionaire. In this blog, we compare how a President Harris and a re-elected President Trump would differ on major tech policy issues. In particular, we compare their views on Biden’s artificial intelligence (AI) Executive Order, antitrust enforcement, taxes, racial/gender biases, cryptocurrency regulation, and digital equity. There is a vast gulf in how each leader would handle these pressing tech matters and what they would do to shape the future of digital technologies. Biden’s AI Executive Order One of the hallmarks of Biden’s technology agenda was an ambitious executive order calling for greater public oversight and regulation of AI. AI is the transformative technology of our time, seeing implementation in virtually every sector. As such, President Biden issued an executive order, which called for every federal agency to examine the impacts of AI in its specific sector and the avenues for addressing its problems. He gave agencies several months to review their AI usage and oversight, with deliverables due sometime in December 2024. Former President Trump’s platform seeks to repeal the executive order, while a President Harris likely would keep it. In general, Trump supports a lighter regulatory touch on AI and other emerging technologies. In his initial term, very little news was generated around AI regulation. In contrast, Harris understands the way AI is transforming communications and service delivery, and the need for public oversight. She likely would extend Biden’s executive order and urge Congress to pass legislation that would codify greater protections to promote consumer privacy, cybersecurity, and human safety. She might also encourage the federal government to use its procurement power to make sure agencies provide appropriate guardrails for their AI use. Antitrust enforcement A President Harris would likely continue Biden’s tough antitrust enforcement. She has talked repeatedly about the need to reduce inflation and improve economic opportunity for all Americans. The administration has gone after large platforms, which they feel have abused their strong market positions and engaged in predatory behavior that has harmed consumers and made it harder for people to buy necessary goods. Trump probably would not be as vigorous at anti-trust enforcement as Biden and Harris have been. He might continue current tech antitrust enforcement cases but would give a green light to tech mergers and acquisitions. His business background makes him generally more sympathetic to the business community, and he is unlikely to appoint strong enforcers to the Department of Justice, Federal Trade Commission, or Federal Communications Commission. That was the case in his first term as president and likely would continue if he wins another term as chief executive. Tech billionaire taxes Trump has indicated he wants to extend his 2017 tax cuts when they expire in 2025 and cut income and corporate taxes even further. Even though a considerable amount of his earlier tax cuts went to rich individuals and wealthy corporations, his tax cut plans likely will continue those trends and push cuts in those directions. Harris likely will continue Biden’s avoidance of income tax increases for those earning less than $400,000. But like President Biden, she wants to raise taxes on the ultra-wealthy on grounds they need to pay their fair share. Those tax increases would help pay for needed services for less-fortunate people. Racial/gender biases There are well-documented racial and gender biases in AI that need to be taken seriously. Trump does not have a track record of supporting strong bias mitigation efforts, especially for racial bias, or of appointing regulators who take tough action in these areas. He has made many dubious claims in this area, most recently using the term “Black jobs“ in the last debate—a term for which no one still has ascertained the meaning. In fact, he has been part of a swarm of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) critics that have condemned the use of race in college admissions on the grounds that such preferences no longer are warranted. Harris, in contrast, has a record of fighting racial and gender biases and supporting effective enforcement actions against those who violate basic rights. She has fought for anti-discrimination action in housing and wealth creation and has spoken clearly on the importance of effective government action. Her focus on these issues will likely continue as she forms a more pro-consumer, tech policy agenda. Cryptocurrency regulation The two candidates differ considerably regarding cryptocurrency regulation. Although Trump previously supported tough regulation against cryptocurrencies, he has recently moderated his position and advocated for a lighter approach. His view appears to be that crypto is an innovation that requires some time to work out and does not require tough oversight at this point. Unlike her Republican opponent, Harris has a tougher stance on cryptocurrency regulation. She thinks consumers need adequate protection and there should be greater transparency in the crypto marketplace. Administration appointments already have called for tougher U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement against cryptocurrency firms. Digital equity In her new book, “Digitally Invisible: How the Internet is Creating the New Underclass,” Nicol Turner Lee argues that who gets into office often determines the scope of national tech policy, especially when it comes to the rewards for industry and communities. During his administration, Trump upended all of Obama’s policies from data privacy to school connectivity, including those connecting the nation’s schools to the internet. However, Trump did advance policies for more robust 5G wireless infrastructure, especially in rural communities. Under the Biden-Harris administration, the largest allotment of funds has been allocated toward national broadband infrastructure under any administration, and federal agencies are steep into getting states the funds to launch their approved projects. If history is a dictate, Trump will halt all those programs and attempt to recoup the funds, while Harris would stay committed to bringing broadband to all communities. With the election more than three months away, it’s still too early to tell how each candidate will fare. But what is expected of Harris, assuming she secures the Democratic nomination, is that she will continue many of the tech policies of the Biden administration and stay that course as president if she were to win.

The three smartest words that Donald Trump during his presidential campaign are “NATO is obsolete.” His adversary, Hillary Clinton, that NATO was “the strongest alliance in the history of the world.” Now that Trump has been in power, the White House the same worn line that NATO is “the most successful Alliance in history, guaranteeing the security, prosperity, and freedom of its members.” But Trump was right the first time around: Rather than being a strong alliance with a clear purpose, this 70-year-old organization that is meeting in London on December 4 is a stale military holdover from the Cold War days that should have gracefully retired many years ago. NATO was originally founded by the United States and 11 other Western nations as an attempt to curb the rise of communism in 1949. Six years later, Communist nations founded the Warsaw Pact and through these two multilateral institutions, the entire globe became a Cold War battleground. When the USSR collapsed in 1991, the Warsaw Pact disbanded but NATO expanded, growing from its original 12 members to 29 member countries. North Macedonia, set to join next year, will bring the number to 30. NATO has also expanded well beyond the North Atlantic, a partnership with Colombia in 2017. Donald Trump recently that Brazil could one day become a full member. NATO’s post-Cold War expansion toward Russia’s borders, despite earlier promises not to move eastward, has led to rising tensions between Western powers and Russia, including multiple close calls between military forces. It has also contributed to a new arms race, including upgrades in nuclear arsenals, and the NATO “war games” since the Cold War. While claiming to “preserve peace,” NATO has a history of bombing civilians and committing war crimes. In 1999, NATO engaged in military operations without UN approval in Yugoslavia. Its illegal airstrikes during the Kosovo War left hundreds of civilians dead. And far from the “North Atlantic,” NATO joined the United States in invading Afghanistan in 2001, where it is still bogged down two decades later. In 2011, NATO forces illegally invaded Libya, creating a failed state that caused masses of people to flee. Rather than take responsibility for these refugees, NATO countries have turned back desperate migrants on the Mediterranean Sea, letting thousands die. In London, NATO wants to show it is ready to fight new wars. It will showcase its readiness initiative—the ability to deploy 30 battalions by land, 30 air squadrons and 30 naval vessels in just 30 days, and to confront future threats from China and Russia, including with hypersonic missiles and cyberwarfare. But far from being a lean, mean war machine, NATO is actually riddled with divisions and contradictions. Here are some of them: French President Emmanuel Macron questions the U.S. commitment to fight for Europe, has called NATO “brain dead” and has proposed a European Army under the nuclear umbrella of France. Turkey has enraged NATO members with its incursion into Syria to attack the Kurds, who have been Western allies in the fight against ISIS. And Turkey has threatened to veto a Baltic defense plan until allies support its controversial incursion into Syria. Turkey has also infuriated NATO members, especially Trump, by purchasing Russia’s S-400 missile system. Trump wants NATO to push back against China’s growing influence, including the use of Chinese companies for the construction of 5G mobile networks—something many NATO countries are unwilling to do. Is Russia really NATO’s adversary? France’s Macron has reached out to Russia, inviting Putin to discuss ways in which the European Union can put the Crimean invasion behind it. Donald Trump has publicly attacked Germany over its to pipe in Russian gas, but a recent German poll saw 66 percent wanting closer ties with Russia. The UK has bigger problems. Britain has been convulsed over the Brexit conflict and is holding a contentious national election on December 12. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, knowing that Trump is wildly unpopular, is reluctant to be seen as close to him. Also, Johnson’s major contender, Jeremy Corbyn, is a reluctant supporter of NATO. While his Labour Party is committed to NATO, over his career as an anti-war champion, Corbyn has NATO “a danger to world peace and a danger to world security.” The last time Britain hosted NATO leaders in 2014, Corbyn an anti-NATO rally that the end of the Cold War “should have been the time for NATO to shut up shop, give up, go home and go away.” A further complication is Scotland, which is home to a very unpopular Trident nuclear submarine base as part of NATO’s nuclear deterrent. A new Labour government would need the support of the Scottish National Party. But its leader, Nicola Sturgeon, insists that a precondition for her party’s support is a commitment to close the base. Europeans can’t stand Trump (a recent poll found he is by only 4 percent of Europeans!) and their leaders can’t rely on him. Allied leaders learn of presidential decisions that affect their interests via Twitter. The lack of coordination was clear in October, when Trump ignored NATO allies when he ordered U.S. special forces out of northern Syria, where they had been operating alongside French and British commandos against Islamic State militants. The U.S. unreliability has led the European Commission to draw up plans for a European “defense union” that will coordinate military spending and procurement. The next step may be to coordinate military actions separate from NATO. The Pentagon has complained about EU countries purchasing military equipment from each other instead of from the United States, and this defense union “a dramatic reversal of the last three decades of increased integration of the transatlantic defence sector.” Do Americans really want to go to war for Estonia? Article 5 of the Treaty states that an attack against one member “shall be considered an attack against them all,” meaning that the treaty obligates the U.S. to go to war on behalf of 28 nations—something most likely opposed by war-weary Americans who a less aggressive foreign policy that focuses on peace, diplomacy, and economic engagement instead of military force. An additional major bone of contention is who will pay for NATO. The last time NATO leaders met, President Trump derailed the agenda by berating NATO countries for not paying their fair share, and at the London meeting, Trump is expected to announce symbolic U.S. cuts to NATO’s operations budget. Trump’s main concern is that member states step up to the NATO target of spending 2 percent of their gross domestic products on defense by 2024, a goal that is unpopular among Europeans, who that their tax dollars go to nonmilitary items. Nevertheless, Secretary-General will brag that Europe and Canada have added $100 billion to their military budgets since 2016—something Donald Trump will take credit for—and that more NATO officials are meeting the 2 percent goal, even though a 2019 NATO report shows only seven members have done so: the U.S., Greece, Estonia, the UK, Romania, Poland and Latvia. In an age where people around the world want to avoid war and to focus instead on the climate chaos that threatens future life on earth, NATO is an anachronism. It now accounts for about three-quarters of military spending and weapons dealing around the globe. Instead of preventing war, it promotes militarism, exacerbates global tensions and makes war more likely. This Cold War relic shouldn’t be reconfigured to maintain U.S. domination in Europe, or to mobilize against Russia or China, or to launch new wars in space. It should not be expanded, but disbanded. Seventy years of militarism is more than enough.

Are there any scenarios for dissolution of NATO? Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall consider this question in their essay “Ahead of the Curve: Anticipating Strategic Surprise”. They insist than in the future the fundamental strategic interests of the US and Europe will diverge. The Americans will not be willing to pay billions for the protection of rich European countries. The Europeans will refrain from participating in peacekeeping operations in places such Africa. Europe’s main goal will be to deter the rising power of America. The United States will withdraw their forces from Europe. The United Kingdom is suspicious of its continental allies and generally follows the United States. Consequently, without America and Great Britain, NATO will collapse. 24 The collapse of NATO may be a sequential result from several correlated events. They might include partisan actions from the U.S. leadership and responses from the European states that will increase political and military disparity. For instance, a reason for possible dissolution of NATO could be the difference between America's national interests and those of the European allies especially with regard to military interventions outside the Euro-Atlantic area. America is likely to feel frustrated by the lack of reciprocity, considering the fact that during the last seventy years the United States invested enormous funds in the reconstruction of the European continent. Americans might have some additional disappointments based on the probability that European partners will delay or will not implement the commitment to provide 2 percent of their GDP to mutual defense. Consequently, the probable European failure to commit to the common security may increase the financial responsibility and may raise the military burden on the United States. The latter may increase the level of dissatisfaction with NATO from U.S. citizens. The possibility of a continued lack of European investment in the area of defense will widen the technological gap and will affect the ability of Allied Forces to act as one entity. Conceived in this way, these factors combined with the traditional American rhetoric about isolationism may lead to the withdrawal of the United States from NATO. Canada without the American military machine will not be able to ensure the survivability of the transatlantic link, which means the effective disintegration of NATO. 25 Richard Jordan from the conservative website the Federalist asserts that the Alliance will crumble slowly and gradually. The author claims the world no longer needs the Cold War’s NATO. Furthermore, he insists that NATO has had a privilege to behave irrationally, there are no reasons for its existence, and there is no force, which might transform it. Nowadays the world is in a different paradigm–America is not willing to pay any price and bear any burden. The current Administration sees the world through the prism of realism, which general assumption is that each party acts only in their own narrow interests. Since the United States has a number of domestic political differences and external economic concerns, Washington does not want to invest resources and efforts to subsidize the luxurious European lifestyle. In five to ten years, the writer proclaims, Europe will experience a crisis, which Europeans will not manage to solve. In addition, Jordan thinks that, due to exhausted political patience the United States might not support Europe which ultimate result is a collapse of NATO.

Trump has made clear that he believes he can withdraw from NATO without seeking congressional approval, consistent with the mainstream position discussed above. This leaves Congress without any clear mechanism for blocking such action. And even if Congress passed a law opposing withdrawal, it seems unlikely that the executive branch would consider itself bound to respect the legislature’s wishes. Instead, Congress would most likely need to challenge the constitutionality of the president’s actions in the courts—an approach that has failed in the past, though there is reason to think that certain challenges may have more success in the future.