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2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 2nc – no WW3 !

Ukraine-Russia war won’t go nuclear

Stein 22 (Aaron Stein -- Director of Research at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) “Ukraine and a Guide To Avoiding World War III” Texas National Security Review 3/3/22 ) CL

After a few days, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has stumbled amid reports of low troop morale and poor logistics. The bungled Russian invasion has given space for different European countries t to the Ukrainian government, but this raises the risk of escalation beyond Ukraine. Such overt assistance has prompted Moscow that it would strike any arms convoys inside Ukrainian territory, presumably with airstrikes near the Ukrainian-Polish border. There is a non-trivial risk of conventional escalation that could turn a contained, regional conflict into a much larger regional war. The United States and Europe ought to take action to reduce these risks even as they supply Ukraine with lethal and non-lethal supplies. The West cannot afford to be sanguine about the increased risk of direct conflict with Russia. The United States and its NATO allies are also flying in close, daily contact with the Russian and Belarusian air forces while NATO troops are deployed in . Additionally, the primary route for Western weapons to reach Ukraine is via Poland. Western policymakers would be wise to consider that Russian aerospace forces may bomb convoys entering Ukraine from Poland, raising the possibility that they or their munitions could strike targets just outside the border, or even cross into Polish airspace. And as the war moves west, Russian fighters could pursue Ukrainian aircraft fleeing the conflict and, perhaps, violate Polish air space. Hot pursuit of aircraft over international borders invites retaliation, potentially bringing NATO and Russian forces into combat. As such, policymakers ought to be clear and deliberate about how to manage potential escalation spirals. While both sides have professional militaries that are governed by rules managing these interactions, NATO air forces will almost certainly be operating in ever-closer proximity to Russian aircraft, at the very least. The airspace surrounding Romania and Poland is , with different NATO forces patrolling over the Black and Baltic Seas, as well as in the tri-border area between Belarus, Ukraine, and Poland. To complicate matters further, Ukrainian air assets have fled to . This means that Soviet-designed aircraft are flying at NATO members’ borders, which requires NATO air forces to identify them and escort them to an appropriate air base. As of now, Russian fighters are not pursuing these aircrafts, perhaps because they have not gained air superiority over Ukraine and are not patrolling in the far west of the country. If the conflict was to escalate or were NATO to decide to reassess its aims and rules of engagement — perhaps in response to Russian forces pushing westward after taking or encircling Kyiv, driving a tide of fleeing refugees before them — things could get much more dangerous. The risk of spillover from the conflict is an urgent topic for discussion precisely because it could lead to a war involving up to four nuclear-armed powers: Russia, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom. President Vladimir Putin has already put his nuclear forces on in an attempt to coerce the Western powers. This order has puzzled observers of Russian nuclear forces, but the signaling appears to be designed to warn NATO to stay out of the conflict, something Biden has pledged to do, rather than signal Moscow’s willingness to use nuclear force first. While the threat of a nuclear exchange is low, the United States and Europe must grapple with the secondary challenges of military support for Ukraine. Russian warnings have suggested that it intends to limit actions to Ukraine, while the Biden administration it will not send troops into the conflict. The line, however, is becoming increasingly blurred with the increasing pledges to support the Ukrainian armed forces. Foreign supplied man-portable weapons are already tearing into Russian supply lines and in numbers larger than what the Kremlin may have accepted before the invasion, and the networks being set up to supply these weapons could easily be used to support a Ukrainian insurgency indefinitely. How will Moscow react once these arms flows from Poland turn from trickles to torrents, or kill Russian soldiers tasked with patrolling conquered urban areas? NATO aerial patrols over Poland are well within the engagement zone of Belarusian surface-to-air missiles. In the event of increased tensions, Belarus, under instructions from the Kremlin, could use its surface-to-air missiles to harass NATO fighters, or consider trying to interfere by jamming aircraft. The other, and perhaps most likely, pressure point will be on the supply convoys from Poland into Ukraine. In Syria, Russia used tactical bombers from Turkey, as part of its siege campaign of Aleppo. This tactic led to Russian bombing directly on the border. In the air, Russian fighters would also to warn away coalition fighters during times of tension (often with little effect), as well as Turkish Air Force fighters patrolling near the border. If the war drags on, and Western supplies do start to make it into the country in larger numbers, NATO should expect Ukrainian-driven convoys with Western aid to be bombed. Russia has pledged to do this, and it would be wise to take Putin seriously. The Russian strategy now, it seems, is to mass forces to besiege Ukrainian cities. As part of this strategy, one should assume Moscow will attempt to cut weapons supplies to Ukraine, even if those supplies come from Poland. The Russian military has performed poorly in Ukraine, but there is little reason to doubt that Moscow can use mass to overcome challenges and take terrain from the Ukrainian military. If this were to happen, Russian military forces could soon different fronts in the south and east, besiege Kyiv, and be in a position to expand the war in the western part of the country. This reality, while unsettling, requires that the United States and NATO think through the risks of increased Russian activity on the Ukrainian-Polish border. To manage this risk, the United States and NATO should announce that no member-state’s territory will be used to launch attacks against the Russian armed forces. The two sides should also continue to push for increased transparency about air operations on the border with Belarus, decreasing the risk of miscalculation on the border. Finally, the United States and Europe should decide how to respond if convoys are bombed. The easiest answer is . However, the pressure to do “something” to protect these convoys is likely to grow, leading to pressures on leaders to extend some sort of protection to aid and weapons convoys that enter Ukraine, even when any such action could be escalatory. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has gone poorly thus far, but the correlation of forces still slants heavily in Moscow’s favor. And Putin will likely increase the brutality of his campaign, substituting mass for operational cleverness in his effort to subdue Ukraine. The West needs to be prepared for this fact, and the potential that the war will move westward. If Putin chooses this course of action, bringing the two sides into far closer contact, it will be important to manage force-on-force friction to keep the conflict limited and to ensure that it does not spill over into Europe. The United States and NATO can manage escalatory risks, but it is important to think clearly about what is at stake, proactively increase transparency with Moscow about certain NATO actions in Poland, and to manage flights in certain air corridors. The West has stood remarkably united in the face of Russian aggression, but all parties involved should be thinking about how to manage spillover from what may turn out to be a longer and bloodier war than Moscow planned for.

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 1nc – no WW3 !

No risk of WW3 – the conflict won’t go nuclear

Simhony 22 (Limor Simhony-- a policy advisor and researcher based in London, “NATO Intervention in Ukraine Won’t Spark World War III” Foreign Policy 4/1/22 https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/01/nato-intervention-in-ukraine-wont-spark-world-war-iii/)

Liberal democracies have war fatigue. It has been demonstrated by disengagement and withdrawal from conflicts (like in Afghanistan) and limited interventions (like in Syria, Libya, and Yemen), where Western forces reduced dependence on ground forces and concentrated on airstrikes and assistance to other fighting forces, such as the Saudis in Yemen and rebels in Syria. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 passed with few consequences for Russia, and as Russia prepared to invade the rest of Ukraine on Feb. 24, it was clear that Western nations would stick to a policy of nonengagement.

Sanctions against Russia have been severe, and Ukrainian forces have been receiving weapons, equipment, and valuable intelligence from Western nations, which have allowed them to deploy unexpected force against Russian troops—fiercely contesting their invasion and causing thousands of casualties, loss of tanks, and other armored vehicles, rocket launchers, aircraft, and ships. Diplomatic efforts to keep Russia isolated have also been crucial. However, Russia’s indiscriminate attacks against Ukrainian civilians—including bombing hospitals and schools as well as the use of horrific weapons, such as cluster bombs and white phosphorus—should drive the West to reevaluate its war engagement policy and take a more active role by implementing a no-fly zone or securing evacuation corridors—perhaps even actively fighting Russian forces. The main concern is any such escalation could lead to World War III. There are two reasons that this is unlikely. The first is that Russia’s military capabilities are poor relative to those of Western armies. Their forces are not sufficiently trained; their equipment and weapons are dated and inferior; they experience major logistical, operational, and tactical difficulties; and their soldiers have low morale. The expectation that Moscow could escalate the war into other theaters in an effective way, especially by conventional means, is unrealistic. Damaging economic sanctions also mean that Russia may not be able to fund a wider war. The expectation that Moscow will be able to escalate the war into other theaters in an effective way, especially by conventional means, is unrealistic. It is possible that if the Russian military continues to struggle, Russian President Vladimir Putin will deploy chemical or even nuclear weapons to increase gains and deter the West from interfering—but that is unlikely. The second is that Russia has become isolated. To fight a world war, Russia needs powerful allies, which it does not have. Its strongest ally, China, has largely remained on the sidelines since the war started. It abstained from voting against the demanding that Russia ends its offensive, and it is worried about secondary sanctions if it aids Russia. The only countries besides Russia that voted to reject the resolution were Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, and Syria—hardly a winning alliance. Both world wars saw blocks of powerful allies fight one another. Currently, such a bloc does not exist on Russia’s side. These factors mean that there is not a high risk of substantial escalation into total global war. This should be enough to convince Western nations to change their engagement policy and help Ukraine win the war by repulsing an opponent that is considerably inferior militarily to their own forces. It is unlikely to happen for two main reasons: fear of Russian nukes and the West’s aversion to casualties. The most widely discussed reason is the concern that Russia will use nuclear weapons if NATO intervenes militarily. Putin has reasserted Russia’s right to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine, making this a legitimate concern. However, it is more likely that nuclear deterrence—albeit different to Cold War deterrence—will hold. Russia’s deployment of nuclear weapons, either against Ukraine or against a NATO member state, could incur devastating consequences for Russia. As then-U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis said in 2018, dismissing the notion that tactical nuclear weapons are somehow a lesser threat, “Any nuclear weapon used … is a strategic game-changer.” Therefore, if NATO retaliates with a powerful response, either nuclear or conventional, it may target strategic Russian military positions and perhaps even sites of political power, aiming at wiping out Russian military capabilities and targeting those in positions of authority—a move that could threaten Putin’s leadership. A NATO retaliation should therefore be considered a major threat to Putin, especially because rivals include numerous nations with considerable nuclear capabilities, such as the United States, United Kingdom, and France. Sensitivity to casualties—specifically deaths among troops—has become a major element affecting liberal democracies’ war preparedness, use of force, and decision-making. In addition, at the heart of this conflict stands national identity. Putin has little motivation to devastate a county that he wishes to annex and has not knowingly made any preparations for using nuclear weapons. Fear of the bomb accounts for one reason behind the West’s decision to leave Ukraine to fight on its own. Another consideration is fundamental to the West: casualty sensitivity. Sensitivity to casualties—specifically deaths among troops—has become a major element affecting liberal democracies’ war preparedness, use of force, and decision-making regarding participation in wars. The trauma of Britain’s so-called lost generation followed the loss of 750,000 troops in World War I. It overwhelmed the public and affected interwar foreign policy and military preparedness in a misguided attempt to avoid another war. The same happened in other liberal democracies scarred by the war, such as France, whereas countries with shallower liberal and democratic traditions—such as Germany, which suffered heavier losses than France and Britain—consequently gravitated toward fascism and reverted to militarism. Conflict behavior and public attitudes toward wars have undergone deep changes during the 20th and 21st centuries as a result of extensive liberalization and democratization processes. Liberal concepts of individualism, personal freedoms, a reduction in internal violence, and a comfortable lifestyle that includes longer life expectancy brought about changes in attitudes about war—primarily, that it is an undesirable way to resolve conflicts. Rejecting the violence and suffering that comes with it has made it difficult for leaders of liberal democracies to justify to the public participation in wars, especially wars of choice, in which the nation is not under direct threat. The United States’ interventions in Vietnam, Lebanon, Somalia, and Iraq, for example, were shaped by the casualties incurred. The 1983 bombing of the Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon that killed 241 U.S. service members and the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu, where 18 U.S. soldiers died, provoked powerful reactions against the missions, bringing them to an abrupt end despite them initially enjoying wide public support. A similar reaction came after the Tet Offensive in Vietnam in January 1968, which resulted in 1,500 American fatalities. It was a watershed moment that changed the debate about the war and led to the shelving of plans for escalation. Support for the second war in Iraq also fell dramatically as deaths mounted, causing the American public to question the necessity of the war or its conduct and chances of success. Alliance leaders stressed none of its forces would be deployed into Ukraine to prevent the conflict’s spread. Firefighters sit amid debris in the area of a research institute, part of Ukraine's National Academy of Sciences, after a strike by drones, in northwestern Kyiv. Powerful threats could too easily become real disasters. Israel’s use of force against Hezbollah in Lebanon has been heavily influenced by casualty aversion. This included an overreliance on air power in an attempt to limit fatalities among ground forces during the 2006 Lebanon War at the price of undermining military effectiveness. Then-Israeli Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz famously commented: “We didn’t send ground troops into Lebanon because the public couldn’t stomach any more deaths.” Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, where forces had been deployed between 1985 and 2000, was also heavily influenced by the public’s dissatisfaction with the casualties incurred, particularly after several costly incidents during the 1990s undermined support for a continued military presence and enhanced criticism of the government. Nondemocracies and guerrilla and terrorist organizations do not exhibit the West’s aversion to casualties. Nondemocracies and guerrilla and terrorist organizations do not exhibit such an aversion to casualties. During the Iran-Iraq War, both sides callously scarified children by using them as human minesweepers and shields. Similarly, both the Viet Cong in Vietnam and Hezbollah in Lebanon showed considerable willingness to sacrifice lives despite suffering more losses than their liberal enemies. Then-Egyptian President Anwar Sadat famously said, “Egypt would sacrifice a million Egyptian soldiers” during the October 1973 war against Israel despite not facing an existential threat or serious strategic concerns. There has been little evidence to suggest there is heightened sensitivity to losses among troops in Russia, a nation with a history of mass deaths in both the world wars, its own civil war, and from the brutal suppression and killing of its own people. The continued use of force in Ukraine, which has resulted in as many as 15,000 Russian military deaths so far according to the , indicates that casualties are of no concern to Russia’s top brass. This stands in contrast to Ukraine, which accepts its causalities because it is fighting an existential war for independence and national survival. Casualty sensitivity has been one of the factors shaping democracies’ behavior, with Western politicians preferring to avoid direct engagement in wars or to limit the use of ground forces, even at the price of compromising objectives and deterrence. It is one of the reasons that a policy of nonengagement was adopted, without question or hesitation, regarding Ukraine, long before Putin raised the alert status of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Fear of casualties among soldiers meant that a policy of nonengagement has existed prior to Russia’s invasion—and therefore separately to a concern about escalating into a broader war. This has been understood by Putin, who bet—correctly—that Western nations will not take an active role in the war by using direct force against Russian troops, not only out of fear of escalation but as a result of a preexisting doctrine that seeks to minimize casualties. Had the West exhibited less casualty aversion, this could have acted as a greater deterrent against Russian aggression. For the war in Ukraine, unlike the risk of escalation and use of nuclear weapons, the risk of incurring casualties is high. Considering how formative aversion to casualties has been, committing troops to fight Russia will require liberal democracies to undergo a major paradigm shift. But there are ways to mitigate the effect of casualty sensitivity on public opinion. Adjusting the public’s expectations regarding the length of the war and the casualties that will result as well as displaying internal political unity could help. Employing force that relies primarily on air power, which limits casualties, can be used; during Israel’s 2006 war in Lebanon and other wars, this has proved to have only limited effectiveness. However, if done in collaboration with Ukrainian ground forces, this could have better chances of success. This war brought a shift in attitudes toward wars in Europe. The Germans, famously pacifist since 1945, have undergone the largest shift and now support military aid to Ukraine and a considerable increase in funds to rebuild Germany’s military power. But a bigger shift is needed considering Russia’s aggression. Russia is no stranger to targeting civilians, as it has done in the carpet-bombing of Grozny in Chechnya, in 1994 to 1995 and 1999 to 2000. It is doing this again now. It is time for the West to stop being afraid of limited threats that are not likely to materialize and to use its military superiority to help Ukraine defend its independence. Intervention will not turn this local conflict into World War III. It runs the risk of causing a tactical nuclear attack on Ukraine, but this risk is limited given what any retaliation could mean for Russia. The West must therefore decide how long it will refrain from engagement and allow Russia to sow devastation in pursuing expansionist ambitions for fear of casualties or the bomb.

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 2nc – war won’t spread

Article V checks war – no spill up

Hubbard 22 (Kaia Hubbard; general news reporter at U.S. News & World Report, joined the company in 2020 as an intern, after previously writing for Willamette Week, Kaia is a graduate of the University of San Diego, where she led her college paper as editor-in-chief; “EXPLAINER: What Is Article 5 and How Does it Shape NATO’s Ukraine Response?”; March 8th, 2022; DOA: 6/25/22, ) // bh

Article 5 specifies that any attack on any of the member countries is effectively an attack against them all. Through the Cold War, when the alliance sought to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union, it served as a deterrent. But in the current conflict, its violation is a guarantee of escalation on a nightmarish scale. Even NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that NATO allies have a responsibility “to prevent this war from escalating beyond Ukraine.” “The alliance doesn't want to invoke Article 5 because it doesn’t want to have a war with Russia,” says Stanley Sloan, a visiting scholar in political science at Vermont’s Middlebury College and author of Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain. “The best protection against having to do that is Ukrainian success,” Sloan says. “So that’s one reason why the United States and the allies are trying to do everything possible without getting directly involved in the conflict that they can do to help the Ukrainians succeed.” What is Article 5 and How Does it Operate? The alliance calls Article 5 the “principle of collective defense at the very heart of NATO’s founding treaty.” Since it was signed in 1949, the alliance has been so powerful and so effective that Article 5 has only needed to be invoked once – after the 9/11 attacks on the U.S. The charter stipulates that member countries will assist the attacked party “by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” Importantly, each nation gets to determine how they will respond, Sloan says. It’s not an automatic commitment to do anything specific in terms of an attack.

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 2nc – war won’t spread

Article V checks– NATO will defend Western Europe

White 22 (Kenton White; Lecturer in Strategic Studies and International Relations at the University of Reading, historian and researcher focusing on British defence policy from the Napoleonic Wars to the present; “Ukraine: what might happen if the war spreads to a Nato country”; March 18, 2022; DOA: 6/25/22; ) // bh

Zelensky has repeatedly called for a Nato-enforced “no-fly zone” over Ukraine. But Nato leaders have concluded, understandably, that this risks direct military confrontation between Russia and Nato forces, potentially leading to rapid escalation. The same seems to apply to another of Zelensky’s requests – the supply of aircraft to help the Ukrainian air force. But if Nato were to directly provide aircraft to Ukraine, Russia may very well conclude that this is offensive, rather than defensive, weaponry, and take action to stop the supply of planes. This may involve strikes on airfields where the planes are based – for example, in Poland – before they are moved to Ukraine. There’s a chance that Zelensky has called for a Nato-sponsored no-fly zone precisely because he knows it would be impossible, allowing him to begin distancing himself from the idea of Nato membership for Ukraine. This might give him the negotiating room to conclude an agreement with Russia. But at the same time, he reminded America in his speech to the US Congress of the Pearl Harbour and 9/11 attacks. Zelensky is warning of the consequences of continued Nato inaction. Article 5 Nato membership allows a nation to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to call for support from the other members fof the alliance. This article has only been used once in Nato’s history – by the US, following the attacks on New York and Washington DC on September 11, 2001 But Article 5 does not guarantee that all the other Nato states would send armed forces to repel an attack, only that military action is an option which can be included as part of the alliance’s principle of “collective defence”. Given public statements from Westminster, the UK would be expected to honour its obligation to fight a Russian attack. As the UK’s health secretary, Sajid Javid, said only a few days ago in an interview on LBC: “If a single Russian toecap steps into Nato territory there will be war with Nato.” On February 25, one day after Russian forces invaded Ukraine, Nato heads of government met in Brussels. They produced a statement deploring the invasion and pledging aid for Ukraine. The alliance pledged to “continue to take all measures and decisions required to ensure the security and defence of all allies”. Accordingly, Nato has deployed both land and maritime assets across its eastern regions and “activated NATO’s defence plans to prepare ourselves to respond to a range of contingencies and secure alliance territory”. My research on Nato has involved informal discussions with several officers from various member nations. This has led me to believe that some Nato countries further from the conflict zone might be reluctant to send combat forces – even in the event that Article 5 is triggered. There is also the question of whether Nato’s political leaders would be willing to carry out attacks on Russian soil, which would represent a significant intensification of the conflict and would carry the additional risk that Russia might respond by escalating to nuclear or chemical weapons. Deterrence – whether conventional or nuclear – requires rational calculation by both sides. As I have written before, Putin’s rationality is different to that of western leaders, which is part of the reason why this crisis and conflict happened in the first place. So far, Putin has not been deterred by Nato. Instead, he has threatened the alliance with “consequences you have never seen in history”.

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 2nc – war won’t spread

Ukraine spillover is unlikely

Ellyatt 22 (Holly Ellyatt – CNBC Correspondent focused on macro-economics and politics, studied European Social and Political Studies at University College London and completed a MA at City University. “Could there be war between Russia and the West? Strategists predict what could happen next” CNBC 4/29/22 CL

Tensions between Russia and the West appear to have risen dramatically over the last week. In the last few days alone, Russia stopped gas supplies to two European countries and has warned the West several times that the risk of a nuclear war is very “real.” Russian President Vladimir Putin said that any foreign intervention in Ukraine would provoke what he called a “lightning fast” response from Moscow. The saber-rattling and rhetoric between Moscow and the West have become notably more aggressive this week, prompting concerns that a direct confrontation between the two power blocs could be more likely. In the last few days alone, for example, Russia stopped gas supplies to two European countries and has warned the West several times that the risk of a nuclear war is very “real.” In addition, has said that any foreign intervention in Ukraine would provoke what he called a “lightning fast” response from Moscow, while his Foreign Ministry warned NATO not to test its patience. For their part, Western officials have dismissed Russia’s “bravado” and “dangerous” nuclear war rhetoric, with the U.K. calling on Western allies to “double down” on their support for Ukraine. CNBC asked strategists about the likelihood of a direct confrontation between Russia and the West. Here’s what they said. Nuclear attack? At the start of the week, Russia’s foreign minister warned that the threat of a nuclear war “cannot be underestimated” and said NATO’s supply of weapons to Ukraine was tantamount to the military alliance engaging in a proxy war with Russia. Putin doubled down on the bellicose rhetoric Wednesday, threatening a “lightning fast” retaliation against any country intervening in and creating what he called “strategic threats for Russia.” He then appeared to allude to Russia’s arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons when he warned that Russia has the “tools” for a retaliatory response “that no one else can boast of having now ... we will use them if necessary.” But strategists told CNBC that Putin is playing on risk aversion in the West and that the chances of a nuclear war are remote. “I think it’s outside the realm of possibility right now that there’s going to be a nuclear war or World War III that really spills over that far beyond Ukraine’s borders,” Samuel Ramani, a geopolitical analyst and associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, told CNBC. “If there’s a border spillover right now, we’re still probably most likely looking at something like Moldova being vulnerable to an invasion,” he said. He noted that Russia has a long history of using “nuclear brinkmanship” as a way of preventing the West from pursuing security policies that it doesn’t like, with the escalation in hostile rhetoric aimed at deterring NATO members from making heavy arms deliveries to Ukraine. Moment of danger Nonetheless, Ramani noted the threat posed by Russia could become more acute if it felt humiliated on the battlefield. In particular, military setbacks in Ukraine around May 9 could pose some danger. That’s Russia’s “Victory Day” — the anniversary of Nazi Germany’s defeat by the Soviet Union in World War II. “Putin has had a history of escalating unpredictability if he feels that Russia is being humiliated in some way ... and if there are major setbacks, especially on around the 9th [of May] then there’s a risk of unbreakable action,” he said. “But also there’s a logic of mutually assured destruction that hopefully will rein everybody in.” Threatening nuclear attacks is part of Putin’s “playbook,” said William Alberque, director of strategy, technology and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies think tank. “Putin enjoys using risks and he thinks he has a much more appetite for risk than the West does,” he told CNBC on Thursday. “He’s trying to use the old playbook of ‘if I terrify you enough, you’ll back down’,” he said. “Ultimately, if he uses nuclear weapons, even a demonstration strike, this would turn Russia into a global pariah,” Alberque said. He advised Western leaders, “We just need to be able to manage our risk and keep our nerve and not panic when he does something that we might not expect.” There’s no indication that there will be a direct confrontation, Liviu Horovitz, a nuclear policy researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, told CNBC. “Both the United States and Western European governments have repeatedly said that they have no interest in escalating this conflict beyond Ukraine, and I don’t see anything suggesting that NATO troops will be fighting in Ukraine anytime soon.” Still, if a wider war did break out, “NATO’s overall conventional capabilities outmatch Russia’s,” he noted. What’s important now is that “all sides should avoid any steps that could create misunderstandings,” he said — steps that could lead to an accidental and potentially catastrophic war. Economic war While NATO has shied away from providing any aid to Ukraine that could be misconstrued as a direct attack on Russia, Western allies continue to pile on the pressure on Moscow. Indeed, the economic punishment on Russia has been increasing by the day, in the form of more sanctions on its businesses, key sectors and officials close to or within Putin’s regime. Russia’s own Economy Ministry expects the economy to contract as a result, by 8.8% in 2022 in its base-case scenario, or by 12.4% in a more conservative scenario, For its part, Russia has sought to inflict its own pain on European countries that are, awkwardly, heavily reliant on Russian natural gas imports. This week . Russia’s move was branded as “blackmail” by the EU but defended by Moscow. While a direct confrontation between Russia and the West remains unlikely, one close Russia watcher said Western governments need to imbue their populations with a “war mentality” to prepare them for the hardships they could face as the economic fallout from the war continues. Those include rising energy costs and disrupted supply chains and goods from Russia and Ukraine, among the world’s biggest “bread baskets.” “We’re likely to see a further escalation of the economic war, because in some ways, that’s a rational and logical move from both sides that have a very difficult time fighting one another in a direct way because of the nuclear escalation risks,” Maximilian Hess, a fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, told CNBC on Thursday. “Russia will cut off gas to more countries, it will increase its ruble demands, because it wants to ensure the ruble convertibility remains open, and the West needs to be preparing for this with a full war mentality, making the Western populations understand that this is going to have real economic costs and real impacts on the cost of goods, the cost of living and inflation over the coming years.” “If we don’t take this war mentality and apply it to the economic war, then it becomes a lot easier for Putin to win and have successes there,” Hess said. Other flashpoints to watch After more than two months of war, Russia has expanded its control of territories in eastern and southern Ukraine, trying to create a land bridge from Russia via the Donbas region to its annexed territory of Crimea. But it has also sustained large losses in terms of manpower and arms. In the meantime, , and the country’s forces are mounting a strong resistance to Russian troops, signaling a protracted and bloody conflict ahead. NATO’s chief, Jens Stoltenberg, warned Thursday that the war in Ukraine could last for years. Andrius Tursa, Central and Eastern Europe advisor at Teneo Intelligence, said that against this backdrop, “there is no end in sight to Russia’s war in Ukraine, and relations with the West will likely continue to deteriorate.” “The rhetoric in Russia is already shifting from statements of fighting the ‘nationalists’ in Ukraine to an alleged (proxy) war with NATO. Multiple flashpoints could further escalate the tensions with the West,” he said. Those include recent explosions in the breakaway Moldovan region of Transnistria (which could serve as a pretext for an increased Russian presence in the region) which could bring the conflict “dangerously close to NATO’s borders,” Tursa said in a note Wednesday. “Moscow could also step up threats to NATO over weapons supplies to Ukraine, especially after multiple military and energy facilities in Russia have been allegedly hit by Ukraine. Finally, decisions by Finland and Sweden to join NATO would be perceived by Moscow as another security threat to Russia and could increase military tensions in the Baltic region.”

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 1nc – war won’t spread

NATO is strong and can resist Russian encroachment – EU response proves

Wunderlich 4/5 (Uwe, Lecturer in International Relations at the School of Social Sciences and Humanities and a member of the Aston Centre for Europe (ACE) at Aston University in Birmingham, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: A Turning Point for European Integration?,” London School of Economics, April 5, 2022, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2022/04/05/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-a-turning-point-for-european-integration/)-AT

The EU’s response has been swift and unprecedented. The first package of sanctions was already agreed on 23 February, a day before the invasion began. Three more sanction packages have followed, including restrictive measures on individuals with close links to the Putin regime, severe economic sanctions, diplomatic measures, and restrictions on economic cooperation as well as on Russian media outlets. Indeed, the EU’s reaction has gone beyond sanctions. Under the European Peace Facility, the EU has agreed to support the Ukrainian resistance with a set of assistance measures ranging from personal protection equipment, first aid kits, fuel and military equipment to defensive platforms designed to deliver lethal force. Plans to eliminate the dependency on Russian fossil fuel imports have triggered discussions on how to secure stable energy supplies and on possible measures to mitigate against the impact of high energy prices. This is part of a wider set of responses among the members of the transatlantic alliance. NATO has long struggled to find a raison d’être following the fall of the Iron Curtain. Russia’s willingness to use military force has put NATO back in the spotlight, rejuvenating the alliance and catalysing a dramatic increase in European defence spending, most notably in Germany. Support for NATO membership is rising in hitherto neutral countries such as Sweden and Finland. Individual countries have also imposed their own sanctions on Russia while sending weapons, ammunition, medical supplies and financial assistance to Ukraine. The civic response to the humanitarian crisis has been spectacular. Ukraine’s European neighbours have kept their borders open to Ukrainian refugees, demonstrating compassion and solidarity. This has been reinforced at the EU level: financial support packages for EU countries sheltering Ukrainian refugees have been approved and assistance such as medical supplies, tents and generators has been made available via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. EU ministers have also agreed to offer people fleeing from the war in Ukraine temporary protection and to share equally the burden for receiving refugees arriving at the EU’s external borders. It is too early to say whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represents a historical turning point for European integration. During historical turning points, the demand for collective solutions to shared problems intensifies, paving the way for rapid institutional development. They create a stimulus for institutional adaptation and change. Decision-makers are more focused, established structures may be found wanting, new avenues may be explored. The Ukraine war has altered the political, strategic and economic framework conditions for European regional cooperation and transatlantic relations. Perhaps not without a sense of irony, Moscow’s aggression has reminded the European bloc of its Cold War origins. Indeed, long distrustful of Russia, some of the smaller states of Europe have been the most enthusiastic supporters of NATO in recent years. The war has highlighted the multidimensional nature of security issues and the highly integrated nature of the two main pillars of the Western alliance system: NATO (and the inbuilt transatlantic partnership) and the EU. The war will provide a renewed impetus for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and for enhanced EU-NATO cooperation. Russia’s invasion is also deeply symbolic, representing an assault at the very normative foundation of the European integration project – on its values of democracy, human rights, freedom and the rule of law. The war was, at least in part, triggered by the Ukrainian attempt to break free from Moscow’s shadow, seeking a democratic and European future. Moscow has been suspicious of the changes sweeping through Ukraine since the 2014 Maidan Revolution. There are some obvious parallels to the 1968 Prague Spring. Czechoslovakia’s removal of the Soviet-backed regime and the launching of political and economic reforms was regarded as a threat to Soviet influence. Soviet tanks and troops eventually crushed the reformers. Just over half a century later, Russian tanks have once again been sent towards a European capital. It is important to remember that European integration emerged out of the ashes of World War II and the ensuing Cold War in the form of a network of interconnected and criss-crossing institutions such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC), the forerunners of the EU, and including institutions with a membership beyond Europe such as NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation / Organisation for European Co-operation and Development (OEEC/OECD) and the Council of Europe. Similarly, the sudden end of the Cold War also represented a significant historical turning point for European integration. Almost overnight, the political order created by the Iron Curtain vanished. This left the future of the Western alliance system, including transatlantic relations, uncertain. This situation has now changed once again and it may well be that the Ukraine war has inadvertently provided the impetus for a refocusing of European integration and a rejuvenation of the transatlantic alliance.

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 2nc – war ending now

The Russian general public wants the Ukraine and Russian conflicts to end

Dixon 22 (Robyn Dixon -- Moscow bureau chief and foreign correspondent for the Washington post. The Washington Post. 6/5/22, “As the war drags on, weary Russians yearn for a return to normal life” ) CL

RIGA, Latvia — For Russia’s urban middle class, the war on Ukraine has messed up plans, ruined longed-for vacations and stripped away joys like shopping for a favorite foreign clothing brand, turning the key in a new Japanese car, even biting into a Big Mac. As the war drags on, many yearn for life to go back to normal, before prices went crazy and foreign companies quit the country over Russia’s invasion. But these Russians are equally sure that President Vladimir Putin will keep on fighting until he wins, because that’s what he always does. After convincing the majority of the population that the war was necessary to “liberate” Ukrainians from “Nazis,” state television propagandists are now doggedly preparing Russians for a long war, ominously warning that it might end in nuclear war. In Ukraine, that means more civilian casualties, bombed houses and dozens of soldiers killed daily defending the country’s east. Russian hardships may be trivial by contrast, but the deadening gloom of a long war worries the Kremlin, according to analysts, because of the challenge of dragging the population along as sanctions bite, businesses retrench, prices continue to surge, and it dawns on people that life may never go back to the way it was. But the old Kremlin playbook, accusing the West of plans to gobble up Russia, is working so far. Denis Volkov of independent polling agency Levada-Center said the latest polling for April showed almost half of Russians unconditionally support the war and about 30 percent support it with reservations, with 19 percent opposed. Many in focus groups saw it as an existential confrontation with the West, not Ukraine. “People explain that a significant part of the world is against us and it’s only Putin who hopes to hold onto Russia, otherwise we would be eaten up completely. To them it is Russia that is defending itself,” he said. The conflict, however, is taking a toll on Russians like Marina, 57, a language teacher, whose friends are so weary of the war, they avoid the topic. She succeeded in changing the minds of a few friends and relatives who supported the war. “But in general, it seems everyone is sick and tired of the war or special operation. People have their own problems and the main problem is survival, especially with the rising prices.” Marina acknowledged that few Russians are opposed to the war and most are finding a way to “get by somehow.” But she added: “This ‘somehow’ is becoming boring. Most people got tired of it. I want to travel. Others want to be able to plan. We want to get back to our ordinary lives.” People sitting at a bus station are reflected on a bus window adorned with the letter Z, which has become a symbol of support for Russian military action in Ukraine, in Moscow on June 2. (Kirill Kudryavtsev/AFP/Getty Images) Marina can’t help dreaming wistfully of her old life — just a few months ago. “I want to be able to watch Western movies on Netflix and shop at Uniqlo. I want to travel to Europe on affordable and reliable airlines. I want to be part of the world and not an outcast,” she said. Many people, still in denial, are struggling to adapt, said Grigory Yudin, professor of political philosophy at the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences. “The natural question for Russians is not whether I support it or not — nobody asks you, actually — but how do I adapt to this?” People want certainty about their incomes, travel plans and mortgages. Part of the Moscow elite, including middle-ranking bureaucrats who feel they are Europeans, are not happy about the war, he said, but tend to believe Putin will fight until he wins. “I think the majority of Russians still honestly believe that this is going on with military success, or at least this is what people want to believe,” Yudin said. He added: “The more-educated people who are more informed and tend to consume information from different sources are not that certain about that. They have significant doubts.” Volkov said the latest polling showed interest in watching news about the war is beginning to wane, with people in focus groups wishing their lives could go back to the way they were. “The best scenario is for this to end as soon as possible and then we hope things will go back to normal,” said Ksenia, 50, a bookkeeper at a firm that sells foreign materials and has been hard hit by Western sanctions. Most of her work colleagues began strongly supporting the war, but lately they avoid the subject, except to complain that ordinary people in Russia always pay the price of government decisions. “My colleagues have finally started to realize that things are not great. In general, we try not to discuss it because we start to fight. They’re saying, ‘We didn’t start this war and now we have to pay.’” Her plan to vacation in the United States or Italy this summer is ruined because she cannot get a visa. “Now I feel as if there’s no future and it’s very depressing.” She ached when McDonalds’ golden arches were removed not for any love of the burgers or fries, but for the idea it represented. “I’m really upset about McDonald’s, and I really mean it. McDonald’s has always been a symbol of freedom for me. I remember when the first McDonald’s opened in Moscow,” she said recalling the queues in 1990s months before the Soviet Union collapsed. “It felt like the light at the end of the tunnel.” For Ksenia and friends opposed to the war, the worst part is thinking of the Ukrainian civilians, including children, being killed and the women raped by Russian soldiers. “I can survive without certain clothes. And I think I can survive without Western movies. But the main problem for me is that now Russians are outcasts, with whom nobody will want to shake hands. Psychologically, it's really hard for me to feel that I'm unwanted everywhere.” Viktor, a 35-year-old carpenter, says his small business has lost most of its clients, as they’ve been forced to economize. He cannot finish building his own house because he says prices for building materials doubled while his income halved. Viktor thought war would rage about two months. “Now it will take years, and it’s a disaster. It’s not only losing lives. In the years to come we will be living in poverty and we will be hated again like the fascists in Germany in World War II — like we are the new fascists.” But 43-year-old Andrei from Moscow sees the war as “God’s plan” and believes Russians are willing to make sacrifices to see it through. A yoga-loving, vegetarian computer programmer, he is not the typical elderly, conservative Putin supporter. He gets his news from one pro-Kremlin blogger and shares a common Russian conviction that Western news of Russian war crimes is “fake.” He declined to give his surname. “The idea is to remove fascism from Ukraine and to return the civilians who want to live in the U.S.S.R., like before the ’90s,” he said echoing the propaganda. “Right now we don’t feel any meaningful impact from sanctions,” he added, although many of his friends in IT have fled for Armenia and elsewhere, and he can no longer afford to buy a beloved MacBook computer. Nor can he purchase the new Mazda 6 he had his eyes on; he had been hoping pay about 2 million rubles — five months’ salary — but the price went up to 3 million. Andrei is convinced that Russia will win the war in a year or so, prices will fall and Apple products will find their way to Russia via the black market. Until then, he says he’ll make sacrifices (but not volunteer to fight.) “Western people like comfort, they need comfort,” he said. “Russian people may have comfort, or they may not. This is not a problem.” Political analyst and journalist Fyodor Krasheninnikov said many Russians hope that Ukraine would soon capitulate to Russian military power. “The mood in Russia now is that ‘We want this to be over as soon as possible because we just can’t live like this any longer. We want to get back to normal life,’” he said. “It’s not that people really like what Putin does,” he continued. “No, but they feel frustration and depression because they cannot change anything. It’s like bad weather. They realize that it’s going to rain every day. But what can they do about it?”

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 2nc – war ending now

Russian forces are exhausted

Santora 6/25 (Marc, International News Editor based in London, focusing on breaking news events. He was previously the Bureau Chief for East and Central Europe based in Warsaw. He received separate bachelor’s degrees in journalism and art history from Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Va., “Ukraine News: More Brutal Fighting Expected in East,” The New York Times, June 25, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/06/22/world/russia-ukraine-war-news)-AT

The battle for the twin cities of Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk has left both the Russian and Ukrainian armies severely depleted, offering a window into the bloody struggle still to be fought for wider control of Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region. Russian forces are closing in on what would be their first significant territorial gain in weeks in Ukraine, as they advance on the two cities, the last major pieces of Luhansk province not to fall into Russian hands. Each side has suffered thousands of casualties and whole swaths of the cities have been reduced to rubble. But capturing all of Donbas would mean taking both Luhansk and neighboring Donetsk province, and the Russian advances in Donetsk in the past month have been small. The capture of the twin cities would eliminate an advantage the Ukrainians have in being able to use the Siversky Donets River as a natural defensive barrier that Russian forces have suffered heavy losses trying to cross. Even so, the Russians would face a difficult road to capturing towns and cities to the west in Donetsk, including Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. Russian attempts to advance on the region from the north remain stalled, with both sides trading a few miles of land each day in battles around the city of Izium. Military analysts have suggested that heavy losses by both sides already might necessitate an “operational pause” in fighting similar to the lull seen between late March and mid-April, as Russia regrouped from its early failures to capture Kyiv, the capital, and retreated from northern Ukraine. “There is evidence that both sides, due to high numbers of casualties and ammunition expenditure, are nearing exhaustion,” Mick Ryan, a retired Australian general and commander of the Australian Defence College, wrote in a recent analysis. “An operational pause in the next month or two is highly possible.” Some military analysts have questioned the wisdom of Ukraine investing so much blood and equipment to defend territory with marginal strategic value. However, much as the 86-day-long fight for Mariupol forced Russia to devote resources to the battle and gave Ukrainian forces in other parts of the country time to mount a defense, the fight in Luhansk has bought them time, allowing for more powerful weapons to flow into the country. The Ukrainians have sought to take advantage of stretched Russian forces to set the stage for counter offensives around Kherson in the south and Kharkiv in the northeast. Control over southern Ukraine is central to Moscow’s efforts to strangle Ukraine economically, while holding the Kharkiv area is critical to maintaining supply lines for its forces in the east. It remains to be seen how the flow of Western weapons to Ukraine might alter the strategic balance, but military analysts and the Ukrainians say they will make any new Russian offensives much more costly, and enable more counter offensives. For now, Russia continues to bombard Ukrainian positions along the entire Donbas front. The Ukrainians reported on Wednesday that 21 buildings in Donetsk were damaged in Russian shelling over the past day, including a school and several houses, leaving one person killed and 10 injured. “Massive air and artillery strikes,” had struck the region, President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine said in his address on Wednesday night. “The goal of the occupiers in this direction remains the same — they want to destroy the whole Donbas step by step,” he added. “They aim to turn any city into Mariupol. Completely ruined.”

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 1nc – war ending now

Russia-Ukraine war slowing down – Russia is running out of resources.

Teh 6/23/22 (Cheryl Teh - Senior Breaking News Reporter. “Boris Johnson says the Russian army might soon run out of soldiers and weapons and lose its 'forward momentum' in Ukraine.” Insider. Jun 23, 2022. )

British Prime Minister Boris Johnson said this week that he believes Russia will soon lose momentum in its war with Ukraine. Speaking to the German newspaper Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Johnson said that he thought Russian President Vladimir Putin's army was suffering heavy losses of soldiers and equipment just to gain ground in Ukraine's Donbas region. Citing intelligence reports from the British defense forces, Johnson told the outlet that he believed the Russian onslaught in Ukraine would likely lose steam in the coming few months. "Our defense intelligence service believes, however, that in the next few months, Russia could come to a point at which there is no longer any forward momentum because it has exhausted its resources," he said, per Sueddeutsche Zeitung. "Then we must help the Ukrainians to reverse the dynamic. I will argue for this at the Group of Seven summit," he said, per the outlet. Johnson also told Sueddeutsche Zeitung that he thought it was important for the Ukrainian army to be supported in launching a counter-offensive if it is able to do so. "This is their crisis. They are the victims of Putin's aggression, they must decide what they want to do. But it is absolutely clear if you go to Ukraine, if you talk to the Ukrainians, and if you talk to [Ukrainian President Volodymr] Zelenskyy. you will come away with the overwhelming view that the Ukrainians will not concede their territory," he said, per the outlet. Johnson added that he thought a win for Ukraine would include Russian forces being repelled from the areas they invaded and for Ukraine to "regain the status quo" before the invasion on February 24, per Sueddeutsche Zeitung. "Ukraine must win, we agree on that. The unity of the West is far more conspicuous than the divisions," Johnson told the outlet. Intelligence from the UK has suggested that Russia may soon struggle to produce enough military equipment to fuel a prolonged conflict in Ukraine. Ukraine's forces are currently engaged in a critical fight in the Donbas. In June, Ukraine estimated that Russia had 10 to 15 times more artillery than its forces, appealing to the West to send more weapons. Reports have also cited a growing number of deserters among Ukrainian forces. Earlier this month, a senior US official also told The Washington Post that Russia would likely gain control of eastern Ukraine within weeks after doubling down on its military efforts in the Donbas.

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 2nc – soft power in decline

Trump caused US soft power to decline

Kokas and Mastro 1/15 (Aynne Kokas and Oriana S. Mastro, Aynne Kokas is an associate professor of media studies at the University of Virginia and a senior faculty fellow at the Miller Center for Public Affairs, Oriana Skylar Mastro is a Center Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, where her research focuses on Chinese military and security policy, Asia-Pacific security issues, war termination, nuclear dynamics, and coercive diplomacy. She is also a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and continues to serve in the United States Air Force Reserve, for which she works as a strategic planner at INDOPACOM. She holds a B.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Politics from Princeton University, “The Soft War That America Is Losing,” Stanford Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies,” January 15, 2022, https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/soft-war-america-losing)-AT

The images of bare-chested, flag-waving MAGA loyalists overtaking the US Capitol flooded US social media and news channels in the days following the January 6 siege against the electoral college count. Memed and amplified, the same images circulated widely on Chinese social media and state-owned news sites without even the need for critical commentary. The literal destruction of the US Capitol at the hands of President Donald Trump's followers required little imagination to characterize abroad as the downfall of American democracy. There are many reasons for pessimism. According to one of the most authoritative indexes, Polity, the United States is no longer the world’s oldest continuous democracy, dropping in status to a system that is part democracy, part dictatorship. Beyond the domestic concerns faced in the aftermath of the breach of one of America's most hallowed buildings, the Capitol siege was a win for China. US soft power, one of its comparative advantages in the great power competition, has taken a huge hit. Soft power is “the ability to get what you want through persuasion or attraction in the forms of culture, values, and policies”.⁠ The US has been the primary beneficiary of soft power, with its globally recognized brands, pop culture, fast-food chains, world-renowned universities, and political values. It is relatively low cost and high impact compared with other forms of power. The United States' relative attractiveness is one of the reasons America prevailed in the Cold War. The Chinese government is having a propaganda field day. More than ever, the US looks like a country in decline, discouraging to allies and potential partners. Chinese commentators have noted that America's days as the "city on the hill" have come to an end. This is karma, some say, payback for the US supporting opposition groups, as in Hong Kong. As one netizen commented on the popular microblog website Weibo: "So lucky to be born in China.” China has also been trying to increase its soft power through traditional mechanisms such as building its media, education, and tourism sectors. It has enjoyed only moderate success in these areas because of its censorship, pollution, and lack of independent civil society. But COVID-19 has led to the strengthening of other Chinese public diplomacy efforts, such as its landmark Belt and Road Initiative global trade and investment scheme. Related initiatives such as the Digital Silk Road, a program to build out global digital infrastructure using Chinese technology, and the Health Silk Road, a plan to export Chinese health expertise through things such as COVID-19 laboratories and vaccine diplomacy, draw on China's comparative advantage in a top-down soft power approach. Meanwhile, the Trump administration has undermined the historical sources of US soft power. It has shuttered visa lines, investigated international students on campus, and driven the rise of a culture of nationalism. The cancellation of the Fulbright US Student Program and the Peace Corps program in China are prime examples. And the COVID-19 decreased US media production, educational exchange and tourism, which shrank opportunities for promoting its democratic values on the global stage. A bird’s-eye view of America's relative soft power may seem to offer cause for optimism. Even after four years of Trump's buffoonery and "America First", the US is still far ahead of China, ranking fifth in overall soft power, while China ranks 24th. And isn’t this what matters in competition? Yes and no. The problem is two-fold. First, the US relies more on its political values as a soft power source than Beijing does. Ironically, this has especially been the case during the Trump administration. National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien has argued that democracies and authoritarian countries such as China “are offering a different approach to the world”. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has argued to international audiences that democracy is “what we’ve got right”. Second, Beijing has tried to leverage its comparative advantages to build soft power through pathways other than political values, especially where a top-down government approach is effective. China set up COVID-19 testing labs in Palestine in agreement with Israeli and Palestinian authorities. It extended its hand in Africa by building more than 70 percent of its 4G infrastructure. Depending on need, useful solutions can be as compelling as political principles.The future of the US as a world leader is at stake. American military base access worldwide depends on perceived political alignment between the US and its allies. In the tech sector, the widespread adoption of US platforms relies on other countries finding that benefits to allowing in foreign platforms outweigh the potential political risks. Successful multilateral treaty negotiations on issues such as global trade and climate change rely on the perception of a dependable US political system. Strengthening democracy at home and moving away from "America First" policies will go a long way in reconstructing the trust and relationships central to soft power. But the United States will always be seen as a country in which the election of Donald Trump to the presidency, and now the storming of the Capitol, were possible. President-elect Joe Biden will soon learn that soft power, once lost, may be difficult to revive.

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 2nc – soft power in decline

No sign of US soft power recovery post-Trump

Tengjun ’21 (Zhang Tengjun, Deputy Director and associate research fellow at Department for Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies, “US soft power hard to return as its core rots,” The Global Times. 1/12/21. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202101/1212546.shtml)

In an article entitled "American soft power will survive Donald Trump," Joseph Nye, who coined the term "soft power" in the late 1980s, argued that with Joe Biden in office, American resilience will once again lead to a recovery of the US soft power. Nye stressed the US has serious problems, but that "it also has a capacity for resilience and reform that has rescued us in the past." American soft power has been eroded badly under Trump's presidency. In 2019, Gallup polled 134 countries and regions and found that only 30 percent of the polled held a favorable view of the US, a drop of almost 20 points since Barack Obama's presidency. There are mainly two reasons for the decline of the US soft power. First, the Trump administration's governance has undermined the US democratic system, aggravated social conflicts and intensified political, economic and social crises in the US. Second, the US under Trump willfully withdrew from a string of international organizations and pacts, disregarded international rules and preached unilateralism and bullyism, which made other countries suffer a lot. The past four years have witnessed declining confidence in the US leadership and US soft power around the world. These brazen US acts have brought about fundamental changes: All other countries including US allies are becoming more independent. They are all considering how to better safeguard their own national interests in a world without US leadership. Even if the US soft power can recover somewhat, the perceptions of these countries have altered. Nye said the US has a capacity for resilience and reform which will help the US recover its attractiveness. But can the US capability for reform really lead to soft power recovery? Trump's four-year tenure has made us see the weakness of US reforms and governance. The US government has been unable to solve its domestic problems. In fact, various problems even have been intensified due to growing political polarization and partisan struggles. There have been some voices in the US calling for reform over the past four years. But reform is stagnant. It's in fact not merely the fault of the Trump administration. It's the US deep political and social divisions that obstruct the reform's advancement. Whether it is the turmoil in Capitol Hill, or the controversy surrounding the presidential elections, or Trump's highly controversial governance in the past four years, many observers believe that US democracy is already dead. It not only cannot avoid people like Trump to lead the country, it also has no way to fix the problems existing in the US society. This is an institutional crisis. Even if the Biden administration comes to power and the transition is completed, what we will see will be a deepened rift within the US. It will cause more difficulties for Biden to govern the country in the future. Nye wants those who mourn American democracy to understand that "the 2020 election saw an unprecedented turnout of voters who were able to unseat a demagogue." The problem is, the number of people who voted for Trump has also hit the record. The high level of political and social antagonism in the US is a systemic crisis. It is unrealistic to rely on a new administration to solve these problems. After the Capitol riots, some countries have expressed their regret and many other countries have been very disappointed. They believe the riots have ripped off the fake mask of US democracy. The attractiveness of US democracy to other countries has been severely weakened. The US democracy represented by these riots is very hypocritical. The US has a set of standards for itself, but when it turns to other countries' domestic problems, it has other standards. Therefore, many countries have recognized the true face of US democracy. Essentially, it serves the hegemony of the US. It's not a universal democratic system or standard that other countries need to admire. Therefore, the so-called beacon effect of US democracy is weakening and declining. But regrettably, Nye and some other US elites are still trapped in the myth of US democracy. They still have blind faith in their democratic system. But in fact, such a kind of impractical mentality will not likely help them find the light at the end of a tunnel. The mentality does not help resolve the problems of the US. At this time, it is more important to have profound reflections about the US democratic system's inherent problems. The US should have a humble and frank attitude and be more open to others' criticism. The US needs to seriously reflect on the root causes of its problems and propose some systematic reform plans.

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 2nc – soft power in decline

Trump already killed US soft power

Drezner ’20 (Daniel W. Drezner, Professor of international politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “U.S. soft power is only mostly dead,” The Washington Post. 1/9/20. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/01/09/us-soft-power-is-only-mostly-dead/)

Two years ago the hard-working staff here at Spoiler Alerts looked at the survey data out there from Pew and Gallup about how the rest of the world viewed President Trump and concluded, “The United States is losing its global standing because the world hates Donald Trump. Anyone who tells you differently is selling you something.” Twenty-four months is a lifetime in the Age of Trump. There has been no world war or financial crisis during that time. Low bar, I know, but perhaps this means the rest of the world has learned to like Donald Trump. Well, maybe “like” is not the right word. Maybe the rest of the world has exhibited some Stockholm syndrome and decided maybe Trump had his good moments when he wasn’t keeping everyone emotionally hostage? Last year’s Gallup data suggests the answer remains no, and now we have the just-released findings from the latest Pew surveys. They reveal not much has changed. Like, at all: “As has been the case throughout his presidency, U.S. President Donald Trump receives largely negative reviews from publics around the world. Across 32 countries surveyed by Pew Research Center, a median of 64% say they do not have confidence in Trump to do the right thing in world affairs, while just 29% express confidence in the American leader.” Also unsurprisingly, the depth of anti-Trump sentiment is especially strong where you would expect it: Western Europe, where approximately 75 percent of respondents lack confidence in Trump. The numbers from Mexico are even worse: 89 percent have no confidence in him. He has pockets of support in India, Poland, Israel, the Philippines and not much else. Obviously, these numbers are far worse than Barack Obama’s at the same stage of his presidency. They are also slightly worse than George W. Bush’s numbers at a similar stage in his presidency. Global distrust of Trump is further revealed in the survey results in which respondents are asked which foreign leader they trust to do the right thing in world affairs. Trump scores well below German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President Emmanuel Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin. About as many people trust Trump as they do Chinese President Xi Jinping, but more respondents have no confidence in Trump (Xi is less well-known). No doubt Trump’s supporters would argue it is better to be feared than loved, as Machiavelli so eloquently put it. As Trump himself told Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, “Real power is, I don’t even want to use the word, ‘Fear.’ “ There are two problems with that counterargument. First, feared leaders generally do not invite laughter from their peers. Trump has had to cope with U.N. General Assembly leaders laughing at his face and NATO leaders caught laughing behind his back. My Washington Post colleague Aaron Blake has collected other examples. Trump is not a president people fear, except for his witless incompetence. Second, Machiavelli also warned in the very next paragraph that “nevertheless a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that, if he does not win love, he avoids hatred; because he can endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated.” This quote seems particularly salient given the reaction of some U.S. allies to the targeted killing of Qasem Soleimani. As Politico’s Matthew Karnitschnig noted, “Behind the sober public pronouncements from Brussels and national capitals about the need for ‘de-escalation,’ officials are seething. … Within hours of Soleimani’s assassination, Europe’s shock over the Iranian general’s killing morphed into anger at Trump.” Trump has entered a new era of warfare by openly authorizing the assassination of another nation's military leader, using an armed drone, says David Ignatius. So this seems like a depressing state of affairs for those Americans who desire respect in the world. Yet Trump is not the same thing as the United States of America, and the latter’s standing in the world could best be described as only “mostly dead.” As Pew reports, overall attitudes toward the United States remain favorable. A small majority of respondents have favorable views of the United States, a full 25 percentage points above Trump’s individual standing. This will probably persist unless or until Donald Trump is reelected — it was after George W. Bush’s 2004 reelection that global public attitudes toward the United States started to converge to Bush’s low levels.

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 1nc – soft power in decline

US soft power low under Biden

Korybko 5/5 (Andrew, a Moscow-based American political analyst. The article reflects the author's opinions and not necessarily those of CGTN, “Biden's literal weaponization of democracy discredits US soft power,” China Daily, May 5, 2022, https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202205/05/WS62732e80a310fd2b29e5ab21.html)-AT

US President Joe Biden gave one of the most important speeches of his presidency thus far on May 3 at the Lockheed Martin Pike County Operations in Troy, Alabama that's responsible for building its anti-tank Javelin missiles. During his remarks, he boasted about how his country is literally weaponizing democracy through its military-industrial complex, which represents formal acknowledgement of a process that's already been underway for decades. From the president's perspective, the production and export of these arms to Ukraine in its fight against Russia represents "the arsenal of democracy," which he compared to its unprecedented effort during World War II to fight Nazi Germany and the Japan Empire. According to Biden, this is a hybrid civilizational-political struggle between Western democracy and supposedly non-Western autocracies that only comes around once every six or eight generations. Biden's warmongering words should concern the entire world. His World War II-era rhetoric about the American military-industrial complex supposedly being an "arsenal of democracy" amounts to an unofficial declaration of global hybrid war considering the context in which he made this ridiculous description. The US plans to continue ramping up its military production as it wages regional proxy wars against countries like Russia under the pretext of supposedly saving Western civilization. The real reason why the US is doubling down on its military-industrial complex is because it's desperate to revitalize its shrinking economy which fell 1.4 percent in the last quarter. The American economic model has failed to reap the successes that were expected of it by its leaders, hence the need to return to massively producing weapons in an expensive attempt to stimulate it ahead of the upcoming midterm elections. The ruling Democrats are worried that their Republican rivals might win back control of Congress so Biden is doing everything that he can to manipulate domestic perceptions in the run-up to the vote. This includes misportraying his country's unprovoked regional proxy war against Russia as a civilizational crusade comparable to World War II and artificially boosting the economy through a renewed focus on military-industrial production. The World War II-era imagery and rhetoric is also intended to imply that Americans shouldn't complain about their current economic suffering that might last for a number of years since it's supposedly for the sake of saving Western civilization. Biden is manipulating his compatriots' patriotic sentiments for self-interested political reasons related to reducing the Democrats' expected electoral losses during the fall midterms that'll be held in half a year's time. Awareness of these self-interested motives and the manipulative way in which the ruling party's political interests are being advanced discredits the US's soft power even more than it's already been in recent years. First, the American economic model clearly isn't producing the results that it's supposed to, hence the need to transition parts of the economy to a literal wartime footing. Second, the pretext for doing so is the false narrative that countries like Russia threaten Western civilization. Up until this point, it was taken for granted in the West that its political model was so appealing to the rest of the world that it wouldn't need to be exported by force, let alone upheld in such a way in its transatlantic cradle where it initially emerged centuries ago. That was never truly the case, and now none other than current American president himself is indirectly acknowledging that by hyping up the supposed "threat." This brings the analysis around to the third and most powerful point, and it's that Western democracies are more aggressive and globally destabilizing than the countries they are pointing fingers at. After all, it's not Russian President Vladimir Putin who is alluding to a third World War nowadays, but Biden and his transatlantic peers who are waging proxy war against Russia. It's for these reasons that Biden's latest speech was arguably among the most important of his presidency thus far, but not at all in a positive way. It can be interpreted as an unofficial declaration of hybrid war that disturbingly evokes World War II-era imagery and rhetoric, which has very dangerous implications if one reflects on what that could ultimately entail. The US is so desperate to slow the decline of its hegemony that it's destabilizing the whole world to this end.

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 2nc – Poland support high

Poland supports Ukraine now and has been a powerful advocate of NATO

Tyler 22 (Melissa Conley Tyler is Program Lead with the Asia-Pacific Development, Diplomacy & Defence Dialogue. For 13 years she served as National Executive Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, an independent international policy institute established as a branchof Chatham House in 1924, with close links to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Under her leadership, the AIIA was recognised for three years running as the top think tank in Southeast Asia/Pacific and one of the top 50 think tanks worldwide in the University of Pennsylvania’s Global Go To Think Tanks Index, the only comprehensive ranking exercise. In 2017, she co-authored Think Tank Diplomacy, the first book-length discussion of the role of policy institutes in the international sphere. She joined the University of Melbourne in 2019 as Director of Diplomacy at Asialink and then as a Research Fellow/Associate in the Asia Institute. Most recently she was a visiting fellow in Taiwan at the Ministry of Defense’s think tank – the Institute of Defense and National Security Research – funded by a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellowship. Melissa has extensive experience establishing and sustaining Australia-Asia engagement through Track II dialogues involving government officials, academics, media and business. She is a lawyer and specialist in conflict resolution, including negotiation, mediation and peace education, who worked as program manager of the University of Melbourne’s International Conflict Resolution Centre and Senior Fellow of Melbourne Law School. Melissa is a prolific commentator with expertise in Australian foreign policy, Australia’s key relationships across Asia and the practice of diplomacy, “Ukraine: The view from Warsaw”, The Interpreter, Published 27 May 2022 05:00 , https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/ukraine-view-warsaw)

This week I was in Warsaw listening to experts on regional strategy and security. It was clear that Poland sees itself as Ukraine’s champion. Beyond the immediate emergency response following Russia’s invasion, Poland is acting as Ukraine’s advocate in building support both across NATO and EU member states and, crucially, through its relationship with the United States. Many would be aware that Poland been an important first responder, estimated to have taken in close to and acting as a hub for humanitarian assistance. It’s important to see this in human terms: for example, the person I sat next to on my flight was hosting five Ukrainian refugees while his sister-in-law was hosting eight. As well as welcoming Polish-speaking Ukrainians, who are figuratively (and sometimes literally) family, there is huge sympathy for all Ukrainians as victims of Russian aggression. There is a visceral sense among Poles that “last time this was us”. This support isn’t costless, with . Yet there is still a strong political consensus to continue to provide support. Beyond this humanitarian response, Poland has been playing a key role in advocating for Ukraine – perhaps most importantly to the United States. Polish and American experts alike admit that the United States needed some convincing. The US saw the invasion coming and sounded the alarm. But the belief that Ukraine would lose affected the sort of support that the Biden administration considered providing – such as a reluctance to provide high-end weapons in case they fell into Russian hands. Poland sees the Biden administration as having adapted over time, for example in its definition of offensive and defensive weapons. Poland continues to apply pressure on the United States to expand its support. It may have been an optimistic view, but multiple experts talked of Ukraine potentially pushing Russia back. This is vital because the view from Warsaw is that the result of the war is still very much to be decided. Russia has not yet been able to defeat the Ukrainian army, occupy its terrain and break Ukraine’s will. The hot war is not over and is seen as moving into a middle phase where Russia recalibrates its strategy (and redefines victory). It may have been an optimistic view, but multiple experts talked of Ukraine potentially pushing Russia back. If so, it could be a long war and one that Poland wants Ukraine to win. Poland has also been a powerful advocate within NATO and the European Union. Poland sees it as its responsibility to motivate others to mobilise in support of Ukraine, building unity for a Russian strategic defeat. From NATO experts, I heard again and again that 24 February was a watershed moment that fundamentally upended the European security order by bringing a major land war to Europe. This framing was not preordained; in another sense it is the continuation of an eight-year war. Poland can take some credit for this view due to its consistent clarity of perspective. It sees Russia as a rogue state that flouts international law and advocates the need to impose strategic costs on Russia, including treating Russia as an international pariah. There is interest in the potential for Poland to prosecute war crimes through its national courts or establish an international special tribunal given that Russia is not a party to the International Criminal Court. This unequivocal framing of the conflict has had a lasting impact on threat perceptions and NATO unity. For example, the old paradigm used to be that NATO would mobilise in event of a crisis. The emerging one is to strengthen national armed forces to be prepared to defend every inch of NATO territory. There is increasing discussion of “multinationality”, of joint training and learning how to operate together. Poland has been working with the United States on a program to build readiness and interoperability on NATO’s Eastern flank (now Eastern front). As Chief of the Polish Armed Forces General Rajmund Andrzejczak stated, “the house of my neighbours is on fire”. This makes Poland a frontline country. Its job is to convince the rest of the European Union to express understanding, trust and solidarity on the basis that they could one day find themselves in a similar position. Those involved in European defence report a much greater sense of common security. Certainly, there was a greater sense of a unified “West” that is common in similar discussions in the Indo-Pacific. The conflict was expressed as “us vs them”, “liberal vs illiberal”, and there were irony-free references to the “free world”. (Along with the sense of the United States an indispensable power, it feels quite nostalgic to an Indo-Pacific observer.) The common cause can be seen in increased defence commitments and the announcement that Sweden and Finland have applied to join NATO. I heard Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki commit to come to their defence if needed during accession. What I heard in Warsaw underlines the scale of Russia’s strategic error. Russia clearly didn’t expect the extent of Ukrainian resistance – or the wider effects on European unity and US support. A more unified NATO with greater defence spending and an expanded vision of collective security was not one of Russia’s ambitions. Neither was improved trans-Atlantic relations and US sense of efficacy. Poland will continue to be an important part of building this common commitment. What I took from Warsaw is how strongly Poland believes that it is its duty to do everything possible to support Ukraine to achieve what Ukraine defines as victory – and the energy it is willing to expend to achieve this. As the Polish Institute of International Affairs Director SŁawomir Debski put it, “we know who we are, we know what we’re fighting for, and we are not lacking in determination.”

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 2nc – Poland support high

Poland supports Ukraine – welcoming refugees and rallying Europe

Higgins 2022 (Andrew Higgins - Moscow Bureau Chief for the New York Times. “Long on Europe’s Fringe, Poland Takes Center Stage as War Rages in Ukraine.” The New York Times. March 25, 2022. https://archive.ph/bEU8a)

On Wednesday, Poland said it had identified 45 Russian diplomats as spies, all of whom had been ordered to leave the country. The deputy foreign minister, Pawel Jablonski, said Poland could not tolerate Russia’s abuse of its embassy in Warsaw when Moscow “is waging a barbaric war against Ukraine.” Spies disguised as diplomats, he added, not only “pose a threat to Poland’s security, but also to the security of Ukrainian citizens staying in Poland. Hence this decision.” Previously scolded by Brussels for its hostility to migrants, Poland has over the past month welcomed more than two million refugees fleeing the war next door in Ukraine, far more than any other country. It has also become a vital staging post for the supply of weapons, ammunition, fuel and other assistance to Kyiv and put itself at the center of deliberations shaping the West’s response to the crisis. Warsaw has become the capital through which all diplomatic, military and humanitarian roads to Ukraine now pass. And the Polish government, which earlier infuriated Washington by pushing through legislation, later vetoed by the president, that threatened an American-owned television network, is basking in the glow of appreciative attention. In recent weeks, it has received visits and praise from Vice President Kamala Harris; the head of the C.I.A., William Burns; Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III; the president of the European Council, Charles Michel; and a host of other senior U.S. and European officials. Jake Sullivan, President Biden’s national security adviser, on Tuesday described Poland as a “frontline and very vulnerable ally” that “has taken the brunt of the humanitarian impact outside of Ukraine.” Poland’s sudden prominence as NATO’s most exposed frontline state has stirred alarm that it could be sucked into the conflict, particularly after Russian missiles last week obliterated a Ukrainian military base near the border. Among those most worried are some of the Ukrainians who fled to escape fighting at home. “Poland is too close. I want to get out of here,” said Yevgeny Pyskuko, a music teacher who fled to Poland after Russian forces attacked a huge nuclear power station near his home in southeastern Ukraine. “I want to go across the ocean. It is not safe here,” he added. Despite the possible risks, Poland has been in the forefront of rallying Europe to take tough measures to punish President Vladimir V. Putin for his aggression. When Germany, stunned by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, weighed whether to preserve the longstanding pillars of its security and foreign policy toward Russia, Poland’s prime minister, Mateusz Morawiecki — who just a few weeks earlier had attended a conclave of Putin-friendly populists in Madrid — flew to Berlin to personally “shake Germany’s conscience” and stiffen its resolve against Moscow. Soon after Mr. Morawiecki’s trip to Berlin, the German government dropped its earlier resistance to sending weapons to Ukraine and to ejecting key Russian banks from a money transfer network known as SWIFT. Poland’s deputy culture minister, Jaroslaw Sellin, a conservative firebrand who previously relished his country’s role as Europe’s great disrupter, has found a new cause celebrating Poland’s favor at the center of attention. “Everyone watches us with admiration,” he told Radio Gdansk on Tuesday. Long-running squabbles with the European bloc over the rule of law, L.G.B.T.Q. rights, coal mining and various other issues still rumble in the background and the government’s critics worry that instead of curbing what they see as a steady demolition of democratic norms by the governing party, Law and Justice, Poland’s newfound favor will only embolden the government. “We are in this respect another victim of the war,” lamented Roman Kuzniar, a professor at Warsaw University who advised the country’s previous pro-European governments before Law and Justice took power in 2015. “War always helps those who are ruling a country. It would be too bad if both the European Union and the United States forget about all the wrong things that this government has done and is doing,” he added. For the moment, however, security issues have trumped the governing party’s image as a disruptive force obsessed with stoking culture wars and hostility to foreigners, particularly migrants, bureaucrats in Brussels and Germans. “The government focused too much on stupid things instead of more important things like security,” Mr. Bartosiak said. “But now everybody in Poland sees what matters.” Supported in Parliament by even its fiercest political enemies, Law and Justice last week enacted a new Homeland Defense Act that will increase military spending to 3 percent of gross domestic product, from around 2.2 percent. Poland was already one of only 10 countries in the 30-member NATO alliance that met a minimum spending target of 2 percent. Polish foreign policy, preoccupied until the war in Ukraine with efforts to form a bloc of like-minded conservative and often pro-Kremlin European populists who share its hostility to Brussels, is now working to cement a new bloc of European countries pushing for tougher sanctions against Russia, including the Baltic states and the Czech Republic. At a meeting of European foreign ministers this week in Brussels, Poland joined Lithuania and other countries on Europe’s eastern fringe that have a long and painful experience of Russian aggression in lobbying hard for a ban on oil imports from Russia. The effort failed in face of strong opposition from Germany, the Netherlands and others, but it put Warsaw at the center of an emerging bloc of nations determined to punish Mr. Putin for invading Ukraine. It has also sundered Poland’s close partnership with Hungary, which opposes further sanctions and whose proudly illiberal prime minister, Viktor Orban, shares the Polish governing party’s view on Brussels but has a long record of cozying up to the Kremlin.

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 2nc – Poland support high

Poland is the country that supports Ukraine the most in the Russia-Ukraine war

TFN 22 (The First News (TFN). “Forbes names Poland as leader in aiding Ukraine.” TFN. June 01, 2022. https://www.thefirstnews.com/article/forbes-names-poland-as-leader-in-aiding-ukraine-30752)

Poland has come first in a ranking countries giving aid to Ukraine, the Polish edition of Forbes magazine has reported. The magazine analysed the activities of many countries based on 11 criteria to create an index showing which states were most engaged in helping Ukraine. It took into account voting at the UN General Assembly on demanding a Russian withdrawal, recognising Russian acts in Ukraine as genocide, expulsion of Russian diplomats, including Russia on a list of "hostile countries," taking part in a conference at the Ramstein base in Germany on support for Ukraine, the extent of financial aid granted both in absolute terms and as a proportion of GDP, visits of high-ranking officials to Ukraine between February 24 and May 30, and opposition to imposing sanctions on Moscow. The highest possible score was 100 with countries scoring more than 40 points recognised as being friendly towards Ukraine. Poland came first with 97 points with the USA second on 96 and Estonia third on 95. Also in the top 10 were Latvia (94), Canada (88), Lithuania (88), Great Britain (88), Slovakia (82), the Czech Republic (81) and Portugal (78). The ranking's authors highlighted visits by Polish government officials to Ukraine, actions on the international political arena and financial aid granted to Kyiv. Poland has given Ukraine USD 3.1 billion, or 0.46 percent of its GDP.

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 1nc – Poland support high

Disinformation fails in Poland – favorable views of NATO and Ukraine are only increasing

Poushter et al. ‘22 (Jacob Poushter, associate director at Pew Research Center, Christine Huang, research analyst focusing on global attitudes at Pew Research Center, Laura Clancy, research assistant focusing on global attitudes research at Pew Research Center, “Spotlight on Poland: Negative Views of Russia Surge, but Ratings for U.S., NATO, EU Improve,” Pew Research Center. 6/22/22. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2022/06/22/spotlight-on-poland-negative-views-of-russia-surge-but-ratings-for-u-s-nato-eu-improve/)

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to a dramatic shift in attitudes in Poland, a key European partner and one which only three decades ago was part of the former Soviet Union’s Eastern Bloc. Negative attitudes among Poles towards Russia are at all-time highs since Pew Research Center began tracking opinion on this question in 2007, with virtually unanimous negative opinions of the Russian state. Currently, 94% see Russia as a major threat, up from 65% who said this in 2018, and 94% have no confidence at all in Russian President Vladimir Putin – also an all-time high. The sharp decline in positive attitudes toward Russia has benefited Poland’s western allies, specifically the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (Poland is a member of both NATO and the EU). Around nine-in-ten Poles have a favorable view of the U.S., NATO and the EU, all of which represent the highest shares since 2007. In terms of Poland’s relationship with the U.S., the increase in favorable attitudes toward America coincides with a strong 82% confidence rating for U.S. President Joe Biden, a marked increase from the 51% who had confidence in former President Donald Trump in 2019. In addition, roughly two-thirds in Poland see having a close relationship with the U.S. as more important than having one with Russia. Only 1% want a closer relationship with Russia, while 28% volunteer that both are equally important. Just three years ago, more than half of Poles (53%) offered that both relationships are equally important. The shift in attitudes also benefits Polish views of the NATO alliance. Roughly nine-in-ten Poles have a favorable view of NATO, including 34% with very favorable opinions of the military alliance. Currently, 84% of Poles support arming Ukraine through NATO and 75% want Ukraine to become a NATO member, a substantial increase in support since 2015. In addition, roughly two-thirds in Poland say they would support their country using military force to defend a NATO ally from a hypothetical Russian military action, and about the same share say the U.S. would defend that NATO ally. This support for military action in the event of a Russian attack on a NATO ally is up a considerable amount since the question was last asked in 2019. Another clear beneficiary of the decline in ratings for Russia is the EU: It has received its highest rating in Poland (89%) since Pew Research Center began asking the question in 2007. And Poles are now much more likely than they were in 2018 to say that the EU understands the needs of Polish citizens and promotes democratic values, prosperity and peace. Fewer now also say that the EU is intrusive or inefficient. A majority (57%) says that the economic integration of Europe has strengthened the Polish economy. Most Poles say EU promotes peace, democratic values and prosperity More than three million Ukrainians have fled to Poland since Russia’s invasion, and eight-in-ten Poles now support taking refugees from countries where people are fleeing violence and war, up from 49% who held that view in 2018.

2022 CNDI Negative
Ukraine-Russia Adv Answers › 1nc – disinformation failing

Russian disinformation campaigns about Ukraine are failing now – Europe and North America shoot down false narratives

Woolf ’22 (Marie Woolf – Writer for the Canadian Press. “Russia's misinformation campaign failing, say Canadian general, EU and NATO officials.” National Post. 5/21/22. https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/russias-misinformation-campaign-failing-say-canadian-general-eu-and-nato-officials)

Russian attempts to sell false narratives in the West about the invasion of Ukraine are failing, say a Canadian general and senior NATO and European officials. At a security conference in Ottawa, they said misinformation campaigns by the Kremlin are being successfully thwarted and countered in both Europe and North America. But they warn Russian President Vladimir Putin is stirring up dissent in Africa and the developing world by blaming Western sanctions for food shortages resulting from the Russian invasion and the blockade of Ukraine’s ports. Putin’s strategy is trying to increase Russia’s sphere of influence not just in Ukraine but in Africa and the developing world by sowing dissent and “weaponizing everything” including food, the conference heard. Lt.-Gen. Giovanni Manione, deputy director general of the EU Military Staff, said on top of the four riders of the apocalypse — conquest, war, famine and death — there was a fifth rider in this conflict: disinformation. “How many countries will fall to Russia without shooting a single shot in Africa and Asia?” he asked, adding that disinformation was difficult to counter. The conference heard that in Russia a majority believe Putin’s spin about its action in Ukraine, but that the same narratives were not penetrating in the West. Outside Russia, the EU, Canada, NATO and Ukraine are successfully shooting down false Kremlin narratives, including that food shortages are caused by the West, the conference heard. “The Russians are so cocooned by the propaganda, they will never listen to us,” Manione warned. The European Security and Defence Symposium in Ottawa was attended by Canadian military leaders and defence officials, as well as senior figures from NATO, the EU and Ukraine and European ambassadors to Canada. Jay Janzen, communications director for NATO’s Allied Command Operations, said Russia has experienced “catastrophic failure” since the invasion of Ukraine, including with its misinformation campaigns and was not “10 feet tall.” Maj.-Gen. Michael Wright, commander of the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, said the U.K., U.S. and Canada have successfully countered disinformation from Russia since the beginning of the war. Early on, the U.K. and U.S. had declassified intelligence to show what Russia’s intentions really were. Canada has also taken action to counter false narratives from the Kremlin. Charles Fries, EU deputy secretary-general for common security and defence policy, said the EU is fighting “a huge battle of narratives” and pushing back Russian propaganda, including “totally untrue” Kremlin claims that food shortages stem from sanctions. He said the invasion is now “far larger than a European war” and Russia is “now using food products as a weapon and is using the food security concerns as a kind of blackmail to put pressure on poor countries and some African countries.” The EU and allies’ sanctions had never targeted food supplies for the world, or even fertilizer exports from Russia, and the Russian claims were untrue, he said. Putin’s belief that the invasion would divide the EU and sap its resolve has backfired, he said. “Putin wants to divide us and he achieved exactly the opposite,” Fries said. “So it is a total failure.” Yegor Chernev, a Ukrainian MP and head of Ukraine’s delegation at NATO, warned that “the Russians will continue their false narratives, their fake news” and will try to spread these falsehoods in Canada and Europe. He also said the allies had to be prepared to deal with Russian “blackmail” with gas and oil.

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 1nc – sanctions fuel HR violations

The US’s overuse of sanctions has various unintended consequences - destabilization and humanitarian issues

Guyer ’22 (Jonathan Guyer, Jonathan Guyer covers foreign policy, national security, and the world for Vox. From 2019 to 2021, he worked at The American Prospect, where as managing editor he reported on Biden’s foreign-policy team. He has written for The New Yorker, The New York Times, The Paris Review, and Rolling Stone. Previously, he spent five years as a correspondent in Egypt and researched Arab political cartoons as a Harvard Radcliffe fellow., “The Biden experts waging war without weapons,” Vox News, May 9, 2022, )

Most sanctions ramp up over weeks, months, or years, but the Russia sanctions came together days after Russia’s assault on Ukraine and were initially harsh — part of the administration’s “start high and stay high” approach. “We know where Russia’s pressure points are,” Singh told NPR, reflecting on what he had learned since 2014. “So that’s why instead of taking a gradualist approach, we’re prepared to start with sanctions at the top of our escalation ladder and stay there.” Just two days after Russia’s invasion, the US, the European Commission, and major European countries imposed sanctions on Russia’s central bank. The next day, Japan joined. The central banks of petro-states like Venezuela and Iran have been sanctioned before, but a country the size of Russia took it to a whole new level. And since then, new sanctions are being rolled out almost every week against individuals, companies, and banks. Russia’s energy sector is perhaps the last arena that the US has yet to comprehensively sanction with its partners and allies. All told, 30 countries that consist of more than half of the global economy have joined the coalition. The Biden administration official who spoke on condition of anonymity emphasized that major Russian financial and banking institutions have been sanctioned without causing major global disruptions. “We’ve really carefully kicked the tires on these measures before we’ve done them,” the official said. “We’ve managed this in a way that has been remarkably effective at minimizing collateral costs.” The central bank sanctions had to have been prepared methodically and well in advance, says Daniel Fried, a former ambassador to Poland who coordinated sanctions on Russia in Obama’s State Department. “And I thought, ‘Damn, they’re good,’” he told me. In 2014, Fried traveled Europe with Singh, then a senior Treasury official, in advancing sanctions against Russia during its initial invasion of Ukraine. “Jack Lew, the Treasury secretary, basically sent Daleep [Singh] on my delegation to make sure that ‘Wild Man’ Fried wouldn’t trash the world financial system with my sanctions on Russia,” said Fried, who then quickly realized that Singh was a huge asset and supported his work. Lew told me the Treasury Department had studied “how Russia was interconnected to the European global economy” to ensure that sanctions didn’t kick off a recession. “State was pushing to do more, and Treasury was making the case to do it in a surgically targeted way, to have the maximum impact you’re looking for with the minimum unintended consequences that could undermine the whole effort,” Lew said. The combined effort put pressure on Putin that, according to Lew, brought Russia to the negotiating table and culminated in the 2014 Minsk agreement. “If State and Treasury are knit up, who’s gonna stop us?” Fried added. Now, the stakes are higher. The sanctions against Russia aren’t just about Ukraine, but may impact the future of sanctions — a coercive tool that policymakers think might be the route of first resort in a potential conflict against China. Julia Friedlander, a former career Treasury official, said that if sanctions fail to achieve Biden’s goals in Europe, new questions will be raised about the tool. “Can we really pretend to have faith in this kind of maximum pressure and financial sanctions again?” she said. “Maybe we have to realize that we’ve been barking up the wrong tree.” It’s also not been articulated yet what lifting sanctions would look like. Singh said last month that “we’re not at the point at which we’re talking about sanctions relief.” And an administration official declined to speculate about what circumstances might lead to sanctions being lifted. Limited congressional oversight means the president is not required to spell out goals, say how the administration is tracking them, or describe humanitarian fallout from sanctions. Critics worry that the administration is overselling how effective sanctions will be. In March, for example, Rosenberg spoke to anti-money laundering (AML) specialists. She went so far as to say, “The fate of Ukrainian democracy and the strength of democracies to push back against autocracy writ large depends on whether we do our jobs — and whether you do AML and Russian sanctions compliance work well.” Those who praise the Biden administration’s coordination of sanctions also express concern about their unintended consequences. “I do think that no one has really had the time to plan out what the longer-term implications are going to be of essentially annihilating the Russian economy,” Friedlander, now a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, told me. The truth is that Russia will adapt — it already has, and the ruble has begun to bounce back. Research indicates that sanctions aren’t a very effective tool unless formulated within a broader foreign policy strategy. A 2019 report from the Government Accountability Office found that government agencies aren’t great at assessing whether sanctions are working. “We need more accountability around sanctions policy — when and how they’re successful,” said Michael Wahid Hanna of the International Crisis Group. “US and European policymakers have never clearly defined how weakening or diminishing the economic welfare of ordinary people creates the conditions for a possible political or diplomatic resolution to something as significant as a military conflict,” said Esfandyar Batmanghelidj of the economic research institution Bourse and Bazaar Foundation. The intensive sanctions on Russia will also change the way countries think about the free movement of capital. Adam Posen of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has argued that these sanctions on Russia will have a corrosive effect on the world economy that might result in the “end of globalization.” Above all, the humanitarian effects may be staggering and could elevate international food prices by up to 22 percent, with vulnerable people bearing most of the war’s costs. As a result of US sanctions, Iranians suffered from limited access to medicine, especially early in the pandemic. In Venezuela, sanctions contributed to the collapse of the health care system. Humanitarian exemptions are built into sanctions for foods, agricultural items, and medicines, as well as licenses for some international organizations and nonprofit groups to operate in Russia. “Even so, they don’t always work to mitigate those unintended impacts in the way that the designers and implementers of sanctions law or executive orders intend,” a Democratic congressional aide told me. Lew explained that sanctions at this level will inevitably hurt Russians. “When you’re in a war, like the war that Russia has created here, it’s impossible to protect all the quote-unquote innocent people, and there’s a question of what innocent means when your country is doing things like that,” he told me. Since OFAC is so understaffed, former Treasury officials explained, it can be difficult to create enough licenses and waivers for humanitarian reasons. The humanitarian consequences “can never be a secondary issue,” said Adeyemo, who says he and his team are “thinking about how we can get more consistency around our humanitarian carve-outs.” Banks tend to overcomply with sanctions: they want to avoid potential hits to their reputations, and are generally overcautious. More than 250 companies have already left Russia, including airlines, banks, consulting firms, and retailers. One bank executive told me that they had been working 15-hour days since December to understand the overlapping layers of Biden’s sanctions. There are concerns the humanitarian fallout could become collateral or peripheral to the immediate crisis. “If you really want to amp the pressure up as much as possible, you’re obviously going to affect the population,” Friedlander said. So when the Biden administration announces that they’ve taken the humanitarian dynamic into account, as the White House often does in press releases, it’s only part of the story. “You’ve taken it into account but then you bagged it,” she explained. “And then you try to mitigate it afterward.” Narges Bajoghli, an anthropologist at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies who is writing a book on sanctions, says the fact that the sanctions team uses military terminology suggests that the humanitarian consequences are, to some extent, intentional. “It’s similar to the way in which the humanitarian aspect is thought about in some ways in a hot war situation,” she said, “where, yes, it’s unfortunate, but it’s a necessary byproduct of going up against the state.”

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 2nc – sanctions fail

Sanctions alone will not end the war in Ukraine, but sanctions do risk stronger ties between China and Russia

Dempsey 22, (JUDY DEMPSEY, NONRESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW CARNEGIE EUROPE EDITOR IN CHIEF, March 10, 2022, “Judy Asks: Can Sanctions End Russia’s War in Ukraine?”, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/86606)

The threat of sanctions did not prevent President Vladimir Putin’s war, but the reality of them may help to end it. While hopeful voices have wondered if sanctions might produce enough popular discontent inside Russia to cause Putin to reverse course, this is unlikely. Instead, while no one can say definitively when the war will end, we can expect that it will end with a settlement. No matter how poorly his military seems to be doing—and it appears they are performing quite poorly indeed—Putin retains capacity to draw out the conflict into a bloody, rolling horror in the months to come. The strength and severity of the sanctions and their palpable effect on the Russian economy are likely to incentivize Putin to seek a settlement sooner than he otherwise would and could offer bargaining chips to counter some of Russia’s most egregious demands. To be clear, the sanctions won’t lead to a good deal soon; the deal will still be bad and too late, but not as bad and as late as it might have been. And even if they don’t help end this war, they are important both as an immediate step toward accountability and as a potential deterrent to other actors in the future. KRZYSZTOF BLEDOWSKICOUNCIL DIRECTOR AND SENIOR ECONOMIST AT THE MANUFACTURERS ALLIANCE FOR PRODUCTIVITY AND INNOVATION It depends on whose sanctions. Russia had factored in the sanctions cost of the war before triggering it. The actual breadth and depth of sanctions alongside private capital flight, trade restrictions, and diplomatic ostracism probably surprised the Kremlin. But there also exists in Russia a cost-benefit calculation when it comes to stopping the war short of its goal. And here, the cost of failure—not overthrowing the Kyiv government and subjugating the population—must also be set against the burden of the West’s sanctions. Aside from the West, there’s one other global power whose economic and strategic capacity makes a difference in the Kremlin’s calculations, and that’s China. When Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela suffocated under the West’s sanctions, these countries could count on Russia and China to evade some of them. So long as Beijing straddles the fence, Russia’s economy won’t implode. It will experience hyperinflation, its living standards will erode, and its long-term growth will decline. But it will muddle through. However, should China signal it is prepared to shadow the West’s sanctions, the calculations in Moscow would change. Alas, it is not clear whether for Beijing, the advantages of China’s lining up with the West would make up for the costs of a rupture with Russia. ROBERT COOPERCOUNCIL MEMBER AT THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS Yes. But sanctions are only one element. The story begins with the horror of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, its neighbor and cousin; then the courageous, inspiring resistance of a united Ukrainian people. Add to that the crushing economic penalties, cutting Russia off from the global system and, in a world where we are all joined together, anything is possible. In war, wrote Napoleon, the moral stands to the material in a ratio of three to one. These sanctions are different from past cases such as Cuba or South Africa. Those aimed at regime change. With Ukraine, the plan is simpler: empty the war chest and stop the war. If President Vladimir Putin falls too, that would be a bonus. MARTIN EHLCHIEF ANALYST AT HOSPODÁŘSKÉ NOVINY These are the most comprehensive sanctions any superpower or major developed country has had to face since 1945. So one would expect them to work. But even experts warn that sanctions per se are not the instrument for winning wars—as history teaches us. At this moment in time, these sanctions are an irreplaceable tool the international community can use against the Russian regime. I am not naive to think that Russians will rise up against Vladimir Putin immediately due to the impossibility to use Apple Pay. And I also do not believe the unprecedented unity of the democratic West would survive a longer period. But for the here and now, these sanctions could significantly contribute to persuading the Russian government to stop fighting because they show the unity of the West, a unity which nobody—neither us nor Putin—imagined possible about three weeks ago. THERESA FALLONDIRECTOR OF THE CENTRE FOR RUSSIA, EUROPE, ASIA STUDIES (CREAS) Sanctions as such cannot end the war. They can create hardship for the Russian population, but historically Russians are used to suffering and the official Russian propaganda will put the blame for the sanctions squarely on the West. Propaganda will paint the sanctions as unjust persecution of Russia by its enemies and will try to use them to rally the people around the regime. Only a minority have access to outside information and are ready to protest against the government. Sanctions will make Russia more dependent on trade with China, increasingly making Russia the junior partner in the China-Russia de facto alliance, which I call “Chinusia.” This will give China access to Russia’s vast natural resources, feeding China’s economic growth and military buildup. On the other hand, sanctions will hurt the economic interests of Russia’s economic, security, and political elites (oligarchs). It is still possible for a small elite to thrive, even under sanctions and in conditions of economic isolation, as in North Korea. However, is Russia comparable to North Korea? If the sanctions against Russia are sustained, there is a hope that Russia’s elites may act to put pressure on Putin to change course, or they may try to replace Putin with a new leader altogether. GEOFF KITNEYWRITER AND COMMENTATOR ON AUSTRALIAN AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS When Vladimir Putin visited Australia the one and only time in September 2007 for an APEC meeting, a journalist asked him what he thought of Australia, to which he replied: “I never think about Australia.” Despite its remoteness from Russia, Australia has vigorously joined the global action to sanction Russia—not just to hurt Russia but also to warn China. Australian leaders believe that widely enforced sanctions are setting the Russian economy back decades. Australia wants Beijing to see how united global action to cripple Russia is the price to be paid for military adventurism of a kind it is contemplating toward Taiwan. Australia sees its biggest long-term security threat coming from what it calls “an arc of autocracy” formed by a strategic alliance between Russia and China. Australia believes the free world’s response to Russia’s Ukraine war must be so strong that it will force China to pause for thought about the likely cost of a military takeover of Taiwan: that it may not be necessary for the West to go to war to make China an economically damaged, pariah nation. From Australia’s point of view, even if sanctions don’t end the war in Ukraine quickly, their success will also be measured by the strength of the message it sends to China. JOHN C. KORNBLUMFORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY No. Sanctions alone cannot do the job. They are a limited tool substituted for more difficult alternatives. The same was the case in 2014, after the Russian takeover of Crimea, and in 1968 and 1979 after Prague and Kabul. I managed a sanctions package against Serbia in 1996 and 1997. In the end, it was the NATO bombing which forced then president Slobodan Milošević to pull back. But NATO cooperation on sanctions was essential to agreeing the military option. Sanctions may help stop the Russian attack, but they will not change Russian behavior overnight. Sanctions will help us maintain the moral high ground, especially with the Russian people. Thirty years ago, our Russian partners wanted a fresh start. Today, we may be forced to deal with Vladimir Putin as we did with Milošević in Serbia. We probably can’t expect a return to the Charter of Paris, but at the same time cannot modify it to meet Russian demands. Fifty years ago, German Social Democrat Willy Brandt and then U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger defined Western principles in a way that both Russia and China found acceptable. Thirty years have passed since current arrangements were agreed upon. Even without Russian attacks, it would be time to bring some of the agreements up to date, just as we did with the Charter of Paris and the Helsinki Summit in 1992. The active application of sanctions will be essential in helping to define future goals. STEFAN MEISTERHEAD OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND DEMOCRACY PROGRAM AT THE GERMAN COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (DGAP) The most comprehensive sanctions Western countries have ever enacted against Russia seriously hit the Russian state, society, and economy. After these sanctions, Russia will not be like it was before. It is about changing the way of life for the Russian people and decoupling the country from the global economy. At the same time, even if they are important, sanctions will not stop Russian President Vladimir Putin in his war against Ukraine. Putin is on an historical mission to get Ukraine back at any cost. He has prepared this war over the years while he built a repressive apparat for any internal opposition and securitized all parts of the Russian state where the economy has to serve as an instrument to resist any kind of sanctions. Russian oligarchs depend more on the Russian state than they are able to resist Putin’s policy. Even if people in the system are shocked by what Putin is doing, for the time being, they fall into patriotism or apathy. Sanctions will work in the medium term, but then there might be no Ukrainian state anymore and Russia may be so isolated that the West lacks any impact. Ukraine is fighting for European security and needs any means to resist the Russian attack. Sanctions alone will not stop Putin. MARIANN ŐRYHEAD OF THE FOREIGN DESK AT MAGYAR HÍRLAP Western sanctions alone will most likely not end the war in Ukraine. They were never enough to change the fundamental geopolitical stance of Russia. Putin has a certain goal to reach and Russia has probably prepared to deal with most of these sanctions. Of course, it’s also possible that the sanctions will change the course of events. Even though Putin underestimated the EU’s and the United States’ willingness to make sacrifices, these sanctions will hurt the West too. Some of sanctions and the decisions made by big companies are aimed at making the Russian people put pressure on their government. It is very hard to estimate by Western logic and experience how the Russian people will react. Sanctions can also have far-reaching consequences. Pushing Russia toward China and India can create a new geopolitical reality. MARC PIERINIVISITING SCHOLAR AT CARNEGIE EUROPE Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is unfolding in the most brutal fashion imaginable and there is little clarity about the endgame. But, if Grozny and Aleppo are any meaningful yardsticks of Russian military operations, it is doubtful that, at this very moment, Western sanctions have any effect on the Kremlin. There are two reasons for this. The first one is that, by virtue of the current pattern of Western European imports of gas, oil, and coal, Russia is still earning some $600-700 million per day—enough to fuel a massive war for a long period of time. The second reason is that the Kremlin’s political motivations for such a massive invasion are solidly cast in ideology and history. They are packaged in fabricated narratives and the media are all but suppressed. Over the medium term, though, incremental sanctions will have two effects. They will vastly increase the cost of war for Russia and will cut it off from the West, its main source of income. They will also make the consequences of the invasion visible to each citizen of Russia, each policymaker, and each general. Even in Russia, that may matter.