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2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 2nc – sanctions fail

Sanctions will not sway Putin – and they threaten world economic stability

Wadhams 22 (Nick Wadhams, National Security Reporter at Bloomberg, “US Officials Are Split Over the Next Round of Russia Sanctions”, Bloomberg, June 1, 2022 at 11:01 AM PDT, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-01/us-wavers-over-next-russia-sanctions-as-fears-of-divide-grow#xj4y7vzkg)

Biden administration officials are divided over how much further the US can push sanctions against Russia without sparking global economic instability and fracturing transatlantic unity. While President Joe Biden’s team rallied behind behind a sanctions plan it rolled out just after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the debate is more heated now that President Vladimir Putin has shrugged off the early economic penalties and is forging ahead with his war, according to officials familiar with the discussions. The people, who asked not to be identified discussing internal deliberations, said factions have emerged over how hard to push. One group, which includes many officials at the State Department and White House, advocates even stricter measures known as secondary sanctions in response to Russian atrocities, arguing opposition from allies can be overcome. Another group of officials, many based at Janet Yellen’s Treasury Department, worry about further strains on a global economy already suffering from supply-chain woes, inflation, volatile oil prices and a potential food crisis. Some fret about the looming midterm elections and Democrats’ chances if prices at the pump stay high. They argue for a different, untested approach: a cap on oil prices that would allow countries to buy Russian energy while limiting Moscow’s income. “We’re now just coming up to the limit of how severely you can impose sanctions against a major economy without it having such bad spillover effects that you are creating a ton of bushfires elsewhere,” said Nicholas Mulder, a Cornell University professor and author of “The Economic Weapon,” a history of sanctions policy. The challenges have been exacerbated by the of Daleep Singh, the deputy national security adviser who was managing the administration’s sanctions rollout, according to one person familiar with the internal dynamics. Singh had also as part of US efforts to push the government further out of Russia’s orbit. His absence will fan concerns that the US lacks an influential voice to play that role at an even more perilous time. Officials from the State Department, Treasury Department and National Security Council all declined to comment. But other people familiar with the dynamic characterized it as a healthy internal debate and denied any suggestion that agencies were pitted against each other. One said that it’s Treasury’s normal role to scrutinize decisions that could disrupt economic flows. The debate mirrors broader tensions in the trans-Atlantic alliance, with agreement harder to find on how much more pain to inflict on Putin. A harbinger of the challenges to come emerged in recent days, when the European Union agreed to pursue a ban on oil imports -- but only after granting to Hungary -- and then were unable to decide on what to do next or how aggressively to go after gas imports. Until now, unity had been a defining characteristic of the US and European response to the war. “We continue to look at what other sanctions we can impose,” Jose Fernandez, the undersecretary of state for economic growth, energy and the environment, said in an interview. He stressed the importance of Western unity, saying Putin faces a “solid group of countries that are dead set against the invasion.” “You’ve got countries applying for NATO membership,” Fernandez said. “That kind of unity -- and sanctions are part of that -- is something I don’t think he was expecting.” One person familiar with the matter said the US focus on unity had been so all-encompassing that the Americans had even asked the UK in recent weeks not to pursue a trade battle with Ireland over Northern Ireland for fear it would give Putin a weak spot to exploit. Yet with Putin undaunted by the economic chokehold and pressing ahead with his war, there are growing calls within the administration to test that unity by taking action against other countries and companies that help Russia evade sanctions or provide what the US calls “material support” to sanctioned entities. They argue that such moves would be narrowly targeted, nothing like the broad sanctions campaign that sought to stifle Iran over its nuclear program by targeting almost any country or company that did business with Tehran. Many US allies and humanitarian groups argued that approach was counterproductive. But supporters of the harder line say that, with the war in its fourth month, its time has come. “There’s a time and a place for considered US unilateral action,” said Edward Fishman, a former State Department official who is now an adjunct professor at Columbia University. “There’s no good argument against maximizing sanctions on Russia. And the sooner you do it, the better because time isn’t really on our side.” But that’s testing the limits of what sanctions can do in the face of a evidence that even crippling penalties fail to force stubborn regimes to capitulate. Skeptics point to sanctions programs against nations such as North Korea, Venezuela, Syria and Cuba that have only entrenched adversarial leaders determined to hunker down and pass the suffering onto their own populations. If the US goes forward with more sanctions, it might find itself largely alone in such efforts, in effect inserting the wedge between it and allies that Putin has a history of exploiting. It could also further roil energy markets, possibly causing new pain at US gas pumps. Some in the Biden administration seeking a more cautious approach have floated the idea of a price cap -- not restricting the flow of oil, but merely the price that would be paid for it. That idea faces considerable skepticism given that it’s never been tried before. Two people familiar with the matter said there was also a belief internally that the price cap idea was part of an effort to redirect clamor in Congress and among outside groups away from imposing secondary sanctions on Russian energy exports, which they fear would spur even stronger macroeconomic shocks. The debate is also forcing a wider reassessment of the sanctions campaign. Officials are confronting the fact that the oligarchs who have been targeted by sanctions may not wield the influence with Putin they once had. And the administration has shifted away from its argument that sanctions could hasten the end of the war to the claim that sanctions, export controls and other restrictions will take a long time -- perhaps years -- to weaken Putin. “I wouldn’t say the system is broken, but over-reliance on these tools to direct your foreign policy is a problem,” said Julia Friedlander, a former Treasury Department official. “It’s an asymmetry between trying to stop a government from invading a country and doing so by following money around the world. I still say do it, but there are hitches in the concept itself.”

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 2nc – sanctions fail

Sanctions legitimize Putin’s power – he is proud of withstanding economic hardships from the West

Alexeev 22 (Sergey Alexeev; Journalist at EuroPP; “Western sanctions are only strengthening Putin’s grip on power”; May 11th, 2022; DOA: 6/25/22; ) // bh

For Russians, the recession of the 1990s, when the economy underwent an unprecedented structural transformation, is an important benchmark. At the beginning of that transformation, the economy lost 52% of its output. By comparison, during the Great Depression, a textbook example of economic collapse, the American economy declined by only 34%. Many of Russia’s ruling class have been in power since that period. Thus, their tolerance for economic calamities is unimaginably high. The inconsequential sanctions of 2014 only reinforced their confidence that recovery will inevitably follow once the economy adjusts. Soon after the first 2022 sanctions were implemented, Putin’s government stated that he expected the economy to recover after a temporary increase in inflation and unemployment. But sanctions are not only an inadequate deterrence for Putin – they are actively tightening his grip on power. Putin legitimises his rule by claiming Russia is heroically withstanding economic hardships caused by the West. This message is compatible with the Kremlin’s framing of the Ukraine conflict as a ‘denazification’ project and with its broader obsession with the Second World War. Many Russians view the atrocities perpetrated by Nazi Germany on the Eastern Front, the painful economic transformation of the 1990s, and the current economic sanctions as a single narrative, with Putin continuing the fight against Russia’s enemies both within and outside the country. All of this underlines the futility of applying criminological principles such as incapacitation and deterrence to a country. While these principles may be effective at preventing crimes carried out by individuals, they are entirely inadequate for preventing aggression by states, even thoroughly personified dictatorships like Putin’s Russia. They are also undermined by assigning collective blame to all Russians, who are in many respects also victims of the country’s unjust institutions and political leadership.

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 2nc – sanctions fail

Sanctions fail to end war – Russian oligarchs can’t speak out

O’Connor 3/2022 (Eileen O’Connor - former journalist and attorney who worked in Russia and Ukraine. “Putin Cares About Only One Thing, and It’s Not Oligarchs.” The New York Times. March 25, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/25/opinion/russia-ukraine-putin-sanctions-oligarchs.html)

As President Vladimir Putin faces the biggest test of his now-22-year reign, squeezed between a passionate Ukrainian resistance and tightening sanctions on oligarchs, oil and technology transfers, the answer remains the same, as it has throughout Russian history. Many in the West are hoping for Mr. Putin’s overthrow. They do not understand Russia or the attitudes that people there have toward power. Russian scholars have long noted that the absence of private property rights and impartial legal authority lead to state actors holding the power that determines the lives of Russians in every way. Beyond its borders, Russia has since the 15th century exerted its power through military aggression. In a country where power is nearly everything, sanctions and lost fortunes alone will not change that fundamental dynamic. Mr. Putin’s speech earlier this month proves the point and illustrates what he and many in Russia see as the objective of the war: to defend Russian territory and sovereignty against Western dominance. To him, the West has ignored Russia for too long, and denied it superpower status. In Western capitalist democracies, wealth often equates to access and influence. So it’s not surprising that many believe that sanctioning oligarchs can move them to pressure Mr. Putin to change course. That is a miscalculation. These oligarchs may hold wealth that connects them to power and that can be used by Mr. Putin, but in Russia, that does not mean that they wield any power over him or those in the Kremlin. It all goes back to the 1990s, when I witnessed mostly former Communist Party officials amassing wealth through a privatization of state assets overseen by Mr. Chubais. Those who then vowed fealty and lent money to Mr. Yeltsin’s political campaign became even wealthier, granted ownership of the largest state-owned enterprises in oil, gas and raw materials like nickel and aluminum. Today they remain the richest men in Russia. But the lack of properly defined property rights and a legal and institutional framework to protect them meant these oligarchs still depended on the Kremlin, occupied since 2000 by Mr. Putin. Court decisions for or against oligarchs could easily be reversed depending on the favor of the Kremlin. In the 2000s, after I had transitioned to working as an attorney representing Western investors in the region, I saw this dynamic myself. And the source of oligarchs’ wealth is not the only thing Mr. Putin can control. He has made clear the dangers of challenging his hold on power. Take the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who was once the wealthiest man in Russia. Rising from the ranks of the Communist Youth, Khodorkovsky obtained several formerly state-owned oil fields in Siberia and formed the corporation Yukos. In a televised meeting at the Kremlin in 2003, he dared to criticize the government as corrupt. Mr. Putin responded by stripping Mr. Khodorkovsky of his assets and putting him in prison for 10 years, until he was allowed to leave to live in exile. Experiences like Mr. Khodorkovsky’s may explain why so few oligarchs are speaking out now. The only ones who have said anything about the war have done so from the comfort of places like London, where Mikhail Fridman, the founder of Alfa-Bank, put out a statement saying that “war can never be the answer” — but not criticizing the president. Even with that, Mr. Putin, in his recent speech, lumped those oligarchs in with his adversary, the West, saying “they can’t get by without oysters or foie gras” and that they do not mentally exist “here, with our people, with Russia.” He vowed to spit them out “like a midge that flew into our mouths.” That might have been why Mr. Chubais — who, in addition to overseeing the privatization push, became an oligarch in his own right, and has remained in Mr. Putin’s good graces — resigned his symbolic position as climate czar and left the country. The only people who can truly sway Mr. Putin are ideologues who share his views, the so-called siloviki. The word literally means people with force — the power that comes from being in the security forces or military. These insiders have been with Mr. Putin since his days in the K.G.B. or in the St. Petersburg municipal government, and they see themselves as protectors of Russia’s power and prestige. They have kept their money mostly inside Russia and out of reach of sanctions. And like Mr. Putin, they see the dissolution of the Soviet Union as the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century, and believe this fight is for Russia’s “sovereignty and the future of our children.” To influence them, the West must prioritize the things that they believe give Russia its superpower status: its oil and its military. Russia’s oil and gas sector provides as much as 40 percent of the country’s federal budget revenues and accounts for 60 percent of the country’s exports. That is why President Biden’s focus on sanctions banning oil imports is important, though somewhat symbolic, given how little the United States imports from Russia. While Germany has halted development of a major gas pipeline, the European Union has not cut off Russian supplies, which represent around 40 percent of its needs, arguing it will take time to find alternative sources. If European countries were serious about affecting Mr. Putin’s thinking, they would spend less time seizing oligarchs’ yachts and more lessening their dependence on Russian energy. Likewise, the West must push for India and China to join these sanctions as well. Meanwhile, the best way to undermine Russia’s military is by limiting access to technology. As has become clear on the ground in Ukraine, the Russian military lacks the vital hardware and software used by other modern forces to gather real-time field intelligence, along with the communication systems necessary to use that intelligence effectively. And the dayslong stalling of a tank convoy indicates that the Russians lack a sophisticated supply-chain system to bring food and gas to troops. Sanctions cutting off access to the tools that keep Russia’s military operating — the overt exertion of power — can make a difference to those advisers around Mr. Putin. The United States and Europe imposed sanctions to do just that, but they must encourage India and China to do the same. It may not be easy, but doing so will depend on whether the United States can make the case that the principles of sovereign nations and the world order they rely on are under an existential threat. In an interview with Bloomberg, Mr. Fridman, the London-based oligarch who has since been put under British sanctions, said that if the European Union thought he could tell Mr. Putin “to stop the war and it will work, then I’m afraid we’re all in big trouble,” because that means Western leaders “understand nothing about how Russia works.”

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 2nc – sanctions fail

Putin tolerates sanctions

Mathieson 22 (Rosalind Mathieson; Executive Editor for International Govt at Bloomberg; “Weapons, Not Sanctions, May Stop Putin in Ukraine”; April 11, 2022; DOA: 6/5/22; )

Putin seems willing to tolerate the economic and financial squeeze, and as long as the president can force his people to do the same, sanctions won’t lead him to pull back in Ukraine. Indeed, Russian troops are pressing forward in the eastern Donbas region, having largely given up their campaign in the north after weeks without progress. Putin would no doubt like to claim at least a partial win by May 9, when Russia marks its victory day in World War II. Moscow has also streamlined its military leadership in Ukraine under one commander. So far the only thing that has slowed Putin down has been his military’s fumbles in northern Ukraine. Weapons sent by Europe and the U.S., especially anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, have proven a boon for the Ukrainian forces mounting fierce resistance on the ground. As Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba said last week, Ukraine needs three things: “weapons, weapons and weapons.” Allies are responding. They are agreeing to send more offensive arms including tanks, though fighter jets may still be off the table. NATO members are talking about training Ukrainian forces on more modern equipment rather than just sending them Soviet-made kit.

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 2nc – sanctions fail

The US should have learned from Iran – sanctions fail to end the war and cause staggering HR violations

Ziabari 22 (Kourosh Ziabari; journalist and Asia Times correspondent and a former Chevening scholarship recipient. He is an alumnus of the Senior Journalists Seminar Fellowship by the East-West Center, a 2021 Dag Hammarskjold Fund for Journalists fellow, and a 2022 World Press Institute fellow; “Sanctioning Russia Won’t Stop Putin. Just Look at Iran.”; April 21, 2022; DOA: 6/5/22; ) // bh

Culminating in former U.S. President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign, these [Iran] sanctions, in short, have been a failure. The humanitarian costs of the sanctions have been staggering, and Iran’s civil society and middle class have had to pay a dear price, be it in the form of disenfranchisement from medicine, safe aviation, international mobility, educational opportunities, and COVID-19 vaccines, or their shrinking purchasing power, mushrooming poverty, and a currency that lost 70 percent of its value since Trump walked away from the Iran nuclear deal in 2018. It is difficult to gauge the total damage Iran has incurred from the sanctions, because the oil-dependent economy is diminishing over time, and there are various components that should be factored into the country’s economic freefall, including corruption, mismanagement, nepotism, lack of transparency, and bureaucratic labyrinths, in addition to sanctions. However, last year, then-Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif acknowledged U.S. sanctions have imposed damages on the national economy adding up to $1 trillion. Yet although Iranian citizens have been at the end of their tether with a strained economy and lives that are becoming increasingly untenable, occasionally prompting them to storm the streets and stage anti-government protests, the formidable sanctions have done little to change the government’s overall behavior and policies, and there are those who suggest they even have produced a counterforce by radicalizing Tehran’s regional conduct and nuclear priorities. In particular, in the aftermath of Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal, Iran accelerated its race to new nuclear thresholds and reneged on its commitments under the deal by enriching uranium to 20 percent and 60 percent, and even going the extra mile to produce metal uranium. These are some basic indications that the economic pressure has backfired and, instead of having a bearing on the government or coaxing it into diplomacy, has merely decimated a vulnerable middle class that is admittedly the sacrificial lamb in an ongoing vendetta involving Iran and the world powers. Further evidence of this assumption is Iran’s risky escalations in the Persian Gulf, targeting of Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities through its Houthi proxies, and nearly going to war with the United States after showering the Ain al-Asad air base in Iraq’s Anbar province with missiles in retaliation for the assassination of its top commander Qassem Suleimani in January 2020. These developments can be read as the failure of the sanctions regime: The government in Tehran has learned how to survive—to find workarounds to dodge the sanctions, sneak into the black market, empower the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to keep the national economy afloat—and has emerged resilient while the United States exhausts its options. In 2016, then-U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew warned that the overuse of sanctions against adversaries will water down their effectiveness and chip away at the United States’ leadership role. Russia bears many hallmarks of Iran’s authoritarian governance model. Its democratic credentials are scant, there is little willingness to open up to the world and show transparency and accountability, and civil liberties and social rights are not guaranteed. Russia is also a major world power, and with an annual defense expenditure of $61.7 billion as of 2020, and it boasts the world’s second-largest military. It produces its own arms and exports a massive quantity, including fighter jets, to traditional customers. Draconian sanctions, divestment, and embargoes, however inclusive and pungent, will not bring such a militarized juggernaut as Russia to its knees or deter it from further aggression in Ukraine, nor will they stave off its hypothetical prospective adventures in Europe, if there are indeed any (including the idea of invading Poland, raised by Andrii Deshchytsia, Ukraine’s ambassador to Poland).

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 2nc – sanctions fail

US sanctions don’t solve – they are flawed and Russian foreign policy won’t change

Constable 2/22. (Simon Constable – freelance economics and markets commentator for U.S. News & World Report. “Why Sanctions on Russia Won’t Work.” Time. Febuary 23, 2022. https://time.com/6150607/why-sanctions-on-russia-wont-work/)

As the U.S. and Europe roll out an arsenal of economic sanctions to combat Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, there is scant understanding that the financial interdependence of the crisis’s significant players means quick and easy solutions are unlikely to work. Worse still, imposing sanctions on Russia’s elite will do little if anything to bring order to what has fast-become chaotic. Putin in the Sanctions Crosshairs Nevertheless, news earlier this week that Russia ordered its military to take a “peacekeeping” role in disputed regions of eastern Ukraine, prompted the western democracies to impose sanctions on Russia. Specifically, the U.S., U.K., and other countries slapped penalties on specific Russian companies and people. In the U.S., the sanctions list included some Russian banks and wealthy individuals and oligarchs. Plus, there’s a ban on purchasing the country’s debt. In short, these actions are aimed at hurting the rich and powerful in Russian President Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. The problem is that few experts think these actions will make much difference. “So far, we’ve seen timid sanctions,” says Peter Tchir, head of global macro strategy at New York-based financial firm Academy Securities. “Sanctions only work when they force behavior change, but in Putin’s case they won’t.” As it was under the Czars, the issue in Russia now is that the population is mainly poor – with average annual per capita income around one fifth of that in the U.S. Just a few ultra-wealthy individuals sit at the top of the economic pyramid. Ultimately, the poverty-stricken will feel the bite of sanctions far more than the elite. “Russia has always treated the poor as peasants,” Tchir says. Poor History of Sanctions Success Other experts see more significant flaws in imposing sanctions. “The record of those actions is that they fail,” says Steve Hanke, professor of applied economics at Johns Hopkins University. “There are always workarounds,” meaning sanctions won’t stop the rich from getting money in or out of the country. Indeed, Russia has been subject to sanctions for years dating back at least as far as the 2014 annexation of Crimea—and the behavior of the country has not changed in a positive way since then. As with the recently introduced penalties, the past sanctions were surgically applied to hit the elites. Other countries have also weathered severe sanctions without improving their behavior. Hanke notes that U.S. sanctions on Venezuela haven’t pushed out the country’s authoritarian President Nicolas Maduro. Similar actions against Cuba didn’t get rid of dictator Fidel Castro. Likewise, Iran’s theocratic mullahs remain in charge despite more than four decades of harsh U.S. measures against the regime. The issue is that sanctions often prompt a country’s population to rally around the flag. “Whoever is imposing the sanctions are viewed as the enemy,” Hanke says. Put another way, a siege mentality takes over with people banding together to weather the economic storm.

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 1nc – sanctions fail

Sanctions won’t solve - Ukraine proves

Jones 22 (Lee Jones is Professor of Political Economy and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London., “Sanctions won’t save Ukraine”, UnHerd, February 28, 2022, https://unherd.com/2022/02/sanctions-wont-save-ukraine/)

Unsurprisingly, the West has decided it won’t send its sons and daughters to die for Ukraine. Instead, it hopes to cripple Russia with economic sanctions. Will such measures bring about the end of the Russian invasion? Will Vladimir Putin scuttle back to the Kremlin with his tail between his legs? It seems unlikely. As the record of international conflict shows, sanctions rarely (if ever) work. To succeed, sanctions must not only impose economic costs — they must also change the political behaviour of target governments. Neither is at all straightforward. As the past week has shown, designing sanctions that will harm Russia but not other European economies is fiendishly difficult. So far, only modest measures have been imposed: primarily asset freezes and exclusion from the Swift payments system for some banks; asset seizures and travel bans for some elites and oligarchs; and limits on Aeroflot flights. None of these will cripple Russia’s economy, despite fanciful claims by Western leaders. The proposed sanctions on Russia’s central bank . Exactly how far these will go is not yet clear. But freezing Russia’s overseas currency reserves will make it harder for the central bank to defend the value of the rouble, and to supply foreign exchange for commercial banks. This is unlikely to collapse the economy, as some advocates , but it could have significant and far-reaching consequences, including runs on Russian banks and impediments to foreign trade. However, it’s precisely the threat to trade that will probably lead Western governments to avoid a total freeze — limiting Russia’s access to foreign exchange, but not severing it entirely. The reason is simple: Russia is not a minor economy. Western countries, firms and banks do a lot of business with Russia. Wide-ranging sanctions will naturally have blowback. This is why tougher measures will be difficult, if not impossible, to impose. The real “nuclear” option would be to embargo Russia’s energy exports, which comprise over half of Russia’s total exports. This would inflict serious damage. But, given that Europe relies on Russia for about a quarter of its oil and over a third of its gas, it would also spur massive inflation and induce economic recession in the West. Prices have due to the conflict, which will further harm households reeling from record-high energy prices. It’s telling, for example, that Germany has “de-certified” the Nordstream-2 pipeline, but not the pipelines through which it receives existing supplies. Likewise, Western governments appear  on completely blocking Russia from Swift, because this would create difficulties for Russian and Western banks alike. Without Swift, how would Germany pay for Russian gas? And, if it cannot pay, would the gas keep flowing? How would the many other Western businesses working in or dealing with Russia make payments? For the same reason, although some sectors of the Russian economy, such as chemicals and automobiles, rely on imported hi-tech Western components, so far, export restrictions remain limited, for fear of damaging Western firms. Despite their belligerent rhetoric, Western leaders are wary of creating more problems for economies already struggling to recover from the deep recessions caused by their Covid-19 lockdowns. They are quietly carving out even non-critical economic sectors, such as , from the sanction regime. It is hard to avoid the impression that, having blundered into confrontation with Russia, Western governments are now realising they have very limited options, and remain reluctant to put their money where their mouths are. However, even if the West can find ways to inflict serious economic damage on Russia, that still does not mean sanctions will “work”. To be truly effective, they must also change the Russian government’s behaviour. And this is where the logic of sanctions . It is remarkably rare for Western policymakers to explain — or even consider — exactly how “economic pain” is supposed to translate into “political gain”. And the prospects in this particular case do not look promising. The fundamental problem is that sanctions are based on a dubious understanding of human behaviour. They are a quintessentially liberal instrument, resting on the assumption that every man has his price: if I impose economic costs on you, you will revise the cost-benefit analysis of your course of action, and change your behaviour accordingly. In the real world, however, many regimes and their supporters are willing to endure colossal economic costs to pursue their political and security goals. Saddam Hussein’s Ba’ath Party regime to see Iraq’s economy and society destroyed rather than relinquish power. Fidel Castro’s regime withstood a punishing US embargo for decades. Iran has suffered serious economic harm under Western sanctions without relinquishing its nuclear programme. What are Putin’s goals in Ukraine? The Russian government has made it clear since the early Noughties that it cannot tolerate the eastward expansion of Nato, considering it a serious threat to Russian security. Its invasion of Georgia in 2008, and its attacks on , long ago demonstrated the Kremlin’s determination to prevent neighbouring countries falling into the Western orbit, even at the cost of international isolation and punitive sanctions. One does not need to sympathise with Putin at all to recognise that Russia’s bank balance is not his primary consideration. If Putin will not put economic costs ahead of his security goals, how else might sanctions work? Classically, comprehensive embargoes seemed to be guided by a “” of sanctions, whereby economic suffering is expected to compel the population to rise up against their wicked leaders. But this rarely, if ever, happens. If anything, economic immiseration tends to fragment and weaken the population, who become absorbed by the struggle to subsist and more reliant on government help — . Targeted sanctions work on an equally naïve basis, assuming that political leaders and their business cronies are completely autonomous from the people, such that manipulating their personal wealth will convince them to change course. In truth, political leaders always represent some broader set of forces in their regime and wider society. Their policies reflect that underlying coalition. If they change course, they will have to answer to their supporters. Vladimir Putin is a powerful and quasi-authoritarian leader, but he is not autonomous from Russian society. His rise reflects a broadly-based nationalist backlash against the consequences of neoliberal “shock therapy” practised on Russia by the International Monetary Fund after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Under the pro-Western President Yeltsin, the public wealth built up under communism was pillaged by oligarchs, while the Russian people suffered astonishing levels of deprivation. In the , GDP fell by 45%, mortality increased by 50%, government revenues had nearly halved, and crime had doubled. Putin rose to power by promising to halt and reverse Russia’s national decline. In his first seven years in office, real wages (albeit from a low base). Using soaring oil revenues, Putin stabilised the economy and paid off foreign debt, reasserting Russia’s sovereignty. He brought the oligarchs to heel, jailing or exiling anyone who would not recognise the state’s supremacy. And he restored stability and a measure of national pride to an exhausted and demoralised people. His regime, centred on a network of siloviki (security and military officials) and managers of state-owned enterprises, has proven politically robust and durable — a state within the state. This is important not to praise or exonerate Putin, but to understand why his popularity has remained high, even under sanctions. suggests that Russia’s economic decline since 2014 — mostly caused by declining oil prices, though compounded by sanctions — has cost Putin some support. But it has been more than compensated for by an upsurge in nationalist backing. Putin’s increased from 65% in January 2014 to 86% in April 2014, following the annexation of Crimea. It remained above 80% for the next two years before returning to the high 60s. Today, a of Russians blame the West for the crisis in Ukraine, while have little or no concern about sanctions. Putin’s regime may have persecuted opposition figures, curbed dissent, and restricted electoral competition — but, despite such authoritarian measures, he retains widespread support. Western leaders could only dream of his approval ratings: support for Biden stands at , for Macron, , and, for Boris Johnson, just . Nor is there much sign of political fracture within the regime that sanctions could exploit. Putin’s ability to his spy chief, who bodged his lines at the televised, stage-managed security council meeting prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, suggests he feels secure and confident. The overwhelming vote in the Duma of in favour of recognising the breakaway “republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk suggests either broad elite consensus or an unwillingness to openly defy the Kremlin. Exactly how the (modest) economic pain caused by sanctions is meant to generate political gain is therefore hard to discern. All too often, sanctions are a comforting but dangerous illusion: they are alluring because they seem to provide an effective option between war and words. When diplomacy seems to fail, and states are unwilling to risk war, something else is needed — and that something is sanctions. But just because something must be done does not mean that this “something” is going to work. Moreover, it is all too easy to forget that embargoes are a weapon of war, often devastating target populations and escalating conflicts, rather than peacefully resolving them. In response to the latest sanctions, Putin . It seems unlikely that he would deploy them in response to banking sanctions. But this is a reminder of that the stakes are incredibly high. Ultimately, even if sanctions do bite, we need to ask: what is the endgame? Sanctions are at best a means to an end, and surely the desired end is lasting peace in Eastern Europe. And one does not need to have any sympathy whatsoever with the Putin regime to believe that this can only be achieved by reckoning with core Russian interests. Like it or not, powerful states have the capacity to inflict serious harm on weaker ones — just ask the Serbs, Libyans, Afghans, Iraqis and Syrians on the receiving end of the Nato powers’ tender mercies. If Russia is dissatisfied, it clearly has the power to upset the existing order by force. The only way to prevent this is to compromise with Russia’s concerns, or deploy overwhelming force to deter it from using its military power. The West has done neither, dismissing Putin’s demands to establish a neutral buffer zone between Russia and Nato, while failing to deter him from using force to achieve his objectives. The only way out of this disaster is a negotiated settlement, which will require Nato to reckon with Russian interests, and preserve Ukrainian democracy and sovereignty within a framework of international neutrality. For the brutal reality is this: sanctions are unlikely to force Russia out of Ukraine, and the West is unwilling to be drawn directly into battle with a nuclear-armed state. Unless a diplomatic solution can be found, sanctions are likely to be merely part of a grinding proxy war along the lines of the brutal and horrific conflict in Syria. The people of Ukraine have already suffered too much. Sanctions won’t save them — they may only make their misery worse.

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 2nc – no Russia influence

Latin American countries are resistant to Russia’s efforts to gain influence in the region – the invasion of Ukraine was a wake-up call

Runde 3/22 (Daniel F. Runde - Senior Vice President; William A. Schreyer Chair; Director, Project on Prosperity and Development; and Director, Americas Program. “Russian Invasion of Ukraine Should Force a Rethink about Russian Presence in the Americas.” Center for Strategicc & International Studies. 3/3/22. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-invasion-ukraine-should-force-rethink-about-russian-presence-americas https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-invasion-ukraine-should-force-rethink-about-russian-presence-americas)

Given the global revulsion toward Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, governments in Latin America and the Caribbean should rethink their relationship with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. There should be a price to pay electorally, diplomatically, and commercially for being too close to Putin. It is likely that the significant sanctions on Russia will have spillover effects on Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua—the three countries closest to Russia in the region. The brutality of this invasion should make Argentina and Brazil, two countries flirting with Putin, think twice about a deeper partnership with the Kremlin. The rest of the region should see Russia’s invasion as a wake-up call and reduce their ties in the coming weeks and months. In recent years, Russia brought its “Kremlin playbook” to the Western Hemisphere, interfering in elections not only in the United States but also in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia. Russia, through overt and covert means, has sought to undermine democratic processes by subverting, delegitimizing, or otherwise frustrating the political opposition in much the same way that Russia attempted to influence the United States’ 2016 and 2020 elections. Russia Today (known as RT) has a major presence in Latin America in Spanish, not only on television, which remains a major source of information in the region, but also via digital platforms. If RT is not providing disinformation, it is at the very least providing Kremlin propaganda. Russia seeks to project military power in the region in an attempt to “balance” NATO’s own eastward movement into Russia’s “near abroad.” Russia has a consistent presence in the region in the form of listening posts, special forces deployments, and military and intelligence training and support. Russia has periodically deployed strategic bombers and naval forces in the hemisphere to remind the United States and its allies in the region that it too can project power in the hemisphere. Russia has offered its Sputnik V vaccine in a number of countries on the continent. The vaccine is not as effective as Western vaccines or even those offered by China. However, if Guatemala, led by a friend of the United States, must wait at the back of the line for the “top-shelf” vaccines made in the United States or Europe, then Guatemala is going to buy the Sputnik V vaccine or remain unvaccinated. The leftist governments in Peru, Chile, and Bolivia (and possibly incoming governments in Colombia and Brazil) would have been tempted to be more “Putin curious” in the past. Working with Putin should now become untenable, especially for those governments that lead with a human rights platform. Russia will likely seek diplomatic or material support from the region and will likely work with actors in the region to try to work around sanctions. Russia has sought to build a collective resistance to sanctions. For example, with the help of China, as well as Russia and Iran, Venezuela’s oil company, PDVSA, has successfully sold millions of barrels of “sanctioned” oil via tankers primarily destined for China and with financial support from Russia. Countries under sanctions in the Western Hemisphere know that they can count on help from their allies when sanctions are imposed. For example, Maduro routinely ships sanctioned oil and diesel (and even food) to Cuba while his own people remain undernourished. Russia has spent years trying to create an alternative to SWIFT that Russia’s partners in the region could adopt to erode the West’s ability to influence behavior through financial sector sanctions. As the SWIFT sanctions bite in Russia, expect to see Russia’s allies join a Russia-led alternative to SWIFT.

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 2nc – no Russia influence

Growing opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in Latin America

Ostos 4/22 (Claudia Gago Ostos - Research Intern, State Resilience and Fragility Program. “How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Affects Latin America.” Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy. April 7, 2022. https://newlinesinstitute.org/russia/how-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-affects-latin-america/)

Until Russia invaded Ukraine, Washington seemed to pay little attention to Russian influence in Latin America. However, with growing international opposition to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the decline in Moscow’s reliability as an ally for the Latin American countries, the U.S. appears more interested in regaining diplomatic terrain in the region. In recent weeks, Washington approached the Venezuelan government about restarting the oil trade, a highly controversial decision within the U.S. government, and met with Colombian President Iván Duque over giving Colombia a non-NATO ally status – a status only Argentina and Brazil currently hold in the region. On March 2, 141 countries voted in favor of the non-binding resolution by the U.N. General Assembly to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and demand a withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory. Out of the remaining 52 member states, 35 abstained and five voted against the resolution. These five were: Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, Russia, and Syria. Out of the 35 that abstained, we find longstanding Russian allies like Cuba, Nicaragua, and China. More interestingly, Bolivia and El Salvador were also among the Latin American countries that abstained. Other member countries were unable to vote on the matter; Venezuela could not vote because it had not paid its membership dues. Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine left Latin American countries in a difficult position. Most followed Mexico and Brazil’s course: The two countries declined to impose economic sanctions on Russia or condemn the Russian invasion. They also have no concrete plans to cut diplomatic ties, even though their representatives voted in favor of the U.N. Resolution. Brazil and Mexico have expressed their concerns over how sanctions could affect their own economies. Brazil imports more fertilizers from Russia than any other country; 69 percent of Brazil’s fertilizers are imported from Russia. After Brazil, Mexico is the second most important partner for Russia in Latin America. According to Mexico’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, Russia was Mexico’s 35th largest trading partner in 2020, with two-way trade worth just under $1.3 billion. Russian products accounted for two-thirds of that amount. Even if these countries will not sanction Russia themselves, sanctions from companies and trading partners mean they will need to find other trading partners to substitute the goods they import from Russia in order to satisfy their internal demands. On the other side, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela supported Russia’s actions in Ukraine and blamed the crisis on the U.S. and NATO, as was expected. After all, Russia shares more than military and trade deals with these countries; Russia’s financial system has been an essential enabler in Venezuela and Nicaragua’s sanctions evasion efforts in recent years. With Russian financial institutions now cut off, these countries could face additional economic challenges in the coming months. Furthermore, for Russia, these Latin American allies represent critical components in its efforts to establish a long-term security threat for the U.S. by continuously stating that depending on how the U.S. and NATO to act near its border, Russia will engage its allies in the region via unspecified “military-technical measures.” Despite Moscow’s influence in Latin America, the U.S. and China have far more significant ties to the region. In 2019, for example, South American exports to Russia amounted to $5 billion, but exports to the U.S. and China were $66 billion and $119 billion, respectively, according to data compiled by Harvard University. Russia’s specialty in the region has been political support for countries becoming isolated on the global stage and defense assistance, but that support may soon lose its value with Russia’s diplomatic isolation and economic decline. Likewise, if Moscow’s key allies in the region decide to abandon their relationship with Russia, Cuba and Nicaragua are likely to suffer the worst because of sanctions, but they would still have close economic ties with China to rely on. For now, they act as proxies that Russia can leverage against the U.S. because of their geostrategic proximity to the U.S. and military alliances with Russia. Although Venezuela plays a similar role, Maduro is uniquely positioned to exploit the current situation. With the U.S. banning Russian oil imports, it has turned to Venezuela after almost three years without any diplomatic relations, and Maduro’s administration seems eager to begin talks. Nonetheless, it is up to the United States to take Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as an opportunity to enhance its alliances with Latin American (and European) partners. Washington will also have to navigate the challenge of incoming leaders, as Colombia, Costa Rica, and Brazil face elections this year. With the Summit of the Americas taking place in Los Angeles in June this year, Washington has a unique opportunity to further push this goal, guide Latin American countries in this changing economic landscape, and use new opportunities to spread democracy and development in the region.

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 1nc – no Russia influence

Russia won’t be able to form relations with South America - too distracted now

Runde 3/22 (Daniel F. Runde - Senior Vice President; William A. Schreyer Chair; Director, Project on Prosperity and Development; and Director, Americas Program. “Russian Invasion of Ukraine Should Force a Rethink about Russian Presence in the Americas.” Center for Strategicc & International Studies. 3/3/22. https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-invasion-ukraine-should-force-rethink-about-russian-presence-americas https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-invasion-ukraine-should-force-rethink-about-russian-presence-americas)

First, the United States needs to raise the price of engaging with Russia in the region. The longer this crisis lasts, the more Russia will look for friends wherever it can find them, both for diplomatic support and for assistance in dodging the sanctions. A full-court diplomatic press will be required to ensure Moscow doesn’t find any new supporters. It is possible that harsh Western sanctions on Russia might help some Latin American countries (e.g., Venezuela) in terms of commodity prices like oil, but it is more likely that the crisis will drive inflationary pressures and economic disruptions in the region. The United States, Europe, Canada, and others should seek to bolster the region with economic assistance to countries particularly hard hit by sanctions backlash. The United States should also increase its engagement in the OAS and consider a capital increase for the Inter-American Development Bank. The crisis will also impact how the United States uses the Summit of the Americas that it is hosting in June in Los Angeles. Second, Putin may be bluffing, but he could deploy forces to the region. Russia has threatened to send military assets to the Western Hemisphere during this crisis. With oil at $100 a barrel, Putin will have resources at his disposal, but sanctions may also curb his ability to spend this money. If the crisis in Ukraine drags on and Russia sees U.S.-led sanctions as tantamount to “acts of war,” Putin might try anything. Strong statements to the Kremlin from the United States and its allies that they will oppose such deployments will be required. On the other hand, the invasion of Ukraine may leave Russia too distracted, too economically weak, or too overstretched to effectively assist client states such as Nicaragua, Cuba, or Venezuela. Third, the United States should be prepared for a change in leadership in Moscow or a Kyiv quagmire scenario that causes Russia to disengage with the Western Hemisphere. The United States should be ready to fill a void left by a weakened Russia so that China does not fill that void instead.

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 2nc - US relationship with Latin America low

America’s attempt to re-establish leadership in Latin America is failing now – too many hurdles

Liptak 6/8 (Kevin, news reporter at CNN that covers the White House, and he previously covered Trump’s foreign and domestic policy, campaign politics, and the internal dynamics of the administration, “Snubs from key leaders at Summit of the Americas reveal Biden’s struggle to assert US leadership in its neighborhood,” CNN, Wednesday, June 8, 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/07/politics/summit-of-the-americas-joe-biden/index.html)-AT

Biden, who arrives in Los Angeles on Wednesday, is expected announce a new partnership with countries in the Western Hemisphere during the gathering as part of a broader effort to stabilize the region, according to the officials. He and his administration have been working since last year to organize the summit, which was formally announced last August. The city of Los Angeles was selected as the venue in January. Biden named former Sen. Chris Dodd, his friend and former colleague on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as the special adviser for the event. Dodd traveled in the region to muster support, one of a number of administration envoys to Central and South America that included Vice President Kamala Harris and even first lady Jill Biden. Yet as the summit approached, it became evident an event designed to reassert American leadership in the region was facing serious hurdles. For weeks before the summit began, López Obrador hinted that he would boycott unless all leaders from the region were invited – including those from Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, each of whom has faced US opposition because of their human rights records. Other, mostly leftist leaders signaled they, too, may not attend if invitations did not go to everyone. Administration officials privately cast doubt those leaders would follow through on their threats, suggesting they were instead attempts to play to domestic audiences that are often skeptical of the United States. During an April telephone call between Biden and López Obrador, the subject of the summit arose. In a readout, the White House said the men “looked forward to meeting again at the June Summit of the Americas,” a sign the administration believed then the Mexican president would attend. Over the past weeks, Dodd spent lengthy virtual sessions lobbying López Obrador to reconsider his threat of a boycott. Members of Congress – including Sen. Bob Menendez, Democratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee – began to publicly agitate against inviting any leaders from Cuba, Venezuela or Nicaragua. And frustration mounted among administration officials that questions over the invitations and attendees were clouding out the summit’s intended goals. “The biggest problem is that the focus on attendance takes us away from the focus on substance, but that is the logical thing that happens ahead of a summit. It’s like the sausage-making period. We don’t talk much about the substance because the summit hasn’t started yet, we talk only about who might be there,” said Roberta Jacobson, the former US ambassador to Mexico who also served as an adviser to Biden on southern border policy. Ultimately, the weeks of speculation were put to rest — but not in the way the White House had hoped. “There cannot be a Summit of the Americas if all countries of the Americas cannot attend,” López Obrador said at a news conference in Mexico City. “This is to continue the old interventionist policies, of lack of respect for nations and their people.”

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 1nc – US relationship with Latin America low

Old fault lines between Washington and the leaders of Latin America drive current tensions

McKinley 5/25 (P. Michael, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, served for 37 years as an Ambassador in the U.S. Foreign Service and is former Secretary of State, “Beyond the Summit of Americas: Resetting U.S. Policy in Latin America,” United States Institute of Peace, May 25, 2022, https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/beyond-summit-americas-resetting-us-policy-latin-america)-AT

Despite the Biden administration’s efforts to outline a new, positive vision for engagement with Latin America and the Caribbean, old fault lines are likely to come into play at the upcoming Summit of the Americas, which kicks off in Los Angeles on June 6. Both U.S. domestic politics and governments in the hemisphere with a more skeptical view of Washington and its intentions contribute to these tensions. A new U.S. perspective is required — one that takes into greater account the region’s diversity, priorities and political complexity. Without such a shift, the perception and reality of declining U.S. influence are only likely to deepen. The tri-annual regional summit is in trouble. The heads-of-state of Mexico, Brazil, many Caribbean countries and other nations are threatening to boycott — largely, but not only, because of the exclusion of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. While the softening of sanctions legislation on Cuba and Venezuela is welcome in the region, it’s being viewed as a belated effort to respond to concern over their exclusion. Whether or not a widespread boycott of the summit ultimately materializes, the stresses in U.S-regional relations will have been exposed in an unflattering light. Observers and analysts are also pointing to longer-term concerns over U.S. policy in the region, including decreased U.S. influence and interest; growing regional ties with China; the failure to check Ortega’s Nicaragua, Maduro’s Venezuela and Cuba; and the “ambivalence toward democracy” and the “pink tide” trend in Latin American elections. The administration is responding. Secretary of State Antony Blinken presented an ambitious set of objectives in a May 3 speech to the Council of the Americas focused on “growth with equity.” The assistant secretary for the region, Brian Nichols, has mentioned reaching agreements on “clean energy transition, a green future, and digital transformation.” First lady Jill Biden visited Ecuador on May 19 and spoke about “achieving an equitable and sustainable future, building health and pandemic resilience, and strengthening democratic government” in the region. The importance of like-minded nations working with Washington should not be discounted. The summit could yet be salvaged. Despite promises of a wider agenda, however, issues like irregular migration, nearshoring and the state of regional democracy may dominate at the summit and will likely be perceived as Washington setting priorities. Most Latin American and Caribbean governments are concentrating instead on post-COVID pandemic measures to restart their economies and address the problems created by slow growth, inequality and political fragmentation. The summit in Los Angeles is unlikely to resolve these differences. The uncertainties surrounding the summit, however, are a wake-up call for the United States. Like the last period of serious redefinition of our hemispheric relations at the end of the Cold War in 1989, when Washington forged closer ties with a newly democratic hemisphere, the U.S.-Latin American relationship going forward must evolve.

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 2nc – disinformation failing now

Latin American companies are developing technology that stops the spread of misinformation

Tameez 5/16 (Hanaa’, staff writer at Neiman Lab, “Factchequeado launches to combat misinformation in Spanish-speaking communities in the US,” Neiman Lab, May 16, 2022, https://www.niemanlab.org/2022/05/factchequeado-launches-to-combat-misinformation-in-spanish-speaking-communities-in-the-u-s/)-AT

Last month, Factchequeado launched as a way to address misinformation in Latino and Spanish-speaking communities in the United States. Founded by Laura Zommer of Chequeado in Argentina and Clara Jiménez Cruz of Maldita.es in Spain (both are fact-checking organizations), The idea for the venture emerged when Jiménez started noticing that misinformation in Spanish targeting U.S. Latinos was also reaching Spanish speakers in Spain. She figured that the misinformation must have made its way to Argentina too, so she reached out to Zommer. “We’ve been seeing in Spanish-speaking countries in the past five to 10 years that misinformation travels in a different way and very often has specific topics targeting specific communities,” Jiménez said. “So at Maldita, we thought maybe all these things that we’ve learned over the years can be applicable in the U.S. and we can launch [a] fact-checking project there for Spanish speaking communities that can also benefit our own communities in our own regions. Because we see that this information has no borders, this misinformation fabricated in the U.S. comes to Spain and to Latin America, and misinformation fabricated in Spain and Latin America is probably reaching the U.S. as well.” Jiménez and Zommer also pointed out that Big Tech companies focus their efforts and resources on combatting misinformation in English, even though misinformation on social platforms is a problem in many languages, including Spanish. That means smaller, sometimes non-profit fact-checking outlets like Maldita.es and Chequeado shoulder the responsibility of fact-checking in Spanish. Zommer noted that when the Plandemic video came out and went viral, Facebook linked in English to the World Health Organization’s website. But with the Spanish version of the video, Facebook linked to a group called “Médicos por la verdad” (Doctors for Truth), which disseminates misinformation about issues related to the coronavirus. “One of our approaches here is thinking if we manage [to get] platforms and the companies to put attention into Spanish-language misinformation in the U.S., that is going to benefit our regions and our languages in the long term,” Jiménez said. Factchequeado, a team of five, is a service journalism project and its model is based on collaboration. It partners with English- and Spanish-language publications in the U.S. that want to republish its fact-checks and explainers. In return, Factchequeado asks that the organizations help them reach broader audiences and learn more about their news and information consumption habits by sharing its WhatsApp chatbot number. So far, Factchequeado’s partners are Conecta Arizona, Conexión Migrante, Documented, El Detector, Enlace Latino NC, FactCheck.org, La Esquina, MediaWise, PolitiFact, and Telemundo’s Verifica. Factchequeado determines what to debunk with two factors: virality and level of danger. Its team won’t cover something that only one person forwarded them on WhatsApp if the reach of the content in question is low because doing so could lead to amplification. It will also focus on misinformation that surfaces in times of crisis, social movements, and elections. Since its launch, Factchequeado has covered cryptocurrency scams and how to protect yourself from them, fake polls about Mexican president Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the Amber Heard and Johnny Depp trial, and what will happen to abortion access if the U.S. Supreme Court overturns Roe v. Wade. Spanish speakers in the U.S., of course, aren’t a monolith. Jiménez and Zommer know that different communities in different regions have all kinds of interests and consumption habits, and that WhatsApp is commonly used among Spanish speakers around the world. In Factchequeado’s pilot year, they want to quantify that information more and understand where certain narratives come from, how they get to certain communities, and what the takeaways from those findings are in order to better combat misinformation in Spanish. Then they can show how tech companies answer misinformation and disinformation in Spanish differently than they do in English, Zommer said. But to get all that information, building relationships with news consumers and social media users is key. “One of the approaches that Maldita and Chequeado have taken throughout their time is the idea of building trust by doing the public a service,” Jiménez said. “What we do on a daily basis is listen to the audiences, understand what their needs are and try to answer them. Once they trust us, we can start [giving them] other kinds of information that is not necessarily the one that they [came to us for].” Factchequeado plans to experiment with different formats to reach users as well, something that Chequeado and Maldita already do. Many of Factchequeado’s stories start with, “if you only have a few minutes, read this” and a few bullets that summarize the piece. Most people likely don’t have or want to spend the time reading 2,000 word articles, but they do have 20 seconds to understand that something is false. They’ll test out shorter pieces, images, short videos and audio files to see what what resonates most with its users. Its tone gives more “friend telling you something at the bar” vibes instead of “journalist trying to explain the world at you,” Jiménez said. “We as journalists often [face] pieces of misinformation that we might not think are super important or that they’re going to make us win a Pulitzer,” Jiménez said. “But they’re the ones that build trust within communities because you answer the questions that they have and afterwards, they will stay for the rest.”

2022 CNDI Negative
Latin America Adv Answers › 1nc – disinformation failing now

Latin America is fighting disinformation now

Rauls 21 (Leonie, Leonie Rauls was the development and external relations coordinator at the Inter-American Dialogue from 2018-2019. She graduated summa cum laude from Amherst College with a BA in Political Science and Spanish, focusing on development policy, “How Latin American Governments Are Fighting Fake New,” Americas Quarterly, October 19, 2021, https://americasquarterly.org/article/how-latin-american-governments-are-fighting-fake-news/)

Governments and civil society have tried a number of different approaches to fight misinformation. But the barriers are formidable. Latin America has among the world’s highest rates of social media use, making countries fertile territory for fake news. But several of the proposed solutions infringe on free speech or can be easily abused by authoritarian governments with their own agendas, among other flaws. Below, AQ compiled five categories of initiatives being tested, discussed or implemented in parts of Latin America. 1. Government-run fact-checking and monitoring services In June 2019, Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador launched Verificado, a fact-checking operation, as part of the government’s newswire Notimex. As of August 2021 it had no activity. Civil society and journalism groups expressed concerns the tool could be politicized and undermine the credibility of independent fact-checkers. (Verificado also faced a legal battle over the name itself, as several Mexican fact-checkers were already using it.) In Argentina, the Public Defender’s Office launched the Observatory of Disinformation and Symbolic Violence on Digital Media and Platforms (NODIO) in October 2020, to “detect, verify, identify and disarticulate malicious news.” Critics across the region said the initiative could be akin to censorship and a few politicians in the opposition tried unsuccessfully to sue the public defender who created the unit. 2. Legislation The most common response to misinformation in the region is to try to create legislation to stop it, said Columbia University researcher Laura Duarte. In Brazil the Internet Freedom, Responsibility and Transparency Bill, popularly known as the “fake news” bill, was approved by the Senate in 2020 and is now in the lower chamber. The bill aims to combat the spread of false information by making social platforms responsible for combating disinformation and creates an “internet transparency council” with members from government and civil society. After Venezuela’s controversial 2004 Law of Social Responsibility in Radio, which was followed by a change in the country’s penal code in 2005, several Latin American countries are looking to criminalize the dissemination of fake news—with sentences of up to 10 years as in Nicaragua’s Special Cyber Crimes Law from 2020. Critics say Venezuela’s and Nicaragua’s legislation are effectively tools for political persecution. Other proposals making fake news a crime are being discussed in Chile, Colombia, Panama and El Salvador. According to the International Press Institute, 17 nations globally have passed some form of regulation targeting disinformation during the pandemic, with many other bills still pending in legislative bodies. 3. Working with social media companies Several governments are trying to work with social media companies to tackle the main tools used to spread fake news. Mexico’s National Institute of Elections (INE) signed collaboration agreements with social media companies prior to the 2018 elections. As part of those accords, INE staff received training on using and monitoring the Facebook platform, while Google pledged to disseminate on YouTube information generated by INE about the electoral process, as well as other initiatives such as marking voting locations on Google Maps. Argentina’s electoral authority signed a memorandum of cooperation with Facebook, which pledged to amplify official electoral information while curbing the visibility of false posts. Brazil’s Superior Electoral Court (TSE) also partnered with social media platforms, with the creation of an official court chatbox on WhatsApp where people can send inquiries about dubious posts directly to TSE officials. Another tool allows electoral officials and WhatsApp to receive and collect information on social media accounts suspected of spreading messages in bulk, which also violates Facebook’s terms of use. 4. Ethics pacts among political parties In Uruguay the six political parties with representatives in Congress signed an Ethical Pact Against Disinformation in April 2019, pledging “not to generate or promote false news or disinformation campaigns to the detriment of political adversaries.” The pact was proposed by the Uruguayan Press Association as part of a three-pronged campaign against disinformation that also includes training media professionals and a fact-checking tool. 5. Media literacy training Researchers and specialists are almost unanimous that media literacy programs are the most effective long-term tool against the dissemination of fake news. The state of São Paulo in Brazil included media literacy as an elective class for middle schoolers to help them recognize what is news and how to check sources. Argentina’s fact-checking group Chequeado put together a handbook with UNESCO to help train others to spot disinformation. Outside the region, Finland has introduced a media literacy program at public schools in 2014 that teaches children from the age of six to read sources critically. Children are taught to evaluate and fact-check websites, and hunt for dubious sources. In 2019, the government of Finland topped the European Media Literacy Index that measures countries’ resistance to misinformation and disinformation.

2022 CNDI Negative
2024 Adv Answers › 2024 › 2nc – no civil war !

No civil war – civil wars are rare and risk is very low

Koren 1/2022 (Ore Koren - Assistant Professor of Political Science, Indiana University. “Civil war in the US is unlikely because grievance doesn’t necessarily translate directly into violence.” The Conversation. January 14, 2022. https://theconversation.com/civil-war-in-the-us-is-unlikely-because-grievance-doesnt-necessarily-translate-directly-into-violence-174456)

The potential for violent extremism in America to erupt into full-fledged conflict across the country is a common topic of discussion nowadays. A 2021 FBI report highlights an increasing risk of violence against government institutions, private organizations and individuals. The possible perpetrators: primarily “lone wolves,” but potentially also militias and other organized groups such as animal activists, anti-abortionists and white supremacists. Claims that America is at the greatest risk of civil war since, well, the Civil War, recently received additional support from some experts in the field of political science. But civil wars are rare events. Before the 2020 election, I analyzed the risk of a so-called “Second American Civil War” that some speculated might ignite on or around Election Day. I concluded the risk was very low, while also emphasizing the uncertainty of the times. Despite the ugly Capitol riot of Jan. 6, 2021, and anti-racism protests of the past few years, some of which included rioting, violent confrontation, and property destruction, my analysis has held, and I remain unconvinced that America is likely to descend into civil war in the near future. Before proceeding, I want to stress that, as a scholar who studies civil conflict, I discuss the manifestations of violence here not on the basis of their underlying political ideologies but in relation to empirical definitions of different types of political violence. Grievance doesn’t translate into violence. Researchers usually define civil wars based on a certain threshold of combatant deaths, often 1,000 or more. In 2020, for example, only eight conflicts crossed that threshold worldwide. They happened in countries – including Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Yemen – experiencing rampant poverty and underdevelopment, nondemocratic or dysfunctional political institutions, and a long history of conflict along ethnic and religious lines. When trying to assess the likelihood of civil war, researchers first look at whether people are willing to engage in violence. Willingness is often attributed to anger and grievances over inequality or political marginalization. Individuals or groups may have grievances with specific state or national policies, or with other groups. As their anger grows, these people may not only use aggressive and demeaning language, but also become more accepting of the idea of using violence. Anger and grievances are probably the most frequently highlighted issues in the mainstream media, and especially in social media outlets. Studies of social media outlets have found that their algorithms are designed to amplify anger to appeal to wider groups. Aggrieved people, however, exist almost everywhere, even in the world’s happiest countries. Feeling aggrieved and even using harsh and violent rhetoric does not mean a person is willing to take up arms against the government or one’s fellow citizens. Risks to joining a rebellion. But even if they are fully willing, in almost every case, civil war will not happen unless these very angry people have the opportunity to organize and use violence on a large scale. Joining a rebellion is extremely risky. You can die or be severely wounded. Your chances of winning are low. If you don’t win, even if you survive unscathed, you still risk prosecution and social alienation. You may lose your job, your savings and even your home and put your family at risk. It doesn’t matter how angry you are, these considerations are usually prohibitive. All these calculations are part of what economists call “opportunity costs.” Opportunity costs basically measure how much you would have to potentially give up if you were to engage in a given activity, such as rebellion. In most countries afflicted by civil war, poverty, economic downturn and even food insecurity mean that these costs are relatively low. An unemployed farm laborer in rural Mozambique has, from an economic perspective at least, less to lose from joining an extremist insurgency than, say, Robert Scott Palmer, owner of a cleaning and restoration company from Largo, Florida. Apparently willing to risk his livelihood by using violence against police during the Jan. 6 riot, Palmer was thwarted by other factors that are highly relevant in determining the potential for a full-fledged rebellion – the government’s capacity to punish and deter violence, and the opportunity, or lack of opportunity, for dissidents to organize and mobilize effectively enough to start a war. For example, people who want to organize and rebel against the government will find it easier to do in remote areas where the government cannot know or reach them. Tora Bora – the cave complex in the mountain of eastern Afghanistan – is an example of such a place. Insurgents can hide and train there, practically unknown to, and untouchable by, Afghanistan’s military, which generally lacks the capabilities and capacity of its American counterpart. The high levels of American policing and intelligence capacity mean that insurgency opportunities are rare in the U.S. Individuals who organize, arm themselves and decide to act against the government risk being detected and thwarted before they can become real threats. Moreover, because of the low urban density of the U.S., even if such rebels are successful in organizing – in rural Alaska, for example – they will be unable to reach, let alone conquer, big cities or threaten American sovereignty in significant ways. ‘Intensified domestic terrorism.’ These low opportunities suggest that civil war in America is still unlikely. But this does not preclude the occurrence of other forms of less intense violence. Concerns about increased violent extremism in the United States recently led the U.S. Justice Department to establish a new domestic terrorism group. It is possible we might see a rise in the number of organized domestic terror attacks – along the lines of the British experience during its conflict with the Provisional Irish Republican Army or the U.S. experience with the Weather Underground during the 1960s and 1970s

2022 CNDI Negative
2024 Adv Answers › 2024 › 1nc – no civil war !

Despite political division, Civil war in America is unlikely

Pazzanese 22, (Christina Pazzanese, Harvard Staff Writer, January 11, 2022 “We don’t need a civil war to be in serious trouble”, https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2022/01/harvard-political-scientist-says-u-s-civil-war-unlikely/)

As the House Select Committee investigating the Jan. 6 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol prepares for televised hearings later this month, public attitudes toward the attack are divided sharply along partisan lines. With extremist movements and rhetoric on the rise, a growing number of people, including some historians and many opinion writers, believe the U.S. is on the brink of disaster. A Zogby poll in the fall found that 46 percent of Americans think the country is headed for another civil war. In late December, a survey by The Washington Post and the University of Maryland revealed that one in three Americans think that violence against the government is sometimes justified. But are we really on the brink of armed conflict or is it just that the political vitriol makes it feel that way? Jay Ulfelder is a political scientist who studies civil wars and former research director of the Political Instability Task Force, a U.S. government-funded program that helps policymakers understand and anticipate political crises around the globe. Currently a fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard Kennedy School, he spoke with the Gazette about the prospect of civil war in the U.S. The interview has been edited for clarity and length. Q&A Jay Ulfelder GAZETTE: First, how is civil war defined today? Second, is the country heading down this road? ULFELDER: I’m glad you asked the definitional question. When anybody asks “Is it going to happen?” my first response is, “What do you mean by civil war?” The answer depends tremendously on that. In academic work, civil war is generally defined as a violent conflict between two organized, armed groups within a country that kills at least 1,000 people. Sometimes it’s a certain number of people per year — usually, in the hundreds — and where those people are killed directly by violent clashes between those armed organized factions. So it matters that we’re not talking about armed troops or police massacring unarmed civilians. One important thing to know about civil war is that it’s very rare. There are civil wars that last a long time, but onsets of new civil wars are quite rare, especially in the last several decades. We’re usually talking not more than a few around the world in any given year. And, very importantly, almost never in very wealthy countries, and certainly not in very wealthy democracies — that almost never happens. One of the rare exceptions is the conflict in Northern Ireland. But that kind of thing is virtually unheard of in wealthy, ostensible democracies in the last half-century. “There are so many bad things that can happen well short of civil war that I wish we, as a country, were talking more about.” My knee-jerk reaction is that it’s really unlikely to happen here. Last year was extraordinary in recent U.S. history in terms of how politically divided the country is, how violent things got, how tense they were — and you still had a number of deaths that was not anywhere close to civil war. You’d have to see a tremendous escalation of violence from where we are now to get to what political scientists usually think of as civil war. In a way, I think it’s the wrong question. I’m not faulting you for this, because I know this is the question people are kicking around a lot right now. There’s a tremendous range of things that can happen between where we are now and what would get construed as civil war. There are so many bad things that can happen well short of civil war that I wish we, as a country, were talking more about. GAZETTE: What worries you the most? ULFEDLER: What really worries me is we absolutely have seen the radicalization of one of the major political parties in the U.S., both in terms of the political ideas it’s putting forward, but also, its embrace of violence as a legitimate means to achieve those ends. The rhetoric coming from the right — “Watering the tree of liberty with blood,” “It’s back to 1776” — Jan. 6 was a reflection of that. There has been a lot of small-scale street violence around protest activity in the last couple of years, especially since the summer of 2020. Also the use of intimidation to try to push policy agendas and political agendas, especially at the local level, with people showing up at school board meetings and county council meetings and threatening people and staging outside with guns. That’s new-ish and it’s really bad, especially if you live in the areas where that is happening. But it’s not anywhere close to civil war. We’re getting into this weird space where the variance in how democratic things are, and how violent things are, is widening and is now quite large across the country. And that fragmentation and balkanization of politics, I think, is going to get worse. That’s what really worries me a lot more than, are we going to get to hundreds of people shooting each other? GAZETTE: Is it a bad sign that something apolitical like a pandemic became political so quickly? ULFELDER: Yeah, and that’s part of the issue here. I’ve also heard people talk about how “If the Democrats could just push forward on certain kinds of social welfare policies that would help the vulnerable people who are susceptible to radicalization on the right, that would solve the problem.” They’ve got the causal arrow going the wrong way. The radicalization is driving people’s response to these things. Even if you could get those policies passed, I’m super skeptical that people would suddenly start thinking differently about those things. They would just move on to the next issue in that “us versus them” narrative that they’re already stuck in. GAZETTE: What can be done to help cool tensions and stop the country from sliding into further conflict? ULFELDER: I wish I had a good answer to that. I can point to various things that I think are part of the cause. One is a constitutional design problem that disproportionately tips power toward parts of the country that are most desirous of preserving a white, Christian, patriarchal order that they think of as the “real America.” I also think social media is quite relevant. The way social media platforms work has accelerated political radicalization. That’s one small piece of it, but important for people not to lose sight of. Trying to address that aspect of it may be an important part, long term, of trying to get out of this hole. Part of the curse of having worked on this topic internationally for a long time is the knowledge that in situations where politics becomes factional in this way — it gets called polarization, but it’s primarily in the U.S. a function of the radicalization of one side, not both sides equally running away from each other. But polarization or factionalism tends to be very persistent once it sets in. It’s really hard to get out of it. It takes many years and there’s not some obvious thing that explains why it gets resolved when it does.

2022 CNDI Negative
2024 Adv Answers › 2024 › 2nc – election inevitably a disaster

2024 elections “will be a mess” – has nothing to do with Russian disinformation

Saric 22 (Ivana Saric; Breaking News Reporter, Newsdesk Reporter; “Rep. Adam Kinzinger warns 2024 election "is going to be a mess"”; Jun 19, 2022; DOA: 6/26; ) // bh

Rep. Adam Kinzinger (R-Ill.) told ABC's "This Week" on Sunday that he is "very worried" that the 2024 presidential election could be embroiled in the same election denial controversies as the 2020 election was. Driving the news: Kinzinger warned that one thing to watch for will be disputes over the certification of election results and the use of certain voting machines, pointing to the refusal last week by a Republican-led commission in New Mexico to certify the results of a primary election as an example. The commission's decision, which cited concerns over Dominion voting machines, underscored the extent to which former President Trump's illegitimate claims of election fraud have manifested in distrust in elections on all levels, including locally, Axios' Erin Doherty writes. Dominion was the subject of baseless conspiracy theories after the 2020 election, when Trump and his allies promoted unfounded claims that the company rigged the election. What they're saying: "We focus so much on what goes on in D.C., in Congress and the Senate, but when you have these election judges that are going to people that don't believe basically in democracy — authoritarians — 2024 is going to be a mess," Kinzinger said. "Wake up, America. Wake up, Republicans. Because this is not going to be good for you if you think it is," he added.

2022 CNDI Negative
2024 Adv Answers › 2024 › 2nc – election inevitably a disaster

US elections already derailed

Schouten 22 (Fredreka Schouten, CNN Election deniers are winning political nominations across the country," CNN, 6-15-2022 https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/15/politics/nevada-new-mexico-election-deniers/index.html) CL)

(CNN) Republican voters this week picked Nevada businessman as their nominee for secretary of state, bringing yet another 2020 election denier closer to overseeing elections in 2024 in a presidential battleground state. Last month, Pennsylvania Republicans chose as their gubernatorial nominee a staunch defender of former President Donald Trump and his election falsehoods. And , a GOP-led county commission refused to certify the results of the June 7 primary election in the county, citing concerns about election fraud. The move prompted legal action from Democratic Secretary of State Maggie Toulouse Oliver, who this fall will facewho has called the 2020 election that Trump lost a "coup" and has argued that vote-tallying machines manipulate election results. As a House committee investigating the January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol seeks to shed light on the falsehoods that swirled around the last presidential contest, a growing number of midterm results underscore how much deep suspicion of the 2020 election has taken root among Republican primary voters and some of the officials they already have installed in key positions. "Week by week, the dangers to the integrity of the election system are increasing," Richard Hasen, an election law expert at the University of California's law school at Irvine, told CNN on Wednesday. "It wasn't just the Marchant victory in the primary, and it's not just a rogue county board not doing their job to certify election results. It's also a purge within the party of those voices who have stood up to Trump," he said, citing the politicians who have dropped out of their reelection bids, were stripped of their GOP leadership posts or lost their seats as the former President has sought revenge. On Tuesday, for example, South Carolina GOP Rep. Tom Rice became the first of the 10 House Republicans who voted for impeachment last year to lose a primary to a Trump-backed opponent. It's not a given, by any means, that the election doubters elevated to date will prevail in general elections this fall. In New Mexico, for instance, Oliver won her 2018 election by a landslide. But the rise of these candidates in state after state -- along with the move by commissioners in one New Mexico county to decline to certify the election results -- set off fresh alarms among voting rights experts this week. "We're in a really dangerous spot right now," David Becker, executive director of the nonpartisan Center for Election Innovation & Research, said Wednesday. "The pieces of tinder being laid right in front of our eyes." Election deniers advance Marchant, who has led a coalition of 2022 candidates who insist the 2020 election was rigged, is the latest proponent of election fraud claims to move closer to reshaping the election system in a battleground state crucial to the next presidential election. (The Silver State, won by President Joe Biden by a little more than 2 percentage points in the last election, has seen many Democratic victories in recent years but remains increasingly competitive.) Marchant, a former state assemblyman, has thrust election doubts into the center of his campaign to become the state's next election chief, saying on his website that his No. 1 priority would be to "overhaul the fraudulent election system in Nevada." After Marchant lost a 2020 bid for the US House to Democratic Rep. Steven Horsford, he brought a lawsuit claiming voter fraud, but it was later dismissed. The candidate has said he would not have certified more than 33,500-vote victory in Nevada had he been secretary of state in 2020. And, more recently, Marchant has lobbied local governments to abandon the use of machines to cast and count votes. He wants to return to -- a move experts say will cause errors, delays and chaos in future elections. He will face attorney Cisco Aguilar, who ran unopposed for the Democratic nomination, in the fall. Marchant did not respond to interview requests Wednesday. He joins several other Republicans who have sought to cast doubts on the 2020 election and now are closer to overseeing elections in key states themselves. In Pennsylvania, for instance, state Sen. Doug Mastriano --- who played a key role in efforts to overturn Biden's victory in the Keystone State -- is the Republican nominee for governor. The Pennsylvania governor appoints the secretary of state, the person in charge of running the state's elections. And in Michigan, delegates to the state GOP convention backed Kristina Karamo's nomination for secretary of state -- a political newcomer who gained attention after the 2020 election when she alleged witnessing fraud as a poll challenger during the counting of absentee ballots. She also signed on to an unsuccessful US Supreme Court challenge to Biden's win. More candidates who are aligned with Trump's election views are on the ballot in states with upcoming primaries, including Arizona. The state become a breeding ground for election conspiracy theories, exemplified by the widely disparaged 2021 review of the 2.1 million ballots cast in its largest county that, in the end, reaffirmed Biden's narrow victory in Arizona. New Mexico drama In New Mexico, Oliver has sought and won emergency action from the state Supreme Court to force the Republican-led commission in Otero County to certify the June 7 primary -- a step required for the candidates who won last week's contests to advance to the November ballot. The commissioners had voted 3-0 on Monday not to certify the results, citing their distrust of Dominion voting machines. On Wednesday, the high court sided with Oliver and ordered the commission to act by Friday, the deadline for counties to sign off on primary election results. (In a statement Wednesday, a Dominion spokesperson called the county's action "yet another example of how lies about Dominion have damaged our company and diminished the public's faith in elections." The company has filed several defamation lawsuits against people who have spread falsehoods about their machines.) In all, more than 7,300 voters in Otero County cast ballots in last week's primary election, according to the secretary of state's office. Among the Otero officials voting against certification this week: Commissioner, a founder of Cowboys for Trump. He was found guilty in March during a bench trial of trespassing on the US Capitol grounds on January 6, 2021, while then-Vice President Mike Pence was there. Griffin is scheduled to be sentenced later this week. He did not respond to an interview request. In court filings, Oliver said other New Mexico counties may choose to balk at certifying their results in the days ahead, citing a "statewide attempt to influence other county canvassing boards." Alex Curtas, the top spokesman for the secretary of state's office, said Oliver moved quickly in order to avert a potential broader rebellion. "One of the biggest concerns is that this will spread to different counties and different states and have this become part of the national trend that we've seen since 2020 to deny the election with no proof," Curtas told CNN earlier Wednesday. "There are ramifications of this for people's safety, the potential disenfranchisement of voters and the overall degradation of trust in our system of government and elections."

2022 CNDI Negative
2024 Adv Answers › 2024 › 1nc – election inevitably a disaster

Trump’s misinformation is entirely independent of Putin – the aff’s i/L is wrong

Pilkington 21 (Ed Pilkington; Chief reporter at Guardian US, Experienced Chief Reporter with a demonstrated history of working in the publishing industry. Skilled in Digital Strategy, Journalism, Corporate Communications, Newspapers, and Social Media; “‘Terrifying for American democracy’: is Trump planning for a 2024 coup?”; Nov 14 2021; DOA: 6/25/22; ) // bh

Since Joe Biden was inaugurated on 20 January, Trump has dug himself deeper into his big lie about the “rigged election” that was stolen from him. Far from cooling on the subject, he has continued to amplify the false claim in ever more brazen terms. Initially he condemned the violence at the US Capitol on 6 January. But in recent months Trump has emerged as an unashamed champion of the insurrectionists, calling them “great people” and a “loving crowd”, and lamenting that they are now being “persecuted so unfairly”. Trump recorded a video last month praising Ashli Babbitt, the woman shot dead by a police officer as she tried to break into the speaker’s lobby, where Congress members were hiding in fear of their lives. Babbitt was a “truly incredible person”, he said. Michael Waldman, who as president of the Brennan Center is one of the country’s authorities on US elections, told the Guardian that Trump was normalizing the anti-democratic fury that erupted that day. “He has gone from being embarrassed to treating 6 January as one of the high points of his presidency. Ashli Babbitt is now being lionized as this noble martyr as opposed to a violent insurrectionist trying to break into the House of Representatives chamber.” Over the past year Trump has spread the stolen election lie far and wide, telling supporters at his regular presidential campaign-style rallies that 2020 was “the most corrupt election in the history of our country”. He has used his iron grip over the Republican party to cajole officials in Arizona, Pennsylvania, Texas, Wisconsin and other states to conduct “audits” of the 2020 election count in further vain searches for fraud. One of the most eccentric of these “audits” (or “fraudits”, as they have been called) was carried out in Arizona by a company called Cyber Ninjas, which had virtually no experience in elections and whose owner supported the “Stop the Steal” movement. Paradoxically, even this effort concluded that Biden had indeed won the state, recording an even bigger margin for the Democratic candidate than the official count.

2022 CNDI Negative
2024 Adv Answers › 2024 › 1nc – disinformation fails

Russian disinformation will always fail in the face of Western government transparency

Hiday ’22 (Jeffrey Hiday, director of the Office of Media Relations at the RAND Corporation, “Russia Will Struggle to Sustain Its Disinformation Machine, Former New York Times/BBC Chief Tells RAND Europe”, RAND Corporation. 5/24/22. https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/05/russia-will-struggle-to-sustain-its-disinformation.html)

As former head of the New York Times and the BBC, Mark Thompson has tackled disinformation on both sides of the Atlantic. One of his big takeaways: It's not as easy as you might think to sustain a successful disinformation campaign. “The Russian disinformation machine has taken some good kicks because of facts on the ground,” Thompson told attendees at a 30th anniversary gathering of RAND Europe council members and staff. “It turns out doing disinformation well is not pathetically easy. The Russian disinformation army seems to have been caught short when the rubber met the road.” Thompson, quizzed on stage by Trusted News Initiative founder and former BBC journalist Jessica Cecil, noted former President Obama's recent line that disinformation is like flooding the public square with raw sewage. “That's a powerful message, but it's the kind of diagnosis I find inadequate—as if the public are innocent victims of disinformation and the only policy challenge we face is dealing with the bad actors who either create or distribute it.” Thompson suggested paying more attention to the “demand side” of disinformation. Many members of the public go out and actively look for it,” he said. On the plus side, Thompson reckons lessons must have been learned from the “wholly inadequate” messaging around Afghanistan withdrawal. “We get to early 2022 and now we're seeing highly effective, proactive, and sometimes preemptive Western messaging” about Russia's designs on Ukraine. Those messages, particularly from U.S. and British government spokespeople, were more proactive and transparent. “Western messaging indicated what would happen—and then it happened. That reinforces trust in government messaging,” Thompson said. That's not what emanated from the U.S. government at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, in Thompson's view. Once you start lying to the public, then the public says, well, why should we believe you now. Even quite small, well-intentioned mistakes like that can really impair public trust. Mark Thompson Share on Twitter “We saw well-intentioned disinformation,” he said. “Essentially, we were lied to about actual knowledge of use of masks, which we knew from SARS worked. It's hard to overestimate how damaging that was. It poisoned the water right at the beginning of the pandemic. Once you start lying to the public, then the public says, well, why should we believe you now. Even quite small, well-intentioned mistakes like that can really impair public trust.” When it comes to freedom of speech, Thompson, perhaps not surprisingly from the perspective of a journalist, sees the biggest danger as coming from government. “The more zeal and passion I see for government to 'do something' about disinformation, the more nervous I get.” Potential solutions? Thompson has a few. “One good premise is to think of people we're addressing not as helpless sheep but as people as smart and savvy as we are,” he said, referring to fellow journalists. Another: “The government should start telling the truth—painful though it can be, all the time without fail—to the public.”