Free beta access. 5 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Competition › AT: Perm DCP

Budget classification proves it’s military-to-military

Van Eerden 20, Captain (James, “Seeking Alpha in the Security Cooperation Enterprise A New Approach to Assessments and Evaluations,” Journal of Advanced Military Studies, 11.1)//BB

The Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget: Security Cooperation Consolidated Budget Display outlines seven categories of security cooperation activity, including military-to-military engagements, support to operations, and humanitarian and assistance activities, among others.6 The security cooperation framework traditionally includes security assistance (SA), security force assistance (SFA), and some aspects of foreign internal defense (FID).7 In the context of this article, the term security cooperation refers primarily to military-to-military engagements, where the U.S. military engages in training partner forces under the auspices of Title 10 and Title 22 authorities.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Competition › AT: Perm DCP

The CP uses non-coercive measures implemented by civilians, the plan uses the DoD and defense commitments.

Withers et al ‘8 (George, WOLA Senior Fellow focused on human rights in Latin America, “Ready, Aim, Foreign Policy,” WOLA, March, https://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/downloadable/Regional%20Security/past/LAWG-Combo-ForeignPolicy-6.pdf)

These changes are not just theoretical. In December 2006, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted the increasing role of U.S. defense agencies in leading foreign policy on the ground, and issued a stern warning in a document entitled Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign (S. Prt. 109-52): It has traditionally been the military’s mission to take direct action against U.S. adversaries while the civilian agencies’ mission has been to pursue non-coercive measures through diplomacy, international information programming, and foreign and economic assistance. As a result of inadequate funding for civilian programs, however, U.S. defense agencies are increasingly being granted authority and funding to fill perceived gaps. Such bleeding of civilian responsibilities overseas from civilian to military agencies risks weakening the Secretary of State’s primacy in setting the agenda for U.S. relations with foreign countries and the Secretary of Defense’s focus on war fighting. Policy Recommendations 1. The next administration should reassert the State Department’s control over foreign military training and assistance programs in its communication with the Congress, in interagency discussions and, most importantly, in the budget it presents for the State and Defense Departments.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Competition › AT: Perm Do Both

Even if both policies are equally resourced, the Department of State will be pushed into the supporting role

Oakley 19, Army strategist and currently serves as an assistant professor at National Defense University’s College of International Security Affairs (David, “THE PROBLEMS OF A MILITARIZED FOREIGN POLICY FOR AMERICA’S PREMIER INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,” War on the Rocks, )//BB

Neither is Stavridis the first retired military leader to voice this concern. In 2013, future secretary of defense James Mattis, then a Marine Corps general, famously quipped, “if you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.” In 2012, Karl Eikenberry, a retired lieutenant general and former ambassador to Afghanistan, argued that the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and an unequal investment in the Defense Department over other departments resulted in the military becoming the “starting and relief pitcher for a number of foreign policy problems.” In a speech at Kansas State University in 2010, Michael Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, articulated his concern with the Defense Department’s increasing role in foreign policy: “My fear, quite frankly, is that we aren’t moving fast enough in this regard. U.S. foreign policy is still too dominated by the military, too dependent upon the generals and admirals who lead our major overseas commands. It’s one thing to be able and willing to serve as emergency responders; quite another to always have to be the fire chief.” In an earlier interview, Mullen described a vicious cycle of policymakers turning to the military and increasing funding to the Defense Department because they have greater trust in military capability than in other agencies, and this greater funding in turn makes the military even more capable relative to other national security institutions. Instead of correcting a significant imbalance in resourcing national security capabilities, policymakers just turn to the military to handle an increasing array of missions. The military then becomes the lead while other organizations find themselves in supporting roles.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Competition › AT: Perm Do Both

The State Department needs full control of the policy in order to guarantee mission success

Gould ’22 (Joe, senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry, For America’s security aid programs, who will run the show?,” April 11, 2022, Defense News,

Max Bergmann, a former State Department official who authored security assistance reform recommendations last year, said efforts to shift greater authority to the State Department will succeed only if the White House prioritizes them. In a high-stakes competition with China, the U.S. can’t afford for parallel security-assistance bureaucracies to undermine statecraft, he said. “What is critical is that we have full control over that lever, and not have it be a bureaucratic mess where one hand doesn’t know what the other is doing and it’s difficult for any senior policymaker in the White House to know what the hell’s going on,” said Bergmann, now a senior fellow at Center for American Progress. Meanwhile, members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on both sides of the aisle are generally supportive of shifts, arguing for an overhaul of the current setup. “As the Defense Department continues efforts to cut the State Department out of security cooperation, we’ve seen a greater focus on short-term tactical capabilities than on sustainable forces aligned with strategic foreign policy,” Risch said. “We must address governance challenges like corruption in all our activities, and we need to professionalize our security assistance workforce.”

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Competition › AT: Perm Do Both

The permutation is redundant, inefficient, and continues DoD overlap that encourage militarization, lack of oversight, and miscalculation.

Bergmann ’21 (Max, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, “It’s time to get the Pentagon out of the business of administering U.S. foreign aid,” Washington Post, March 11, 2021, )-mikee

“Diplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy,” President Biden announced last month in remarks that were heartening — and long overdue. But rebuilding the State Department will require more than just elevating career officials and building up a bigger and more diverse diplomatic corps. Shifting the center of power to the State Department requires putting diplomats back in charge of U.S. foreign policy and empowering them with new resources. To achieve this requires ending a byproduct of the post-9/11 era: the Pentagon’s foreign aid program. By law, foreign aid, which includes assistance to foreign militaries, is the responsibility of the State Department. This is for the simple reason that providing arms to another country is fundamentally an act of foreign policy. The State Department’s foreign military financing program has provided roughly $6 billion aid annually to foreign military partners, such as Israel and Egypt, for a half-century. But in the past two decades, the Defense Department has developed its own security assistance program. This happened by accident, not design. A few small niche programs related to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq gradually metastasized into larger and broader programs. The trend accelerated during the Obama years. The government saw security assistance as a tool to help U.S. partners cope with instability and terrorism in the Middle East and Africa, Russian aggression in Europe, and China’s bullying of its Asian neighbors. As the administration sought to fund these efforts, it found that the State Department couldn’t get more money from Congress to create these programs. The 2011 Budget Control Act, which President Barack Obama brokered with congressional Republicans, put hard limits on government spending. But while the State Department’s budget was capped, the Defense Department’s contingency budget was not. That meant that the easiest way to fund new security assistance endeavors was through the Pentagon. And the Obama administration found it easier to get a Republican Congress to grant the Pentagon the authorities necessary to provide assistance than it was to get money for the State Department. Once this spigot opened, the Pentagon’s top brass — led by combatant commanders eager to get funding for their regions — descended on Congress. The Pentagon was granted billions in funding, and at least 56 of these new programs required no coordination with the State Department. The result today is that the United States has two distinct security assistance systems — one at the State Department and one at the Defense Department — doing the same thing. That has created a bureaucratic mess involving countless planning and operational conflicts — one that also makes it impossible for Congress to conduct effective oversight, since the two departments answer to different committees. Recognizing the problem, some policymakers in Congress and the Pentagon have recently implemented a few useful reforms — but they go only so far. Today, when combatant commanders show up in the countries they’re assigned to, they frequently have security assistance funding at their disposal. But State Department officials of similar rank often lack comparably flexible funding and yet have to deliver tough messages on other U.S. foreign policy priorities, from human rights to economic reform, democratization or even climate policy. This power imbalance is not lost on foreign partners, and they act accordingly, often tuning out the State Department while cultivating their relations with the Defense Department. The current bifurcated system is not just wasteful — it’s also potentially dangerous. Policymakers originally expanded Defense Department assistance in response to the post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism, when security assistance was often seen as a technical tool to smooth collaboration with foreign militaries. But in a new era of global great power competition, the provision of arms to another country sends a loud foreign policy signal, one that can easily lead to miscalculation. Those assistance decisions need to be well coordinated and calibrated by diplomats, not generals.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Solvency › S – Cyber

The State Department best shapes global cyber policy. AND, their initiatives are followed by the DoD to keep cyber engagement below thresholds of armed conflict

Goldman ’20 (Emily, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” Texas National Security Review, 3.4)//BB

The Department of State should contribute more directly to efforts to disrupt, degrade, and contest malicious cyberspace behavior. It can do so by leveraging diplomatic channels to increase routine and agile collaboration with partners and allies for continuous pressure against adversary campaigns below the level of armed conflict. The goal would be to frustrate and thwart cyberspace aggression before it harms the United States and its allies. This approach would allow the United States to be more responsive to great-power competition, enable and sustain similar efforts by the Department of Defense, and complement the cyber deterrence initiative. Closer synergy between promoting norms of responsible state behavior in international venues and conducting persistent cyberspace operations that expose and contest behavior inconsistent with such norms has the best chance of producing a convergence of expectations (i.e., norms) on acceptable behavior. Mutually reinforcing efforts across the U.S. government to deter, disrupt, expose, and contest malicious cyberspace behavior can produce the synergy between defense and foreign policy needed for great-power competition. This, however, requires a reevaluation of cyber diplomacy priorities, activities, lines of effort, and mindset.59 Cyber Diplomacy for Great-Power Competition: Seizing and Sustaining Initiative Political conditions today favor an energetic U.S. diplomatic campaign. Russia and China’s aggressive information, political, and economic warfare campaigns have highlighted the risks to U.S. partners and allies.60 Those allies are eager to improve their cyberspace security and to work cooperatively with the United States. The U.S. government can capitalize on this favorable environment by forging agreements with foreign partners that encourage a deeper level of interaction. The United States can build coalitions for continuous pressure against adversary cyberspace campaigns outside of armed conflict.61 Such agreements and the joint efforts that follow will normalize collaborative cyberspace operations for mutual defense. Essentially, the State Department needs to operationalize the core objective of cyber persistence: seizing and sustaining initiative. The State Department is uniquely positioned to convene interagency discussions on defining boundaries of acceptable behavior below the level of armed conflict, to forge consensus with allies and partners on boundaries of acceptable competition, and to mobilize international coalitions to enforce those boundaries. It can better enable the Department of Defense to persistently engage and defend forward in cyberspace below the level of armed conflict — a necessary ingredient for constructing norms through interaction. Diplomats should be well-versed in the full range of U.S. cyber activities and explain them to U.S. partners in order to set the international conditions for the United States to compete in a globally interconnected domain. With these goals in mind, the following recommendations are offered as a roadmap for improving U.S. cyber diplomacy.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Solvency › S – Cyber

Cyber diplomacy is better than cyber security. The State Department can promote norms, capacity building, intelligence sharing and resilience. Solves the aff.

Williams et al ’21 (Brandon Williams with contributions from Veronica Chinchilla, Evan Lisman, Amanda Tobey, and Emilyn Tuomala. Brandon is a PhD, postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research. “US. AND ALLIED CY BER SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE INDO-PACIFIC,” Center for Global Security Research, March 30, 31 and April 1, 2021, https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1787217)-mikee

The workshop's penultimate panel stressed a renewal of innovation in diplomatic practice. An active cyber diplomacy holds the promise of restoring stability to cyberspace, and, for the United States, advocating for a free, interoperable, and secure internet globally. State Department retains the bureaucratic competencies and personnel to enact forward-looking cyber diplomacy, but they have much ground to cover on norm construction, capacity building, and affirming that states follow international law in cyberspace. Diplomacy's most substantial roles are protecting an on-line ecosystem where human rights are respected, restoring stability by reducing incentives for states to act maliciously, and demonstrating U.S. leadership in digital rights and emerging technology. Cyber diplomats at the State Department and DHS cooperate with allies on publicly attributing blame for aggressive cyber acts to state-sponsored APTs. State Department is active in the UN's Group of Governmental Experts and Open-Ended Working Group, lobbying for an internet of information freedom rather than information control by states. Thus far, as one panelist emphasized, the State Department has not yet framed its cyber diplomacy efforts in the realities of the cyber strategic environment. The State Department can make strides in supporting Persistent Engagement by socializing foreign service officers and diplomats, who are the face of diplomacy, to the domain's competitive nature. Shaping international discourse on cybersecurity norms, responsible state behavior, and governance can be best attained by a corps of diplomats who are unified with the United States' cyber doctrine. Norm construction from the bottom up presents the best route to shape global norms. Leveraging agile coalitions of allies to build norms represents a workable solution to adversary intransigence at the UN. Values, by themselves, do not have the power to influence norms against concerted state pressures to assert authoritarian control over the internet. Competitive allied cyber diplomacy can shape the standards and norms that determine the future of the internet. A competitive cyber diplomacy relies on the State Department's core competency in creating bilateral and multilateral agreements for capacity building, threat intelligence sharing, resilience measures, and to promote best practices in a competitive cyber ecosystem. Diplomats understand countries' strategic and political environments, and the State Department has the capacity to scale Hunt Forward operations. USCC [US Cyber Command] encounters limits in growing Hunt Forward. Collaboration between the State Department and USCC may present the best avenue to consensually operate in other countries' networks to observe malicious actors. The State Department will guide the United States' cyber diplomacy, not USCC [US Cyber Command], and integrating cyber authorities will create synergies for how the United States can restore stability in cyberspace and safeguard the United States' cybersecurity.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Solvency › S – Emerging Tech

New State Department bureau solves expertise and norm development on emerging tech

Bade 22 (Scott, tech and policy analyst @ Eurasia Group “Digital diplomacy gets a reboot,” Tech Crunch, )//BB

CDP [Bureau of Cyberspace and Digital Policy] will have three policy buckets: international cyber security, digital policy and digital freedom. Each roughly corresponds to preexisting competencies: the cyber coordinator office (created back in 2011), the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, respectively. It will be run by a yet-to-be-confirmed ambassador-at-large; in the meantime, career diplomat Jennifer Bachus will run the team as principal deputy assistant secretary. While the new bureau will deal with the day-to-day, a separate special envoy position will also be created to focus on more long-term issues around emerging and critical technologies like AI, quantum and biotechnology. Missing in action no more? The “decision to stand up a new bureau is an indicator of how seriously [the Biden administration] sees these threats,” Eileen Donahoe, a former U.S. ambassador who now runs the Stanford Global Digital Policy Incubator, tells me. “They understand the need for more thought leadership and diplomatic capacity.” One sign of that seriousness is that both offices will, for at least a year, report directly to Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, the department’s number two official. This is a good thing, says Chris Painter, who was the Obama administration’s top diplomat on cyber issues. Sherman, he says, has a long history with cyber issues and worked to integrate technology issues at regional bureaus she ran earlier in her career. CDP will need that high-level support. The State Department is playing catch up, I’m told, and attempting to bring its expertise — diplomacy and knowledge of international relations — to more technical policymakers at the Departments of Commerce, Energy, and other agencies. The implication is clear: State’s voice has been missing in the interagency process and opportunities have been missed both at home and abroad. For example, as Nate Picarsic and Emily de la Bruyère have written, the U.S. has been largely absent from the politics of the intergovernmental organizations that are quietly setting the global standards of technology. As a result the U.S. has ceded ground to others, especially Russia and China, but even the European Union, with massive implications for who controls the future of technology. And as new international entities emerge, like the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council or the Quad’s technology working group, the State Department needs to be able to coordinate and advise. Under the Trump administration, you “had good, talented people,” working these issues, Painter tells me, “but no one at the leadership level [able] both to deal with the White House and senior counterparts and foreign counterparts. [The new bureau] helps fill that gap.” “This is a real down payment by the department,” says Yll Bajraktari, a former national security official who is now the CEO of Special Competitive Studies Project, an AI advocacy group. “Integrating the department’s capacity for cybersecurity, digital infrastructure and governance issues including internet freedom will help create a coherent diplomatic strategy.”

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Solvency › S – Emerging Tech

The State Department’s diplomatic expertise solve emerging tech issues better – it avoids the security-dominated approach that causes retaliation.

Saeed ‘21, (Ferial Ara Saeed is CEO of Telegraph Strategies LLC, a risk management firm providing clients strategic guidance and analysis of political and economic trends, “A STATE DEPARTMENT FOR THE DIGITAL AGE,” War on the Rocks, JUNE 21, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/06/a-state-department-for-the-digital-age/)-mikee

But emerging technology policy requires equal consideration of the economic and political challenges that these technologies present in the hands of competitors and adversaries. AI, for instance, could give autocrats greater capacity to manipulate public opinion, destabilize democracies, and monitor their citizens. It makes as much sense for arms control specialists to formulate and drive the required policy responses as it does to ask democracy experts to address the strategic stability questions raised by hypersonic missiles (another emerging technology). Economic interests fare no better. The last administration reached into its security policy toolkit to regulate “the availability of things” in response to China’s unfair practices in the technology race with United States, risking American innovation leadership and economic competitiveness. While some may argue that the administration was responding to the perceived loss of U.S. competitiveness resulting from China’s predatory trade practices, U.S. industry, at the center of the storm, certainly did not see it that way. American technology companies pushed back hard against the worst of these policies on the grounds that they would not only harm their interests but also the U.S. economy, and so undercut the very goals that the administration was trying to achieve. The strategic risks of a security-dominated approach are even broader. Restrictive U.S. policies and China’s responses to them also turned the dial of Sino-American relations decisively towards confrontation. A warier, more critical approach to Beijing is warranted, but Washington has to walk a fine line to keep the complicated mix of rivalry and mutual interests in the relationship from spilling over or prompting hedging by other states. A security-dominated approach to emerging technologies is simply too blunt and too narrow. Arms control specialists, with their focus on security, unquestionably have a critical role to play on such issues as seeking a global prohibition against AI-enabled systems deciding when to deploy nuclear weapons. But leading the State Department on emerging technology policy requires perspective on a diversity of vital U.S. interests that go well beyond security. Technology Policy at the State Department: Too Many Cooks Moving oversight of the emerging technologies portfolio to the deputy secretary of state for management and resources, who has broad responsibilities for policy and management, would be a good start. But it would still not address the bigger organizational challenges that rightly concern Congress. Lawmakers want the department to fix the coordination problems that limit its effectiveness on technology issues, elevate cyber diplomacy as a foreign policy priority, and ensure equal focus on economic, security, and political concerns. Congress also seeks a separate China strategy, given the decisive role of technology competition in Sino-American rivalry. Yet, for all that lawmakers get right about what ails the State Department organizationally, not a single congressional proposal tackles the fundamental problem: the department’s balkanized technology policy landscape, which stretches across more than a dozen regional and functional bureaus. Five undersecretaries divide oversight of this policy sprawl: political affairs, arms control, economic affairs, civilian security, and public affairs. None are technology experts. Each has a mandate, a budget, and bureaucratic turf to protect. Lawmakers are merely tinkering at the margins, proposing the consolidation of some functions or adding new layers of bureaucracy to solve a coordination and integration problem that starts on the ground floor, not inside the boardroom. Without changes at the State Department, a security-focused approach will dominate emerging technology policy. This critical area of foreign policy will resemble an arms control agreement: a maze of constraints, hurdles, and walls. U.S. economic competitiveness will also be at risk because traditional arms control thinking tends to be “prohibitory and regulatory,” so in interagency policy deliberations the State Department will be inclined to support burdensome and expensive new layers of restrictions on business in the interest of security. Of course, it will be important to take security considerations into account when thinking about economic and technology policy toward China. But it should not be the only consideration. Absent important bureaucratic changes, other priorities like promoting internet freedom and international cyber stability will suffer from the absence of high-level attention. Furthermore, while counterpart agencies like the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security build the deep bench of expertise necessary to adapt to an era of geostrategic competition rooted in technology, the State Department will fall further behind in this area — where its leadership is essential to America’s well-being and success. Consolidate Technology Policy Functions Solutions are not simple, but they are obvious. First, the State Department should create a new undersecretary position and bring all technology issues under it, as the congressionally established National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence recommends. The undersecretary should have broad expertise in technology and its applications. Consolidation will improve coordination and rapid decision-making when trade-offs are required, while developing a cadre of tech-savvy cyber diplomats. The department’s large country desks provide proof of concept. They build deep and practical country expertise because they are multidisciplinary. Information is routinely shared among desk officers handling diverse portfolios — political, economic, and security. Political and economic considerations factor seamlessly into security policy, and vice versa. This integrated, coordinated approach makes country desks formidable policy players. They are well-rounded and respected for their knowledge and advocacy of reliably well-coordinated initiatives and positions, road-tested across competing U.S. interests. That is the model to emulate. Second, the State Department should discuss its organizational plans with counterpart agencies — including the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce, Treasury, Justice, and Energy — something the last administration, according to the Government Accountability Office, did not do. The National Security Council should lead this discussion and specifically address whether federal agencies are handling emerging technology policy with the kind of comprehensive focus it requires, and not merely as an adjunct of cyber security. Third, the new undersecretary should report to the third-ranking official in the department, the deputy secretary for management and resources, a position Congress should mandate that every administration fill. Undersecretaries usually report to the secretary of state, but the reality is that they do not all get equal attention. This alternative structure would ensure consistent, high-level involvement. It would give cyber diplomats the stature to go toe-to-toe with counterparts, both in the U.S. policymaking process and in foreign governments, who would see them as influential representatives of a powerful part of the State Department. Organize for the Present, With a Clear View of the Future America faces a tidal wave of challenges wrought by unprecedented and ubiquitous advances in emerging technologies and the rise of China as an anti-democratic economic superpower. The State Department has a leading role to play in addressing both challenges. Consolidating all technology issues under a single undersecretary would significantly strengthen the department’s hand in the interagency policymaking process. The department is better positioned than its interagency counterparts to articulate a national emerging technology policy that accounts for the full range of U.S. national interests, not just those related to security. Multidimensionality is the State Department’s core comparative advantage. Consolidation would reinforce it. No other agency has the mandate, the expertise, and the credibility to compel consideration of that vital perspective. Without it, the United States risks undermining its complex geostrategic interests with over-securitized responses to rivalry with China and the related, evolving challenges presented by the most rapid technological change ever experienced in human history.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Solvency › S – Generic

Diplomacy solves alliance cohesion and achieves foreign policy goals.

Haass ’20 (Richard, President of the Council on Foreign Relations, “Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” Council Special Report No. 89)//BB

Diplomacy is a critical tool in a nation’s foreign policy tool kit, enabling a country to leverage its power and bring it to bear on critical international issues. The United States’ most enduring advantage over its rivals is its unprecedented network of alliances, and through consultations officials and diplomats maintain these relationships and enlist allies in common causes. Those representing the government are tasked to negotiate treaties, dealing with issues from arms control to climate change, and advance U.S. interests in international organizations. They are the face of America overseas, representing the country around the world and providing critical services to Americans traveling abroad. Too often, however, diplomacy is neglected. Sometimes serious diplomacy is sidelined in favor of unrealistic calls for regime change or demands that the other party cannot reasonably be expected to meet. A related problem, one highlighted by former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, is that American foreign policy has become over-militarized, with the military asked to perform missions such as nation-building that it was never intended to. While the Department of Defense receives record appropriations, the Department of State struggles to have its comparatively small budget approved. In this valuable and timely Council Special Report, Jon Finer, an adjunct senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Uzra S. Zeya, the CEO and president of the Alliance for Peacebuilding, propose policies for revitalizing the State Department and American diplomacy. They rightly assess that the Department of State “has fallen into a deep and sustained period of crisis.” They point out that the State Department is currently enduring turbulence but, equally important, that many of its problems are deep-seated and predate the Donald J. Trump administration. They provide an array of policy proposals they believe the State Department can and should implement to restore American diplomacy. The list of proposals is long, and few readers will agree with all of them. In some cases what is put forward will likely meet with bureaucratic or congressional resistance. What is clear and inarguable, though, is that U.S. foreign policy needs to better recognize and reflect the unique and valuable contributions of diplomacy. The State Department needs to rethink its organization along with the role of embassies and those who serve in them, attract individuals with more diverse backgrounds, skill sets, and experience, and reimagine career paths and training opportunities. The goal should be to attract the best and brightest to the State Department, be it for a career or a stint, and to invest in them so that those designing and carrying out American foreign policy have the creativity and professionalism required to meet the challenges and opportunities of a twenty-first-century world. All of which is to say that revitalizing the State Department should be a priority for the next administration regardless of who occupies the Oval Office.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Solvency › S – Generic

Achieving consensus at NATO requires diplomatic, not military, efforts

Burns ’21 (Nicholas, Professor of Diplomacy and IR at Harvard, “A Time for Diplomacy,” Belfer Center,

Diplomacy also works best when far-sighted leaders take charge of a crisis and point the way ahead. Think of: FDR and Churchill’s organization of a massive global coalition to defeat Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Helmut Kohl, Mikhail Gorbachev, and George H.W. Bush’s negotiations to unite Germany in the NATO Alliance and to end the Cold War. Nelson Mandela who used a four-year diplomatic negotiation to dismantle and destroy the apartheid regime. Angela Merkel who led the world diplomatically in confronting and sanctioning Vladimir Putin following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Diplomacy and negotiations, of course, do not always succeed. At its worst, if diplomacy fails, war, lawlessness, and destruction ensue – Vietnam, Rwanda, and Iraq in the past. Syria, Tigray, Myanmar, and China’s power grab in the South China Sea in the present. That is one reason why it is so important to integrate effectively the work of ambassadors and Generals combined with the unique power of intelligence officers. Foreign policy making in the U.S. Government is a team sport. It takes coordination among all the country’s actors to succeed. We diplomats understand that our ability to succeed is often related directly to the intelligence on which we depend and the military partners with whom we share power. It has long been understood that diplomacy and defense are inextricably tied to each other. When I was U.S. Ambassador to NATO, the majority of my staff was from the Pentagon – both the uniformed military and Defense Department civilians. We thought hard about aligning our diplomatic moves with our military might. When we responded to the 9/11 attacks, we drew on the resources of both diplomats and warriors. When NATO went into Afghanistan, we thought of it as a combined military and diplomatic mission. What has been missing in the U.S. government in recent years is a strong, energetic, self-confident diplomatic corps. President Biden and Secretary of State Tony Blinken have shown they appreciate the need to elevate diplomacy as a first-order priority for the United States. From their first days in office, they have emphasized their determination to strengthen America’s diplomatic power in the world. President Biden chose the State Department as the site of his first foreign policy speech. Some of his earliest and most notable appointments immediately strengthened our diplomatic bench behind Secretary Tony Blinken – Ambassadors Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Wendy Sherman, Victoria Nuland, and Samantha Power, as well as an impressive and experienced NSC team led by Jake Sullivan, Jon Finer, Kurt Campbell, Laura Rosenberger, Sumona Guha, and many others. For President Biden’s new emphasis on diplomacy to succeed, however, the career Foreign Service, in particular, will need to be strengthened dramatically. It is no secret that the Foreign and Civil Service are at their lowest points in morale and effectiveness in the memory of anyone listening today in this Zoom room. I began my diplomatic career 41 years ago as an intern at our embassy in Nouakchott, Mauritania in the Sahara Desert. I have witnessed many highs and lows of American diplomacy since. Frankly, I have been shocked to see the damage done to the career Foreign Service during the last four years. The result is disastrously low morale, a lack of budgetary support, the debilitating departure of some of our most senior career diplomats, the sidelining of the Service for a time, and the resulting lack of confidence in its future by a younger generation of diplomats who will be most critical to its resurrection. President Biden and Secretary Blinken have a rare opportunity to lead a radical overhaul at the State Department. Under their leadership, this must remain a first-order priority for the administration. In November just following the Presidential election, two former American Ambassadors, Marc Grossman, Marcie Ries, and I released a Harvard Kennedy School report entitled, “A U.S. Diplomatic Service for the 21st Century.” Our goal was to recommend the fundamental steps necessary to reform the Foreign Service and to reposition it for success in the future. Based on conversations with over 200 people inside the U.S. government and beyond in over 40 workshops during the past pandemic year, we reported that the Foreign Service “is confronting one of the most profound crises in its long and proud history.” We recommended a determined, bipartisan effort to revive and restructure it. Specifically, we called for a new Foreign Service Act by Congress to set a renewed mission and mandate for the 21st century diplomatic corps. The last time Congress passed such an Act was in 1980 when the world was a very different place with very different challenges. than it is now. We advocated a “relentless focus on diversity” to counteract the woeful lack of progress in the percentage of African Americans, women, Latinx Americans, Asian Americans and other minorities in the senior ranks of American diplomacy. We called for the creation of a new Diplomatic Reserve Corps and a Mid-Level entry program to ensure the inclusion in the diplomatic ranks of experienced citizens with specialized skills. Given the proliferation of political appointee Ambassadors at the State Department, we also recommended that, by 2025, 90 percent of Ambassadors should be career appointees, not 70 percent as is the current practice. We also recommended that 75 percent of the powerful Assistant Secretary of State positions be held by career officers. During the Trump Administration, not a single one of these Assistant Secretary positions was led by a Senate-confirmed career officer. This was the first time in memory that the Foreign Service had been entirely unrepresented at that critical leadership level. Finally, we proposed to rename the “Foreign Service of the United States” the “United States Diplomatic Service.” We believe it signals transformation and reinforces the vital role our diplomats perform in service to our nation. This new title would begin with the two words, of course, that are most important – United States. A reinforced career diplomatic corps would help President Biden and his successors from either party to revive American leadership in the world. President Biden’s great insight has been to see our alliances as the critical asset we have in this long-term battle for global power and the future of democracy. The NATO Alliance is fundamental to a long-term peace in Europe. It has expanded a zone of security to encompass the great majority of Europeans, East and West. It protects all of us, particularly smaller countries, from the Russian Bear. It will be largely a diplomatic task to return the U.S. to leadership of the Alliance and to maintain allied unity in containing Russia power in the next few days, weeks, months, and years.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Solvency › S – Generic

Diplomacy is best for achieving successful multilateral goals

Powell ’22 (Jo Ellen, career member of the United States Foreign Service who served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Human Resources, “Bringing America’s Multilateral Diplomacy into the 21st Century,” Academy of Diplomacy, https://www.academyofdiplomacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/Bringing-Americas-Multilateral-Diplomacy-into-the-21st-Century-FINAL.pdf)

In his February 4, 2021, address to the U.S. Department of State, President Joseph R. Biden declared “diplomacy is back at the center of our foreign policy.”1 The President called on the Department of State to meet accelerating global challenges, from the pandemic to the climate crisis to nuclear proliferation, by working in common with other nations. He spoke of global diplomacy, and global power, as America’s inexhaustible source of strength and its abiding advantage. Many perceive that advantage has eroded over the years. Today, the Department of State has a singular opportunity to lead an interagency collaboration to restore that advantage, with the support of the Administration and other interested agencies. To achieve this, the State Department cannot exclusively rely on its traditional model of bilateral diplomacy; multilateral diplomacy must become a greater focus of the Department’s efforts. To effectively address the global challenges the President discussed, the Department must exert equal effort in its multilateral and bilateral diplomacy. Although the U.S. remains virtually unmatched in its economic and social influence and power, the gap between it and the competition is narrowing. It is no longer true (if it ever was) that the U.S. does not need a global range of partners to address global crises. China is rapidly extending its presence and influence in international organizations, including international financial institutions, as are other countries, such as Russia and India. The U.S. must build strong and enduring partnerships with countries beyond its traditional alliances, particularly in Latin America and Africa. As political dynamics and world powers shifted, the U.S. response was often to disengage from multilateral diplomacy. Yet, disengagement did not lead to resolution. We must set aside the notion that international organizations excessively constrain or disproportionately burden the United States. To manage the global issues we face today and for the foreseeable future, we need to work with a global coalition of partners, even when not all of them agree with the United States all the time. In considering how to meet these challenges, it is useful to examine how other countries have maximized their multilateral influence. Smaller nations often see international organizations as the most effective way to leverage their influence. The Nordic countries are an oft-cited example of the smart application of multilateral diplomacy, but the U.K., France, Japan, and Germany also give considerable weight and attention to multilateral diplomacy, with highly effective results. These successful practitioners of multilateral diplomacy have several practices and approaches in common. Their diplomats’ entry-level training includes serious emphasis on multilateral diplomacy and negotiation; their career paths often involve multiple assignments to or within international organizations; and their foreign ministries are actively engaged in recruitment and advocacy for placement in international bodies of highly qualified applicants at all levels, from interns to senior executives. Other characteristics they share that the U.S. cannot easily adopt are greater ease of movement between their Civil and Foreign Services and the absence of an “up or out” promotion system. Both sets of characteristics enhance those countries’ flexibility to second personnel to international organizations, and the latter somewhat offsets the nearly universal perception that secondments are not helpful to one’s career. Effective multilateral diplomacy is essential for the U.S. to achieve its foreign policy objectives and effective bilateral engagement is arguably the most critical element of successful multilateral diplomacy. U.S. diplomats must set the standard, not just throughout the U.S. government, but worldwide, for effective multilateral diplomacy. Our recommendations to achieve this fall into three categories: policy, practice, and preparation.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › 1nc › 1nc – Net-Benefit

Security cooperation fuels militarism – that causes miscalculation and turns the case.

Bergmann & Schmitt ’21 (Max Bergmann is a senior fellow at CAP, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy, he served in the U.S. Department of State, received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics. Alexandra Schmitt is a senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress REPORT, MAR 9, 2021, )-mikee

Today, U.S. aid to build up a partner’s military should be viewed through the lens of competition between states, in addition to the ongoing counterterrorism concerns and state fragility challenges, with much higher stakes for U.S. foreign policy and national interests. This renewed geopolitical competition is at its core an ideological competition between states. China’s rise and Russia’s resurgence require the United States to realign its foreign policy toward strengthening relations and bolstering democratic states. Security assistance is a tool to do so: It strengthens America’s closest partners and fosters closer relationships with other states. When a country accepts U.S. military equipment or enters into a long-term procurement or acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, they are tying their country to the United States. The U.S. decision, for instance, to provide military aid to the United Kingdom through the lend-lease program in the 1940s was not a simple military consideration but a foreign policy consideration with enormous consequences.7 Today, U.S. decisions to provide weapons or support tie American officials to how that support is used—whether they like it or not—as the case of U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen demonstrates. Moreover, countries that receive U.S. military systems are not just buying equipment off the shelf; they are entering into a longer-term relationship with that country for training, maintenance, and sustainment. This is similar to when a consumer buys a smart phone, as they are not simply buying a piece of hardware; they are reliant on the company to access its broader ecosystem of apps and software and trusting the company to safeguard important data. Over time, a consumer becomes locked in and dependent on a particular provider. Similarly, when a state commits to expanding military-to-military ties—often the most sensitive area for a country—they are making a diplomatic bet on that country. As they base their military on U.S. equipment and U.S. training and engagement, they similarly become locked in to the United States. This sets the ground for more productive American partnerships to tackle a range of geopolitical challenges. For example, U.S. security assistance has been key to building ties with Vietnam after the war between the two countries. American assistance provided to clear unexploded ordnance has helped repair diplomatic relations between Hanoi and Washington, while the recent provision of a retired Coast Guard ship to the Vietnam military can help strengthen military ties and potentially open the door to more U.S. assistance and security cooperation, which will further strengthen bilateral relations.8 There are several reasons that today’s security assistance system must change: Current security policy decision-making perpetuates the status quo. The current system perpetuates an ineffective status quo, whereby the United States often fails to effectively exert significant diplomatic leverage that it has through security assistance because the bureaucratic structure to administer it—both within the State Department and between the State Department and the DOD—is not designed to advance diplomatic efforts but merely to administer appropriated funds.9 This makes it challenging to change security assistance programs given shifting foreign policy dynamics or changes in a partner’s behavior that may make them a less suitable recipient of U.S. security aid, such as democratic backsliding or a pattern of human rights abuses. U.S. engagement with partners could be dominated by military issues if foreign officials turn to DOD counterparts instead of diplomats for assistance resources. Because the DOD controls its own security assistance accounts, other foreign policy concerns may get trumped if partners go around the State Department to get aid from the Pentagon. Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD) worried at a 2017 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that the shift to increasing DOD authorities could “send a fundamental message that the United States considers security relationships over all other U.S. foreign policy objectives or concerns, including human rights or good governance.”10 Under the current framework, the State Department’s ability to put the brakes on security assistance or military cooperation under DOD authorities is highly limited because the State Department does not control implementation and can often only approve or disapprove of DOD proposals. While State Department officials and ambassadors can and sometimes do halt or temper problematic efforts, doing so requires exerting significant political capital that is in short supply.11 Centralizing control at the State Department would help to fix this bureaucratic imbalance between diplomacy and the Pentagon. Defense priorities often undervalue democratic and human rights concerns. Compared with the State Department, the DOD is less equipped to effectively weigh human rights concerns in its decision-making. This makes it harder to leverage U.S. military cooperation for economic or political concessions or changes that might bolster democratic goals. For example, U.S. military objectives to counter terrorist groups in Somalia called for continuously supplying Uganda with U.S. assistance despite growing human rights and democracy concerns.12 Putting the State Department in charge would make it easier to realign U.S. security assistance toward democratic states and effectively consider human rights issues in every security assistance decision. Security assistance in a tense era of great power competition is extremely sensitive and can increase tension and lead to miscalculation. The risk in today’s geopolitical environment is that providing sensitive and potentially provocative assistance will not receive the same scrutiny from policymakers and will become the norm for the administering agency, the DOD. In the last era of great power competition, the Cold War, security assistance often stoked tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and led to spiraling commitments. For instance, Soviet provision of nuclear missiles to Cuba led to a nuclear standoff, while U.S. military support for Vietnam led to deepening U.S. engagement. As competition with China and Russia increases, security assistance could once again prove a major source of tension and cause miscalculation. Providing aid in this environment is not a mere technical military matter, but ultimately a political and diplomatic concern that is highly sensitive. Yet today, it is the DOD that is driving assistance to countries such as Ukraine and regions such as Southeast Asia.13 When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the National Security Council became significantly involved in policymaking and limited types of assistance that could be provided, including lethal aid.14 Such unique scrutiny was warranted because there was a crisis involving a U.S. partner and a nuclear-armed state. But the nature of White House intervention was necessary in large part because the security assistance process—for both decision-making and for providing assistance—was broken. A military-led response can overprioritize military engagement and could unintentionally steer American engagements into high-risk confrontations. Without careful calibration and understanding of broader political context, there is real concern that the DOD could get ahead of U.S. policy or drive it in a more military-centric direction. For example, China could interpret the DOD’s provision of some security assistance through the agency’s Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative as an act of aggression if it is not carefully and effectively calibrated against broader political concerns in the region.15 Given the political sensitivities of great power competition, responsibility and oversight for security assistance decisions should rest with the agency most in tune with broader U.S. foreign policy concerns and diplomatic developments: the State Department. Reforming security assistance by centralizing it at the State Department would help to elevate the diplomatic considerations of this policy area, while reducing the military-first priorities of the current system that are ill-suited to today’s geopolitical challenges.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › 1nc › 1nc – Text & Solvency

Diplomacy solves better than military assistance – Only non-security cooperation promotes the trust necessary for the plan to succeed.

Stohl ’16 (Rachel Stohl is senior associate with the Managing Across Boundaries Initiative at the Stimson Center. She served as consultant to the United Nations Arms Trade Treaty process. “The Pitfalls of the Pentagon Taking the Lead on U.S. Security Assistance,” World Politics Review, Sept. 20, 2016, )

Burkina Faso, a small West African country that most Americans have never heard of and that saw a popular uprising in 2014 and attempted coup a year later, has received more than $4 million in the past 10 years to help professionalize its military. However, even with consistent U.S. security assistance, the State Department reports significant human rights concerns in Burkina Faso, including extrajudicial killings by security forces and excessive use of force, such as torture, against civilians. Burkina Faso is not the only country receiving U.S. security assistance despite a questionable human rights record. Every year, the United States spends billions of dollars on military and security assistance to foreign governments through programs run by both the State Department and the Department of Defense. But in the past 15 years, the scope and magnitude of the Pentagon’s programs have expanded dramatically. Experts now estimate the Pentagon alone spends $8 billion to $10 billion a year on assistance to more than 180 countries—compared to approximately $8 billion a year by the State Department to 147 countries—which has led many to question the apparent militarization of U.S. security assistance and the impact that has on short- and long-term security and foreign policy objectives. Oversight and transparency over these myriad programs are often extremely difficult. Numerous government accounts provide this money, and depending on the program, different congressional committees maintain oversight. The stove-piped nature of U.S. military assistance and the steadfast secrecy that surrounds decisions made for reasons of “national security” often create an artificial division between national security interests and foreign policy ideals. They also make it nearly impossible to identify the exact amount of spending, to evaluate the effectiveness and impact of various programs, and to avoid duplicating resources and efforts across different offices and agencies. This tension between the State Department and the Pentagon is not new. For decades, there have been contradictions between advancing U.S. security interest and foreign policy goals, such as the protection of human rights. Traditionally, the State Department was the primary decision-maker that determined who received security assistance and for what purpose. Yet all of that began to change after Sept. 11. Before 9/11, Congress had already begun authorizing the Pentagon to support foreign militaries in roles that had long been filled by the State Department. Starting with anti-drug training in the Western Hemisphere, the number and size of these programs has steadily grown since. In the aftermath of Sept. 11, the purpose of “train and equip” programs was altered to fill an expanding list of priorities to “build partner capacity,” known as BPC. A RAND Corporation study in 2013 found that of 184 unique authorities that underwrite 165 BPC programs, at least 70 are managed and can be utilized by the Pentagon to provide security cooperation. The mandates of these programs are vast, ranging from counterterrorism to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. After 9/11, the Defense Department created military assistance programs to supplement traditional State Department ones. But from the outset, the appropriated funds that support these programs were subject to fewer restrictions than their State Department counterparts. For example, the Pentagon’s Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program was originally created in 2002 with a mandate that critics claimed served the same purpose as the State Department’s International Military Education and Training program. The Pentagon program provided nonlethal counterterrorism training, but lethal training was made available two years later. Beyond the lack of transparency and oversight, a larger and more philosophical concern is that foreign policy has become militarized. Similarly, in 2006, the Pentagon was authorized to use $200 million of its Operation and Maintenance funds to equip and train foreign militaries for counterterrorism operations. In creating these parallel training authorities and funding them through the defense budget, the Pentagon is, in effect, able to implement its security assistance without applying Foreign Assistance Act restrictions, which are intended to ensure that human rights and other foreign policy concerns are taken into consideration when determining the provision of security assistance. Experts have counted a tripling of military assistance out of the Pentagon budget from 2008 to 2015. That money comes with greater influence. And although the State Department can veto some programs, others are outside its authority, and program planning is not always shared with State Department personnel. After 9/11, the Pentagon gained a larger role, not just because it had the money, but because it was believed that it had the experience and means to react more quickly to changing situations and needs in an expansive and fast growing war on terror. While many of the countries receiving Pentagon military assistance are seen as national security priorities, their behavior often raises foreign policy concerns that make diplomatic engagement difficult. Providing arms to these countries also increases the risk that U.S.-origin weapons could be used against the United States, its soldiers, its allies and/or its interests. In many cases, military and security assistance is provided to achieve short-term security gains, which may undermine long-term U.S foreign policy interests. These issues are compounded by the fact that the Pentagon simply has more money and resources to address these concerns, and it has become easier for it to simply foot the bill. Pentagon spending on military assistance has totaled at least $122 billion since 2001, compared to approximately $119 billion for the State Department. The Security Assistance Monitor, a program of the Center for International Policy that tracks U.S. security assistance to countries around the world, has documented a tenfold increase in Pentagon security aid programs since 2001—from $1 billion in 2001 to $10.8 billion in 2015. State Department spending nearly doubled in that time from $4.6 billion to $8.3 billion. However, it is not the dollar figure that is worth comparing, but rather the meteoric rise of Pentagon spending, as opposed to a more gradual increase from the State Department. This increased spending has made some observers apprehensive. A Congressional Research Service report last May raised serious concerns about the roles of the State Department and the Pentagon with regard to security assistance and reconciling foreign policy objectives with security goals. It highlighted the lack of reporting requirements for Pentagon programs compared to the State Department and the resulting lack of oversight and accounting. In addition, Pentagon programs are not subject to country-by-country public reporting, making understanding a recipient country’s priorities, activities and funding impossible. At least 66 Pentagon programs do not allow any specific country information to be made available at all. Beyond this lack of transparency and oversight, a larger and more philosophical concern is that foreign policy has become militarized. Recipient countries and communities have the impression that help only comes from the U.S. military, which changes the context of assistance and the relationship with those receiving it. The mission and its perception differ depending on whether the help comes from the U.S. military, or instead from the U.S. Embassy, the United States Agency for International Development or other civil servants from various U.S. government agencies. Today, American security assistance has become unnecessarily military in nature, simply because there are additional Pentagon funds and programs that can quickly move money. At a fundamental level, when speaking with members of the U.S. military involved in these types of missions, such as building schools or bridges in African countries, they have recognized that they are simply there to complete their work and to strengthen military-to-military relationships. They often don’t worry about diplomatic aspects or the types of relationships they are establishing. To be sure, developing any relationship, particularly in countries with questionable and at times poor records of democracy and human rights, is important, and military relationships may buy the security that is desired in the short term. But in the long term, without deeper diplomatic relationships and nonmilitary engagement, it will be impossible to achieve larger strategic objectives and foster an environment of trust.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Notes

To Do:

Specific mechanisms or solvency arguments for specific plans.

More competition cards distinguishing security cooperation from non-security cooperation.

DOD specific trade-off DA. If affs start to own DOD action and craft their advantages around “hard right” military postures, then the neg will need to generate links off of DOD resource tradeoffs.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Notes

Cons:

The more the aff is about defense capabilities and military responses, the less the CP solves.

The militarization NB is inevitable and non-unique. If Ukraine doesn’t thump, I’m not sure what does.

It probably still links to the Russia DA. The cards about perception and the way military escalate are ok, but Russia/China wouldn’t love any alliance action on emerging tech.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Notes

Pros:

The CP attempts to expose the fact that few aff cards will say “NATO” and “security cooperation” in the same paragraph. Most are about general coordination, cooperation, and shared policy goals. The CP can accomplish all of that without military assistance, especially around emerging tech.

The softer/lefter the aff, the more the CP solves. Any aff that talks about norms, shared principals, data, and other policies not related to weapons systems can be solved by diplomatic action.

The militarism bad/diplomatic cred good NB has good impacts, and you might be able to win it turns the aff.

2022 CNDI Counterplan
DIPLOMACY CP › Notes

Overview:

The CP tests whether “security cooperation” is needed or desirable. Instead of increasing military assistance, it promotes diplomatic engagement (non-military). That’s not to say it doesn’t try to promote security, it just avoids using military mechanism and personnel. Instead, it cooperates at higher levels, with diplomats and relevant civil sectors.

There are a lot of technical definitions (see T file) that specify security cooperation as Department of Defense (DoD) activities, whereas diplomatic assistance if implemented by the Department of State (DoS). In this case, the CP could be seen as an agent CP. Few affs will specify their agent, so it’s also important to think about the philosophical difference and lean into the cards that define security cooperation as military-to-military engagement.

Two possible net-benefits: one internal and one external. The internal net-benefit is about reducing “creeping militarism” in US foreign policy and reestablishing the credibility of our diplomats. The external net-benefit is that it avoids the Russia DA because diplomatic engagement is more sensitive to political and cultural realities and the perception of the CP will be less aggressive.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Turns › Perm Solvency – Movements

Only the perm solves – movements fail without showing credible political alternatives, and their anti-reformist ideological purity prevents true democracy.

Teivainen 5 [Teivo Teivainen, professor of World Politics at the University of Helsinki, “The World Social Forum: Arena or Actor?”, Chapter 11 in Charting transnational democracy : beyond global arrogance / edited by Janie Leatherman and Julie Webber, 2005, https://link.springer.com/book/10.1057/9781403981080]

Being anti-something can be politically useful, but only up to a point. The protesters of Seattle and similar events have been very effective in pointing out authoritarian aspects of the capitalist world-system. Even if various groups that have participated in these events do have programmatic statements for alternative futures, the way these events have been staged has not been very conducive in showing these futures to the world. The criticism of not being able to show a credible alternative, or any alternative at all, has become a problem for the legitimacy of the protest movements.

In most of the post-Seattle events, the protesters have often been labeled as “antiglobalization,” and some of them have used the expression themselves. 24 It would, however, be analytically faulty and politically unwise to simply define the movements as being against globalization, if the term is understood as the increasing transgression of nation-state borders on a worldwide level. Many of them are, I would claim, looking for a different kind of globalization, though some may prefer to use the older term internationalism. From a democratic perspective, the problem in some antiglobalization rhetoric is that one easily ends up with rather strange bedfellows. Professing antiglobalization pure and simple is not very helpful in terms of making a distinction between regulating the cross-border movements of speculative capital and those of black immigrants.

2022 CNDI Kritik
Aff › Turns › Interventionism Good Turn

US interventionism is good – it’s the only alternative to mass death.

Rieff 99 (David, World Policy Institute, New York Institute for the Humanities and Council on Foreign Relations, Summer, “A New Age of Liberal Imperialism?” World Policy Journal, Vol XVI No 2, http://www.worldpolicy.org/journal/rieff2.html)

Finessing the Disaster And yet in Kosovo (this had almost happened in Bosnia), the West was finally hoist on the petard of its own lip service to the categorical imperative of human rights. It was ashamed not to intervene, but it lacked the will to do so with either vision or coherence. Kosovo is probably a lost cause; it is certainly ruined for a generation, whatever eventual deal is worked out, as Bosnia, whose future is to be a ward of NATO, America, and the European Union, probably for decades, has also been ruined for a generation, Dayton or no Dayton. What remains are the modalities through which this disaster can be finessed, and its consequences mitigated. It is to be hoped that in the wake of Kosovo, the realization that this kind of geo-strategic frivolity and ad hoc-ism, this resolve to act out of moral paradigms that now command the sympathy but do not yet command the deep allegiance of Western public opinion-at least not to the extent that people are willing to sacrifice in order to see that they are upheld-will no longer do. To say this is not to suggest that there are any obvious alternatives. Even if one accepts more of its premises than I do, the human rights perspective clearly is insufficient. As for the United Nations, it has been shown to be incapable of playing the dual role of both succoring populations at risk while simultaneously acting like a colonial power and imposing some kind of order and rebuilding civic institutions. The important Third World countries seem to have neither the resources nor the ideological inclination to intervene even in their own regions, as Africa's failure to act in Rwanda in 1994 demonstrated so painfully. The conclusion is inescapable. At the present time, only the West has both the power and, however intermittently, the readiness to act. And by the West, one really means the United States. Obviously, to say that America could act effectively if it chose to do so as, yes, the world's policeman of last resort, is not the same thing as saying that it should. Those who argue, as George Kennan has done, that we overestimate ourselves when we believe we can right the wrongs of the world, must be listened to seriously. So should the views of principled isolationists. And those on what remains of the left who insist that the result of such a broad licensing of American power will be a further entrenchment of America's hegemony over the rest of the world are also unquestionably correct. What Is to Be Done But the implications of not doing anything are equally clear. Those who fear American power are-this is absolutely certain-condemning other people to death. Had the U.S. armed forces not set up the air bridge to eastern Zaire in the wake of the Rwandan genocide, hundreds of thousands of people would have perished, rather than the tens of thousands who did die. This does not excuse the Clinton administration for failing to act to stop the genocide militarily; but it is a fact. And analogous situations were found in Bosnia and even, for all its failings, in the operation in Somalia.