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2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Uniqueness Answers › Russia-China Already Allied

Chinese Russian relations have been great since 2014 – invasion of Crimea and decline of the west

Taylor and Shullman 22 (Andrea Kendall-Taylor is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Transatlantic Security Program, Center for New American Security and David O. Shullman is a Senior Director of the Global China Hub, Atlantic Council. “Best and Bosom Friends: Why China-Russia Ties Will Deepen after Russia’s War on Ukraine,” 6-22-22, https://www.csis.org/analysis/best-and-bosom-friends-why-china-russia-ties-will-deepen-after-russias-war-ukraine)ZK

Previous Russian aggression in Ukraine has been a catalyst for deepening Russia-China relations. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 significantly accelerated the slow warming of the relationship that started in the waning days of the Cold War. Convinced that it had no real economic opportunities in the West, the Kremlin turned to China for help in offsetting Western pressure. At that time, China’s initial support for Moscow was tepid. Beijing was vaguely critical of the West for supposedly causing the crisis, and it never verbally supported Russian annexation, abstained on key UN resolutions, and allowed Chinese firms to abide by U.S. and European sanctions. China also took advantage of Russia’s increased economic dependence to drive a hard bargain on key energy deals. Yet Beijing eventually leaned into its partnership with Russia. While Moscow’s need to diversify away from the West energized relations, Beijing also came around to recognize the utility in building a stronger relationship with the Kremlin. In particular, the China-Russia partnership crystallized around a fundamentally similar view of the United States as a primary strategic threat. Both Xi and Putin view U.S. support for democracies in their regions—and for those fighting repression and authoritarianism inside China and Russia—as an effort to extend influence and ultimately overthrow their regimes. The leaders also view the U.S. alliance network—including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Quad grouping in the Indo-Pacific—as a direct challenge to their security and to their regimes. In the wake of 2014, these views hardened, especially as both countries’ relations with the United States grew more adversarial. Moreover, Xi and Putin have noted the increasing challenges facing Western democracies and have grown more confident that the United States and the West are in decline. They therefore view the time as ripe to challenge the U.S.-dominated global order and alliance network and hasten Washington’s retrenchment from their respective peripheries. Both also expect the United States to do everything in its power to hold onto its superpower status, particularly in the face of China’s rise, including coercing its allies to take actions against their own interests. Russia and China’s deepening alignment since 2014, along with the complementarity of their needs and capabilities, has fueled growing ties across all dimensions of their partnership. In the economic sphere, for example, China’s share of Russia’s external trade doubled from 10 to 20 percent between 2013 and 2021. Their partnership deepened most notably in the defense domain and in their common crusade against democracy and the universality of human rights. Arms sales and technical cooperation have grown, as have the frequency, scope, and complexity of their joint military exercises. In the democracy domain, Moscow and Beijing together are popularizing authoritarian governance, exporting their best practices, watering down human rights norms, backing each other up in multilateral forums, creating norms around cyber and internet sovereignty, and bolstering illiberal leaders. Despite these developments since 2014, China is once again treading carefully in the aftermath of Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine. China has abstained from voting on key UN resolutions, and Chinese firms are tentative about maintaining operations with Russia, given their desire to avoid secondary sanctions. The key difference, reflecting the much deeper starting point of their relationship going into this crisis, has been China’s far stronger rhetorical support for Russia. Senior Chinese officials not only indicated support for the Kremlin’s “reasonable security concerns” about potential NATO expansion as a justification for its initial actions but have since doubled down on pledges to deepen ties with Russia, parroting Russian talking points about its actions in Ukraine and the culpability of the United States and NATO for the conflict’s endurance. To signal their enduring close partnership, Russia and China flew joint patrols near Japanese and South Korean air defense zones in May 2022 during President Joe Biden’s trip to Asia designed to rally America’s U.S. Indo-Pacific allies.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Uniqueness Answers › Russia-China Already Allied

Russia China alliance growing based on opposition to democracies, specifically US, may also embolden autocratic governments

Champion 22[Marc Champion. Istanbul bureau chief for the Wall Street Journal, an editor at the Financial Times, the editor-in-chief of the Moscow Times and a correspondent for the Independent in Washington, the Balkans and Moscow. "Why Closer Ties Between Russia and China Have Democracies Worried". 6-14-2022. Bloomberg. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-14/why-increasing-russia-china-ties-worry-democracies-quicktake. 7-2-2022.]-cg

Rivals for centuries, China and Russia now have a partnership that has “no limits,” Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin said in early February. The energy, military and political ties nurtured over the past decade between the world’s two most powerful authoritarian states — both of which aim to upend at least parts of the US-dominated, post-Cold War order — have aroused growing concern among democratic leaders from Washington to Tokyo. Just weeks after the joint statement, when Russia invaded Ukraine, China refused to condemn the move. Still, the support Beijing has shown its ally since has been anything but boundless. The rapprochement was driven by a common alienation from America that deepened after the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq and became increasingly overt after the 2008 financial crisis, which originated in the US. Both states concluded that the meltdown would undercut faith globally in the US economic and political model. They increased ties cautiously until 2014, when Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula triggered sanctions and a definitive break between Russia and the wider West. That forced Moscow to look for new partners and especially new markets for its energy exports. China was a good fit, proving a massive and fast-growing buyer of Russian commodities and weapons. The two states also share a deep hostility toward US alliances in what they consider their own rightful spheres of influence. For Russia, that’s the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe; for China, it’s Washington’s network of bilateral defense treaties in the Indo-Pacific region. Though short of a formal, treaty-based alliance, the partnership between China and Russia has been enhanced by a strong personal bond between Putin and Xi. Products of tough childhoods, both men have evinced a determination to crush dissent at home and restore their nations to greatness, ending their perceived humiliation by the US and Europe. They have met more than 30 times, making dumplings together in Tianjin and pancakes in Vladivostok. In 2019, Xi called Putin his “best friend.” In a joint statement in February, they spelled out their shared contempt for Western ideas of democracy. They defined democracy without reference to elections, independent courts or free media and said it was about economic development, with all models for public political participation equally valid. In the 1800s, Russia was among European powers that imposed so-called unequal treaties on China’s Qing dynasty, including one ceding the territory where the Russian city Vladivostok sits today. Relations improved dramatically for a short period after Mao Zedong led China’s Communist Party to power in 1949, finding a natural ally in Josef Stalin. But Mao opposed the political reforms known as de-Stalinization that followed the Soviet leader’s 1953 death and, in 1961, he split from Moscow. In 1969, the two countries fought a brief border war over disputed territories and, in 1972, China did the unthinkable by turning toward the US. It wasn’t until the mid-1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev took charge in the Kremlin, that relations began to thaw again. Since 2014, Russia has sold China some of its most advanced weapons systems, including $5 billion worth of S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems and SU-35 attack jets. Within two months of Crimea’s annexation, Russia’s Gazprom PJSC signed a deal it said was worth about $400 billion to supply China with natural gas through a pipeline called the Power of Siberia. A second pipeline deal has been struck since. In addition, the two countries have increasingly coordinated their positions at the United Nations Security Council, where both wield vetoes. The growing cooperation between China and Russia has led some policy makers in the US to fear that the country could be forced to fight wars on two fronts, for example if Russia were to threaten an American ally in Europe to distract the US during a confrontation with China over Taiwan. US Senator Jim Inhofe argued last year that, adjusted for purchasing power parity, the two nations combined spend more on defense than the US. There’s a wider concern that the combination of economic, military and political muscle the two can muster is emboldening other world leaders with autocratic tendencies, undermining confidence in democracy as a political system, and threatening the version of the rules-based international order promoted by the US and its allies since the end of the Cold War. China avoided criticizing the invasion, blamed the US and NATO for the conflict, and bought Russian oil that was being shunned by some other countries, indirectly funding Moscow’s war machine. But Xi proved reluctant to unequivocally back the war or help Russia cushion the financial impact of US and European Union sanctions. With a gross domestic product almost eight times the size of Russia’s, China has substantially more at stake in a global economy that’s still dominated by the US and other developed democracies.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Uniqueness Answers › China Hege Decline Now

China in decline – US must maintain force and hege to contain aggressive and violent policies of China.

Brands ‘22 (Hal Brands. Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. "The Dangers of China's Decline as a Great Power". April 14, 2022. Foreign Policy. https://archive.ph/1Rt7v. 7-1-2022.)-cg

Decline is a tricky concept. The term makes us think of a country that is falling like a rock—one whose power and capabilities are dropping across the board. But a country can be in relative decline vis-à-vis a fast-growing adversary even if its own power is still increasing. It can be surging forward in some areas, such as military might, even as its underlying economic strength starts to wither. And decline doesn’t always lead a country to scale back its objectives—the sense of urgency it creates can cause ambitious powers to grab what they can before the clock runs out. Xi Jinping’s China is about to give the world an education in the nuances of decline. Since the onset of its economic reforms in the 1970s, China has long defied predictions that it would soon stumble or collapse. Its spectacular growth challenged prevailing views about the sources of national success in the modern world. In some ways, China is still soaring: Its military power grows more formidable every year. When Xi declares that “the East is rising and the West is declining,” he gives voice to this sense that China is a country on the make. Yet military power is often a lagging indicator of a country’s trajectory: It takes time to turn money into military muscle, and massive buildups often persist even after a country’s economic fortunes begin to flag. And today, for reasons including demographic disaster and the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, China is facing the end of the stunning economic growth that made it possible for Xi to assert that the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” was at hand. The China of the 2020s will be a country whose coercive capabilities are more intimidating than ever as its economic dynamism fades. That could be the worst possible combination for the world. Any country that rises as impressively as China is bound to make fools of some prophets of decline along the way. In recent decades, Beijing has repeatedly confounded those who predicted it was about to hit the wall. In the aftermath of Mao Zedong’s death, some Western observers were skeptical that China—a country that U.S. diplomat George Kennan once called a “vast poorhouse”—could put together the policies necessary for sustained growth. After the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, it was common to wonder whether the resulting political crackdown would stifle the country’s prosperity. Through the early 2000s, social scientists and U.S. officials predicted that China could be rich or autocratic—but not both. A few prominent analysts made careers for themselves by heralding China’s collapse. It hasn’t happened—yet. From 1978 to the onset of the global financial crisis three decades later, China’s constant-dollar GDP grew by a factor of 17, without the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) losing control. That growth enabled the decades-long military buildup and sprawling economic influence that made China a force to be feared on the global stage. As Tufts University’s Michael Beckley and I argue in our forthcoming book, Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict With China, this economic miracle required good luck and good policy. China seemed to have hit the demographic jackpot in the 1980s and 1990s; the unlikely combination of warfare and famine in the 1930s and 1940s, a regime-sponsored baby boom after the CCP took power, and then the institution of the one-child policy in 1980 left the country with a huge working-age population unencumbered by lots of young or old dependents. China was nearly self-sufficient in food, water, and other resources. And it had the fortuitous timing to start its reforms as globalization went into overdrive, making it easier to integrate the country into complex supply chains and thereby make China the workshop of the world. Good policies were also crucial. Mao’s one-man rule and economic illiteracy had condemned China to serial, self-created disasters. Once he died, Deng Xiaoping and his successors moved toward a “socialist market economy.” They opened China to trade and investment, overhauled the tax and regulatory systems, shrank bloated state-owned enterprises, and encouraged private business. Accompanying political reforms limited the power of China’s rulers and enlarged the space for nonideological competence within the regime. The CCP relaxed its grip enough to permit economic spontaneity—and reaped the benefits in the form of prosperity that reinforced its political control. China’s ascendance shook the world intellectually as well as geopolitically: It undermined post-Cold War Western beliefs that prosperity would lead inevitably to political liberalization, that democracies produced higher rates of growth than autocracies, and that tyranny was incompatible with sound economic management. As China became a global heavyweight, a new orthodoxy solidified—that a hegemonic transition was approaching as Beijing surpassed the United States. One dissenter was the political scientist David Shambaugh. In 2015, Shambaugh argued that China was suffering from a deep internal malaise and that Xi’s increasingly repressive rule was a sign of insecurity, not confidence. “[F]or all the Western views of it as an unstoppable juggernaut,” he wrote, China’s economy “is stuck in a series of systemic traps from which there is no easy exit.” Shambaugh struck a discordant note at a time when Beijing was tightening its control of the South China Sea and spreading its influence across multiple continents. He also happened to be right. Not least of the oddities surrounding contemporary China is that much of the world deemed its ascent inevitable just as its prospects started to dim. This may sound absurd, given all the hype surrounding China’s rise. After all, that country is supposedly destined, as the Harvard University political scientist Graham Allison (channeling legendary Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew) has written, to become “the biggest player in the history of the world.” It’s true that China does boast many apparent advantages. It has an enormous domestic market and is the leading trade partner of roughly 130 countries around the world. It is making concerted investments in artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, and other critical technologies. If the United States doesn’t up its game, a national commission chaired by former Google CEO Eric Schmidt warned in 2021, China could become the premier “AI superpower.” But look closer, and China’s trajectory starts to seem more tenuous. For one thing, many of China’s technological achievements are narrower and less impressive than they first appear. For example, Beijing has made great strides in AI applications focused on surveillance (no surprise there), but the United States still leads significantly across the wider expanse of AI subfields and uses. Despite vast state subsidies, China’s Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp. is years behind in the creation of cutting-edge semiconductors that make up the foundation of advanced economies in the information age. Just this year, Peking University published a candid assessment—which the CCP then predictably censored—of China’s progress in science and technology. The verdict was that China is “following [the United States] in most fields, running side by side in a few, and leading in very few.” And while China’s other strengths are not illusory, neither can they hide a reality that Beckley and I discussed last year: The magic that made China’s economic miracle is unmistakably fizzling. The country’s resource abundance is old news: Overuse devastated much of China’s arable land; industrialization and pollution left the country with severe water scarcity. More damaging still, China’s abundance of human resources is also a thing of the past. The one-child policy was a devil’s bargain that is now causing demographic implosion. China’s total population is set to peak by 2028 (or perhaps as soon as this year, by some estimates) and then plummet by as much as half by century’s end. Its working population crested in 2015; it will fall by 70 million between 2020 and 2035 and even faster after that. China will soon combine an enormous geriatric population with a rapidly shrinking workforce. It will experience one of the worst peacetime demographic crunches on record, a formula for stagnation at best and catastrophic economic contraction at worst. Making matters worse, the era of enlightened economic policy is over. The reform agenda has been stalled for more than a decade because further liberalization—necessary to make the leap to a more innovative, knowledge-based economy—would threaten the privileges of entrenched elites. If anything, Xi has thrown the country into reverse. Politically, he is taking China into neototalitarianism through pervasive repression and indoctrination. And economically, his policies have a decidedly retrograde feel. Xi’s agenda has featured a preference for state-owned enterprises at the expense of the more vibrant private sector; the imposition of severe, politically motivated restrictions on wide swaths of the economy; attacks on the autonomy of relatively technocratic institutions such as the central bank; and the empowerment of political minders in companies of nearly all sizes. China’s leaders may talk about the need to transition to a high-tech, services-based economy, but Xi’s policies are stifling the competence, creativity, and spontaneity necessary to make that shift. It all constitutes a “great leap backward”—a reversion to pre-Deng-era policies that condemned China to stagnation. There is also the question of what Xi’s consolidation of power means for the country’s long-term resilience. As the political theorist Francis Fukuyama has written, for nearly 40 years after Mao’s death China avoided the “bad emperor” problem—the worst pathologies that accompany authoritarian rule—by imposing term limits on its rulers and making them more accountable to other CCP elites. Yet Xi has systematically disassembled this system by purging rivals, sidelining potential successors, and entrenching himself in power. By doing so, he is enabling China to move faster and more decisively. But he is also leaving the country vulnerable to impulsive or unwise decision-making—a perpetual problem of one-man rule—and creating the potential for terrible instability when his reign finally ends. Xi’s centralization of authority, while seemingly impressive, is setting the country up for a fall. Finally, it doesn’t help that a more assertive China is now facing more international resistance. Trade barriers against Chinese companies and products proliferated in the decade after the global financial crisis. Washington has waged a technological cold war against Huawei, seeking to deprive that Chinese firm of high-end semiconductors and keep it out of the world’s 5G networks. Dozens of countries are more carefully scrutinizing their economic, financial, and technological ties with Beijing; the Japanese government is offering to pay companies to reduce their China exposure. China is still central to the global economy, but the days when the United States and other powerful countries eagerly abetted its ascent are over. Indeed, Xi’s effort to cultivate the domestic market is an implicit admission that China, which rose on the strength of an export-focused economy, now confronts a very different world. China’s predicament has been thrown into relief, ironically, by COVID-19. Early on, the pandemic seemed to herald an epochal global shift. Prominent U.S. analysts saw it as a “Suez moment,” the terminal crisis of the U.S. empire. Xi touted his regime’s success in containing COVID-19 at home (albeit after allowing it to escape to the world) as an advertisement for Chinese authoritarianism. Two years later, it’s clear that COVID-19 was a turning point but not in the way that Xi hoped. The pandemic hypercharged global anti-China sentiment, after Beijing concealed the initial outbreak and then exploited the resulting chaos to bully nations from Australia to Germany and the United Kingdom. It thereby encouraged a host of efforts—through multilateral institutions such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, AUKUS, and the G-7, as well as the United States’ bilateral alliances in the Pacific—to counter Chinese power. “A Cold War mentality” had reemerged, a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry complained, as the United States and its friends pursued “anti-China encirclement.” COVID-19 also confirmed how patchy China’s rise had been: The country’s biotechnology sector couldn’t produce anything like the revolutionary vaccines that democratic innovation economies in the United States and Europe churned out. Even China’s heavy-handed success in containing COVID-19 at home became a trap: The combination of “zero-COVID” policies, low levels of natural immunity, and vaccines that proved weak or worthless against highly contagious variants condemned the country to recurring lockdowns of major cities, with all the accompanying disruptions. Even before COVID-19, in fact, China’s economic vital signs were worrying. The government claimed a growth rate of 6 percent, but Chinese insiders and academic research indicate that the true number is considerably lower—and even that growth is inflated by the relentless injection of capital into a less and less efficient economy. As a result, overall debt grew eightfold between 2008 and the end of 2020, reaching 335 percent of GDP. In other countries, this combination of slumping productivity and growing debt usually presages sharp crises that turn into lasting economic quagmires. Xi’s Chinese dream involves catching up to the United States. In reality, his country is slowing down. China is not, however, slowing down in all areas at once. This isn’t unusual: The Soviet Union hit the apex of its military power in the 1980s, when its economy was in a death spiral. In the early 20th century, Britain ruled a global empire at a time when its economic supremacy had already slipped away. Today, China is stagnating economically, but its drive for world power is accelerating. Chinese leaders and propaganda organs now openly tout the country’s designs: In the coming decades, the official state news agency Xinhua proclaimed, China will “re-ascend to the top of the world.” Beijing is creating new international organizations and co-opting others. Its marquee projects, namely the Belt and Road Initiative and the Digital Silk Road, aim to project economic and political influence across Eurasia and beyond. China also fashions itself as an ideological role model for other countries: Its style of governance, Xi has said, offers a “new option for other countries and nations that want to speed up their development while preserving their independence.” Most notably, China is building and wielding the tools of geopolitical coercion. Countries such as Australia, Lithuania, Norway, and South Korea have felt China’s economic bite after they opposed its policies or criticized its internal practices. Chinese military spending—having already grown tenfold in real terms between 1990 and 2016—continues to rise, funding a dramatic expansion of the capabilities needed to conquer Taiwan, overawe Beijing’s neighbors, and perhaps even take on the United States in the Western Pacific. The statistics are simply astounding: Beijing put as many ships to sea from 2014 to 2018 as were in the navies of Britain, Germany, India, Spain, and Taiwan combined. And having long avoided a nuclear arms race with Washington, Beijing is now sprinting forward and could be the United States’ nuclear peer by the 2030s. Threats to use force against enemies have also become ubiquitous: Anyone who obstructs China’s plans, Xi warned in 2021, will “have their heads bashed bloody against the Great Wall of Steel.” It is sometimes hard to believe that such a country is running out of gas. But perhaps China’s strategic urgency is increasing because its economic outlook has turned grim. China’s “hide and bide” strategy—the approach it followed for a generation under Deng and after—was one of patient confidence. If time was on a rising Beijing’s side, then it made sense to gradually build the country’s power and delay confrontation with the United States. Today, China’s strategic mindset is darker and more insistent. In many areas, Xi acknowledges, “the West is strong, and the East is weak.” China must race to make itself “invincible” so that “nobody can beat us or choke us to death.” What the United States will face in this decade, then, is a China whose ability to batter its enemies and challenge the global order is growing, even as leaner economic times loom ahead. This China is unlikely to be benign or peaceful. History has seen many once ascendant countries lash out violently rather than accept a disappointing future as a second-tier power. This fear is what led Germany to take the risks that helped ignite World War I. It prompted Japan to undertake the expansionist rampage that helped bring on World War II. Xi has grand ambitions, from capturing Taiwan to establishing China’s primacy in Asia and, eventually, the world. If he loses faith that the patient accumulation of economic power will bring Beijing these rewards, he may become more inclined to take risks and use China’s coercive tools to secure them instead. This means that the task of dealing with China could prove quite ticklish in the years ahead. The United States can’t simply rest easy, confident that a peaking China will fade away. Instead, it will have to rapidly firm up its defenses in places where an impatient Beijing might lunge for advantage, such as the Western Pacific. The United States and its allies will have to join forces to prevent China from weaponizing its still considerable economic and technological leverage to fracture the anti-Beijing coalitions now taking shape. And they will have to ensure, through multilateral control measures as well as investments in their own capabilities, that the democratic world maintains its edge in semiconductors and other critical technologies that will shape the future balance of economic and military power. Yet Washington and its friends will also have to do all this while keeping channels of communication open and not unnecessarily provoking an anxious China that may lash out as its predicament worsens. After all, power and pessimism can make a deadly mix. The hardest sort of China to handle may be one that is strong and weak at the same time.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Uniqueness Answers › China Hates NATO

China already hates NATO action

McCarthy 22[Simone McCarthy. China Writer for CNN Digital Worldwide, Previously South China Post, received Awards at WAN-IFRA, contributor to SupChina. "Analysis: Europe sees China through a Russian lens, and Beijing is not happy". 6-30-2022. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/29/china/china-nato-g7-russia-ukraine-intl-hnk-mic/index.html. 7-2-2022.]-cg

As leaders of major Western democracies and their allies met in two back-to-back summits this week in Europe, their focus was clear: keeping pressure on Russia as its brutal assault on Ukraine enters its fifth month. But another country was also pulled into the spotlight in those meetings: China. And Beijing is not happy about it. For the first time, China was included in NATO's "Strategic Concept," adopted at the bloc's summit in Madrid on Wednesday. The document, last updated in 2010, lays out the security challenges facing the alliance while outlining a course of action, and now says China's ambitions and "coercive policies" challenge the allies' interests, security and values. The new language has prompted China to accuse NATO of being a "Cold War remnant." "The Strategic Concept claims that other countries pose challenges, but it is NATO that is creating problems around the world," China's Mission to the EU said in a statement Wednesday. "We urge NATO to stop provoking confrontation by drawing ideological lines, abandon the Cold War mentality and zero-sum game approach, and stop spreading disinformation and provocative statements against China. Since NATO positions China as a "systemic challenge," we have to pay close attention and respond in a coordinated way," it said. Earlier this week, the Group of Seven (G7) major democratic economies included tough language on China in their own communique, released days after launching an infrastructure investment plan to counter China's Belt and Road Initiative. European leaders have grown increasingly wary of China in recent years and those views have hardened over the past few months as Beijing has repeatedly refused to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine and bolstered its ties with the Kremlin. "We see a deepening strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing. And China's growing assertiveness and its coercive policies have consequences for the security of Allies and our partners," NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said at a news conference Wednesday. "China is not our adversary. But we must be clear-eyed about the serious challenges it represents," he said. Differences still exist between countries in the bloc on how to treat China, observers say. Some NATO members want to ensure the focus remains squarely on Russia, while the United States -- by far the block's most powerful member -- has pegged China as the "most serious long-term challenge to the international order." But the developments this week, which show China to be higher on these bodies' agendas than ever before, signal an increasing alignment between the US and its partners. They also mark a significant setback for Beijing, which has tried to drive a wedge between the American and European stances on China, observers say. "The combination of the kind of language used by the G7 and (China's formal inclusion) in NATO strategic documents is indeed a blow for (China), and something that they would have hoped and wished to be able to prevent," said Andrew Small, a senior transatlantic fellow in the Asia Program at The German Marshall Fund of the United States. "It's an exceptionally strong period in terms of transatlantic cooperation and that translates for China in ways that they're very concerned about," he said. China's concerns have been clear this week, as its Foreign Ministry pushed back on the NATO designation in regular scheduled press briefings. "China pursues an independent foreign policy of peace. It does not interfere in other countries' internal affairs or export ideology, still less engage in long-arm jurisdiction, economic coercion or unilateral sanctions. How could China be labeled a 'systemic challenge'?" ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said on Tuesday. "We solemnly urge NATO to immediately stop spreading false and provocative statements against China," he said, adding that NATO should "stop seeking to disrupt Asia and the whole world after it has disrupted Europe." But that rhetoric -- blaming NATO for "disruption" in Europe -- is part of what is driving a shift in European perspectives, analysts say, as Beijing has refused to condemn Russia's actions in Ukraine, including the killing of civilians, while actively blaming the US and NATO for provoking Moscow. China "very quickly and very clearly lined itself up -- at least in words, not so much in deeds -- with Russia," while transatlantic partners came together against Russia and in support of Ukraine in the wake of the invasion, said Pepijn Bergsen, a research fellow in the Europe Program at the Chatham House think tank in London. The contrast between the two has helped drive an emerging "democracies versus autocracies" narrative in Europe, he said, adding that internal politics also play a role. "In Eastern and Central Europe, where Russia is regarded as by far the number one security threat, relations (with China) had already been starting to fray, but the fact that China so clearly lined up with Russia has accelerated a shift," Bergsen said. China, for its part, appears to have underestimated the extent to which its stance would reverberate through its relationship with Europe, one that was already on shaky ground following European concerns over alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang, erosion of freedoms in Hong Kong and China's economic targeting of Lithuania over the Baltic nation's relations with Taiwan. That miscalculation was on show in a terse summit between China and European Union leaders in April, where China focused on talking points around deepening their relations and economic cooperation, while EU officials were bent on pushing China to work with it toward brokering peace in Ukraine. China has claimed neutrality and that it supports peace, but has made no concrete steps in that direction. Rising concerns about China from the G7 -- made up of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the US -- were reflected in the bloc's joint communique, released Tuesday after a summit in German Bavaria. The document, which mentioned China around a dozen times -- versus four references in the G7 leaders' statement a year earlier -- touched on areas of cooperation, but focused on calling on China to improve its human rights record and abide by international rules. And in a mark of how Russia has shaped the bloc's view on China, the group called on Beijing to "press" Moscow to comply with United Nations resolutions and stop its military aggression. The statement followed what Washington called the "formal launch" on Sunday of a $600 billion G7 infrastructure investment initiative, first announced last year. The drive, which the EU said would "demonstrate the power of development finance when it reflects democratic values," was an apparent bid to counter China's flagship Belt and Road Initiative, which critics say Beijing has used to build its global influence. At NATO, the newly adopted strategy document says China "employs a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up." It also points to a "deepening strategic partnership" between Russia and China and says their "mutually reinforcing attempts" to undercut the rules-based international order "run counter" to NATO values. The language, which also saw Russia move from a "strategic partner" in the 2010 document to "the most significant and direct threat" in the current iteration, is a clear bolstering of NATO's stance. That's significant not least of all because in recent years, as NATO statements began to reference China, some members and observers raised concerns that taking too firm a stance risked turning China into an enemy. Others have seen China as outside the region's key security interests. Following a NATO meeting last June, in which leaders characterized China as a security challenge, French President Emmanuel Macron downplayed the move with a quip that "China is not in the North Atlantic." Some of those concerns still exist, and inside the bloc there remain differences in views on how to handle China, observers say. Within Europe, such debates even extend to the emerging "autocracies versus democracies" narrative being promoted by the US, according to Pierre Haroche, a research fellow in European security at the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM, Paris). "Do you want to solidify the 'dragon-bear monster' to show that there is a clear ideological 'Cold War' between democracies and autocracies, because that's convenient in terms of the narrative? Or is it (a better) strategy to say that the two (China and Russia) are very different actors ... who might even, in the future, oppose one another?" said Haroche, summarizing the argument. But even as differences may exist between member states, it's clear that NATO is thinking bigger at this year's summit, with the historic inclusion of leaders from New Zealand, Australia, South Korea, and Japan. The move was met with ire in China, where officials have long argued that NATO was seeking to expand its presence into the Indo-Pacific, which Beijing views as its own neighborhood. "The sewage of the Cold War cannot be allowed to flow into the Pacific Ocean - this should be the general consensus in the Asia-Pacific region," a Tuesday editorial from the Communist Party-affiliated nationalist tabloid Global Times said. But observers have characterized this not so much as an expansion of NATO into the Indo-Pacific, but rather a bid to strengthen relations between, in the NATO secretariat's words, "like-minded countries." Those democracies across the Pacific, like their counterparts in Europe, may now be seeing the threats they face as more connected, according to The German Marshall Fund's Small. "There is much more of a sense emerging from all of this, conditioned by the China challenge, by the Russia challenge, that the democratic allies have to be more effectively coordinated," he said.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Uniqueness Answers › China Econ Declining

China’ economy in freefall – mismanagement, COVID, and external factors make it damage beyond repair

Singleton ‘22 [Craig Singleton is a senior China fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former U.S. diplomat., 6-13-2022, Foreign Policy, "China's Crisis of Confidence", https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/13/china-xi-jinping-economy-downturn-slowdown-decline-geopolitics-competition-united-states/#:~:text=China's%20economy%2C%20long%20in%20decline,prolonged%20era%20of%20slow%20growth.]//PJ

What if the new era of great-power competition was over before it had even begun? Many of today’s fears about a multigeneration conflict with Beijing rest on linear extrapolations of yesteryear’s data, harkening back to a time when China appeared on track to supplant the United States as the world’s largest economy. Yet more and more signs point to a China that is fully unprepared for the competition with the United States it once sought. China’s economy, long in decline, is now in freefall—thanks to Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s mismanagement. Case in point: This year, the U.S. economy is forecast to grow faster than China’s for the first time since 1976, with strong indications that China has entered a prolonged era of slow growth. More surprising is that Xi, in an attempt to stabilize China’s finances, has largely abandoned his ambitious plans to overhaul China’s growth model, choosing instead to double down on the very economic policies that got China into today’s economic bind in the first place. Put differently, Xi blinked. Xi’s reversal speaks volumes. It suggests he lacks confidence in his own plan to transform China’s unsustainable economic model into one that can deliver on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) promise of “high quality” growth. More important is that China’s fizzling economic miracle may soon undercut the CCP’s ability to wage a sustained struggle for geostrategic dominance. This raises a tantalizing question: What if, instead of being a competitor, China cannot actually afford to compete at all? Xi is often said to have tapped into Chinese resentment over its colonial-era humiliations to kick-start its modern-day competition with the United States. But the decision to jettison China’s policy of hiding its capabilities and biding its time began much earlier. Indeed, for decades before Xi’s ascent into power, CCP elites made clear this dictum would be discarded as soon as the international balance of power shifted in China’s favor. When Washington looked to be terminally weakened by the 2008 financial crisis, Chinese officials made their move, betting that overseas investments and economic coercion were the keys to outcompeting the West. They were mostly right. China’s economic clout, beyond any other consideration, still serves as the foundation for the country’s vast influence. The gravitational pull of China’s market, along with Beijing’s ability to influence economic conditions and shape political perceptions in other countries, enabled China to bind itself to the world. The fruits of China’s economic expansion also underwrote its power projection, covering the costs of the Belt and Road Initiative, military modernization, and expanding multilateral commitments. China’s GDP growth paid domestic dividends for the CCP too, empowering a model of state capitalism that broke down the barriers between the private sector and government institutions to mobilize the former in service of the latter. Nevertheless, China’s meteoric rise, fueled by annual GDP growth above 6 percent, appears over. Yes, China’s economy has been cooling for years, plagued by systematic deficiencies like chronic overinvestment, massive debt loads, and a shrinking workforce, which has put enormous stresses on China’s finances. But these systematic trends have been exacerbated, perhaps irreversibly, by China’s disastrous pandemic response, where the lack of an effective domestic vaccine and the CCP’s unwillingness to approve and purchase Western ones have made rolling lockdowns a permanent way of life. So far, the CCP’s containment measures have resulted in plummeting industrial output, surging unemployment, capital flight, and a sinking currency. Efforts to stabilize the Chinese economy will be further strained by a deteriorating external environment, with the World Bank warning of 1970s-style stagflation and reduced global demand for Chinese exports—until now, the engine of China’s growth. The economy remains severely dependent on vast supplies of imported fuel, grain, and other commodities whose prices have massively surged. Western technology transfer restrictions are also taking their toll. Another challenge is growing frustration in China’s largest markets—the United States and the European Union—over Xi’s support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Already, large multinational companies like Apple are shifting supply chains to Southeast Asia and other regions perceived as more stable while expatriates are abandoning the country and newly minted college graduates flee in droves. Indeed, China’s brain drain has begun. So far, Xi has offered few new ideas for remedying China’s crisis, even as his subordinates warn about the need to “act decisively” to avoid financial ruin. Xi’s big bet consists of an “all-out” infrastructure push to boost the economy—the same approach that fueled China’s current debt bubble, massive industrial overcapacity, and the creation of entire ghost cities of half-finished apartments. But such investments are unlikely to stimulate China’s economy, not least because they are focused on propping up the least productive parts of China’s economy, including the state sector. Making matters worse, Xi has offered little relief for Chinese consumers, the linchpin in his effort to drum up domestic consumption, decrease inequality, and reduce the economy’s reliance on exports and unproductive investments. Consumers were integral to China’s pandemic rebound in 2021 but now face growing fears about job security and sustained income losses from never-ending lockdowns. At the same time, one by one, Xi’s signature economic initiatives have disappeared from the front pages of China’s state-owned newspapers. That includes Xi’s push for “common prosperity,” which ostensibly aimed to reduce extreme inequality by giving ordinary Chinese a greater share of the nation’s wealth. Plans to introduce a property tax to slow down China’s notorious real estate bubble—where the elite have amassed vast fortunes—have also been shelved. Chinese regulators have also signaled an end to Xi’s crackdown on China’s tech giants, whose growing influence has long been viewed as a growing threat to the CCP’s power. Nevertheless, foreign investors, who lost billions of dollars on Chinese tech stocks tanked by Xi’s policies, remain wary. With many Western banks warning that the regulatory risks of investing in China now outweigh the potential benefits, these investors may not come to Beijing’s rescue either. Mere months before Xi’s coronation to a third term as party secretary, CCP officials whose jobs it is to worry about economic growth, like Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, are now openly pitted against Xi and those more concerned with regime security and party control, such as Chinese Vice Premiers Han Zheng and Hu Chunhua. While Xi projects calm and warns citizens not to question his zero-COVID policies, Li refuses to endorse them and instead speaks of China’s “complicated and grave” situation. This fractured policy environment, where ideological and technocratic factions battle for influence, is eerily reminiscent of late Chinese leader Mao Zedong’s era. Just as it did then, today’s intraparty clash will produce winners and losers. For now, the latter group includes Xi, who will probably be forced to make key personnel concessions during this fall’s 20th National Party Congress to secure the support needed to guarantee a third term. For the remainder of 2022, China’s worsening domestic challenges will remain the party’s highest priority, and addressing them will take up an increasing share of China’s economic resources. The upshot is that U.S.-China tensions will likely remain subdued, at least for the short-to-medium term. China’s state-owned enterprises, provincial and local governments, private companies, and citizens will be forced to compete for a piece of a pie that is no longer growing. More difficult to predict, however, is how China’s fight for resources and power will affect the country’s various domestic stakeholders. For the first time in a while, China’s state-owned enterprises, provincial and local governments, private companies, and citizens will be forced to compete for a piece of a pie that is no longer growing. As a result, funding trade-offs will be necessary, including those considered inconceivable when China’s annual growth hovers around 10 percent. That will include cuts to current and planned investments in China’s power projection capabilities, both civilian and military. Outbound Chinese development loans, a key tool for Beijing to expand relations across Asia and Africa, have already dropped 96 percent in recent years, from $75 billion in 2016 to approximately $4 billion during the pandemic. The overall average value of Belt and Road Initiative-related projects, averaging $255 billion annually between 2010 and 2019, also cratered to less than $81 billion in 2020. Although these figures may recover slightly, Chinese policymakers will be hard pressed to justify such expenditures as China’s economy falters. Similar trade-offs will also be necessary for certain aspects of China’s defense spending. In a contested resource environment, tensions will almost certainly emerge between China’s army, navy, and domestic security apparatus. The same goes for civil-military relations because local officials are often expected to provide the military with the materiel and support required for training and large-scale exercises. Overtime, China’s economic slowdown could also lead to civil unrest, which could force the military to become more involved in maintaining domestic security at the expense of its broader modernization. Potential economic constraints could also impede plans to fully fund newly announced ventures, such as China’s space force. Over the long term, China could be forced to choose among certain core missions, such as monitoring China’s coast, building up its South China Sea outposts, maintaining its air defense identification zone, and even protecting its unruly borders. Either way, China’s military will be forced to do more with less. In the end though, China’s sustained economic cooldown and Xi’s crisis of confidence will result in the very outcome he, the CCP, and Chinese nationalists feared most: broad recognition that China may be incapable of competing with the United States at all.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Uniqueness Answers › China Econ Declining

Chinese economy collapse is coming – Ukraine conflict and lockdowns causes economic downturn.

Chen 22 (Yawen Chen is in Beijing, crunching economic data, interviewing high-level officials, and travelling to far-flung provinces to visit factory floors and talk to local shopkeepers, “China is at risk of self-inflicted recession,” Reuters, 4/12/2022, ) - MP

China’s stubborn battle to eradicate Omicron is raising the risk of a serious economic crisis. Nearly one-third of the population is under some sort of lockdown, with shops shut and factories struggling. Policy easing looks unavoidable, but with benchmark yields dropping below U.S. Treasury bonds, so does capital flight. The outbreak in Shanghai, where asymptomatic cases are running at around 25,000 a day despite two weeks of rigorous lockdown, is prompting other regions to impose draconian measures pre-emptively. At least 373 million people in cities contributing to 40% of China’s GDP have been affected, a Nomura survey showed. Key indicators are already reflecting the shock. Domestic sales of passenger cars fell over 10% in March, per official data; an index tracking freight traffic in China dropped by about 25% during the first week of April. China contained the initial outbreak in 2020 quickly and resumed production, allowing its manufacturing sector to tap export markets to revive growth after a single quarter of contraction. Omicron is far more infectious, yet Beijing aims to reproduce that result. Officials appear to be realising that won’t be easy. With the war in Ukraine pushing up commodities costs, and demand for Chinese exports cooling as inflation spikes in key overseas markets, premier Li Keqiang this week warned of “unexpected changes” in the external and domestic environment that would require more urgent, aggressive measures. Fiscal stimulus and infrastructure spending will be hard to implement during lockdowns, which leaves monetary policy. Cutting interest rates and reserve ratios, however, is tricky given the increasingly hawkish U.S. Federal Reserve. Yields on China's 10-year government bonds fell below U.S. Treasury yields for the first time in 12 years on Monday; local inflation rates are still lower but rising quickly. If sharp currency depreciation ensues, Beijing might face a repeat of the capital outflows it struggled to contain in 2015. There are already signs foreign investors are evacuating. For private businesses, uncertainty as to when lockdowns will end, and whether they will resume soon after, will deter investment and job creation regardless of the cost of credit. Consumers rushing to hoard food before they get sealed inside their flats are unlikely to spend on other goods. The longer Beijing digs its heels on zero Covid, the closer a recession will get. - At a forum held with local government officials on April 11, Premier Li Keqiang said the government must be vigilant against “unexpected changes” in the international and domestic environment that are putting downward pressure on the Chinese economy. Li urged officials to speed implementation of policy measures announced earlier in the year, ranging from tax cuts and special-purpose government bond issuance to ensuring stable energy supply. - Yields on China's 10-year government bonds fell below U.S. Treasury yields for the first time in 12 years on April 11, Reuters reported. - Chinese banks extended 3.1 trillion yuan ($490 billion) in new yuan loans in March, up sharply from February and exceeding analyst expectations, data released by the People's Bank of China on April 11 showed.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Uniqueness Answers › China Econ Declining

China is in a recession – econ collapse is inevitable

He 22 (Laura He is a reporter and digital producer for CNN Business, based in Hong Kong. She covers news about Asian business and markets, with a focus on China, “China’s economy is going backwards,” CNN Business, 5/5/2022, ) - MP

China’s gigantic services sector just contracted at the second sharpest pace on record as Covid lockdowns hit businesses hard. The Caixin purchasing managers' index, a closely-watched indicator for assessing the state of the economy, plummeted to 36.2 in April from 42 in March, according to a survey released by IHS Markit on Thursday. A reading below 50 indicates contraction, while anything above that gauge shows expansion. The services sector accounts for more than half of the nation's GDP and over 40% of its employment. And with survey data showing China's manufacturing sector also shrinking last month, the world's second biggest economy went backwards in April. While conditions might improve this month as Covid infections rates ease and officials try to limit the damage to the economy, large parts of Beijing have just been placed under tighter restrictions and some economists are now forecasting that Chinese GDP will decline in the second quarter. The nation's capital has effectively shut down its largest district, Chaoyang, suspending transportation within it and encouraging 3.5 million residents to work from home as part of its latest effort to curb Covid-19 cases, local authorities announced Wednesday. The nearly 6-point decline in services activity in April was second only to the collapse in February 2020, when China's economy came to a near standstill as it battled to contain the initial coronavirus outbreak that started from Wuhan. In that month, the Caixin services PMI dived to 26.5 from 51.8 in January. Businesses in the world's second largest economy were already grappling with rising energy and raw material costs, when Covid lockdowns hamstrung their operations further. It has also become harder for firms to pass the higher prices to consumers, because of the impact Covid restrictions have having on customer demand. That has translated to even lower employment. "Some companies, affected by the drop in orders, laid off workers to lower costs," said Wang Zhe, senior economist for Caixin Insight Group. The measure for employment in the services sector has been under 50 for four consecutive months, the survey showed. The data came just hours after China reported a steep drop in tourist spending for the Labor Day national holiday. Tourist spending was only 64.7 billion yuan ($9.8 billion) over the five-day holiday, down 43% from the same period last year, according to a statement by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism late Wednesday. People made 160 million domestic tourist trips during the holiday, down 30% from a year earlier. The data again highlights how China's zero-Covid policy has taken a heavy toll on its economy. On Saturday, PMI surveys from the government indicated that both factory and non-manufacturing activities slumped in April to their worst levels since February 2020. "Recent mobility trends suggest that China's growth momentum deteriorated significantly in April," analysts from Fitch Ratings wrote on Tuesday. They expect GDP to contract in the second quarter, before output recovers in the second half. Nomura analysts also warned last month of a rising risk of "recession" in the second quarter, as lockdowns, a shrinking property sector, and slowing exports hit the economy hard. As the highly transmissible Omicron variant spreads quickly in China, the country is battling its worst outbreak in more than two years. So far, at least 27 Chinese cities are under full or partial lockdown, which could be impacting up to 185 million residents across the country, according to CNN's latest calculation. That includes Shanghai — the nation's leading financial center and a major manufacturing and shipping hub. The city has been under a lockdown since March 28. Although authorities started to lift some restrictions last month, more than 8 million residents are still banned from leaving their residential compounds. The Chinese government still adheres to its stringent zero-Covid policy more than two years after the initial outbreak — at a time when the rest of the world is learning to live with Covid. The policy involves mandatory mass testing and strict lockdowns to contain the spread of the virus. But economic costs are rising. Many economists have downgraded their China GDP growth targets for this year, citing risks from the zero-Covid policy. Last month, the International Monetary Fund lowered its China growth forecast to 4.4%, well below the government's official target of about 5.5%. In recent days, Chinese leaders have repeatedly tried to reassure the public about fixing the economy. President Xi Jinping last week called for an infrastructure spending spree to promote growth. And the Communist Party's Politburo on Friday promised "specific measures" to support the internet economy.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Uniqueness Answers › China Econ Declining

China’s economy declining – markets plummeting, rising risk of recession, and GDP decline

He ‘22 {Laura He is a reporter and digital producer for CNN Business, 5-5-2022, CNN, "China's economy is going backwards ", https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/05/economy/china-economy-services-decline-covid-intl-hnk/index.html]//PJ

China's gigantic services sector just contracted at the second sharpest pace on record as Covid lockdowns hit businesses hard. The Caixin purchasing managers' index, a closely-watched indicator for assessing the state of the economy, plummeted to 36.2 in April from 42 in March, according to a survey released by IHS Markit on Thursday. A reading below 50 indicates contraction, while anything above that gauge shows expansion. The services sector accounts for more than half of the nation's GDP and over 40% of its employment. And with survey data showing China's manufacturing sector also shrinking last month, the world's second biggest economy went backwards in April. While conditions might improve this month as Covid infections rates ease and officials try to limit the damage to the economy, large parts of Beijing have just been placed under tighter restrictions and some economists are now forecasting that Chinese GDP will decline in the second quarter. The nation's capital has effectively shut down its largest district, Chaoyang, suspending transportation within it and encouraging 3.5 million residents to work from home as part of its latest effort to curb Covid-19 cases, local authorities announced Wednesday. The nearly 6-point decline in services activity in April was second only to the collapse in February 2020, when China's economy came to a near standstill as it battled to contain the initial coronavirus outbreak that started from Wuhan. In that month, the Caixin services PMI dived to 26.5 from 51.8 in January. Businesses in the world's second largest economy were already grappling with rising energy and raw material costs, when Covid lockdowns hamstrung their operations further. It has also become harder for firms to pass the higher prices to consumers, because of the impact Covid restrictions have having on customer demand. That has translated to even lower employment. "Some companies, affected by the drop in orders, laid off workers to lower costs," said Wang Zhe, senior economist for Caixin Insight Group. The measure for employment in the services sector has been under 50 for four consecutive months, the survey showed. The data came just hours after China reported a steep drop in tourist spending for the Labor Day national holiday. Tourist spending was only 64.7 billion yuan ($9.8 billion) over the five-day holiday, down 43% from the same period last year, according to a statement by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism late Wednesday. People made 160 million domestic tourist trips during the holiday, down 30% from a year earlier. The data again highlights how China's zero-Covid policy has taken a heavy toll on its economy. On Saturday, PMI surveys from the government indicated that both factory and non-manufacturing activities slumped in April to their worst levels since February 2020. "Recent mobility trends suggest that China's growth momentum deteriorated significantly in April," analysts from Fitch Ratings wrote on Tuesday. They expect GDP to contract in the second quarter, before output recovers in the second half. Nomura analysts also warned last month of a rising risk of "recession" in the second quarter, as lockdowns, a shrinking property sector, and slowing exports hit the economy hard. As the highly transmissible Omicron variant spreads quickly in China, the country is battling its worst outbreak in more than two years. So far, at least 27 Chinese cities are under full or partial lockdown, which could be impacting up to 185 million residents across the country, according to CNN's latest calculation. That includes Shanghai — the nation's leading financial center and a major manufacturing and shipping hub. The city has been under a lockdown since March 28. Although authorities started to lift some restrictions last month, more than 8 million residents are still banned from leaving their residential compounds. The Chinese government still adheres to its stringent zero-Covid policy more than two years after the initial outbreak — at a time when the rest of the world is learning to live with Covid. The policy involves mandatory mass testing and strict lockdowns to contain the spread of the virus. But economic costs are rising. Many economists have downgraded their China GDP growth targets for this year, citing risks from the zero-Covid policy. Last month, the International Monetary Fund lowered its China growth forecast to 4.4%, well below the government's official target of about 5.5%.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Aff Answers › Uniqueness Answers › China Losing

China’s authoritarian ascendence will cause its downfall – the US will outcompete

Kroenig ‘20 (Matthew Kroenig is a professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University, and the deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, “Why the U.S. Will Outcompete China,” The Atlantic, 4/3/2020, MP

National-security analysts see China as one of the greatest threats facing the United States and its allies. According to an emerging conventional wisdom, China has the leg up on the U.S. in part because its authoritarian government can strategically plan for the long term, unencumbered by competing branches of government, regular elections, and public opinion. Yet this faith in autocratic ascendance and democratic decline is contrary to historical fact. China may be able to put forth big, bold plans—the kinds of projects that analysts think of as long term—but the visionary projects of autocrats don’t usually pan out. Yes, democratic governments are obligated to answer to their citizens on regular intervals and are sensitive to public opinion—that’s actually democracies’ greatest source of strength. Democratic leaders have a harder time advancing big, bold agendas, but the upside of that difficulty is that the plans that do make it through the system have been carefully considered and enjoy domestic support. Historically speaking, once a democracy comes up with a successful strategy, it sticks with the plan, even through a succession of leadership. Washington has arguably followed the same basic, three-step geopolitical plan since 1945. First, the the current, rules-based international system by providing security in important geopolitical regions, constructing international institutions, and promoting free markets and democratic politics within its sphere of influence. Second, it welcomed into the club any country that played by the rules, even former adversaries, like Germany and Japan. And, third, the U.S. worked with its allies to defend the system from those countries or groups that would challenge it, including competitors such as Russia and China, rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, and terrorist networks. America can pursue long-term strategy in part because it enjoys domestic political stability. While new politicians seek to improve on their predecessor’s policies, the United States is unlikely to see the drastic shifts in strategy that come from the fall of one political system and the rise of another. Democratic elections may be messy, but they’re not as messy as coups or civil wars. Open societies have many other advantages as well. They facilitate innovation, trust in financial markets, and economic growth. Because democracies tend to be more reliable partners, they are typically skillful alliance builders, and they can accumulate resources without frightening their neighbors. They tend to make thoughtful, informed decisions on matters of war and peace, and to focus their security forces on external enemies, not their own populations. Autocratic systems simply cannot match this impressive array of economic, diplomatic, and military attributes. David Leonhardt in The New York Times, “Chinese leaders stretching back to Deng Xiaoping have often thought in terms of decades.” Commonly cited examples of that long-term thinking include the Belt and Road Initiative, a program that invests in infrastructure overseas; Made in China 2025, an effort to subsidize China’s giant tech companies to become world leaders in 21st-century technologies, such as artificial intelligence; and Beijing’s promise to be a global superpower by 2049. Since putting in place sound economic reforms in the 1970s, China has seen its economy expand at eye-popping rates, to become the world’s second largest. Many that China could even surpass the United States within the decade, and that China’s model of state-led capitalism will prove more successful, in terms of economic growth, than the U.S. template of free markets and open politics. I doubt these predictions. Because autocratic leaders are unconstrained and do not have to contend with a legislature or courts, they have an easier time taking their countries in new and radically different directions. Then, when the dictator changes his mind, he can do it again. Mao’s autocratic China ricocheted from one failed policy to another: the Great Leap Forward, then the Hundred Flowers Campaign, then the Cultural Revolution. Mao only to nearly with Moscow in the next decade. Beginning in the time of Deng Xiaoping, China pursued a fairly constant strategy of liberalizing its economy at home and abroad. But President Xi Jinping abandoned these dictums when he took over. As the most powerful leader since Mao—he has changed China’s constitution to set himself up as dictator for life—he could once again jerk China in several new directions, according to his whims, and back again. , he has stalled or reversed course on eight of 10 categories of economic reform promised by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) itself. Moreover, Xi is baring China’s teeth militarily, from neighbors in the South China Sea and with Russia in Europe. The problem for Beijing is that stalled reforms will stymie its economic potential and its confrontational policies are provoking an international coalition to contain them. The declared great-power competition with China the foremost security threat to the U.S.; the European Union labeled China a “systemic rival”; and Japan, Australia, India, and the United States have formed a new “quad” of powers to balance China in the Pacific. Furthermore, the plans often cited as evidence of China’s farsighted vision, the Belt and Road Initiative and Made in China 2025, were announced by Xi only in 2013 and 2015, respectively. Both are way too recent to be celebrated as brilliant examples of successful, long-term strategic planning. A certain level of domestic political stability is a prerequisite for charting a steady strategic course in foreign and domestic affairs. But autocratic regimes are notoriously brittle. While institutionalized political successions in democracies typically lead to changes of policy, political successions in autocracies are likely to result in regime collapse and war. China’s “5,000” were pockmarked by rebellion, revolution, and new dynasties. Fearing internal threats to domestic political stability—consider the and Xinjiang—the CCP than on its national defense. If you follow the money, the CCP is demonstrating that the government is more afraid of its own people than of the Pentagon. This domestic fragility will frustrate China’s efforts to design and execute farsighted plans. If threats to Chinese domestic stability were to materialize and the CCP were to collapse tomorrow, for example, Chinese grand strategy could undergo another seismic shift, including possibly opting out of competition with the United States altogether. Autocracies have other vulnerabilities as well. State-led planning has never produced high rates of economic growth over the long term. Autocrats are poor alliance builders who fight with their supposed allies more than with their enemies. And the highest priority of autocratic security forces is repressing their own people, not defending the country. The world has undergone drastic changes in just the past few years, but these enduring patterns of international affairs have not. Some fear that Trump’s nationalist tendencies will erode the U.S. position, but the momentum of America’s successful grand strategy has kept the country on a fairly steady course. Despite Trump’s criticism of NATO, for example, two new countries have joined the alliance on his watch, including . The coronavirus has upended a sense of security in the U.S., leading many people into the familiar trap of in contrast to the halting and patchwork measures in the United States. But there is good reason to believe that this assessment will be updated in America’s favor with the benefit of hindsight. Already we are seeing evidence that conditions are much worse in China than CCP officials are letting on and that China’s attempts at international “disaster diplomacy” are backfiring. It has been revealed that the CCP has continually the numbers of COVID-19 infections and in China, and European nations have and returned faulty Chinese coronavirus testing kits. The great political theorist Niccolò Machiavelli considered a similar line of thinking in the 16th century, about whether republics or dictators charted a more stable course. He wrote, “I, therefore, disagree with the common opinion that a populace in power is unstable [and] changeable … The prince … unchecked by laws, will be more … unstable, and imprudent than a populace.” The U.S. political system certainly has problems. But democracy is the best machine ever invented for generating enormous power, wealth, and prestige on the international stage.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
NEG › AT: Impacts › 1NC --- AT: Nuclear Extinction

Nuclear war doesn’t mean extinction

Ladish 20 [Jeffrey Ladish, an Information Security and Biosecurity Consultant at Gordian Research, November 6, 2020, “Nuclear war is unlikely to cause human extinction”, Lesswrong, https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/sT6NxFxso6Z9xjS7o/nuclear-war-is-unlikely-to-cause-human-extinction]-Hayer

There simply aren't enough nuclear warheads to kill everyone directly with kinetic force, and there likely never will be. There are ~14,000 nuclear weapons in the world, and let’s suppose they have an average yield of something like 1 megaton. This is a conservative guess, the actual average is probably closer to 100 kilotons. With a 1 megaton warhead, you can create a fireball covering 3 km², and a moderate pressure wave that knocks down most residential houses covering 155 km². The former kills nearly everyone and the latter kills a decent percentage of people but not everyone. Let's be conservative and assume the pressure wave kills everyone in its radius. 14,000 * 155 = 2.17 million km². The New York Metro area is 8,683 km². So all the nuclear weapons in the world could destroy about 250 New York Metro areas. This is a lot! But not near enough, even if someone intentionally tried to hit all the populations at once. Total land surface of earth is: 510.1 million km². Urban area, by one estimate, is about 2%, or 10.2 million km.² Since the total possible area destroyed from nuclear weapons is ~2.17 million km² is considerably less than a lower bound on the area of human habitation, 10.2 million km², there should be basically no risk of human extinction from kinetic destruction.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
NEG › AT: Impacts › 1NC --- AT: Deterrence

10 reasons why Nuclear Deterrence doesn’t work

Krieger 11 [David Krieger, Krieger is President Emeritus of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He is the author and editor of many books on peace and nuclear weapons abolition, including "Speaking of Peace: Quotations to Inspire Action.", February 7, 2011, “TEN SERIOUS FLAWS IN NUCLEA DETERRENCE THEORY", NUCLEAR AGE PEACE FOUNDATION, https://www.wagingpeace.org/ten-serious-flaws-in-nuclear-deterrence-theory/]-Hayer

As volcanoes often give off strong warning signals that they may erupt, so we have witnessed such signals regarding nuclear arsenals and the failure of nuclear deterrence theory over the course of the Nuclear Age. Nuclear arsenals could erupt with volcano-like force, totally overwhelming the relatively flimsy veneer of “protection” provided by nuclear deterrence theory. In the face of such dangers, we must not be complacent. Nor should we continue to be soothed by the “experts” who assure us not to worry because the weapons will keep us safe. There is, in fact, much to worry about, much more than the nuclear policy makers and theorists in each of the nuclear weapon states have led us to believe. I will examine below what I believe are ten serious flaws in nuclear deterrence theory, flaws that lead to the conclusion that the theory is unstable, unreliable and invalid. 1. It is only a theory. It is not proven and cannot be proven. A theory may posit a causal relationship, for example, if one party does something, certain results will follow. In the case of nuclear deterrence theory, it is posited that if one party threatens to retaliate with nuclear weapons, the other side will not attack. That an attack has not occurred, however, does not prove that it was prevented by nuclear deterrence. That is, in logic, a false assumption of causality. In logic, one cannot prove a negative, that is, that doing something causes something else not to happen. That a nuclear attack has not happened may be a result of any number of other factors, or simply of exceptional good fortune. To attribute the absence of nuclear war to nuclear deterrence is to register a false positive, which imbues nuclear deterrence with a false sense of efficacy. 2. It requires a commitment to mass murder. Nuclear deterrence leads to policy debates about how many threatened deaths with nuclear weapons are enough to deter an adversary? Are one million deaths sufficient to deter adversary A? Is it a different number for adversary B? How many deaths are sufficient? One million? Ten million? One hundred million? More? There will always be a tendency to err on the side of more deaths, and thus the creation of more elaborate nuclear killing systems. Such calculations, in turn, drive arms races, requiring huge allocations of resources to weapons systems that must never be used. Leaders must convince their own populations that the threat of mass murder and the expenditure of resources to support this threat make them secure and is preferable to other allocations of scientific and financial resources. The result is not only a misallocation of resources, but also a diversion of effort away from cooperative solutions to global problems. 3. It requires effective communications. In effect, nuclear deterrence is a communications theory. Side A must communicate its capability and willingness to use its nuclear arsenal in retaliation for an attack by adversary B, thereby preventing adversary B from attacking. The threat to retaliate and commit mass murder must be believable to a potential attacker. Communications take place verbally in speeches by leaders and parliamentary statements, as well as news reports and even by rumors. Communications also take place non-verbally in the form of alliance formations and nuclear weapons and missile tests. In relation to nuclear deterrence, virtually everything that each side does is a deliberate or inadvertent form of communication to a potential adversary. There is much room for error and misunderstanding. 4. It requires rational decision makers. Nuclear deterrence will not be effective against a decision maker who is irrational. For example, side A may threaten nuclear retaliation for an attack by adversary B, but the leader of side B may irrationally conclude that the leader of side A will not do what he says. Or, the leader of side B may irrationally attack side A because he does not care if one million or ten million of his countrymen die as a result of side A’s nuclear retaliation. I believe two very important questions to consider are these: Do all leaders of all states behave rationally at all times, particularly under conditions of extreme stress when tensions are very high? Can we be assured that all leaders of all states will behave rationally at all times in the future? Most people believe the answer to these questions is an unqualified No. 5. It instills a false sense of confidence. Nuclear deterrence is frequently confused with nuclear “defense,” leading to the conclusion that nuclear weapons provide some form of physical protection against attack. This conclusion is simply wrong. The weapons and the threat of their use provide no physical protection. The only protection provided is psychological and once the weapons start flying it will become clear that psychological protection is not physical protection. One can believe the weapons make him safer, but this is not the same as actually being safer. Because nuclear deterrence theory provides a false sense of confidence, it could lead a possessor of the weapons to take risks that would be avoided without nuclear threats in place. Such risks could be counterproductive and actually lead to nuclear war. 6. It does not work against an accidental use. Nuclear deterrence is useful, if at all, only against the possibility of an intentional, premeditated nuclear attack. Its purpose is to make the leader who contemplates the intentional use of a nuclear weapon decide against doing so. But nuclear deterrence cannot prevent an accidental use of a nuclear weapon, such as an accidental launch. This point was made in the movie Dr. Strangelove, in which a US nuclear attack was accidentally set in motion against the Soviet Union. In the movie, bomber crews passed their “failsafe” point in a training exercise and couldn’t be recalled. The president of the United States had to get on the phone with his Soviet counterpart and try to explain that the attack on Moscow that had been set in motion was just an accident. The Americans were helpless to stop the accident from occurring, and so were the Soviets. Accidents happen! There is no such thing as a “foolproof” system, and when nuclear weapons are involved it is extremely dangerous to think there is. 7. It doesn’t work against terrorist organizations. Nuclear deterrence is based upon the threat of retaliation. Since it is not possible to retaliate against a foe that you cannot locate, the threat of retaliation is not credible under these circumstances. Further, terrorists are often suicidal (e.g., “suicide bombers”), and are willing to die to inflict death and suffering on an adversary. For these reasons, nuclear deterrence will be ineffective in preventing nuclear terrorism. The only way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to prevent the weapons themselves from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. This will become increasingly difficult if nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials to build them proliferate to more and more countries. 8. It encourages nuclear proliferation. To the extent that the theory of nuclear deterrence is accepted as valid and its flaws overlooked or ignored, it will make nuclear weapons seem to be valuable instruments for the protection of a country. Thus, the uncritical acceptance of nuclear deterrence theory provides an incentive for nuclear proliferation. If it is believed that nuclear weapons can keep a country safe, there will be commensurate pressure to develop such weapons. 9. It is not believable. In the final analysis, it is likely that even the policy makers who promote nuclear deterrence do not truly believe in it. If policy makers did truly believe that nuclear deterrence works as they claim, they would not need to develop missile defenses. The United States alone has spent over $100 billion on developing missile defenses over the past three decades, and is continuing to spend some $10 billion annually on missile defense systems. Such attempts at physical protection against nuclear attacks are unlikely to ever be fully successful, but they demonstrate the underlying understanding of policy makers that nuclear deterrence alone is insufficient to provide protection to a country. If policy makers understand that nuclear deterrence is far from foolproof, then who is being fooled by nuclear deterrence theory? In all likelihood, the only people being fooled by the promised effectiveness of nuclear deterrence theory are the ordinary people who place their faith in their leaders, the same people who are the targets of nuclear weapons and will suffer the consequences should nuclear deterrence fail. Their political and military leaders have made them the “fools” in what is far from a “foolproof” system. 10. Its failure would be catastrophic. Nuclear deterrence theory requires the development and deployment of nuclear weapons for the threat of retaliation. These weapons can, of course, be used for initiating attacks as well as for seeking to prevent attacks by means of threatened retaliation. Should deterrence theory fail, such failure could result in consequences beyond our greatest fears. For example, scientists have found in simulations of the use of 100 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons in an exchange between India and Pakistan, the deaths could reach one billion individuals due to blast, fire, radiation, climate change, crop failures and resulting starvation. A larger nuclear war between the US and Russia could destroy civilization as we know it.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
NEG › AT: Impacts › 2NC/1NR --- No Impact Extension --- Cyber MAD

Russia isn’t causing major cyberattacks because of cyber MAD.

Maundrill 22 [Beth Maundrill began her career in business-to-business publishing in 2013 and has previously written about technology in the maritime industry, supply chain, defense and aerospace sectors. “Why Russia has refrained from a major cyber-attack against the West”, Cyber Security Hub, 6-15-22, https://www.cshub.com/attacks/articles/why-russia-has-refrained-from-a-cyber-attack-against-the-west] SL

Firstly, Charles Denyer, a national security and cyber security expert, told CS Hub that Russia does indeed have the capability to weaponize their cyber capabilities and could hit the West in a way which would have a similar impact to that of the Colonia Pipeline attack of 2021. One reason such an attack has not been perpetrated however, Denyer supposes, is the idea of mutually assured destruction (MAD). Reflecting on the MAD principle that provides the cornerstone of global nuclear policy, a significant cyber-attack committed by Russia against the West could see an equal level of retaliation which Moscow and Putin can ill-afford as they become bogged down in the campaign against Ukraine. “Russia is definitely among the top four or five cyber entities, with the US being number one,” Denyer said. “But from my understanding based on the intelligence apparatus of the US, they are clearly aware that if they hit the US with any type of meaningful cyber-attack that would really damage our CI to the point that American society would stop functioning, [Russia] knows what is going to happen. US Cyber Command would hit them back with an offensive counterpunch that could do damage of the likes the world has not seen.”

2022 CNDI Affirmative
NEG › AT: Impacts › 1NC --- AT: Populism

Populists already have low public approval

Taylor 22 [Chloe is a news assistant at CNBC. “Populist politics lost support globally during the pandemic, research finds”, CNBC, 1-17-22, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/01/18/populist-politics-lost-support-during-the-pandemic-research-finds.html] SL

Opposition populist parties also lost support during the pandemic, while “mainstream” opposition parties gained supporters. Approval of the way governments handled the Covid crisis also showed rising skepticism toward populist leaders’ competence. In June 2020, public approval of how countries with populist leaders had handled the pandemic was an average 11 percentage points lower than approval of countries with centrist governments. By the end of 2020, the gap had widened to 16 points. Statements associated with populism, such as a dislike for “corrupt elites” and a desire for the “will of the people” to be obeyed, also saw a decline in support, the report found. The number of people saying they agreed with similar statements fell by around 10 percentage points in Italy, the U.K. and France between 2019 and 2021.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
NEG › AT: Impacts › 1NC --- AT: Democratic Backsliding

Democratic governments are disadvantaged

Hegre 14 [Håvard Hegre is the Dag Hammarskjöld Professor of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and Researcher, Peace Research Institute Oslo, “Democratization and Political Violence”, Our World-United Nations University, 5-15-14, https://ourworld.unu.edu/en/democratization-and-political-violence] SL

Democracies are at a disadvantage relative to non-democracies in two respects when it comes to countering political violence and insurgencies. First, they are accountable to a large citizenship. If terrorist activity succeeds in increasing the risk of death, it can create a widespread feeling of insecurity. Because democratic governments are expected to safeguard the lives and property of all of their citizens, they must respond in some way to this increased risk. At the same time, democracies are legitimate only to the extent that they protect individual freedoms and handle perpetrators through the legal system. Terrorism, then, may also undermine government support if authorities respond to threats too forcefully. Provoking such over-reactions may even be an aim of some terrorist groups. This means that democratic political systems provide more opportunities for the use of political violence than authoritarian systems. Indeed, comparative research shows that democratic governments experience more transnational terrorism than other governments. Rebel groups fighting democracies in civil wars target civilians more often than those fighting non-democracies, often using terrorism to complement guerilla warfare and other military challenges to government troops. Armed conflicts also tend to last longer in democracies than in non-democracies, possibly because counter-insurgency efforts are less brutal and hence less effective in restricting opportunities for violent political opposition.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
NEG › AT: Impacts › 1NC --- AT: Democratic Backsliding

Democratic Leaders are more aggressive

Vasco 18 [American Journal of Political Science, July 18, 2018, “Democracies More Prone to Start Wars – Except When They’re Not”, Caltech, https://www.caltech.edu/about/news/democracies-more-prone-start-wars-except-when-theyre-not-82879]-Hayer

The difference boils down to public pressure, say the study's authors, Michael Gibilisco of Caltech and Casey Crisman-Cox of Texas A&M University. Because of pressure from voters to not back down and appear weak, democratic leaders tend to act more aggressively in international conflicts. An autocrat, on the other hand, is answerable to no one and can back down from a conflict without facing personal consequences. "If an elected leader makes a threat during a conflict with another country and the threat isn't followed through, they may face a decrease in approval ratings, or they may lose an election," says Gibilisco, assistant professor of political science. In democracies, he notes, voters can punish their leaders for appearing weak—these punishments or consequences are known as "audience costs" in political science parlance. To avoid those costs, leaders in representative governments become more aggressive during disputes. In their study, Gibilisco and Crisman-Cox, who is also an assistant professor of political science, first developed a mathematical model of dispute initiation between countries and then fit the model to data of actual conflicts that occurred among 125 countries between 1993–2007.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
NEG › AT: Uniqueness › 1NC --- No NATO Credibility

Non-unique, NATO is not credible – Ukraine proves

Taylor 22 [Will Taylor, Journalist for LBC, March 13, 2022, “'Incredibly weak': Nato is using 'Chamberlain tactics' on Putin, ex-Ukraine PM warns”, LBC, https://www.lbc.co.uk/news/nato-weak-ukraine/]-Hayer

Oleksiy Hornachuk, who served as prime minister of Ukraine, told LBC's Swarbrick on Sunday that Russian invaders want to "destroy everything they can, kill everyone they can". He blasted the Western response to the invasion of his country as "incredibly weak" and compared it to Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister most associated with appeasement of Adolf Hitler. The West has imposed severe economic sanctions and supplied weapons and equipment to Ukraine's military, but Kyiv has called for a no-fly zone to be imposed by Nato. Mr Hornachuk said: "What I see now, I see absolutely incredibly weak response from the West and from Nato. Incredibly weak.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
NEG › AT: Uniqueness › 1NC --- No NATO Credibility

NATO is not credible – Ukraine and Georgia

Hunter 22 [Robert E. Hunter, Robert E. Hunter served as U.S. ambassador to NATO (1993-98) and on the National Security Council staff throughout the Carter administration, first as Director of West European Affairs and then as Director of Middle East Affairs. In that role, he was the White House representative at the Autonomy Talks for the West Bank and Gaza and developer of the Carter Doctrine for the Persian Gulf. He was Senior Advisor to the RAND Corporation from 1998 to 2011, and Director of the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies at the National Defense University, 2011-2012. He served on the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board and is a member of the American Academy of Diplomacy, March 24, 2022, “NATO has a serious credibility problem”, RESPONSIBLE STATE CRAFT, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/03/24/natos-credibility-problem/]-Hayer

Damage to US and NATO credibility over the matter of Ukraine can trace its history at least as far back as the 2008 Bucharest summit, when President G.W. Bush proposed that Ukraine (and Georgia) be enrolled in Membership Action Plans (MAPs), the next-to-last step before becoming allies. This was a decisive move beyond the 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter and consultative Council, which provided no security guarantees. Most allies resisted, including because they were not prepared to take the risk of pushing NATO right up to Russia and straddling the traditional invasion route into the heart of Europe – in both directions and with long memories. How would Russia respond to such a step? But the European allies also recognised that, although moving Ukraine and Georgia toward NATO membership had to be ruled out, the US president could not be sent home empty-handed. So the summit declared that both countries “will become members” of the alliance. Those words were designed to put off consideration of NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia to the indefinite future (“never,” in the eyes of many European allies.) But in their haste, NATO’s leaders obviously did not understand the full import of that statement. It signaled that the two countries were geopolitically so important to the West that they would definitely be brought into the alliance, whatever Russia thought: in plain English, it was thus the actual moment of commitment. Soon thereafter, Georgia’s president, Mikheil Saakashvili, tested the proposition by using military force to try reclaiming occupied parts of South Ossetia, only to be defeated by Russian forces. Not a single NATO ally sent troops to defend Georgia. Finis, for any practical purposes, to “will become members” of NATO. Yet instead of putting the commitment into George Orwell’s Memory Hole, NATO has repeated the formulation at every summit and ministerial meeting, and, until just before Putin’s 2022 invasion, top leaders of the Biden administration were still harping on NATO’s “open door” to Ukraine’s membership, even though it is a fantasy. This last observation is based on two interrelated facts. First, NATO takes all decisions by consensus – a unit veto; and second, many allies have already made clear that would never be willing, in response to aggression against Ukraine (on Russia’s border), to invoke Article 5 of the NATO Treaty: that “…an armed attack against one or more [ally]….shall be considered an attack against them all…” Thus Ukraine will never be admitted to NATO.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
NEG › Russia General – NEG › 1NC --- Russia = Defensive

Russia is seemed as aggressive but is actually playing defense

ZollMann 21 [Florian ZollMann is an academic and author of media, Propaganda and the Politics of Interventions (Peter Lang, New York). “Russia is reacting to NATO’s policy of expansions”. Indybay, Monday Dec 27th 2021. .] - NAAh

Russia is accused of calculating power and bellicose behavior. As far as the situation in Ukraine is concerned, however, the political facts speak a different language. Russia is being built as an enemy for peace. With its Ukraine policy, Russia is actually reacting to NATO's expansionist policy. Is Russia an aggressor in the Ukraine conflict? "The political facts speak a different language" Interview with journalism researcher Florian Zollmann [This interview published on 12/23/2021 is translated from the German on the Internet, .] "Russia is being built as an enemy for peace. With its Ukraine policy, Russia is actually reacting to NATO's policy of expansion." This is what journalism researcher Florian Zollmann says in an interview with NachDenkSeiten. Zollmann, who deals a lot with political propaganda in the media, says the media are "turning reality upside down" when it comes to classifying the tensions between Russia and Ukraine. "The Russian side, which perceives a progressive eastward expansion of NATO in disregard of agreements reached at the highest political level, is marginalized in the media," said Zollmann, who teaches at Newcastle University in England. By Marcus Klöckner. Mr Zollmann, the media is currently focusing again on Russia in connection with Ukraine. Recently, it was reported that Russia had gathered 175,000 troops on the border with Ukraine. What is happening right now. Representatives of leading NATO states are outraged because Russia has allegedly moved troops to the border with Ukraine. A look at the facts, however, shows that Russia is acting as any other state in a similar geopolitical situation would act. For a long time now, there has been no question in the "reporting" of major media: Russia is the aggressor! What does your analysis look like? Exactly. The media coverage gives the impression that Russia is an imperial power and that the West must protect itself and its allies from it. What does this view have to do with reality? Nothing. Reality is turned upside down. Because the historical context is hardly adequately illuminated in the media. The Russian side, which perceives a progressive eastward expansion of NATO in disregard of agreements reached at the highest political level, is marginalized in the media. Imagine the following hypothetical facts: Russia would have included Latin American states such as Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama and Honduras in its international military alliance Organization of the Collective Security Treaty (CSTO) and claimed to install nuclear weapons in these countries. Imagine, furthermore, that the CSTO launched military cooperation with Mexico and tried to include the country bordering the south of the USA in the CSTO. In this case, wouldn't it be expected that the US would move troops to the border of Mexico? And exactly this scenario is currently taking place, but on the border with Russia.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
NEG › Russia General – NEG › 1NC --- Russia = Defensive

The US and NATO are at fault for provoking Russia

Carpenter 22 [Ted Galen Carpenter is senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. Carpenter served as Cato’s director of foreign policy studies from 1986 to 1995 and as vice president for defense and foreign policy studies from 1995 to 2011. “The U.S. and NATO Helped Trigger the Ukraine War. It’s Not ‘Siding With Putin’ to Admit It”, Cato Institute, 3-7-22, ] SL

Moscow’s cruel overreaction deserves emphatic condemnation. However, the culpability of the United States and its NATO allies also is sizable. Moving an alliance that one great power dominates to the border of another major power is inherently destabilizing and provocative. Those people who are familiar with even the basics of international relations should grasp that point; it was inexcusable that so many U.S. and NATO leaders apparently did not do so. One can readily imagine how Americans would react if Russia, China, India, or another peer competitor admitted countries from Central America and the Caribbean to a security alliance that it led—and then sought to add Canada as an official or de facto military ally. It is highly probable that the United States would have responded by going to war years ago. Yet even though Ukraine has an importance to Russia comparable to Canada’s importance to the United States, our leaders expected Moscow to respond passively to the growing encroachment. They have been proven disastrously wrong, and thanks to their ineptitude, the world is now a far more dangerous place.