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2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Links › L – Cyber

The plan is resource intensive. It would require long and drawn-out negotiations

Lonergan and Moller ‘22 (Erica D. Lonergan is an assistant professor in the Army Cyber Institute and a research scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Sara B. Moller is a former Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College and will be joining the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University later this year. “NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with its Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea.,” Politico, )

NATO has achieved some strategic ambiguity with its current cyber policy, which may help to deter high-stakes Russian assaults during the present crisis. However, rather than an all-out Russian cyberattack, a far more plausible scenario is a lower-level attack carried out by the Russian government or a proxy group against one or more allies. In this case, the alliance’s interests — not to mention transatlantic security — would be better served by adopting nationally-tailored responses rather than pulling the Article 5 lever. Additionally, to prevent further escalation and reinforce the implicit firebreak that currently exists between cyber and conventional military operations, NATO allies should also agree to restrict any retaliatory response against Moscow to the cyber realm or non-military instruments of power. With little chance of improved NATO-Russian relations any time soon, time is of the essence to get this right. The allies should begin the hard political legwork now to ensure members get on the same page before NATO’s June summit, if not sooner. Achieving consensus on significant cyber issues has previously taken time. NATO’s attribution of the Microsoft Exchange hack last summer to China was an important step for the alliance and sent a strong signal to our adversaries. But it took months to reach agreement on the statement; the hack was uncovered in March 2021 and the NATO statement was not made public until July. In the current crisis, the alliance will not have the luxury of waiting four (or more) months to agree on a response. To avoid incurring damaging costs to NATO’s credibility and its deterrent powers, the allies should refine their cyber policy, now.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Links › L – Cyber

NATO cyber-defense is enormously expensive

Sanger ‘16 (David, White House and national security correspondent, and a senior writer @ NYT, “As Russian Hackers Probe, NATO Has No Clear Cyberwar Strategy,” New York Times,

At United States Cyber Command, which has expanded rapidly since the United States carried out cyberattacks against Iran in 2010, Russia’s networks are a regular target of surveillance. By next year, Cyber Command will have more than 130 teams fully in operation around the world, integrated into Army, Navy, Marine and Air Force units, in addition to teams that work alongside the National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Md. It has built up a vast early warning network, placing tens of thousands of “implants” — sensors that can also be used to insert malware — into networks around the world. But NATO is only beginning to explore what it delicately calls “active defense,” and says it is not focused on offensive cyberweapons. The Russians have no such compunctions. But it is unclear what Russian hackers hope to achieve here in the Baltics, other than to make the point, as they did in 2007 when they brought Estonia to an electronic halt, that they can get into any system, anytime. “Whatever the Russians have in mind — mostly intimidation — it usually fails,” said Estonia’s president, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who grew up in New Jersey before coming here to turn this small NATO country into a pioneer in introducing new web-based technology for governing a nation. The 2007 attacks backfired, he noted, because they drove Estonians far more solidly into the European and NATO camps. In Sweden and Finland, neutral nations in the Cold War, the politics are more complex. As the NATO exercise began in Finland last week, the Finnish foreign minister was in Moscow, meeting his Russian counterpart, Sergey V. Lavrov. The more Sweden and Finland turn to NATO, the more their networks, their news sites and their government ministries come under cyberattack. As Adm. John Richardson, the chief of United States naval operations, said at an event at the Council on Foreign Relations in May, “The fact is it’s a pretty hot war in the cyber domain going on right now.” A hot war, but a kind that suits Russia well: It is part of what military strategists call “gray zone” combat. For Mr. Putin, cyberespionage and cyberattacks keep NATO and its partners off balance. They are enormously difficult and expensive to defend against, and, at least for now, they have operated below the line that is likely to prompt a military or economic response. “It stays below the radar,” Martin Libicki of the RAND Corporation told a conference sponsored this month by the NATO cyber center here, officially known as the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence. For the Russians, Mr. Libicki said, cyberespionage and weaponry are part of a larger strategy of information warfare and a blitz of propaganda that makes sorting out fact from fiction — say, the causes of the Malaysia Airlines crash in Ukraine — all the more difficult. But the attacks also remind the smaller nations here of their vulnerability, even if Russia’s troops stay on their side of the border. So far, NATO has found few effective means of deterring attacks.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Links › L – Cyber

The plan would demand significant resources and attention – guarantees a trade-off.

Daniel & Kenway ’20 (Michael Daniel currently serves as President and CEO of the non-profit Cyber Threat Alliance (CTA). Joshua Kenway is a Cybersecurity Associate at the Cyber Threat Alliance and a Research Fellow with the Algorithmic Justice League. “Repairing the Foundation: How Cyber Threat Information Sharing Can Live Up to its Promise and Implications for NATO,” in Cyber Threats and NATO 2030: Horizon Scanning and Analysis, December 2020, )-mikee

Effective cyber threat information sharing requires planning, long-term investment, and sustained commitment. For example, technical cyber threat information sharing is not merely a matter of adopting a technical standard and installing software. It takes engineering and analytic time on an ongoing basis as well as maintenance of the technology and processes. Similarly, consuming cyber security best practices is not a one-time endeavour; organisations must incorporate regular review and implementation into their business processes. Absent a long-term commitment from organizational leadership, sharing usually withers after an initial burst of enthusiasm. Cyber security should take on the same status as other business enablers, such as accounting, legal affairs, and communications; like these areas, cyber security should be a function that all organisations budget for and sustain over the long-term. Cyber threat information sharing has bedevilled the cyber security community for at least two decades. Faulty assumptions have prevented this fundamentally sound concept from achieving its potential. But while information sharing is a tough problem, it is not an insoluble one. If the cyber security community adopts different underlying assumptions for information sharing then the volume, quality, and utility of the exchanged information can increase. In turn, more effective, relevant information sharing will enable defenders to better understand and anticipate adversaries, develop mechanisms to disrupt adversary activities more strategically, and raise the level of cyber security across the digital ecosystem. Under these circumstances, cyber threat information sharing can finally live up to its promise to enable better cyber security for everyone. For NATO, updating programmes to reflect these revised information sharing assumptions would require significant changes to current operations. First, overcoming the technical, economic, legal, and cultural barriers to sharing relevant, actionable information across member countries and economic sectors will require sustained attention, prioritisation, and funding from NATO’s senior leadership. Absent such attention, the barriers will likely prove insurmountable. Second, NATO should build on its existing MISP [Malware Information Sharing Platform] use to create a more comprehensive system of information sharing that broadens the types of information shared and widens the number of recipients. Third, NATO should consider how to better leverage industry for technical information, while enriching that information with government-derived information about context, attribution, and intent. If NATO shifted its approach to information sharing as suggested, the Alliance would have the opportunity to assume a leadership position in this area. If not, NATO will continue to struggle to make information sharing live up to its promise.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Links › L – Focus

US leadership in Europe undermines effective deterrence of China

Mearsheimer ’22 (John, Professor of Political Science at U Chicago, “Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine,” The New Yorker, March 1, 2022, )//BB

I’m talking about the raw-power potential of Russia—the amount of economic might it has. Military might is built on economic might. You need an economic foundation to build a really powerful military. To go out and conquer countries like Ukraine and the Baltic states and to re-create the former Soviet Union or re-create the former Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe would require a massive army, and that would require an economic foundation that contemporary Russia does not come close to having. There is no reason to fear that Russia is going to be a regional hegemony in Europe. Russia is not a serious threat to the United States. We do face a serious threat in the international system. We face a peer competitor. And that’s China. Our policy in Eastern Europe is undermining our ability to deal with the most dangerous threat that we face today. What do you think our policy should be in Ukraine right now, and what do you worry that we’re doing that’s going to undermine our China policy? We should be pivoting out of Europe to deal with China in a laser-like fashion, number one. And, number two, we should be working overtime to create friendly relations with the Russians. The Russians are part of our balancing coalition against China. If you live in a world where there are three great powers—China, Russia, and the United States—and one of those great powers, China, is a peer competitor, what you want to do if you’re the United States is have Russia on your side of the ledger. Instead, what we have done with our foolish policies in Eastern Europe is drive the Russians into the arms of the Chinese. This is a violation of Balance of Power Politics 101.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Links › L – Focus

The plan distracts US from deterring China.

Hass ’22 (Ryan, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies and Nonresident Fellow at Yale Law School, “For Taiwan, reading the moment is essential,” June 13, 2022, Order From Chaos report from Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/13/for-taiwan-reading-the-moment-is-essential/)-mikee

There has been a lot of global media frenzy about Taiwan’s security in recent weeks. Experts have debated what lessons China might be drawing from Russia’s military setbacks in Ukraine. Pundits grew excited when President Joe Biden declared in Tokyo that the United States would intervene militarily if Taiwan was attacked. Yet, below this exuberant froth, policy discussions in the United States, Asia, and Europe have remained relatively steady. I have had an opportunity to interact with senior officials and diplomats from all three of these regions in recent weeks, as well as a range of business executives. They all have unanimously said they are paying heightened attention to developments in the Taiwan Strait and thinking methodically through how best to adjust to shifting circumstances. Contrary to what daily newspaper headlines would suggest, though, they are not considering radical shifts in approach. They are responding to evolving circumstances by doing the equivalent of adjusting a light dimmer rather than flipping a light switch​. Some American experts fear that Ukraine will distract the U.S. from preparing for the principal arena of potential conflict — Asia. They argued early in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that the United States should not allow itself to get bogged down in a European conflict that did not implicate America’s vital interests. They suggested instead that the United States should accelerate its transition in focus and military resources to the Indo-Pacific and strengthen America’s deterrent posture against China.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Links › L – Budget Resources

Security cooperation with NATO trades off with commitments to Asian allies

Bowne ’18 (Andrew, Major, Judge Advocate in the US Air Force, “Defending The New Fulda Gap: Deterring Russian Aggression Against The Baltic States Through Fiscal Legislation,” Military Law Review, 226.3)//BB

Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine the precise amount of expenditures the United States commits directly to NATO, estimates by RAND Corporation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) place the total costs of keeping U.S. forces in key industrial nations at less than $10 billion a year, or less than two percent of the total defense budget.58 While the United States increased defense spending by over eighty percent since 2001, “virtually none of that increase was generated by NATO commitments.”59 When compared to the defense posture the United States fielded in Europe during the Cold War, the resources currently obligated to defending Europe are remarkably low. In 1990, approximately fifteen percent of the total worldwide active strength was stationed in Europe, whereas only three percent of a significantly smaller total active force remains in Europe in 2017.60 Thus, despite the political rhetoric and fact that the United States spends more on defense than all other NATO members combined, it is clear the actual contribution to NATO is a relatively small portion of the overall U.S. defense budget. It is critical to understand the parameters of the United States’ contribution to NATO because the United States has finite resources, and, since enactment of the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011, legally binding caps on funding.61 Every dollar spent towards the objectives of NATO is, in theory, a dollar less going to fight the Islamic State or towards the Pacific pivot. However, the misunderstanding of the true costs of the United States’ role in NATO could have dangerous consequences. If the U.S. budgets and plans for NATO operations based on the false premise that it already spends too much and its partners do not contribute enough, U.S. leadership will likely make decisions that adversely affect its own national security interests.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Links › L – Generic

Increasing security cooperation locks in dependence and makes challenging China impossible – status quo is temporary, the aff makes in permanent.

Wertheim ’22 (Stephen, senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Europe is showing that it could lead its own defense,” March 3, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/03/europe-defense-nato-ukraine-war/)-mikee

In the long run, the United States can’t contain both Russia and China. Europe’s resolute opposition to Putin’s war provides an opening for a strategic shift. When a great power takes a gamble, the world shakes. By ordering an attack on Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has unleashed a chain of reactions whose endpoint no one can yet foresee. Already apparent, however, is one consequence for the United States. Overstretched to begin with, America has just seen its strategic burden increase. Just as suddenly, however, a new solution is coming into view: Europe is ready to take on greater military duties. Before the war, many Americans, including some political leaders, had determined to be more realistic about their country’s strategic ambitions in an increasingly competitive world. Sensibly, President Biden had sought to stabilize relations with Russia and reduce U.S. war-making in the greater Middle East while turning attention and resources toward managing a rising China. But Putin’s Russia has refused to be sidelined. By invading Ukraine, it has caused NATO’s eastern flank, with four countries bordering Russian territory, to demand reinforcements — and the United States has risen to the task. Biden has sent 14,000 American troops to Europe since the crisis began, bringing the total to 100,000. Providing temporary reinforcements is the right decision today in the face of Russia’s bald aggression. But the United States should resist the inclination to revive its role as the military protector of Europe, especially since Europe is awakening to its responsibilities. Britain is sending troops to the Baltic states and Poland. France is pushing “strategic autonomy” for the European Union. And days after halting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline supplying natural gas from Russia, Germany reversed a long-standing ban on providing military assistance and sent weapons to Ukraine. Germany also vowed to spend more than 2 percent of its economy on defense, finally committing to meet NATO’s target. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz declared his country, and Europe, to have reached a “historic turning point.” Both Americans and Europeans would benefit if Scholz’s words prove true. In the coming years, European states should move to take the lead in their collective defense, and the United States should do everything possible to encourage them. To stake the defense of Europe on the United States, over the next decade and beyond, would be to answer Putin’s rash gamble with a slow-moving gamble of our own. It might seem as though the United States will remain able and willing to protect all of NATO’s 28 European countries far into the future. After all, America has orchestrated Europe’s defense for the past eight decades. Yet it did so under two markedly different conditions. During World War II and the Cold War, the United States sought to stop totalitarian powers from conquering the region. An Axis or Soviet takeover of Europe would have closed off the entire continent to liberal, American-style interaction and influence, and put the Western Hemisphere on the defensive. After the Cold War, however, as the Soviet threat collapsed, the United States recommitted to Europe not because the stakes were high but arguably because they were low. Threats were so negligible that it seemed U.S. leadership could keep things that way through modest exertion — and spread democracy to boot. Expanding NATO eastward, American officials convinced themselves that what had been a military alliance was more comparable to a political club, one that need not become an adversary of Russia. Russia’s assault on Ukraine ends that chapter and begins a new one. The prospect of further Russian aggression in Eastern Europe cannot be dismissed as negligible, as it was in the 1990s or 2000s. At the same time, Russia poses far less a threat to overrun Europe and threaten American security or prosperity than the Soviet Union did. After all, the Russian economy is roughly one-fifth the size of that of the European Union, and that was before the severe sanctions of the past week. Although Russia has built a formidable military, one that enables it to launch wars like that in Ukraine, NATO’s European members collectively outspend Russia on defense. During the Cold War, by contrast, the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact boasted land forces superior in number to those of NATO (including the U.S. share), and the gap between its economic output and that of Western Europe was several times smaller than Russia’s shortfall today. In the security environment now emerging, with Russia menacing Eastern Europe, the United States is set to face major costs and the ultimate risk: great-power war between nuclear peers. Yet the threat Russia poses remains one that Europeans could handle themselves, with America acting as a supporter rather than the leader. The United States remains a superpower. Why shouldn’t it be the main counterweight in Europe to Moscow? There are two reasons both the United States and Europe would be better off if it declined this role. One lies in Beijing, and the other in Washington. The United States has already identified China as its primary rival, embarking on “strategic competition” with the world’s number-two power. Taking on China and Russia at once would be unwise and likely impossible. True, the Pentagon has previously planned to fight two wars at once, but those wars were envisioned as “regional” conflicts against small states like Iran, Iraq or North Korea. In practice, the United States had difficulty prosecuting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simultaneously. China and Russia represent challenges of a far greater magnitude, which explains why the Pentagon abandoned its two-war standard in 2018, even as its budget has grown. If the United States doubles down on European security while leading the charge in Asia, it may either fall short in both places or default on its commitments in Europe just when they come due. America’s domestic divisions must also be taken seriously. The Republican front-runner for 2024, former president Donald Trump, initially called Putin’s invasion of Ukraine a “genius” move. How reliable, then, is America’s commitment to Europe? Even in better times, it would remain uncertain whether a U.S. president would place the American people in peril for the sake of repelling a Russian attack in Eastern Europe — for example, potentially trading a nuclear attack on Boston to protect the Estonian capital of Tallinn. Under present circumstances, it would be folly for Europe to trust its fate to doubtful promises, and wise for the Biden administration to Trump-proof American alliances. Today, even smaller European countries like Belgium, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are ferrying arms to Ukraine, while perpetually neutral Switzerland is freezing Russian assets. Yet proclamations of a “new Europe” are premature. If the United States does not galvanize and incentivize its allies to step up, they are unlikely to make the profound changes needed to build a European security architecture that can last. In the coming months, the administration could formulate a multiyear but time-limited plan to transition to a European defense led by Europe. Such a plan would build on the work of the British-Baltics-Polish coalition that reinforced Eastern Europe before the war, but it must also involve the major Continental powers of Germany and France, whose participation is key to forging a durable order. By publicizing the plan, and doing so while passions remain high, the United States and its allies could create a credible commitment on both sides of the Atlantic. Europe would have to act quickly to redress its strategic deficits relative to Russia, which are real but too often exaggerated. The European members of NATO already possess around two dozen armored and mechanized brigades, enough to make a Russian offensive difficult in the early stages and allow Europe to prevail through its overwhelming economic and demographic advantages. The most urgent task is to improve the readiness and sustainability of European forces. German determination and funding will go a long way toward that end. In particular, Europe must develop certain critical capabilities, such as surface-to-air missile batteries, combat-support assets, and air-refueling systems — all essential for high-end operations, and at present possessed mostly by the United States. During the transitional period, U.S. military would continue to provide command-and-control functions and logistics support so as not leave an opportunity for Moscow to exploit. The Biden administration would, however, begin to shift command of NATO to European leadership, and deepen its support for E.U. defense efforts, which previous administrations sought to suppress. As European forces steps up, the United States could bring most of its personnel home, with some air and naval forces remaining. Europe would also need to grow its defense-industrial base, both to develop cutting-edge technologies and to create enduring political support for higher spending. Since 2017, the E.U. has implemented promising new measures to increase and coordinate investments in defense. If the E.U. could borrow 750 billion euros to fund pandemic recovery, it could borrow billions more to finance new defense capabilities. Here, as elsewhere, the United States would have to take concerned action just to keep from getting in its allies’ way. To allow European industry to grow, the White House and Congress ought to be less aggressive in facilitating sales of U.S.-made military equipment. The profits of domestic contractors should yield to the vital defense needs of the United States and Europe. In another era, the prospect of letting Europeans lead Europe’s defense would have caused an outcry in some quarters of Washington. Even today, it will cause controversy. But political reality suggests it is necessary. Biden has a once-in-a-generation chance to realign America’s strategic priorities while demonstrably strengthening Europe’s defenses. By doing so, he could inspire bipartisan unity. He could forge a path that his successors could follow, regardless of party or personality, by building a Europe-led, U.S.-supported order to preserve the next decades of peace and prosperity across the Atlantic.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Uniqueness › AT: Ukraine

Biden is shifting from Ukraine to focus resources on China now

Tharoor ‘22 (Isanan, analyst @ WaPo, “Biden pivots to Asia as Ukraine war rages on,” Washington Post, 5-13-2022, )

The past couple of months marked a rallying moment for the geopolitical West. The Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered a sweeping, united response from Europe and its allies across the Atlantic. It led to far-reaching, coordinated sanctions on Moscow. It provoked a new, steely approach from many Europeans to diplomatically and militarily confront Russia. And it spurred the imminent expansion of NATO, an alliance cast by critics not long ago as an obsolete relic of the Cold War. The United States and its E.U. partners are flooding Ukraine with weaponry and aid. By some accounts, the Biden administration alone has mustered more funding for Ukraine in recent weeks than it is committing in the next fiscal year for fighting the planetary peril of climate change. Yet in Washington, there remains a large elephant in the room: China. New battles with the Kremlin have energized the doyens of the city’s foreign policy establishment, many of whom cut their teeth during the Cold War. But the Biden administration is trying to show that it hasn’t lost sight of its key 21st century “strategic competitor.” And it recognizes that its contest with China requires closer partnerships well outside Europe. A new push started this week. On Thursday evening, the White House hosted a dinner with eight leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a part of a major U.S.-led summit with the regional bloc. On Friday, the Southeast Asian delegations are slated to continue discussions at the State Department before a plenary session with President Biden. Next week, Biden will embark on a five-day trip to South Korea and Japan, culminating in another meeting of the “Quad” grouping with Australia, Japan and India. U.S. officials recognize that a decade of talk about a strategic “pivot” to Asia has yet to yield concrete results. “Several administrations in succession in the United States have tried … to launch more fundamental efforts, policies, frameworks in Asia, East Asia, Indo-Pacific, and found themselves stymied or misdirected or directed toward other pursuits,” said Kurt Campbell, the White House’s lead official on Indo-Pacific policy, in a speech this week at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. “And that has been something that I think all of us are deeply aware of in the formulation and execution of policy.” The Biden administration aims to show that its heavy involvement in the Ukraine war is not a distraction from its priorities to the East. But it is climbing an uphill road with ASEAN countries, where many officials lament a lack of American engagement, especially during the years of the Trump administration.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Uniqueness › AT: Ukraine

Aid to Ukraine doesn’t trigger perception of abandonment in Asia, yet. But, further moves to solidify US presence in Europe would

Walker ‘22 (Dustin, nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a former staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, “Biden Must Do Better Than Obama on Ukraine,” Foreign Policy, )

The Winter Olympics are just around the corner. Russian President Vladimir Putin has Ukraine on his mind. In Washington, the Pentagon is preparing a new defense strategy that looks beyond the Middle East to focus on the Pacific and China. The White House, meanwhile, is concerned about costs and wants to rein in military spending. Sound familiar? Well, this is exactly what the world looked like once before—in 2014. When the Obama administration’s defense strategy was released in March 2014, the document was obsolete the day it was published. It did not mention Ukraine, even though Putin’s little green men had already seized Crimea. It did not mention the Islamic State by name, though the group’s fighters had already captured Fallujah. With the defense budget under spending caps and the threat of sequestration, the Pentagon had to spend tens of billions of dollars in contingency funds to rebuild European deterrence following Russia’s invasion and occupation of Ukraine and to defeat the Islamic State in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the Obama administration’s attempt to pivot to Asia stalled, and the U.S. military edge over China continued to shrink. As history threatens to repeat itself, U.S. President Joe Biden—who served under Barack Obama as vice president—looks perilously close to following in his predecessor’s footsteps. Biden faces the same question as in 2014: How can the United States stay focused on China while dealing with the crisis in Ukraine? Just as it was then, prioritizing the Indo-Pacific and countering China will not be strategically effective or politically sustainable if it is premised on sacrificing the commitment to credible NATO deterrence and defense. But given finite resources, the United States cannot confront China, the most powerful adversary it has ever faced, without substantially changing how it achieves strategic ends in Europe—especially when it comes to military power. That’s not just an urgent strategic question to answer now, as Washington decides how to deal with Russia’s threatened invasion of Ukraine. It also needs to be at the core of the Pentagon’s strategy that is set to be published as early as March. The administration must resist calls for a return to a strategy designed to win on two fronts simultaneously or in sequence. Right now, the United States can do a lot to support Ukraine, impose costs on Russia, and assure NATO allies without compromising its strategy to counter China. At the top of the list are accelerated deliveries of defensive military equipment to Ukraine—especially anti-armor, anti-ship, and air defense capabilities—as well as intelligence support and humanitarian assistance. If Russia does invade, Biden should get much more serious about sanctions than Obama was in 2014. Washington should target the wealth of Putin’s cronies in Western financial hubs, terminate Russian access to the SWIFT global payment system, prohibit transactions in Russian sovereign debt, sanction the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and cut off access to U.S. technology critical for industries favored by Putin, including defense. The Trump administration’s technology sanctions that have seriously hobbled the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei are an excellent precedent for this. The United States should also join NATO efforts to reinforce its eastern flank, including contributing U.S. troops to support the temporary activation and deployment of NATO’s Response Force. For this eventuality, the Biden administration has placed up to 8,500 U.S. military personnel on alert. But even as Washington reacts to Moscow’s threats to overturn the European security order, China and the Indo-Pacific must remain the primary focus of the United States’ strategic calculus. To that end, the administration should ensure sanctions do not inflict collateral damage on Indo-Pacific allies and partners. In particular, ensnaring India in Russia-focused sanctions for New Delhi’s planned purchase of the Russian S-400 air and missile defense system would be a mistake. Sanctions won’t stop the S-400 deal, but they would play into the narrative pushed by Moscow and Beijing that Washington is not a trustworthy partner for New Delhi. To keep its focus squarely on the Indo-Pacific, the United States must exercise restraint in what forces it sends to reinforce NATO should Putin invade Ukraine, and from where. Forces should not be taken from the Pacific. They should be relocated within Europe, from the United States, or from lower-priority theaters. For example, air and ground forces stationed in the Middle East could be moved to southeastern Europe to bolster NATO while remaining close enough to respond to any contingency. Deployment of an additional U.S. Army brigade combat team—of limited utility vis-à-vis China—may be sensible. But the Pentagon should avoid new, long-term deployments of assets in low supply, such as missile defense systems and advanced platforms for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Biden administration should also remember that allies provide the bricks, while the United States provides the mortar. NATO allies should contribute the bulk of any new forces deployed to guard the alliance’s eastern flank while the United States provides key military enablers such as command and control, logistics, and combat medicine. The good news is that allies are in fact stepping up: Denmark, France, Spain, and the Netherlands have all recently announced or proposed reinforcements of ships, fighter aircraft, and ground forces. Even as it responds to the crisis in Europe, Washington can take parallel steps to bolster deterrence in the Pacific—so that the current attention on Europe is not interpreted as a sign of weakness and distraction, as it was in 2014. For example, the Biden administration could announce plans to station a fifth and eventual sixth attack submarine in Guam. It could also back legislation on Capitol Hill to increase security assistance to Taiwan. Taking these steps during a crisis in Europe would send a powerful signal to Beijing and allied capitals that the United States’ priority on the Pacific perseveres. The Biden administration’s new defense strategy needs to confront the question of overstretch head-on. Given limited resources and the strength of the United States’ adversaries—especially China—the U.S. ability to prevail in a great-power conflict cannot be taken for granted. That’s why the administration must resist calls for a return to a strategy designed to win on two fronts simultaneously or in sequence. Such a force sizing is simply not realistic and would dilute the U.S. military’s focus on the Indo-Pacific as its priority theater, China as its pacing threat, and Taiwan as its pressing scenario. Critically, staying on track in the Pacific requires matching any new military commitments in Europe—even temporary ones—with new resources. The United States must not ask its military to do more with less or pretend that China and Russia can be deterred and confronted on the cheap. Now is not the time to cut defense spending as the Biden administration has proposed. Not when the U.S. military edge relative to China has so dangerously eroded. Not when inflation, aging platforms, rising personnel costs, and the failure to pass a budget on time are sapping the Pentagon’s buying power. The Biden administration and the U.S. Congress must provide the military with the sufficient, timely, and predictable funding demanded in these perilous times, and which U.S. service members deserve.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Uniqueness › AT: Ukraine

Biden is reducing involvement in Ukraine– China is the top-priority now

Ferguson ’22 (Niall Ferguson is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. The Milbank Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, “Dust Off That Dirty Word Detente and Engage With China,” June 5, 2022, )-mikee

To his credit, Biden dialed back his administration’s goals in a measured op-ed for the New York Times on May 31. “We do not seek a war between NATO and Russia. … [T]he United States will not try to bring about [Putin’s] ouster in Moscow. So long as the United States or our allies are not attacked, we will not be directly engaged in this conflict. We are not encouraging or enabling Ukraine to strike beyond its borders. We do not want to prolong the war just to inflict pain on Russia.” But the reality is that the administration has become the arsenal of Ukraine’s democracy, not the broker of a peace that it is leaving to Ukraine to define. Three of Europe’s most important leaders — French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi — are distinctly uneasy about this. They would much prefer to see an imminent ceasefire and the start of peace negotiations. But to speak of compromise in the current febrile atmosphere of Ukrainophilia is to invite charges of appeasement. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy reacted angrily to Kissinger’s argument for a peace based on the status quo ante. “I get the sense that instead of the year 2022,” Zelenskiy snapped, “Mr. Kissinger has 1938 on his calendar.” Yet Zelenskiy himself has said repeatedly — most recently in an interview on May 21 — that he would regard as “victory” a return to the territorial position on Feb. 23, which was what Kissinger plainly meant by the status quo ante. That would mean Ukraine taking back Kherson and the ravaged city of Mariupol. It would mean pushing Russia out of its “land bridge” from Crimea to Russia. And it would mean completely reversing all the gains the Russians have made in the eastern Donbas region. Zelenskiy knows, and so should we, what a daunting task that represents. In a speech last week, he acknowledged that Russia has seized around a fifth of Ukraine’s territory. In an interview with Newsmax, he admitted that Ukraine was losing “60 to 100 soldiers per day as killed in action and something around 500 people as wounded in action.” Even with an open-ended commitment from the US to supply them with weapons, do the Ukrainians have the trained manpower to drive Russia out of all the territory it has occupied since Feb. 24? And if this brutal war continues through the summer, and is still being fought as the year wanes and the temperatures begin to fall in Europe, what then? Vladimir Putin is surely counting on the usual divisions within the Western alliance and within American politics to resurface sooner or later. The most remarkable thing about the foreign policy of the Biden administration is that helping Ukraine defeat Russia is not even its top priority. “Even as President Putin’s war continues,” declared Secretary of State Antony Blinken in a speech at George Washington University on May 26, “we will remain focused on the most serious long-term challenge to the international order — and that’s posed by the People’s Republic of China.” Blinken’s speech repays close study. About one-tenth of it was conciliatory. “We are not looking for conflict or a new Cold War,” he declared. “We do not seek to transform China’s political system. … We will engage constructively with China wherever we can.” But the rest was as hawkish a speech on China as the one delivered by then Vice President Mike Pence in October 2018, which for me was the moment Cold War II got going in earnest. In Blinken’s words: Under President Xi, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad. We see that in how Beijing has perfected mass surveillance within China and exported that technology to more than 80 countries; how its advancing unlawful maritime claims in the South China Sea, undermining peace and security, freedom of navigation, and commerce; how it’s circumventing or breaking trade rules … and how it purports to champion sovereignty and territorial integrity while standing with governments that brazenly violate them. Blinken spelled out how the US intends to “shape the strategic environment around Beijing,” citing the new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, announced by Biden on his recent Asia tour, and the Quad of the US, Australia, India and Japan, with its new Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, not forgetting AUKUS, the US deal on nuclear submarines with Australia and the UK. But the most startling lines in Blinken’s speech were the ones on “the genocide and crimes against humanity happening in the Xinjiang region”; on US support for “Tibet, where the authorities continue to wage a brutal campaign against Tibetans and their culture, language, and religious traditions”; on Hong Kong, “where the Chinese Communist Party has imposed harsh anti-democratic measures under the guise of national security”; on “Beijing’s aggressive and unlawful activities in the South and East China Seas”; and — the coup de grace from a Chinese vantage point — on “Beijing’s growing coercion” and “increasingly provocative rhetoric and activity” toward Taiwan. The response of the Chinese Foreign Ministry to this confrontational speech was, I thought, surprisingly restrained. Taiwan is, of course, the key issue. As if to confirm Xi Jinping’s darkest suspicions, Biden went off script again at a press conference in Tokyo with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida on May 23. A reporter asked if the United States would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack. “Yes,” the president answered. “That’s the commitment we made. We agree with a one-China policy. We've signed on to it and all the intended agreements made from there. But the idea that, that it (Taiwan) can be taken by force, just taken by force, is just not, is just not appropriate.” Almost immediately, US officials, led by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, walked this latest gaffe back. But when is a gaffe not a gaffe? When the president of the United States says it three times. By my count, that is the number of occasions Biden has pledged to come to Taiwan’s defense since August last year. What are the practical implications of ditching the half-century-old policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan, which dates to Kissinger’s compromise with Zhou Enlai in 1972? In his book “The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict,” Elbridge Colby argues that the US can and must prioritize the defense of Taiwan. Colby was deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development under Donald Trump. His book has been a hit with China hawks precisely because it gets specific about how the US could cope with a Chinese attempt to seize Taiwan. “Defending forces operating from a distributed, resilient force posture and across all the war-fighting domains,” Colby writes, “might use a variety of methods to blunt the Chinese invasion in the air and seas surrounding Taiwan.” The US and its allies might “seek to disable or destroy Chinese transport ships and aircraft before they left Chinese ports or airstrips. The defenders might also try to obstruct key ports; neutralize key elements of Chinese command and control … And once Chinese forces entered the Strait, US and defending forces could use a variety of methods to disable or destroy Chinese transport ships and aircraft.” “There’s a very real chance of a major war with China in the coming years,” Colby tweeted last month. “Everyone with influence should be asking themselves: Did I do *everything* I could to deter it? And make it less costly for Americans if it does happen? … China has the will, the way, and increasingly a sense of urgency to take us on over stakes that are genuinely decisive for us (and the world, for that matter).”

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Uniqueness › U – Resolve High Now

Resolve high now because Biden is prioritizing Asia above Europe

Erlanger ’21 (Steven, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe, based in Brussels, “The Sharp U.S. Pivot to Asia Is Throwing Europe Off Balance,” New York Times, 9-28-2021, )

Until this week, the so-called “pivot to Asia” by the United States had been more of a threat than a reality for Europe. But that changed when the Biden administration announced a new defense alliance against China that has left Europe facing an implicit question: Which side are you on? It is a question that European leaders have studiously sought to avoid since former President Barack Obama first articulated that America should “pivot” resources and attention to Asia as part of its rivalry with China. European leaders hoped that the relationship between the two superpowers could remain stable and that Europe could balance its interests between the two. Then the Trump administration sharply raised the temperature with China with tariffs and other trade barriers. And now the Biden administration on Wednesday announced an alliance between the United States, Britain and Australia that would help Australia deploy nuclear-powered submarines in the Pacific — and, in doing so, also tore up a $66 billion deal for Australia to buy a French fleet of diesel-powered subs. “Europeans want to defer the moment of truth, to not make a choice between the two,” said Thomas Gomart, director of the French Institute of International Relations, or IFRI. “The Biden administration, like the Trump one, is provoking the moment of choice.” France was enraged. Yet if it was a humiliation — as well as the cancellation of a lucrative defense deal — it possibly did have a silver lining for France’s broader goals. President Emmanuel Macron of France has been Europe’s loudest proponent of “strategic autonomy,” the idea that Europe needs to retain a balanced approach to the United States and China. “We must survive on our own, as others do,” said Josep Borrell Fontelles, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, echoing the French line. The French embarrassment — the Americans also announced the submarine deal with little if any warning — came after the disastrous fall of Afghanistan. European allies were furious with the Biden administration, blaming the Americans for acting with little or no consultation and feeding Mr. Macron’s argument that the United States is no longer an entirely reliable security partner. “The submarines and Afghanistan, it reinforces the French narrative that you can’t trust the Americans,” said Ulrich Speck of the German Marshall Fund in Berlin. Emmanuel Macron’s Second Term as President of France With the reelection of Emmanuel Macron, French voters favored his promise of stability over the temptation of an extremist lurch. Cabinet: President Macron’s new government combines continuity with change, as newcomers at the foreign and education ministries join first-term veterans. New Prime Minister: Élisabeth Borne, the minister of labor who previously was in charge of the environment, will be the second woman to hold the post in France. Overcoming Tragedy: Ms. Borne’s father, a World War II resistance member and a Holocaust survivor, killed himself when she was 11, an experience she has rarely discussed in public. Rape Allegations: Two women have accused Damien Abad, the newly appointed minister for solidarity and for disabled people, of raping them. Mr. Abad has denied the allegations. But whether France will succeed in turning this bilateral defeat into a way to promote strategic autonomy is doubtful, analysts suggest. “Many Europeans will see this as a transparent way for the French to leverage their own interests,” said Robin Niblett, director of Chatham House, the London-based research institution. Even so, there seems little doubt that Europe’s balancing act is becoming trickier to maintain. “Europe needs to think hard about where it sits and what it does,” said Rosa Balfour, director of Carnegie Europe. A Europe that spends more on defense is to be desired, but it also needs allies — including Britain and the United States, she said. And a Europe that does more to build its own security capacity “is the best way to be listened to more by its partners,” she added. The new alliance, known as AUKUS, is an effort to integrate Australia and Britain into the broader American effort to create a security deterrent to China. For Australia, which has seen its once-strong relations with Beijing deteriorate, America and Britain provide a much stouter deterrent to China in the Indo-Pacific, analysts agree, than could the deal with France. “It’s sending a very big signal to Beijing, which is useful for the U.S., but especially useful to Australia,” said Ian Lesser, acting director of the German Marshall Fund and head of its Brussels office. “And the weight of that signal is important because of who the partners are.”

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Uniqueness › U – Taiwan Focus

US-Taiwan security cooperation is increasing, and there are plans to expand it further, but only with sufficient resources and dedicated effort.

Yeager and Gerichten ’22 (Maj. Jake Yeager is an intelligence officer in the U.S. Marine Corps. William Gerichten works for the U.S. Defense Attaché Service as a civilian attaché and serves in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserves as an intelligence officer. “REESTABLISH THE U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE ADVISORY GROUP-TAIWAN,” JANUARY 7, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/01/reestablish-the-u-s-military-assistance-advisory-group-taiwan/)

The United States has a nasty habit of firing resources at a military problem first and asking questions about effective implementation later — as recently demonstrated in Iraq and Afghanistan — but that does not have to be the case with Taiwan. U.S. officials are starting to get more serious about supporting Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. They debate competing policy stances on defending Taiwan (ambiguity versus clarity) but largely agree that “bolstering Taiwan’s self-defenses is an urgent task and an essential feature of deterrence,” as recently stated by the Pentagon’s top official for Asia. Experienced U.S. officials are raising the alarm that China may attempt forceful unification with Taiwan later this decade if deterrence continues to erode. In the 1970s, the United States used triangular diplomacy to gain leverage over the Soviet Union by opening relations with China and eventually switching diplomatic recognition from Taipei, which Washington had previously recognized as the seat of the legitimate Chinese state and government, to Beijing. Prior to this switch in 1979, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Taiwan was the central hub for planning, coordinating, and executing defense cooperation initiatives. It served as the eyes, ears, and voice of the U.S. military to the Taiwanese armed forces. It possessed the requisite staff and planning horsepower to facilitate the large-scale military arms transfers, training, and advising that contributed to decades of Taiwanese military superiority over China, which has since evaporated. BECOME A MEMBER U.S.-Taiwanese defense initiatives are ramping up — to levels unseen since 1979 — due to legitimate concerns about Chinese designs on the island. However, the thick military organizational connective tissue that existed prior to 1979 is no longer in place to facilitate this cooperation. Without a military organization focused on the island, the U.S. personnel, funding, and materiel poured into supporting Taiwan may be inefficiently applied and generate limited return on investment — defined in terms of deterrence and lethality in conflict. To help to deter Chinese aggression, the United States should establish a 21st century version of this often forgotten advisory group to provide the staff capacity, synchronization, and interagency integration required to facilitate increasingly robust U.S.-Taiwanese military collaboration, bolster Taiwan’s defenses, and strengthen its will to fight. Despite inevitable Chinese government counterpressure, reestablishing this organization would probably not trigger military conflict and would be consistent with the U.S. commitment to the One China policy, guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. The Original Organization The original U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group-Formosa (this last word was later changed to “Taiwan”) operated from 1951 to 1979 and was instrumental in professionalizing and modernizing Taiwan’s military. During the Cold War, the United States established military assistance advisory groups in South Korea, Japan, South Vietnam, Europe, and the Middle East to strengthen allies threatened by communism. The group in Taiwan was a reincarnation of the similarly named organization that operated in China from 1947 to 1949, until the Republic of China was defeated by the Communists and withdrew to Taiwan. From 1951 to 1955, this group was responsible for all U.S.-Taiwanese defense matters. In 1955, upon ratification of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command was established and absorbed many personnel, resources, and responsibilities that had previously been aligned to the advisory group. The original advisory group was established in 1951 to facilitate large-scale arms transfers and provide military training and assistance to deter Chinese aggression. The impetus for establishing the organization was a U.S. military aid package worth $300 million — equivalent to over $3 billion today — that would have overwhelmed the small U.S. military staff in Taiwan at the time. In 1950, after North Korea invaded South Korea, the United States shifted its policy to support Taiwan and sent a small team to the island to prepare a comprehensive report on Taiwan’s military that was the basis for the aid package. Once established, the advisory group was led by a major general and initially manned with 116 U.S. servicemembers, but later grew to over 2,000 personnel. The group established a comprehensive American-type military school system for Taiwan’s officer corps, helped the country to implement conscription, trained and advised the military, and oversaw military aid. The U.S. advisory group deeply understood the Taiwan military, shaped its defense concepts, and built complementary U.S. war plans. Lessons from previous U.S. security cooperation efforts — including recent failures in Iraq and Afghanistan — suggest that Washington’s willingness to influence higher-order issues of mission, organizational structure, and leadership is critical. The original advisory group had offices in the same building as the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense and U.S. staff sections were directly attached to their Taiwanese counterparts. It embedded advisers in all major Taiwanese training units and at the regimental level and above. All of the group’s initiatives were informed by the in-depth understanding of Taiwan’s military that was gained through this integration. The group also influenced Taiwan’s defense concepts. It translated hundreds of U.S. military training manuals into Chinese, which shaped Taiwan’s warfighting approach. In the early 1950s, U.S. advisors helped Taiwan to adjust its defense concept from static to mobile defense. The United States later helped Taiwan to shift from a defensive approach to an offensive posture, to hasten an end to the Korean War by implicitly threatening a second front in China’s southeastern underbelly. Prior to the establishment of the Taiwan Defense Command, the advisory group developed U.S. war plans that complemented Taiwan’s own. It also planned U.S. support to the island’s wartime logistical requirements. As part of the U.S. strategy to leverage Taiwan to help to end the Korean War, the organization planned to help to deploy 25,000 Taiwanese military personnel to the Korean front by the end of 1954. A reestablished advisory group could similarly improve Taiwan’s defenses today while creating regional security benefits for the United States and its interests. The Requirement: Control the Increasing Flow of U.S. Military Resources to Taiwan A new advisory group would ensure that increased U.S. defense support provided to Taiwan is synchronized and woven into a holistic plan that enables a credible defense of the island and helps to reverse the erosion of cross-strait deterrence. China has rapidly modernized its fleet and increased its inventory of major naval combatants since 2005, while the U.S. fleet has aged and shed major combat vessels. The U.S. Navy still leads — 213 major combatants to China’s 145 — but China is expected to reach rough parity in major combatants and surpass the U.S. Navy in total submarines by 2030. Further, China’s navy is deployed almost entirely in the Indo-Pacific while America’s is dispersed around the globe. There is ample opportunity to bolster Taiwan’s deterrence to help offset declines on the U.S. side of the equation. This organization would help to fulfill the legal mandate in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. The law requires the United States to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity.” The group would ensure that the growing volume and complexity of “defense articles” and “services” being provided to Taiwan arrive in a timely manner and are “sufficient” to deter Chinese aggression. Bilateral military initiatives are reportedly expanding, in accordance with the growing threat posed by China. Washington is reportedly considering using special operators to help Taipei to conduct irregular warfare, including establishing resistance networks and countering an amphibious landing. This could support Taiwan’s grassroots efforts to mount a whole-of-society defense of the island, integrating civilian militias with active-duty and reserve military personnel. Earlier this year, the United States and Taiwan signed a coast guard cooperation agreement. Taiwan is fielding coast guard vessels capable of carrying anti-ship missiles and envisions its coast guard as a second navy during wartime. Taiwan is also revamping its military reserve system. These are complex undertakings that would benefit from substantial U.S. advice and assistance — especially if they are to be realized this decade. Congress is also pushing for more tangible U.S. support to Taiwan’s defensive preparedness, beyond routine U.S. arms sales. The recently introduced Taiwan Deterrence Act and Arm Taiwan Act would authorize $2 billion and $3 billion a year respectively in foreign military financing for Taiwan. This could help Taipei to purchase relevant defense articles like survivable communications systems, coastal defense cruise missiles (including in shipping containers), small missile boats, sea mines, loitering munition swarms, and mobile air defenses. The Taiwan Partnership Act would establish a partnership between the U.S. National Guard and Taiwan’s military. Taiwan’s plan to spend an extra $9 billion on domestically manufactured missiles and other capabilities may also generate demand for increased U.S. military assistance. Unless it reestablishes a dedicated Taiwan-focused organization, U.S. military staff planning capacity — rather than U.S. policy — may soon become the limiting factor that slows the momentum of expanding U.S.-Taiwanese defense initiatives. U.S. Forces Korea and U.S. Forces Japan headquarters are staffed with hundreds of personnel dedicated to bilateral military cooperation and supporting the defense of their host-nation allies. The U.S. military lacks an equivalent organizational headquarters focused on military cooperation with Taiwan. The United States needs an integrated organization that is dedicated to military deterrence and tightly networked with other elements of national power. It should be flush with U.S. interagency personnel and allies — especially from Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Japan. To have credibility with Taiwan’s senior officers, it should be led by a U.S. general or flag officer who is empowered to speak authoritatively on military matters on behalf of the U.S. government. It should start with 100 to 200 personnel and grow as additional initiatives come online or scale-up. It should also maintain well-staffed satellite offices in U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and Washington. The advisory group would facilitate training for Taiwanese personnel beyond the borders of Taiwan, in the United States and throughout the Indo-Pacific region. This new security cooperation and assistance organization should be headquartered in Taiwan to enable integration with Taiwanese counterparts. Consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, it should be affiliated with the American Institute in Taiwan — the non-profit organization responsible for U.S. relations with Taiwan. This new organization would not be a military “command” — like the old U.S. Taiwan Defense Command — and placing it in Taiwan would not constitute “basing” troops on the island. Most of its personnel should be contractors and retired military personnel, with a smaller contingent of active-duty liaisons and interagency personnel to fill key leadership and staff positions. These personnel would serve in an unofficial capacity, consistent with how the institute is currently staffed in order to maintain Washington’s adherence to the One China policy. If placing this new organization on the island is deemed politically infeasible, it could be headquartered elsewhere — perhaps Palau, Guam, Japan, or Australia — with forward elements in Taiwan.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Uniqueness › U – Taiwan Focus

US increasing its involvement with Taiwan now.

Hass ’22 (Ryan, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for East Asia Policy Studies and Nonresident Fellow at Yale Law School, “For Taiwan, reading the moment is essential,” June 13, 2022, Order From Chaos report from Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/06/13/for-taiwan-reading-the-moment-is-essential/)-mikee

Standing firm to support Europe does not equal diminishment of focus on Asia. In the past several weeks alone, President Biden has hosted leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Washington for the first time. He traveled to Seoul and Tokyo, where he met with leaders from the Quadrilateral Grouping (Australia, India, Japan, the United States), in addition to strengthening bilateral and trilateral relations in Northeast Asia. He launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Importantly for Taiwan, the Biden administration also committed to the Initiative on 21st Century Trade, a new effort to break the logjam and invigorate U.S.-Taiwan economic ties. President Biden also signed legislation to push for Taiwan’s observer status at the World Health Assembly and Secretary of State Antony Blinken rallied other countries to lend support for Taiwan’s participation. In other words, the Biden administration is deepening its investments in Asia and upping its focus on Taiwan. The more pressure Beijing has placed on Taiwan, the more visible America’s support for Taiwan has grown. President Biden’s statement that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense should be understood as an insight into his state of mind, rather than a signal of a significant policy shift. Biden clearly feels strongly about defending Taiwan and deterring Beijing’s aggression. He is not an activist who is seeking to radically alter the cross-Strait status quo, though. His administration remains committed to deterring unilateral changes to the status quo. This longstanding American position reflects America’s guiding focus on upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Secretary Blinken’s May 26 speech provided a clear, well-coordinated articulation of America’s interests relating to China and Taiwan. The State Department’s decision to update its website on Taiwan policy following ​Blinken’s remarks reflects the authoritative nature of the speech. Beijing’s growing military capabilities clearly are focusing minds in Washington, Taipei, and elsewhere on taking steps to strengthen deterrence. At the same time, I do not detect enthusiasm in Washington or elsewhere for dramatic shifts in government policies on Taiwan, barring an aggressive move by Beijing that compels countries to respond. Given these dynamics, Taiwan’s best path for gaining greater international support for its political autonomy, economic dynamism, and dignity on the world stage is by continuing to demonstrate its steady, principled, and practical in its approach to cross-Strait tensions. The more Taiwan does so, the more it stands to benefit by contrast from Beijing’s pressure. Taiwan also would be well-served to seize the opportunity the Initiative on 21st Century Trade presents. A strong coalition of countries already has made clear the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait to global security and prosperity. American, European, Japanese, and other countries’ interests will dictate their further involvement in cross-Strait issues if Beijing ratchets up tensions further.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Uniqueness › U – China Priority Now

Pivot to Asia is high now. But it’s not permanent.

Wilkinson ’22 (Tracy, covers foreign affairs from the Los Angeles Times’ Washington, D.C., bureau “Remember the ‘pivot’ to Asia? U.S. wants to reassure Pacific allies it’s still on,” Los Angeles Times, )

Like many U.S. governments before it, the Biden administration intended a foreign policy “pivot” toward China and Asia. Instead, Washington quickly faced war in Gaza, a chaotic pullout from Afghanistan and a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine. On Wednesday, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken arrived in Melbourne, Australia, for a regional tour that will see him try to reassert U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific against a rising China and to reassure allies worried that their issues are being given less priority in Washington. Blinken is scheduled to meet with his Australian, Indian and Japanese counterparts, whose nations, together with the U.S., form the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, an on-again, off-again group established as a counterbalance to Beijing. Speaking to reporters traveling with him, Blinken insisted that the Biden administration has maintained a “sustained focus” on the region despite an all-consuming and urgent mission to prevent Russia from invading Ukraine. He said he was on the phone in consultations over Ukraine during the long flight from Washington to Australia — the latest of some 200 engagements in recent weeks — and acknowledged that video-conferences and calls between Washington and European capitals on the crisis would continue to hum in the background of the talks in Melbourne. “Having said that, the world is a big place, our interests are global and you all know very well the focus that we have put on the Asia-Pacific and the Indo-Pacific region,” Blinken said. Blinken and the Quad representatives will tackle an “increasingly broad and deep agenda,” he said. It will be dominated by what most other countries in the region see as Chinese aggression on land and sea, as well as other issues such as emerging technologies that can also be threatened by Beijing. Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne welcomed Blinken’s arrival and that of the other Quad ministers, saying that by gathering here they were “voting with their feet in terms of the priority that they accord to [Indo-Pacific] issues.” Target fine lines and wrinkles while visibly firming skin with our anti-aging treatment for men. Kiehls first all-in-one anti-aging moisturizer for men is specifically formulated for men's thicker, coarser skin. This revitalizing anti-wrinkle... U.S. officials tacitly acknowledge a pep talk is in order. Blinken “will demonstrate the strength and the credibility of America’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region,” Daniel Kritenbrink, the assistant secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific affairs, said ahead of the trip. “We intend to demonstrate that our partnerships deliver, and they deliver practical and real benefits to our own peoples and to the peoples of the region.” Some in Asia expected greater interaction with President Biden, who campaigned on a shift to “strategic competition” with China as a pillar of his foreign policy. During Biden’s eight years as vice president, the Obama administration had also promised a “pivot” to Asia as its diplomatic focus. Instead, as crises erupted around the world, full-on engagement was delayed. In the meantime, Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has converted himself into leader for life, continued to claim Beijing’s sovereignty over disputed islands in the South China Sea; pushed its massive “Belt and Road” program, which spends billions of dollars in development money to gain influence in Europe, Africa and Latin America; and ignored international criticism of its treatment of the Muslim Uyghur minority, which the U.S. has called a genocide. This week, China again took the global center stage by hosting the Winter Olympics. The U.S. and several Western countries refused to send government delegations, but Russian President Vladimir Putin attended, striking a masterfully symbolic pose with Xi as the leaders of a new post-democratic alignment. The two men issued statements lavishing support on one another. “A much more powerful and assertive Xi government increasingly sees U.S. geopolitical strategy and activities in Asia through a very similar lens as [the one through which] Putin has long viewed American activities in Europe,” Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group, said in an analysis of Blinken’s tour. “To China, the Quad feels a lot like NATO encroachment does to Putin.” One potential flashpoint is China’s claim on Taiwan, which Beijing considers a breakaway republic much as Putin views post-Soviet Ukraine. Despite its stated focus on the region, the Biden administration still seems to be seeking its footing in Asia policy, said Michael Green, an Asia expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington. The Trump administration receives credit for designating China as a strategic competitor, Green said, although it did not follow through with policy. Biden “has picked up and amplified” that decision, “but has essentially no economic strategy for Asia.”

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Uniqueness › U – China Priority Now

Biden prioritizing China now – diplomatic meetings and resources.

Shear ’22 (Michael D. Shear is a veteran White House correspondent and two-time Pulitzer Prize winner, “Biden Hosts Southeast Asian Leaders as He Tries to Return Focus to China,” May 12, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/12/us/politics/biden-asian-nations-china.html?action=click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article)-mikee

WASHINGTON — President Biden on Thursday began hosting the leaders of Southeast Asian nations at the White House for a two-day visit, delivering a message of solidarity — and aiming to provide a bulwark against Chinese influence in the region — even as much of his administration remains focused on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The summit, which concludes on Friday, is intended to cover an array of topics, including trade, human rights and climate change. But it is also part of an effort by Mr. Biden’s foreign policy team to highlight one of the president’s primary goals: assembling a united front against China as it increasingly demonstrates its economic and military might around the world. As a candidate, Mr. Biden promised to make China a central focus of his foreign policy. Instead, a senior administration official acknowledged to reporters this week that the war in Europe had created daily demands that had consumed the time and energy of the president and his team. But the official, who requested anonymity to discuss preparations for the summit, said Mr. Biden remained concerned about, and focused on, the need to prevent China from dominating the Indo-Pacific. The gathering of Mr. Biden and the other world leaders in Washington is an opportunity to demonstrate that commitment, the official said. On Thursday evening, the White House announced new investments of about $150 million in the region as part of a series of agreements between the United States and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN. The investments by the United States include $40 million for clean energy projects in Southeast Asia. A senior White House official said the administration estimated that the money would be used to help raise or finance as much as $2 billion for the construction of the projects. The United States also pledged to invest $60 million to deploy additional maritime assets — led by the Coast Guard — to the region, and to perform training and other activities in coordination with other countries aimed at enforcing maritime laws. And the administration said it would spend $15 million to expand health surveillance programs in Southeast Asia and better detect Covid-19 and other airborne diseases in the region. The president is also traveling to Japan and South Korea from May 20 to May 24, a trip that will focus in large part on China. White House officials have not provided details about the trip, but the president is expected to meet with fellow leaders of the other so-called Quad countries: Australia, India and Japan. On Thursday, the leaders from the ASEAN countries met with Speaker Nancy Pelosi and other lawmakers before gathering at a Washington hotel to discuss business opportunities with Gina Raimondo, the commerce secretary, and executives from American industries. Mr. Biden welcomed the leaders to the White House on Thursday evening in a brief ceremony on the South Lawn. The group posed for a picture before walking into the White House for dinner. On Friday, the Asian leaders will meet with Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken in the morning, and then with Mr. Biden at the White House later in the day. According to the administration official, the group will discuss trading opportunities; transit through disputed waterways, including the South China Sea; and other topics. One of those topics is likely to be Myanmar, an ASEAN member, where Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was ousted as the country’s civilian leader last year when the military staged a coup. The administration official said the United States and countries in the region were focused on the situation and frustrated by it. An American national security official said the United States and the other nations agreed to leave a chair empty during the summit for Myanmar as a way of registering their disapproval of the actions by its military. The official also said the United States supported the decision by ASEAN to prevent a military representative from Myanmar from attending the summit. The gathering is also intended to be an opportunity for Ms. Harris to demonstrate her focus on the region. She led an American delegation to Asia last summer, using a speech in Singapore to denounce China’s “unlawful claims” over the South China Sea, which she said “undermine the rules-based order and threaten the sovereignty of nations.” The administration official said Ms. Harris planned to use Friday’s meeting with the Asian leaders to focus on climate action, clean energy and sustainable infrastructure.

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CHINA TRADEOFF DA › Uniqueness › U – Long Term

Long-term efforts still point to China – time and resources are zero-sum.

Drezner ’22 (Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “Can the United States focus on China while countering Russia?,” May 18, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/05/18/can-united-states-focus-china-while-countering-russia/)-mikee

It is worth remembering that in the year before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Biden sought a “stable” relationship with Russia and its leader, Vladimir Putin. The reason he wanted stability in that relationship was so the United States could shift its attention toward China and the Indo-Pacific region. Indeed, in the week before Biden’s June 2021 summit with Putin, the Group of Seven and NATO communiques focused more on building a coordinated response to China. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan was also keyed on a reorientation toward China. Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine obviously pushed “countering Russia” to the top of the policy queue. Putin’s continual ratcheting down of war aims from “regime decapitation and occupation of Kyiv” to “let’s take the entire Donbas region” to “let’s take Luhansk oblast” suggests that U.S. support of Ukraine has been a foreign-policy success. The war in Ukraine raises the awkward question of whether the United States can still reorient toward the Indo-Pacific region, however. Biden administration officials sure think so. Many of them told Bloomberg News’s Peter Martin earlier this month that they “see the conflict’s toll and the slew of sanctions placed on Moscow as leaving Russia hobbled for years to come. Combined with bolstered European defense spending, that means the U.S. may have a freer hand to accelerate its long-term shift toward China, viewed as America’s biggest future challenge.” Such a supposition holds up in theory. Russia’s actions in Ukraine have caused a sea change in European perceptions of Russia. This explains Germany’s increased military spending, Sweden’s and Finland’s applications for NATO membership, and even Switzerland’s flirtation with more cooperation with NATO. A better-armed Europe and a depleted Russia should free up U.S. time and resources to focus on the Indo-Pacific. And China experts such as Andrew Nathan argue that the Biden administration has the necessary strategic acumen to counter China.

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The status quo is goldilocks – Biden is balancing both regions now, but new demands trade-off and complicate existing strategies.

Baker and Kanno-Youngs ’22 (Peter Baker is the chief White House correspondent and has covered the last five presidents for The Times and The Washington Post. Zolan Kanno-Youngs is a White House correspondent covering a range of domestic and international issues in the Biden White House. “Biden Begins Trip to Asia Meant to Reassure Allies of Focus on China,” NY Times, May 19, 2022,

With the administration’s attention having shifted to Ukraine, President Biden plans to emphasize that the United States can counter aggression in both Europe and Asia. President Biden departing for South Korea on Thursday. Mr. Biden’s first trip to Asia will pose diplomatic challenges on several fronts. SEOUL — President Biden embarked Thursday on his first diplomatic mission to Asia since taking office, hoping to demonstrate that the United States remained focused on countering China, even as his administration stage-managed a war against Russia in Europe. With his original strategy of pivoting foreign policy attention to Asia effectively blown up by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Biden has now shifted to the argument that there can be no trade-off between Europe and Asia and that only the United States can bring together the democracies of the East and West to stand up to autocracy and aggression in both spheres. For Mr. Biden, finding his balance between the twin imperatives will require geopolitical maneuvering that would challenge any president. The competing demands on his time and attention were on display on Thursday as he squeezed in a last-minute meeting at the White House with the leaders of Sweden and Finland to welcome their decisions to join NATO before heading to Joint Base Andrews to board Air Force One for the long flight to South Korea. And days before that, Mr. Biden hosted Southeast Asian nations at the White House to detail new investments in clean energy and maritime assets, part of an effort to prevent China from dominating the Indo-Pacific.

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2. That war goes nuclear – conventional and nuclear forces are intermingled.

Talmadge ‘18 (Caitlin; associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University; 11/18; "Beijing’s Nuclear Option"; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option; SM)

As China's power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington's fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation-resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan-no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China's strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as "somewhere between nil and zero." This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon's preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States' signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent's key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China's conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a "no first use" pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. Nato stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on nato soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other's territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China's nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate- especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China's nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war- that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China's nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation- an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation- was a viable option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan. Beijing's long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington's longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will "consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." Were Washington to intervene on Taipei's behalf, the world's sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities- whether doing so was Washington's stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China's "boomers," the four nuclear armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China's conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China's attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China's ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China's sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China's growing land based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China's nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China's ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China's coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country's interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military's failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990-91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, highintensity conventional war. China's vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing's worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing's eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China's nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China's real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored U.S. strategy to ensure a conventional victory would likely endanger much of China's nuclear arsenal in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China's nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the "no first use" pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in wartime developments that could shift China's assumptions about U.S. intentions. If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose-on an unpopulated area or at sea-as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline.

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1. A failed Asian Pivot emboldens China to invade Taiwan.

Sacks ‘22 (David, research fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where his work focuses on U.S.-China relations, U.S.-Taiwan relations, Chinese foreign policy, cross-Strait relations, and the political thought of Hans Morgenthau, “Don't Pivot From the Pivot to Asia,” Council on Foreign Relations,

With Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, major war has returned to Europe and with it calls for the United States to prioritize countering the present threat posed by Russia over the threat China could one day pose. But Russia’s ineffectiveness on the battlefield, paired with the increasing investments European nations are making in their defense, gives the United States a better opportunity than ever to finally pivot to Asia and focus on the more formidable challenge China represents. A failure to do so could embolden China and give Beijing an opening to increase its influence, to the detriment of U.S. security and prosperity. Over a decade ago, President Obama announced the “pivot” or “rebalance” to Asia in a speech to the Australian Parliament, declaring “the United States is turning our attention to the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region.” The president’s speech followed an essay by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton entitled “America’s Pacific Century,” where she argued for a “strategic turn to the region.” All too often, however, the United States has failed to pair this ambitious rhetoric with policies that reflected the region’s importance. Now, Putin’s aggression against Ukraine has led to a growing consensus that the United States needs to view Russia as its primary geopolitical challenge and shift resources to Europe. But such a reorientation of U.S. strategy would again delay the pivot to Asia just when it is both more necessary and more viable than ever. The reasoning may be counterintuitive but holds all the same. The war in Ukraine has revealed Russia’s military is incapable of waging modern warfare and does not have the ability to fundamentally threaten NATO. Russia failed to establish air superiority over Ukraine, its logistics are in shambles, and morale among its soldiers is reportedly dangerously low. The defining image of this war thus far is of a stalled Russian convoy stretching forty miles on a road leading to Kyiv. Overcoming these issues will take years and require a fundamental overhaul of Russia’s military culture and doctrine. Russia will have to undertake these difficult reforms with its military in tatters. While it is difficult to know exactly how many casualties Russia has suffered in Ukraine, it is well into the thousands, and the Russian military will likely suffer far greater losses if it attempts to take Kyiv. Russia has lost some of its most advanced fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, and artillery, while depleting its munitions. It will take a long time for Russia to rebuild its material strength, a prospect that will be even more daunting given the sanctions that are in force. The crisis in Ukraine has also forced European countries to awaken from their slumber, and they are now willing to shoulder a greater burden for their defense. Most consequentially, Germany has announced it will increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP and purchase 35 F-35 fighter jets, which will increase interoperability with NATO forces. Sweden is also looking to increase its defense spending to 2 percent of GDP, while support for joining NATO has surged in the country. Denmark has pledged to meet the 2 percent target, while Latvia, Poland, and Romania have signaled they will boost defense spending to exceed that target. A depleted and exhausted Russian military and increased European investments in their defense mean the United States can meet its obligations to its NATO allies while shifting resources to Asia. As such, the Department of Defense should continue to identify China as the pacing challenge given its military might and its regional ambitions. Taiwan should remain the pacing scenario, as it is the most difficult one for the United States to address and therefore if the United States gets that right it will be well-positioned to respond to other regional contingencies. Capabilities most relevant for a Taiwan scenario should be prioritized, in particular long-range missiles and submarines, while the United States should continue to distribute its military presence throughout the region. With NATO’s conventional capabilities set to improve, once this crisis passes the United States should withdraw the seven thousand troops it sent to Europe following Russia’s invasion and review its force posture on the continent, where it currently has ninety thousand service members based. While Putin has upended European security, nothing has occurred since the war in Ukraine began that reduces the challenge that China poses for the United States. China’s military spending shows no sign of slowing down and is projected to increase by over 7 percent this year. It is continuing to invest in capabilities designed to prevent the United States from successfully intervening on behalf of its allies and is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal. China’s economy is set to grow by 5.5 percent this year and it is pulling additional economies into its orbit with the entry into force of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and ongoing Belt and Road Initiative investments. While the United States certainly needs to deal with the urgent threat to European security, it cannot lose sight of the more serious and multidimensional challenge coming from Beijing. Indeed, if the perception takes root that the United States is pivoting away from Asia and toward Europe this could prompt China to conclude it has a window of opportunity for remaking the regional order.

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b. Link: Security cooperation is zero-sum. Focus on Europe trades-off with Asia. The aff escalates US involvement in NATO at the expense of deterring China.

Townshend and Corben ’22 (Ashley Townshend is director of foreign policy and defense and Tom Corben is a research associate in the foreign policy and defense program at the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. “Op-Ed: War in Ukraine Threatens America's Ability to Counter China,” The Strategist, MAR 16, 2022, )

As the United States slides deeper into a proxy war with Russia, Indo-Pacific countries are increasingly concerned about the long-term implications of the Ukraine crisis for America’s power and position in this part of the world. And so they should be. While President Joe Biden’s initial approach to Ukraine struck the right balance of resolve and restraint—marshalling global allies in support of sanctions against Russia and funnelling military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine—the war is now sapping more and more American attention and defence resources. A dangerous tit for tat is taking hold. Washington’s lethal military aid and economy-breaking sanctions signal an investment in the war that could slip beyond Biden’s original articulation of limited interests. Russia’s nuclear threats and increasingly brutal operations have triggered further US involvement, including the deployment of advanced F-35 fighters and expensive Patriot missile-defence systems to NATO frontlines in Eastern Europe, and a massive $13.6 billion Ukraine emergency bill passed by Congress last week. Calls are getting louder for a ‘limited no-fly zone’ which, though rebuffed so far, may become politically harder to resist. All this is understandable given the humanitarian carnage. But hot on the heels of the release of Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy, it’s unsettling to watch Washington’s strategic gaze drift, once again, away from a robust "pivot to Asia." As we argue in a new United States Studies Centre report, these developments are especially worrying given that the Biden administration has so far failed to deliver on key defense components of its regional strategy. Senior US officials insist that events in Europe will not see the Indo-Pacific or efforts to balance Chinese power deprioritised. Earlier this month, the White House’s Indo-Pacific coordinator, Kurt Campbell, again promised that Washington was capable of sustaining "deep commitments" in both theaters simultaneously, even at great cost, just as it had in the past. But while America can—and must—continue to buttress European security, it doesn’t enjoy the luxury of riches or unchallenged military primacy required to underwrite an expansive global strategy against two great-power rivals. Matching ends with means in the Indo-Pacific—America’s so-called ‘priority theatre’—requires difficult trade-offs between competing priorities, including in Ukraine. A more sustainable division of US and allied defense responsibilities in Europe and Asia is urgently required. Biden understands this and deserves credit for attempting to match US global interests and commitments in his first year. Poor execution aside, his Afghan withdrawal showed a willingness to make tough, politically unpopular trade-offs. His initially restrained approach to the Ukraine crisis suggested he would keep it in global strategic perspective. But Washington won’t be able to sideline Moscow from its foreign policy agenda the way it had hoped. Delays to the publication of the US national defense strategy and national security strategy suggest that Russia is forcing a hurried reassessment of Biden’s global priorities. In a worst-case scenario for the Indo-Pacific, it’s possible these documents will return US military strategy to an equally weighted focus on Asia and Europe—contradicting hard-fought efforts in recent years to make China the Pentagon’s outright priority. This is not a callous point to make. America simply doesn’t have the military resources required to prosecute an effective multi-theater strategy in an era of great-power rivalry. Nor is it spending enough to change this equation: while the 2018 national defence strategy recommended three to five percent real growth in defense spending annually to keep pace with China and Russia, not a single defense budget since has met these targets. Biden’s budget continues this unsatisfactory trend. And in contrast to the stark warnings from top brass at US Indo-Pacific Command, who see conflict with China as a possibility this decade, the administration’s defense budget prioritizes long-term military modernization in anticipation of high-end conflict in the 2030s - leaving the US underprepared to deal with Chinese military coercion over the next few years. Budget shortfalls are mirrored by slow-moving efforts to realign US forces globally. Efforts to empower US allies are even more important as Washington is once again pulled in conflicting global directions. Indo-Pacific allies should advocate for more. As a priority, Australia should caucus with Japan and other close security partners to push for overdue reforms to US export controls on defense technology. Indo-Pacific allies should also press Washington for greater insight and input into its regional military planning. A credible collective defence strategy requires clarity on when, where and how to address shared defence challenges. Biden’s effort to build support among regional allies for a Taiwan contingency is a step in this direction. But while Taiwan is the Pentagon’s "pacing challenge," regional countries face Chinese military coercion across a far wider range of lower intensity scenarios, as China’s intimidation of an Australian military aircraft in the Arafura Sea last month attests. New strategic planning initiatives must reflect these realities. In the end, however, these initiatives can’t change the strategic physics of the Indo-Pacific. A favorable balance of power with China can only be upheld with unprecedented US support. Alliance modernization is a necessary component of this strategy, but it’s not a substitute for a robust US military posture and presence in the Indo-Pacific. As the conflict in Ukraine grinds on, America’s capacity to deliver an effective defense strategy for the region will depend on its ability to keep its escalating involvement in check and in global strategic perspective.