Free beta access. 5 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Philippines Add-on › Philippines Impact --- More

War in South China Sea has massive impacts

Heydarian, ’21 (Richard Javad Heydarian is a professorial chairholder in geopolitics at the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, and author of, among others, “The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China and the New Struggle for Global Mastery” [Palgrave Macmillan] and the forthcoming “China’s New Empire” [Melbourne University Press]. “Will the South China Sea Spark the Next Global Conflict?” The Diplomat, 06/01/22, )-Alex

In Asia’s maritime heartland, all the ingredients of a global cataclysm are conspiring against the post-Cold War period of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.

In many ways, the South China Sea disputes are today’s version of the early 20th century Balkans, where “some damned foolish thing” can trigger a devastating global conflict without precedence and beyond our wildest imagination. It is here in Asia’s maritime heartland, where all the ingredients of a global cataclysm are conspiring against the post-Cold War period of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific. It’s also here where the naked edge of China’s hegemonic ambitions are on full display, with dire consequences for smaller neighbors and the broader liberal international order. Here lies the defining geopolitical dilemma of our times.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Philippines Add-on › Philippines –- Impact Uniqueness

China pursuing naval dominance in the SCS now.

AP ’22 (The Associated Press is an independent global news organization dedicated to factual reporting. Founded in 1846, AP today remains the most trusted source of fast, accurate, unbiased news in all formats and the essential provider of the technology and services vital to the news business.” “China accuses the U.S. of trying to hijack support in Asia”, National Public Radio, June 12, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/06/12/1104414204/china-accuses-us-of-trying-to-hijack-support-in-asia)

China's defense minister accused the United States on Sunday of trying to "hijack" the support of countries in the Asia-Pacific region to turn them against Beijing, saying Washington is seeking to advance its own interests "under the guise of multilateralism." Defense Minister Gen. Wei Fenghe lashed out at U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, rejecting his "smearing accusation" the day before at the Shangri-La Dialogue that China was causing instability with its claim to the self-governing island of Taiwan and its increased military activity in the area. Austin had stressed the need for multilateral partnerships with nations in the Indo-Pacific, which Wei suggested was an attempt to back China into a corner. "No country should impose its will on others or bully others under the guise of multilateralism," he said. " The strategy is an attempt to build an exclusive small group in the name of a free and open Indo-Pacific to hijack countries in our region and target one specific country — it is a strategy to create conflict and confrontation to contain and encircle others." China has been rapidly modernizing its military and seeking to expand its influence and ambitions in the region, recently signing a security agreement with the Solomon Islands that many fear could lead to a Chinese naval base in the Pacific, and breaking ground this past week on a naval port expansion project in Cambodia that could give Beijing a foothold in the Gulf of Thailand. Last year U.S. officials accused China of testing a hypersonic missile, a weapon harder for missile defense systems to counter, but China insisted it had been a "routine test of a spacecraft." Answering a question about the test on Sunday, Wei came the closest so far to acknowledging it was, indeed, a hypersonic missile, saying, "As for hypersonic weapons, many countries are developing weapons and I think there's no surprise that China is doing so." "China will develop its military," he added. "I think it's natural." U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken last month said China represented the "most serious long-term challenge to the international order" for the United States, with its claims to Taiwan and efforts to dominate the strategic South China Sea. The U.S. and its allies have responded with so-called freedom of navigation patrols in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, sometimes encountering a pushback from China's military.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Philippines Add-on › Philippines –- Impact Uniqueness

Risk of conflict in the SCS high now.

Buddhavarapu ’22 (Ravi Buddhavarapu is a reporter for CNBC.com based in Singapore. “South China Sea faces higher risk of conflict as arms race builds up, says weapons expert” CNBC, April 26 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/27/south-china-sea-region-at-a-higher-risk-for-conflict-weapons-expert.html)

The South China Sea region faces a heightened risk of conflict as it arms itself at an “alarming rate,” an expert from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute told CNBC on Monday. It comes as worldwide military spending surpassed $2 trillion for the first time ever in 2021, he added. “The region is arming at an alarming rate. Countries are playing with each other in terms of action-reaction, where when one country increases [purchases], another country [also] increases, procuring more weapons,” Nan Tian, a senior researcher in military expenditure at SIPRI, told CNBC’s “Squawk Box Asia.” Tian said China’s increased military spending has created a “greater threat perception” in the neighborhood. This has “led to these neighboring countries such as Singapore, Japan, Australia and Taiwan purchasing a lot of new technologies, such as nuclear submarines and precision missile systems,” he said. In response to China’s growing assertiveness in the South and East China Seas, its neighbors have purchased several U.S weapon systems over the past decade. Earlier in April, the U.S. approved the sale of up to $95 million worth of training and equipment to support Taiwan’s Patriot missile defense system developed by Raytheon. It’s the third arms sale to Taiwan under the Biden administration. In 2020, the U.S. approved a $23 billion order by Japan for a large number of F-35 fighter aircraft manufactured by Lockheed Martin. Northrop Grumman also delivered Global Hawk UAVs to Japan earlier this year. And Singapore has placed orders for F-35 fighters expected to be delivered in 2026. Some of these U.S. defense stocks have surged since the start of Russia’s unprovoked war on Ukraine. Raytheon shares are 5% higher since Feb. 24, while Lockheed Martin stocks are up around 12% and Northrop Grumman is higher by around 11%. In comparison, the S&P 500 index is down over 2% in the same period. Tian also referred to the threat North Korea poses to the region and the world. “North Korea is testing and developing nuclear weapons, which of course is a greater concern to not only the region but the world as a whole,” he said. Tian said a large amount of financial resources are being allocated to the militaries of the South China Sea region, making a miscalculation possible. “A miscalculation could have severe consequences, given the amount of weapons being procured and the amount of financial resources being allocated to the region’s militaries to increase capabilities,” he said.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Philippines Add-on › Philippines --- AT: Deterrence Fails

Philippines shifting towards deterrence of China – US support key.

Javier 22 (Erick Neilson C Javier, research officer at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP). The views expressed in this article are his alone, and do not represent the views of the NDCP, the Department of National Defense, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or the Philippine Government, ‘Rethinking the Philippines’ Deterrence in the South China Sea’, MHT Corporation, March 26, 2022, )

Manila should change the narrative from a focus on “how to defend” against China toward a more active strategy of deterring China. This is not mere semantics, but a change of mindset in how the Philippines frames its defense and security policies. The former concedes all initiative to China and puts the Philippines in a position where it may be forced to compromise on its interests. This was demonstrated by attempting to resupply Philippine troops in Second Thomas Shoal in November 2021. Resupply eventually resumed, but with the . Short-term relief for the shoal may have been bought at the cost of long-term risk, should Chinese forces again block resupply to the Philippine outpost. Chinese military vessels continue to test Philippine sovereignty over even internal archipelagic waters, with the most recent on March 14, 2022. A more active strategy of deterrence posits that the Philippines can influence Chinese decision-making, if not compelling Beijing to renounce its claims, then at least pushing it to reconsider its gray zone operations and other forms of aggression. The urgency for improving the Philippines’ posture has only increased since the Whitsun Reef incident, as due to the Chinese insistence on excluding other extra-regional powers, particularly the United States, as part of the CoC’s provisions. In conceptualizing deterrence, Manila must be able to explain how and why planned military capabilities affect the adversary’s decision-making. Developing a , particularly for the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea, can be crucial in this task. A “theory of victory” comprises coherent ideas that guide the Philippines in utilizing its defense resources to achieve the desired conditions, whether that is preserving Philippine holdings in the disputed sea, deterring coercive actions against Philippine vessels and citizens in the waters of the West Philippine Sea, or compelling and/or incentivizing Chinese recognition of and compliance to the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration Award. In crafting a theory of victory, Manila must conduct a thorough appraisal of the likely adversary, accounting for their unique , , and exercise of military and coercion. The theory must also include considerations of the Philippines’ allies, including their limitations and situations where they may not be able to extend aid. A theory of victory gives intellectual foundations to devise Philippine deterrence concepts and objectives, generating more policy options for Manila to respond to current and future aggression. This can support AFP modernization efforts either by reinforcing or re-examining the logic to procure and . Developing a theory of victory can show that the Philippines is purposeful in preparing for long-term defense of its interests, reducing the impact of defeatist and that aim to sow confusion and doubt in the country’s resolve.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Philippines Add-on › Philippines --- AT: Deterrence Fails

U.S. presence in the SCS prevents Chinese aggression

Krepinevich, ’15 (Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich is president and chief operating officer of Solarium, a defense consulting firm. He’s served in the DOD, and he currently serves as chairman of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel and on the Advisory Council of Business Executives for National Security. Dr. Krepinevich has taught on the faculties of West Point, George Mason University, Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, and Georgetown University. He has an M.P.A. and Ph D. from Harvard.

These changes are clearly meant to check an increasingly assertive China. And with good reason: Beijing’s expanding territorial claims threaten virtually every country along what is commonly known as “the first island chain,” encompassing parts of Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan—all of which Washington is obligated to protect. But to reliably deter Chinese aggression, the Pentagon will have to go even further. Emerging Chinese capabilities are intended to blunt Washington’s ability to provide military support to its allies and partners. Although deterrence through the prospect of punishment, in the form of air strikes and naval blockades, has a role to play in discouraging Chinese adventurism, Washington’s goal, and that of its allies and partners, should be to achieve deterrence through denial—to convince Beijing that it simply cannot achieve its objectives with force.

Leveraging the latent potential of U.S., allied, and partner ground forces, Washington can best achieve this objective by establishing a series of linked defenses along the first island chain—an “Archipelagic Defense”—and, in so doing, deny Beijing the ability to achieve its revisionist aims through aggression or coercion.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Philippines Add-on › Philippines --- AT: Deterrence Fails

China will move onto the South China Sea if it perceives the US as being weak there

Kaplan, ’14 (Robert Kaplan graduated with a B.A. in political science from University of Washington in 1966. He’s a lawyer in Seattle who has served on numerous nonprofit boards and community organizations. In ’96, he was recognized by the American Bar Association for his pro-bono work. “Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific,” Random House, 03/25/14, pg. 27-30)

“Plan B is the U.S. Navy—Pacific Command. But we will publicly remain neutral in any U.S.-China dispute.” To make certain that I got the message, this official said: “An American military presence is needed to countervail China, but we won’t vocalize that.” The withdrawal of even one U.S. aircraft carrier strike group from the Western Pacific is a “game changer.”

China, by way of its 1,500 short-range ballistic missiles focused on Taiwan and its 270 commercial flights a week to Taiwan, will be able to do an end run around Taiwanese sovereignty without needing to subdue it through a naval invasion. As with the closing of the American frontier, China’s effective capture of Taiwan in the years to come will allow Chinese naval planners the ability to finally concentrate their energies on the wider South China Sea, an antechamber to the Indian Ocean in which China also desires a naval presence, in order to protect its Middle Eastern energy supplies. Were China to ever replace the U.S. Navy as the dominant power in the South China Sea— or even reach parity with it—this would open up geostrategic possibilities for China comparable to what America achieved upon its dominance of the Caribbean.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Philippines Add-on › Philippines --- Bases Deter

Bases Deter – empirics

Change 4-4 (Felix K. Chang, senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is also the Chief Operating Officer of Decision, a predictive analytics company, and an assistant professor at the Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences. ‘Strategies Behind China and the Asia-Pacific’s Military Base Construction’, FPRI, April 14, 2022, https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/04/strategies-behind-china-and-the-asia-pacifics-military-base-construction/)

At the turn of the new millennium, , greater trade, and tighter economic integration would obviate China’s motivation to build or expand its military bases. That has not turned out to be the case. Thus, one by one, countries across the Asia-Pacific have come to reassess their needs for military bases. The types of bases built since the late 2000s signal three distinct strategies. First is a strategy of limited deterrence, the intent of which is to prevent Chinese forces from operating with complete impunity, rather than to thwart them. Vietnam was the first to employ this approach. In the late 2000s, it overhauled its Cam Ranh Bay naval base. It then offered the use of the base’s modernized facilities to foreign navies, including those of India, Japan, and the United States. By the late 2010s, it had become home to the backbone of the Vietnamese navy: six new Project 636.3 (Kilo-class) diesel-electric attack submarines. Malaysia followed by building a new naval base for its two Scorpene-class diesel-electric attack submarines at Sepanggar Bay on Borneo, near the South China Sea, in 2008. A half decade later, Kuala Lumpur built a second naval base at Bintulu, also on Borneo, to monitor China’s growing maritime presence off its coast. Malaysia expanded the base with an airfield in 2022. Getting off to a later start were Indonesia and the Philippines. It was not until 2014 that Jakarta expanded its Pontianak naval base on Borneo. Then in 2021, after lengthy preparations, Jakarta broke ground on a new base on Natuna Island for three of its planned diesel-electric attack submarines. Similarly, Manila began to expand its naval facilities at Oyster Bay on Palawan Island, adjacent to the South China Sea, in 2014. Six years later, it selected a site at Subic Bay on Luzon Island for a new base that will house , including two or three planned diesel-electric attack submarines. It also expects to construct an air base nearby for its new F/A-50 jet fighter-trainers. And, since the mid-2010s, Vietnam has built, and the Philippines will soon build, bases for mobile anti-ship missile batteries along their respective South China Sea coasts. The bases will enable the two countries to project modern firepower into the disputed region. To the north, Japan began building new military bases at about the same time. But unlike the strategy behind Southeast Asia’s bases, Japan’s bases suggested a strategy whose intention was to not only fully deter China from seizing the Senkaku Islands, but also frustrate China’s wider naval ambitions. In 2014, Tokyo set up a coastal observation base on Yonaguni Island, near the disputed islands. Soon after, it began preparations to construct , which run from the Japanese mainland to Yonaguni Island. The first base was built on Amami Ōshima Island. It was armed with a Type 12 anti-ship missile battery and defended by a Type 03 surface-to-air missile battery. Tokyo then built similar bases on Miyako Island in 2020 and Ishigaki Island in 2022. The missile bases cover the disputed Senkaku Islands as well as all the transit points for the Chinese navy into the Pacific Ocean, including the Miyako Strait. Finally, further out into the Pacific Ocean, the United States has started to seriously reconsider its basing requirements. Having pulled back much of its forces in Asia (including those in South Korea) to military bases on Okinawa and mainland Japan after the Cold War, Washington grew increasingly worried about their safety from Chinese ballistic missile attack during the 2010s.[4] Indeed, with the advent of new Chinese intermediate-range missiles, American military bases on Guam seem vulnerable too. Hence, the United States has been gradually shifting from a strategy of forward deployment to one of dispersion and redundancy. In 2018, Washington arranged a more-or-less permanent American presence in Darwin at the northern tip of Australia. Then, in 2020, the United States opened negotiations with a welcoming Palau for a possible new base there. And, given America’s need to secure its sea lanes of communications across the Pacific Ocean, it was no surprise that it also decided to reopen its embassy in the Solomon Islands in 2022.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Philippines Add-on › Philippines --- Russia Draw-in

War in the SCS spills out.

Stavridis, 21 (James Stavris is a retired U.S. Navy admiral, former supreme allied commander of NATO, and dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, he is vice chairman of global affairs at the Carlyle Group. He is the author most recently of "To Risk It All: Nine Conflicts and the Crucible of Decision." “Four Ways a China-U.S. War at Sea Could Play Out,” Bloomberg, 4/25/21, ) -Alex

Taiwan is the most likely flashpoint, but combat could stretch out as far as the Indian Ocean.

I see four distinct maritime “flashpoint” zones, where the Chinese navy may potentially take military against the U.S. and its allies, partners and friends. They are the Taiwan Strait; Japan and the East China Sea; the South China Sea; and more distant waters around China's other neighbors, including Indonesia, Singapore, Australia and India.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Philippines Add-on › Philippines --- Russia Draw-in

Russia is invested in the South China Sea

Le Thu & Cao, ’19 (Huong Le Thu is a principal fellow at Perth USAsia Center, is advisor for Asia-Pacific development, diplomacy & defence dialogue at Canberra, is on the board of advisors for the Griffith Asia Institute and is a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Sunny Cao is a senior assistant at Deloitte. “Russia’s growing interests in the South China Sea,” The Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 12/18/19, ) -Alex

Rosneft, which is half-owned by the Russian government, is no stranger to the South China Sea. It an operator of a joint project for gas production and exploration in Block 06.1 in the Nam Con Son Basin, off the coast of Vietnam, back in 2013. Since 2018, it has also been working with Vietnam to expand gas development projects in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone, including two new wells in the area. Russia’s presence in the South China Sea complicates the ongoing disputes between China and its neighbours over competing territorial claims. If the Philippines engages in joint exploration with Rosneft, Russia could start to play a wider role in the region. Russia has also been a key long-term defence partner for Vietnam, both strategically and militarily. The two nations a defence cooperation agreement covering 2018–2020 last year, and to enhance defence cooperation during 2019–2023. Russia and Vietnam also their bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2012. Vietnam is the only claimant that has been consistently vocal in its opposition to China’s activities in the South China Sea. Events this year—specifically, in which Vietnamese and Chinese coastguard vessels were involved in a confrontation over the presence of a Chinese survey vessel in waters Vietnam controls—illustrate the territory-related tensions in China–Vietnam relations. But despite Moscow’s claim that it will not get involved in territorial disputes, by continuing to work with Vietnam through Rosneft it is expressing support for Hanoi. If Rosneft remains undeterred by China’s attempts at coercion, it may set an example for other international commercial oil companies to engage in joint operations in this disputed body of water.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Philippines Add-on › 2NC/1NR --- Read

War in the South China Sea goes nuclear

Helmy ‘22 (Nadia Helmy is associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Politics and Economics at Beni Suef University in Egypt. An Expert in Chinese Politics, Sino-Israeli relationships, and Asian affairs, she’s Visiting Senior Researcher at the Centre for Middle Eastern Studies (CMES) at Lund University in Sweden. She’s also Director of the South and East Asia Studies Unit. “Future scenarios about a potential U.S. -China nuclear war in Taiwan and South China Sea,” Modern Diplomacy, 4/15/22, )-Alex

Chinese military analyzes also confirm that the war between China and the United States of America near the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea is likely to turn into a nuclear war, emphasizing that in order to change the course of the war for the losing or defeated party, the party that will lose its war with  The other, may have to compensate for his loss and defeat, by displaying his nuclear power and tactical nuclear weapons to strike the winning side, by using several (tactical nuclear weapons, that is, using a number of warheads of limited power, but they can accurately destroy military targets).

In the event that China succeeds in paralyzing and obstructing the American military force near the areas of direct Chinese influence, Washington may respond to China to save its face in front of its people and other international and regional powers to save Taiwan, for fear of an invasion by China, through the possibility of (the use of tactical nuclear weapons by the United States of America against China’s ports, airports, sea and air fleets). This is not just a baseless analysis without real indications of it, as the US armed forces are currently developing nuclear weapons to deter China primarily in Taiwan and the South China Sea in the event of a war between them, through the development of Washington for the “cruise missile” program with nuclear warheads to be (launched by US nuclear submarines located near the areas of direct Chinese influence), the US military and its forces in the Indo-Pacific region could use these nuclear weapons, near China, to achieve an American nuclear military victory over China.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Philippines Add-on › 2NC/1NR --- Read

Loss of Philippine bases destabilizes the SCS – escalates.

Baxter 20 [Caroline, senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, where she focuses on issues related to operational strategy, base resiliency, expeditionary warfare, and military readiness. “If U.S. Forces Have to Leave the Philippines, Then What?”, Rand, February 28, 2020. https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/02/if-us-forces-have-to-leave-the-philippines-then-what.html]

Without the Philippines, U.S. forces would be faced with a series of math and physics problems from fighting from much farther away.

The closest military facilities to the South China Sea are in Okinawa (approximately 1,000 miles), South Korea (1,600 miles), mainland Japan (2,000 miles), Guam (2,000 miles), and Darwin, Australia (2,300 miles). Such distances present a number of logistical and operational complications.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Philippines Add-on › 2NC/1NR --- Read

Faltering alliances in the region impedes US access to bases – an investment in Europe projects a lack of follow through in the Asian pacific.

Patton 6-1 (Ms. Patton is a research fellow with the Lowy Institute in Sydney, “Australia., China Is Winning in Asia. Biden’s Plans Won’t Change That.” New York Times, June 1 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/01/opinion/us-biden-asia-china-economy-influence.html)

U.S. officials counter that the plan is more suited to the 21st century than “past models.” But potential Asian partners have trouble seeing what’s in it for them. A lack of buy-in could undermine the United States’ ability to set the rules on emerging issues like the digital economy, which would give American firms a leg up. Meanwhile, China has forged ahead. State-owned companies have locked up big projects around the region, often under the umbrella of China’s sprawling Belt and Road Initiative. China also practices persistent diplomacy. Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s travels in Southeast Asia and the Pacific have far outstripped the pace of his U.S. counterpart, Antony Blinken. Despite the fanfare of Mr. Biden’s recent trip to Asia, it was his first to the region since taking office 16 months ago and included visits only to close allies South Korea and Japan. China also cultivates powerful elites. In the Philippines, its newly elected president and vice president have both politically benefited from China’s investments in their home constituencies. In Cambodia and the Solomon Islands, China has opened pathways for expanding its military presence far from home. In Indonesia, a strong relationship with the coordinating minister for maritime affairs and investment gives Beijing the access needed to pursue objectives such as deals for Huawei in the country’s 5G network. The United States does have something China lacks: time-tested alliances with what the Biden administration calls “like-minded” democracies such as its fellow members of the “Quad” grouping — Japan, Australia and India — as well as South Korea. The Quad is meant to demonstrate that the United States and its partners can provide an alternative to China on, for example, vaccines and infrastructure. But the Quad has yet to have much real impact. An ambitious pledge to deliver one billion vaccines to Indo-Pacific countries by the end of this year has run into manufacturing obstacles in India. The Quad, in fact, highlights an American weakness: The United States is strong in the democracies fringing the region but weak at the center in Southeast Asia. Over time, a more dominant China could impede U.S. military access to regional bases during crises, pose challenges for American companies doing business and force U.S. diplomats to work harder to make their voices heard.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Philippines Add-on › 2NC/1NR --- Read

However, Marcos Jr. is open to expanding relations with China now too – plus this card has impact uniqueness – SCS tensions are rising.

Kurlantzick 6-24 (Joshua Kurlantzick is senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). “What Can Be Learned From Ferdinand Marcos Jr.'s First Weeks in Office?”, Council on Foreign Relations, June 24, 2022, ”,)

After winning a massive victory in the Philippine presidential elections in early May, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., who was something of a cipher on the campaign trail, with few clearly enunciated policy proposals, has begun to formulate policies, make key appointments, and offer hints of what his presidency will be like – at least in the initial stages. For one, despite predictions by many analysts (including me) that relations between the Philippines and China had become so toxic in Philippine public opinion, and the Duterte administration had strategically moved back toward the United States, Marcos Jr., who long has had a close relationship with Beijing, seems ready to try to again prioritize Philippine-China ties. He may prioritize them even above links to the United States, which is still a treaty ally, of course. The United States certainly has wooed Marcos Jr. intensely, despite the fact that he never disowned his family’s past crimes, or the brutal record of his dictator father. As political analyst Richard Heydarian notes, despite the fact that Marcos Jr. still faces a contempt of court charge in the United States, the Biden administration sent Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman to meet with Marcos Jr. in Manila, where she said that Marcos Jr. now has immunity from the former charge, setting the stage in the future for a Marcos Jr. visit to the White House. (Duterte, who has held strong personal anti-American views much of his life, never visited the United States as president, even as he rebuilt strategic ties with Washington later in his presidency.) And yet Marcos Jr. already has declared that China is the Philippines’ “strongest partner,” a statement that surely angered the Philippine defense establishment, which has warned of China’s growing encroachment in the South China Sea and is generally anti-China and in favor of closer U.S. ties. The statement also came while tensions were ramping up in the South China Sea again. Whether Marcos Jr. is able to get China to deliver on more of what it promised Duterte – more funding for infrastructure projects that actually get built – may determine whether he is able to pull off this move closer to China, or whether public opinion will swell to even higher anti-Beijing heights, limiting his options with China, like Duterte in the latter part of his presidency. Marcos Jr. clearly intends to turn to China for more economic assistance, but whether he will get what Duterte did not remains to be seen.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Philippines Add-on › 2NC/1NR --- Read

Biden focusing on US-Philippine relations.

Oshin 6-26 [Olafimihan, Staff writer for the Hill. “Emhoff to lead delegation for Marcos’ inauguration in Philippines,” June 26, 2022. https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3537739-emhoff-to-lead-delegation-for-marcos-inauguration-in-philippines/]

However, the Biden administration was quick to congratulate the new Philippines’ president, as it seeks to counter China’s influence in the region. Outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte, who remained widely popular during his term in office, maintained closer ties with China and Russia, while at times railing against the United States. Marcos has said in prior interviews that he wants his country to have a better relationship with the U.S. but also reiterated that he wants to maintain a positive relationship with China as well. In a phone call after his election win, Biden also expressed his interest to work with Marcos on expanding relations between the two countries.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Impact › 2NC/1NR --- AT: US Victory in Taiwan

China would be successful in a Taiwan invasion.

Luce and Dilanian ’21 (Dan De Luce is a reporter for the NBC News Investigative Unit. Ken Dilanian is the intelligence and national security correspondent for NBC News, based in Washington. “China's growing firepower casts doubt on whether U.S. could defend Taiwan”, NBC, March 27 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/china-s-growing-firepower-casts-doubt-whether-u-s-could-n1262148)

China's massive arms buildup has raised doubts about America's ability to defend Taiwan if a war broke out, reflecting a shifting balance of power in the Pacific where American forces once dominated, U.S. officials and experts say. In simulated combat in which China attempts to invade Taiwan, the results are sobering and the United States often loses, said David Ochmanek, a former senior Defense Department official who helps run war games for the Pentagon at the RAND Corp. think tank. In tabletop exercises with America as the "blue team" facing off against a "red team" resembling China, Taiwan's air force is wiped out within minutes, U.S. air bases across the Pacific come under attack, and American warships and aircraft are held at bay by the long reach of China's vast missile arsenal, he said. "Even when the blue teams in our simulations and war games intervened in a determined way, they don't always succeed in defeating the invasion," Ochmanek said. A war over Taiwan remains a worst-case scenario that officials say is not imminent. But China's growing military prowess, coupled with its aggressive rhetoric, is turning Taiwan into a potential flashpoint between Beijing and Washington — and a test case for how the U.S. will confront China's superpower ambitions. The outgoing head of the U.S. military's Indo-Pacific Command, Adm. Philip Davidson, warned senators this month that the U.S. is losing its military edge over China, and that Beijing could decide to try to seize control of Taiwan by force by 2027.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Impact › 2NC/1NR --- Deterrence Solves

U.S. military deters China from invading Taiwan – empirics.

Frison & Scobell, ’04. (Both Douglas Frison and Andrew Scobell are affiliated with the Strategic Studies Institute in the U.S. Army War College. “China’s Military Threat to Taiwan in the Era of Hu Jintao,” Strategic Studies Institute, 1/31/04, Pg. 3)-Alex

The CCP has long fostered nationalism over the Taiwan issue and the desire to unify the “motherland” as a means of building unity and drawing attention away from internal problems.4 This is especially true now, in an age when few Chinese are interested in communist ideology and few believe in Marxism-Leninism and/or Mao Zedong Thought. Chinese leaders also regard control over Taiwan as an important step in establishing Chinese influence in East Asia and blunting American influence. The loss of Taiwan through independence would be a critical blow to the Chinese regime. China will not give up it’s over fifty-year claim to Taiwan. Only the military might of the United States for the past half a century has prevented China from fulfilling the quest for reunification with Taiwan.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Impact › 2NC/1NR --- China Nukes o/w

China is a bigger nuclear threat than Russia

Martina, ’21 (Michael Martina is a graduate of Tshinga University, University of Florida and University of Washington. Now, he works as a political correspondent at Reuters. “China will soon surpass Russia as a nuclear threat –senior U.S. military official,” Reuters, 8/27/21, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-will-soon-surpass-russia-nuclear-threat-senior-us-military-official-2021-08-27/)-Alex

China, in the midst of a rapid nuclear weapons buildup, will soon surpass Russia as the United States' top nuclear threat, a senior U.S. military official said on Friday, warning that the two countries have no mechanisms to avert miscommunication. "There's going to be a point, a crossover point, where the number of threats presented by China will exceed the number of threats that currently Russia presents," Bussiere told an online forum. Unlike with Russia, the United States did not have any treaties or dialogue mechanism with China on the issue to "alleviate any misperceptions or confusion," he added.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Impact › 2NC/1NR --- Impact Uniqueness

Uniqueness --- US would defend Taiwan now

McCurry and Ni 5-23 (Justin McCurry is Guardian's Tokyo correspondent, and Vincent Ni is the Guardian's China affairs correspondent. , “US would defend Taiwan if attacked by China, says Joe Biden,” May 23, 2022, ) -LM

President says US’s responsibility to protect island is ‘even stronger’ after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Joe Biden has said the US would intervene militarily to defend Taiwan if it came under attack from China, in an unusually forceful presidential statement in support of self-governing that drew a defiant response from Beijing. Speaking in Tokyo on the second day of his visit to Japan, and against the backdrop of growing concern over Chinese military activity in the region, Biden said the US’s responsibility to protect the self-ruled island – which China considers a renegade province – was “even stronger” after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.“That’s the commitment we made,” Biden said, after he told the Japanese prime minister, Fumio Kishida, that Washington backed Japan’s permanent membership of a reformed UN security council and Tokyo’s plans to beef up its security with record levels of defence spending, as it seeks to counter a nuclear-armed North Korea and an increasingly assertive China. The US president said any attempt by China to use force against Taiwan would “just not be appropriate … it would dislocate the entire region and be another action similar to what happened in Ukraine”.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Links › Link --- Russia Focus Bad

China is increasingly becoming a larger threat – Especially as the west focuses on Russia

Rogin ’22 [Josh Rogin, columnist for the Global Opinions section of the Washington Post and a political analyst with CNN. He is also the author of Chaos Under Heaven: Trump, Xi, and the Battle for the 21st Century, released March, 2021 by Houghton Mifflin Harcout. Previously, Josh has covered foreign policy and national security for Bloomberg View, Newsweek, The Daily Beast, Foreign Policy magazine, Congressional Quarterly, Federal Computer Week magazine, and Japan’s Asahi Shimbun., “China is expanding in the Pacific while the West is distracted”, The Washington Post, April 14, 2022, ] -Chinmay

Officials and experts throughout Asia expressed shock last month when a leaked document emerged showing a draft of a “security cooperation” agreement between China and the Solomon Islands, a small former British colony in the South Pacific that has been independent since 1978. The draft agreement would enable Beijing to send armed police or military personnel, at the request of the Solomon Islands, for a variety of purposes, including to “assist in maintaining social order.” Marked confidential, the agreement would also expand the Chinese military’s ability to send ships and troops to protect Chinese people and projects on the islands. If you haven’t been paying attention to the Solomon Islands government, led by Beijing-friendly Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, you’re like most policymakers in Washington. But if you doubt the islands’ strategic significance, just look at the map. A Chinese military presence there would put People’s Liberation Army troops less than a five-hour flight from the eastern coast of Australia and far closer to U.S. territories than ever before. China surely hasn’t forgotten the role played by the Solomon Islands in World War II, especially during the 1942-43 Battle of Guadalcanal. “Ensuring that these islands, within striking distance of Australia and occupying critical strategic geography, remain free from Chinese coercion and military presence is a massive strategic imperative for the U.S. and Australia,” Alex Gray, director for Oceania and Indo-Pacific Security at the National Security Council during the Trump administration, told me. Predictably, Beijing says that the agreement is no big deal and is “beyond reproach.” But the U.S. and Australian governments have been scrambling to try to stop its completion. Australian officials are engaged in frantic shuttle diplomacy with the Sogavare government. President Biden’s top NSC official for Asia, Kurt Campbell, will become the administration’s first senior official to visit the Solomon Islands next week, in a regional tour that will include several other stops. It was Campbell who predicted in January that China would unveil a “strategic surprise” in the Pacific this year. Clearly, the U.S. and Australian governments had some indication that this was coming. Yet neither seems to have done much to try to prevent the Chinese move. Now, experts say, both governments are struggling to catch up to Beijing. “Reversing momentum, rather than stopping it in the first place, is risky and expensive,” said former Australian national security official John Lee, now with the Hudson Institute. “The failure to do more to prevent the deal from even being contemplated means the U.S. and allies will need to spend more resources and regional political capital than they would like.” Biden administration officials maintain that they are, in fact, heavily engaged in the Pacific Islands. Biden spoke to Pacific Island leaders in August, via Zoom. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Fiji in February. Last month, Biden appointed Ambassador Joseph Yun as a special envoy to work on completing negotiations to renew U.S. compacts with three other Pacific Island nations. State Department climate envoy John F. Kerry attended a conference in Palau this week. A senior Biden administration official told me that covid restrictions hampered face-to-face diplomacy until recently, but the official assured me that the Biden team is determined to step up the United States’ game in this region. Nevertheless, details of exactly how the Biden administration plans to try to persuade Sogavare to turn away from China are scarce. “This did not come as a surprise, and this is not the only place in the Pacific or globally where China is extraordinarily active,” the official said. "This is but a recent manifestation, and it’s probably one of the boldest." To be sure, the Solomon Islands is only one of many places in the Pacific Islands where China is expanding its influence. Beijing has persuaded two Pacific island countries to drop diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in recent years, including the Solomon Islands. China offers tempting packages of economic, diplomatic and military aid while bribing any and all corrupt leaders in these countries. Rather than reacting case by case, the United States and allied governments need to come to the table with substantive, long-term offers of aid and investment to reassure these Pacific Island nations that they have another option besides betting their future on partnership with Beijing. Russia is an urgent threat, but China is the more serious long-term competitor, only too happy to exploit our distraction. Xi has global ambitions, which means we must confront his aggression in many places at once. If the Pacific Islands become China’s outposts, the region and the world will be a much more dangerous place.

2022 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › Links › Link Uniqueness – China = Cyber Threat

China is a major cyber-threat to the US

Perlroth ’21 [Nicole Perlroth, covers cybersecurity and digital espionage for The New York Times. She has covered Russian hacks of nuclear plants, airports, and elections, North Korea's cyberattacks against movie studios, banks and hospitals, Iranian attacks on oil companies, banks and the Trump campaign and hundreds of Chinese cyberattacks, including a months-long hack of The Times. She is the author of the New York Times bestselling book “This Is How They Tell Me The World Ends,” about the global cyber arms race. The book, and several of her Times articles, have been optioned for television., “How China Transformed Into a Prime Cyber Threat to the U.S.”, The New York Times, July 20, 2021, ] -Chinmay

On Monday, the United States again accused China of cyberattacks. But these attacks were highly aggressive, and they reveal that China has transformed into a far more sophisticated and mature digital adversary than the one that flummoxed U.S. officials a decade ago. The Biden administration’s indictment for the cyberattacks, along with interviews with dozens of current and former American officials, shows that China has reorganized its hacking operations in the intervening years. While it once conducted relatively unsophisticated hacks of foreign companies, think tanks and government agencies, China is now perpetrating stealthy, decentralized digital assaults of American companies and interests around the world. Hacks that were conducted via sloppily worded spearphishing emails by units of the People’s Liberation Army are now carried out by an elite satellite network of contractors at front companies and universities that work at the direction of China’s Ministry of State Security, according to U.S. officials and the indictment. While phishing attacks remain, the espionage campaigns have gone underground and employ sophisticated techniques. Those include exploiting “zero-days,” or unknown security holes in widely used software like Microsoft’s Exchange email service and Pulse VPN security devices, which are harder to defend against and allow China’s hackers to operate undetected for longer periods. “What we’ve seen over the past two or three years is an upleveling” by China, said George Kurtz, the chief executive of the cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike. “They operate more like a professional intelligence service than the smash-and-grab operators we saw in the past.” China has long been one of the biggest digital threats to the United States. In a 2009 classified National Intelligence Estimate, a document that represents the consensus of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, China and Russia topped the list of America’s online adversaries. But China was deemed the more immediate threat because of the volume of its industrial trade theft. But that threat is even more troubling now because of China’s revamping of its hacking operations. Furthermore, the Biden administration has turned cyberattacks — including ransomware attacks — into a major diplomatic front with superpowers like Russia, and U.S. relations with China have steadily deteriorated over issues including trade and tech supremacy. China’s prominence in hacking first came to the fore in 2010 with attacks on Google and RSA, the security company, and again in 2013 with a hack of The New York Times. Those breaches and thousands of others prompted the Obama administration to finger China’s People’s Liberation Army hackers in a series of indictments for industrial trade theft in 2014. A single Shanghai-based unit of the People’s Liberation Army, known as Unit 61398, was responsible for hundreds — some estimated thousands — of breaches of American companies, The Times reported. In 2015, Obama officials threatened to greet President Xi Jinping of China with an announcement of sanctions on his first visit to the White House, after a particularly aggressive breach of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management. In that attack, Chinese hackers made off with sensitive personal information, including more than 20 million fingerprints, for Americans who had been granted a security clearance. White House officials soon struck a deal that China would cease its hacking of American companies and interests for its industrial benefit. For 18 months during the Obama administration, security researchers and intelligence officials observed a notable drop in Chinese hacking. After President Donald J. Trump took office and accelerated trade conflicts and other tensions with China, the hacking resumed. By 2018, U.S. intelligence officials had noted a shift: People’s Liberation Army hackers had stood down and been replaced by operatives working at the behest of the Ministry of State Security, which handles China’s intelligence, security and secret police. Hacks of intellectual property, that benefited China’s economic plans, originated not from the P.L.A. but from a looser network of front companies and contractors, including engineers who worked for some of the country’s leading technology companies, according to intelligence officials and researchers. It was unclear how exactly China worked with these loosely affiliated hackers. Some cybersecurity experts speculated that the engineers were paid cash to moonlight for the state, while others said those in the network had no choice but to do whatever the state asked. In 2013, a classified U.S. National Security Agency memo said, “The exact affiliation with Chinese government entities is not known, but their activities indicate a probable intelligence requirement feed from China’s Ministry of State Security.” On Monday, the White House provided more clarity. In its detailed indictment, the United States accused China’s Ministry of State Security of being behind an aggressive assault on Microsoft’s Exchange email systems this year. The Justice Department separately indicted four Chinese nationals for coordinating the hacking of trade secrets from companies in aviation, defense, biopharmaceuticals and other industries. According to the indictments, Chinese nationals operated from front companies, like Hainan Xiandun, that the Ministry of State Security set up to give Chinese intelligence agencies plausible deniability. The indictment included a photo of one defendant, Ding Xiaoyang, a Hainan Xiandun employee, receiving a 2018 award from the Ministry of State Security for his work overseeing the front company’s hacks. The United States also accused Chinese universities of playing a critical role, recruiting students to the front companies and running their key business operations, like payroll. The indictment also pointed to Chinese “government-affiliated” hackers for conducting ransomware attacks that extort companies for millions of dollars. Scrutiny of ransomware attackers had previously largely fallen on Russia, Eastern Europe and North Korea. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said in a statement on Monday that China’s Ministry of State Security “has fostered an ecosystem of criminal contract hackers who carry out both state-sponsored activities and cybercrime for their own financial gain.” China has also clamped down on research about vulnerabilities in widely held software and hardware, which could potentially benefit the state’s surveillance, counterintelligence and cyberespionage campaigns. Last week, it announced a new policy requiring Chinese security researchers to notify the state within two days when they found security holes, such as the “zero-days” that the country relied on in the breach of Microsoft Exchange systems.