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2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › China Internal

China is also increasing attacks on NATO members.

Conklin ’22 (Audrey Conklin is a digital reporter for FOX Business and Fox News. “Chinese cyberattacks on NATO countries increase 116% since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: study”; Fox Business; March 26, 2022, )

Cyberattacks against NATO countries originating from Chinese IP addresses have increased 116% since Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb. 24, new research shows. Cyberattacks from Chinese IPs have also risen 72% worldwide, according to trends analyzed before and after Russia's invasion of Ukraine by cybersecurity firm Check Point Research. "As the Russia-Ukraine conflict intensifies, we grew curious around cyber attacks originating from China. We’re seeing significant increases in cyber attacks that originate from Chinese IP addresses," Omer Dembinsky, data group manager at Check Point Software, the software arm of Check Point, said in an emailed statement. He noted that while Check Point researchers cannot attribute the attacks to the Chinese government, "as it is difficult to determine attribution in cyber security without more evidence," it is clear to researchers that "hackers are using Chinese servers to launch cyber attacks world-wide, especially NATO countries." Last week, attacks from Chinese IP addresses on countries around the globe were 60% higher than the first three weeks of the war in Ukraine. The increase in attacks from Chinese servers is also significantly higher than the increase in cyberattacks over all since Russia's invasion began, researchers noted. "The servers are likely used by hackers within China and abroad," Dembinsky said. "The trend can have many meanings. For example, the increase can indicate where it is now easy or cheap to set up and operate a service or where it is more opportune to hide the real origin of the attack. It can also indicate how global cyber traffic is being routed at this moment in time." The FBI earlier this week announced it would be partnering with the private sector to combat foreign cyberattacks against U.S. entities.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › Cyber Disunity Internals

Cyber ops are key to Russia’s revisionist strategy by undermining support for Western governments

Oscar Jonsson in 2021

scholar of strategy, emerging technology and Russia who is founder of Phronesis Analysis and Researcher at Swedish Defence University; FROM EASTERN FLANK TO WESTERN ELECTIONS: RUSSIAN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE EU AND NATO; The Center for European Policy Analysis; https://cepa.org/the-evolution-of-russian-hybrid-warfare-eu-nato/

The cyber domain is another area which holds a lot of promise for a revisionist power like Russia to offset a more prosperous and superior West. Russia is skilled at combining the use of different domains of influence. It is a sophisticated cyber actor that has the “full range of capabilities for undertaking actions in cyberspace …. It implements a very advanced offensive program.”29 These capabilities were shown in Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and are a reminder that the most significant impact of its operations was not through fake social media accounts, but the hack-and-leak operation against the Democratic National Committee (DNC), which started with a cyber intrusion.30 U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that the DNC hack sought “to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump.”31 Following the exposure of its meddling, including by the Mueller report, Russia improved its modus operandi with increased operational security and more stealthy operations.32 This included “a partly successful attempt to interfere, via hack-and-leak, in the French presidential elections of 2017 and almost certainly in the United Kingdom in 2019.”28

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › Cyber Disunity Internals

Successful Russian cyber ops undermine NATO cohesion by spreading disinformation that erodes political support

Oscar Jonsson in 2021

scholar of strategy, emerging technology and Russia who is founder of Phronesis Analysis and Researcher at Swedish Defence University; FROM EASTERN FLANK TO WESTERN ELECTIONS: RUSSIAN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE EU AND NATO; The Center for European Policy Analysis; https://cepa.org/the-evolution-of-russian-hybrid-warfare-eu-nato/

The conduct of modern conflict is constantly developing with organizational and technological innovation, and through interactions with the participants. Russia’s leadership has notably had a more difficult task as the world has become more aware of its nonmilitary influence since the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The big technology companies — Facebook, Twitter, and Google — also seem to have woken up to the fact that they are key arenas for the information conflict, and have started to take countermeasures. On the other hand, hybrid warfare still favors the attacker as few costs are imposed. Moreover, the conditions for such warfare were particularly favorable during the Trump presidency and the higher demand for information in the pandemic. It is critical to put Russian influence operations in perspective. It is incorrect to dismiss them as unsuccessful simply because both NATO and the EU are intact, or because many of the posts coming from the IRA have low viewership and low levels of interaction. In fact, Russia, starting from a limited power position, is attempting to impact the world’s most powerful political union, the EU, and the world’s most powerful military alliance, NATO, by using relatively cheap means. Moreover, the aggregate impact of flooding the media with fake news is often bigger and more important than interactions with individual pieces of content. This can be seen in a study of the media landscape in Michigan in the lead up to the 2016 U.S. presidential election. It found that sensational and conspiratorial material as well as fake news was shared a lot more on social media than well-researched news, the proportion of well-researched news being shared was the lowest ever the day before the election, and that Trump-related hashtags by far surpassed Clinton-related ones.33 That being said, Russian disinformation attempts can hardly be so effective as Trump himself stating that it would be the most fraudulent election ever.34 Nonetheless, it is lazy analysis to simply state that Trump was more harmful than foreign meddling as that is a false dichotomy. More correctly, the most effective influence operations have always been about exploiting existing divisions and local actors. For example, Trump described Montenegro as “very aggressive” and said that defending it would lead to World War III.35 The question is, where did those views originate? It is hard to believe that they originated from U.S. intelligence briefs. That narrative was only being pushed by the Russian disinformation machinery. This illustrates the fact that the impact of disinformation cannot merely be measured through Facebook interactions, it can also be seen in a president’s comments that draw either directly from Russian sources or, more likely, from sources that are susceptible to Russian disinformation. Even if Russian influence operations in 2016 did not sway a single voter, they sharpened the polarization in U.S. politics and society. This was manifested in the country being tied up for years in debates on the extent of collusion by the Trump campaign with the Russians and impeachment procedures. The threat from Russian influence operations remains real, even though they are, by their very nature, unlikely to have an immediate or obvious impact. The EU and NATO are dependent on political support from their member states. In these states, there is some opposition to both institutions that can be amplified and exploited by malign Russian actors.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › Cyber Disunity Internals

Hybrid cyber ops against NATO undermine cohesion through disinformation- new NATO strategy is key

Harlan Ullman, 1-30-2022, "The Russia crisis has exposed why NATO needs a strategy shift," Atlantic Council,

The standoff over Ukraine has underscored a pressing need for NATO. Even though NATO leaders agreed to its new military strategy of defense and deterrence in 2019, given the events in Ukraine, that strategy appears dated. Why? First, Russia has shown it is prepared to use its military in anger and certainly as a threat. And it has modernized its conventional and nuclear forces. NATO has not begun a major modernization for either its conventional or nuclear forces. And the current strategy, at least the of the classified guidance that have been , offers rhetoric and not substantial guidance on modernization. Second, while NATO created centers of excellence to deal with specific aspects of hybrid war, the Alliance still has not produced a viable and comprehensive counter-gray area/hybrid-war strategy with corresponding capabilities. Russia calls these operations “active measures” that include cyber, propaganda, misinformation, disinformation, and information operations to erode the will and cohesion of NATO. Third, while advanced technology has generated revolutionary advances in military capability, conversely, it also has created greater vulnerabilities—particularly in command-and-control and logistics. Effectively targeting these vulnerabilities will disrupt any offensive. In the 1940 Battle for France, had British and French forces sustained air and long-range artillery attacks on the many miles of German convoys crowding major roads driving west, one of the greatest traffic jams in history would have resulted. That did not happen. Fourth, while NATO spends many times more collectively on defense than Russia does, costs are rising faster than defense-spending increases for virtually every item from people to pencils to precision weapons. As an ironic result, the more is spent on defense, the more . All these factors would seemingly demand a major strategy review. The Ukraine crisis intensifies this urgency. The question is whether NATO will take note.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › Cyber Disunity Internals

Russian cyber warfare is undermining NATO decision-making and unity

Franz-Stefan Gady 21, Research Fellow for Cyber, Space and Future Conflict, International Institute for Strategic Studies. “NATO Decision-Making in the Age of Big Data and Artificial Intelligence” Editors: Sonia Lucarelli; Alessandro Marrone; and Francesco Niccolò Moro. Sonia Lucarelli is Professor of International Relations and European Security at the University of Bologna, and member of the Board of Directors of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). Alessandro Marrone is Head of the Defence Programme of IAI and teaches at the Istituto Superiore di Stato Maggiore Interforze (ISSMI) of the Italian Ministry of Defence. Francesco N. Moro is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Bologna and Adjunct Professor of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University Europe Campus. This publication is the result of the Conference “NATO Decision-making: promises and perils of the Big Data age”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. //pipk

This chapter seeks to offer preliminary answers to two questions. First, to what degree will Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled information warfare exacerbate hybrid threats to NATO decision-making? Second, what can NATO countries do to alleviate the threat? To narrow the research scope, this chapter will principally look at threats posed by Russian AI-enabled information warfare operations under the concept of gibridnaya voyna. The study argues that given that AI-enabled information warfare has the potential to amplify societal polarization, elite disagreement within domestic politics, and reshape the perception of the “Russian threat” in NATO member countries, it can have a direct negative impact on national and NATO decision-making. Such operations, however, only amplify existing symptoms of polarization and disagreement found within NATO member states and are not their root causes. The chapter concludes that NATO must better integrate tech-centric so-called “whack-a-troll” tactics with a whole-of-nation strategy to better safe-guard NATO decision-making and alliance cohesion. Renewed discussion of whole-of-society defense concepts to inform national security strategies may be useful in this regard.

Introduction NATO defines hybrid threats as threats that “combine military and non-military as well as covert and overt means, including disinformation, cyber attacks, economic pressure, deployment of irregular armed groups and use of regular forces” (2019). Such hybrid methods are used to blur the line between war and peace and “attempt to sow doubts in the minds of target populations.” NATO further emphasizes that “[t]he speed, scale and intensity of hybrid threats have increased in recent years.” The latter can partially be traced back to various technological advances including in the fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and offensive cyber capabilities, utilized in conjunction with deliberate attempts by competitor nations to undermine the political cohesion of NATO member states from within.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › NATO Unity Low/Collapsing

Turkish-Greek disputes in the Aegean Sea are disunifying relations within the southern NATO block – meetings collapsing now.

Daily Sabah 6-15 [Turkish based news organization. “NATO urges Turkey, Greece to resolve disagreements over Aegean”. June 15, 2022. https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/nato-urges-turkey-greece-to-resolve-disagreements-over-aegean]

Stoltenberg's comments came two weeks after President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared Turkey would no longer participate in regular high-level meetings with Greek leaders intended to foster cooperation between the two countries. Erdoğan raised the stakes last week, warning Greece to demilitarize its Aegean islands and saying he was “not joking.” He spoke during Turkish wargames near the Greek islands that included an amphibious landing scenario. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis responded that he would not engage in a "ping-pong" of personal insults with Erdoğan. The two NATO allies have long been at odds over a number of issues including offshore rights, ownership of uninhabited islets, competing claims over jurisdiction in the Eastern Mediterranean, overlapping claims over their continental shelves, maritime boundaries, airspace, energy, the ethnically split island of Cyprus, the status of the islands in the Aegean Sea and migrants. They have come close to war three times in the past half-century, while NATO stepped in when a dispute over drilling rights for potential oil and gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea led to a tense naval standoff in the summer of 2020. Turkey says Greece is stationing troops on islands in the Aegean in violation of peace treaties signed after the World Wars, demanding that Greece demilitarize its eastern islands, citing the 20th-century treaties that ceded sovereignty of the islands to Greece. Greece counters that the islands need defenses given threats of war from Turkey, which has NATO's second-biggest military and maintains a large landing fleet on its Aegean coast. Turkey in recent months has stepped up criticism of Greece stationing troops on islands in the eastern Aegean, near the Turkish coast and in many cases visible from shore. These islands were required to be demilitarized under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and the 1947 Treaty of Paris, so any troops or weapons on the islands are strictly forbidden.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › NATO Unity Low/Collapsing

Turkish resistance to accepting Finland and Sweden into NATO is causing rifts with the US and other NATO member states – Russian arms sales create defence system disunity.

Umut Uras 5-17 [Umut Uras is a senior producer with experience covering the Cyprus dispute, Turkish politics and EU affairs. “Why does Turkey oppose Finland and Sweden’s NATO membership?”. May 17, 2022. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/5/17/why-turkey-opposes-finland-and-swedens-nato-membership]

Erdogan on Monday accused the two Nordic countries of backing “terrorism”. “Neither of these countries have a clear, open attitude towards terrorist organisations,” Erdogan said, referring to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara has designated a “terrorist group”, and other armed Kurdish groups active in Turkey and its periphery. “How can we trust them?” On the same day, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu slammed Finland and Sweden for not extraditing suspects wanted in Turkey despite Ankara’s requests. The wanted individuals were either accused of having links to the PKK or to the Gulen movement, which is blamed by Turkey for a 2016 coup attempt that killed hundreds of people. In response, the Finnish foreign minister, Pekka Haavisto, said that while he was surprised at Turkey’s stance, he did not want to “bargain” with Ankara. Erdogan also targeted Stockholm in his remarks for its arms sanctions against Turkey. Sweden has frozen arms sales to Turkey since 2019 over Ankara’s military operation in neighbouring Syria. The Turkish military has carried out several cross-border operations in Syria since 2016, targeting ISIL (ISIS) and Kurdish fighters seen as “terrorists” by Ankara. Turkey controls swaths of territory in northern Syria and has been accused by some NGOs of forcing out local residents.

Mensur Akgun, professor of international relations at Istanbul’s Kultur University, told Al Jazeera that Ankara has also sought to use Sweden and Finland’s membership bid as leverage to fix the pressing issues it has with the United States, a staunch supporter of the bids. “Ankara has been under US sanctions over F-35 fighter jets and is not happy about it,” Akgun said. Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 defence system has been one of the key issues that have strained relations between Turkey and the US in recent years. In July 2019, the US removed Ankara from its key F-35 fighter jet programme days after Turkey received the first delivery of the Russian S-400s. The US and NATO allies say the use of a Russian missile defence system by a NATO member is dangerous for NATO’s own defence systems, but Turkey says it decided to buy the missile system after then-President Barack Obama’s administration stalled on a sale of the US Patriot air defence system, widely used by NATO member states. Turkey has also condemned Washington’s support for armed Kurdish groups in Syria. The US recognises the PKK as a “terrorist” organisation but has militarily and politically supported the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Syrian offshoot of the former, particularly during the height of the fight against ISIL in the 2010s.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › NATO Unity Advantage Extensions › NATO Unity Low/Collapsing

Hungarian ties with Russia are deepening – Ukrainian support sits badly with them.

Yana Dlugy 6-16 [Yana Dlugy is a contributing writer with the Briefings team at The New York Times, and has reported from abroad for more than 20 years. She has been on several postings in Moscow, including for Newsweek and Agence France-Presse, and has also been based for AFP in Kyiv, the Middle East and Europe. “European Leaders Offer Support”. June 16, 2022. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/16/briefing/russia-ukraine-war-eu-france-germany-italy-hungary.html]

Transcarpathia, in western Ukraine, is home to 150,000 ethnic Hungarians. The region ended up within Ukraine after centuries of European conquests and often cruel border adjustments. (When I reported from Ukraine, I wrote about the village of Selmentsi that was cleaved in half in 1945, separating families and friends. It wasn’t until 2005 that a border crossing through the village was opened.) The community’s kinship with Hungary, which lies just to the south, has contributed to its ambivalence about the war and to tensions with fellow Ukrainians, my colleague Erika Solomon reports. Hungary’s leader, Viktor Orban, is President Vladimir Putin’s closest ally in the E.U. and the Hungarian broadcasts that most people watch in Transcarpathia are often sympathetic to Moscow’s version of events. In this poor region, Orban has given funding for schools, churches, businesses and newspapers. He has also encouraged Hungarians to claim citizenship. Tensions have been rising for years. After Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, Ukrainian nationalists marched through the city of Uzhhorod with chants of “Magyars to the knife,” referring to Hungarians. A Hungarian cultural center in the city was set ablaze twice in 2017. Authorities said they believe Moscow was behind the provocations. Some ethnic Hungarians in Transcarpathia feel loyal to Ukraine, but say they owe their livelihoods to Hungarian funding. “When we go to Hungary, we feel like Ukrainians,” Zoltan Kazmér said. “When we are in Ukraine, we feel like Hungarians.”

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Cyber War Advantage Extensions › Impact – Disease

An effective health care system is key to preventing the spread of disease

Peterson 14 (Kimberly Ann Petersen, Captain, Fremont, CA, Police Department. “The Affordable Care Act: A Prescription For Homeland Security Preparedness?” Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master Of Arts Security Studies (Homeland Security and Defense) from the Naval Postgraduate School. September 2014. https://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/43979/14Sep_Petersen_Kimberly.pdf?sequence=1)

An effective health surveillance system requires that those stricken by illness or disease—whether accidentally contracted or intentionally afflicted—seek treatment from a health care professional. The health care professional works to diagnose the problem, prescribe care, mitigate further spread, and report the illness as necessary to the health care community and possibly the government. This process is critical to our nation’s security in the event of a bioterror attack, such as with an Ebola virus or anthrax attack. The same holds true in managing contagious diseases such as influenza or newly emerging diseases. The sooner an illness or disease is correctly diagnosed, the more options remain available to help mitigate the spread or effect. Delays in diagnoses and therefore the development of appropriate treatments can have a limiting effect on both the health care community’s and the homeland security community’s choices and options in managing the spread and effect of the affliction. Jack Hadley’s analysis showed statistically significant and positive support for the hypothesis that having health insurance or greater medical care use improves health: seven of the 10 natural experiments analyzed, six of the seven longitudinal studies, 29 of 35 of the observational studies showed “statistically significant results consistent with a positive relationship between health insurance or medical care use and health.”170 According to author G. Kenny, the uninsured received only 55 percent of the medical services received by the insured.171 Increased health insurance coverage correlates with an increased use of health care services,172 which is likely to increase the chance of earlier identification and mitigation of disease. This is good news for homeland security. The uninsured are more than four times more likely than the insured to delay needed medical care or forego it altogether due to cost concerns.173 By increasing the number of insured Americans, we also increase the likelihood that those with contagious diseases will seek treatment earlier on, allowing health professionals to identify, treat and mitigate disease spread more successfully. This would include diseases of concern to the homeland security community such as influenza virus, or any disease that has the ability to spread from person-to-person. A 2012 report from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence focused on “megatrends” and future possibilities for the global world in the year 2030.174 One area of focus was the increasing likelihood that viruses previously unknown in humans would continue to cross over from the animal reservoir to humans due to increased livestock production and human encroachment into the jungles. Examples of prior occurrences include a prion disease in cattle that jumped to humans in 1980 to cause variant Creutzeldt-Jacob disease in humans and the bat corona virus transferring to humans in 2002, known now as SARS.175 These diseases can be devastating to the human population, due to the lack of prior exposure, as well as the lag-time required to diagnose the disease and develop treatments. The same is true for any emerging disease, regardless of source. Early detection, identification, and mitigation are particularly critical with emerging diseases. New viruses appear on a daily basis. Viruses utilize RNA rather than DNA in the reproductive process. The RNA process is not as exact as the DNA process, and the reproductions vary in their genetics compared to the parent. This phenomenon is termed “antigenic drift,” and it makes viruses a moving target in terms of vaccination and treatment. As an example, there are multiple strains of the rhinovirus (the common cold) circulating at any one time. By the time a rhinovirus has passed through a given population, it will be genetically different than the strain that touched off the contagion. Early medical care, diagnosis, and treatment are particularly critical when dealing with newly emerging diseases that are more dangerous than the rhinovirus, such as hemorrhagic viruses like the Ebola virus. These viruses have an extremely high mortality rate, as high as 90 percent in some cases,176 and for many there are no known cures. When there are no cures for such deadly diseases early identification and quarantine become the primary management tools. Increased health insurance coverage makes the U.S. better positioned to find and manage emerging diseases earlier on in an outbreak. The same holds true for the health surveillance system as it relates to food safety: an increase in the number of Americans with health insurance is likely to increase the health surveillance system’s ability to help us in spotting food-safety issues. More insured people will seek medical care earlier on, which allows the surveillance system to pick up on patterns sooner.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Cyber War Advantage Extensions › Impact – Grid

A cyber attack on the power grid causes nuclear war

Tilford 12 (Robert, Graduate US Army Airborne School, Ft. Benning, Georgia, “Cyber attackers could shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast” 2012, ***we don’t agree with the ableist language)

To make matters worse a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also cripple [wreck] the U.S. military. The senator notes that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also power “every military base in our country.” “Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not days, fuel supplies would run out”, he said. Which means military command and control centers could go dark. Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut Down completely. “Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems would be left without either fuel or electric power”, said Senator Grassley. “So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions”, he said. We contacted the Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real. Top national security officials—including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, “preventing a cyber attack and improving the nation’s electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country” (source: Congressional Record). So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this? Enough to start, or end a war over it, for sure. A cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an “Act of War” and could be met with a “full scale” US military response. That could include the use of “nuclear weapons”, if authorized by the President.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Cyber War Advantage Extensions › Impact – Econ

Decline would collapse deterrence----that causes extinction but keeping it solves the case

Tønnesson 15 (Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311)

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among interdependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Cyber War Advantage Extensions › Impact – laundry list

Populism, econ, grid, health care

Pelletier 22 [Justin Pelletier is the business director for Eaton Cybersecurity Security Assessment and Forensic Examination (SAFE) Lab in RIT's Center for Cybersecurity ,The Conversation Us Russian Cyberattacks against the U.S. Could Focus on Disinformation Scientific American 1-28-2022 ] 6/14/2022

As tensions mount between Russia and the West over Ukraine, the threat of Russian cyberattacks against the U.S. increases. The Department of Homeland Security issued an intelligence bulletin on Jan. 23, 2022, warning that Russia has the capability to carry out a range of attacks, from denial-of-service attacks on websites to disrupting critical infrastructure like power grids.

“We assess that Russia would consider initiating a cyber attack against the Homeland if it perceived a US or NATO response to a possible Russian invasion of Ukraine threatened its long-term national security,” the DHS stated in the bulletin, which it sent to law enforcement agencies, state and local governments, and critical infrastructure operators.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Cyber War Advantage Extensions › Impact – Russia War

Russia war is the only actual extinction risk

Farquhar et al ‘17 (Sebastian Farquhar, DPhil from the University of Oxford in Cybersecurity and AI. Stefan Schubert, PhD in philosophy and postdoc at London School of Economics, where he combined his research with outreach work in the field of political rationality. Owen Cotton-Barratt, DPhil in pure mathematics, Research Fellow at the University of Southampton, former Director of Research at the Centre for Effective Altruism. Haydn Belfield, Policy Associate to the University of Oxford’s Global Priorities Project, former Senior Parliamentary Researcher to a British Shadow Cabinet Minister. John Halstead, Global Priorities Project, a collaboration between the Centre for Effective Altruism and the Future of Humanity Institute, part of the University of Oxford. Andrew Snyder-Beattie, fellow in the Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Initiative from the Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security. “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance”. Global Priorities Risk 2017. ) swap

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter. According to one model 9, an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Cyber War Advantage Extensions › Impact – Russia War

NATO-Russia war goes nuclear and kills billions

Majumdar 18 (Dave Majumdar (the defense editor for the National Interest). “Doomsday: Why a War with Russia Would Go Nuclear (And Kill Billions of People).” The National Interest. January 25, 2018. )

A NATO counter-offensive would be bloody and fraught with escalatory risk—but it’s one of the probable outcomes of a Russian invasion. In that eventuality, Russian conventional forces—of which only a portion are well trained and well equipped—would likely be severely damaged or even destroyed. Moreover, if NATO forces hit targets inside Russia or crossed over into Russian territory, Moscow might conclude that there is a danger to the existence of the state. After all, Moscow has expressed concerns in the past that regime change by the West is an all too real danger. In that situation, Russia might counter advancing NATO forces with its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons. While a recent RAND Corporation study concluded that Russia could overrun NATO’s member states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Baltics within sixty hours, the war games did not simulate the use of nuclear weapons. If, however, a war were to breakout between NATO and Russia, nuclear weapons would certainly come into play—especially if the conflict were going poorly for Moscow. Unlike the Soviet Union, which had a stated “no first use” policy, modern Russia explicitly rejected that pledge in 1993. In fact, as Moscow’s conventional forces continued to atrophy during the economic and social meltdown of the 1990s, Russia developed a doctrine called de-escalation in 2000 . Simply put, if Russia were faced with a large-scale attack that could defeat its conventional forces, Moscow might resort to nuclear weapons. In 2010, Russia revised the doctrine somewhat as its conventional forces started to recover from the aftermath of the Soviet collapse—the current version states Moscow would use nuclear weapons in situations “that would put in danger the very existence of the state.”

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Cyber War Advantage Extensions › Deterrence

NATO must improve its cyber defense capabilities to credibly deter war

Lindley-French ’22 (Julian is a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and chair of The Alpen Group, 2-1, 22, To keep the peace, NATO must be ready to fight the wars, https://ipolitics.ca/2022/02/02/to-keep-the-peace-nato-must-be-ready-to-fight-the-wars/)

The NATO alliance is now facing what could be the most complex set of challenges in its history. Given the nature and extent of the threats against citizens of the alliance from Vancouver to Vilnius, urgency must be the hallmark of Strategic Concept 2022 — in essence, the alliance’s manifesto — to more clearly stress defence against, and deterrence of, Russian aggression in the region. Russia continues to pose the most immediate threat to NATO (also called the North Atlantic Alliance). The latter will continue seeking dialogue with Russia and honouring the NATO-Russia Founding Act, even though Russia continues to breach the values, principles, trust, and commitments that were meant to underpin the NATO-Russia Council. Much will depend on Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine, and the alliance can’t stand aside. NATO should launch a Ukrainian Deterrence Initiative to provide military equipment and training, as well as enhance Ukraine’s resilience. Terrorism continues to challenge the rules-based international order by undermining democracy and stability across the globe. China’s rise as a military power will be the main cause of change in the coming decade. While NATO must seek to maintain a constructive dialogue with China, possibly through some form of NATO-China Council, Beijing’s growing influence and power present challenges that the alliance must address. NATO must also grasp failure, and reflect on hard lessons from the chaotic and tragic withdrawal from Afghanistan. The need for realistic political objectives allied to strategic patience must be reinforced by strengthened political cohesion and the equitable sharing of risk and cost. Mass disruption and mass destruction are merging into a continuum of risk, challenge, and threat, which the alliance must contend with across a broad spectrum of tasks, from defence and deterrence to engagement. Strategic Concept 2022 must reset NATO’s purpose. The alliance will continue to lead the collective defence of Europe in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. NATO remains vital to effective crisis management, and has a critical role to play in promoting co-operative security with partners in and around Europe and across the wider world. Something old, something new? The principle of resilience, making civil society more robust, is anchored in Article 3 of the alliance’s founding treaty. NATO has also reaffirmed that national and collective resilience is a vital component of credible deterrence and defence. Cyberattacks and information warfare on critical civilian and military infrastructures are now deemed clear and present dangers, and must be countered. But it’s deterrence and defence that must remain NATO’s core business. If the alliance is to remain credible as a peacekeeper, NATO must always be a capable warfighter. NATO forces must meet the challenge of the fast-changing character and conduct of warfare, which now stretches across a mosaic of information war, cyberwar, and increasingly precise and rapid “hyper war.” U.S. armed forces will continue to lead NATO for operations in Europe, but they’re engaged with the world. By 2030, a more equitable sharing of alliance burdens is needed, built on a commitment by the European allies to field 50 per cent of NATO’s minimum military requirement. Call it European strategic autonomy or strategic responsibility; either way, it realizes that greater European military capability will be vital. By 2030, Canadian and European allies must be able to deploy a NATO Allied Command Operations Mobile Heavy Force (AMHF). By consolidating all Allied Rapid Response Forces into a single pool of forces, the AMHF could act in any and all emergencies as a high-end first responder NATO Future Force that reinforces rather than drains the Americans. Fail to act now, and Europe could face a digital Pearl Harbor from which it wouldn’t recover. A catastrophic “bolt from the blue” would combine strategy, capability, new technologies of intelligent design, artificial intelligence, Big Data, quantum computing, etc., to decisively change the character of warfare, and Europe with it. By 2030, NATO must be a very different alliance, because it will be in a very different place. Otherwise, it could fail, although any such failure might not be the catastrophic demise some have predicted for so long. A Potemkin NATO would simply be yet more European-defence pretence: a pretty, reassuring façade of false security. Strategic Concept 2022 is the best chance NATO leaders have to set the alliance on course for 2030. Collectively, they must generate the necessary will, vision, and leadership.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Cyber War Advantage Extensions › Miscalculation

Failure to coordinate with allies causes cyber attacks to generate miscalculation that escalates conflict with Russia

Alina Polyakova and Mathieu Boulègue in 2021

President and CEO of the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) as well as an adjunct professor of European studies at the Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) AND Senior Research Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Programme @ Chatham House; The Evolution of Russian Hybrid Warfare: Conclusion; https://cepa.org/the-evolution-of-hybrid-warfare-conclusion/

The current Russian leadership has no incentive to dial back its efforts to undermine Western cohesion, especially since the assessment in Moscow is that these are largely succeeding. The West should, therefore, expect more, not less, tactical exploitation of the logics of chaos for the foreseeable future. Despite individual countries becoming more resilient to Russia’s evolving hybrid warfare, as seen in the cyber arena in Estonia and to some extent, the United Kingdom, the problem remains that the broader Western alliance as a whole is still underprepared to cope with and respond effectively to Russian destabilization. As a result, miscalculation and overreach by both sides in crisis scenarios are increasingly more likely and outcomes more unpredictable. Geopolitical competition will look less like a cold war and more like a constant barrage of violent episodes, low-threshold probes of Western readiness, and strategic deception and obfuscation of targets and intentions. Russia’s resolve to engender global chaos could unintentionally lead to an escalatory cycle. This danger will be compounded by Russia’s relentless effort to probe NATO’s coherence and ability to defend its member states. Without equal assessment and adaptation to Russia’s evolving tactics of hybrid war, Western policies will become less effective over the long run. Despite growing sophistication in certain domains, such as cyber, Russian influence attempts are often messy and opportunistic, taking advantage of weaknesses within target states’ systems. Moscow has also shown itself to be effective at identifying and filling, with minimal resources, power vacuums left behind by Western, and in particular U.S., disengagement. Comprehensive measures to address these vulnerabilities should necessarily also restrict the potential entry points for Russian influence attempts.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Cyber War Advantage Extensions › Russia Capable

Russia absolutely has the capability

Tidy, 22 (Joe Tidy, 3-22-2022, accessed on 6-16-2022, BBC News, "The three Russian cyber-attacks the West most fears", https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-60841924)ao

However, Russia is a cyber-superpower with a serious arsenal of cyber-tools, and hackers capable of disruptive and potentially destructive cyber-attacks. Ukraine has remained relatively untroubled by Russian cyber-offensives but experts now fear that Russia may go on a cyber-offensive against Ukraine's allies. "Biden's warnings seem plausible, particularly as the West introduced more sanctions, hacktivists continue to join the fray, and the kinetic aspects of the invasion seemingly don't go to plan," says Jen Ellis, from cyber-security firm Rapid7. Here are the hacks that experts most fear. BlackEnergy - targeted critical infrastructure attack Ukraine is often described as the hacking playground of Russia, which has carried out attacks there seemingly to test techniques and tools. In 2015 Ukraine's electricity grid was disrupted by a cyber-attack called BlackEnergy, which caused a short-term blackout for 80,000 customers of a utility company in western Ukraine. Nearly exactly a year later another cyber-attack known as Industroyer took out power for about one-fifth of Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital, for about an hour. The US and EU named and blamed Russian military hackers for the attacks. "Russia could absolutely try to execute an attack like this against the West as an illustration of capabilities and to make a statement," says Ukrainian cyber-security responder Marina Krotofil, who helped investigate the power cut hacks. "However, no cyber-attack against a power grid has resulted in an extended interruption of power supply. Executing cyber-attacks on complex engineering systems in a reliable way is extremely difficult and achieving a prolonged damaging effect is sometimes impossible due to in-built protections." Experts like Ms Krotofil also hypothesise that this could backfire on Russia too, as the West is most likely to have a decent foothold in Russian networks too. NotPetya - uncontrollable destruction NotPetya is thought to be the most costly cyber-attack in history and has been blamed on a group of Russian military hackers by the US, UK and EU authorities. The destructive software was hidden in an update of popular accounting software used in Ukraine, but spread worldwide destroying the computer systems of thousands of companies and causing approximately $10bn (£7.5bn) of damage. North Korean hackers are accused of causing huge disruption with a similar attack a month earlier. The WannaCry "worm" (a kind of virus) scrambled data on approximately 300,000 computers in 150 countries. The UK's National Health Service was forced to cancel large numbers of medical appointments. "These kinds of attacks would cause the greatest opportunity for mass chaos, economic instability, and even loss of life," says Ms Ellis. "It might sound far-fetched, but critical infrastructure often depends on connected technologies, just as much as every other part of our modern lives, and we have seen the potential for that with the impact of the WannaCry on UK hospitals." However, computer scientist Prof Alan Woodward, from the University of Surrey, says such attacks carry risks for Russia too. "These types of uncontrollable hacks are much more like biological warfare, in that it's very difficult to target specific critical infrastructure in specific places. WannaCry and NotPetya saw victims in Russia too." Colonial Pipeline - cyber-criminal attacks intensify In May 2021, a state of emergency was declared in a number of US states after hackers caused a vital oil pipeline to shut down. Colonial Pipeline carries 45% of the east coast's supply of diesel, petrol and jet fuel and the supply led to panic at the pumps. This attack wasn't carried out by Russian government hackers, but by the DarkSide ransomware group, which is thought to be based in Russia. The pipeline company admitted to paying criminals $4.4m in hard-to-trace Bitcoin, in order to get computer systems back up and running. A few weeks later meat supplies were affected when another ransomware crew called REvil attacked JBS, the world's largest beef processor. One of the big fears experts have about Russian cyber-capabilities is that the Kremlin may instruct cyber-crime groups to co-ordinate attacks on US targets, to maximise disruption. "The benefit of instructing cyber-criminals to carry out ransomware attacks is the general chaos they can cause. In large enough numbers they can cause serious economic damage," Prof Woodward says. "It also comes with the added bonus of plausible deniability as these groups are a step removed from an attack by the Russian state." How could the US respond? In the highly unlikely case that a Nato country is on the receiving end of a cyber-attack that causes loss of life or huge irreparable damage, then this could trigger Article 5, the alliance's collective defence clause. But experts say this would drag Nato into a war it does not want to be a part of, so any response is more likely to be from the US and close allies. President Biden has already said that "we are prepared to respond" if Russia launches a large attack on the US. However, the unprecedented cyber-chaos seen in Ukraine in recent weeks from vigilante hackers on either side of the war shows how easily things can escalate. So any action is likely to be extremely carefully considered.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Cyber War Advantage Extensions › Russia Attacks Increasing

NATO-Russia cyber war is increasing—5 eye warns necessitates protection

Nick Corbishley; April 22, 2022; writer for Naked Capitalism; The Russia-NATO Cyber War Is Escalating Fast; Naked Capitalism; ;

Eight cybersecurity authorities from the so-called “Five Eye” nations (United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand) released a joint statement on Thursday warning that more malicious cyber activity is on the way as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to undermine geopolitical stability. Before we look at the statement in any depth, an important five-pronged caveat is needed: Both the US and the UK are among the primary antagonists in NATO’s ongoing war with Russia; They both have significant offensive cyber war capabilities of their own; US intelligence agencies, at Obama’s behest, have drawn up a list of potential overseas targets for cyber attacks; Both countries have surreptitiously conducted vast surveillance programs, targeting not only their own populations but also citizens and government leaders of other countries; The world right now is in the grip of the biggest information war of this century. As such, any information coming out of the Five Eyes’ intelligence services should be treated with a healthy dose of skepticism. That having been said, here are the first three paragraphs of the missive: The cybersecurity authorities of the United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom are releasing this joint Cybersecurity Advisory. The intent of this joint CSA is to warn organizations that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could expose organizations both within and beyond the region to increased malicious cyber activity. This activity may occur as a response to the unprecedented economic costs imposed on Russia as well as materiel support provided by the United States and U.S. allies and partners. Evolving intelligence indicates that the Russian government is exploring options for potential cyberattacks (see the March 21, 2022, Statement by U.S. President Biden for more information). Recent Russian state-sponsored cyber operations have included distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, and older operations have included deployment of destructive malware against Ukrainian government and critical infrastructure organizations. Additionally, some cybercrime groups have recently publicly pledged support for the Russian government. These Russian-aligned cybercrime groups have threatened to conduct cyber operations in retaliation for perceived cyber offensives against the Russian government or the Russian people. The document also emphasizes the frontline role likely to be played by Russian state actors, including the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), GRU’s Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) and the Central Scientific Institute of Chemistry and Mechanics (TsNIIKhM) of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Clearly, Russia has the capability to launch a barrage of cyber attacks against the west; the question is: does it want to? The authors of the document urge critical infrastructure organizations to take immediate steps to protect against cyberattacks. Those steps, they say, should include patching known exploited vulnerabilities, updating software, enforcing multi-factor authentication, securing and monitoring remote desktop protocol (RDP) and other “potentially risky” services, and providing end-user security awareness and training. As The Register, a British technology news website, notes, if any of these recommendations come as a surprise to critical infrastructure operators, “we’re screwed”. The warning from the “Five Eye” nations comes just days after NATO began (as Bloomberg puts it) “the largest and most complex ‘live-fire’ cyber defense exercises” ever conducted. More than 2,000 people from 32 nations were expected to participate in the war game, which began on Tuesday in Tallinn, Estonia. They include representatives of five to 10 large global financial institutions, including Santander and Mastercard. This is all happening as fears rise that the boundaries of the cyber war between Russia and NATO could soon spread beyond Europe, where attacks have been registered not only in Ukraine and Russia but also Poland and Finland. On March 21, President Joe Biden warned American businesses to prepare themselves for cyberattacks. Russia is likely to deploy cyber attacks as a form of retaliation against US sanctions, Biden said, adding that Russia has “a very sophisticated cyber capability,” which Putin “hasn’t used… yet” but which forms “part of his playbook.”

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Cyber War Advantage Extensions › Russia Attacks Increasing

Russian cyberattacks are coming and NATO is vulnerable- cyberwar is the lynchpin of Russia’s strategy of countering the US

Dolan 2/15/22

Dr. Chris J. Dolan is a Professor of Political Science and Director of the Master’s of Science Intelligence and Security at Lebanon Valley College; NATO Must Boost Hybrid Warfare Defenses; Just Security; https://www.justsecurity.org/80176/nato-must-boost-hybrid-warfare-defenses/

Russia could launch a conventional military invasion of Ukraine at any moment, but it could also destabilize and undermine it without ever firing a shot. Russian military exercises and positioning are powerful tools of unpredictability that keep NATO and Ukraine off balance while Russian operatives and their proxies wage a hybrid war through covert operations, coordinated disinformation campaigns, and cyber attacks. To build resilience against hybrid warfare, NATO should collaborate with the private sector and devote more resources to technology literacy and innovation.¶ Russia’s Hybrid Warfare Strategy¶ Russia’s strategy is centered on promoting a narrative of grievances. Russia believes the United States is using Ukraine and promoting NATO expansion to contain Russian national security interests and encroach on its traditional spheres of influence. It also contends that Ukraine should return to the Minsk Agreements and end its attempt to win back Donbas. These are false narratives because sovereign and independent states have the freedom to determine their own path and seek membership in any alliance. And it would be madness for the Ukrainian government to retake Donbas given the Russian military presence there. The Russian rhetoric is a trojan horse created by the Kremlin to renegotiate the end of the Cold War and redraw European borders the same way Russia did when it illegally annexed Crimea in 2014.¶ The effectiveness of the Russian narrative depends on combining conventional military positioning with hybrid tactics or “active measures.” Hybrid actions taken in the so-called “gray-zone” typically consist of measures short of conventional warfare such as limited strikes, special operations forces, raids, cyber attacks, and covert influence operations. Hybrid warfare is a central element of Russia’s military strategy, in which operatives remain just below the radar and work with proxies to stage false flags to justify an invasion. To crush the Prague Spring in 1968, Soviet operatives in Czechoslovakia planted weapons in packages labeled “Made in the USA,” which were published in Soviet state-controlled outlets as signs of a U.S.-led plot. The KGB ran active measures during the Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980’s, often using “false bands” of Afghan units posing as CIA-backed guerillas to justify Soviet military operations.¶ Misinformation and disinformation are quickly and efficiently distributed through news channels and social media to influence public opinion. Russian state-owned outlets Russia Today (RT), Tass, and Sputnik have a strong presence on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Telegram, echoing the Kremlin’s position and portraying NATO and the United States as aggressors. In 2013-2014, Russian state media framed the Maidan protests that toppled Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych as “fomented by the U.S. in cooperation with fascist Ukrainian nationalists” that were used as a pretext for Russia’s little green men to seize Crimea.¶ One Russian-backed channel on YouTube is НАШ or NASH TV, which has been promoting Russia’s narrative until it was banned in Ukraine. Founded by former pro-Russia Ukraine parliament member Yevheniy Murayev, NASH TV is a Kremlin mouth piece flooding viewers with anti-American and anti-NATO falsehoods. Last month, the United Kingdom accused Russia of attempting to overthrow Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and replace him with Murayev. This is the same approach used by Russia when it seized Crimea and installed Sergey Aksyonov as the so-called Prime Minister of Crimea.¶ Sustained Russian information operations reinforce specific elements in Moscow’s narrative of grievances. First, NATO’s eastward expansion since the end of the Cold War is the real threat, not Russia. Second, Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO would threaten the European security order. Third, the annexation of Crimea and support for separatists in Donbas are liberations of Russian-speaking communities.¶ Troll factories and bots spread large volumes of fake news stories, making it almost impossible to counter the steady deluge of disinformation. On January 31, it Western media reported that Russia planted fake stories about bomb threats against Ukrainian schools and shopping malls, forcing children to online learning and closing businesses. Just last week, U.S. officials uncovered a plot by Russian intelligence to fabricate a propaganda video portraying fake explosions, corpses, and grieving women designed to legitimate a Russian invasion to protect civilians in Ukraine.¶ Russia supplements information operations with cyber attacks. Russian hackers recently breached Ukrainian networks, replacing publicly facing websites with messages in Ukrainian and Polish designed to look like a Polish cyber operation. Russian cyber attacks targeted Georgian networks during the 2008 South Ossetia War and again in 2015 when Sandworm, a hacking group linked with Russian intelligence, took down Ukraine’s power grid.¶ Russian state-sponsored cyber attacks targeting Ukraine can devastate U.S. and NATO networks. The 2017 Notpetya and WannaCry attacks spread throughout the world soon after hitting their targets. In the 2020 Solar Winds hack, cyber criminals directed by Russian intelligence inserted malicious code into updates in Orion software that infected servers used by the U.S. Treasury, Energy, and Defense Departments, as well as Microsoft, Intel, and Cisco. The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency recently warned U.S. networks are vulnerable to more Russian cyber attacks.¶ Russia also uses blended cyber operations, in which governments tolerate cyber criminals and ransomware groups operating in their countries. For example, the 2021 cyber attacks against Colonial Pipeline, which controls much of the fuel along the U.S. East Coast, were launched by criminal group Darkside operating in Russia. Darkside locked up Colonial Pipeline’s networks and held data hostage until it paid a ransom of $5 million.

2022 CNDI Affirmative
Cyber Info Aff › Cyber War Advantage Extensions › Russia Attacks Increasing

Russia’s failure in the Ukraine means it will resort to more cyber-attacks.

Atlamazoglou ’22 (Stavros, Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations, a Hellenic Army veteran, and a Johns Hopkins University graduate. “Putin’s Next Move: A Cyber War On NATO?” May 17, 2022, )

Is Putin Planning a Cyber Attack? The director of one of the United Kingdom’s top spy agencies warned that Russia is looking to target the U.S., NATO, and European Union countries with cyberattacks for their ongoing support of Ukraine. Putin’s Cyberwarfare Plan The war in Ukraine isn’t going well for Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin. The Russian military has suffered failure after failure in Ukraine, losing thousands of troops, tanks, aircraft, and vehicles in the process. Russia and Putin are becoming an international pariah as NATO wants to add new members. Sweden and Finland have decided to shed hundreds of years of non-alignment and join the transatlantic military alliance. It seems that cyberwarfare remains the one warfighting domain in which Russia can truly be effective and a tool Putin can leverage. And the West knows that. In a cyber security conference, Sir Jeremy Fleming, the director of the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), warned that the Russian military and intelligence services are searching for targets in the West to potentially attack with cyberweapons. “We’re seeing it in cyber too. Perhaps, the concept of a ‘cyber war’ was over-hyped. But, there’s plenty of cyber about, including a range of activity we and partners have attributed to Russia. We’ve seen what looks like some spill over of activity affecting other countries. And we’ve seen indications that Russia’s cyber operatives continue to look for targets in countries that are opposing their actions,” the GCHQ director said. GCHQ is the signals and cyber intelligence agency of the U.K. and an equivalent of the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA). Is Putin Thinking Cyberattack? On the eve of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Russian hackers launched a cyberattack against the Ukrainian military’s secure communications in an attempt to frustrate or takedown altogether its command and control (C2) functions. The idea was to prevent commanders from effectively and timely communicating with one another and their troops as the Russian ground and air forces were launching their operations. However, the attack spilled over and took down satellite communications in other countries, disrupting operations and internet service for thousands. “Today, in support of the European Union and other partners, the United States is sharing publicly its assessment that Russia launched cyber attacks in late February against commercial satellite communications networks to disrupt Ukrainian command and control during the invasion, and those actions had spillover impacts into other European countries. The activity disabled very small aperture terminals in Ukraine and across Europe. This includes tens of thousands of terminals outside of Ukraine that, among other things, support wind turbines and provide Internet services to private citizens,” the U.S. Department of State stated last week in a press release In addition to that cyberattack, the Russian intelligence services had been targeting Ukraine with repeated cyberattacks in the years and months before the invasion. “The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) assesses that the Russian Military Intelligence was almost certainly involved in the 13 January defacements of Ukrainian government websites and the deployment of Whispergate destructive malware. The NCSC also assesses that it is almost certain Russia was responsible for the subsequent cyber-attack impacting Viasat on 24 February,” the U.K. government announced.