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The World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of 1994 seeks to implement a uniform set of intellectual property protection across member nations to provide greater stability in international economic relations. Critics argue that the TRIPS agreement provides unnecessarily strong protection of intellectual property rights which serves to prevent the ill in developing nations from having access to affordable essential medications.

Kunkle ’23 [Kellie; August 23; writer for INTIPSA, and intellectual property law blog; INTIPSA, “The Essential Role of Intellectual Property Law: Protecting Creators and Owners,” https://www.intipsa.com/what-is-the-purpose-of-intellectual-property-law]

Intellectual property (IP) law is a complex and ever-evolving field, with different rules and regulations governing different countries. It is essential to comprehend the distinction between domestic and international IP law to guarantee that your IP rights are secured. Domestic IP law is the set of laws that control intellectual property inside a particular nation. These laws are typically set up by the legislature of that nation and are intended to secure the privileges of people and organizations to their intellectual property.

In understanding what Domestic IP Law means, we have to understand the context in which the word “domestic” is used. The English electronic dictionary defines domestic to mean “of or relating to home” and “internal to a specific country”. Adopting this definition, “domestic” qualifies activities peculiar to a locality which is home to some persons. Thus, an opposite of “domestic” will be “foreign” or “international”.

Therefore, Domestic IP Law will refer to the IP Laws of a region, state, or nation that applies to the people of such region, state, or nation. This is opposed to the International IP Laws. Here when we refer to the Domestic IP Law in this sense, we refer to the Domestic IP Law of States like Nigeria, Ghana, England, South Africa, Britain, USA, Cameroon, to mention but a few. For every State, reference must be made to its specific legislation, although the provisions of the law may be similar. There are, however, subsidiary legislations that may be made in a state to regulate IP practices, this class of legislations shall not be treated in this discourse. For the purpose of this discourse I shall identify the Domestic IP Laws of Nigeria, Cameroon and Ghana and reference shall only be made to legislations. I encourage detailed discussions on them on later sessions.

IPR is backed by both national and international laws. In the United States, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and the U.S. Copyright Office register and enforce these rights. Internationally, organizations like the World Intellectual Property Organization work to harmonize and enforce IP laws across different countries.

Infringing on intellectual property rights is a serious offense with severe legal consequences. Civil penalties range from fines to damages. In extreme cases, IP infringement can lead to criminal charges in severe cases.

(http://www.usingenglish.com/glossary/possessive-pronoun.html)

Mine, yours, his, hers, its, ours, theirs are the possessive pronouns used to substitute a noun and to show possession or ownership. EG. This is your disk and that's mine. (Mine substitutes the word disk and shows that it belongs to me.)

On its face, the written instrument granting easement rights in this case is ambiguous. The same sentence which refers to the right to lay a 14 inch pipeline (singular) has a later reference to "said lines" (plural). The use of the plural "lines" makes no sense because the only previous reference has been to a "line" (singular). The writing is additionally ambiguous because other key words which are "also may change the size of its pipes" are dangling in that the possessive pronoun "its" before the word "pipes" does not have any subject preceding, to which the possessive pronoun refers. The dangling phrase is the beginning of a sentence, the first word of which does not begin with a capital letter as is customary in normal English [***10]  usage. Immediately preceding the "sentence" which does not begin with a capital letter, there appears a dangling  [*236]  semicolon which makes no sense at the beginning of a sentence and can hardly relate to the preceding sentence which is already properly punctuated by a closing period. The above deviations from accepted grammatical usage make difficult, if not impossible, a clear understanding of the words used or the intention of the parties. This is particularly true concerning the meaning of a disputed phrase in the instrument which states that the grantee is to pay damages from ". . . the relaying, maintaining and operating said pipeline. . . ." The instrument is ambiguous as to what the words ". . . relaying . . . said pipeline . . ." were intended to mean.

The Court inadvertently used the word "his" when the Court intended to use the word "its." The possessive pronoun was intended to refer to the party preceding its use--AGF. Indeed, that reference is consistent with the undisputed facts in this case, which indicate that Cassin completed an application for the insurance policy and submitted it to his agent, Theodore Tunick & Company ("Tunick"). Tunick, in turn, submitted the application to AGF's underwriting agent, TL Dallas. (See Pl.'s Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. 5.)

AT&T also argues that Merger Commitment 7.4 only permits extension of “any given” interconnection agreement for a single three year term. AT&T Brief at 12. Specifically, AT&T asserts that because Cricket adopted the interconnection agreement between Sprint and AT&T, which itself was extended, Cricket is precluded from extending the term of its agreement with AT&T. Id This argument relies upon an inaccurate assumption: that the agreement (contract) between Sprint and AT&T, and the agreement (contract) between Cricket and AT&T, are one and the same. In other words, to accept AT&T’s argument the Commission must conclude that two separate contracts, i.e. the interconnection between Sprint and AT&T in Kentucky (“Sprint Kentucky Agreement”) and the interconnection between Cricket and AT&T in Kentucky (“Cricket Kentucky Agreement”), are one and the same. Upon this unstated (and inaccurate) premise AT&T asserts that “the ICA was already extended”; id. at 14, and “the ICA Cricket seeks to extend was extended by Sprint . . . .”; id. at 15, and, finally, “Cricket cannot extend the same ICA a second time . . . .” Id. (emphasis added in all). Note that in the quoted portions of the AT&T brief (and elsewhere) AT&T uses vague and imprecise language when referring to either the Sprint Kentucky Agreement, or the Cricket Kentucky Agreement, in hopes that the Commission will treat the two contracts as one and the same. But it would be a mistake to do so. The contract governing AT&T’s duties and obligations with Sprint is a legally distinct and separate contract from that which governs AT&T’s duties with Cricket. The Sprint Kentucky Agreement was approved by the Commission in September of 2001 in Case Number 2000-00480. The Cricket Kentucky Agreement was approved by the Commission in September of 2008 in Case Number 2008-033 1. AT&T ignores the fact that these are two separate and distinct contracts because it knows that the merger commitments apply to each agreement that an individual telecommunications carrier has with AT&T. Notably, Merger Commitment 7.4 states that “AT&T/BellSouth ILECs shall permit a requesting telecommunications carrier to extend its current interconnection agreement . . . . As written, the commitment allows any carrier to extend “its” agreement. Clearly, the use of the pronoun “its” in this context is possessive, such that the term “its” means - that particular carrier’s agreement with AT&T (and not any other carrier’s agreement). Thus, the merger commitment applies to each agreement that an individual carrier may have with AT&T. It necessarily follows then, that Cricket’s right to extend its agreement under Merger Commitment 7.4 is separate and distinct right from another carrier’s right to extend its agreement with AT&T (or whether such agreement has been extended).

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strengthen | BUSINESS ENGLISH

Similarly, in the context of patent enforcement, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. reversed a century of common patent practice in holding that injunctions should not routinely issue based on a finding of patent infringement.38 Rather, federal courts are now directed to weigh the more general four-factor test to determine whether an injunction should apply.39 Prior to eBay, prevailing patentees obtained injunctions in nearly every case in which they proved infringement.40 Subsequent to eBay, approximately 27% of infringement verdicts have resulted in damages rewards without an injunction, thereby weakening patent protection.41

While each study makes important contributions in assessing the strength of IPR protection in countries, several conceptual and measurement issues are raised. The first conceptual issue is which IPR laws must be examined to gauge protection. Rapp and Rozek's measure assumes patent laws are ipso facto IPR laws. However, services increasingly are accounting for larger portions of economic growth. The value of a name or identification therefore has significant economic impact. Particularly in western countries, the economic contributions of copyrighted software production, entertainment products, and publishing are significant. To discount these two forms of IP protection would be to underestimate their economic impact. Similarly, it has been argued elsewhere (Ostergard 1999; Hettinger 1989) that nations do not treat all IP equally. Some forms of IP are more important to nations' economies than others. Using patents as a proxy for all IPR may overlook this issue. While Seyoum measures the strength of these laws individually, Sherwood's measure blends five different forms of IPR laws into the measure. As I noted earlier, the combining of various laws into one conceptual measure of IPR protection may present some theoretical and methodological difficulty.

A second conceptual issue relates to the enforcement of the laws. Rapp and Rozek and Seyoum do not include a component for enforcement in their study, though Rapp and Rozek recognize the issue (1990a, 7). The logic behind this proposition is intuitively simple. Nations may have in place the institutional structures and financial resources to enforce these laws, but others that do not have these structures and resources may not be able to enforce the laws adequately. Sherwood too recognizes this issue by including an enforceability component in his measure, but it does not significantly address the behavior of the governing regime in enforcing the intellectual property laws. The enforcement component Sherwood uses reflects an assessment of the potential to enforce IPR laws and not an assessment of the regime's actual performance.

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), including trademarks and patents, encourage creative activity for the benefit of a free society. Innovations are protected through IPR and inventors afford an opportunity to derive fair returns from their investments. The acquisition of Intellectual Property Rights is one of the primary tools for incentivizing creators in a modern economy. Property rights are human rights that spark innovation and nurture economic growth. It has been the most effective mechanism to guarantee civil rights and civil liberties. Protecting individual liberty is the fundamental reason for a system of strong private property rights.

Throughout the unprecedented pandemic crisis, there has been a continuing debate about pat- ents for medicines. The right balance provides early access to affordable medicines with sufficient flexibility to protect intellectual property (IP). Patents are a part of the solution for the COVID-19 vaccine. Dismantling patent protection is not correlated with IP. In fact, scientists developed vac- cines in record time because of the security and resources provided by IP systems.

Park ’8 [Walter G.; May; Professor of Economics and Associate Dean of Graduate Studies at American University; Research Policy, “International patent protection: 1960–2005,” Volume 37, Issue 4]

The global trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS) agreement of 1995 has intensified interest in, and research on, the economics of intellectual property protection. Researchers and policymakers, for example, have been interested in the extent to which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) influence R&D and innovation, international trade and technology transfer, productivity growth, and national and global welfare.1

The Supreme Court made it more difficult to acquire and enforce patents in other ways as well. In two of the most significant patent decisions during the period of study,33 the Court raised the creativity threshold for acquiring a patent and weakened remedies for patent infringement. The central requirement for obtaining a patent is that an invention be nonobvious.34 A patent applicant must demonstrate that the invention would not have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at the time the patent application was filed.35 In KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., the Court made it harder to establish nonobviousness by expanding the scope of subject matter that is considered obvious in light of existing technology.36 Subsequent to KSR, both the courts and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have been more likely to deny patent protection for an invention by holding that it is obvious.37

The two copyright statutes that weakened protection did so in a narrow context: clarifying that particular educational uses of copyrighted material are exempt from copyright infringement liability. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEA) establishes that copyright protection does not bar a publisher of instructional materials used in elementary or secondary schools from creating and distributing certain instructional materials specified by IDEA, as long as they are used within limitations established under IDEA.121 Similarly, the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act extended a copyright liability exemption for instructional broadcasting for the purpose of digital distance learning and distance education.122

The two most prominent trademark cases decided during this time period were likely Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.63 and Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.64 In Moseley, Victoria’s Secret sought to enjoin the Moseleys from using the name “Victor’s Little Secret” for a store selling lingerie and adult novelty items.65 Victoria’s Secret argued that the Moseley’s use of “Victor’s Little Secret” would dilute Victoria’s Secret’s brand.66 The district court and circuit court held that the two names were sufficiently similar such that Victor’s Little Secret would dilute Victoria’s Secret brand through tarnishment.67 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that dilution requires proof of “actual dilution,” not simply the possibility or probability of dilution.68 This result weakened protection by making dilution more difficult to prove for trademark owners.69

Utilizing the same methodology described above,94 three coders classified each legislative action as strengthening intellectual property rights, weakening intellectual property rights, or being neutral with respect to such rights. Initial agreement exceeded 90%, and all discrepancies were resolved by discussion and research concerning the legislation in question.95 Though certain of the statutes included multiple provisions, each was considered as a unitary whole for analysis because each statute is passed as a single legislative act.96

At first glance, forty-three legislative acts may sound like a surprisingly high level of activity, but many of these acts were administrative or procedural in nature, with a neutral effect on intellectual property rights. Examples include laws concerning internal organization at the PTO and the Copyright Office,97 statutes that transferred authority to appoint administrative patent and trademark judges,98 and laws that extended sunset provisions.99 Removing these laws from the dataset leaves twenty congressional acts of legislation over the past fourteen years that substantively impacted intellectual property owners’ rights.

cases of the time period according to Westlaw’s citation tool, as of December 31, 2016, are Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), and Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), both in total citations (4400 citations and 2500 citations, respectively) and in citations within three years of decision (1100 citations and 1000 citations, respectively). See also Tom W. Bell, Misunderestimating Dastar: How the Supreme Court Unwittingly Revolutionized Copyright Preemption, 65 MD. L. REV. 206, 226 (2006) (discussing the import of Dastar); Krista F. Holt & Scot A. Duvall, Chasing Moseley’s Ghost: Dilution Surveys Under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1311, 1311 (2008) (stating that Moseley was a landmark decision); Greg Lastowka, Trademark’s Daemons, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 811 (2011) (noting that Moseley is one of the most prominent examples of trademark dilution law). Two of the Supreme Court trademark decisions concerned procedural issues that did not strengthen or weaken substantive trademark protection. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1305 (2015) (holding that trademark issues adjudicated by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board preclude a party from arguing the same issues before a district court); Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S. Ct. 907, 911 (2015) (holding that whether two trademarks can be tacked for priority purposes is a question of fact for the jury).

A number of the Supreme Court decisions are neutral in this regard. Neutral coding can occur for multiple reasons, such as procedural decisions that affect both intellectual property owners and opposing parties in equivalent manners, or decisions that regulate ownership among competing claimants. An example of the former type of neutral decision is Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc.13 This case clarified the proper standard of appellate review for a district court’s factual findings made in patent claim construction.14 The Court held that the standard of review is clear error,15 a decision that neither strengthened nor weakened intellectual property owner rights because sometimes district courts construe patent claims in favor of patentees and other times in favor of alleged infringers.16 Decisions that neither strengthened nor weakened intellectual property rights were classified as neutral.

Recent legislative and judicial actions concerning intellectual property law reveal several stark trends. Congress has been remarkably hospitable to stronger intellectual property rights. Congress passed forty-three intellectual property laws during the time period in question. Of those that affected the substantive strength of intellectual property rights, over 80% made rights stronger.1 These laws made it easier to acquire intellectual property rights, broadened the scope of protection, and strengthened enforcement. The Supreme Court’s intellectual property jurisprudence, however, has moved largely in the opposite direction. The Court decided forty-four intellectual property cases from the October 2002–2003 Term through the October 2015–2016 Term, and of those that substantively affected the extent of rights, two-thirds weakened protection.

Footnote 1